sorts of offensive arms there be but three much in use namely the pistol sword and carabine The Spaniards onely have continued some few companies of lances which they keep rather for gravitie then reason for the lance doth no effect but by the violence of the carreir of the horse and besides there is but one rank which can make use of it so that their order must be to fight by single ranks which cannot resist the squadrons and if they should fight in squadrons they would rather be troublesome then serviceable And for musketiers on horseback or dragones they are also in a manner left off for that in the civil warres they ruined the Infantery every man desiring to have a nag that so he might be the fitter to rob and pillage neverthelesse some well-ordered troups of this kind in an armie are of very great service either for executions to gain bad passages to guard the quarters of horse or else on a day of battel to cause them to dismount as forlorn hopes before the squadrons of Cavalrie Now the Cavalrie must be proportioned with the Infantery which may be distinguished according to the situation of the countrey where the warre is made or else according to the enemy against whom you are to fight For if you you be in a champain full of forrage and if ye be to make warre against a great Cavalrie as that of the Turk in such a case you must fortifie your self with the greater number of horse But if the warre be in a countrey enclosed either by mountains forrests moores or hedges and ditches and that hath many fortified places for that the warre is rather reduced to sieges then to battels and field-combats in such a case you must strengthen your Infanterie And these two bodies are so necessary the one for the other as an armie cannot be held to be good nor subsist unlesse it be equally provided of both Neverthelesse if I were not induced by some extraordinary reason I would make the proportion of my army for the open countrey of a fourth part of horse to three fourth parts of Infantery as to twentie foure thousand foot eight thousand horse in an inclosed countrey of a sixth part of horse to five parts of foot as to twentie foure thousand foot foure thousand horse It remaineth to give to these two bodies such arms as were before mentioned with the most profitable proportion The Swisses have many more pikes then muskets and for this they have made themselves to be much feared in a champain countrey for in a day of battel where you come to hand the number of pikes hath much advantage of that of muskets Other nations do equally divide the pikes and muskets and because the war in these times is reduced to sieges rather then battels we desire to have a greater number of muskets then of pikes For my self which adde the targets to them my opinion should be to have the regiments of 1440 souldiers namely of 600 pikes 600 muskets and 240 targets For the Cavalrie I would proportion it after this manner I would compose the regiments of 500 horse whereof I would arm 400 with Cuirassiers arms 50 with carabines and 50 to be dragones But this is not all to provide good arms for your souldiers unlesse you oblige them to wear them it being an unsufferable shame to see their delicatenesse in these times and how they disesteem them and to cover this fault they publish that it is want of courage to go armed and that they will go in their doublets into the most dangerous places aswell as they which are armed It is not enough to go into a place to cause ones self there to be knocked on the head we should go thither to conquer and not to be beaten Besides this inconvenience groweth of it that if you use not your self to wear your arms you are so pestered with them as you cannot fight in them on the contrary if you accustome your self to them they are no more troublesome to you and you are at as much libertie in them as if you were in your doublet But the greatest mischief that cometh of it is that the ruine of military discipline followeth on it which a good Captain ought to cause to be exactly observed in every part For if he slacken it in one or in favour of some persons the consequences which follow on it by little and little will be such as they will wholly overthrow it and then he shall find himself without obedience and without respect which he shall never recover without incurring the hatred of those whom he hath too much spared it being most certain that it is easier to prevent a mischief then to help it when it is befallen CHAP. III. Of Militarie Discipline BEsides that which hath been said to incite every one to take upon him the profession of arms rather then any other we must make other observations to make a man worthy thereof which consist in three things namely in the recompense of commendable actions in the punishment of bad ones and in the continuall and exact exercise of militarie discipline for there is no profession in the world which hath more need of such helps then that of warre where for the single pay which hardly affordeth livelyhood and with which the meanest artisan would not be contented the souldier abandoneth himself to all sorts of perils and labours but none are instigated thereunto unlesse it be by emulation of honour or by licence to do evil and as the first aim is vertuous so you shall have good service of such as enter into it for that end But of the other you shall reap nothing but shame for in stead of a good and obedient army you shall find that you have no better then a troup of pillaging rogues which without order or obedience forsake you either after a good boot-haling or in any eminent danger For this reason the election of souldiers is a better way of forming an army then onely to receive voluntaries where all the vagabonds and evil livers and such as cannot live but by robbing cause themselves to be enrolled Therefore to incite such as are vertuous to well-doing and to deterre the vitious from doing evil recompenses and punishments are principally necessary The Romanes have made very profitable use of these two means and if we follow not their way we shall never have good nor well-disciplined souldiers It matters not though we use not the very same remunerations and the same punishments they did it sufficeth that they be equivalent that so we may receive the same benefit by them and these things are diversly done according to time and custome The principall is to be an exact observer of them that so the remunerations may excite brave men to worthy actions and the rigour of punishment may keep cowards from doing basely The manner of decimating the souldiers which the Romanes had is held to be cruel neverthelesse there
