from the contrary of these CHAP. 9. Of Grace or Favour GRace is that Vertue by which a man is said to do a good turn or do service to a man in need not for his own but for his cause to whom he doâ—â— it Great Grace is when the need is great or when they are hard or difficult things that are conferr'd or when the time is seasonable or when he that conferr's the favour is the only or first man that did it Need is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired Grace therefore it is not if it be not done to one that needs Whosoever therfore would prove that he has done a Grace or Favour must shew that he needed it to whom it was done Grace it is not Which is done by Chance Nor which is done by Necessity Nor which has been requited Nor that which is done to ones Enemy Nor that which is a trifle Nor that which is naught if the Giver know the fault And in this manner a man may go over the Praedicaments and examine a benefit whether it be a Grace for being This or for being so Much or for being Such or for being Now c. CHAP. 10. Of Pity or Compassion PIty is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it and which he thinks may happen to himselfe or his And because it appertains to Pity to think that he or his may fall into the misery he pities in others it follows that they be most compassionate Who have passed through Misery And old men And weak men And timorous men And learned men And such as have Parents Wife and Children And such as think there be honest men And that they are lesse Compassionate Who are in great despair Who are in great prosperity And they that are Angry for they consider not And they that are very Confident for they also consider not And they that are in the Act of contumely for neither do these consider And they that are astonished with fear And they that think no man honest The things to be pitied are Such as grieve and withall hurt Such as destroy And Calamities of fortune if they be great as none or few friends dedeformity weaknesse lamenesse c. And evill that arrives where good is expected And after extream Evill a little Good And through a mans life to have no good offer it self or being offer'd not to have been able to enjoy it Men to be pitied are Such as are known to us unlesse they be so near to us as their hurt be our own And such as be of our own years Such as are like us in manners Such as are of the same or like stock And our Equals in dignity Those that have lately suffer'd or are shortly to suffer injury and those that have the markes of injury past And those that have the words or actions of them that be in preseÌ„t misery CHAP. 11. Of Indignation OPposite in a manner to Pity in good men is Indignation which is grief for the prosperity of a man unworthy With Indignation there is alwayes joyned a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy as Pity is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it In wicked men the opposite of pity is Envy as also the companion thereof delight in the harm of others which the Greeks in one word have called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of these in the next Chapter Men conceive Indignation against others not for their vertues as Justice c. For these make Men worthy and in Indignation we think men unworthy But for those goods which men indued with vertue and noble men and handsome men are worthy of And for newly gotten power and riches rather than for ancient and especially if by these he has gotton other goods as by Riches Command The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new then ancient Riches is that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs but the antient seem to have but their own For with common pleople to have been so long is to be so by Right And for the bestowing of goods incongruously as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Vlysses And for the comparison of the Inferiour in the same thing as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant or whether absolutely Superiour as when a good Scholer is compared with a good Man Apt to Indignation are They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods and do possess them And they that are good And they that are ambitious And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth then he that hath it Least apt to Indignation are Such as are of a poor servile and not ambitious Nature Who they are that Rejoyce or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily and in what occasions may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said Whosoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the Judge he must make him apt to Indignation and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good and worthy of the Evill which happens to him CHAP. 12. Of Envy ENvy is griefe for the prosperity of such as our selves arising not from any hurt that we but from the good that they receive Such as our selves I call those that are equall to us in bloud in age in abilities in glory or in means They are apt to Envy That are within a little of the highest And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them especially Wisdom or good Fortune And such as would be thought wise And such as catch at glory in every action And men of poor spirits for every thing appears great to them The things which men envy in others are Such as bring glory And goods of Fortune And such things as we desire for our selves And things in the possession whereof we exceed others or they us a little Obnoxious to envy are Men of our own time of our own Countrey of our own age and Competitors of our glory And therefore Those whom we strive with for honour And those that covet the same things that we do And those that get quickly what we hardly obtaine or not at all And those that attain unto or do the things that turn to our reproach not being done by us And those that possesse what we have possessed heretofore So old and decayed men envy the young and luâ—ty And those that have bestowed little are subject to be envied by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other mens hurt He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail when he craves pity or other favour must dispose the Judge to Envy and make his Adversary appear such as are above described
Interrogations Answers and Iests THe times wherein 't is fit to ask ones Adversary a question are chiefly four 1. The first is when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity he has already uttered one and we would by Interrogation draw him to confesse the other 2. The second when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity one is manifest of it selfe and the other likely to be fetch'd out by a question then the Interrogation will be seasonable and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferr'd without adding that Proposition which is manifest 3. The third when a man would make appear that hisâ— Adversary does contradict himselfe 4. The fourth when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these In some sort 't is so In some sort 't is not so Out of these Cases 't is not â—it to Interrogate For he whose question succeeds not is thought vanquished To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully and not to be too brief To Interrogations which we fore-see tend to draw from us an Answer contrary to our purpose we must together with our Answer presently give an Answer to the objection which is implied in the question And where the question exacteth and answer that concludeth against us we must together with our answer presently distinguish Iests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse and grave discourse is deluded by Iests The severall kinds of Iests are set down in the