own Contracts no man could trust them and consequently all Society with them would be dissolved And whatever Supreme Power may do as to such Acts as are properly its own yet where there is Jus quaesitum alteri as in all Contracts there is that cannot be taken away by it But all this was answered on the other side by the Plenitude of the Popes Power for it was a Contradiction they said to own that and to say That there was any Engagement by Oath or otherwise which he could not Dispense with For as Hank 11 H. 4. 37. says Papa omnia potest And therefore all such Oaths and Promises as limit the Popes Dispensing Power are void in themselves And as to Ecclesiastical Laws or Constitutions they easily resolved all Difficulties about them upon such Principles as these 1. That the Popes have the supreme Power in the Church 2. That the Ecclesiastical Laws were the Popes Laws 3. That it is an inseparable Prerogative in the Pope to Dispense with Ecclesiastical Laws upon Necessity and urgent Occasions 4. That the Pope is the sole Judge of that Necessity 5. That this was not a Trust given to the Pope by Councils or Conclaves but by God and St. Peter and therefore cannot be taken away from her But I shall endeavour to give a clearer Light into this Matter by shewing the several Steps and Degrees how this Dispensing Power came into the World and how it passed from the Ecclesiastical to other Laws when Princes assumed such a Plenitude of Power in Civils which the Popes practised in Ecclesiasticals The first time we read of Dispensations was with respect to the Ancient Canons of the Church and it implied a Relaxation of the Rigour of them not with respect to their Force or binding Power but as to the Penance which Persons were to undergo for the Violation of them And herein the Notion of Dispensing was very different from what the Canonists made it afterwards when they declared it to be a Relaxation of the Law it self so that it should not have that Force upon the Conscience which it otherwise had For a Dispensation with them is a Licence to do that which they cannot lawfully do without it and that with a non-obstante to that which otherwise makes it Unlawful De Jure illicitum fit ex Dispensatione licitum hic est proprie effectus Dispensationis saith Pyrrhus Corradus who gives a large Account of the Practice of Dispensations in the Court of Rome which conclude with a non-obstante to any former Constitutions or Canons of Councils But no such thing can be found in the Ancient Practice of the Church because the Popes themselves were then believed to be under the Canons But when it was supposed That the severe Execution of the Canons would rather hinder than advance the Good of the Church the Governours of it thought they had sufficient Authority to abate the Rigorous Execution of them As about the Times of Penance the Translation of Bishops from one See to another the Intervals of Orders and such like But the Popes then pretended to be strict Observers of the Canons when the particular Bishops took upon them to Dispense with the Execution of them as appears by Ivo's Preface to his Collection of Canons where he distinguisheth the Immoveable or Moral Precepts from the Canonical which he calls Moveable In the former saith he no Dispensation is to be allowed But in those things which only concern Discipline the Bishops may Dispense provided there be a Compensation i. e. That the Church's Interest may be better secured or advanced thereby as he there discourses at large And his Rule is Ibi Dispensatio admittenda est ubi rigor periculosus est But by this means the Severity of the Primitive Discipline was quite lost The Bishops of Rome observing this thought it a proper time for them to appear zealous for the Ancient Canons which gained them a great Reputation in the World and by this means the Custody of the Canons was looked on as their particular Province Which they improved so well that at last they turned the Guardianship of the Canons into a Power over them and then they found Fault with the Bishops Dispensing with them for another Reason viz. Because the Dispensing Power was a Prerogative of the Roman See and Inferior Bishops could act no farther in it than they had Authority from it We find that in S. Bernard's time the Pope did take upon him to Dispense too far to his great Dissatisfaction for by his Dispensing Power he saith he overthrew the Order of the Church Murmur loquor saith he querimoniam Ecclesiarum The Pope dispensed with the Ecclesiastical Laws in Exemptions of Abbots and others from that Subordination they stood in to their proper Superiors He saith He could not see how this Dispensing Power could be justified You do indeed shew a plenitude of Power but it may be not of Justice you shew what you can do but it is a Question whether you ought or not and you ought to consider First Whether it be lawful then whether it be decent and lastly whether it be expedient At last he allows a Dispensing Power in two Cases Urgent Necessity and Common Good otherwise he saith It is not fidelis Dispensatio sed crudelis Dissipatio an overthrow of all Order and Government In one of his Epistles he speaks sharply against getting a Dispensation to do that which it was not lawful to do without one And he thinks he hath disproved it by invincible Reason For a Licence from the Pope can never make that Lawful which without it were Unlawful When the Practice of the Dispensing Power grew more common there were two great Questions raised concerning it Whether if a Dispensation were granted without Just Cause it were Lawful or not And Whether if it were not Lawful yet it was valid There were some who flattered the Dispensing Power so much that they allowed it in all Cases whether there were a just Cause or not These were the high-flown Canonists who resolved all Laws into Will and Pleasure But others who allowed a Dispensing Power upon a Just Cause yet thought it repugnant to the Original Design of Government for those who are entrusted with Care of the Laws to Dispense with them without such a Cause as answers the End of Government And some went so far as to deny any Validity in a Dispensation granted upon Pleasure for as an unjust Law hath no Force so said they an unjust Dispensation of a Good Law hath none Upon this Point two great Schoolmen differ Suarez whom the Lord Chief Justice Vaughan commends for his Learning in this Matter goes upon these Grounds 1. That a Prince is not Dominus sed Dispensator Legum although the Force of a Law depends upon his Authority and therefore in Dispensing with a Law he doth not act by Absolute Power but by Administration For
he is not Lord over the Community but Governour 2. That for him to Dispense in a Law made for the Community without a just Cause is not only malum quia prohibitum sed ex se ex natura rei semper malum Therefore Suarez was far from thinking a Prince might Dispense with any thing that was not malum in se for he makes it to be so for him to dispense with a malum quia prohibitum if it be prohibited by a Law made for a Publick Good and there be no just Cause for it 3. That although a Prince sins in Dispensing with such a Law yet his Dispensation holds as to the Force of the Law which he supposes to depend on the Will of the Prince and therefore his Will being altered the Obligation ceaseth as to the Persons Dispensed with 4. That although such a Dispensation holds as to the Law yet he thinks a Prince bound in Conscience to Revoke such a Dispensation because it is unlawful for him to persist in such a Will it being repugnant to the Common Good and the Obligation of his Duty 5. That if such a Dispensation be to the Injury of a third Person then it is void in it self as being repugnant to Justice Vasquez saith They are all agreed That no Prince hath a Power to Dispense with his Laws according to his Pleasure or because they are his Laws But he saith There is a Dispute Whether an unlawful Dispensation be valid or not And he thinks not and that a Man's Action after the Dispensation is as faulty as if there had been none His Reason is because a Prince is bound by his own Laws so that he cannot Dispense with himself as to the Obligation of them for if he could at Pleasure Dispense with himself he could never be bound for how can a Man be bound to keep a Law in which he can Dispense with himself when he pleases And if he cannot Dispense with himself much less with any under him Having thus endeavoured to clear the Nature and Original of the Dispensing Power I now come 2. To the Reason assigned