the stronger without any fortified place you shall preserve your countrey in keeping the field There is yet a further inconvenience in the fortifying of great towns that is that you make them so proud as they will not acknowledge their Sovereigne but upon good terms and upon the least discommoditie they receive in any warre the inhabitants desire rather to change their master then to see their goods wasted Insomuch that I conclude that you ought to have so few fortresses that they may not hinder you from keeping the field that those which you have be so well fortified and furnished with munition as they may make a great resistance and to place them so well as they may bridle the great towns and that they may assure the frontiers that so the enemy may make difficultie to leave a place behind him which might discommodate his victuall and that by intelligence or otherwise he may not seise upon some principall town which may serve him for a seat to entertein warre within the countrey These things thus disposed of you must regard what enemy assaileth you If it be a power of confederates united together it is the more easie to disunite then when it dependeth on one alone and in this case it is exceeding good to cause some diffidence to grow betwixt them by feigning of intelligence with some one of the confederates to whom shewing more respect and lesse animositie you may give jealousie to the rest as also by procuring a diversion upon the countrey of one of the rest It being a very difficult thing that many sovereigne powers should long hold a league together without some disgusts to arise amongst them or mistakings envies and even enmities by reason of the diversitie of their humours and interests so that that power which onely dependeth upon one State onely is much more to be feared And because you may be assailed more or lesse fiercely I must say a word for that If it be by forces which are not too much disproportionable to yours you may preserve your countrey without forsaking it and with your army and fortresses tie up the enemy in hindring him from victuall and by entrenching alwayes so near him as you shall hinder him from making any siege of importance For if a Conquerour advanceth not forward he recoileth and it is impossible for him to subsist in a countrey which he would conquer if at first he taketh no footing and doth not strengthen himself by some considerable prise If also you be assailed by a power altogether disproportionable to your forces in this case you must leave the field and burn all the victuall which you cannot contein within your fortresses and also all the towns and villages which you cannot guard for it is better for you to preserve your self in a ruined countrey then to keep it for your enemy And it is in this that a Prince to gain as he thinketh the name of being compassionate towards his people which in such occasions turn their backs upon him becometh cruel towards himself But it is rather a vice of irresolution and of weaknesse of courage which possesseth us then a true compassion which we have of the misfortune of another as that of the Emperour Otho who upon the first ill fortune that befell him his forces being yet entire durst not trie the hazard of a battel any more And he who could not afford any pitie to Galba in his decrepit age being his designed successour to the Empire and which had committed all kinds of villanies to attein it would perswade posterity that compassion to see the Romane bloud shed had made him resolve to estrange himself from it by killing himself Thus it is that we oftentimes desire to cover our vices with the vertue which is nearest thereunto But as it is a maxime that no publick good can be without some prejudice to some particular men so a Prince cannot disintangle himself from a perilous enterprise if he will please every man And the greatest and most usuall faults which we commit in matters of State and war proceed from suffering our selves to be carried away with this complacencie whereof we repent us when there is no remedy left But to avoid such storms you must hold this for a fundamentall law for your own preservation Never to suffer that neighbour of yours to grow up which maketh himself the strongest for it is better to offend him by hindring him from enabling himself to destroy you then to suffer him to grow greater out of fear to offend him It being a thing certain that no man preserveth his libertie against a conquering enemy by complements but onely by force It remaineth that we speak of puissant States which without help of another have arms money and what else is needfull to maintein a continuall warre Of this kind there be but few and they need to care for none but themselves for that one sole enemy is not able to assail them and that it is hard for the leagues of severall Princes all to agree in such a designe or for any long time to subsist together Neverthelesse I will say a word on this subject Great States are either compacted altogether or spread abroad in severall places the first which have all their forces united are able to assail and to defend themselves