Art of Poetry Whereof one kind is Ironia and tends to please ones selfe The other is Scurrility and tends to please others The later of these has in it a kind of basenesse the former may become a man of good breeding CAP. 18. Of the Epilogue THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things Either of inclining the Judg to favour his own or disfavour the Adversaries side For then when all is said in the cause is the best season to praise or dispraise the Parties Or of Amplification or Diminution For when it appears what is good or evill then is the time to shew how great or how little that good or evill is Or in moving the Judge to Anger Love or other Passion For when 't is manifest of what kind and how great the good or evill is then it will be opportune to excite the Judg. Or of Repetition that the Judge may remember what has been said Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner For the Orator must shew that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration and how Namely by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries repeating them in the same order they were spoken FINIS THE ART OF RHETORICK Plainly set forth With Pertinent EXAMPLES for the more easie understanding and Practice of the same By a concealed Author LONDON Printed by Thomas Maxey 1651. THE ART OF RHETORICK RHetorick is an Art of speaking finely It hath two parts 1. Garnishing of speech called Elocution 2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance called Pronunciation Garnishing of speech is the first part of Rhetorick whereby the speech it self is beautified and made fine It is either 1. The fine manner of words called a Trope or 2. The fine shape or frame of speech called a Figure The fine manner of words is a garnishing of Speech whereby one word is drawn from his first proper signification to another as in this sentence Sin lyeth at the door where Sin is put for the punishment of sin adjoyned unto it Lyeth at the doore signifieth at hand as that which lieth at the Door is ready to be brought in This changing of words was first found out by necessity for the want of words afterward confirmed by Delight because such words are pleasant and gracious to the ear Therefore this change of signification must be shame fa'cd and as it were maidenly that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification to be driven by force unto the same yet somtimes this fine manner of Speech swerveth from this perfection and then it is Either 1. The abuse of this fine Speech called Katachresis or 2. The excess of this fineness call'd Hyperbole Be not too just nor too wicked which speech although it seem very hard yet it doth not without some fineness of Speech utter thus much That one seek not a righteousness beyond the Law of God and that when none can live without all sin yet that they take heed that sin bear not Dominion over them As My tears are my meat day and night Those that hateme are mo in number than the hairs of my head Both which do utter by an expresse of Speech a great sorrow and a great number of enemies The abuse of Speech is when the change of speech is hard strange and unwonted as in the first example The excess of speech is when the change of signification is very high and loftie as in the second Example and Ps. 6.7 But the excellencie or fineness of Words or Tropes is most excellent when divers are Shut up in one or Continued in many An Example of the first sort is in the 2 Kings I pray thee let me have a double portion of thy Spirit where by Spirit is meant the gift of the Spirit and by thy Spirit the gift of the Spirit like to thine The continuance of Tropes called an Allegorie is when one kind of Trope is so continued as look with what kind of matter it be begun with the same it be ended So in the 23. Psal. The care of God towards his Church is set forth in the words proper to a Shepherd So in the whole book of Canticles the sweet conference of Christ and his Church is set down by the words proper to the Husband and the Wife So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech Eccles. 12. 5,6 Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words called a Trope Now the divers sorts do follow They are those which note out 1. No Comparison and are with some Comparison or 2. No respect of Division or some respect The first is double 1. The change of name called a Metonymie 2. The mocking speech called an Ironie The change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it It is double 1. When the cause is put for the thing caused and contrariwise 2. When the thing to which any thing is adjoyned is put for the thing adjoyned and contrariwise The change of name of the cause is when Either the name of the Maker or the name of the Matter is put for the thing made Of the Maker when the finder out or the Author of the thing or the instrument wherby the thing is done is put for the thing made So Moses is put for his Writings so Love is put for Liberality or bestowing Benefits the fruit of Love so Faith the Cause is put for Religious serving of God the
what we are fit for And what evill men do not And what we love to do CHAP. 7. Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evill comparatively THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives 1. More is so much and somewhat besides 2. Less is that which and somwhat else is so much 3. Greater and more in number are said only Comparatively to Less and Fewer in number 4. Great and Little Many and Few are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind So that Great and Many is that which exceeds Little and Few is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are these Greater Good is Many then Fewer or one of those many And Greater is the kind in which the greatest is greater then the greatest of another kind And greater is that Good then another good whose kind is greater then another's kind And Greater is that from which another Good followes then the Good which followes And of two which exceed a third Greater is that which exceeds it most And that which causes the greater Good And that which proceeds from a greater Good And Greater is that which is chosen for it selfe then that which is chosen from somewhat else And the end greater then that which is not the end And that which less needs other things then that which more And that which is independent then that which is dependent of another And the Beginning then not the Beginning Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good or Evill then that which is not the Beginning and the End then that which is not the End One may argue from this Colour both wayes as Leodamas against Chabriâ—s would have the Actor more to blame then the Advisor and against Calliâ—tratus the Advisor more then the Actor And the Cause then not the Cause And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause And the Beginning or Cause of a greater Good or Evill And that which is scarce greater then that which is Plentifull because harder to get And that which is Plentifull then that which is Scarce because oftner in Use. And that which is Easy then that which is Hard. And that whose Contrary is greater And that whose Want is greater And Vertue then not Vertue a greater Good Vice then not Vice a greater Evill And greater Good or Evill is that the effects whereof are more Honorable or more Shamefull And the effects of greater Vertues or Vices And the Excesse whereof is more tolerable a greater Good And those things which may with more honour be desir'd And the desire of better things And those things wherof the Knowledge is better And the Knowledge of better things And that which wise men preferre And that which is in better men And that which better men