in a matter which he had before discreetely enough plotted and disposed moreouer he cannot beare swaie as master of the confederate forces insomuch as he which sendeth succours may vnderhand deliuer to his Commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited then the necessitie of the vndertaken affaire would permit Also the least distaste either of the Prince which assisteth or of the Captaine which conducteth such succours serueth oft-times to dismisse the promised forces deceiue the others expectation and bring all he vndertaketh to nothing So as he remaineth not onely more weake by this disappointment but his owne forces also become vnprofitable and consequently himselfe exposed to all wrong and ruine for as if one only wheele of a clocke be out of temper it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion so where the vndertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troupes the effects which in part depend thereon likewise faile and the course of his warlike designes remaine crossed and peruerted I will not forget also to say that a campe consisting of such borrowed peeces hath necessarily need of many heads to command it and an armie compounded of so manie heads because of the diuersity of opinions and affections will most commonly haue the woorse when it commeth to handie blowes 5 We may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch vs neere and are familiar vnto vs and were not long since practised for this cause I will more willingly then otherwise I would heere produce them In our time we haue seene two most memorable leagues between the Pope the king of Spaine and the Venetians consenting and vnited to vndertake one warre against the Turke the one was vnder Pope Paul the third and the other in the life time of Pius Quintus The first was caried with an excessiue charge yet without any effect woorthy so great an assembly The cause in my opinion proceeded of the difficulty that was found to ioyn in one body the confederat forces and draw them together at the Rendeuous in due season for they met not till the end of September Although an other inconuenience may be alledged to this purpose which ouerthrew the good successe of such a holy and Christian attempt yet it may appeere that to auoide the shame and dishonour that followed thereof it had beene easie to haue performed somewhat of more memorable consequence then was the taking of Castle-nouo if we had knowen how to husband the times and occasions fit for the imployment of so combined a power Concerning the second which was as I said in the time of Pius Quintus the army of the Venetians very gallant and strong spent all the sommer in attending the Galleis of Spaine which were to conuoy succours into the I le of Cypres then attempted by the Turke so as this slacknesse of assembling the Galleyes was a cause that the army became almost quite vnfurnished of good souldiours drawen together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitifull hauocke amonge them Notwithstanding all this they forbeare not to make towards Cypres so late as by the way they receiued the newes of the lamentable taking of Nicosia Which made them imagine that the Turkes had vpon that commodity most strongly manned their Galleys as it was likely enough with land Souldiours and that therefore there was more appearance of danger thē of good successe in assailing them vpon which consideration they held it best to turne their course homeward and refer that businesse to an other time hauing then thus dishonorably behaued themselues returning they incountred so many misfortunes as well weather beaten by reason of the Winter then approching they at length arriued at their home sorely brused and spoiled The yeare following the army of the consederats met notwithstanding all this very late yet vndertooke they to incounter the enemy of whome they got that so renowned victory in the yeare 1571. if God had permitted vs to reape thereby those worthy fruits that we had reason to expect Now for all this Cypres was not recouered but remained to the infidell as the reward and wages of his valour The third yeare of the league the king of Spaine in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the Turke as he had determined caused Don Iohn of Austria Admirall of his fleete to stay at Messina because he then doubted that the French would assaile Flanders with such forces as they had that yeare rather suffered to take breath then wholy cased and dismissed So as the whole season was spent vnprofitably without attempting ought worthy such preparation as the confederates had in due time set forth This was an occasion of excessiue charge and that the armies did not once stirre till it was too late attending what their neighbours would do who as I haue said seemed to threaten the King of Spaine with some attempt vpon his country of Flanders In the meane time the Venetians tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose treated a peace with the Turke 6 Who will make any question now those things well weighed and considered that if the leagues both the first and second had beene well caried without these crossings iealousies and suspitions which accompanied them though vainly and vpon no ground but that they would haue brought foorth some woorthie and honorable fruite to the glory and honour of God the peace of his church the encrease and establishment of the Christian common-wealth This may be enough to prooue that forces compounded of diuers nations depending of many and different heads are in marching more slowe and at a time of need lesse effectuall then others It may appeere to some that I heereby inferre that leagues betweene Princes are vnprofitable and therefore not to be made so farre is it from me to maintaine that opinion as I rather willingly embrace the contrarie but I reserue a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league especially against the Turke when I shall arriue at the place appointed for this purpose to the end I may discourse of it at full Now let vs returne to the argument of discourse in handling 7 The Ottomans neuer made league either offensiue or defensiue with any and neuer had helpe of strangers on the contrarie they haue alwaies had to doe with armies compounded of different nations confederate and conducted by sundrie Commanders all which as ill vnited not vnderstanding one another they haue euermore vanquished Moreouer we haue ordinarily seene them more forward and deliuer about their enterprises being alone then accompanied and consequently more vnited in their force more nimble in execution and it must needes follow more renowned and fortunately victorious 8 Yet they had no lacke of whom where with to practise their associations if they had approoued them as good necessarie as among other with the Soldan of Caito with the kings of Carmania