more powerfully then they which are so separated because they carry all their forces where need requireth with more diligence and facilitie and lesse charge the other put a great part of the world into an alarm and jealousie because they frontier upon the greatest number of States Neverthelesse if the one or the other be assailed they must make use of the defenses we propounded before onely I will say that they ought to have no fortresses but good ones and few in number and onely on the frontiers and none within the heart of the countrey for that having more cause to fear civil warres then forrein and without which no man will ever assail a great Empire it is the way to take away the main root from them which maketh them to undertake the enterprise and to subsist Besides you ought not to perpetuate any governments neither to families nor yet for life But the principall and most able remedy against civil warre is to entertein a forrein warre which chaseth away idlenesse setteth all on work and particularly giveth satisfaction to ambitious and stirring spirits it banisheth luxurie it maketh your people warlike and mainteineth you in such reputation amongst your neighbours as you are the arbitratour of all their differences It is true that this maxime is not good to be observed but by such States as are of this last sort For as it is necessary for them I find it hurtfull for pettie States which must fear all sorts of warre for being too weak to gain by it they run the hazard to be the pray of such as are the stronger CHAP. XX. Of the means how to assure a
own men The Venetians and Hollanders in imitation of the Carthaginians are served by auxiliarie souldiers The French and Germanes abound in good souldiers and may well forbear auxiliaries England alone of all the States of our time may choose them and take such as she pleaseth Whereupon we must consider the constitution of these States on what maximes they be founded and what either of them may best do to have good souldiers The greater part of States at this time are more founded upon policie then upon warre and endeavour rather to conserve themselves then to grow greater Wherefore we see that learning flourisheth there and arms degenerate in so much that those States which are founded upon warre do devour the other The example of the Turk to the shame of the Christians and that of the king of Spain to the prejudice of Germany and Italy are two manifest proofs That which causeth this mischief is that men of the gown have possessed themselves of the government of almost all States which for that they hate souldiers cause them alwayes to be ill dealt with and do advise Princes to imploy auxiliars rather then their naturall subjects which is a most pernicious maxime But this being no fit place to treat of it we will onely speak of the election of souldiers England which hath right by the laws of that kingdome to make choice of her souldiers may observe the form of the election of the Romanes which is very good The other kingdomes which have not that power must incite their men which are ambitious of honour to cause themselves to be enrolled aswell for the hope of being advanced to other honours by embracing the profession of warre as by shutting up the means of atteining thereunto by any other way then that For example not to bestow any office of the kingdome nor of the kings house nor any charge amongst the souldiers to any but such as have served in the warres a certain number of years nor to make any man Colonel of horse which hath not been a Captain and other officer of the Cavalrie nor any to be Marshall of the field which hath not honourably born lesser charges nor any to be Generall of the army which hath not been a worthy Marshall of the field briefly that none may be advanced to any office which hath not passed through the degrees of warre And as the hope of advancement is a strong spur to encourage every man to exercise the profession of arms so the fear of finding ones self poore and needy after long service is a sharp bit to keep men from â—â— Therefore I would prevent that by establishing a foundation for men of that profession so that they might live out the rest of their dayes commodiously and honourably Those States which by reason of their form of government are fearfull to arm their own people as Venice or where their subsistence dependeth on traffick as the Low-Countreys and which for these reasons are constrained to help themselves in their warres by auxiliars must principally be carefull to choose good Commanders next to have a certain body of well exercised and â—â—sciplined souldâ—ers alwayes in readinesse sufficient as well to guard them from a surprise as to give them time â—o assemble greater forces For an armie formed â—nd disciplined at leisure though but small is more capable to defend it self yea to conquer â—hen those armies which assure themselves onely in their great numbers And great conquests are almost alwayes made by small armies as great Empires are alwayes lost with their innumerable forces For that they which were to fight against such numerous armies opposed them with an exact discipline and good order and the other having neglected all discipline and order have endeavoured to supply that defect by their great number of men which hath brought upon them the greater confusion and hath served them for no other end but to make their losse the more disgracefull VVhence I conclude that the best means to have good souldiers is to choose such as are most fit for warre the second to incite men of ambition and vertue freely to enroll themselves by shutting the doore of any other way to advancement and lastly to entertein a body of an armie and to be carefull as well in peace as in warre to keep them under an exact discipline without relaxation One of which three wayes all sorts of States may make use