bee freed from hatred SHall the Prince free himselfe there-from if hee bee r Sen. de Clem. slow to punish delinquents and thereby giue testimony to the world that his intent is rather to heale and bind vp a soare then to launch and make it bleed by the arme of Iustice Or shall hee this way free himselfe if hee neuer punish but Å¿ Sen. de Clem. when the safety of the Common wealth calleth vpon him so to do or at least his Subiects be so perswaded Or shall hee this way rather bee freed if hee t Cic. 2. de Offic. neuer exact to take punishment of delinquents in an angry moode Or may he this way auoide his Subiects hatred if hee u Sen. 1. de Clem. shew noâ— any signes of reioycing when hee inflicteth punishment vpon offendours as though he thirsted after bloud or were delighted with the shedding of it Or rather may this be his way that when many haue offended hee do not x Tacit. Agric. now and then call them to account as hee listeth holding them in a perpetuall feare but take his aduantage against all and punish all forthwith Or rather by this way may he be freed therefrom by not deuising any new kind of punishments but inflicting those which haue beene in vse according to old and ancient custome of the Country Or may he this way likewise free himselfe if hee be very sparing in punishing of delinquents and when he doth it hee might bee thought to command it to bee inflicted against his will but neuer to bee a spectator thereof Or finally may hee thus free himselfe there-from if to please his subiects hee diuert the force of his fury another way y Tacit. 13. Annal. causing such as haue beene his counsellours and perswaders to wrong the Common-wealth to taste the cup of his choler by inflicting seuere punishments vpon them or deliuering them into the peoples hands to be tormented 8 It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himselfe of that hatred which hee hath purchased by vexing his Subiects with Impositions Taxes Tallages c. which are commonly grieuous to them to beare MAy this be done if the Prince perswade the people z Tacit. 13. Annal that if they will liue in peace and out of danger that it is altogether necessary they indure such impositions which if they should not it were impossible for them to liue in safety or the State to bee durable For a Tacit. 4. hist peace is not purchased but by Armes nor Armes maintained but by Souldiers well paid nor can the Souldier be paid without leuying of Subsidies Or shall the Prince free himselfe if hee command the gatherers of such Impositions that they b Idem Ibid. neither by force nor fraude exact more of the Subiect then anciently hath beene accustomed to be paid Or shall hee rather this way auoide their hatred if sparingly as iust occasion inforceth him hee impend and lay out such treasure as hath beene leuied by Subsidies that his Subiects may see and perceiue that hee is but a Steward for the good of the Common-wealth and no riotous spender or exhauster of the treasure so gathered or that he hath any desire to conuert any of it to his owne vse or ends Or shall hee thus rather free himselfe by taking of a course that c Plin. Paneg. iust and vniforme contribution be made according to euery mans ability neuer by fauour sparing one man that the burthen may lye the heauier vpon another mans shoulders 9 It may further be demanded how and by what meanes a great and potent Subiect may auoide and shunne the hatred of his Prince MAy this be effected if this great Noble man make himselfe first odious to the people Or shall hee better effect it if hee shew himselfe very dutifull and obsequious to his Prince praising all his good deeds and sayings and craftily dissembling whatsoeuer is bad in him Or shall hee attaine therevnto if hee d This was the practise of Antipater one of Alexanders Captaines as Q. Curt. reporteth neuer proiect to make himselfe great strengthen himselfe with friends or seeke to bee maister of greater riches then is conuenient for his estate Or if fortune haue east all these things vpon him that hee acknowledge continually that hee hath receiued gained and gotten them by the grace and fauour of his Prince whose they are whensoeuer he shall please to make vse of them Or shall hee this way auoide his Princes displeasure if he haue a speciall care to e This was the practise of Ioab Dauids Generall attempt or do nothing without consulting with or obtaining the consent of his Prince though otherwise hee were assured that hee could preuaile in his attempts and that it would turne to the good of his Country Or shall hee this way shunne it if being for a certaine time made Deputy Lieutenant General or raised and euected to any other speciall place and dignity he f The praictse of Antipater and Lucius Lucullus forth-with at the end and expiration of his time resigne his office to his Princes hands and in no wise seeme to be desirous that it be prolonged or continued vnto him least hee should seeme to be sick of the swelling humours of Ambition Or may hee this way auoide it if hauing wonne and prouing victor in diuers battels hee impute the glory of his Conquests to the good fortune of his Prince desiring that the victorious Army may now bee led by some other whom the Prince shall thinke good of and retiring put himselfe into his Princes protection carrying himselfe in a moderate fashion as free from pride and ambition By this onely meanes a great Generall though suspected and feared of his Prince may so mollifie and lenifie his minde that hee shall haue no cause to thinke ill of him but shall make to himselfe great and apparant reasons to reward him for his good seruices 10 It may further bee demanded why euery Kingdome is so fickle and vnstable IS it because that euery g Sen. Oedip. Idem etiam Ep. xcij. Principality is the obiect of Fortune who can neuer be daunted but challengeth the like priuiledge against Empires as Emperours Or may this bee the reason rather because it is exposed to such and so many hatreds as the Tragicall h Senec. Theb. Poet sung The Maker of the world coupled these two together Hatred and a Kingdome Or may this be the cause for that it is subiect to so many h Attius treasons treacheries c. for there bee very many in a Kingdome which bee naught and vnfaithfull few good 11 To the same purpose it may bee demanded why among the Grecians and Romanes i Senec. Theb. a Kingdom was so hatefull for the most part DId this come to passe by reason of the k Idem Agam. manners and crooked dispositions of their Princes who being for the most part