chuse And that which is more then that which is lesse delightfull And that which is more then that which is less Honourable And that which we would have for our selves and Friends a greater Good and the contrary a greater Evill And that which is Lasting then that which is not Lasting And that which is Firme then that which is not Firme And what many desire then what few And what the Adversary or Judge confesseth to be greater is greater And Common then Common And not Common then not Common And what is more Laudable And that which is more Honour'd a greater Good And that which is more Punish'd a greater Evill And both Good and Evill divided then undivided appeare greater And Compounded then Simple appeare greater And that which is done with Opportunity Age Place Time Means disadvantageous greater then otherwise And that which is naturall then that which is attained unto And the same part of that which is great then of that which is lesse And that which is nearest to the end designed And that which is Good or Evill to ones self then that which is simply so And Possible then not possible And that which comes toward the end of our Life And that which we do really then that which we do for shew And that which we would be rather then what we would seem to be And that which is good for more purposes is the greater Good And that which serves us in great necessity And that which is joyned wiâ—h less trouble And that which is joyned with more delight And of the two that which added to a third makes the whole the greater And that which having we are more sensible of And in every thing that which we most esteem CHAP. 8. Of the severall kinds of Governments BEcause Hortation and Dehortation concern the Common-wealth and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evill as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract so we must speak of them also in the Concrete that is of what is Good or Evill to each sort of Common-wealth in speciall The Government of a Common-wealth is either Democracy or Aristocracy or Oligarchy or Monarchy Democracy is that wherein all men with equall right are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot Aristocracy is that wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those that had the best education according to what the Lawes prescribe for best Oligarchy is that where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth Monarchy is that wherein one man hath the Government of all which Government if he limit it by Law is called Kingdom if by his own will Tyranny The end of Democracy or the Peoples Government is Liberty The end of Oligarchy is the riches of those that govern The end of Aristocracy is good Laws and good ordering of the City The end of Monarchy or Kings is the safety of the People and conservation of his own authority Good therefore in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends And because beliefe is not gotten only by proofes but also from manners the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade or disswade in matter of State Their manners may be known by their designs their designs by their ends and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in But of this more accurately in the Politicks CAP. 9. Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable IN a Demonstrative Oration the subject whereof is Praise or Dispraise the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable and Dishonourable In this place we anticipate the second way of getting beliefe which is from the manners of the Speaker For Praise whether it come in as the prinpall businesse or upon the by depends still upon the same Principles Which are these Honourable is that which we love for it selfe and is withall laudable And that Good which pleaseth us only because 't is Good And Vertue Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good and
the faculty of doing many and great things well The kinds of it are these 1. Iustice which is a Vertue wherby every man obtains what by law is his 2. Fortitude which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself honourably and according to the Lawes in time of danger 3. Temperance which is a Vertue whereby a man governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law 4. Liberality which is a Vertue by which we benefit others in matter of money 5. Magnanimity which is a Vertue by which a man is apt to do great benefits 6. Magnificence which is a Vertue by which a man is apt to be at great cost 7. Prudence which is an Intellectuall Vertue by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity And Honourable are the Causes and Effects of things Honourable And the Works of Vertue And the signes of Vertue And those actions the reward wherof is Honor. And the reward wherof is rather Honor then Money And that which we do not for our own sakes And what we do for our Contries good neglecting our own And those things are Honorable which good of themselves are not so to the Owner And those things which happen to the dead rather then to the living And what we do for other men especially for Benefactors And bestowing of Benefits And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of And those things which men strive for earnestly but without fear of Adversary And of the more Honorable and better men the Vertues are more Honorable And more Honorable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit then those which tend to ones own And Honorable are those things which are Just. And Revenge is Honorable And Victory And Honor. And Monuments And those things which happen not to the living And things that excell And what none can do but we And Possessions we reape no profit by And those things which are had in honor particularly in severall places And the signes of praise And to have nothing of the servile mercenary or Mechanick And that which seemes Honorable Namely such as follow Vices confining upon Vertue And the extreams of Vertues And what the Auditors think Honorable And that which is in estimation And that which is done according to custome Besides in a Demonstrative Oration the Orator must shew that he whom he prayseth did what he prayseth unconstrainedly and willingly And he does so who does the same often Prayse is speech declaring the magnitude of a Vertue Action or Work But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker is a circular Proofe To Magnifie and to Praise differ in themselves as Felicity and Vertue For Praise declares a mans Vertue and Magnifying declares his Felicity Praise is a kind of inverted Precept For to say Do it because 't is good is a Precept But to say He is good because he did it is Praise An Orator in Praising must also use the formes of Amplification such as these He was the first that did it The onely man that did it The speciall man that did it He did it with disadvantage of Time He did it with little help He was the cause that the Law ordained Rewards and Honors for such Actions Further he that will praise a Man must compare him with others and his actions with the actions of others especially with such as are renowned And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration then to any other For here the Actions are confess'd and the Orators part is only this to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster CHAP. 10. Of Accusation and Defence with the Definition of Injury IN a Iudiciall Oration which consists in Accusation and Defence the thing to be proved is that Injury has been done and the heads from whence the proofes are to be drawne are these three 1. The causes that move to Injury 2. The Persons apt to do Injury 3. The Persons obnoxious or apt to suffer Injury An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge and without compulsion The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable Aâ— the Covetous man does against â—he Law out of an intemperate desire of Money All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition or not Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance by Compulsion or by Naturall necessity Those that proceed from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Custome or upon Premeditation or in Anger or out of Intemperance By Chance are said to be done those things whereof neither the Cause nor the Scope is evident and which are done neither orderly nor alwaies nor most commonly after the same manner By Nature are said to be done those things the Causes whereof are in the Doer and are done orderly and alwaies or for the most part after the same manner By Compulsion are done those things which are against the Appetite and Ordination of the Doer By Custome those Actions are said to be done the Cause whereof is this that the Doer has done them often Vpon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit as the End or the way to the End In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful In sum every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit or Pleasure The Colours of Profitable are already set down The Colours of that which is Pleasing follow next CHAP. 11. Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure PLeasure is a suddain and sensible motion of the Soule towards that which is Naturall Grief is the Contrary Pleasant therfore is that which is the cause of such motion And to return to ones own Nature And Customes And those things that are not violent Unpleasant are those things which proceed from Necessity as Cares Study Contentions The contrary whereof Ease Remission from Labour and Care also Play Rest Sleep are Pleasant Pleasant also is that to which we have an appetite Also the appetites themselves if they be sensuall as Thrist Hunger and Lust. Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasion and Reason And those things we remember whether they pleased or displeased then when they were present And the things we hope for And Anger And to be in Love And Revenge And Victory Therefore Also contentious Games as Tables Chess Dice Tennis c. And Hunting And Suites in Law And Honor and Reputation amongst men in Honor and Reputation And to Love And to be Belov'd and Respected And to be admir'd And to be Flatter'd And a Flatterer for be seems both to love and admire And the same thing Often And Change or Variety And What we return to afresh And to Learn And to admire And to
from the beginning and the Author and Father of all deceit Iohn 8.44 Yet man had power to have resisted him if he would which he not doing became the true and proper efficient cause of Corrupting himself and all his posterity who likewise by means of the poyson derived from his Loyns became also the proper and immediate causes oâ— their own sins Mark well then O my Soul the Root of this evil and furthrr consider what unsavory and cursed fruit it bringeth forth surely even such as it self is for such as the Tree is such are the fruits as is the root so are the branches a poysoned fountain casteth forth no wholesome streams Iames 3. And who can bring as the Wiseman saith a clean thing out of filthiness surely there is not one but onely he who is holiness it self Iohn 14.4 And without all Controversie the reward and wages of sin is deathâ— and that not onely temporal and bodily which is a separation of the body from the soul for a season but also spiritual and eternal both of soul and body for ever and ever Is any good thing withâ—held from us let us thank our sin for it is any plague or punishment laid upon us be sure that sin is the cause or at the least even in the dearest Children of God the occasion of it Is any good blessing of God made of no force or even turned to a Curse to us we may be sure that it is by reason of our sin for as the Prophet saith The Lords hand is not shortned that it cannot save nor his ear heavy that it cannot hear but our iniquities separate betwixt us and our God and our sins do hide his face from us that he will not hear Esay 59. 1 2. Finally as Iob saith Misery springeth not forth of the dust neither doth Affliction spring one of the earth but man is born to labour as the sparkles flie upward Job 5. 6 7. As if he should say Man is as prone by nature to sin against God and consequently to pull Gods judgements upon himself as the fire which is a light Element is naturally prone to ascend and mount aloft And to the end that thou my soul maist see upon what an ugly monster thou hast set thy delight dost doâ—e upon and art bewitched withall consider how fair and how amible piety and vertue are for as they make a man lovely and honourable so sin maketh him loathsome and contemptible The fear of God saith Solomon makes the face of a man to shine and be beautifull but impiety and profanesse do deface and disfigure the image of God in him and cause both God and all good men to loath detest him as a polluted andâ— filthy thing Favour saith the same Wise-man is deceitfull and beauty is vanity but the woman that feareth â—he Lord shee shal be praised Prov. 31.39 A vile person is contemned that is a prophane man and basely esteemed how great soever he be in the world in the eyes of him that feareth God Psal. 15.4 And piety is the only beauty that the Lord himselfe is delighted with 1 Pet. 3.4 Therefore it is clear in the contrary part that he loatheth and abhorreth impiety and sin And yet my soul to bring thee further out of love with this most ugly monster consider whereunto it is like and to what it may be compared It is like saith Esay to filthy raggs that are cast aside upon the dunghill and detested of all the passers by It biteth as a serpent and stingeth as a Coccatrice creepeth as a gangrene or deadly canker that eateth to the heart and cannot be cured and though it seeme sweet in the begiuning yet it is most bitter in the end and that which relisheth like hony in the mouth will prove ranke poyson in the bowels Finally O my soul if thou peruse the holy Scriptures thou shalt find no book no leafe no chapterâ— nor scarce any verse whâ—rin there is not some precept some prohibition some promise some threatning or some example which seems not very fitly and profitably to shew forth the amiableness of vertue and the uglinesse of sin and with what care zeal watâ—â—â—â—lnesse c. the one is to be shunâ—â—â— and the other to be imbraced Thus far Mr. Egerton Lib. 3 Cap. 6. Now that thou maist attain kind reader unto this sweet delight of meditation or to the top of whatsoever felicity thou aimest at by this art use my book in this manner following It consisting only of rules and examples will be no great burthen for thee to commit it all to memory and so whether thou meditatest or discoursest of sin or piety in the generall or any vice or vertue in the particular thou shalt find from the head of this Art after the example foreshewed abundance of matter to furnish thy meditation So cum paucis sapientibus I commit my labour to thy discreet and favourable construction and with equall respect to all indifferently rest R. F. Iunior PETER RAMUS to the READER ARchymedes O Reader would have the reâ—â—â—â— of the Spheres and Cliâ—â—â—tes in which Invention hee had more vehemently laboured ingraven upon his sepulchre And truly shouldst thou ask me of my vigils and studies I desire a pillar to be raised upon my grave from the instructions of the Art of Logick Touching the cause of the wish they answer first to the accurateness of the Art the books of invention of Arguments and their disposition to be judged not onely from Aristotle Organicall Rhetoricall