by Sir E. Coke from the Year Books why the King may Dispense with Laws because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. My Lord Vaughan said Right concerning it That this Rule hath more confounded Men's Judgments on this Subject than rectified them Which I shall make appear by shewing I. That it alters the Frame of our Government II. That it takes away all Security by Law. III. That it contradicts the Sense of our Nation in former Ages IV. That the Rule is contrary to the Precedents in Law. I. That it alters the Frame of our Government For it goes upon a very false Ground viz. That the King may Dispense with any thing which is not Evil in its own Nature or antecedently to any Human Laws which is to suppose the whole Legislative Power to be lodged in the Person of the King For all who understand these Matters do agree That a Power to Dispense with Laws is the same with a Power to make them Dispensare hoc est lege solvere is solus potest qui ferendae abrogandaeque leg is potestatem habet saith H. Grotius Suarez saith He hath the Power of Dispensing qui legem tulit quia ab ejus voluntate potentia pendet Vasquez That the Dispensing Power lies in him qui habet Potestatem condendi abrogandi legem Pufendorf That none can Dispense with a Law but such as have the Power of making it But we need no Authorities in this Matter For to Dispense in the Sense it is here taken is to take away the Obligation of a Law and whoever takes it away must have the Power of laying it on And there is no Difference between the Dispensation with a Law and the Abrogation of it but that a Dispensation is an Abrogation of it to particular Persons while others are under the Force of it and an Abrogation is a General Dispensation that being no more than a Relaxation of the whole Law to those Persons who were bound by it before But if a part of the Law be taken away as to the whole Community then it is called a Derogation of it But if the Law be Relaxed only for a limited Time and under certain Conditions then it is not an Abrogation but an Indulgence or Suspension of the Law. To Dispense with a Law is more than to give an Equitable Sense or a Favourable Interpretation of a Law for he that Inteprets a Law supposes his Interpretation to agree with the Sense and Design of the Law he that Dispenses owns that which he dispenses with to be against the Intention of the Law but that he hath Power to take away the Force of it so far as he thinks fit He that saith Thou shalt not kill doth not reach to Legal Executioners of Justice interprets the Law according to Reason and Equity But when God said to Abraham Go and Sacrifice thy Son he must be supposed by virtue of his Supreme Authority to Dispense with the Law in his Case so as to make that Lawful upon his Command which would not have been so without it Some will not allow this to be called a Dispensation but an alteration of the Matter of the Law but when that Alteration comes from the Authority of the Law Makers it is the same so that to Interpret a Law is an Act of Discretion and Judgment but to Dispense with it of Authority and Jurisdiction And none can therefore Dispense in the Law of God but he that made it all that the Wisest and greatest Men can justly pretend to is no more than to give the true Sense of it and it is intolerable Prsumption for any Creature to pretend to more An Equitable Sense as to Human Law is not always that which seems to be most favourable to those who go against the Letter of it but that which most enforces the End and Design of the Law although it be not comprehended in the Words of it If a Law mentions a Crime of a lesser nature in regard of Circumstances and in regard of those Circumstances promises some Favour as Benefit of the Clergy it can be no Equitable Sense to extend it to such Acts which have worse Circumstances because the Ground of the Favour was the extenuation of the Fact by the Circumstances so that the chief Rule of Equity in the Interpretation of a Law is to attend to the Intention and Design of it more than to the bare Words The Intention and Design of the Law is not to be measured by Particular and Accidental Cases wherein some Inconveniencies are to be born but by the Publick and General Good which more than makes amends for them which is the Reason of that Maxim Better a Mischief than an Inconvenience which is false unless taken in such an Equitable Sense There are
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction are either such as other Princes have an equal Right to or else they must imply such proper Eclesiastical Jurisdiction as follows the Power of Order and then how can the Pope give the one without the other Such a Gift is like an Appropriation of a Benefice with a Cure to a Nunnery which the Lord Hobart saith is void in Law by reason of the incapacity of the Persons But the Supremacy which our Law gives is not any proper immediate spiritual Jurisdiction like that of Bishops but an Authoritative and Legislative Supremacy without any foreign Appeals as will appear afterwards But the Rights which the Kings of Sicily challenge are these 1. That they have the same Powers which Legates a Latere have and may judge of the same Causes and proceed in the same manner with Ecclesiastical Censures 2. That no Appeal lies from the King's Commissioner even to Rome it self and it is common to appeal from the Censure of the Bishop to him The former is a Power which our Kings never pretended to by vertue of their Supremacy for it is a Delegation of the Power of the Keys which the Legates à Latere exercise by vertue of their Function as well as their Commission But the Legal Supremacy with us is a Right to govern all sorts of Men by our own Laws without any foreign Jurisdiction and that with respect to Ecclesiastical Matters as well as Temporal But to prevent Mistakes and Cavils about this Matter it will be necessary to clear the Notion of Supremacy as it hath been owned and received in the Church of England And for this we have two Authentic Declarations of it to rely upon The first is mentioned 5 Eliz. c. 1. § 14. Where the Supremacy is declared to be taken and expounded in such form as is set forth in the Admonition annexed to the Queens Injunctions published in the first year of her Reign And the Words there are That the Queen neither doth nor will challenge any Authority but such as was of ancient time due to the Imperial Crown of this Realm that is under God to have the Sovereignty and Rule over all manner of Persons born within these her Realms Dominions and Countries of what Estates either Ecclesiastical or Temporal soever they be so as no other foreign Power shall or ought to have any superiority over them The Second is in the 37th Article wherein it is declared That by the Supremacy is meant that only Prerogative which we see to have been always given to all Godly Princes in Holy Scriptures by God himself that is that they should rule all Estates and Degrees committed to their Charge by God whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal and restrain with the Civil Sword the stubborn and evil doers So that granting a Commission for proceeding by Ecclesiastical Censures is no part of that Supremacy which our Church owns And thus the Divines of our Church have understood it By the Supremacy saith Bishop Andrews we do not attribute to the King the Power of the Keys or Ecclesiastical Censures R. Thompson in his Desence against Becanus saith The Supremacy is not to be defined by Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction but by Supream Government Becanus urged this as an Argument against the Kings Supremacy That he had no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Dr. Burrhil answered That the Supremacy implied many other things as the Power of calling Convocations of confirming Canons of giving Commissions of Delegates of taking Cognizance of the Misdemeanors of Church-men as well as others but for proper Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction he denies it to belong to Supremacy And after asserts That the King's Supremacy is preserved if he takes care that those who have the Power of Ecclesiastical Censures do exercise them and not as though it belonged to the Supremacy to give an immediate Power to proceed by Ecclesiastical Censures which was not supposed to belong to it but a supreme Right of governing all sorts of Persons by our Laws The King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters doth not saith Mason imply the Power of the Keys which the King hath