Millitary Discipline Or is it not gotten by these meanes alone but by f Tacit. 11. Annal firme counsell and wary circumspection also Or may it be attained vnto by making g Arist Rhet. ad Alex Cap. Vltim firme leagues and sure peace with forraigne Princes Or to conclude may it bee gotten by the h Quint. Curt. lib. 8. benefite of fortune who most what doth maruailously fauour and aduance some speciall sorts of men 3 It may further bee demanded what might bee the reason that those men who are ambitious and haue an itching desire to bee inuested with the gouernment of States if they once bee euected to some eminent place in the Common-wealth i So it fared with Iohn of Gaunt Duke of Lancaster and Thomas Woodstocke Duke of Glocester protectors of Rich. the 2. And with Rich. the 3. protector of Edw. the 5. c. they are neuer contented but striue and endeuour to rise higher and higher and if once they can surprize the State they wil rather die then come afterwards to leade a priuate life COmmeth it thus to passe for that all k Mach. disp lib. 1. cap. 37. men euen by nature are apt and prone to desire great matters though they bee not so fitted and accommodated in themselues to obtaine and keepe them Now where the desire is more then the ability to get the minde can neuer be at quiet or contented with those things which already it doth enioy Or is it for that l Guicchardinus Ambition of it selfe blindeth the eyes of men perswading them that their merites and deserts are greater then indeed they bee and thereupon they affect and attempt strange matters and run head-strong courses to their owne destructions oftentimes Or may this bee the reason for that hee who once hath had his temples circled with a Crowne can neuer after brooke a priuate life because Kings and Kingdomes are euer to bee thought and beleeued to exceed proportion 4 It may further bee demanded what man may rightly be censured and deemed to be ambitious IS hee so to bee deemed and taken who vnder m Aul. Pol. pretence of amplyfying and enlarging the dignity Royall will seeke to dominere ouer others and rule all things according to his owne lusts without cause or reason changing the auncient Officers though neuer so honest at his will and pleasure and suffecting others into their places whom hee well knoweth to be of his owne faction and when time shall serue will fauour his party Or may hee likewise be thought ambitious who with great n Tholoz lib. 22 gifts large promises and all kind and friendly Offices seeketh to conciliate and get the fauour and good will of the people whereby hee may be one step higher to his rising 5 It may further bee demanded why all the Arts cunning and practises by which ambitious men study to climbe to the height of greatnesse are kept so secret that they hardly or neuer burst out or come to be knowne till they haue obtained what they sought for COmmeth it so to passe for that o Mach. disp lib. prim Cap. 46. men do not by and by and as it were vpon the sodaine but by degrees grow ambitious whose progresses being not obserued except of some few they may more easily deceiue and blind mens eyes Or may this rather be the reason for that the ambitious do alwaies p Idem Ibidem vse some honest pretext whereby they may compasse their designes as though all their actions did tend and bend to these ends least the Common-wealth forsooth or themselues should be wronged when the truth is that they striue to get the garland that thereby they may both oppresse others and the weale Publick 6 It may further be demanded how and by what safe meanes it may be prouided for that a man shall not grow too ambitious and insolent in a State or if hee should how his insolency may bee repressed and nipt in the head whilst it is yet in the bud MAy this bee effected if there should neuer way be giuen or meanes affoorded to create or erect any such office or eminent dignity in the Common-wealth out of the which the State might haue cause to feare least in processe of time Tyranny might take her first rising and beginning there-from Or may it rather thus bee compassed if the State take heed and with wary circumspection prouide q Aristophanes in Ranis that they neuer foster cherish orbring vp any Lyons Whelpe much lesse the Lyon himselfe within their Territo ries Or may it thus likewise be done if such wormes and r Tholoz lib. 22. moaths which breed of too much moisture and are wont to consume those things whereof they had their beginnings bee choked or shaken off before they come to any great bignesse or turne the whole Substance of that they feed vpon into their owne Or may it thus likewise bee brought to passe if heed be taken that if by the heate of the bosome of the Common-wealth there bee hatched and nourished any dangerous serpent it bee Å¿ The errour of the Athenians and Florentiues that they would not doe after this Counsell timously exposed to the cold which is the onely way to kill it yet neuer suffer it to hisse other where in a place more commodious least by sucking out the poyson thereof there might follow a deeper stinging Or may this also be effected if heed be taken that the t The practise of Rich. the 2. against the Duke of Hereford and Tho. Mowbray Duke of Norfolke For the King feared Heref. least hauing the loue of the people hee should haue vanquisht Mowbray and so hee banished them both and least also it might haue fallen out that the Duke of Heref. should haue gotten the victory so haue graced himselfe ambitious bee neuer permitted to ingage himselfe in any publique businesse especially neuer employed in Martiall affaires least by the well managing