Physicall but from Cicero and Quintilian and so many Orators In all which wee have strived with all study and diligence by all reasonable wayes to contract them briefly into these two Books that no particle or the least shadow of Logick might be there confused whose truth might not be expresly delivered And this shall be first made known touching Archymedes his Probleme They answer secondly to the use of Logick the elegance and dignity of all the parts to be explicated to stir up Logicall meditations as well the popular phrases of Poets Orators Historiographers as also the liberall and ingenuous arts of a new Body delivered in a new form to the studious adorned with excellent indowments And leâ—t any should fear leâ—t they should happen to be strangers they are given and committed to the liberall custodies of their schools This shal be secondly made known touching Archymedes his problem Those therefore shall be witness of so many day and night watches touching the truth and utility of Logick and shall answer for the cause of our wish shall also admonish thee Reader as I hope of I know not what madnesse is in most Academies of Europe disputing of their sophisticall precepts how that they are far unlike both to the verity and utility of Logick and shall also inflame thee to the study of the more true and profitable Faculties But beside this there is objected a great company exstructed with theatricall reproaches
Q. What is the force of this example A. Here are three terms Laws Magistrates People Q. Have not feigned likeness equal force with these above A. Yes Q. Give example A. It appeareth chiefly in this explicated similitude of Esope his Apology taken out of Horace Epistâ— 1. But if Romes people ask me happily Why not 'mongst Iudges on the bench fit I And do that which they love fly that they hate I answer as the crafty Fox of late When toth ' sick lion he this message senâ— Fain would I come to that thing was I bent But that I saw the steps of many feet That way to go none back again to get CAP. 22. Dislikes Q. What are dislikes A. Dislikes are comparatives whose quality is diverse Q. What are the proper notes of dislikes A. Dislike different another Q. Give example A. Pro Plan. Although the paying of mony and thanks be unlike AEneid 1. O ancient house O how unlike for that Lord to govern Caes. Pri. Bel. Gal. All these differed in their tongues instructions lawes Agra 2. One is known by his countenance another by his voyce another by his gate De Nat. Deo 2. Because I have begun to do otherwise then I had said in the beginning Q. Are not dislikes also knowne by denying the likes A. Yes Q. Give an example A. De orat 2. Philosophy is not like the other artes AEneid 2. But he was not of that seed wherein thou remembrest Achilles such was Priamus his enemy Lor. Epist. 1. There is not the same age the same minde Ad frat 1. So thy ring is not as a certain vessel but as thy self Phil. 3. This certain day he is wont to expect not so much of sacrifice as counsel Q. Give some poeticall examples A. By this argument the shepherd confesseth his error AEclog 1. Ah fond friend Melie I whilom deem'd That famous city which I now and then In common chat amongst our country men Have heard denoted by the name of Rome For all the world like to our homely home And by and by so did I dare Kids liken to their Goats whelpes to their dams And Moul-hills wont to mountains to compare Q. Shew the force of this example A. As neither the whelpes to the dogges nor kids to their dams so nâ—â—ther is Mantua like to Rome Q. Be not notes of dislikes sometimeâ— wanting A. Yes oftentimes and the dislikeness is more clearly explicated Q. Give an example out of some Orator A. Quint. l. 1. â— 11. Brutus slew thâ— children of the traitors Muntius diâ— punish by death the vertue of his sonne Q. Give another example A. Cat the sunne sets and riseth again but when our little light setteth there is a perpetual night CAP. 23. Conjugates Q. Hitherto you have expounded thâ— first arguments those derived from the first follow What are they then A. Those derived from the first are these which are even to that which they argue as the first from whence they are derived Q. What be the kinds of these arguments A. A Conjugate a Notation â— Distribution and a Definition Q. What are Conjugates A. Conjugates are names drawn diversly from the same principle Q. Give example A. Justice just justly Q. Is there not a symboll in conjugateâ— of agreeing arguments A. Yes Q. Give example A. Propert. lib. 2. Because in love there is no liberty Who ever loves that man can ne'r be free Q. Shew the force of this example A. Here liberty is the cause why we should be free Q. Give another example A. Cic. Nat. Deo 2. Where he speaketh of Dionysius the Tyrant He commanded that the tables of silver in which were the images oâ— the gods should be taken away in which after the manner of the Graecians should bâ—ingraven The goods of the gods saying that he was willing to use of their goodness Q. Shew the force of this example A. The Gods are good therefore their goodnesse is to be used here from the Effects it is directed to the Causes Q. Give another example A. Ter. I am a man no humane thinâ— is strange to me Q. Is it not sometimes from the subject to the adjunct A. Yes Q. Give example A. Phil. 2. I will not handle thee as a Consul lest thou handle me as one stâ—nding for the Consulship In Pis. When as all the cause was of the Consuls and Senate both the Consuls and Senate had need of my help CAP. 24. Notations Q. What is notations A. Notation is the interpretation of a name Q. What are names A. Names truely are notes of things Q. May there not be rendred a reason of the names A. Yes either from the deriation or composition if they be made by true notation from some first argument Q. Give example A. Homo ab humo Ovid. Fast. 6. â—tat vi terra sua vi stando vesta vocatur Q. Shew the force of this example A. This is a notation from the cause Q. Give another example A. At focus à flammis quod fovit omnia dictus Q. Shew the force of this example A. This is a notation from the effects Q. Give another example A. Vir. 4. O Verrea praeclaraâ— quid enim accessisti quo non attuleris tecum istum diem enim quam tu domum quam urbem adiisti quod fanum denique quod non eversum atque extersum reliqueris quare appellentur sanè ista Verrea quae non ex nomine sed ex moribus naturâque tuâ constituta esse videantur Q. Shew the force of this example A. This is also a notation from the effects Q. Give another example A. Ovid. Fast. 1. Prima dies tibi carna datur dea cardinis haec est Nomine clausa aperit claudit aperâ—â— suo Q. Wherein is the force of this exaÌ„ple A. This is a notation from the subjects in the inward about which the deity of this goddesse is exercised Q. Give another example A. From the adjuncts there is â— notation from Bambalion Phil. 2. Quia balbus stupidus hinc igituâ— cavillatio in Antonium generum Tuâ— conjugis bonae foeminae locupletatiâ— quidem certè Bambalio quidem pater hoâ—o nullo numero nihil illo contemptius qui propter haesitantiam linguae stuporémque cordis cognomen ex contumelia traxerit Q. Shew the force of this example A. This is a notation from adjuncts Q. Are there not notations also from disagreeings A. Yes Q. Give example A. Quint. lib. 1. cap. 6. Lucus quia umbra opacus parum luceatâ— ludus quia sit longissimè a lusu dis quia minimè dives Q. May not notation be also from comparatives A. Yes Q. Give example A. Pyropus quod ignis flammam imitetur Q. But is there not as to the notation to his name so an affection of the name to the notation A. Yes Q. Give example A. Animi plenus ergo animosus Q. Shew the contrary A. Animosus ergo animi plenus CAP. 25. Distribution Q.