not but he may command those who have them to use them rightly All these wrote in King James I. his Reign when the Point of Supremacy was throughly sifted on both sides And the King himself who very well understood these Matters saith That the Oath of Supremacy only extended to the King's Power of Judicature over all Persons as well Civil as Ecclesiastical excluding all foreign Powers and Potentates to be Judges within his Dominions Not as though the King hereby challenged to himself a Power of inflicting Ecclesiastical Censures on Persons but leaving the Spiritual Jurisdiction to those who have the Power of the Keys it belonged to him to exercise his Supreme Authority over Ecclesiastical Persons and Causes as he did over Temporal For saith Archbishop Bramhal our Laws never invested the King with any Spiritual Power or Jurisdiction witness the Injunctions of Q. Eliz. witness the Publick Articles of Our Church witness the Professions of King James witness all our Statutes themselves The King of England saith he by the Fundamental Constitution of the Monarchy hath plenary Power without the Licence or Help or Concurrence of any Foreign Prelate or Potentate to render final Justice that is to receive the last Appeals of his own Subjects without any Fear of any Review from Rome or at Rome for all Matters Ecclesiastical and Temporal Ecclesiastical by his Bishops Temporal by his Judges And thus our Laws were in the Right when they called the Act of Supremacy Restoring the Rights of the Crown for if we take away all the Papal Usurpations as to Appeals Exemptions of Persons Dispensations Provisions making Canons sending Legates to hold Courts to call Convocations c. we may easily understand what the Supremacy is viz. a Power of Governing all Sorts of Men according to the Laws Ecclesiastical and Temporal without any Foreign Jurisdiction But as in Temporal Matters the King 's Supreme Authority is exercised in his Ordinary Courts so likewise in Ecclesiastical Which deriving their Jurisdiction from the King as Supreme his Supremacy is preserved in the ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts but as to extraordinary Jurisdiction that deper ds on the Legislative Power And whether that be not now taken away by it is the thing in Question Having endeavoured to set this Matter in as clear a Light as I could I now return to the Instance of Edward the Confessor And those Words of his as they are in Hoveden signifie no more than a General Right of Protecting and Defending the Church which is not denied to belong to Kings where the Pope's Authority is the most owned I cannot but take notice of a different Reading in the Lord Cokes Copy from all that I have seen for where he hath it Sanctam Ecclesiam regat defendat Lambard veneretur regâ—t but Hoveden revereatur ab
and to bring an Account next Parliament ad quod praedictum Episcopum adjornavimus are the Words of the Writ And that the Business was heard in Parliament appears by the Records 31 E 1. The King seized on the Temporalities of the Bishop of Durham upon a Judgment given against him in Parliament for extending his Spiritual Jurisdiction too far as appears by the Record of the Concord made between the King and him In the Reign of King Edward the Second In the Reign of K. E. 2. nothing is produced but the Statute 9 E. 2. for Regulating the Proceedings between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Courts But how the Kings Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is proved hereby is hard to understand It appears indeed that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is allowed and limited by Parliament But from hence saith he it follows that these Laws may be called the Kings Eccclesiastical Laws or the Ecclesiastical Laws of England There is no question but they may But there is a Difference between Laws so called by Acceptation and Allowance and such as have their whole Force and Authority from the King. For otherwise where the Popes Jurisdiction is owned and received the Pope must receive his Authority from the King. But a Liberty to exercise Authority and deriving Authority are two Things In the Reign of King Edward the Third In the Time of E. 3. many things are alledged and to more purpose but yet a short Answer will serve If the first Instance doth hold viz. That the Sentence of Excommunication by the Archbishop holds against the Sentence of the Pope or his Legate it only proves that the Eccesiastical Jurisdiction here by Law is in the Archbishop and not in the Pope or his Legate But there may be another Reason mentioned by Fitz Herbert viz. That the Certificate of the Archbishop might be more Authentick than the Seal of a Legate The second sixth and eighth only prove the King Supreme Patron and a Right of Patronage is distinct from a Right of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and so it was resolved in Grendon's Case Pl. f. 498. That the King presents by Lapse as Supreme Patron and not as Supreme Ordinary For this belongs to him as King the Land on which Churches are built being originally held of him And this Right the King enjoyed when the Pope was owned to be Supreme Ordinary But in the Case of his own free Chapels Fitz-Herbert saith right That in Case of Lapse by the Dean the King presents as Ordinary the Archbishop and Bishop having no Authority there as Ordinaries The third fourth and fifth are about Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdictions granted by the King especially in his own free Chapels which are only visitable by Commission from the King. But this very Pretence of Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdiction was founded upon the Belief of the Pope's being Supreme Ordinary for exempt Places were not supposed to be free from all Ordinary Jurisdiction but from that of Inferior Ordinaries being immediately subject to the Pope A Bishop by the Canon Law may grant an Exemption from his Right of Jurisdiction but not from his Right of Visitation but the Pope from both And in the Grant of Exemption the immediate Subjection to the Roman See is expressed As to the King 's free Chapels their Exemption was by an express Bull of Innocent III to King John and in the Case of the free Chapels of S. Martins Henry III granted a Prohibition wherein it is inserted That it was a free Chapel ab omni Jurisdictione Episcopali per Sedem Apostolicam exempta And 45 Hen. 3. in a Prohibition concerning the free Chapel of Wolverhampton the Grant of Innocent III is repeated The Right to extra-parochial Tithes is Provisional and not by way of Inheritance and so it may belong to the King although he have no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction As to the severe Proceeding about Bulls from Rome I have given an Account of that already in E. 1. The anointing of Kings proves no more their Capacity of Spiritual Jurisdiction than it proves the Kings of Israel to have been High Priests There is no doubt the Ecclesiastical Courts may be limited by the Laws of the Land and there are some Causes which belong to them not originally of a Spiritual Nature but they have been a long time possessed of them by Custom and are allowed by Law which is well expressed in 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. where it is said That all Causes Testamentary Causes of Matrimony and Divorces Rights of Tithes Oblations and Obventions the Knowledge whereof by the Goodness of Princes of this Realm and by the Laws and Customs of the same appertaineth to the Spiritual Jurisdiction of this Realm shall be determined within the Kings Jurisdiction and Authority It doth not seem probable That the King by his own Authority would remove Secular Canons and put in Regular when Hoveden saith in the same Case H. 2. did it by the Pope's Authority and with the free Consent of the Parties The Statutes of Provisors were excellent Statutes but are said to be enacted for the Good and Tranquility of the Realm which no doubt the King and his Parliament were bound to take care of But they prove no more Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction than the Pragmatick Sanctions of Lewis IX and Charles VII in France did which were of the same nature The following Instances in other Reigns are many of them of the same kind with those already answered but what seems to have any new Force shall be considered In the Reign of King Henry the Fourth 2 H. 4. c. 15. is urged to prove That the King by consent of his Parliament did direct the Proceedings of the Spiritual Courts in Cases of Heresie and other Matters more Spiritual but it is evident by the Act it self That the Spiritual Jurisdiction was left wholly to the Ordinaries and only an Inforcement of it by the Civil Power was added by the Law then made for the Words are Whereas the Diocesans of the said Realm cannot by their Jurisdiction Spiritual without Aid of the said Royal Majesty sufficiently correct c. Therefore a Power to Imprison and Fine was given to the Ordinaries who might before have proceeded by Ecclesiastical Censures but these being contemned by them the Ordinaries called in the Assistance of the Civil Power If there had been a Power before to have proceeded against Hereticks by Common Law when convict by their Ordinaries I cannot see any Reason why that Law should be made In case of Apostacy i. e. Renouncing Christianity Bracton saith The Person convict is to be burned and he instanceth in the Deacon who turned Jew in the Council of Oxford And Fleta speaks only of Apostates whether Clerks or others and those are the Miscreants in Briton and in Horn Heresie was then the same with renouncing Baptism or turning Jew or Turk or using Sorcery but after Wickliff's Time the Ordinaries inlarged the Notion of Heresie and took