thereof he draw vnto himselfe credit and estimation with the Common-people which hee abusing might afterwards turne to the hurt and dammage of the Weale Publique Or may it bee brought to passe by this menes also if diuers of his u Tholoz lib. 22. owne ranke and quality do bandy with him and of set purpose oppose his proceedings the munition and all other warlike furniture being in the meane time vnder the command of the Prince or Common-wealth Or may this finally be effected if x Mach. disâ— lib. 1. cap. 52. hinderance be giuen to his ambitious designes by the same waies meanes and instruments which he himselfe vsed to climbe to the top of his desires 7 It may lastly be demanded wherefore the more eminent Cities as in particular it may truely bee instanced in and of this Honour able Citie of y So Ia cke Straw his rebellion begun in Kent in the time of Rich. the 2. who was flame by the Right Honourable William Walworth
it hath beene thought fit by some of the wisest heads that euer haue beene that such a Prince should neuer bee without an enemy or be a great nourisher of factions in a forreigne Land Which course if Rome had taken and not destroyed Carthage they should haue had their braue spirited youth better trayned vp practised and made ready in feates of Armes which might haue steeded the Common-wealth for offence or defence thereof Graue and mature counsell should haue flourished in the Senate the Citizens should not haue wasted themselues with ciuill warres and so the Empire should haue beene more durable and lasting The reasons of those who hold it vnprofitable and euery way disaduantageous to a Prince to nourish factions are as follow It is k Mach. lib. 3. dis cap. 37. impossible say they by reason of an inbred inconstancy in the nature of men that those factions which at this or that present depend vpon a Prince should alwaies and after one and the selfe-same manner bee so affected towards him for that men being wauering doe greatly desire sometimes this Prince sometimes that Prince to be their chiefe Patron Againe l Idem Ibidem the nourshing of factions by a Prince in a forreigne Land is oftentimes the cause that by little and little discords and ciuill garboyles are brought into his owne Country which will scarcely be thought to bee conuenient Further a great inconuenience or rather an apparant losse might happen to a Prince who should nourish factions within his owne Dominions For m Idem Prin. cap. 20. vpon any sodaine inuasion such Cities of his which should happen to bee rent asunder by factions must of necessity be all lost For the n Tholoz lib. de Repub. 23. weaker part would rather submit and apply it selfe to a stranger then yeeld to the aduerse faction in any thing Moreouer this course of gouerning by nourishing of factions must needs o Mach. Prin. cap. 20. argue the weakenesse and imbecility of the Prince both in power and iudgement For if hee were strong and prudent hee would neuer indure that his Country should bee torne in peeces by factions and contentions To conclude seeing that euery faction consisteth of few or many both of these must needs bee hurtfull to the Common-wealth This latter for that p Liu. lib. 34. they trusting to their owne strength would presently take Armes and turne the quiet of the State into garboiles The former likewise though perhaps somewhat more secretly and slowly would no lesse vexe and molest the Common-wealth by reason that q Arist 5. Polit. cap. 4. factions of the Nobility are wont to draw vnto themselues all or the greatest part of the Commons to take part with such or such of them as they most affect These things thus standing they conclude that factions are rather to bee extinguished and quenched then nourished For mine owne part Right Honourable though I will determine nothing of this matter yet thus I thinke thereof That Factions to the singular benefite of the Prince and Common-wealth may be nourished in a forreigne gouernement and though it were not so conuenient perhaps they should bee set on foote and maintained at home yet at no hand are they to be neglected especially in the time of peace For seeing that there is no Common-wealth which doth not breed and bring forth yea foster and cherish some enuy and contention these contentions may proue healthfull to the State of a Common-wealth as Agues are sometime beneficiall to the state of a mans body And it is certaine that the Romane Common-wealth was neuer in better health and safety then when the Tribunes of the People and the Patricians were at variance and the Lacedaemonian State neuer in better state then when their Ephori and their Kings could not agree For by this curbing of one another the publique Offices of a Common-wealth were better discharged both at home and abroad SECT I. CHAP. XIIII Of Sedition Mutiny and defection of the greatest part of the people in a State and of standing Newtrall or part taking 1 It may be demanded whence sedition and mutining in or against a State taketh his beginning MAY it arise and spring out of the bitter a Tholoz Aristotle 5. Pol. Cap. 3. roote of oppression as when men apprehending the remedy of present euils and dangers to bee the euils and dangers themselues doe vpon a sodaine breake out and so take Armes Or may it proceede b Idem Ibidem of feare as the Phylosopher well conceited For feare may moue and incite men to bee seditious fearing or expecting punishments to be inflicted vpon them for the wrongs they haue done and by this meanes running out they thinke or at least are willing to preuent them before they can bee put in execution Or may this proceed of too much indulgency clemency and remissnesse of the gouernement together with the superfluity and aboundance of all things it being rather the nature of the people to c Liuy lib. 2. grow to bee Wantons then Warriours Or may it come rather of d Salust Sugurth penury and scarcity of things necessary Or may it happen through the e Liu. lib. 38. pride and ambition of euill Gouernours and Councellours Or may it rather arise of taking vp too much mony at Vse with the which the Commons being as it were eaten vp and their states consumed they grow desperate thereupon and so take Armes thinking f Tacit. 