viz. the beast-like heads of the multitude and therefore he deceiveth divers wayes he beginneth in the middle there oftentimes he comprehendeth the first to conclude the last he placeth an uncertain and an unthought of chance So as Horace saith Homer disposeth his Iliads Ne doth this man Troyes wars divide so well He alwayes maketh haste th' event to tell Even in the midst his reader he doth catch Leaves off his tract with haste from it doth snatch And thus he lies thus mingles false with true So that ne first nor midst in it I view Q. Proceede to furtâ—er example A. So Virgil taketh AEneas from Sicilia and makes a narration of him in the banquet of Carthage and at last bringeth in his diverse troubles So the Commedian Poets although with great judgment they have distinguished their Comedies by acts and scenes yet do so effect that all things seem to be done by chance The Orators attribute all to victory Therfore this seemeth to be placed chiefly by them not so much to teach as to perswade when as also those things which do equally excell are kept even unto the last and the means are conferred into the middle according to Homers disposition FINIS A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORICK Containing in substance All that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three Books of that Subject Except onely what is not applicable to the English TONGUE A BRIEF Of the ART of RHETORICK The first Book CHAP. 1. That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the passions of the Iudge but chiefly in Proofes And that this Art is profitable WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse some by chance but some by method This method may be discovered and to discover Method is al one with teaching an Art If this Art consisted in Criminations only and the skill to stirre up the Judges to Anger Envy Feare Pity or other affections a Rhetorician in well ordered Common wealths and States where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing could have nothing at all to say For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question And that which the pleader is to shew and the Judge to give sentence on is this only 'T is so or not so The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker who judging of universals and future things could not be corrupted Besides 't is an absurd thing for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to use It consisteth therfore chiefly in Proofes which are Inferences and all Inferences being Sllyogismes a Logician if he would observe the difference between a plain Syllogisme and an Enthymeme which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme would make the best Rhetorician For all Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick Whether they inferre truth or probability and because without this Art it would often come to pass that evill men by the advantage of naturall abillities would carry an evil cause against a good it brings with it at least this profit that making the pleaders even in skill it leaves the oddes only in the merit of the cause Besides ordinarily those that are Judges are neither patient nor capable of long Scientificall proofes drawne from the principles through many Syllogismes and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall and shorter way Lastly it were ridiculous to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body and not to be ashamed of being inferiour in the vertue of wel expressing the mind CHAP. 2. The Definition of Rhetorick RHetorick is that Faculty by which wee understand what wil serve our turne concerning any subject to win beliefe in the hearer Of those things that beget beleefe some require not the help of Art as Witnesses Evidences and the like which we invent not but make use of and some require Art and are invented by us The beleefe that proceedes from our invention comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker partly from the passions of the hearer but especially from the proofes of what we alledge Proofes are in Rhetorick either Examples or Enthymemes as in Logick Inductions or Syllogismes For an Example is a short Induction and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme out of which are leâ—t as superfluous that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer to avoid prolixity and not to consume the time of publick business needlesly CHAP. 3. Of the severall kinds of Orations and of the Principles of Rhetorick IN all Orations the Hearer does either hear only or judge also If he heare onely that 's one kind of Oration and is called Demonstrative If he judg he must judg either of that which is to come or of that which is past If of that which is to come ther 's another kind of Oration and is called Deliberative If of that which is past then 't is a third kind of Oration called Iudiciall So there are three kinds of Orations Demonstrative Iudiciall Deliberative To which belong their proper times To the Demonstrative the Present To the Iudiciall the Past and to the Deliberative the time to come And their proper Offices To the Deliberative Exhortation and Dehortation To the Iudiciall Accusation and Defence And to the Demonstrative Praysing and Dispraysing And their proper ends To the Deliberative to Prove a thing Profitable or Unprofitable To the Iudiciall Iust or Unjust To the Demonstrative Honourable or Dishonourable The Principles of Rhetorick out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn are the common opinions that men have concerning Profitable and Unprofitable Iust and Vnjust Honourable and Dishonourable which are the points in the severall kinds of Orations questionable For as in Logick where certain and infallible knowledg is the scope of our proofe the Principles must be all infallible truths so in Rhetorick the Principles must be common opinions such as the Judg is already possessed with because the end of Rhetorick is victory which consists in having gotten beleefe And because nothing is Profitable Unprofitable Iust Unjust Honourable or Dioshonourable but what has been done or is to be done and nothing is to be done that is not possible and because there be degrees of Profitable Unprofitable Iust Unjust Honourable and Dishonourable an Orator must be ready in other Principles namely of what is done and not done possible and not possible to come and not to come and what is Greater and what is Lesser both in general and particularly applyed to the thing in question as what is more and less generally and what is more profitable and less profitable c. particularly CHAP. 4. Of the subject of Deliberatives and the abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of businesse of State IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject wherin and the ends whereto the Oratour exhorteth or from which he dehorteth The Subject is alwayes somthing in our own power the knowledg whereof belongs not to Rhetorick but for the most part
to the Politicks and may be referred in a maner to these five heads 1. Of levying of mony To which point he that will speak as he ought to do ought to know before hand the revenue of the State now much it is and wherin it consisteth and also how great are the necessary charges and expences of the same This knowledge is gotten partly by a mans owne experience partly by Relations and accounts in writing 2. Of Peace and Warre Concerning which the Counsellor or Deliberator ought to know the strength of the Commonwealth how much it both now is and hereafter may be and wherein that power consisteth Which knowledge is gotten partly by experience and Relations at home and partly by the sight of Wars and of their events abroad 3. Of the safeguard of the Country Wherein he onely is able to give counsell that knows the forms and number and places of the Garrisons 4. Of Provision Wherein to speak well it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State what Commodities they have at home growing what they must setch in through need and what they may carry out through abundance 5. Of making Laws To which is necessary so much Politicall or Civill Philosophy as to know what are the severall kinds of Governments and by what means either from without or from within each of those kinds is preserved or destroyed And this knowledge is gotten partly by observing the several Governments in times past by History and partly by observing the Government of the times present in severall Nations by Travell So that to him that will speak in a Councell of State there is necessary this History Sight of Wars Travel Knowledge of the Revenue Expences Forces Havens Garrisons Wares and Provisions in the State he lives in and what is needfull for that State either to export or import CHAP. 5. Of the ends which the Orator in Deliberatives propoundeth whereby to exhort or dehort AN Orator in exhorting always