of CHAP. II. Of Arms. THe most usuall arms of the Infanterie at thiâ— present time are for the defensive thâ— head-piece the cuirace and the tasses and foâ— the offensive the sword the pike and the musket which are rather the arms of the Grecians then oâ— the Romanes Whereupon we must observe that ouâ— muskets serve us as the casting-weapons did thâ— Ancients so that the body of the battel consisteâ— of pikes which is a very fit weapon to resist thâ— Cavalrie for that many of them joyned together make a very solid body and very hard to be broken on their front by reason of their length whereof foure or five ranks extend the heads of their pikes beyond the first rank of men and do alwayes keep out the squadrons of horse from them twelve or fifteen foot of Maurice Prince of Orange had a great desire to make use of the target and having caused divers trials to be made thereof hath found that it hath not onely resisted the pike but that half the number of targets hath alwayes entred into twice the number of pikes and hath routed them Neverthelesse being but Generall of the armies of a State and not a sovereigne and absolute Prince he durst not make so great a change whether it were that he feared the Cavalrie which now-adayes is exceeding well armed or else the reproch of some evil successe not being ignorant that the people Judge of the actions of such as serve them rather by the event then by reason For my part I would adde this kind of arms to our discipline making alwayes the principall body of my Infantery to be of pikes and to have for every battallion a small body separate of one hundred or one hundred and twentie targets to charge on the flank which would work a marvellous effect on the day of battel and this should be the true place of voluntiers and of very brave Nobilitie which often prove to be but troublesome to an army Concerning the offensive arms of the Cavalrie there be of five sorts namely the lance the pistoll the sword the carabine and the musket the two first are given to the heavie-armed calvarie which must have for defensive arms the cuiracecask vambraces tassets cuisses and guard-rein and not many years since some horses have been armed with barbs Of the two other kinds they which serve with carabines have the head-piece and cuirace and because they fight on horseback they must be well mounted but they which serve with the musket have no defensive arms Of these five
must be well strengthened by good moats and flanked by good corps-du-guards to preserve them against the sallies of the besieged If there be any out-works which are not yet in good defense and which may be carried by force you must attempt them otherwise you must approch them by little and little for it is there where the bravest defense is made because that at the beginning they can easiliest make their sallies When the outworks are taken and the cannon is planted on the counterscarp and you sap into the moat and prepare your self to lay over your galleries to get over to the bulwarks you must then place your musketiers all along the counterscarp that so under favour of them and of your cannon you may passe over your galleries If the moats be drie they will dispute it with you but at last the stronger overcometh the weaker If they be full of standing water that hindereth you not from making your cawsie whereupon you place your gallerie If they be full of running water you must make use of floting bridges to put over your miners When you are got close to the bulwarks you are to use mines great or small so by little and little to get into the ground and the retrenchments which may be made behind the bulwarks I trouble not my self here to shew how to make the quarters forts circumvallations the trenches that they lie not open to the enemy the batteries that they be well assured the descents into the moat how to assail the false brayes how the galleries are to be made also the mines and the lodgings which are to be made after they be sprung because whatsoever may be said on that subject is alreadie written and it must be experience that must perfect the rest where every day something is altered or some new thing is added CHAP. XII Of the defense of towns against sieges TO withstand a siege well the town must be well fortified it must have a sufficient number of souldiers to defend it it must abound in victuall and it must have good store of arms and munitions of warre And these foure things are so necessary as that if there were an abundance of three of them if the fourth be wanting the rest will serve for nothing For what will a well fortified place serve for if there be not souldiers to defend it or what good will souldiers do if they have neither arms nor munitions of warre to fight neither will arms nor munitions avail if they want bread to live by to which I adde instruments to work in the earth without which it is impossible to make any great resistance But it is not enough to have all that is necessary for resistance there must be a good order and rule kept otherwise it will all be dissipated by those which will desire to get out of danger quickly and will find some pretext to yield upon terms which shall not be dishonourable the number of such being alwayes greater then of those which will reâ—â—st stoutly You must proportion the labour anâ—â—â—st amongst the souldiers and the townsmen that so they which are well affected be not suppressed and that the rest grow not lazie through idlenesse They must be distinguished by companies of pioners miners carpenters smiths and all artificers usefull for a siege appointing a commander to every of them You must take an inventory in the town of all the iron wood linen instruments to work in the ground drugs fit for artificiall fires and other such things necessary for a siege and take care that there be alwayes of them in the magazins to serve for the