keep off from his Person by striking a Boxer Who can do both a Pancratiast or general Wrestler who excels in all a Pentathlian or a Man for all the five Exercises of Cuffing Leaping Running Hurling the Bowl and Wrestling A happy old Age is that which comes late and brings no Pains or distempers with it For he who sooner or later grows old if he be tormented with Aches and Distempers leads an uneasy Life Now there are some which are vertues both of the Body and of Fortune for he that is of a sickly Constitution and not Strong shall not be free from Pain or tho' he be he shall not be long liv'd nor can he last without Fortune for there is another way to live long without Strength and Health seeing that many live long without the Vertues of the Body But a farther Examination of these things is needless at present Now what is multiplicity of honest and vertuous Friends shall be shewn in the definition of a Friend A Friend is therefore he who does for his friends sake whatever he thinks will be for the advantage and profit of his Friend He then who has many such friends is the Friend of many and if they be persons of Integrity he has many good and vertuous Friends Prosperity is that when all or most or the chiefest part of these Blessings of which Fortune it self is the cause flow into a Man and make him happy Now Fortune is the cause of many things artificial and of many things without Art which tho' they proceed from Nature are Preternatural as the air is the cause of Health nature the cause of Beauty and Stature And those Benefits that altogether proceed from Fortune which are still the Subject of other Mens Envy Fortune is also the cause of those Benefits for which no reason can be given as when all the rest of the Brothers are deform'd and one alone proves to be Beautiful or when all the rest of the Brothers oversaw the Treasure and one had the luck to find it out Or when the next Person happens to be struck through with an Arrow and the other escapes Or when only one Person came not to a place who was never wont to fail and all the rest that came who never us'd to come came only that time and happen'd to be all kill'd For all these things seem to be the act of Fortune As for the Vertue of ohe Mind because it is a Topic most proper for the discourse of Applause and Commendation we shall refer it to Demonstration CHAP. VI. Of Profitable and Good WHAT we ought to aim at in perswading whether in reference to things present or to come or in disswading we have already made manifest For they that disswade dissawade the contrary Now in regard that Profitable is the scope of him that advises and they that advise consult not about the End but those things which relate to the End and for that these things are profitable in the Effects if rightly acted and profitable is good we are to consider the Element of good and profitable simply Good is therefore that which is to be desir'd for its own sake and that for whose sake we desire something else and which all things or Creatures desire if they have Sence and Understanding or would desire if they had and whatever the Understanding dilates to every one and what the understanding Dictates concerning each Particular good to every Man that is good to all in general Which being present the Mind is at rest and contented in it self Which is sufficient for it self and which is the cause and Preserver of these things and upon which those things attend that prevent and destroy the Contraries to it Now those things attend upon it two ways either at the same time or afterwards as Knowledg attends Instruction but afterwards but Life and Health go both together The Efficient causes attend three manner of ways sometimes as soundness of Body attends upon Health sometimes as Diet attends Health sometimes as Exercise attends it for it generally procures Health These things thus laid down there is a necessity that the Election of things good and the rejecting of what is hurtful should be good On the one side it follows that we are not pester'd with what is hurtful at the same time on the other that we obtain the good afterwards and instead of the lesser good we choose the greater and in lieu of the greater Evil we chuse the less For the same reason that the greater exceeds the less therefore we chuse the one and avoid the other And of necessity all Vertues must be good it being always well with those that are endu'd with ' em Besides that they are the efficient and active causes of Good but to say what and of what nature they are requires a distinct discourse of each Pleasure also is most certainly a Good since all Creatures naturally covet it wherefore it is necessary also that delectable and honest should be good For Honest is the effective cause of Pleasure And honest things are partly delightful and partly chosen for their own Sakes But that we may discourse of each particularly of necessity these must be good things First Felicity because it is desired for its own sake sufficient and that for whose sake we desire many other things as Justice Fortitude Modesty Magnanimity Magnificence and all the rest of the Vertues of the Mind together with Health Beauty and the like For these are the Vertues of the Body and the effective causes of many things as Health is the cause of Life and Pleasure And therefore some account it the best of good things as being the cause of those two things which are the chiefest of good things Life and Pleasure Then Riches wherein consists the vertue of Possessing which is the effective cause of many other Benefits Next Friends and Friendship for Friendship is desireable for its own sake and is the effective cause of many good things Honour also and Fame For they are delightful and produce many good things and generally shew that they contain those things within themselves for which they are admir'd Next the faculty of speaking and acting For they are also the effective causes of good things Likewise Wit Memory aptness to learn excellency of Mind and Thought with all other things of the same Nature For all these are faculties productive of good things In the same List we may number the Arts and Sciences and Life it self From whence though no other good should flow yet it is desirable for its own sake Just is also in the same Roll because it conduces to the public advantage These are the chiefest part of those things which all Men account good things As to those things that are call'd in question Arguments are thus fram'd to prove them good That to which evil is contrary is good and the contrary of that which is serviceable to our Enemies as if to be
covet what is great or pompous but only what is necessary not are they over liberal For one of their necessary things is their Estate and as they are experienc'd they know how hard it is to get how easie to loose an Estate They are fearful and affraid of all things for Old Age open's a way to fear as being cold for fear is a kind of Refrigeration They are desirous to live especially when nearest their ends as covetous of what they shall leave behind and what we think we shall most want we most covet They are more querulous then needs which proceeds from their Pusillanimity They live according to the rules of profit not of honesty For profitable is to themselves advantageous Honesty but a Good in it self They are rather Impudent then modest for having a different esteem of profitable and honest they little value the semblance of Honesty They are apt to despond as having but small and fluid hopes by reason of their Experience For which reason and because they are fearful they frequently come by the worst They live more by Memory then by Hope for the remainder of their days is but small the longest part is past which is the reason of their Loquacity for they love to talk of old Stories as taking delight in remembrance In their anger vehement but feeble In their desires impotent only in the desire of gain and therefore they seem to be temperate remiss in their lusts and Servants to their avarice They live rather by reason then custom and their Injuries are mischeivous not contumelious They are also compassionate but not for the same reason as young Men these out of humanity they through Infirmity For they think the miseries of others neat themselves whence they become querulous but not facetious nor do they mind jollity or mirth For to whine and moan are contrary to mirth and laughter These are the several Dispositions of young and old Men. Wherefore since all approve Orations adapted to their own Dispositions it is hence apparent how an Orator is to frame his Oration to suite with this variety CHAP. XIV Of the Dispositions of middle Age. BEtween these two lye the Manners of middle Age pruning off the Excesses of both For they are neither over confident which is rashness nor over timorous but fairly in a medium between both Neither confiding in all men nor mistrusting all Men but rather judging according to the Truth neither living altogether according to the Rules of Bravery nor altogether following profit but between both Neither parsimonious nor luxutious but according to what is laudable and convenient Observing the same measures both as to anger and desire temperate with courage and couragious with Temperance Which things are divided in Youth and old Age. For young Men are strong and Intemperate old Men temperate and cowardly So that to speake in a word whatever Youth and Age divide apart between 'em as to what is profitable that middle age enjoys entire Where they exceed or are defective middle Age observes the Medium and the moderate Now the Body is in its full vigor from thirty to five and thirty the Soul from thirty to nine and forty And thus much for the three Ages of Man CHAP. XV. Of the Humours of Noble Men. AS to the humors of Noble Men most certain it is that he is most covetous of honour who possesses it For all Men desire to add to the heap which they have Now Nobility is the honour due to Aucestry Therefore Noble Men are apt to despise those who are like their Progenitors For remote Renown is more venerable then honour newly got and more fit to be boasted of Now Noble proceeds from the vertue of Lineage Generous is that which does not degenerate from Nature Which does not frequently happen to the Noble but sometime they become Persons of mean and abject Spirits For there is a fertility in the Progenies of Men as in the products of the Earth Sometimes a fertile Stock bears a race of Illustrions Persons but then the Stock being worn out the Fruit degenerates And many time the offspring of sublime Ancestry corrupts into cruelty and insaneness like those that descended from Alcibiades and Dionysius and mild Genius's sink into sloth and effeminacy like the Descendants from Conon Pericles and Sorates CHAP. XVI Of the Humonrs of the Rich. THE Humors that attend