that before we can reduce them to one consent and body time and opportunities are fled But the Turke hath his powers so limited and ranged not depending but of one only head as he is alwaies in a readines to repell all assaults almost before the threatning of them can be with him In conclusion if all these reasons suffice not to cleare the proposition yet should they teach vs at the least to proue wise resolute aduised hence forward not to enterprise ought so out of season as that we should be driuen to fight with time rather then men they should teach vs to gaine rather then to lose occasions to abound rather then want to seeke to be honoured and to thriue rather then to receiue dishonour and losse but the maine point in all is to haue God on our side as our chiefe strength and most assured conductor CHAP. XVI That he hath neuer diuided his forces 1 Wisdome of the Turkes in vndertaking one not many wars at once 2 Diuision of forces dangerous 3 Those few good Commanders that are found in a confused multitude are not to be farre separated 4 The ouerthrow of one army may breed terror in the rest 5 Prouision cannot be made at once for many expeditions 1 SVch hath beene the wisdome and foresight of the Ottomans as they haue neuer almost had to do with two enemies at once Contrariwise they haue so well ordered their enterprises as the finishing of one hath drawen on the beginning of an other but when they forsooke this beaten and sure way then loe miserie ouertooke them as it hapned to Mahomet the second who would needes warre with three armies at one time sending one for Italy at such time as he tooke Ottranto the other to Rhodes where his Generall and armie were well beaten the third he himselfe went to conduct against the Mammoelucks if by death he had not beene preuented He had in these three armies aboue three hundred thousand men besides his armie at sea consisting of aboue fiue hundred saile The voyages and designes ill digested all these three armies were discomfited for that of Italy though it tooke Ottranto got nothing by it seeing that assoone as the souldiers vnderstood of their masters death they quitted the place vpon composition 2 But me thinkes this proposition whereby I maintaine that it is not good at once to set a foote diuers enterprises may be thus impugned That the successe of the Turkes death and the commotion it wrought amongst his people was cause that those armies miscaried and not the separation of them and their enterprises I confesse as I ought that whatsoeuer betideth vs necessarily hapneth by way of a first or exciting cause But to come to the ground of our principall matter without farther subtiâ—â—tsing this discourse it is easily seene how hard it is for a prince to prouide sufficiently at one time for sundry enterprises at the least vpon a sound foundation thereby to reape honorable fruites since all diuision of forces bringeth with it a debility and becommeth rather a subiect of iniurie then to be able to iniure others to be beaten then to beat to be others pray rather then to pray vpon others for as a body diuided by parcells is not of that weight taking it seuerally as when it is reduced to the first vnitie In like sort the forces of a prince when they are diuided and disunited haue not that vertue and subsistance as they would haue in their vnitie and well-ordered consunction for proofe who considereth that Mahomet had three hundred thousand men will say that the vnitie of such force was inuincible but diuided it proued not so though indeed each of these powers by it self at the least in regard of the Christians was a most mightie army had it had proportion squared to what it would attempt and if this masse of 300000. souldiours had marched in one intire body it had beene easie for them to haue attained their purpose one seconding another as he might haue done with that of Rhodes Patros and Ottranto which he had in this case vndoubtedly conquered 3 An other reason may be yet alledged and that is that it is hard to finde such Captaines as are fit for the conduct of armies that in these great assemblies of forces there are few resolute souldiours and that they which are such being once by their diuision as a man may say diminished it is a kinde of gelding the army of those which may serue by their example to assure and incourage the other confused multitude 4 Moreouer when we vndertake three enterprises at once as Mahomet who serueth to this purpose did if it happen but one of them to faile the newes of their misaduenture maketh the rest vndoubtedly depending the one vpon the other to faile of resolution 5 Again as we haue before deliuered it is necessary that the war be vndertaken in grosse and that assay be made of our forces as soone as may be that we may not be driuen long to entertaine a great army which for delay of execution doth oft times disband breake vp and ouerthrow it selfe with it selfe but especially with answerable prouisions the better to inioy great happinesse with smal charge which will neuer befall him that diuideth his forces and at once attempteth in diuers places We will then conclude that the Ottomans for the most part haue not had but one enterprise in hand at once and that to atchieue it they haue so well prouided for it as the victory hath remained on their side CHAP. XVII That he hath not long held warre with one alone 1 Why the Turkes haue not continued war with one alone 2 A long war addeth courage and experience to the enemy 3 It moueth neighbours out of the feare of their owne like misery to aide the oppressed 4 The Turkes manuer of shifting his wars and making peace at his pleasure 1 WHat more assured testimony can wee haue of a continued wisdome or to say better of a well caried subtilty amongst the Ottomans then in that they haue alwaies come off well in concluding their wars and haue not maintained them long against one and the selfe same enemy The practise of this policy hath beene most aduantageous vnto them such people as they haue not been able at the first to subdue they haue left in peace yet haue not forborn in the meane time to turne their armes elsewhere I haue fashioned to my selfe two especiall causes of this discreet course 2 The first is the feare they haue euer had lest they might make good souldiours of those against whom they should wilfully maintaine a lingering war A thing ill practised by the Spaniards in Flanders and the low-countries for continuing war many yeres together against them they haue acquainted that people before soft and effeminate with the fearfull clashe of their armes they haue so encouraged and imboldened them as at this day there are few nations