1. Hist. themselues most safe when they runne the most vncertaine courses for worse then they are they thinke they cannot bee 2 It may further bee demanded whether when once sedition groweth hot and commeth to Heads it were better to stand Newtrall then to fall to part-taking TOuching this Question Right Honourable vnlesse that g Solon great Athenian Law-giuer had decreed and established by Law that vpon any sedition arising in that State h Sic refert A. Gaellius in Noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12. he that would not take part with one side should bee banished the Citie and loose all that euer hee possessed I should scarce haue thought it worth the looking into but after so wise a man had determined it and for that I perceiued others who thought themselues as wise as the said Law giuer did stiffely stand against his opinion and vpon good grounds as they suppose produced arguments to the contrary I thought it worthy my labour likewise to put downe the reasons on both sides and in conclusion to enterpone mine own priuate opinion touching the premisses Those therefore who stand on Solons side and allow and stand for part-taking doe thus argue i A. Gaellius noct Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12. If the good men which be in the Citie or Common-wealth perceiuing the Seditious to bee madded with fury and to grow to an head should apply themselues to either part there is no doubt but that they might bee a meanes to reduce them to vnity perswading first with their owne side how ill beseeming a thing it is for Citizen to striue with or take Armes against Citizen and what destruction of them and theirs may ensue if they suffer themselues still to be led with passion and by that meanes mollifying their owne friends minds they may happily get leaue likewise to deale with the other side in those or such like termes and so perswade both parties to lay downe their weapons Againe k Phauorinus Philosophus those which take part with neither side if the differences of the factious should once bee compounded should smart for it being hated on both sides deemed as publique enemies and such as solaced themselues and reioyced to see them at those oddes and therefore are iustly exposed to the prey and iniuries of either party Further it were very dangerous when the Citie or Common-wealth is diuided into faction not to take part with the one or the other side least a l Iosephus de bello Iudaico third faction should spring out of the others as hath sometimes beene read to haue falne out in the Iewes Common-wealth But those which stand for newtrality think otherwise and thus they reason m Tacit. Annal. Ciuill Armes of themselues can neither be prouided taken vp or managed by any good or lawfull meanes and the issue and end of them commonly proueth naught For the Leaders and Captaines of the seditious vnder the pretence of seeking the good of the Common wealth do euery one seeke to promote his owne ambitious humours and so draw the people to follow their fancies which no good Patriote ought to do Againe it argueth great folly in any who shal take either part and ioyne with the seditious for by that meanes they n Salust in bello Iugâ—rthino strengthen and encourage them encrease their malice towards their Countrey-men and fellow-Citizens of the aduerse partie and become partakers of their rebellions madnesse and folly Touching mine owne priuate opinion herein I think right Honourable that newtrality is regularly to be auoyded in either Prince or Courtier except in some maine case where a man by making shew to be newtrall may more handsomly compouud and contriue his owne businesse and better promote and sooner come to his owne ends FINIS
almost ready to come forth I haue resuted Euidently prouing that the Church being a part of the State it cannot bee without apparant danger to the same to admit of forraigne Iurisdiction in managing matters Ecclesiasticall but that such affaires ought alwaies to bee ordered by those who beare the Soueraignety or some other by their appointment within the same State 3 It may bee further demanded wherefore the h Liu. lib. 7. hist Rom. Romanes alwaies confessed and acknowledged that they were more obliged and indebted to Numa then to Romulus THis question Right Honourable out of the Romanes owne History is thus resolued Affirming that Romulus though founder of their Citty left little or nothing vnto them but their names to be called Romanes But Numa being the chiefe bringer in of Religion perpetuated the same and seemed to giue vnto them their very essence and being and as it were to cause the prosperous successe of their State For Romulus saith the History brought in the forme of a Common wealth which was likely not to be durable but might end with himselfe But his Successor Numa vpon the bringing in the continuall practise and exercise of Religion did in such wise forme and frame the Common-wealth that though himselfe should shortly die yet there was left an euident meane and way to make it durable for many ages 4 To the same purpose it may be demanded wherefore the i Liu. lib. 10. Hist Rom. Romanes did make more account of Religion then all other Nations VVAs it because they plainely saw that the setling Religion in the State was the firmest prop they could rely vpon for the vpholding conseruing and perpetuating of their Common-wealth and that it would serue most fitly for the bringing in of Military Discipline and Armes to which they were most addicted and without which they iudged their State could not stand Or was it rather for that they vnder this pretence as those who knew how to make vse of Religion did practise it ore fortunately and with better successe then others to retaine and keepe those which were good in their allegeance and obedience and to curbe and restraine those who were ill disposed from committing euill or persisting and continuing in their lewd courses as likewise