present necessity and to avoid disorder in the distribution of all these things there must be a counsel which must have the oversight thereof and which shall cause all to be delivered out and received in according to the order of the Governour and the Counsel of warre These things thus put in order you must think upon defense which is done principally after two wayes by holding the enemy off by retrenchment and by hindring him when he approcheth by sallies For the first it is approved and practiced by all and he which breaketh ground best and beginneth to dispute it the furthest off is he which maketh the longest resistance For the smallest retrenchment without accommodated with pallisadoes is hard to be forced But if it be mined and that there be another made behind it it is a dangerous piece to enter and you constrain the enemy to approch by little and little and with the same ceremonies which are used to fall upon the bulwarks and the great moat so that by divers retrenchments you keep off the enemy at a distance a long time before he can come to fall upon the counterscarp who cannot take away your outworks but by mines which taketh up good store of time The moat also may be defended if it be dry by portable casemats which are called coffers incircled by little moats or pallisadoes to hinder the approch which are placed in severall places of the great moat to defend it and not to be discovered by the cannon of the assailant The bulwarks are also to be defended by retrenchments which you are to make either at the point or at the middle or at the gorge according as they are capable and that the mines of the besiegers do enter forward within the bulwarks And when all that is forced the last defense is a retrenchment of the whole town reducing it to keep onely one part of it For the second way of defense in stead of many sallies to drive back them that work in the approches some would have onely some few to good purpose in great necessitie alleaging that the besieged there alwayes lose some men and of the best of them which they ought to conserve against a strong assault and that oftentimes they which would have a fair pretext to yield the town cause their souldiers to be maimed by continuall sallies to shew that they yield not themselves but through necessitie For mine own part which do approve of the quantitie of sallies and which have alwayes seen the works of the assailants retarded by them more in one houre then in eight dayes by other defenses I answer that these reasons would carry some shew if the town were attempted by assault for they not taking any other but that way at that time it were fit to preserve the souldiers to withstand them but whilest the assailant getteth ground by little and little if you defend not the town otherwise then by retrenchment you must lose it at last wherein your quantitie of souldiers standeth you in no stead at all in so much that the care you have taken to preserve your souldiers doth not prolong the taking of the town one day but if by your brave sallies you ruine batteries throw down trenches force the redoubts which defend them and when they are within the moat you burn their galleries they
which were with him The small number of souldiers which he had in his camp as yet not in good defense emboldned those people to revolt hoping that they should at the first assault defeat him For it was insupportable unto them that he should have their children in hostage and they feared also that the Romanes would annex those places to Provence which was near at hand So that he saw himself assaulted on all parts before he had leisure to understand the danger he was in and finding his affairs in great extremitie having neither victuall to subsist nor men to make a long resistance despair made him follow the counsel of Publ us Sextius Baculus first Centurion of that Cohort Tribunus and of Caius Volusenus Colonel of a thousand men which was to sally out from all parts upon the enemy which they did so violently that they which thought they were not able to defend themselves in their trenches defeated them in open field That done he maketh use of their discomfiture to retire his Legion into a place of safetie But the occasion of the fourth warre was this Publius Crassus one of Cesars Lieutenants having sent divers Tribunes to make provision of corn necessary for the feeding of his army into the countreyes of Perche Cornoaille and Vannes Vaelli Curiosilitae Veneti they reteined them contrary to publick faith in hope thereby to recover their hostages By this example their neighbours did the like and all sent word to Crassus that they would not deliver them up unlesse he restored their hostages Cesar having heard of this combination prepareth diligently for a warre truly considering that if he suffered this he should open a gap to a generall revolt for he well knew the readinesse of the French to take arms loving their libertie and abhorring servitude He provideth in the first place to hinder the increasing of the league to this end he sendeth Labienus into the countrey of Triers with the cavalrie Trevori giving him order to visit those of Rhems and the Belgae Aquitania Publius Crassus into Gascongne with 12 Legionarie ensignes and good store of horse Quintus Titurius Sabinus with 3. Legions into Perche Allencon and Lysieux Lexobii giveth the command at sea to D. Brutus himself with the land-forces resolveth to charge those of Vannes the chief cause of this war Their countrey is maritime of difficult approch and strong in shipping insomuch that when with much labour he had brought a place to the extremitie of being taken the inhabitants imbarked themselves with their goods and removed to another so that what he did was little worth untill his navie being arrived he gave them battel and defeated them after which they yielded themselves to Cesar who put to death all