tumults and ciuill commotions 3 Feare amongst subiects is vpheld by Iustice and plentie of thinges necessary 4 Praise of peace and Iustice 5 Execution of Iustice amongst the Turkes pleasing and tollerable though vniust 6 An exhortation to Christian Princes to administer Iustice IT hath oft hapned and in our times we haue had triall of it that the people though vnarmed haue in their despaire and fury disquieted a whole estate and brought the common-weale into an exceeding distresse and perplexity Furor arma ministrat saith Virgil Iamque faces sax a volant We haue the testimony of the Romans time in those ciuill wars which hapned in Italy in Sicily of the mischiefes which followed those rebellions as much hath beene seene to happen in these times in the I le of S. Domingo about the change of gouernment introduced vpon those conquered people forced to subiect themselues to a new kinde of seruitude In very deede that people is not weakely armed which hath a heart a good spirite and a nimble hand 2 This is the cause why the Turke to preuent these popular commotions hath depriued the people of all sorts of armes to the end they may forget both the vse and courage to handle them and that they may not by them take occasion to mutiny Now to prouide that so barbarous a yoake driue them not to despaire he maintaineth a general peace and tranquillity throughout his estate he hath a care that iustice be equally distributed that they haue plenty of victuals and all other vsuall commodities the better to lull asleepe their fury 3 By these meanes euery one maketh the best of his fortune and liueth quietly at home embracing that naturall desire of holding his owne which to performe euery man emploieth whatsoeuer may proceed out of himself moreouer this quiet and ease of minde doth so soften men as they rest free from the thought of plotting or vndertaking sturs and rebellions Iustice quiet and plenty are three things which haue for their opposites the violence of soldiours in time of war the corruption of Iudges in time of peace and scartsiy and famine in both The iniustice the abuse and auarice of officers and magistrates are those which procure the subuersion and vnauoidable ruine of a country I could adde to this discourse many examples domesticall proofes but not to enter into too deepe a sea I will spare them and will content my selfe to say only that all those of ancient times and such as haue had any touch of a good minde either Christians or infidels haue euermore confessed that the sincere execution of iustice is the strongest piller of all well ordered estates as on the contrary iniustice is the ouerthrow not alone of men and countries but of beasts also To returne to our matter it is sure that when the common subiect hath wherewith to nourish cloath and handsomely accommodate himselfe and family when in the middest of armes he is safe in his owne home when he standeth not in feare of forged crimes or bribery of Iudges then is it that he falleth asleepe in securitie and careth not but to entertaine that tranquillitie reiecting all thought of rebellions This is it which the Turke who warreth continually with his neighbours putteth in practise to maintaine peace throughout his dominions and to be beloued and faithfully serued of his subiects whom he tieth to him with those strong bands which are to say the truth besides Iustice and tranquillitie most proper for preseruation A great helpe heereunto is his continuall imploying his Captaines and Souldiers in the wars especially out of his owne countrey and to the spoile of his enemies 5 Peace is the horne and true mother of abundance Then is it that euery man tilleth his land without disturbance and quietly inioyeth and encreaseth his owne store since as the Poet saith Pax arua colit Iustice Queene of vertues is that which serueth as the base and most sure foundation to peace which could not otherwise subsist nor the lawes likewise then is it that they gaine strength and vigour 5 And though the forme of the Turkish Iustice be not without much vanitie and oppression and though all matters be determined amongst them by way of witnesses who are alike bought and sold and that iudgements passe as gold and siluer is stirring yet the quicke dispatch they receiue maketh them forget this inconuenience and though the sentence of such Iudges be often pronounced against all order of Iustice yet is there thus much good gotten by it that men consume not themselues bodie and goods in pleading and trotting after Lawyers and Atturnies which haue their consciences as large as the other who are bought more deerely besides the delay vexation and vncertainety of the iudgement And though the sentence of such men be much displeasing yet the people haue this to comfort them that they many times see them endure most notable and exemplary punishment for the Turke sometimes vpon the least complaint brought against them putteth them to death be they neuer so great personages as well to inrich himselfe with their spoiles as to manifest himselfe to be a Prince most respectiue of iustice and equity and to giue also a manner of satisfaction to his subiects so oppressed as Selim left that example of Bostand Bassa 6 Hence Christian Princes are to fetch an aduertisment how to be more carefull then they are in making their ministers obserue a more vpright and speedy distribution of iustice amongst their subiects not vpon the grounds and intents of this barbarous Turke but rather because they are one day to render an account before God who to this ende established them in place aboue others Questionlesse the long delaying of suites is the most damnable plague to be found at this day in all estates The abuses committed otherwise by the ministers of Princes are more to lerable then these where the whole is in question For this cause Princes ought to looke more neerely to this then to any other thing CHAP. V. The common remedy applied by the Turke against the force and fury of the people 1 Another way of preuenting popular seditions by hauing alwaies bands of foote and horse in a readinesse 2 The Turkes strength in his court 3 His other strengthes 4 Inconueniences that grew by the Romane Legions 5 Preuented by the Turke 1 THough the meanes formerly deliuered be sufficient to keepe the Turkes subiects from rebelling yet there are stronger by him practised wholly to preuent and extinguish euen the least sparke of sedition and to prouide against other like inconueniences He maintaineth a great number of horse and foot alwaies armed alwaies in pay and distributed in garrisons thorow out his Empire especially in places most proper to resist or assaile These curbe the people and vpon the least shew of rebellion lay hands on them represse their insolency and suffer not the least apparance of sedition to take roote remouing the causes euen at