to k Liu. lib. 3. Circa legem Terentillam pacifie the seditious l Liu. lib. 3. circa creationem tribulorum plebis consulari dignitate reconcile such Subiects as were iustly offended and grieued with the Rulers and the gouernment m Liu. lib. 5. retaine their Military Discipline and keep their Souldiers in good order n Liu. lib. 10. get credite and authority to their Commanders enterprise warres and to bring them to a happy end 5 Againe it may bee demanded to the same purpose wherefore the Romanes euen in their greatest streights and difficulties did rather vse the pretext and colour of religion to expedite and helpe themselues then any other meanes whatsoeuer WAs it because o Francise Guicciardin they were perswaded that the Common-people did rather iudge by the shadowes then the substances of things Or was it not for that cause alone but rather for that they found by experience that men are more throughly moued and thinke themselues faster tyed vpon an p Liu. lib. 3. oath taken which hath his dependancie vpon Religion then by any Lawes or Statutes whatsoeuer 6 It may further bee demanded wherefore in former times men generally were more religious then they are in these dayes WAs it because that in those elder times there was not that contempt of Religion and neglect of God his seruice as is now in these moderne dayes Or was it rather because in those more happy times it was held altogether vnlawfull for any man to make what construction he list of an oath when hee had taken it and thereout to frame rules of liuing to himselfe according to his owne liking but to fashion his life and manners rather to such lawes as were giuen and imposed vpon him to obserue 7 It may finally be demanded wherefore seeing there is but one truth there are at this day so many and sundry opinions about Religion euen among Christians themselues IS it because the Clergie themselues in diuers poynts disagree being distracted into factions and writing and disputing one against another which the rude and ignorant multitude once seeing do thereby take vpon them to dispute of Diuinitie to establish their fond and foolish opinions in matters of Religion which in no wise belonged vnto them to meddle withall Or may it bee for that sometime yong Schollers either in yeares learning or discretion taking vpon them to preach teach or write doe propound false or vnsound Doctrine to the people whose corrupt opinions once set abroach as though it were a shame for them to change them vpon more mature deliberation into better do continually bestirre themselues and employ their wits rather to confirme then amend their errors Or is this the reason rather for that the followers of any Sect whatsoeuer study to tread in their first Teachers steps and obserue such courses and customes as formerly haue beene prescribed vnto them SECT I. CHAP. II. Of the best forme of a Common-wealth 1 It may bee demanded wherefore according to many mens opinions the Monarchy or sole rule of one ought to be preferred before other formes of gouernement IS it because that a Cic. de legibus lib. 3. Iustinus Hâ—storicus lib. 1 in initio Monarchy is the most ancient kinde of gouernment seeing that the name of Monarchy and Empire was first in the world Or is it because this kinde of gouernement best agreeth to b Salust in Epistolis nature as is to be seene by all or the most of all other creatures in whom this image and shadow of one to rule ouer the rest may plainly appeare Or is it because it is most agreeable to c Tacit. 1. Annal reason that the body of an Empire being but one should likewise be swayed by the discretion of one sole Ruler Or is this rather the reason because that neither in a d Tacit. 4. Annal popular estate where many gouerne nor in an Aristocracie where a few sway the scepter there can be possible any long concord and agreemeÌ„t among them Or is it because that both in e Tacit. 1. Annal Liu. lib. 5. Democracies and Aristocracies it hath bin euer obserued euer great store of good wits which may bee fitted and accomodated to all times and occasions better then other formes of gouernement Or might this rather bee their reason because they obserued that this forme of gouernement was not so subiect to n Arist Polit. 5. alteration or to grow into tyranny For to speake as they would haue the thing to be o The opinion of Machiauel lib. 1. Disputat Cap. 5. though these few of the Clarissimi who sway the gouernement be naturally ambitious notwithstanding when they see
of Princes IS it because they exactly a Guicchardine know not the matters of State the ends of Princes or how farre this or that businesse effected or neglected doth concerne them Or may this rather bee the reason that b Idem forasmuch as the counsels purposes and designes of Princes differ so farre from the drifts and courses of priuate men it is impossible that the selfe-same proiects should be auaileable to them both For it most what so falleth out that although matters of State determinations of businesses and the commodities or discommodities which may be expected to arise thereof should be knowne as well to priuate men as to Princes themselues their applications censures and iudgements notwithstanding touching the premisses would be diuers as their first ends and intentions were which they had propounded to themselues 2 In the next place it may bee demanded wherefore as wee commonly reade in Histories as out of Tacitus and others that that man whose aide and helpe a Prince hath made vse of bring him to the Crowne within a while after is neither liked nor loued of that Prince but either is fed with the smoake of innouation or made shorter by the head IS it because that some Princes being naturally suspicious do esteeme the faith of those to be fickle to them which they haue proued to haue beene to the damage of others Or is not that the reason but this rather that the very sight of them whose helpe they haue vsed to their rising groweth idious vnto them for that it seemeth to vp-braide them with the basenesse of their former meane fortunes Or may it not be so