upon the Rich are easie to be discern'd by all Men. For they are Contumelious and excessively Proud as being swell'd up with their Wealth As if they look'd upon themselve to enjoy all the Happiness in the World For Wealth is a Price whereby to value other Men. Therefore they believe all things vendible to themselves They are also voluptuous and profusely lavish The first to shew their Riches and make an Ostentation of their Felicity The latter because men love to gratifie their darling humours and please themselves with what themselves admire believing that all other men admire what they do And in some respects it does 'em a kindness in regard there are many who want what others have and therefore Simonides being ask'd by Hierâ—'s Queen whether it were best to be a Rich or a Wiseman reply'd I have seen Wise men wait at Rich mens doors Another Reason is because they think themselves worthy to govern For they have that for the sake of which they believe themselves worthy to govern others And indeed the humors of the Rich are the humors of the happy Madman But there is a great difference between the Customs of Persons newly enrich'd and such as were born to Wealth For as they are more wicked so are they more wickedly wicked For the Wealth of him that is newly enrich'd is wild and untam'd Nor do they do injuries through Malice but either through Contumelie or Intemperance CHAP. XVII Of the Manners of the Potent and Fortunate IN like manner the Customs of men in Power are plain to be discover'd For they are partly the same with Rich Men partly better For men in power are more Ambitious and more strenuous because they covet to execute what their Power authorizes them to act Also they are more diligent as being constrain'd to take care of what belongs to their Authority And more Majestic then morose for their Dignity begets 'em respect And Majesty is a kind of compos'd and decent Gravity and if they do an Injury it is not in slight matters but in things of Importance Good Fortune also has a great share in the parts of these manners For the cheifest of Fortunes Prosperity's are referr'd to these things Good Fortune also is the cause that we are in a better Condition both in respect of our Offspring and other Corporeal Happinesses Therefore they are more proud and less considerate by reason of their Prosperity But one excellent custom attends good Fortune that it makes 'em Religious beleiving those Goods of Fortune to be the gift of the Deity And thus much
Exercise and by Exercise in Health And the less defective then the other or the others is most desirable as being more sufficient Now the lesser is defective in wanting fewer or more easy or when this cannot be accomplish'd or be without that but that may be accomplish'd without this For that which is not defective is most sufficient in it self and therefore it is apparently the greater good Also if one be a Principle the other not if one thing be the cause the other not For without the Cause or the Principle nothing can be or be done Now where there are two Principles that which proceeds from the greater Principle is the greater Where there are two causes the Product of the greater cause is the greater So that either way the thing must be greater whether one be a Principle the other not or whether proceeding from the greater of two Principles For the end is greater and not the Principle As Leodamus said when he accus'd Callistratus He who advis'd was more in fault then he who acted For had not the thing been advis'd it had ne'r been put in Execution But Chabrias argu'd that he who acted was more to blame then he who advis'd because the thing had not been put in Execution had it not been advised for Action is the end of Consultation Moreover that which is more scarce is more desireable then that which more Plentiful as Gold then Iron For Iron is less profitable Therefore the possession of Gold is greater because it is more scarce to be found But in another Sence that which most abounds is the greater because we make more use of it At other times that which is scarce is exceeded by that which is Plentiful and therefore we say the best Water Briefly difficult things are exceeded by those things that are more easy because they are more scarce but in another Sence easy things exceed difficult because we can obtain 'em when we please Alsowhere the contrary exceeds as likewise where the Privation exceeds Also where the Vertues and Vices of Men are greater there their Actions are more eminent and greater For such as the Causes and Principles such are the Effects and such as are the Effects such the Principles and Causes Also where the excess is 〈◊〉 we desireable or more beautiful as a quick Sight is better then a quick Smell Sight being more desireable than Smelling also it is much nobler to covet Friends then Money wherefore love of Friends is better then love of Money The excesses of the best things are best and more vertuous the Excesses in Vertue and of which our desires are more honest and generous Such things also of which the Knowledg is more honest and ingenious As also the things themselves which are more honest and Lawful For as it is with Knowledg so it is with Truth for every Science teaches those things that belong to it and therefore the Sciences and the things taught hold the same Proportion Also what all or many or most Men of Prudence and Learning have deem'd and decreed to be the greatest good that either ought simply so to be or so far as they have in their Prudence adjudg'd it But that is common to other things For the what and how much and the what sort are to be look'd upon as Knowledg and Understanding have decreed But we have number'd Prudence however among good things as having defin'd Prudence to be that which all Men would desire if they had Prudence And therefore that must be greater which Prudence so adjudges Also what is contain'd in the better things either as they are simply so or as they are better as Fortitude is better then Strength of Body Also what a person of more worth would chuse as rather to suffer then do an Injury which a more just Man would chuse to do And what is more pleasing and delightful then what is less For all follow Pleasure and covet it for delights sake But the good and end of Pleasure is bounded within Limits For that which is more delightful is as well that which is less irksome as that which is more durably delightful and more honest or less honest For honest is either delightful or to be desired for its self And what Men most desire to be the Authors of either to themselves or Friends those are the greater benefits what they least desire the lesser Kindnesses and the more lasting then the less durable and the more solid then the less firm For the use exceeds of the one in time of the other in the Will For where the will is there the use of a thing constant prevails And as when from consequences and like cases other consequences arise as when that which is stoutly and honestly done is to be prefer'd before what is acted temperately also Fortitude is to be preferr'd before Temperance and to be strong before being temperate And what all preferr before what all do not preferr and what more then a few For good was that which all coveted therefore that is greater which is more desir'd Also in Law-Suits where are Plantiffs Judges and Defendants Here that prevails which all affirm there what the Judges Pronounce as excelling in Power and Knowledg Sometimes that is greatest of which all participate for it is a disgrace not to participate Sometimes those things which are most Praise-worthy as being most Honest Sometimes degrees of Honour make the Honours greater for Honour is a kind of price or value set upon a thing The greater Punishments also are the greater and such things as are greater than the things which are apparent and granted especially when divided into parts for then exuberancy of many is apparent which was the reason that the Poet to excite Meleagâ—r uses these words What Mischiefs most thy Subjects then bewail If into hostile Han is the City fall Slaughter and Fire their Masions will invade And helpless Children will be Captive led And then addition and aggravation as in Epich rmus which is apparent partly by the same reason that dividing the parts makes the thing greater for Aggravation plainly shews the Excess Partly because the Original and cause of things seems greater and then because that is greater which is less frequent and more difficult Opportunity Age Time Place and Force make things greater for beyond the Strength the Age of such an one beyond others here there and then denote excess of Beauty Goodness Justice or their Opposites Whence the Epigram upon the Olympian Victor Though formerly 't is true so mean my Trade With heavy Dossers on my Shoulders laid From Argos to Tegea still I trudg'd To sell my Fish till Victor here adjudg'd And Iphicrates gave himself this Encomium from whence all these Moreover Genuine than acquir'd wherfore said the Poet School'd only by my self these Songs I sing Also the greater part of a great thing As Pericles speaks in an Epitaph that Youth being taken from a City render'd it
marks of the habit Since we should praise him that never acted if we thought him to be like the other And the means whereby men become happy and fortunate are the same in themselves but not the same in reference to these But as Felicity contains Virtue so the making of a man happy contains Felicity For praise and deliberation have something common one with another seeing that what we propound in advising the same things by the alteration of the speech beget praise Therefore when we know what we have to act and what the person ought to be These things being said as it were by way of advice are to be chang'd and transpâ—s'd in words as when we say a man is not to boast in the successes of Fortune but in what he wins through his own Virtue which being so said has the force of a precept but thus becomes an Encomium glorying not in the succesles of Fortune but in the acts of his own Virtue Therefore consider what to praise when you advise and what to advise when you praise For the speech will of necessity be opposite when that which prohibits and that which allows are transpos'd We may also make use of many of those things which avail to amplifie As whether he acted alone or the first or with many or whether he were chiefest in the action or whether he observ'd time and season or whether he did the same thing often For that is great and shews him not beholden to Fortune but his own Virtue And whether those things which encourage us to virtue and raise us to honour were thought on and prepar'd by him and upon whom the first Encomium was made As it happen'd to Hippolychus Harmodius and Aristogeiton to have their Statues set up in the Market place And the