propoundeth Felicity or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto and in Dehortation the contrary By Felicity is meant commonly Prosperity with vertue or a continuall content of the life with surety And the parts of it are such things as we call good in body mind or fortune such as these that follow 1. Nobility which to a State or Nation is to have been antient inhabitants and to have had most antiently and in most â—umber famous Generals in the Wars or men famous for such things as fall under emulation And to a private man to have been descended lawfully of a family which hath yeilded most antiently and in most number men known to the world for vertue riches or any thing in generall estimation 2. Many and good Children Which is also publick and private Publick when there is much youth in the State endued with vertue namely of the body stature beauty strength and dexterity Of the mind valour and temperance Private when a man hath many such Children both Male and Female The vertues commonly respected in women are of the body Beauty and Stature Of the mind Temperance and Houswifery without sordidnesse 3. Riches Which is Money Cattel Lands Houshold-stuffe with the power to dispose of them 4. Glory Which is the reputation of Vertue or of the possession of such things as all or most men or wise men desire 5. Honour Which is the glory of benefitting or being able to benefit others To benefit others is to contribute somewhat not easily had to another mans safety or riches The parts of Honour are Sacrifices Monuments Rewards Dedication of places Precedence Sepulchres Statues publick Pensions Adorations Presents 6. Health Which is the being free from Diseases with strength to use the body 7. Beauty Which is to different Ages different To Youth strength of body and sweetnesse of aspect To full men strength of body fit for the Wars and Countenance sweet with a mixture of Terrour To old men strength enough for necessary labours with a Countenance not displeasing 8. Strength Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover To move is to pull to put off to lift to thrust down to presse together 9. Stature Which is then just when a man in heighth breadth and thicknesse of body doth so exceed the most as neverthelesse it be no hinderance to the quicknesse of his motion 10. Good old Age. Which is that which comes late and with the least trouble 11. Many and good Friends Which is to have many that will do for his sake that which they thinke will be for his good 12. Prosperity Which is to have all or the most or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune 13. Vertue Which is then to be defined when we speak of Praise These are the grounds from whence we exhort Dehortation is from the contraries of these CHAP. 6. Of the Colours or common opinions concerning Good and Evill IN Deliberatives the Principles or Elements from whence we draw our Proofes are common Opinions concerning Good and Evill And these Principles are either Absolute or Comparative And those that are Absolute are either Disputable or Indisputable The Indisputable Principles are such as these Good is that which we love for it self And that for which we love some what else And that which all â—hings desire And that to every man which his reason dictates And that which when we have we are well or satisfied And that which satisfies And the Cause or Effect of any of these And that which preserves any of these And that which keepes off or destroyes the contrary of any of these Also to take the Good and reject the Evill is Good And to take the greater Good rather then the lesse and the lesser Evill rather then the greater Further all Vertues are Good And Pleasure And all things Beautifull And Justice Valour Temperance Magnanimity Magnificence and other like habits And Health Beauty Strength c. And Riches And Friends And Honour and Glory And Ability to say or do also Towardliness Will and the like And Whatsoever Art or Science And Life And Whatsoever is Just. The Disputable Principles are such as follow That is Good whose contrary is Evill And whose contrary is good for our Enemies And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of And of which there cannot be too much And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed And that which many desire And that which is praised And that which even our Enemies and evill men praise And What good me prefer And What we do advise And that which is Possible is Good to undertake And that which is Easie. And that which depends on our own Will And that which is proper for us to do And what no man else can do And whatsoever is Extraordinary And what is sutable And that which wants a little of being at an end And what we hope to master And
do Good And to receive Good And to help up again one that 's fallen And to finish that which is unperfect And Imitation And therefore the Art of Painting And the Art of Carving Images And the Art of Poetry And Pictures and Statues And other mens Dangers so they be neer And to have escaped hardly And things of a kind please one another And every one himself And ones own pleases him And to bear Sway. And to be thought Wise. And to dwell upon that which he is good at And ridiculous actions Sayings and Persons CHAP. 12. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the persons that do it or Common Opinious concerning the aptitude of Persons to do Injury OF the Causes which move to Injury namely Profit and Pleasure has been already spoken Chap. 6. 7. 11. It follows next to speak of the Persons that are apt to do Injury The Doers of Injury are Such as think they can do it And such as think to be undiscover'd when they have done it And such as think though they be discover'd they shall not be called in question for it And such as think though they be called in question for it that their Mulct will be lesse then their Gain which either themselves or their friends receive by the Injury Able to do Injury are Such as are Eloquent And such as are practis'd in businesse And such as have skill in Processe And such as have many Friends And Rich Men. And such as have Rich Friends or Rich Servants or Rich Partners Undiscover'd when they have done it are Such are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused as Feeble Men Slaughter Poor and not Beautifull Men Adultery And such as one would think could not chuse but be discovered And such as do Injuries whereof there hath been no Example And such as have none or many enemies And such as can easily conceale what they do And such as have some body to transferre the fault upon They that do Injury openly are Such whose friends have been injured And such as have the Judges foâ— friends And such as can escape their triall at Law And such as can put off their triall And such as can corrupt the Judges And such as can avoid the paiment of their fine And such as can deferre the paiment And such as cannot pay at all And such as by the Injury get manifestly much and presently when the fine is uncertain little and to come And such as get by the Injury money by the penalty shame only And such on the contrary as get honour by the Injury and suffer the mulct of money only or banishment or the like And such as have often escaped or been undiscovered And such as have often attempted in vain And such as consider present pleasure more then pain to come and so intemperate men are apt to do Injury And such as consider pleasure to come more then present pain and so temperate men are apt to do Injury And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune Nature Necessity or Custome and by Errour rather then by Injustice And such as have means to get pardon And such as want Necessaries as poor men or Unnecessaries as rich menâ— And such as are of very good or very bad Reputation CHAP. 13. Presumptions of Injury drawne from the Persons that suffer and from the matter of the Injury OF those that doe Injury and why they do it it hath been already spoken Now of the persons that suffer and of the Matter wherein they suffer the common Opinions are these Persons obnoxious to Injury are Such as have the things that we want either as necessary or as delightfull And such as are far from us And such as are at hand And such as are unwary and Creâ—dulous And such as are Lazy And such as are Modest. And such as have swallowed many Injuries And such as we have injured often before And such as never before And such as are in our danger And such as are ill belov'd generally And such as are envied And our Friends And our Enemies And such as wanting friends have no great ability either in speech or action And such as shall be loosers by going to Law as Strangers and Workmen And such as have done the Injuries they suffer And such as have committed a crime or would have done or are about to do And such as by doing them an Injury we shall gratifie our friends or