the Senate and caused the people to be sold At the same time the Lieutenants which Cesar had distributed amongst the Gauls had their hands full Q. Titurius Sabinus was set upon by Viridonix commander of severall nations with strong forces but by his patience and subtiltie he drew him on to assault him in his camp and overcame him which reassured all that countrey P. Crassus on the Guyenne side defeated the Sontiates besieging them in their citie and took it After capitulation Adcantuannus their Governour made a sally with six hundred of his trustiest souldiers and attempteth to master the Romane camp but being repulsed Crassus neverthelesse holdeth himself to the capitulation before agreed upon During the time of this siege the people of Spain and Gascongne about the Pyrenean hils make a league together and choose their commanders out of those Captains which had been trained under Sertorius Crassus assaulteth them they entrench and cut off his victuall in so much that he is constrained to fight with them within their trenches wherein as good luck served he found some defect by means of which he defeated them This victory caused all that people to submit Cesar seeing none in arms but onely those of Terovenne and Gueldres Moriâ—i Menapii though the summer were farre spent marcheth thither where he findeth a new way of warring the people holding themselves within he goeth to find them out and being near approched as he was fortifying his camp they assaulted him and were repulsed after which Cesar advanceth into the forrest it self causeth the trees to be cut down and made use of them in stead of a rampart and by an incredible labour and diligence he was already advanced to the place where they kept all their cattel and last baggage but the season grew so stormy and wet that he was constrained to draw his armie into their winter-garrison Observations SO ended this warre where we will observe first the profitablenesse of the intrenchments of camps which in entire countreys serve for a bridle as citadels to cities the Romanes having never been able to have held so many conquered States under their obedience but onely by that means For armies garrisoned in sever all towns may by being so separated be defeated totally or in part by conspiracie besides the delicacies of cities do overthrow all militarie discipline and abase all generous courage Howsoever if there be more fortresses then can well be mainteined you must demolish them to the end that nothing may be able to resist the armie which being always in an intire body opposeth it self against all combinings of conspiratours it being most certain that not onely for the keeping reliefs out of a conquered Province but also for the conservation of your countrey against greater forces then your own giving order that there be no want of victuall it is to be done by intrenching strongly for whosoever putteth himself wholly upon the defensive and shutteth himself up in walled towns must in time necessarily perish unlesse he receiveth forreign reliefs for that by two or three yeares spoil of the increase of the champains the cities must of necessitie starve and thereby know your inabilitie to preserve them so that they will rather yield to your enemy then perish In the second place we will consider how Crassus was put to it when he had to do with commanders which had been trained under Sertorius and which according to the custome of the Romanes could make benefit of the advantage of grounds fortifie their camp and cut off their enemies victuall for by such a manner of warring they had brought the said Crassus to such a passe that he was constrained to assault their camp which albeit he forced whether by having better souldiers or by finding some part of it ill fortified yet it is certain that he undertook that task out of despair rather then judgement as being in danger to perish for want of victuals We will further observe that Cesar in all these actions by no diversitie of making warre was ever astonished whether he were assaulted in open field or in his camp whether surprised or whether his enemie retired into places inaccessible alwayes finding them out
were taken At last his troups come from divers parts he beginneth with purging his army of some seditious persons and libertines then resolveth upon a definitive battel To this end he goeth and encampeth before Thapsus which he environeth with trenches not doubting but Scipio would come and relieve the town who having caused king Juba to return again they come and encamp near Cesar in three severall camps And there was the battel fought which Cesar gained with losse of fiftie souldiers onely and some few hurt but on the other side were ten thousand slain and the three camps taken Thapsus on the report of this victory was yielded to C. Rebilius Cato seeing he could not prevail with his men to resolve to defend themselves killeth himself Vtica openeth her gates to the Victour Adrumetum doth the like Zama shutteth hers against her conquered king and calleth in Cesar all the rest of Juba his kingdome revolteth he and Petreius kill each other through despair Sitius having defeated and killed Saburra Juba's Lieutenant and coming to Cesar meeteth with Afranius and Faustus Sylla which were going for Spain these he defeateth and taketh prisoners who afterwards in an uprore were both slain Scipio and divers Senatours having imbarked themselves for Spain were by a tempest cast amongst Sitius his fleet where all perished or killed themselves This was the sequele of that battel wherein all things concurred as if by consent to smooth the way to Cesars absolute victory who pardoned all that had recourse unto his clemencie and after that returned to Rome Observations CEsar hath done three things in this warre which came near to rashnesse the first to passe into Africa in the dead of winter with a small force