same thing is to be observ'd in the contraries Of which if there be not a sufficient quantity to be found singly compare them with others as Isocrates was wont to do as being accustomed to pleading at the Bar. Which comparisons ought to be made between the most remarkable things as having a power to amplifie and is most commendable when a man appears to excel in sincerity Which enlargement fals deservedly upon praise For it consists in excellency and excellency consists in goodness Therefore altho the comparison be not made between things most remarkable at least it ought to be made between other things perhaps of lesser note in regard the excellency denotes the virtue And indeed of all those forms which are common to all Orations Amplification is most apt to demonstrate For they take the actions for granted that they may have no more to do then to add to them Grandeur and Beauty But Examples are more fit for Deliberation for conjecturing of future things from things formerly transacted we make our judgment Enthymemes are more fit for judicial pleadings For the fact admits of the cause and the demonstration because it is obscure And thus from whence all praises and dispraises are produc'd what we ought to look upon when we commend or discommend and of what things Encomiums and dispraises consist is apparent by what has been said For these things being known their contraries as may readily be discover'd CHAP. X. Of Accusation and Defence IN the next place we are to speak of Accusation and Defence of what and of what nature they ought to prepare their Arguments to which purpose we are to consider three things Wherein and to what end Men do Injuries Next how they are affected and thirdly what sort of People they are and in what Condition When we have therefore defâ—n'd what it is to do an Injury we shall proceed with the rest To do an Injury then is to offer harm and violence to another contrary to the Law Now the Law is either peculiar or common I call that peculiar according to which being set down in Writing Men act politically Common that which tho' not set down in Writing prevails among all Men. We act spontaneously whatever we act knowingly and not by constraint Yet where we act willingly we do not all things of choice but where we act by choice we do all things willingly and knowingly for no Man can be Ignorant of what he makes a choice before-hand Now the choosing to do harm and commit evil acts contrary to the Law isa Vice and Intemperance For whoever are addicted to one or more Vices that render 'em wicked are also Injurious As the Miser in Money the Intemperate in Pleasures of the Body the effeminate in Sloth the Timerous in danger For through Cowardice they desert those that are in the same Jeopardy The Ambitious in Honour the Hasty in Anger the desirousof Conquest for Victories sake the Violent for Revenge sake the Imprudent because he is deceiv'd in what is just and good the Impudent through contempt of Reputation and so of the rest every one according to the subject of his Passion But these things are and will be manifest partly from those things that have been spoken concerning the Vertues Partly from those things that shall be explain'd concerning the Affections It remains to declare for what reason and in what condition Men do Injuries and whom they injure First therefore let us explain what we desire and what we avoid while we endeavour to do an Injury For the Accuser must consider how many and which of those things which all Men coveting injure their Neighbors make up the Composition of his Adversary and he that defends must consider which and how many of those things the Adversary misses for all Men act all things partly of themselves partly not of them selves Whar they do not act of themselves they act partly by Fortune partly by Necessity And of those that aâ—â— by Necessity some act by Force some by Nature So that all things whatsoever they do not act of themselves some proceed from Fortune some from Nature and some from Force But of those things which they act of themselves and of which they themselves are the causes some are through Custom others out of a desire and of those some out of a rational Appetite others out of an Irrational but the Will is a rational desire of Good for no Man covets but what he believes to be good The Irrational Appetites are Anger and Lust Wherefore of necessity all things that they act they act for seven Causes Fortune Force Nature Custom Reason Anger Lust Nor must we distinguish those things that are acted according to Ages or Habits or any thing of that nature for if it happen that young Men prove Choleric and Lustful it is not because of their Age but because of the Passions that raign within 'em that they act so Nor are Riches or Poverty the cause that rich or poor Men covet or desire But it happens that the Poor for want covet Money and that the Rich through Licentiousness covet unnecessary Pleasures However they are not actuated by their Riches
or their Poverty but by their desires In like manner the just and unjust and all those that act habitually are actuated by all these things either by Reason or Passion some by honest Inclinations and Affections some by their contraries However it happens that such Consequences attend such Habits such and such others For a temperate person by reason of his Temperance has always good and lawful opinions and desires of Pleasure But an intemperate Person quite the contrary Therefore these divisions are to be omitted and while we are to consider which most usually follows which For whether a Man be black or white or great or little nothing to our purpose follows from thence But if a young or an old Man be just or unjust there is then a difference and in a word whatever things cause a difference in the conditions of Men as it will make a distinction whether a Man be Rich or Poor whether in Prosperity or Adversity But of these things more hereafter now of the rest Those things proceed from Fortune of which there is no determinate cause which are not done for such an end nor always nor for the most part nor usually Which is manifest from the definition of Fortune Naturally those things are done whose cause is in themselves and orderly for they happen either always or for the most part For as for those things which are preternatural whether they proceed from some fort of Nature or from any other cause it will be needless here to enquire though Fortune should seem to be the cause of such things By force those things are acted which are done by the Agents themselves through cogitation or desire Men act by custom when they do those things which they have often done before Those things are acted by Reason which are done for advantage as being of the number of those good things already mentioned or as the end or conducing to the end For the Intemperate sometimes act many things that are useful not for the sake of being prositable but to gratify their Pleasure Anger and Choler is the cause that many act to satiâ—â—â— revenge but there is a difference between Punishment and Revenge for Punishment is inflicted for the sake of him that suffers But he that acts a piece of Revenge does it to gratify himself But as to those things that are done through Anger we shall say more when we come to speak of the Affections For the sake of Lust all those things are acted which appear to be pleasant in regard that those things which are familiar to usby use and custom are delightful and many things also that are not naturally delightful being made familiar by Custom are acted with delight So that in short all those things which Men act of themselves are either good or seemingly good either pleasing or seemingly pleasing For I place the eschewing of Evils or of seeming Evils or the choice of the greater for the less in the number of good things as being in some measure desirable and the eschewing of things painful or seemingly painful or the choice of the less for the greater among those things which are delightful Wherefore we are to understand how many and what things are profitable or pleasant But of those things that are profitable in deliberation already has been spoken We are now to discourse of what is delightful of which the definitions will be sufficient though they be not altogether so exact if they be not obscure CHAP. XI Of things delightful LET us therefore suppose pleasure to be a certain motion and entirely sensible disposition of the mind according to the present condition of nature Grief the contrary Which if it be pleasing and delightful must be the cause of the said affection but whatsoever depraves or causes a contrary disposition of the mind is painful Therefore of necessity those things must be delightful that proceed according to nature especially when being acted according to nature they have assum'd their own nature In regard that custom is a second nature For most frequently approaches near to always Nature being always Custom most frequently provided it be not violent for violence is preternatural Wherefore necessity is painful for which reason it was rightly said Whate're must of necessity be done As harsh and irksome all men look upon Therefore cares distraction of thoughts and intentness of mind are painful For they are of necessity and by constraint unless men be accustom'd to ' em For custom begets pleasure but the contraries of these are delightful And therefore Sloth Ease Rest Mirth Recreation and Sleep are in the number of pleasant Things in regard they are not done by compulsion Whatever also allures our desires is pleasant and delightful For desire is an eager reaching of the appetite after pleasure But of these desires some are rational some irrational Irrational are those which are without any consideration such as are natural and the appetites of the body as hunger and thirst after nourishment There is also an appetite after all sorts of nourishment as also in tastes and venereal sports and general in the smell the touch the hearing and sight Rational are such as when we desire by persuasion For we are eager to desire and enjoy many things upon report and persuasion But because we then are said to enjoy pleasure when we are affected with some sort of sence and for that the imagination is a sort of weak sence and consequently a certain imagination of the thing remember'd and hop'd for attends upon him that remembers and hopes it is apparent that they who have strong memories and hopes are affected with great pleasure because they have a deep sence of what they remember and hope for Therefore all pleasant things of necessity consist in the sence of things present the remembrance of things past or the hope of things to come For we are sensible of the present remember what is past and hope for what is to come Therefore those things which we preserve in our memory are pleasant not only those things which at the time of enjoyment were delightful but also some things that were painful if afterwards they produce any thing of profit or pleasure According to that of the Poet Pleasing it is when once from dangers free To tell the Tales of former misery And that other For Dangers scap'd and Labours undergone To those are pleasing that renown have won For which reason it is that it is a pleasing thing to be free from pain And then again of those things which consist in hope whatever seem to delight at present or to be very helpful or to be helpful without trouble Generally tho whatever delights at present delights bâ—th those that remember and those that hope for the most part Wherefore it is sometimes a pleasing thing to be angry According to that of Homer concerning furious anger Sweeter than Honey from the fragrant Comb For no man is angry with those upon whom