neither but for that it is c Philipus Cominaeus grieuous vnto some Princes to remember that they owe any thing or that they are any waies beholding to their Subiects 3 It may further bee demanded how that Prince who hath bereaued another of his Kingdome might behaue himselfe to enioy his new-got Empire with safety SShall hee effect this if hee d This was the errour of Seruius Tullius King of the Romanes whō Tarquinius Superbus slew affect him whom he hath so spoyled with new fauours and benefites endeuouring thereby to reconcile him and binde him fast vnto him But it is to bee feared that old iniuries will hardly bee forgotten by collating and bestowing of new benefites vpon the wronged especially if the greatnesse of the iniuries exceede the rate of the benefites as it falleth out commonly in the case of Kingdomes Or shall he bring this about the rather if he e This was the practise of Selimus the Turkish Emperor who being but a yonger brother poysoned Baiazet his father made away Corcut and Acomat his two brethren c. So dealt Rich. the 3. with his two nephewes the sonnes of Edward the 4. with the Duke of Buckingham likewise and others murther and kill all those whom he imagineth to stand in his way or whom hee standeth in doubt of least in time they may become his enemies But if he take these courses he must needs fall into some great mischiefe for he shall ingulfe himselfe in the vast Ocean of the peoples hatred and thereby weaken his owne power against the time he should haue most occasion to vse it 4 It may further bee demanded why it so much importeth Princes and great men to be cautelous that they do not iniury or reproach any man IS it for that hee who is wronged of those who are in f Philipus Cominaeus eminent place and authority perceiuing himselfe to bee daily and hourely shot at and noted for the same grieueth the more therat and so sets vp his rest to take a sharp reuenge Or ought they to be cautelous for this cause likewise g Cominaeus least if the wronged hauing formerly retained vnto them or made any dependency vpon them shold vpon any trust committed vnto him pay them home in neglecting or vtterly ouerthrowing their chiefest businesses 5 It may further be demanded why it greatly importeth a Prince to bee Vertuous Honourable of his word iust and of good Example among all men as well Forreigners as Domestiques IS it for that he may be thought vnfit h Xenophon in Paedia Cyri. to gouern who is not better euery way then those who are to bee gouerned Or is it not for that cause onely but for that i Sen. 1. de Clementia his good name and fame likewise at home and abroad is greatly blemished and stained if the course of his life and dealings bee not currant Or ought hee to bee such an one for the better stablishing of his Kingdome also k Sen. Thiest For where there is no shame care of doing of Iustice Sanctity Piety keeping of promise thatkingdom must needs bee vnstable and the State tottering 6 It may be the same purpose further demanded why a Prince ought to be iust to make speciall reckoning of the administration thereof equally to his Subiects ey to do iustice vpon himselfe if hee desire to be held for a good Prince IS it for that l Plato in Polit. a Lawlesse Principallity and loose gouernement is yrksome to euery one especially of the better sort so that they do not delight or haue any desire to liue vnder it Or is it for that the constant and strict obseruation and administration of Iustice doth stablish and strengthen a Kingdome as the m Cic. Parad. Oratour well perceiued who said that Iustice and Equity were the true conseruators of Common-wealthes and Cities Or is it not onely for that iustice doth stablish a Kingdome but for that it doth truely make a kingdome to be a Kingdome giuing vnto it his very essence and being whereby it is that which it is For take away Iustice and what are Kingdomes but great Robberies as well said the n August de Ciuil Dei lib. 4. learned Diuine 8 It may further be demanded why many Princes are very fearefull suspicious and iealous of their estates IS it because that o Attius Kingdomes are commonly subiect to treacheries Or is this rather the reason for that the p Sen. Oedip. nature of most Princes is prone to feare and be iealous of their Estates as well said the Poet q Sen. in Agam. Kingdomes and Mariages brooke no riuals 9 It may further bee demanded wherefore all credit countenance honors and authority in Court are for the most part slippery and not to be trusted vnto HAppeneth it thus by reason of the Fates vncertainty as it pleaseth the r Tacit. 3. Annalium Historian to set downe who auerreth that Court-fauours euen by decree of the destinies are not alwaies lasting Or might this rather be the reason for that ſ Tacit. 17. Annalium Courtiers credites are commonly vpheld by others and not by their owne strengths Or not so neither but for that these things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes their Maisters whom
may giue wholesome counsell MAy they effect this if they be Å¿ Plin. Panet men fearing God making his plaine euen lawes the strict and straight rule of their consulations For seeing it is t Tholoz lib. â—4 God alone which sustaineth and vpholdeth Common-wealths it were very fit that he should be made the chiefe head and director of the counsels thereof Or may they do it the better if standing for the u Tacitâ—â— Hist. libertie of themselues and the Common-wealth they do stoutly and couragiously not faintly and fearefully pronounce and deliuer their mindes and opinions least they might rather be thought to runne with the Fortune of the Prince then with him or the good of the Common-wealth Or may they also effect this if they shew themselues x Tacit. 