not having any assured port there for which cause he was not able to appoint any Rendes-vous for his shipping which thing was imputed him as a want of foresight Neverthelesse after his passage his manner of proceeding was altogether admirable He maketh choice to encamp himself near the citie Ruspina which was within half a league of the port which he joyneth to the citie and his camp and fortifieth it exceedingly for from thence he had one foot on land and the other on the Sea and could as occasions should require act by either sea or land and be secured from being shut up whatsoever should befall This is a good lesson for such as enterprise upon a forrein countrey being weak at the beginning for in this posture great attempts may be withstood and in all extremitie a good retreat may be made The second to leave his army near Ruspina and without giving knowledge to any man to cast himself abord to go seek his shipping And the third having news of the defeat of his fleet to leave his camp to hasten in full carier to Leptis to cast himself into a ship and to rally others and assault the enemies and although he perished in none of them there can be nothing said in his defense but that he trusted wholly to his good fortune and that he never was wearied or disheartned in the most dangerous or laborious designes It is observable that Cesar in all his warres hath alwayes been inferiour to his enemies in number for which cause he hath alwayes helped himself by fortifications more then ever any other hath done which he made much the better when he found himself not sufficiently strong to give battel as he was a long time in Africa insomuch that Scipio himself wondered at his coldnesse neverthelesse he alwayes continued his souldiers in exercise and himself exercised new-levied men and entred them by small skirmishes wherein by his industry for the most part he had the best and alwayes attempted something upon his enemy Which is an excellent maxime to give courage to your souldiers and secure you from being surprised The Spanish warre against Pompey's sonnes The VI. Book THe reliques of the Africane troups reassemble themselves once more in Spain under Cneus and Sextus the sonnes of Pompey Cesar goeth thither He findeth the one laying siege to Vlla and the other in Cordova He sendeth relief into the first and goeth and encampeth himself before the other which inforceth Cneus to quit his siege to relieve his brother Some skirmishes passed between both armies but Cesar not being able to draw his enemy to battel goeth and besiegeth Ategua and after a bold resistance he taketh it in view of Cneus Afterwards both armies had divers encounters and combats but to little purpose at last they encamp themselves in a champain near Munda both resolving not to refuse battel neverthelesse â—neus took a high anâ— advantageous ground for his field of battel where Cesar making difficultie to assail him was put upon it by the fury of his souldiers The fight was long and doubtfull even by his own confession and with much ado he got the victory which was bloudy Thirtie thousand on Pompey s part died upon the place and a thousand on Cesars they which saved themselves into Munda were constrained to yield themselves Sextus Pompeius abandoneth Cordova Cneus is swiftly pursued overtaken and killed All places yield themselves to the victour This was Cesars last battel and the deadly wound to Pompey's party The military order of the Grecians and particularly of their Phalanx THe order of the Grecians is but obscurely to be found amongst their authours because the most part of the books which they have written thereof are lost and none have come to our hands but fragments so that it is hard to collect it very exactly The Phalanx was formed after this manner Zugos Jugum signifieth two men in front and more joyned together make a rank and so the word is often taken Stichos Versus signifieth two men one behind the other and more behind each other make a file and versus is often taken for a file Lochos Decurio signifieth a file which the Grecians made of severall depths but never exceeded the number of sixteen as being sufficient to sustein the violentest charge conceiving that to give a greater depth to their Phalanx was but to imploy men unprofitably and that it was better to extend the battalia into breadth to prevent overwinging and so to be charged on the flanks or else by this means to overwing the enemie then to give so great a depth to their Phalanx The Phalanx was compounded of hoplitae onely that is heavie-armed with sarissas that is long pikes and their bucklers for the archers slingers and other casting-weapons had their orders apart In a Lochos or file of 16 men there were five which had command namely the first fifth ninth thirteenth and sixteenth as we may see by the figure following and their names The first figure Lochagos o File-leader 1. Enomotarcha o  2. Enomotarcha o Half-file-leader 3. Enomotarcha o  Vragos o Bringer-up They made the most valiant the File-leader and the most prudent the Bringer up Now to begin their order They joyned two files