and massacres wherein many Emperours ended their daies they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the Senat and the loue and reuerence they ought to haue borne towards their country The like may we hope or expect from the Ianizzars that they will one day assume to themselues the same power and learne to performe the like whereof they gaue an assaie at such time as they compelled Baiazet the second to resigne the Empire to Selim his sonne They did almost the like when Soliman caused his sonne Mustapha to be murthered for they besieged him and inuironed his tent for certaine daies space crying out they would know the cause of that yong Princes death In the end by the deuise of the Bassa and with stoore of coyne he wan to him foure thousand of them who disengaged him of the feare and danger wherein he was plunged 7 The fift cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the countrie or of ministers swaying the supreame authority credit in places of gouernment Gazeles gouernour of Soria made way for a reuolt of the like quality as did also Acomat Generall of Aegypt Gazeles assisted by the Mamelucks Arabians and those of Rhodes endeuoured to set himselfe vp against the great Turke but he was discouered by Cayembeius whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy This man either for feare as looking into the danger of the enterprise or for enuy of his companions greatnesse reuealed all to his Master Soliman who presently dispatched against him Faratha Bassa by whom he was vanquished in battaile Acomat had not the leasure to proceed far in his attempt for as he did inconsideratly precipitate himselfe into the triall thereof so was he as speedily discouered and in an instant suppressed and slaine without hauing thriued ought in his dessignes CHAP. XIII Of the mixt causes 1 What are the mixt causes 2 How Estates are ouerthrowen by mixt causes 1 IN this third booke we haue at large discoursed how by inward and outward causes Estates may be indangered now we must speake of causes compounded of the one and the other which to discourse more intelligibly we tearm mixt which likewise are of power of themselues to alter an Empire and to bring it either by an vniuersall or a particular change to a lamentable ruine These mixt causes then are those whereby both the enemy abroad and the subiect at home may by a common consent conspire against an Estate and subuert it 2 One of the causes or meanes may be a popular insurrection nourished by the enemy or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by forraine practises or to tearme it better the treasons which subiects may hatch in fauour and by the meanes and authority of their neighbours This hapneth in a twofold manner when the subiect beginneth and setteth on foote the practise or when a stranger laieth the way open vnto them vnder some coulered pretence or else when some one particular person or all a whole communalty frame the occasion thereof in regard of some displeasure or oppression Finally this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one two or three of the principall men to reuolt against their prince and take armes in hand to ouerturne and ruine the Estate CHAP. XIIII How particular persons may be gained 1 How his people are to be prouoked to rebellion 2 How his great men and chiefe officers are to be gained 3 These courses at the first not succeeding are to be oftner attempted 4 Wary proceeding is requisite lest those that manage the businesse incurre danger 5 To whom such businesses are to be committed 1 IT resteth now that we make it appeere how such practises may be set on foote and cherished we will then beginne with the enterprise to bee plotted by some particular person by whose assistance it may take effect We must presuppose that this person is either priuat or publike the priuat persons are those which suffer themselues most often to be corrupted by mony and with these there neede not so many ceremonies or broâ—kings but if they be publike persons of rancke and authority either in regard of the greatnesse of their family or managing of state affaires there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other yet if we may but discouer in them the stinges of ambition and desire of greatnesse and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours for the execution of the desâ—â—gne then is it that we bring them to dare any thing especially if they haue neuer so little disposition to be reuenged of some receiued indignity It is indeed a hard matter to worke particular and priuate persons without great vncertaineties and dangers 2 But if we must haue to doe with the great persons of the Estate we must warily make choice of our time sound them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their Prince either in respect that some one is aduanced to their preiudice or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yoake and seaze themselues of the Estate These are the meanes and occasions which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our Christian Princes smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruine of the common enemy putting on as they say the foxes skin when the lions is wanting The displeasure and ielousie which Faratha Bassa conceiued against Hebraim Bassa because he saw him raised by Soliman to greater honour and estimation then himselfe so depriued him of all reason as suffering the desire of reuenge by little and little to transport him he began to plot a rebellion but discouered he was forthwith put to death the selfe same occasion was the ouerthrow of Pirrus and Mustapha raised by Soliman In our time in the court of Amurath the third now raigning these ielousies and hart-burnings haue beene great betweene Mahomet and Mustapha and since that betweene the same Mustapha and Cicala who hath outstript him and all for fauour of their Master If these humors and ill dispositions had beene well looked into and wisely imploied to their best vse by some great Prince of Christendome they had beene fit matter to haue bred a dissention and reuolt amongst those barbarous people 3 Now though such practises should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to worke that vniuersall change which we wish in that tyrants Empire yet are we not therefore to desist as men dismaied remembring that most commonly the beginnings of innouations and commotions so extraordinary are feeble and that that wisdome sheweth it selfe like it selfe which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attaine to a happy growth I am of opinion that when we incounter with instruments that are not without ambition courage and a thirst of reuenge after we haue felt and sounded them once twise or thrise we shall in the end make a breach in their