3. Hist modest and of a quiet disposition Or may they likewise effect it the better if they can y Quint. Curt. lib. 4. keepe their owne counsels For it is very certaine that no great matter can be looked for at his hands who will vent what hee should hold in Or finally may this better be performed if choyce be made of such Councellors which haue z Tholoz lib. 24. de repub no particular interest in those things which are to be consulted vpon For no man in his owne cause can speake thinke or iudge vprightly because euery man therin will be partiall 6 Considering that middle courses for the most part proue vnfortunate it may be demanded why notwithstanding the running of a middle course being propounded by some one or other in publike deliberations it is most what embraced followed and put in execution COmmeth it to passe through the ill a Fran. Guich disposition and worse affection of some addicted to faction and opposition who perceiuing that their owne conceits cannot passe currant had rather giue way to and allow of that which is worse not extreame least hee should seeme to oppose but different in a lesse distance that thereby they may seeme to haue in part assented Or is it not for this reason alone but for that likewise the other aduisers b Idem least they should displease some prime-man who hath propounded a middle course of proceedings will likewise run along with him and approue of his deuise Or rather is this the reason why such middle courses are by some no sooner propounded then approued because for the most part prouident and wary especially auncient and aged Statists do approue of that course which they imagine to bee least violent and dangerous and incline to the meane as being the sweeter and more passable without noyse or Nuissance 7 Seeing that the close minds wils and ends of Councellours be strange diuers and for sinister respects priuately kept to themselues for oftentimes vpon pounding of matters to bee consulted vpon c This was the practise of Torlton Archbishop of Canterbury against Edward the second by whose aduice his son was sent into France who ioyning with his mother Mortimer became the head and Captaine of the Rebels against his owne father one thing is spoken another thought and meant whereby the mindes and opinions onely of others may be discouered it may here be demanded how a Prince may iudge whether his Councellours aduise him well or no SHall hee know this by the d Mach. in Prin. disposition of the Councellor For he that more respecteth himselfe then his Prince in the carriage of any matter regards his owne priuate more then the good of the Common-wealth as long as hee beareth this minde he can neuer proue a faithfull Councellour nor one whom the Prince or State may trust or rely vpon Or shall hee vnderstand this by the e Tholoz lib. 24. frequent vse experience he hath had of his Councellours in the like businesses falling out ill or well Or shall he rather come to the knowledge hereof by making an f Idem ibidem exact search and disposition how matters are carried and disposed of within his owne territories Or shall he rather come to this knowledge by the frequent reading of Histories or by the apprehending or comprehending of these two Principles What is Profitable What is Honest Which two indeed are the bounds and grounds of truth and of that worthy wisedome and iudgement which ought to be in a Senator SECT I. CHAP. VI. Of Example the vse and abuse thereof in a Common-wealth 1 It may bee demanded why subiects for the most part a Claudian frame conforme themselues to the fashion of their Princes IS it for that both the b Plin. Paneg. eyes of the minde and the body for the most part looke vpwards and stand as it were at gaze at greatnesse and eminencie tending and bending the whole man to dance as they pipe Or is it because c Tacit. 3. Annal Examples vrge and enforce more then Lawes can do seeing it is the nature of man rather to be led of his owne accord then to be coÌ„pelled Or is it rather for that d Quintilian decl 4. Example in Princes is a kind of secret law For it fareth and falleth out thus for the most part with their acts that what they doe they euen seeme to command it â— Againe it may be demanded why in reforming of a Common-wealth the producing of examples of the most famous and illustrious men for vertue in the same do very much auaile IS it because that such men being compelled by no Lawes yet of their owne accord and free-will acting exercising and exhibiting singular and rare examples of vertue do excite and stirre vp such as bee good to follow them and those which are bad they doe either make them a shamed or discourage them from going on in their lewdnesse Or is it rather for this that when by long processe of time there hath bene no examplary punishment inflicted vpon offenders men grow regardlesse of Lawes and the number of delinquents so increase that the Magistrate is afraid to punish them Then one Manlius Torquatus to punish his owne sonne or a Quintus Fabius to bee accused and condemned for ioyning battell with the enemy without the Dictators leaue and such examples do much bridle and represse other mens insolencies 3 It may further bee demanded why hee that iudgeth by examples is commonly deceiued IS it for that c Franciso Guicch all the selfe-same reasons and circumstances in the like actions do seldome or neuer concurre and meete againe Or is it because the f Idem like actions are not alwaies gouerned with the like wisedome and discretion Or may this bee the reason rather because g Idem Fortune at all times playeth not her part alike but now and then faileth her fauorites SECT I. CHAP. VII Of Wits Manners and Dispositions of diuers Cities Countries and Nations as well free as seruile 1 It may bee demanded what kind of wits may bee termed the best wits MAy such bee