he has committed those things of which he stands accus'd And thus he that denies himself to have done any of those things of which he is accus'd must defend himself by Probabilities For so shall he weaken the Probability of the Accusation But if he is compell'd to confess let him them compare his own with the customary practises of many alledging that most or many do as he happen'd to do but if that be not possible to do let him fly to unfortunate miscarriage or Imprudence for Refuge and beg for Pardon making use for advocates of all the Common perturbations of the mind which put us beside our Reason as Love Anger Wine Ambition and the like And this is the most artful Method of Probability CHAP IX Of Examples EXamples are like Actions other where done and contrary to those of which we now speak And they are to be made use of when he that affirms a thing promises to make it out when it seems not to be very probable at what time reciting another Action like to that recited by himself so done as he affirms it that so the more credit may be given to his words Of Examples theâ—e are two sorts Some are according to Reason others beside Reason Examples according to Reason are easily believ'd but such as are not according to reason seldom or never gain credit As if a man should say the Rich are juster then the Poor and brings for Example certain just Actions of Rich men These and such like Examples seem to be according to Reason in regard most men believe the Wealthy to be juster then the Poor But if on the other side another Person brings Examples of Rich men doing Injury for love of Money bringing an Example that it is not so agreeable to Probability he shall lessen the Argument against the Rich. In like manner another Person brings Example of a thing that seems according ing to Reason That the Lacedâ—emonians or Athenians being reinforc'd with a great Multitude of Allies vanquish'd their Enemies and thence will perswade the Auditors to court many Allies These Examples are according to Reason For all men believe that Multitude very much conduces to Victory But if any one will undertake to shew that Multitude is not the cause of Victory he must make use of such Examples as are beside Reason as when the Athenian Fugitives with fifty men and one Tribe eâ—countring a much greater Multitude assisted by the Lacedaemonians their Allies regain'd their own City And again But the Thebans when the Lacedâ—emonians assisted by the whole force of the Peloponnesians invaded Baeotia withstood their Enemies alone and utterly defeated the Lacedâ—â—monians Again But Dio Sayling to Syracuse with three thousand men vanquish'd Dionysius that had five times his Number Also the Corinthians when they Sayl'd with nine Galleys to ay'd the Syracusans drave the Carthaginians out of the City though they had possession of the Town and the Haven with a hundred and fifty ships Breifly such Examples as these that seem contrary to Reason are often objected in Consultation to those Examples that seem much more rational This is therefore the nature of Examples and they are to be us'd both ways When we speak of things that are done according to Reason we shew how such and such things were accomplish'd in such a manner But when we offer Examples that seem contradictory to Reason we shew how such and such things though rashly undertaken had a prosperous Issue But they that speak against these Examples ought to shew how these successes happen'd and then to urge that they rately fall out but the other Examples frequently And this is the use which is to be made of Examples But when we offer Examples contrary to reason we are to collect the most we can and then to affirm that the one as well as the other frequently happen Now we may produce Examples not only from these things but from their Contraries as if we were to shew that some through their covetousness toward their Allies have lost their Friendship and then proceeding say But we would have been more equal and more liberal to our Allies and so have preserv'd their friendship a longer time And again as if after we had shewn that others because they undertook the War before they were well provided for it were vanquish'd we should they say But let us go well provided to War for then we may have more certain hopes of success We may also take many Examples as well from things past as from the present affairs For most things are partly like partly unlike one to another Wherefore we need not fear to have store of Examples to refute those that are offer'd by others CHAP. X. Of Conjectures COnjectures are whatever are done contrary to those things concerning which the Discourse is and wherein the Discourse it self contradicts it self For the most Auditors by those contrarieties which happen contrary to reason of the Common course of Action conjecture that there is nothing of sound and solid in those things which are said or done And a man may make several Conjectures by observing whether the Opponents Oration contradict it self or whether the thing it self be contraty to the Discourse of the Speaker CHAP. XI Of Enthymemes ENthymemes are those things which are not only contrary to Reason and Practice but to all other things beside And a man may make use of many handling them as in the Questioning Kind observing whether the Discoure contradict it self or whether the things transacted be contrary to Justice to the Law to what is profitable to Probability to the Genius of the Speaker or to the nature of the Transactions Therefore such Enthymemes are to be chosen according to the contraries Now the contraries to these are such as we ought to assume for our selves shewing that our Actions and our Words are contrary to what is unjust illegal unprofitable to the manners of wicked men and in a word to every thing that is evil All which ought to be spoken breifly and in few words And in this manner we may frame many Enthymemes and make the best use of ' em CHAP. XII Of a Sentence A Sentence to speak breifly is the declaration of a man's proper opinion in all things Of Sentences there are two sorts The one Credible the other Paradoxical When we speak a thing that deserves to be credited there is no reason to be given For neither is what is said unknown neither does any Person contradict it But when a Paradox is spoken the reasons are in few words to be given to avoid Loquacity and the misfortune of not being believ'd Now those Sentences are always to be spoken that are most consentaneous to the present affairs lest what is utter'd should seem forc'd and improper And we may deduce many Sentences either naturally or from Hyperboles or by way of Paromoiosis Natural Sentences are these No man in my opinion who is unkill'd in Affairs can be a
But when we design to extol any affection or thing any Oration or Estate we praise what is most worthy Commendation in them From the Stock we derive our Encomiums thus If his Progenitors were famous we are to enumerate every one from the first of the race to the Person living and of every one make some remarkable Observation If the first were persons of Industry and men of Renown and that the rest were Persons never noted for any worthy Acts we are to extol the first and pass by the rest pretending that by reason of the great number of his Ancestors thou wilt not be tedious in ennumerating the whole Line besides that it cannot be unknown to all men that they who are born of generous Parents generally tread the footsteps of their Fore-fathers But if the first Progenitors were men of ill Fame and the Father and Grandfather Persons of Renown the first are to be omitted under pretence of Prolixity and the last are to be applauded not doubting but the Progenitors of such Persons were equal in value to them But if there were nothing of Splendid Ancestry praise the Person himself for his own Generosity and Bravery adding that all men are well born who are born to Vertue and that they are to be preferr'd before all others who are born to be the Ornaments of their own Parentage and give lustre to their Ancestry for that many times Persons born of Noble Parentage degenerate The same Method is to be used in vilifying the Parentage of any Person When we come to the Actions of the Person whom we applaud we are first to begin with his Justice then commend him for his Prudence next for his Fortitude and in every Encomium it will not be amiss to use many words to render the Oration Splendid and Magnificent In villyfying Ironies are of great use and to deride the Adversary in those things for which he chiefly magnifies himself CHAP. XXXVII Of the sorts of Questions INterrogation is chiefly useful against Contradictions And they that Interrogate must begin in the same manner with those that are accus'd Where when we have brought proper pretences at the beginning for so doing we are then to proceed to Interrogate Now the Proper pretences in Civil Assemblies are that we do not do it for contentions sake but to make the matter plain to the Auditory and because the Adversary first began with us Now in private Disputes we are to alledge the Enmities or the ill manners of the Persons interrogated or their Affection to the Adverse party In public Disputes we must alledge Legality Justice and Public profit The Proem thus fram'd out of these and things like these after we have propounded in order every one of the things done said or thought we must make our Interrogations and shew how they are contrary to Justice to Law to publick and private Profit and then we must consider all together whether they are contrary to themselves to the Manners of good men or such as seem to be so But to avoid prolixity in ennumerating every one particularly one by one how much the more we prove the Persons interrogated to be averse to ingenious Studies to good Actions or good Manners by so much the more shall we render 'em obnoxious to the Auditors Nor must we interrogate with a severe