loyalty and obedience especially if we set before them be it vnder a true or false title the certaintie of some mightie succour whereof they may see the preparatiues for so they will the more couragiously attempt against the life and estate of their Prince 4 Moreouer it is not to be forgotten that when such practises shall be discouered by the Turke and that he shal see the Christians more diligent then hitherto they haue beene to sound the affections of his seruants and subiects he will thereupon enter into such a distrust of them as euen that will make him offer them some hard measure This distrust will be enough to beget a thousand suspitions and hard conceits in his seruants and subiects either for the managing of affaires or for the danger that the opinion of loyaltie incurreth when it hath to deale with such a distrustfull and suspitious Prince as this would prooue so as by little and little it would worke vs out some occasion fitting our purpose especially if whilest this practise were hatching and on foote the children of the Turke should take armes one against the other or that during their fathers life they should dispute the possession of the Empire for the ice being already broken there would be a more easie passage and better successe then if it had not beene taken in hand at all 5 But because an especiall iudgement patience and much wisedome are requisite in such businesses we must make choice of men furnished with all these parts to the end they may wisely know when to take their opportunities and times to sow these dissentions and that there be not want of mony to distribute amongst this people which are farther in loue therewith then any other nation the world affoordeth CHAP. XV. How the people of the Turke may be wrought from his obedience 1 How the Turkes Christian Subiects are to be wrought to rebellion 2 A place must be chosen for refuge of such as rebell 3 The vaine fooleries of their Alkoran are to be discouered 4 How bookes written to that purpose may come to his subiects hands 5 How such bookes are to be composed 6 What fruites are to be hoped from their reading 7 Exhortation to the Ianizzars 8 The conclusion of this worke 1 THe Turke hath two sorts of people subiect to his Empire one followeth the sect of Mahomet the other the truth of the Gospel of Iesus Christ The Mahometanes are quiet as those which being of one and the same law haue no cause to make any tumult The Christians cannot stirre as being ouer topped and awed by a greater power then their owne which curbeth them so as there is no better way to moue them to rebel then to make them handle as it were and see the assurance of an approching succour to prouide them of armes and all other furniture for the wars for otherwise it is impossible they should dare to make the least shew once to mooue whilest they haue the enemie ouer them alwaies in a readinesse and armed who would in a moment confound them especially being as they are naked and vnprouided of armes offensiue or defensiue Selim the second doubting the woorst by the counsaile of Occhially caused al the Christians inhabiting the sea coasts to retire themselues farre vp into the maine land to the end the presence of the Christian forces should not incourage them against him as it hapned at such time as Andrew Dorea atchieued the enterprise of Patras and Coron 2 If the Christians should euer vndertake the like dissigne they ought to take especiall heede how they vnship their succours in those parts of the continent where the horse are at hand since they were likely enough by their strength to choake at the first the reuolt of the Christians for so mighty are they in horse and of such speed and dexterity as they would in an instant beare downe before them whatsoeuer should oppose them Wherefore it would be better to enter by Albania and by places mountanous and of difficult accesse where the horse are not able to serue as in the plaine This is as much as we ment to say of such Christians as are vnder the Turkes dominions all which I will imagine want not will to rebell if the Princes of Christendome would furnish them of meanes 3 Now let vs see what way were best to be taken to prouoke the Mahometans to reuolt and to fill their countries with troubles and ciuill dissentions If we will but consider how their religion is fraught with vntruthes their Alcoran abounding in follies we shall finde it easie to picke matter enough out of it to set them together by the eares especially if wee doe but disperse among them certaine bookes fit to conuert them or make them doubt of the foolish superstitions they obserue composing them for Europe in the Sclauonian tongue and for Asia in the Arabian 4 But because it would be hard to conuey these bookes into the countries of the Turkes obedience but that they would soone perceiue the deuice and speedily remedy it It were best beginning far off in the Indies and in the parts of Asia and Africke held by the Portugales for because of the trafficke which is great in those parts many Turkish Marchants and others ariue there from all quarters They come to Mozambique in Africke to Zophala and Quiloe in Asia They descend also as low as the Moluccas Cochien Goa Dia Ormus and sundrie other parts appertaining to the crowne of Portugale These bookes also might be dispersed abroad in the countrie of the Gentiles which are friends and confederates of the Christians as in Calicut Zailan Cambeia and others and the like at Oran Arzilla and in other parts of Arabia subiect to the crowne of Spaine and Portugall and in all other parts of Europe which border vpon the Turkes 5 There must be a care had that the title of the booke be so coloured as it doe not at the first discouer the intent of the author but rather that it intice them to peruse it with a certaine curiosity and shew of pleasantnesse and delight It is requisite also that the discourse be not fraught with any disputations or subtill point against the Articles of their beleefe but that contrariwise it be full of tales and matter fit to moue laughter yet with some well conueied passage which may by the way discouer or make them doubt of the fables of their Alcoran 6 The Turkish Marchants or others into whose hands this booke should light would cōfidently reade it in those parts where the Turke is not obeied And though perhaps they durst not aduenture to carry it with them yet the impression and substance of what they had read would remaine fixt in their mindes so as they would after relate it as newes to their friends and families in such sort as it would grow by little and little to be diuulged thereabout whence would spring a longing in others which should