it had failed It must be observed that here onely one Tribune is mentioned which causeth me to believe that the two Tribunes which had the authority for two moneths time did agree to command every day by turns Concerning the guard it was kept day and night and the foure and twentie houres were divided into eight watches First the Consul was guarded by his ordinary Cohort then every body made their guard round about his lodging and besides there were three guards kept one at the Questors lodging and the two other at the lodgings of the Consuls two Lieutenants The Tergiductours or Rear-commanders ordered the guards which drew by lot which should begin first and they which were to begin were led to the Tribune which then commanded who gave them the order of the guard and besides that a little tablet with a mark and all the guards were set after the same manner The rounds were made by the Cavalrie whereof the chief officer commanded foure for the day and foure for the night the first went and took their orders from the Tribune who gave them in writing what guards they were to visit The relieving and visiting of the guards was done eight times in foure and twentie houres at the sound of the trumpet and the first Centurion of the Triarii had the charge to cause them to march when occasion served When the trumpet gave them warning the foure forementioned souldiers drew lots and he to whom it fell to begin took some of his friends with him and if in going the round he found the guards in good order he onely took from them the mark which the Tribune had given them and carried it him back again next morning But if he found the guard abandoned or any sentinels asleep or any other disorder he made his report thereof to the Tribune with his witnesses and presently a councel was called to prove the offense and to punish the delinquent according to his desert The Velites made the guard round about the retrenchment on the outside and inside of it and at the gates The Allies had the same order We find not in writing the number of their Corps-du-guards how they placed their Sentinels round about the camp and how many a day were free from the Guard CHAP. VI. Of punishments and rewards NOne but the Consul could condemne any to death and he had this authoritie as well over the principall commanders of the army as over the meanest souldiers thereof The Tribunes administred military justice which was rigourously practiced The manner of their ordinary punishing was thus So soon as the Tribune had touched the partie condemned with a staff or a rod every souldier laid on upon him with cudgels or battered him with stones and oftentimes before he could get out of the camp he was killed but yet if he escaped he was not received into his countrey again and none of his kindred durst give him enterteinment He that opposed or neglected the orders given for the guard or for the rounds or other service concerning the securitie of the camp or falsely pretended to have done some signall act or had forsaken the place where he had been placed or had lost his arms in the battel or had stolen any thing in the camp or born false witnesse or else had forsaken his ensigne was punished after this manner as also he which committed smaller faults thrice If it happened that many Legions or one Legion or a grosse troup had run away they were punished two wayes the more rigourous way was to make them all draw lots and to punish every tenth man or more or fewer according to the exigence of the cause by this means all were partakers of the fear and a small number of them were punished The more gentle way was to cause them to lodge without the camp and to give them barley in stead of wheat which was a mark of ignominie which many troups have wiped out by performing valourous and memorable acts Concerning their rewards they excited those souldiers by honourable acknowledgements and publick commendations in presence of all the rest which had performed some valourous and extraordinary act Besides that to him that had wounded an enemy in some light skirmish or that voluntarily had gone and assaulted him they gave a dart To him which had killed and disarmed him if he were one that served on foot they gave a target if he were a horseman a horse-furniture To him that at the assault of a town was first got up upon the wall they gave a crown which they called Muralis to him which had rescued a Romane citizen a crown called Civica which was set upon his head by him which was so rescued whom he respected and honoured all his life after as his father The commanders had also their shares of honour by the severall triumphs which they obteined according to the greatnesse of their actions and the felicitie of their victories CHAP. VII Of their Pay COncerning their pay It began not untill three hundred fourty eight years after the foundation of Rome before that every souldier armed and victualled himself at his own charge which was no hard thing in those times because their warre was then extended no further then Rome But when they began to go out of Italy it was necessary to give them pay which at the beginning was very small afterwards it encreased as the Romane empire grew in greatnesse I will not trouble my self to make the valuation of it according to our money it being a thing of no utility onely I will say that the souldiers pay must be so proportioned as he may maintein himself well thereby I will further observe here that the Romanes charged themselves with the furnishing of bread apparel arms and tents for all their souldiers and besides barley for the horsemens horses abating these things out of their pay which I find to be a good order and above all things necessary to make an army subsist for besides that the greater part of souldiers are bad husbands and such as if a care be not taken will never be well clothed nor well fed it is impossible that a souldier should everywhere find bread to be bought and that he should carry all things with him which he standeth in need of CHAP. VIII Of their order of battalia THere is a diversitie of opinions about the order of battel of the Romanes Some would have it that when the Hastati be not able to sustein the enemies charge in their retreat they should fall into the order of the Principes by files and both they into the order of the Triarii and so to renew the fight three times Others will have it to be done by troups whereof I conceive there is much the greater probability holding the first way not onely impossible to be put in practice but also most dangerous the other exceeding feisible and profitable For to fall one into another in that maner by files