and morose Countenance but a mild and winning Aspect By which means the Orators will avoid all pretence of Scandal and their Orations will be the more acceptable to the People When we have diligently interrogated as much as is needful and enlarg'd upon the Questions then it will be requisite to sum up all at the conclusion for the satisfaction of the Auditory CHAP. XXXVIII The Peroration NOW then it behoves those that speak and write to deliver their Orations according to the Actions and to accustom our selves to make use of all these things promptly and readily How then to speak Artificially both in private and public Disputes and in Converse with others we have here the most and the most Artificial assistances But an Orator must not only be careful of his Words but of his Life to adorn it with the Idea's afore mention'd For the care of a mans Life and Conversation avails as well to perswasion as to the gaining of Esteem and Reputation First then we are to divide things according to the division of true Discipline what is to be handl'd in the first and what in the second what in the third and what in the fourth place Then we are to make those preparations which are necessary for the Auditors as in the Chapter of Exordiums For we may win favour to our Persons if we keept constant to our Professions and preserve the same friends while we live not wavering in our Studies but still following the same course We shall render the Auditors attentive if our Subjects be always Important Honourable and Profitable Now having made the Auditory both kind and attentive when we come to propose our Matter whatever contains the diswasion from Evil and the perswasion to Good they will readily and easily admit as being for their advantage or else reject the contrary Now to render thy Oration brief perspicuous and profitable this is to be done Thou shalt quickly conclude if thou doest not design to act all together but the first first of all and the next in order Thou wilt be perspicuous if thou makest an end of one thing before thou passest to another Thy Oration will be probable if thou doest not act any thing contrary to thy own Genius and the good opinion had of thee and if thou dost not pretend the same Persons to be both thy Friends and Enemies Of Proofs we are to make choice of those which we know to be so proper to accomplish our business that we are able to explain 'em to others but as for such as we have not real knowlege of to take those as they most frequently happen For thou shall act most securely in things of this nature if thou art guided by custom In Disputes with the Adversary if we contend by way Oration we must make out our Proofs out of those things that are spoken But if the Dispute be about Contracts we are to proceed according to the Laws both written and unwritten with the choicest witnesses and at a time perfix'd And in the Conclusion we shall the better imprint into the Memory of the Auditors what has been spoken if we make a brief and summary Repetition Of our Actions we shall put 'em in mind when we handle the same again or like the former We shall win the good will of the Auditory if we act those things by which they have receiv'd or do or are like to receive any Benefit And we shall act great things if we undertake Actions that are the Causes of many and honorable events And these are the Preparations we must make toward a vertuous Life the former Treatises concern'd the
such is the High Esteem of Aristotle in the World and his Authority among Men that it would be a vain thing to make any farther Encomiums upon his Wit and Learning the Profoundness of his Knowledge or his Diligence in explaining what he wrote and whom therefore Tully also allows to be the Prince of all Philosophers Aristotle's RHETORIC TO Theodectes BOOK I. CHAP. I. That Rhetoric and Logic treat of the same Subject That they who treated of Rhetoric before did not rightly understand it and of the Benefit of Rhetoric RHetoric and Logic are near of kin the one to the other For both treat of the same things which are in a manner known by all Men and belong to no certain Science And therefore one way or other all Men participate of both seeing that all People by some means or other endeavour to find out and maintain an Argument or to impeach and defend which many do rashly and without Experience many through Exercise and several naturally and habitually Which being either way to be done it is apparent that there is a way and method to be found out to which the matter may be reduc'd when both attain their Ends as well they who proceed according to the dictate of Nature as they who search into the causes and reasons of what they do which all will grant to be the Office of Art Whoever therefore till this time have compos'd the Art of Eloquencs have found out but a small part of it for when only Art prevails to gain Credit and Belief by Perswasion other things are only additional they make no mention of Enthymemes which are the Sinews of Perswasion but make a great pudder about those things which are little to the purpose For Crimination Compassion Anger and those other affections of the Mind are nothing to the business but only serve to move the Judges And therefore as it is the custom in many Cities especially such as are governed by good Laws if the same were observ'd in Judgments they would have nothing left for them to say For so all People partly believe it should be ordain'd by the Law partly they retain the same Constitution to speak nothing from the purpose as in the Areopâ—gus wherein they did well For it is no way laudable to pervert a Judg by moving him to Anger Envy or Pity Which is no more then if a Man should pretend to make use of a Rule and beâ—d it crooked Besides that whoever sets up a Controverâ—y has no more to do then to demonstrate whether the thing is or iâ— not whether it were or were not done Now whether the Act were great or of little Consequence whether just or unjust whatever the Legislator has not distinguish'd that the Judg ought to know and not to learn from him that propounds the Controversy Therefore it is convenient that good and wholesome Laws should make a distinction of all those things themselves and leave as few as possible to the opinion of the Judges First because it is more easy to find one or but a few Prudent Persons that are able to make good Laws and give true Judgment then many In the next place Laws are made by such as take long time to consider Judgments are suddenly pronounc'd and therefore it is a difficult thing rightly to dispence what is just and profitable But this is the chiefest thing of all to be consider'd that the judgment of the Legislator does not confine it self to Particulars and things Present but dilates and extends to Universals and things to come But the Senator and the Judg determine of things definite and present Whence it happens that their own affection or hatred or private advantage intervening they make but a negligent enquiry into the Truth while their Judgments are sway'd by their own gain or loss So that as to other things as already has been said the least power of determining that may be is to be left to the Judg but whether done or not done whether it be or not be will come to pass or not all this of necessity must be submitted to his Determination since it is impossible for a Law-giver to make sufficient Provision in such Cases Which being so it is apparent that they teach those things that are quite from the purpose who treat of other things as what the Proeme what the Narrative ought to contain or any one of the other parts For therein they teach us no more then how to dispose the Mind of the Judg this way or that way But as to artificial Perswasion they inform us nothing that is how a Person may become a good Argumentator Seeing therefore there is the same Method to be us'd in popular Orations as in Pleadings at the Bar and that it is much more noble and of greater use to be a popular Orator then a litigious brangler about Contracts and private Bargains they do ill in being so silent as to the former so voluminous as to the latter believing it is of less concernment to be extravagant in popular Arguments and less wile and subtilty in that then in Bar Pleading as being more common For in the former the Judg determins of what in part concerns himself so that there is no more requir'd then to demonstrate the thing to be as the Adviser says But in causes of Meum and Tu m that will not suffice where it is necessary to take the Ears of the Hearer for the Judgment is to be of other Mens concerns So that while they consider their own profit and hear with favour they give themselves up to the Pleader but make no determination Therefore in many places the Law forbids digressions from the Matter and there the Judges exactly observe that Law But in regard it is manifest that the artificial way relates and consists in Perswasion and that Perswasion is a kind of Demonstration for then we chiefly believe a thing when we suppose it to be demonstrated and for that Rhetorical Demonstration is Argument which if I may so say is the most powerful way of Perswasion and for that Argument is a a certain Syllogism and seeing all Syllogisms are under the Consideration of Logic either in whole or in part it is manifest that he who can most readily find out of what and how a Syllogism is Compos'd will prove the sharpest Argumentator especially Understanding in what things Enthymemes are of chiefest use and how they differ from Logical Syllogisms For the same Consideration will find out what is true and what is like to Truth For Men are sufficiently inclin'd to Truth and for the most part attain to the Truth Wherefore he who attains easily to Probability by conjecture takes the same course to find out the Truth Why therefore others have been so nice about things which are nothing to the purpose and why they have made judicial Pleading the Subject of their Labour is apparent Now Rhetoric is therefore useful because that by Nature those