vse of armes and that he hath brought them to this passe that they cannot vant to hold any thing in propriety which was not practised towards the aboue mentioned moreouer all assemblies vpon whatsoeuer cause are expresly forbidden them he keeps them vnder and makes no more reckning of them then of sheepe pend vp in a fould vsing them like brute beasts not once vouchsafing to imploy them in the wars The other reason is that they haue no power of themselues to oppose the Turkes so mighty forces and which is worst of all they neuer haue had any forraine succour to incourage them to such an enterprise 14 I will forbeare to diue any deeper into this subiect me thinkes we may see sufficiently by this how much more supportable are Cittadels then armies ordinarily intertained But if we speake of conquering I allow that armies are more to be preferred before fortresses considering that we thereby inioy meanes to embrace all occasions offered and at an instant to execute both the will and designe of a Prince so prouided 15. To say the truth it is that which the Ottamans haue practised to aduance their Empire to such greatnesse as at this day we see it it is that which hath heaped on them the honors of so many victories and which hath endowed them with authoritie reputation and meanes They haue alwaies had as they yet haue their armies in a readinesse and haue fought with their neighbours in a manner with as much aduantage as a man armed against one that is naked 16 Some I know will maruell how such a number of people so armed can containe themselues from reuolting I am of opinion that if they were not ordinarily imploied as they are in attempts of warre that in the end their multitudes growen ranke with quiet would easily be drawen to rebellion or mutinies which the souldiers of Alexander the Great can witnesse for whilest the enemy kept them in doings who were then they more hardy and valerous but after their victories who more insolent and vnsufferable The Roman armies how fortunate were they whilest they had continuall warre atchieuing all their interprises in a manner as they could wish but after their conquest they became so turbulent and vnquiet as they assumed to themselues the authoritie of creating Emperors and for the most part so licentiously as euery armie made his particular choise so as there was no remedie but to trie by fight who should carie it which occasioned the ouerthrow of the state The French haue they not euermore faithfully serued their king against strangers but so soone as they had peace with the English and after with the Spaniard they filled euery corner of their country with sedition sackings cruelties and slaughters and that with such obstinate persisting as the contagion thereof hath not beene able for 25. yeeres space to be remooued But that which is most to be lamented is the scandall they haue brought vpon the church This selfe thing may be appropriated to the Flemings and the cause may be imputed to idlenesse and the exceeding plentie wherein they liued The example of Bajazet the second shall serue to close vp this discourse for he being giuen ouer to his ease the soldiours who could not brooke such idlenesse so awaked the courage of his two sonnes Selim and Acomath as all the forces of the Empire which had established the Turkish scepter were diuided into two and it lacked not much of being vtterly ouerthrowne euery one for his part seconding the rebellions of the sonnes against the father CHAP. IIII. That he hath trained vp his soldiours to valour and hardinesse 1 Why the armies of these daies consist not of so good souldiers as in former times 2 Principall causes of victories 3 What care is to be had in leuying of good souldiers and this to be wrought by a fourefould meanes 4 By election 5 Exercise 6 Honors and profit 7 The Turkes proceeding heerein 1 IT is seldome seene that the armies of these times consist of good souldiours for the more we vary from the course our forefathers tooke to bring them to perfection by so much the more are we depriued of that happinesse which were to be desired and seriously sought after by Princes and those which as Commanders would reape honor and profite by the wars 2 Victory which dependeth of the diuine will deriueth her successe and principall ground from the multitude of men but especially from the wisdome of the Commanders and from the valour and generositie of the Souldiour 3 It is requisite then that we looke more narrowlie then we doe vnto their choice and that they be such as we may honour and profit our selues by them now we must deliuer how we may light vpon or make good and hardy souldiours which is doone in my opinion by a foure fold meanes by election exercise honor and profit 4 By election because all those which we leuie for the wars haue not that naturall inclination to valour and courage nor a constitution of bodie fit to indure the trauailes and dangers incident thereunto Moreouer a gallant fashion and spirite are not found in euery one much lesse a resolution to attend defie and assaile the enemy also euery mans hart will not serue him to enter the trenches throw himselfe desperatly into the dike scall the wals offer himselfe valiantly to make good a breach in despite of the Cannon of stones of wilde-fire and of death it selfe Their complexions perhaps will not brooke that they should spend the whole day in continuall turmoiles without eating and the night without rest so as where some make account that Antwerpe is able to make 30000. men Venice 40000. Gant 60000. Paris 100000. all fit and able to beare armes me thinkes they should be vnderstood that they are such as haue the age required but not the disposition proper to such a profession For proofe hereof haue we not of late seene that the Prince of Parma hath ranged vnder the obedience of the King of Spaine euen with small forces those of Gant Antwerp which had formerly together with those of the low countries rebelled against their Soueraigne The Romans held in such esteeme this manner of making choise of their Souldiours as when they would expresse a leuy of men they termed it Delectum agere vel habere to make a choise In our times no man hath beene more carefull and circumspect in the choise of his souldiours at the least of the Captaines of Italy then Cosmo de Medici Duke of Florence and indeede he was prouided of the best and most approued souldiours of his time 5 To election we are to adde exercise without the which there is no forwardnesse or constitution of body be it neuer so strong able to attaine to the perfection requisite to execute and accomplish as appertaineth to a good braue and noble souldiour 6 But if the Generall be so wise as to ioine to exercise profit and honor