upon themselves to be sole Judges in it and for all that I can see the Act 2 H. 4. owns this to be part of their Spiritual Jurisdiction And this is one Reason alledged for the Repeal of this Act 25 H. 8. c. 14. because there is no Declaration of Heresie made in it but it is left to the Judgment of the Ordinary And therefore this Act was ill thought upon to prove the King 's Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction In Henry the Seventh's time the King is said to be persona mixta because he hath both Ecclesiastical and Temporal Jurisdiction But this Argument is drawn only from some occasional Talk mentioned in the Year Books 10 Hen. 8. 18. Brian said That a sage Doctor of Law said one time to him That Priests might be tried at Common Law Car il dit quod Rex est persona mixta car est persona unita cum sacerdotibus saint Eglyse If all this be granted it proves no more than that the King hath Jurisdiction by his Law over Ecclesiastical Persons which is not disputed CHAP. III. Whether the King's Supremacy by Law extends to the Dispensing with Laws Of the Nature and Original of the Power The Inconsistency of such a Dispensing Power with the Frame of our Government HAving thus far proceeded in clearing the ancient Legal Supremacy I am now come to an Instance of greater Weight and Difficulty and which will therefore require more Pains and Care in the Examination of it viz. 11 H. 7. 12. By the Ecclesiastical Laws allowed with in this Realm a Priest cannot have two Benefices nor a Bastard can be a Priest but the King may by his Ecclesiastical Power and Jurisdiction dispense with both these because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. Here we are to enquire into these things 1. How far the King's Power and Jurisdiction did extend in the Cases mentioned 2. How far the Reason here given will justifie a Power of Dispensing with Laws 1. As to the Cases here mentioned there is no doubt but the Canonists made the Power of Dispensing in these to be an Argument of the Pope's Supremacy or the Plenitude of his Power But doth it hence follow That what Princes did to their own Subjects as to the qualifying them for a Legal Possession of Benefices must argue a Supremacy in them over Ecclesiastical Persons and Causes And there is a difference to be made between not Receiving the Pope's Canons in particular Cases and a Power of Dispensing with Ecclesiastical Laws If the Law were so then as is noted by Fineax in 11 H. 7. 12. the plain Consequence is That the contrary were no part of the Ecclesiastical Laws allowed within this Realm As in the famous Case about the Canon Law concerning Bastardy when the Barons said Noluleges Angliae mutari no man can say That the Barons dispensed with the Pope's Ecclesiastical Laws but that they refused to execute them for as it is well observed in Standish's Case in Kelway's Reports 7 H. 8. Ecclesiastical Laws have no force where the General Practice hath been contrary If this were no more than a private Opinion of Fineux of what he thought the King might do although there were no Precedent for it then it signifies little but if from hence it appears What the Common Law of England was then it follows That this was not received at that time for the Ecclesiastical Law of this Kingdom And so Hobart in Colt and Glover's Case understands it f. 147. for he produces this as an Instance That the Crown always kept a Possession of its Natural Power And to this he adds a Power of Commendam or Retaining a Benefice with a Bishoprick 11 H. 4. 60. This he calls a Power of Dispensation in Spiritualibus But with submission to two such great Men in the Law If the Crown always kept a Possession of these Rights there could be no Dispensation with the Ecclesiastical Law in these Matters but an Exclusion of it As for Instance The Kings of France do challenge many Priviledges to themselves in their Kingdoms in plain Derogation to the Canon Law and for these Priviledges they plead an Ancient Right of the Crown or an immemorial Custom As in the great Controversic of late Years about the Regale the Canon Law is express That upon Pain of Excommunication no Lay Person what soever shall presume to meddle with the Profits of Vacant Bishopricks which was decreed by two Popes in several Councils Urban II in a Council at Awergn MXCV and Innocent II in Lateran Council MC XXXIX both entred in the Body of the Canon Law And yet the Kings of France insist to this Day on the Rights of Vacant Sees as belonging to them But can this be pleaded as a Dispensing with the Ecclesiastical Laws allowed in that Realm No but that this Part of the Ecclesiastical Law was not received there for that partly by the Feudal Right partly by the Right of the Crown partly by Immemortal Custom the Profits of Vacant Bishopricks accrue to the King. It is a harder Point to defend the Regale where the Custom hath gone along with the Canon but if the Rights of the Crown be defended in France against Custom and Canon too our Kings cannot be blamed for resuming other Rights after so long Usurpation by the Popes But where the Canon Law was not received in any Part of it there it hath no Force to oblige and where there is no Ecclesiastical Law in Force there can be no Dispensing with it for although the later Canon Law doth void all Customs against the Liberties and Priviledges of the Church Non debet in hac parte Canonibus ex aliqua consuetudine praejudiâ—ium generari Yet when these Canonists come to explain it they tell us That an immemorial Custom hath Force against a Canon but how Not as a Custom but as it is a Proof of an Ancient Priviledge granted by the Pope although there be not the least â—ootsteps of it And so this Instance of H. 7. will prove according to this Way only some Ancient Priviledge our Kings had and no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction by the Right of the Crown But whether the King could Dispense with the Ecclesiastical Laws in these Cases or not it is certain the Pope challenged to himself the Power of doing it For after that the Third Council of Lateran liad strictly forhidden Pluralities which were then so common and scandalous upon pain of Forfeiture Innocent the Third complained in the Fourth Lateran That he saw little or no Benesit come by that severe Canon and therefore he seems to make one more severe That whosoever takes another Benefice shall be deprived of the former ipso jure and if he seeks to keep it to lose the other Yet after all this ends only in the Popes Power to dispense as he saw Cause with Persons of greater Rank or Merit and greater Preferments The Words are Circa sublimes tamen