been said But as to those things which are said or appear to be demonstrated there is one way to do this by Induction another by Syllogism or by that which seems to be a Syllogism For Example is Induction and an Enthymeme a Syllogism Now I call an Enthymeme a Rhetorical Syllogism and Example a Rhetorical Induction since all Men prove by Demonstration producing either Examples or Enthymemes and little else beside So that if it be absolutely necessary that he who makes use of a Syllogism or Induction must demonstrate some thing or some Person which is manifest from our discourse of Analitics by the same necessity must both those be like to both these Now what is the difference between Example and an Enthymeme is manifest from the Topics For there we have formerly spoken of Syllogism and Induction Since if by many and like Arguments we shew the thing to be so in the first there is Induction in the latter Example But where some things being granted there are some things else that for their sakes happen to be not granted in regard such things are either altogether or for the most part the one is call'd a Syllogism the other an Enthymeme and it is apparent that both are to be commended in Rhetoric For what has been said in the discourse of Method holds good in these things for as some sorts of Rhetoric are exemplary others Enthymematical so some Orators move by Examples others by Enthymemes Therefore Orations consisting of Examples are no less perswasive then others but Enthymematical Orations more distract the judgment then the former But we shall enquire afterwards into the causes of either and how to make use of both at present let us examine these very things a little more plainly and distinctly Seeing then that Perswasion is perswasive to some Body and this is immediately perswasive of it self the other because it seems to be demonstrated by such Arguments seeing also that no art inspects into Singulars as Physick does not consider what is wholesome for Socrates or Callias but what is for every one which is the true design of Art seeing moreover that Singulars are infinite and not to be comprehended by knowledg so neither is Rhetoric to consider what will convince every particular person as Socrates or Hippias but what will convince the Generality as Logic also does For Logic also makes use of Syllogism not from whatever they see for some things appear to Madmen but Logic raises her Syllogism from such things as stand in need of reason Rhetoric argues upon those things that fall under Consultation For it is the duty of Rhetoric to discourse of such things about which we consult and have no Art to direct us and among such Auditors that cannot see through multitude of things nor discourse of things remote but we discourse of things that seem possible to be brought about one way or another For as to such things which it is impossible they should be otherwise either at present or for the Future no Man consults at least upon such a Supposition in regard there can be no consultation concerning things that can not be otherwise But we reason and draw our Collections either from what has been Collected by Syllogisms before or from things confus'd that want the contraction of Syllogism because they do not seem to be probable Of which some are of that sort as not easily to be understood by reason of their Prolixity let the Judg be never so candid and other things not convincing as neither being taken for granted nor look'd upon as probable Wherefore there is a necessity to make use as well of Enthymeme as Example to prove things to be so which may be otherwise Example requiring Induction and Enthymeme Syllogism and that from but a few or fewer things then the first Syllogism consists of For if there be any thing there which is perspicuous it is not to be mention'd for the Auditor supplies that himself As when a Lacedaemonian has been victor in such a game wherein he won the garland it suffices to say he was a Victor at the Olympic Games but to say that he was crown'd because he won the Prize at the Olimpic Games is superfluous there being no Man who is ignorant of the Victors being Crown'd But because there are few necessary things from whence Rhetorical Syllogisms are drawn in regard that many things which fall under judgment and deliberation happen to be otherwise since Men consult and deliberate about what they have to do not of necessity but by choice therefore common Accidents are collected from common Examples necessary things are prov'd and perswaded by necessary Consequences Whence it is apparent that of those things from whence Enthymemes are drawn some are necessary others such as are so for the most part For Enthymemes are deduc'd from Probables and Signs So that of necessity both of these must be the same to the other That being probable that for the most part and most usually happensto be not simply as some would have it to be but as being that which in those things that may be otherwise has the same relation to Probable as universal to particular Of Signs there are some that have the same Relation one to another as singular to Universal others as something Universal to Particular Of these some are necessary which are call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but such as not necessary have no name according to this Distinction I call those necessary out of which a Syllogism is Compos'd which is therefore call'd an Argument For when they believe there can be no contradiction of the thing Propounded then they think they have brought a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sign that the thing is Demonstrated Limited and Determin'd For Tekmar and Term or Limit signify both the same thing in the antient Language Now because of these same Signs some hold one to another as the singular to the Universal as if we should say 't is a sign that wise Men are just because that Socrates being a wise Man was just This is a Sign but such a one as does not always hold good tho` what was said were Truth for it cannot be Syllogistically concluded without a Contradiction But this necessarily follows such a one is Sick because he has a Fever Such a one has had a Child because she has Milk Which is the only Argument by Signs when the Sign alone is so true that it cannot be contradicted The other sort of Signs have the same relation one to another as the whole to the part As if a Man should say 't is a sign he has a Fever for he breathes short and yet this may be contradicted tho' it were true when so said For it happens that many who are not troubled with Feavers breath short And thus far what is probable what a sign what an argumentative or conclusive sign and how they differ one from another We have also shewn that Example is
that are possible or that those things that never were nor ever will be should now be done or ever can be done it is necessary as well for the Consulter and the Judg as for him that goes about to demonstrate to be furâ—ish'd with Propositions of Possibility and Impossibility whether itwere or were not whether it will be or no. Moreover seeing that all People who either approve or dislike perswade or diswade sue or defend endeavour to shew not only what has been already said as what is useful what is hurtful what is honest what disgraceful what just what unjust but whether the thing be of great or small moment either considering useful and hurtful honest and dishonest just and unjust in themselves or by comparing one with another it is manifest that they must be furnish'd with Propositions of great and little more and less with respect to Particulars as well as Universals as what is more what less profitable which the greater which the lesser Injury or Injustice and so of other things And thus much as to those things of which Propositions must be made Now we must distinguish every one of them apart and first to which Deliberation next to which Demonstration lastly to which Judgments belong CHAP. IV. Of what things Men usually Deliberate FIRST then we are to consider about what things good or hurtful the Politician consults for that he does not deliberate upon all things but upon what may be or may not be done in regard it is in vain to deliberate upon things that are or will be of necessity or such as it is impossible that they ever will be Nor yet upon all Accidents neither For there are some good things which proceeding from Nature and Fortune happen sometimes to be sometimes not to be upon which it 's not worth while to Deliberate But we are to consult of those things that may be referr'd to us whose Original and Cause is within our selves For we deliberate till we have found whether the things may or may not be done by us Nevertheless it is not our present Business to enumerate every particular nor to digest the several subjects of Deliberation into their several Species's and Forms nor to enquire what may be determin'd concerning 'em according to Truth For that belongs not to Rhetoric but to a more prudent and certain Art tho' much more then what falls properly under her Consideration is now adays allow'd her For what we have already affirm'd is true that Rhetoric is compos'd of the Analytic Science and that part of Politic's which relates to manners and partly resembles Logic partly sophistical Oration However if any one go about to teach either This or Logic not as Faculties but as Sciences he secretly subverts their Nature while he dilates them into Sciences of certain Subject Matters and does not confine them to Oration alone But now let us therefore shew what things more properly fall under Political Consideration and are more proper to be explain'd The chiefest things then of which all Men consult and argue upon in Deliberation are five in number of Wealth of War of Peace of the Preservation of the Country and of what things are exported and imported and of the making and observance of Laws He that consults about the raising of Treasure ought to understand the Revenues of the Country and whence they arise that if there be any deficiency it may be supplieâ— and if it be too small that it may be augmented also that all unnecessary Expences of the City may be cut off and all profuseness moderated For not only addition of Treasure but frugality in Expences increase Wealth And this not only appears from our experience of private affairs but there is a necessity for him that wouldspeak to thepurpose concerning these things to know the Observations of others He that consults concerning War and Peace must understand the Forces of the City what they are at present and how powerful they may be what sort of Strength there is at present and what sort of additional Force is to be provided also what Wars and in what manner the People have carried on their Wars before Nor is he only to understand the Concerns of his own Country as to these Particulars but to be well inform'd of the State and Condition of his Neighbours especially of those with whom his Country may have an occasion to enter into a War and what is the equality or inequality of Force on boâ—h sides that he may make a Peace with the stronger and be at his own Liberty whether or no to make a War with the weaker and then again which is the most wealthy Common-weal of the two for in that also we may be either Superiour or Inferiour Moreover he ought not to be ignorant how the Country may be best preserv'd and defended nor of the number or quality of the Soldiers fit to be kept on Foot nor of places proper for Garrisons which it is impossible to do without an exact knowledge of the Country that if the Garrisons are too weak they may re-inforc'd if superfluous they may be