his army and artillery as he came vpon the Souldan before he dreampt of him supposing him to be as then rather vpon his way to encounter the Persian then to attempt him 10 This particular dilligence of the Ottomans is not to be limited all only with their land wars they haue performed as much by sea so vigilant and wary haue they shewed themselues in exalting the honour of their names and of their great estate by them maintained euen vnto this day And since they are so incredibly nimble and aduised in maritine exploits I hold it not from the purpose to touch briefly the order they obserue in assembling their forces They reiect the vessels and ships of great burden as ouer-heauy and vnwealdy if the wind faile them rather hindering then furthering him that conducteth them Their Gallies and Galliots are speedy well manned and well appointed 11 Wee on the contrary drag with vs a great number of ships and Gallions as our best strength and choice prouision but they are in proofe the cause of such incombrance to the seruice in hand as we for the most part waste the season vnprofitably and spend our opertunities in rigging and attending them being also oft times enforced to disorder our Gallies to the end these great cartes may keepe with vs. Hence groweth yet another discommodity and that is that hauing placed a kinde of hope in our ships we in forgoing them finde our selues too weake and failing of courage to assaile the enemy who is not to be forced to fight but when he please hauing too open a field to flie and espy his occasion as it hapned at Preueza the yeare 1537. and at the battaile of Lepanto which was the yeare 1571. for then the ships of the league remained behind with a good number of souldiours vnprofitable for that action in regard they could not ariue there time enough The yeare after they encountred the like discommodity since for the very same cause the army of the league goodly and mighty fought not at all neither performed ought worthy so great a preparation And when the Gallies of the Pope and Venetians met and that they attended Don Iohn who aboade still at Missina because of the then beginning troubles of Flanders the army of the Turk being then commanded by Oechially he once presented battaile but because of the aduantage of the winde which without other helpes draue our ships and fearing the incounter of our round vessels he made his escape by meanes of a certaine stratagem which for the strangenesse thereof put the counsailes and iudgments of our army to a plunge In verie deede it is worthy the noting for seeing the whole strength of our ships vnited with such confederat Gallies as were then there make towards him he gaue commandement that in euery one of his Gallies they should put fire to a barrell of powder and row backewards not making for al this any shew of flight the prowes of their gallies still appeering towards them and as soone as the smoake had couered his fleete he halled on a maine and in an instant hoissing vp al his sailes shaped his course to Napolis in Romania our ships not daring to follow him In regarde he had gotten the aduantage of them they bearing but their mizen sailes and knowing how dangerous it was for them being ignorant of his designes to breake company eight daies after we comming neere together there followed some light skirmishes but so soone as they perceiued vs to faint as being depriued of our ships they charged vs with the whole army in like sort as when we had them for succour they retired So as it was then found by experience that the great ships serued but to keepe vs from buckling with the enemy I haue made mention of this incountre in my commentaries of the notable occurrants of these times written in Latine and somewhat more at large then I heere deliuer for I was present in the army during all that voiage vnder the command of the Duke de Mayne CHAP. XIII That he hath gone himselfe in person to the war 1 A question concerning the Princes presence in the wars 2 The first commodity is if the Prince be there in person it ads courage to the souldiour 3 The second is it causeth plenty of all things in his army 4 The third it increaseth the army 5 The fourth it worketh facility and speede in aduice and execution 6 Of the power of Lieutenant Generalls in the wars 7 The fift commodity is the Princes authority and dignity 8 The first discommodity growing from the princes presence is that thereby the enemy proceedes more prouidently 9 The second that his Commanders vse lesse diligence in discharge of their places 10 The third is emulation of the leaders whence groweth contention 11 The fourth the emulation of the Lieutenant generall toward the Prince 12 Examples to this purpose pro and contra 13 The preposition defined by distinction 14 The Ottomans wars in their persons haue succeeded well 15 Exhortation to Christian princes to vndertake wars against the Turke 1 WHether the prince should in person goe to the war or else send his Lieutenant is a question often disputed with such reasons and earnestnesse by sundry graue personages as whatsoeuer may be now deliuered to that purpose would proue but an vnprofitable repetition of what hath bene formerly digested by so many rare spirits This then excusing me I will referre the deciding thereof to men of more experience then my selfe yet will I not forbeare by way of discourse to deliuer my opinion and cite such examples as may helpe for the clearing of these doubts First then we are to recken the commodities the Kings presence affoordeth in his armie and so in order of the other consequences 2 Whereof one of the principall is that it putteth spirit and courage into the souldiers it so neerely presseth them as they must of force as it were make their valour appeare especially when they ioine battell where the Maiestie and life of the Prince yea and their owne too is in hazard Then is it that the honest desire of preseruing their masters life groweth feruent in them and so much the more by how much it is farre more pretious then the life of a captaine or generall either mercenary or subiect which the Prince might haue sent to command them This occasion more then any other moueth them more freely to hazard their liues and meanes for their Princes seruice which they would not so couragiously performe vnder any other that should command in his stead They likewise expect greater and more assured rewards from him then from others 3 Againe the king is alwaies better followed he is attended on with the consequence of farre greater prouisions either of victuals munition money or whatsoeuer may be necessary for the enterprise than his lieutenant who hath his power limited his allowance stinted and cannot dispose but in part of the