certain Ways of Reason which Mankind do allow in the Equitable Interpretation of Laws as That no positive Law must be interpreted against Natural and Divine Laws That if Laws contradict each other one or the other must lose its Force That no Case which overthrows a Law by necessary Consequence was ever intended to be allowed by it For that were to make a Law and to give a Liberty to break it at the same Time. If a Law be designed for a Publick Good and an Exception be afterwards made against it as to the Incapacity of some Persons by it for Publick Service which could not but be foreseen and considered at the Time of making the Law there is no Reason that should be alledged as a Reason for Dispensing with the Law which was intended at first by the Law For however the Case may be put as to such things which could not be foreseen at the making of a Law yet what was intended to be prevented by the making it cannot in Reason be alledged against it Because if there had not been other things to have over-ballanced that Inconvenience the Law had never been passed There is no doubt but the same Power which makes a Law may Dispense with it if it sees Cause for if it can Abrogate a Law as to the whole Community it may as well Dispense with it as to particular Persons and leave it in Force to all others The Question then is Whether a Prince assuming to himself a Dispensing Power doth not thereby assume the Legislative too Since it appears That there can be no Power to take off the Obligation of a Law but that which causes it although it be with respect to particular Persons but if it amount to a General Suspension of a Law there can be no Question to those who understand what these things mean. Our present Business was to shew That if the King can dispense with Mala prohibita as such the Legislative Power must be resolved into him because a Dispensing Power can be refer'd to no other And if the King may Dispense with all Mala prohibita he may Dispense with all just human Laws For no Law can be just which requires Malum in se and therefore such a Law being void of it self there can be no Exercise of a Dispensing Power but concerning Mala prohibita And if the King can therefore Dispense because they are only prohibited then from a Parity of Reason he may Dispense with all Laws that concern only such things and we cannot be secure of any Laws but such as forbid things that are evil in themselves II. And this is my Second Reason against it That it takes away all Security by our Laws both as to our Religion and Liberties 1. As to our Religion I grant that to take away all Religion is Malum in se to take away the true Religion is Malum in se but in a Nation divided about the true Religion and where the Prince is of one Opinion and the main Body of the Nation of another concerning it what Security can the People by this Rule have as to the enjoying that which they account the true Religion but the Prince doth not The utmost we can suppose in this Case is for such Laws to be made as they apprehend to be most effectual for this Purpose But what Security can these Laws afford if the Prince assume a Power of Dispensing with Ecclesiastical Laws It is not possible they can have any unless they can be secure he shall never exercise this Dispensing Power for by it he may equally suspend all Laws which relate to it he may give a Dispensation to such as are unqualified by our Laws and put them not only into Places of Authority and Trust but into all Ecclesiastical Preferments as soon as he thinks fit and that without any Check upon his Conscience because those whose Office it is to interpret the Laws tell him he hath such a Power by Law to Dispense with Ecclesiastical Laws although passed in the solemnest manner and with a Design to give Security to the People concerning the preserving their Religion And the higher this Point is carried still the less Security For if it be thought such a Prerogative of the Crown as voids all that is made against it then Laws signifie just nothing For every Law is a Limitation of unbounded Will and Power and therefore Laws afford no manner of Security for either they are void of themselves or may be made void when a Sovereign Prince pleases And I think as Men are meer Will and Pleasure will never be taken for an infallible Security But it may be said That taking away the true Religion is Malum in se and therefore by this Rule such Laws cannot be dispensed with Very true we think so But suppose a King of another Opinion and that he should think it good Service to destroy Heresie and Schism and those are Mala in se what Security can there be then from this Rule For the same Persons who assert the Dispensing Power make the King to be Judge not meerly of the Necessity and urgent Occasions but of what is Malum in se and what not Suppose then he should look on our Religion as Heresie and Schism what possible Security can this Distinction afford us 2. As to our Civil Liberties Which are founded upon our Laws made by the Consent of King and People But if there be such an inseparable Prerogative in the Crown as enables the King to Dispense with all Mala prohibita what becomes of all the Ancient Charters of Liberties For no one can pretend that the contrary to them all are Mala in se. And if there be no farther Security than what this Distinction affords we are in a very precaridus Condition as to all our Liberties I confess the Case is different as to the Ecclesiastical Laws mentioned in 11 H. 7. 12. and as to our Civil Liberties because these Ecclesiastical Laws had their Force as such from a foreign Power and as far as they were the Laws of the Kingdom it was by a Tacit Consent and Acceptation and not by any solemn Enacting of them And as to such as these where the Laws were not received and the things were no farther evil than as they were prohibited by such a Foregin Power there is nothing but what is reasonable in the Case of 11 H. 7. 12. as it is in the Books But when this hath been extended to Laws which have passed in the most solemn manner by the King in Parliament it is time not only to take notice of but to set forth the mischievous Consequences of this Distinction as it is so applied for it leaves us under no manner of Security by our Laws 3. It contradicts the Sense of our own Nation in former Ages Which I shall shew in a remarkable Instance about the Statutes of Provisors 35 E. 1. 25 E. 3. 13 R. 2. which were Prohibitory
Person and this Royal Power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament neither in Thesi nor in Hypothesi but that the King by his Royal Power may dispense with it for upon the Commandment of the King and Obedience of the Subject does his Government consist as it is provided by the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. That all Patents made or to be made of any Office of a Sheriff c. for Term of years or for Life in Fee-simple or in Tail are void and of none effect any Clause or Parol of Non-obstante put or to be put into such Patents to be made notwithstanding And further Whosoever shall take upon him or them to accept or occupy such Office of Sheriff by vertue of such Grants or Patents shall stand perpetually disabled to be or bear the Office of Sheriff within any County of England by the same Authority And notwithstanding that by this Act 1. The Patent is made void 2. The King is restrained to grant a Non-obstante 3. The Grantee disabled to take the Office yet the King by his Royal Sovereign Power of commanding may command by his Patent for such Causes as he in his Wisdom doth think meet and profitable for himself and the Commonwealth of which he himself is sole Judge to serve him and the Weal Publick as Sheriff for such a County for years or for Life c. And so was it resolved by all the Justices of England in the Exchequer Chamber ' 2 H. 7. Here the Point is resolved into an inseparable Prerogative in the King which no Act of Parliament can restrain although made with his own Consent Is there no Act of Parliament then which this great Lawyer will allow to restrain the King's Prerogative so as he cannot disperse with it What saith he to the Case of Buying Offices at Court Cannot the King by vertue of his Prerogative order his Houshold as he pleases to dispose of Offices about him as he thinks fit No. The same Lawyer saith That no Non obstante could dispense with the Act against buying of Offices And yet one would think that the King had as great a Prerogative in the Court as over the Kingdom But how comes he to say That the King can dispense notwithstanding the Disability when elsewhere he saith The King cannot dispense in the Case of a Disability by Law For the Reason he gives why the King cannot present a Man to a Living who is convict of Simony is because the Law hath disabled him Very well And yet in this Case although the Law hath disabled him the King may dispense Where are we now The King can dispense with a Disability and he cannot dispense with it This is indeed a very dark learning of Dispensations as C. Justice Vaughan well called it for we cannot yet find the way through it Can the King dispense with a Disability in Law or not If not the Case of Sheriffs is gone If he can then why not in the case of Symony Why not as to