superiours And such whose friendship we have newly left and accuse And such as another would do the Injury to if we should not And such as by injuring we get greater means of doing good The Matters wherein men are obnoxious to Injury are Those things wherein all or most men use to deal unjustly And those things which are easily hid and put off into other hands or altered And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered And those things wherein prosecution of Injury may be thought a love of contention CAP. 14. Of those things which are necessary tâ— be known for the Definition of Just and Unjust WHen the fact is evident the next inquiry is whether it be just or unjust For the Definition of Iust and Unjust we must know what Law is thaâ— is what the Law of Nature what the Law of Nations what the Law Civil what written Law and what unwritten Law is and what Persons that is what a publick Person or the City is and what a private Person or Citizen is Vnjust in the opinion of all men is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature Vnjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffick and come together is that which is contrary to the Law common to those Nations Vnjust onely in one Common-wealth is that which is contrary to the Law Civill or Law of that Common-wealth He that is accused to have done any thing against the Publick or a private Person is accused to do it either ignorantly or unwillingly or in anger or upon premeditation And because the defendant does many times confesse the fact but deny the unjustice as that he took but did not steal and did but not adultery it is necessary to know the Definitions of Theft Adultery and all other crimes VVhat facts are contrary to the written Lawes may be known by the Lawes themselves Besides written Lawes whatsoever is Iust proceeds from Equity or Goodness From Goodness proceeds that which we are praysed or honored for From Equity proceed those actions which though the written Law command not yet being interpreted reasonably and supplyed seems to require at our hands Actions of Equity are such as these Not too rigorously to punish Errors Mischances or Injuries To pardon the faults that adhere to Mankind And not to consider the Law so much as the Law-makers mind and not the Words so much as the meanâ—â—â— of the Law And not to regard so much the Fact as the intention of the Doer nor
if you speak untruth you shall please men therefore by all means be an Orator A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing and approve another as We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury for all men discommend injustice Again We ought to warre against the Athenians for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy that is is no liberty but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve A fifteenth from Proportion as seeing we naturalize strangers for their vertues why should we not banish this stranger for his vices A sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents as He that denies the immortality of the Gods is no worse then he that has written the generation of the Gods For the same Consequence follows of both that somtimes there are none A seventeenth from that that men change their mind as If when we were in banishment we fought to recover our Countrey why should we not fight now to retain it An eighteenth from a fained end as that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him not as more valiant then another but as one that would partake lesse of the glory A nineteenth from the Cause as if he would infer he did it from this that he had cause to do it A twentieth from that which is Incredible but True as that Lawes may need a Law to mend them as well as Fish bred in the salt water may need salting CHAP. 25. Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility LEt the first Place be from inspection of Times Actions or Words either of the Adversary or of the Speaker or Both. Of the Adversary as He sayes he loves the People and yet he waâ— in the conspiracy of the Thirty Of the Speaker as He sayes I am contentious and yet I never began sute Of Both as He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth whereas I have ransomed divers ciâ—izens with mine own mony A second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amisse and serves for men of good reputation that are accused as The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen imbracing her Son was absolved as soon as she made appear that she imbraced him upon his arrivall from far by way of Salutation A third from rendring of the cause as Leodamas to whom it was objected that he had under the thirty Tyrants defaced the Inscription which the People had set up in a Pillar of his Ignominy answered He had not done it because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand thereby to indear himselfe to the Tyrants by the testimony of the Peoples hatred A fourth from better Counsel as He might have done better for himself therfore he did not this But this Place deceives when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact A fifth from the Incompatibility of the things to be done as They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funerall of Leucothea were told that if they thought her a Goddesse they ought not to mourn and if they thought her a Mortall they ought not to sacrifice A sixth which is proper to Iudicial Orations from an Inference of Errour as If he did it not he was not wise therfore he did it Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility please more then Ostensive for they compare and put contraries together whereby they are the better set off and more conspicuous to â—hâ— Auditor Of all Enthymemes they be best which we assent to as soon as hear For such consent pleaseth us and makes us favourable to the speaker CHAP. 26. Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes OF seeming Enthymemes one Place may be from the form of speaking as when a man has repeated divers Sentences he brings in his conclusion as if it follow'd necessarily though it do not A second from an ambiguous word A third from that which is true divided to that which is false joyned as that of Orestes It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father therefore I justly killed my Mother Or from that which is true joyned to that which is false divided as one cup of Wine and one cup of Wine are hurtâ—ull therefore one cup of Wine is hurtfull A fourth from amplification of the Crime For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies nor does the Accuser seem when he is Passionate to want ground for his Accusation A fifth from signes as when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life A sixth from that which comes by Chance as if from this that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius a man should conclude that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boyes were profitable A seventh from the Consequence as Banishment is to be desired because a banish'd man has choice of places to dwell in An eighth from making that the cause which is not as In Demosthenes his government the war began therefore Demosthenes governed well With the Peloponnesian war began the Plague therefore â—ericles that perswaded that war did ill A ninth from the omission of some Circumstance as Helen did what was lawfull when she ran away with Paris because she had her Fathers consent to chuse her owne Husband which was true onely during the time that she had not chosen A tenth from that which is probable in some case to that which is probable simply as 'T is probable he fore-saw that if he did it he should be suspecteâ— therefore 't is probable he did it not From this Place one may inferre both ways that he did it not For if he be not likely to do it it may be thought he did it not again if he were likely to do it it may be thought he did it not for this that he knew he should be suspected Upon this Place was grounded the Art which was so much detested in Protagoras of making the better causâ— seem the worse the worse the better CHAP. 27. Of the wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme or by an Objection The Places of opposite Syllogisme are the same with the Places of Syllogismes or Enthymemes for a Rhetoricall Syllogisme is an Enthymeme The Places of Objections are four First from the same as To the Adversary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme may be objected that no â—aâ—t is good and yet Love is want or particularly thus The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good The second from Contraries as if the Adversary say A good man does good to his friends an Objection might be made that then an evill man will do also evill to his friends 3. From Similitude as thuâ— if the Adversary say all men that are injured do â—ate those that have