counted for the best which are a Guicch more stirring sharpe and acute fiery and subtile then ordinary But these noble and excellent wits for the most part do proue very crosse and are oftentimes the cause of much disquietnesse turmoile and trouble to him who is indued therewith Or may those rather bee taken for the best which though b Idem more blunt yet are more certaine and lasting and for the most part are more fortunate then the other 2 It may further be demanded why in one and the selfe-same Citie there may be found many distinct families whose manners and conditions are particular to themselues as wee read amongst the Romanes that the Manlij were euer sterne and seuere the Publicolae courteous and gentle the Appij proud and ambitious c. COmmeth this to passe by reason of the diuersity of their temperatures But that as it may bee thought might be changed and altred by the variety of Marriages Or may this rather be the cause for that euery Family hath a peculiar manner of bringing vp their children for this commonly holdeth true c Mach. Disput de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 46. whatsoeuer manners and opinions are instilled into the minds of youth in their infancy they will hardly or neuer bee remoued but continue with them euen to their old age 3 It may bee further demanded why d Liu. in his bookes affirmeth this of the Frenchmen diuers Nations at the first assault or onset giuen seeme to bee magnanimious and very fierce and forward to the battell but within a while after doe grow very fearefull and turne Cowards MAy the cause consist in any peculiar affect in their natures But it is possible that e Mach. disput Cap. 36. nature from day to day may bee corrected and amended Or might this rather bee the reason that such Nations being f Idem Ibidem without order or exercise of Military Discipline are not enabled with such ordinary manhood as may establish their hearts and mindes making them to conceiue an assured hope of victory and therefore if they be not vanquishers in the first assault they straight waies quit the field And this vnder correction I take to be the true reason of their fearefulnesse and running away 4 It may further bee demanded wherefore diuers men euen lewd persons hauing many times occasions offered them to commit some memorable and notable villany notwithstanding for the most part they dare not attempt it or put it in practise and execution IS it for that they are afraid least they should g Mach. disp lib. â— cap. 27. incurre the note of infamy But the greatnesse of the thing might happily couer the badnesse of the fact and likewise protect the party from danger Or do they abstaine from perpetrating and committing such horrtble villany by reason of their h Idem Ibidem owne in-bred goodnesse or nice touch of their conscience But such godly and holy motions do neuer enter into the hearts of such lewd lossels Or may this rather bee the reason for that by nature it is not affoorded to the most men to be i Idem Ibidem absolutely euill or perfectly good 5 It may further be demanded why there should bee such and so great difficulty in chaunging or amending old customes though most men conuicted secretly in their consciences by euident truth should confesse they were altogether vnprofitable and dangerous to the Common-wealth to continue them MAy this bee the reason for that although some good Citizens or Patriots foreseeing the danger do perswade the change thereof yet they should not be able fully to turne the peoples mindes by reason of others oppositions Or may this rather be the cause for that most men stand so affected and affectionated to their auncient course of liuing that they would not willingly depart there-from Or may this bee the reason of the difficulty of amending euill customes for that there is euer a want of proportionable meanes agreeable to the Lawes to bring that businesse about so that they must bee driuen to flie to new courses altogether which seldome proue fortunate Or may this rather bee the reason for that if some few or any one man should go about to change the forme of gouernement it should bee necessary for him first by force to inuade the State and then to seize the liberties thereof into his hands which might bee thought not to bee the part of a good man and therefore hee will rather desist from his purpose then do his Cittizens so much good Or may this bee a further reason for that the most men are perswaded that there can scarcely be that man found who hauing once brought a State vnder subiection by ill meanes would afterwards vse that power and authority which hee had so ill gotten to the benefite and good of the people SECT I. CHAP. VIII Of Benefites and when to bee bestowed Of Ingratitude and how a friend may be purchased that a man may trust vnto 1 It may bee demanded when Benefites are to bee bestowed vpon a man ARE they to bee collated vpon him a Mach. dâ—sp lib. primo cap. 23. iust at that time when the bestower of them is compelled so to doe as needing the present help of such a man or for some priuate end to himselfe best knowne But this manner of giuing should seeme to be very extrauagant and distastefull to the receiuer as thinking that they were collated vpon him by reason of the parties necessity which once serued he would neuer conferre more vpon him Or are they not so to bee collated vpon any man but b Idem Ibidem timously rather before hee which may haue need of them shall haue occasion to vse them or the Collator thereof the person 2 It may further be demanded wherefore they who haue c As Charond as amongst the AEginensians The mistocles amongst the Athenians Camillus Scipio c. among the Romans were imprisoned banished or put to death best deserued of a Common-wealth are oftentimes worst recompenced and requited IS this the reason for that d Pindarus there is nothing lesse lasting then the very name of a Benefite Or is this rather the cause for that it is c This was proper to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians appropriate and peculiar to certaine Common-wealths so to enuy those which excell in vertue and goodnesse as they themselues being not able to follow and imitate them therein seeke to spoile them of their gouernement and Empire Or may this rather be the reason that some f Philip. Comin standing too much vpon their owne merites haue borne themselues too proudly against tje State or their owne society Or might this likewise bee the cause for that those who either by their rare exploits or cunning ambition creepe into the fauour of the people at home and hunt after renowne and admiration abroad may seeme to dimme the glory of their Princes who