sitting in Parliament without taking the Oaths No here is a Disability in Law. What then Cannot the K. dispense with a Disability in one Case as well as the other Bu the same Person saith That in that Case because the Words amount to a Disability the King cannot dispense and here where the Disability is expressed he may But we are lately told there are two sorts of Disabilities one is actually incurred as that upon the Members who sit without taking the Oaths and the other is a Disability annexed to the Breach of a Law as a penalty and that penalty not to be incurred before a Legal Conviction and in this Case the King's Dispensation coming before the Conviction doth prevent it by making that lawful which would not have been so without it But when a Disability is actually-incurred it cannot be taken off but by Act of Parliament I Answer That if the Law which makes the Disability doth allow of a Dispensation antecedent to the Conviction then I grant that the Dispensation before Conviction prevents the Disability As in Digby's Case if the Dispensation had come before Institution the Disability as to holding the former Living had been prevented because the Law doth expresly allow of a Dispensation in the Case But here is no such thing The Act of Parliament supposes no Dispensation but makes an utter Disability as to the holding the Office in Sir Edward Hales his Case but a dispensing Power is set up against the Act of Parliament and such a Dispensation neither before nor after Conviction can prevent a Disability If it could I can by no means see why it might not as well hold as to Members of Parliament at least as to the Oath of Supremacy if they take their Dispensation before Sitting in the House For the Disability doth not take place till they enter the Parliament 5 Eliz. c. 1. And he that entreth the Parliament without taking the said Oath shall be deemed no Knight Citizen Burgess or Baron nor shall have any Voice but shall be as if he had been never Returned or Elected The Intention of the Law for the Test was a disability to hold the Office but it allows time for Persons to qualifie themselves as appears by the Act for the Test. Is not this plain overthrowing the design of the Law for Persons instead of doing what the Law requires to take out a Dispensation for not doing it and so prevent the Disability And what doth a Law signifie when the very design of it is overthrown And what is the Power of making Laws by common Consent in Parliament if without such Consent the whole force of the Law may be taken away by a dispensing Power So that this doth not meerly make Laws to signifie nothing but according to Will and Pleasure but it makes our very Constitution insignificant which requires to every Law the Consent of the People in Parliament As for Instance By the first Constitution of the Roman Government the King had the custody of the Laws but no Laws were to be made but by the Consent of the Roman People in the Curiae thence called Leges Curiatae Would any one have thought this any Privilege if after these Laws were passed the King should claim an inseparable Prerogative of dispensing with them as he sees Cause For it is implied in such a Fundamental Contract as this that Laws when made should not lose their Force without their Consent who made them Else it is not Contractus bonae Fidei I will not dispute whether this were the Original Contract of our Nation or not but this I may say That when our Government came to a Settlement after long struglings this was one of the Fundamental Articles of it That no Laws should pass or Burdens should be laid upon the People but by their own Consent in arliament Bracton saith That a Law among us supposes the Authority of
Particular Statute made for the Security of our Religion or for a Suspension of our Ecclesiastical Laws CHAP. IV. Of the Alterations made in the Supremacy by the Statutes of Henry the Eighth with an Answer to the Objections I Now come to the Alterations made in our Laws about the King's Supremacy in the Time of Henry the Eighth 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. An Act passed for taking away all Appeals to Rome which is founded on the King 's Natural and Independent Right of Governing and doing Justice to all his People and the Sufficiency of his own Clergy for Hearing and Determining such Matters as belonged to their Function and therefore all Causes are to be Heard Discussed Examined finally and definitively Adjudged and Determined within the King's Jurisdiction and Authority and not elswhere in the Courts Spiritual and Temporal But if the King be concerned then it is referred to the Upper-House of Convocation The Preamble of this Act against Appeals to Rome is considerable Whereas by divers Authentick Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed That this Realm of England is an Empire governed by one Supreme Head and King c. with plenary whole and entire Power Preheminence Authority Prerogative and Jurisdiction c. for final determination of Causes c. so that here is an Appeal to Ancient History in this Matter and we have still sufficient Evidence of it before the Popes Encroachments prevailed The Bishops and Barons told Anselm in William Rufus his time It was a thing unheard of and contrary to the Custom of his Realm for any one to go to Rome without the King 's Leave which is after explained by way of Appeal Anselm made but a shuffling Answer to this although he had sworn to observe the Customs of the Realm and he could not deny this to be one but he pretended It was against S. Peter 's Authority and therefore could not observe it for this were saith he to abjure S. Peter From whence I infer That the Custom of the Realm was then thought by Anselm to be inconsistent with the Pope's Authority For whatever they talk of S. Peter it is the Pope they mean. In the Reign of H. 1. the Pope complains grievously That the King would suffer no Appeals to be made to him and that due Reverence was not shewed to S. Peter in his Kingdom and that they ended Ecclesiastical Causes at Home even where Bishops were concerned and very learnedly quotes the Deâ—retal Epistles against them Afterwards the Pope sent his Legate and the King denied him Entrance and the whole Parliament rejected it as contrary to the Ancient Custom and Liberty of England That Passage in the Laws of H. 1. c. 5. which seems to allow of Appeals is a mere Forgery the whole Chapter being a Rapsody taken out of the Canonists H. Huntingdon saith That Appeals were brought in in King Stephen 's time by Henry Bishop of Winchester his Brother being the Pope's Legate By the Constitutions of Clarendon c. 8. the Appeal lay from the Archbishop to the King which is well expressed by Robert of Gloucester And the K. amend solde the Ercbishops deed And be as in the Pope's sted and S. Thomas it withsteed And although H. 2. in his Purgation for the Death of the Archbishop did swear That he would hinder no Appeals to Rome in Ecclesiastical Causes and that he would quit the Ancient Customs of the Realm Yet Hoveden saith The Constitutions of Clarendon were renewed in the Parliament at Northampton and the Justices in Eyre were sworn to observe them and to make others observe them inviolably And for those who went out of the Kingdom in Case of Appeals the Justices were to enquire per consuetudinem Terrae according to the Ancient Custom and if they did not return and stand to the King's Court they were to be outlawed In the Time of R. 1. the Popes complained much of Geofry Archbishop of York for slighting Appeals made to Rome and imprisoning those that made them Celestine doth it twice and in the same Words And Innocent the Third in King John's Time renews the same Complaint of him That he shewed no regard to Appeals made to the Apostolick See. But when the Rights of the Crown were given up by King John to the Pope no Wonder if the Liberties of Appeals were granted by him But yet in the succeeding Reigns we have several Instances upon Record of Persons imprisoned by the King for making Appeals to Rome John of Ibstock in the Time of E. 1. The Abbot of Walden and a Prebendary of Banbury in the Reign of E. 2. The Parson of Leighe Harwoden and the Prior of Barnwel in the time of E. 3. So that this Right was still owned by our Princes when the Matter came into Contest and therefore the Act of H. 8. against Appeals was but a just Resuming of the Ancient Rights of the Crown 25 H. 8. c. 19. A Commission is appointed for reviewing the Canons And it is observable That because it could not be done