dismantled and Garrisons plac'd in more proper places Also what Expence is necessary to supply the City with Provision what the Country will afford and what must be supplied from abroad What commodities are fit to be imported what exported that Leagues may be consider'd accordingly There being a necessity for a Common-weal to keep fair with two sorts of People with those that are superiour in Strength and benefical to it in Commerce But as the knowledg of these things very much conduces to the Preservation of a Common-weal there is one thing no less beneficial which is the skill of making Laws Wherefore it is necessary to understand how many sorts of Governments there are what Constitutions are most profitable and by what Adversities or Prosperities they may be upheld or destroyed for the safety of a City consists in the observance of the Laws I say destroy'd by Prosperity for that unless it be an absolute constitution of Government indeed all others are dissolv'd or deprav'd by rigorous Severity or Remissness As Democracy is not only weakned by Remissness but also when it is too rigorously severe so that at last it falls under the Power of a few Like Noses that being moderately flat or Hawk-Beak'd look well enough but when too much bent or Arch'd or flatted to the Face can hardly be discern'd to be Noses Therefore it mainly conduces to the making of good Laws as well to gather from the benefit of former Constitutions how the Common-weal thriv'd at that time as to understand the condition of other Common-weals and what is most agreeable to the conditions of the People whence it is apparent that a good Law-maker ought to be a great Traveller there being nothing so necessary for him as to understand the Constitutions of other Nations and to enable him for public Council to be exact in the
Cowards is a kindness to our Enemies it is manifest that Fortitude is a great good to our selves and our Country And in a word what our Enemies desire and rejoice at the contrary to that must be advantageous to us Therefore it was well said of the Poet. Sure Priam will rejoice However these are not always but for the most part good things since it may happen that sometimes the same things may be of advantage as well to our Adversaries as to us Whence it is said that Misery reconciles Men when the same thing is pernicious to both Also the Mean between both is good For that which is greater then it ought to be is bad and that for whose sake Men have endur'd many hard labours and wasted much Treasure for now it is a seeming Good and as such is look'd upon as the end and the end of many things but the end is good Whence that of Homer But Fame Indeed was only Priam's aim And that other of the same Poet. But Delay Will shame us if we longer stay With which the Proverb agrees There lies a Snake at the door Moreover what many Men covet and contend for is good for many are look'd upon as the generality and what they commend is fit to be commended For there is no Man will applaud that which is not good As also what our Enemies and wicked Men approve for indeed we may say that all men confess if the bad confess the same For because it is undeniable therefore it is confess'd on all hands as that they are bad whom our Friends discommend and that they are good of whom our Enemies speak no ill And therefore the Corinthians thought themselves affronted by Simonides for saying However Ilium does not Corinth blame Also the good opinion of wise and good Men or Women Thus Minerva preferr'd Vlysses Theseus Helena Alexander was preferr'd by the Goddesses and Achilles by Homer And in general whatever things are desirable before others Now Men chuse to act not only those things which have been already spoken of but to serve their Friends and mischief their Enemies and by such means asare possible Now Possibilities are two-fold such as may be done and such as may be easily done Facil things are such as may be done either without Pain or in a short time For facility is terminated either by Pain or length of time or if they be done according to their Wish but Men wish either for no Evil at all or for much leâ—s then the Good which may come to pass it either they can hide themselves from the Punishment or procure it to be small Also what a Man wishes of his own Election not made choice of by any Man else but beyond the common road Hence the more honour And what are agreeable to their Genius such are those things which are most suitable to their Fortunes or their Strength and what Men believe they are defective in tho little things for they chuse to act in those things to gain or recover Credit And what may be perform'd by any one All these things may be done as being easy And another may do those things which all or many like or lesâ—er have well done before And what will make us acceptable to our Friends and odious to our Enemies And what every one admires they chuâ—â— to act And those things wherein Men are ingenious and expert for such things they believe they shall more easily accomplish and such things as they desire for then the Pains is a Pleasure And which the wicked refuse to undertake for such acts are so much the more Praise-worthy And such things upon which Men have most singularly plac'd their affections As the Waâ—rior upon Victory the Ambitious upon Hoâ—oâ—â— the covetous Person upon Money and so of the rest And thus much concerning good and profitable CHAP. VII Of the greater and lesser NOW because they who grant both to be profitable cannot agree upon which is most profitable therefore we must say something of the greater good and of that which is most Profitable That which exceeds is therefore that which is so much and more The excess that which is within it and always greater and more in respect of the less but great or less many or fewer in the respect of the Magnitude of many And the excess is call'd great the defect little and so of many and few Since therefore we call Good that which is desirable for its own and not for the sake of another of which all the parts are coveted and which every Creature that has Sence and Understanding would covet and that which is the efficient and Preservative cause of all and upon which all things of that nature depend of which the why and the wherefore is the end and the end is for whose sake all the rest and this is good for this or that which is most appropriated to it of necessity the more must be the greater good then one or the lesser according to the number of the one and the lesser because it exceeds and what is contain'd within is exceeded For if the greatest be exceeded by the greatest those also must be exceeded by themselves and if the Kinds are thus exceeded by the Kinds the biggest by the biggest as if the biggest Men are bigger then the biggest Women Men are absolutely bigger then Women and if Men are absolutely bigger then Women the biggest Man is bigger then the biggest Women For the excess of the Kinds and of those things that are contain'd in the Kinds hold the same proportion one with another The same may be said when this follows from that but that does not follow from this Now that which follows follows either together or afterwards or potentially For the use of that which follows is in the other Now it follows together if a Man be in health that he lives but it does not follow that he is in health because he lives But Knowledg follows the being taught afterwards Potentially it follows that if a Man be a Sacrilegious Person that he may rob a Temple seeing a Sacrilegious Person will rob And they are greater that exceed the same thing in greatness for of necessity the greater must be exceeded The Effective causes also of the greater good are greater for by that means the Efficient cause became greater and in the same manner the effects of the greater cause must be greater For if wholesome be more to be desired and a greater Good then Pleasant Health is greater then Pleasure and that which is more desirable inits self then that which is not more to be desired in its self as Strength then Health For that is desirable for its own this not for its own sake which is the true condition of good Also if this be the End that not the End this is mâ—re to be desir'd than that for this is desir'd for that and that for its own sake as that the Body may be kept in
by Aggravation Which is done when the Person amplifies before he has giv'n any demonstration of the matter For thereby he makes it appear how either he has not done the fact when he that defends the cause amplifies or how he has done it when the Accuser is incens'd Therefore it is no Enthymem For the hearer falsely collects that he has or has not done the thing being demonstrated Another Place is from the Signe Yet neither is this a Syllogism As if a Man should say lovers are profitable to Cities For the Friendship of Harmonius and Aristogiton ruin'd the Tyrant Hipparchus Or as if a man should affirm Dionysius to be a Theif because he was a wicked Person For neither is this a Syllogism in regard every wicked Person is no Theif but every Theif is a wicked Person Another from the Accident according to what Polycrates said of the Mice that they were assistant in gnawing the Bowstrings Or if a man should say It was a most honourable thing to be invited to supper For that because Achilles was not invited he was enrag'd against the Greeks in Tenedos but the true reason was because he was slighted which happen'd because he was not call'd Another from the consequence As in Paris that he was Magnanimous for that contemning the applause of the Multitude he liv'd by himself in Idea in regard that such being Magnanimous he was also Magnanimous And because he spruc'd up himself and made his visits by night therefore he was a Whoremaster in regard the custom of Whoremasters is such In like manner also because the Poor both sing and dance in the Temples and because Exiles may live where they please Now then because these things are signs of being happy they who enjoy these priviledges are happy But there is a difference in the manner which makes the Argument defective Another from the Caus which is not but as it were the cause as when the thing which was don together or afterwards is taken as if it fell out for that reason especially by them that manage Afairs of State As Demades averr'd the Management of Demosthenes to be the cause of all the Mischiefs because the War ensu'd Another where there is a deficiency in the When and the How For Paris did not Ravish Helena wrongfully in regard the choice was given her by her Father not always perhaps but at first For till then she was in the Power of her Father Or if a man should say it was ignominious for Freemen to be strick'n though not always but when the one has not provok'd the other Moreover as among Wranglers there is a seeming Syllogism from that which