munition all wanting to the Sophi who may well meete the enemy in the feeld and bid him battaile but not pursue and assaile him if he retire into his fortres because of the aboue said defects of foot artillery though he were prouided of them yet wants he the skill how to vse thē like others The example of Tauris approueth this sufficiently for after he had this last yeere vanquished the armie of the Turks and slaine an hundred thousand men he could neuer take the Cittadell wherein the Turks had drawne all their munition of war and left aboue eight thousand men neither is there any newes hitherto that he hath taken it expelled them thence The Tartarians are as ill stored with foote and artillery as the Persians and except that they last got of the Turke it may be truly said that they neuer did him harme As for the Moscouit which abutteth vpon him as doe also the Polonians they haue in regarde of the Turke small store of men horse and mony so as the most they can doe is to hold their owne Now concerning the Germans they haue lost much of their ancient reputation by the ouerthrow they receiued of the Turke at Exechium Buda and sundry other places so as they are glad to keepe home without daring to assaile him The Venetians haue beene so vnfortunate as they haue neuer moued war against the Turke but it hath succeeded contrary to their hopes and which is the worst of all they neuer consented to anie treatie of peace but they did forgoe some important member of their estate And to say the truth Mahomet the second got Negropont Scutari and Groya Baiazet tooke from them Lepanto and Modon and after in a treaty of peace they made with him they parted with S. Moore in an other treaty they left to Soliman Napoles of Maluasia Selim the second wan by force the I le of Cypres Duleme and Antiuari And though these be heauy losses yet in regard they were far distant from their estates they are more supportable then if they had beene neere hand so ought they now more then euer aduise how to strengthen themselues against the Turke by their braue resolution and prouision which they may better doe now then euer in regard their forces are more liuely and the members of their common-weale more vnited and compact then heeretofore Now we are to come to the king of Spaine Let vs say that he hath store of mony and all prouision necessary to be imploied in the wars that he is not without sufficient numbers of foot and horse alwaie in pay that hee hath the commodity extraordinarily to leuy so many men as may make the Turke stand in feare of him that his forces by sea are good and strong and that he can increase them at his pleasure that he hath store of victuals commodity of hauens for conuenient landing in his countries and in a word that he is so mighty as that neither he standeth in awe of the Turk neither dareth the Turke assaile him yet this power and hability could neuer hitherto be imploied to the purpose against the common enemy of Christendome Not for want of will or inclination thereto but because he is hindred by the reuolt of Flanders The suspition also and feare of his neighbours armes would neuer permit him to display an vnited and firme power against the Turke he hath rather beene enforced to wast his time and meanes vpon the particular preseruation of his estates somewhat distant one from an other in stead of courageously exploiting them against the Turkes to the good and consolation of Christendome But our sinnes are they especially which haue depriued vs of the glorious fruits and aduantages we might haue gained by so worthy a power In conclusion we must grant that since the Empire of the Turke cannot receiue any damage or alteration by outward causes which are wont to ruine estates it is necessary that inward causes either separate or mixt effect it yet before we discourse of these two meanes I hold it not amisse a little to examine whether his estate may be by maine and open force ouerthrowne CHAP. VI. That it is not an impossible thing for the Christians with open force to vanquish the Turke 1 The Turke is not inuincible 2 Examples of their sundry ouerthrowes 3 A comparison of their good and ill successe in battailes All proofes that they may be conquered 1 THe conclusion of the argument of the former chapter is that the Turke cannot by way of open force receiue harme or ruine of importance because of the mighty power and meanes he hath of his owne But heereby is not inferred that therefore Christian Princes should faile of courage or hope to goe thorow with their affaires to his preiudice rather otherwise placing their confidence in the Almighty they are to hope better then euer for the reasons I shall heereafter alledge by the handling wherof I hope to proue that so far is he from being inuincible as on the contrary he may be easily vanquished as many experiences may resolue vs. 2 We haue elsewhere said that Baiazet the first was ouercome and taken aliue at the battaile he fought at Mount-Stella against the great Tamberlain vnder whose hands he died a captiue Carambeius Bassa of Amurath the second was discomfited by Ladislaus King of Polonia in the valley of mount Hermus he came with an intention to reuenge himselfe of the losse and dishonor that the Bassa of Notalia had receiued at the hands of Iohn Huniades which at one time recouered from him a part of Seruia and all Moldauia but instead of performing this he became himselfe prisoner of that King and had almost al his army put to the sword Baiazet the second sent Calibeius and Querscogles his sonne in law into Asia against Caitheus Soldan of Aegypt with a great army to reuenge the intertainment the Soldan had giuen Zizimus his brother whom he had succored with men and mony against him his army was ouerthrowne neere Adena a towne of Cilicia where the Turke receiued the most notable ouerthrow that was euer giuen him For of an hundred thousand which presented themselues in the battaile the third part remained not aliue yet those that performed this noble execution were scarce one against sixe but the aduice of two Italians and of the Mameluckes so furthered the affaires of Caytheus as he spied a time to charge the Turkes when they least expected it Soliman left the siege of Vienna with losse of 60000. men which were there slaine hauing giuen twenty generall assaults to the towne The yeere following he assembled an other army of 200000. men with intention cruelly to reuenge the harmes he had receiued but the Emperour Charles the fift went to meete him with such forces as the other fled so hastily as he had scarce leasure to saue his baggage Don Iohn of Austria naturall sone of Charles the fifth in