in Parliament Time the King hath Power given him by Act of Parliament to nominate the thirty two Persons to act in this Matter in these Words Be it therefore enacted by the Authority aforesaid That the King's Highness shall have Power and Authority to nominate and assign at his Pleasure the said thirty two Persons of his Subjects whereof sixteen to be of the Clergy and sixteen to be of the Temporality of the Upper and Nether House of Parliament And because the last Resort was to the Arch-Bishop in the former Act of Appeals therefore to prevent any Inconveniences thereby a new Power is granted by this Act i. e. Upon an Appeal to the King in Chancery a Commission is to be directed to such Persons as the King shall appoint who are to hear and determine such Appeals and the Causes concerning the same 25 H. 8. c. 21. After the Submission of the Clergy and the King being owned Supreme Head yet the Power of dispensing with the Canons in particular Cases did not pass by Commission from the King but by Act of Parliament The Words are It standeth therefore with natural Equity and good Reason that all and every such Laws human made without this Realm or induced into this Realm by the said Sufferance Consents and Custom Your Royal Majesty your Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons representing the whole State of your Realm in this your High Court of Parliament have full Power and Authority not only to dispense but also to Authorize some elect Person or Persons to dispense c. So that the Power of granting Faculties at a time when the Prerogative was highest was not executed by Commission from the King by vertue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal but was granted to the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury in the manner expressed in that Act. A late Author has stretched this Statute to a Power of dispensing in other
is not the Kings Law. For taking one Example for many every Leet or view of Frank Pledge holden by a Subject is kept in the Lords Name and yet it is the Kings Court and all the Proceedings therein are directed by the Kings Laws and many Subjects in England have and hold Courts of Record and other Courts and all their Proceedings be according to the Kings Laws and Customs of the Realm But there is a Material Objection or two yet to be answered 1. It is Objected That 2 Jac. the Judges declared in the Star-Chamber That the Deprivation of Non-conformists was lawful because the King had supreme Ecclesiastical Power which he hath delegated to the Commissioners whereby they had Power of Deprivation by the Canon Law of this Realm and the Statute of 1 Eliz. doth not confer any new Power but explain and declare the ancient Power And therefore they held it clear that the King without a Parliament might make Orders and Constitutions for the Government of the Clergy and might deprive them if they obeyed not To which I answer 1. Our Question is not Whether the King without a Parliament may not require the Observation of Canons passed the Convocation so as to deprive the Obstinate by Vertue of his Supreme Power in Ecclesiastical Matters but whether he may appoint a Commission with Power to deprive against an Act of Parliament which hath taken away the Legal Power of any such Commission 2. In matters of this nature it is safer trusting the Supreme Judicature of the Nation in Parliament than the Extrajudicial Opinion of the Judges And in this Case the Parliament hath declared it self another way as appears by the Canons 1640. which were not only condemned in Parliament afterwards which then might be imputed to the heat of the Times but in the most Loyal Parliament after the King's Return particular care was taken that neither the Canons of 1640. should be confirmed nor any other Ecclesiastical Laws or Canons not formerly confirmed allowed or enacted by Parliament or by the Established Laws of the Land as they stood in the Year of the Lord 1639. Which implies that the Sense of the Parliament then was that we are not to own any Canons but such as were confirmed allowed or Enacted by Parliament or by the Established Laws of the Land before 1639. And therefore no new Injunctions without a Parliament or Convocation can make the Clergy liable to a Legal Deprivation No not that which the Defender is so pleased with the thoughts of viz. to give their Assent and Consent to the King's Declaration on pain of Deprivation 3. The Temporalties of the Clergy especially the Bishops are secured by several Acts of Parliament without a Tryal at Law. Which because I see none of our great Lawyers take notice of I shall here set down 14 Edward the Third c. 3. We Will and Grant for us and for our Heirs that from henceforth We nor Our Heirs shall not take nor cause to be taken into Our Hands the Temporalties of Archbishops Bishops c. or other People of Holy Church of what Estate or Condition they be without a true and just Cause according to the Law of the Land and Judgment thereupon given 25 Edward the Third c. 6. The Title of the Statute is A Bishops Temporalties shall not be seized for a Contempt And this was received for good Law 9 E. 4. 28. Br. Ord. 12. Reg. f. 32. But a very late Writer tells the World That the Possessions of Ecclesiastical Persons are but Conditional Freeholds and although Absolute Freeholds require a due Course of Law yet Conditional do not so that if a Man chance to be deprived of his Office his Freehold is gone This is touching Clergymen's Freeholds to purpose and no doubt out of pure Zeal to the Church of England But see the Equity and Impartiality of this Man He had undertaken before to give Publick Assurance of Abby-Lands to the present Possessors And for what Reason Because the Pope granted a Dispensation with a non obstante to the Canon Law And yet in this Book he proves That a non obstante is no ways binding to the Supreme Power so that no Man could more effectually overthrow his own Assurance than he hath done himself For saith he Present Sovereigns whether King or Pope cannot bind their Successors And again Acts of Graces and Favours are alterable and suspendible at the Pleasure of the Succeeding Sovereign Why then should any be so weak as to think the Plenitude of the Pope's Power as to Abby-Lands can be bound up by the Act of any former Pope I confess the comparing these two Books together hath extreamly lessened his Assurance of Abby Lands with me And his Answers to the Power of Revocation are so weak that they come at last to no more than this It is a thing which cannot well be done at present therefore there is no fear it ever should be done Here is some Security at least till it can be done But as to the Possessions of the Ecclesiastical Persons of the Church of England he endeavours to prove That they can have no Security at all of their present Possessions notwithstanding any Promise or a Legal Title For if as he saith The King by his Paramount Jurisdiction can make any Exceptions null and so void a solemn Oath not to accept a Dispensation from that Oath why should he not as well make void any Promise of his own when it hinders as he thinks a greater Good especially if the Prerogative cannot be bound But then as to a Legal Title that is the vainest thing imaginable as to such Conditional Freeholds which Clergymen have for if the Commissioners deprive them by their Power ab Officio Beneficio their Attendent Frehold saith he is gone without any Course of Law. And the Defender saith The Commissioners may deprive if Clergymen should not assent and consent to all contained in the King's Declaration if he required it But it is to be hoped That Princes will not take the Measures of Justice and Wisdom and Honour from such Men We will therefore set aside the Omnipotent Engine of a non obstante which doth not batter so much as it undermines and consider the Legal Security of these Conditional Freeholds I. All Freeholds are in some Sense Conditional or else they could never be forfeited Which shews that there are none Absolute with Respect to the Law. And as to their Original among us it is agreed That by the Ancient Right of Tenures all Fees are Conditional for they suppose Fealty the non-performance whereof is Felony Which is not that which is done felleo animo as Sir Edward Coke trifles but it is the same with Falshood or Treachery The Laws of H. 1. c. 5. Si Dominus de Felonia vel Fide mentitus compellat hominem suum And in another Law the punishment of Felony is Forfeiture of the