is simply and that which is not simply as in Logic That non Entitie is Entitie for non Entitie is Entitie not in Entitie and what cannot be known may be known for when a thing cannot be known we may know that it cannot be known Thus in Rhetoric there is a seeming Enthymeme from that which is not simply probable but a certain kind of Probability And this not universally according to that of Agatho Perhaps some one may think it probable That many things improbable to Mortals Happen For that happens which is beside Probability Wherefore that is probable which is beside Probability So that if that be true that which is not probable shall be probable but not simply but as in brangling the Secundum quid or the ad Aliqâ—id or the How not being added makes the Fallacy thus here the beside Probability is not simply Probability but a certain kind of Probability And from this Place was Corax's Art compos'd For whether the person be not lyable to the Crime as he that is infirm has an easie plea against a Battery because it seems unlikely or whether he be lyable to the Accusation as being stout and strong he has the same defence unless the Probability appear and so in other things For of necessity a man must be either obâ—oxious to the Crime or not and both appear probable and that is probable this not simply probable but as has been said And this is to make the Inferiour Reason Superiour which was the reason that men ill brook'd the Reason of Protogoras as being false and not true but seemingly probable CHAP. XXV Of Dissolutions ENthymemes are dissolv'd by opposing another Enthymeme or bringing an Objection Therefore when we oppose another Enthymeme it is apparent that we may do it from the same Places For Syllogisms are made out of Probables and there are many Probables that are contrary one to another Objections as in the Topics are brought four ways either from the same or the like or from the contrary or from things adjudg'd I call from the same as if the Enthymeme were concerning Love as being to be applauded the objection is twofold For you shall either say say Universally that all Indigency is evil or particularly that the Proverb of Caunias Amor had never been brought into Use if Love were not sometimes Bestial and unlawful in some Persons An Objection is brought from the Contrary as if the Enthymeme were that a good man is kind to all his friends the answer should be That neither the Wicked do ill to all men From the like as if the Enthymeme were that they who receive an injury always hate the answer should be That neither they who receive kindnesses always love Things adjudg'd proceed from men of Fame and Reputation As if the Emthymeme were That Drunkards are to be pardon'd for that they sin unwittingly The objection is that then Pittâ—cus is to be discommended whose Laws are no less severe against the drunken then the sober offender Now because Enthymemes which are deduc'd from four things Probable Example Demonstration and Sign and for that those Enthymemes which are deduc'd from those things which for the most part either are or seem to be are deduc'd from probables And those from Example which raciocination collects by Induction from one or more things alike when any assuming universally concludes particularly Those from Argument which are infer'd from one necessary appearance and those from signs when we collect from what is Universal or particular whether it be or not be and probable is that which not always but for the most part appears such Enthymemes are to be dissolv'd by bringing an Objection and the Dissolution will be seeming but not always true For the Objector does not always dissolve the Probability by denying it to be but denying it to be necessary And there it happens that the Defendant is always in a better Condition then the Accuser by reason of this deception For because the Accâ—ser fetches his Proofs from Probabilities and for that the Solution is not the same either that it is not probable or that it is not necessary as also for that he is ready to object that which is for the most part and that it is not only probable but always and necessary the Judge being so
differ from the beginning Since then there are two sorts of Paeanic opposite one to another of which the one is proper for the beginning as they use it This is one long and two short 〈◊〉 Delogena Auricome O Hecate nate Jovis The other three short and one long 〈◊〉 And this is proper for the end For because the short syllables are impersect they cause a lameness from which being separated by the long Syllable the end appears yet not by the Writer nor by the Paragraph but by the dimension of Feet CHAP. IX Of Diffus'd Oration and it's contrary ELocution of necessity must either be diffus'd and one in a Link as the Dilatations or extensions of the Dithyrambics or turn'd and like the Antistrophs of the ancient Poets Diffus'd Oration is very ancient first made known by Herodotus the Thurian Which at first all Writers now not many make use of I call it diffus'd because it has no end of it self until the matter treated of be brought to a conclusion which is unpleasant because tedious and boundless For all men are willing to see a conclusion asâ— being tir'd out of breath toward the end of the Goal or Stage and are willing to turn again But when they see the end they are not a weary before they arrive at it Turn'd Oration is discern'd by the Period I mean by the Period that Oration which has a beginning and an end of it self and a magnitude easily discernable and such a one is delightful and easy to be learnt Delightful as being contrary to that which is boundless and because it is always thought to tickle the Ears of the Reader when he still comes to a full stop But where nothing is foreseen nor any thing illustrated the hearer becomes tir'd and displeas'd It is easie to be learnt because easily retain'd in memory and that because there is Number in Periods Which is the reason that Verses are more easily remember'd then Prose Now the Period must be terminated by the Sentence and not left broken as in the Iambic of Sophocles Calidon this is the land where Pelops raign'd The contrary would appear should it be said Calidon is in Peloponnesus Now of Periods one consists in the members the other is simple and pure In the members there is a perfect and distinct Sentence easily comprehended in one breath not divided but entire and the member is one part of it By simple I mean a Sentence but of one member But neither the Periods nor the members must be curtaild nor tedious For being curtaild they put the Hearer to the stumble For of necessity when the Sentence stretches out in length and the Measure which is bounded comes to be drawn back the Hearer must be put to the stumble by the justling of the Sentence and the Measure together and they leave the Hearer as those that get ground leave those that walk'd together before Whence that jest of Democritus the Chian upon Melampotides making excursions instead of Antisstrophs This Man frames mischeif for himself inframing mischeif for another For long suspence is a mischief to him that causes it which may be truly apply'd to long member'd and long winded Sentences But Sentences that are too short member'd are no Periods for they carry the Hearer headlong But of Elocution in members the one sort is distinct the other opposite Distinct as thus I have often admir'd those who summon'd assemblies and instituted the Gymnic excercises Opposite is that wherein through both members either contrary is compos'd with contrary or the same is joyn'd to contraries As for example they were profitable to both as well those that stay'd behind as those that follow'd For the one purchas'd more then they had at home and for the other they left sufficient to support 'em at home Here staying and following are contraries sufficient and more and as to those that wanted Money and were willing to enjoy it the will to enjoy is oppos'd to fruition Moreover it often happens that Wise Men are unfoortunate and Fools prosper Presently they obtain'd the rewards of stout men and soon after they took upon 'em the command of the Sea Also he Saild upon the Land and travell'd on foot by Sea for he joyn'd the two Shores of the Hellespont and digg'd through Mount Athos Also and they who were by nature Citizens by Law were depriv'd of their City for some miserably perish'd others were shamefully exil'd Or Privately to make use of Barbarians in our families but publickly to despise many of our Allies that are in service Either we will have 'em alive or leave 'em Dead Or what one said against Pitolaus and Lycophron in open Court They sold you remaining at home but coming to us they were bought For in every one of these is to be observ'd what we have said But this sort of Elocution is delightfull because contraries are most notorious and being parallell'd together are yet more easie to be taken notice of as also because they resemble Syllogisms for an Argument is but a Collection of opposites such therefore is opposition But Adequation is when the members are equal Assimilation if both the members have the same extreams Which of necessity must be either at the beginning or the end In the beginning the Assimilation consists in words At the end in the lastâ—syllables of the word or cases of the same word or the word it self In the beginning thus Land it was but Land untill'd which he receiv'd from him Atton'd with gifts and mollify'd with good words they departed In the end thus They did not think he had brought forth a Boy but they thought him to be the cause of the birth In great cares but little hopos In the case of the same word as thus Can he be worthy of a brazen statue who is not worthy of Brass Thou in his life time spok'st ' ill of him and now writest ill of him being dead In the Syllable thus How terribly hadst thou suffer'd hadst thou seen a slothful Man prefer'd Sometimes Opposition Ad equation Assimilation and Ending a like concur in the same Nevertheless there are also false Oppositions as in that of Epicharmus Sometimes I was with 'em sometimes among ' em CHAP. X. Of Festivity and Vrbanity TO learn readily is naturally delightful to all men seeing then that words signifie something whatever learning we attain to most easily from words that is the most pleasing Therefore obsolete words are unknown proper words we know Metaphor also more especially conduces For when we compare old age to stubble we are taught learning and knowledge from the kind For they are both decay'd The Respresentations of the Poets are also useful which being rightly made use of will appear Urbane and Polite Also those Enthymemes and that Elocution must be urbane that imprint a quick apprehension of things And therefore Vulgar Enthymemes are to be rejected I mean by Vulgar such as are obvious to every one and have