Land c. 43. and therefore the Feudists say That Felony is delictum Vasalli adversus Dominum From the Gothick Fell or Fehl which signifies in general a Fault And in this Case the Breach of Trust towards his Lord Of which sort of Felonies the Feudists reckon up some twenty some thirty any one of which makes a Forfeifeiture So that here is no such mighty Difference that the poor Clergymen must only have Conditional and Attendant Freeholds as though other Men's were Absolute whereas Sir Thomas Smith affirms all in England are Fiduciary i. e. Conditional Freeholders beside the King. It is easie enough for any one to frame such a Distinction of Freeholds and to say That these who have but such a Freehold may be ejected without any Trial at Common Law But he ought to have shewed That Magna Charta or the Ancient Laws made such a Difference between Ecclesiastical Freeholds and others which he hath not preended to do and therefore such a Distinction ought not to be allowed especially since I have produced an Act of Parliament 14 Edward 3. c. 3. which saith That Clergymen shall not be ejected out of their Temporalties without a True and Just Cause according to the Law of the Land This was none of those Statutes which are in Print but never enrolled for Sir Robert Cotton owns the enrolment of it and that it was made into a Statute and Mr. Pryn himself had nothing to object against it But now it seems their Conditional Freholds may be taken from them without any due Course of Law. II. There is more to be said concerning the Rights of Ecclesiastical Persons in Colledges because they are Lay Corporations For in Appleford's Case it was declared to be the Opinion of all the Judges in Pattrick 's Case That a Colledge was a Temporal Corporation And therefore some notable Difference in Point of Law must be shewed Why Men may be deprived of some Freeholds without due Course of Law and not of others for I cannot imagine That Colledges being founded for the encouragement of Learning should lay Men more open to Arbitrary Proceedings than any other Legal Societies are However Deprivation in Coveney's Case was agreed to be a Temporal Thing and for that Reason his Appeal was rejected as not relating to a Matter of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which was only provided for 24. and 25. Henr. 8. But it was allowed That he might bring an Action at Common Law. Our Author several times mentions this Case but puts it off till he comes to Treat of Appeals i. e. to the Place he knew it to be improper in For the Question is not Whether an Appeal doth lie to the King in Chancery in a Case of Deprivation but Whether there be not a Remedy at Common Law if a Person be deprived of a Free-hold without due form of Law And after a great deal of Impertinency about the manner of Appeals he at last concludes The Remedy had been at Common Law only which is clear giving up the Point For then in case a Person be deprived without due course of Law of his Free-hold he grants that he is to have his Remedy at Law and consequently that a Deprivation of such a Free-hold without due Course of Law is not sufficient For the Law provides no Remedy where there is no Injury done nor just Cause to seek for Redress And so I come to the second Objection which is this 2. That to deny the Jurisdiction of this Court is to deny the King's Supremacy and that is a dangerous thing by the Law. The Case was this Dr. F. of Magdalen College in Oxford being summoned before the Commissioners denied the Authority of the Court and persisted in so doing which our Author saith in another Kings Reign perhaps might have been interpreted a Questioning the very Supremacy it self which how fatal it was to John Fisher Bishop of Rochester and Sir Thomas Moor is worthy to be considered both as a Demonstration of our Kings Clemency and that the Doctor hath not so much reason to complain of his hard Usage The Meaning whereof is this That if they had proceeded in Justice against him he ought to have suffered as Bishop Fisher and Sir Thomas Moor did This is more than a bare Insinuation That to deny the Jurisdiction of this Court is to deny the Kings Supremacy and that it is meer Clemency not to deal by them who do it as H. 8. did by Bishop Fisher and Sir Thomas Moor. But 1. It is by no means evident That those two Persons suffered meerly on that Account For their Attainder in Parliament was for refusing the Oath of Succession and King James I. mentions the Words of Sir Thomas Moor to that purpose which he spake to the Lords when he was condemned And their Attainder if I mistake not was in the same Parliament which made it Treason to deprive the King of his Dignity Title or Name of his Royal Estate and therefore could not be by an Act not then passed But 2. Suppose that they were at last proceeded against on the Act then passed what is this to the present Case when Coke saith This Act was twice Repealed And it is no extraordinary Clemency not to be proceeded against by a Law that hath no force 3. The Statute in Force 5 Eliz. c. 1. is against those who defend or maintain the Authority Jurisdiction or Power of the Bishop of Rome or of his See heretofore claimed used or usurped within this Realm or by any Speech open Deed or Act advisedly wittingly attribute any such manner of Jurisdiction Authority or Preheminence to the said See of Rome or any Bishop of the same for the time being within this Realm So that it cannot be denied that there is occasion for his Majesties Clemency but it is to another sort of Men. 4. It is very hard straining to make the denying the Jurisdiction of this Court to be denying the Kings Supremacy when a Person hath done all which the Law requires him to do towards owning the Supremacy If he had said Dr. F. had taken Possession of his Fellowship there without taking the Oath of Supremacy which the Law requires he had then indeed given ground to suspect him for denying the Kings Supremacy but to take no notice of those who refused to do as the Law requires and to talk thus of what Severity might be used to one that hath done it looks in him neither like Clemency nor Justice 5. It was always looked on as a Legal Right to make Exception to the Jurisdiction of a Court especially when newly established without Act of Parliament and to any ordinary Understanding in flat Contradiction to it It is very new Doctrine that in a Legal Government Exceptio Fori shall be interpreted a Denial of supreme Authority which was not only allowed by the Canon and Civil Laws but by the most Ancient Common Lawyers we have
deprived by it whereas in Fact there were but Fourteen deprived and that for not doing what they had done before in Henry the 8th's Time viz. for refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy which they had all taken in the time of H. 8. And as far as I can learn they were not deprived by the High Commission but by a particular Commission for that purpose as appears by the best Account we have of it in the Historians who lived nearest the time In the Month of July says Stow the old Bishops of England then living were called and examined by certain of the Queens Majesties Council where the Bishops of York Ely and London with others to the Number of Thirteen or Fourteen for refusing to take the Oath touching the Queens Supremacy and other Articles were deprived from their Bishopricks What he means by the other Articles I know not for there seem to be no other at that time for which they could be deprived by Law but refusing the Oath of Supremacy and so much Saunders himself owns for the other faults were not punishable with deprivation The Bishops being deprived by a special Commission of the Council then saith Stow Commissioners were appointed for all England For London Sir Richard Sackvile Dr. Horn Dr. Huick and Mr. Savage who called before them divers Persons of every Parish and swore them to enquire and present upon certain Injunctions With him Hollingshead agrees only adding that these Commissioners were sent according to an Act passed and confirmed last Parliament This was the Act for the High-Commission which then extended to particular Parishes with such such Powers of the Common Law as are already mentioned but are not of the Essence of the Commission according to the Act of Parliament and therefore the taking away those additional Powers doth not destroy the High Commission but the Repealing the Act of Parliament on which it was built takes away any such Court-Proceeding by Ecclesiastical Censures To make this more plain by a Parallel Instance The Court of Star-Chamber was taken away at the same time the High-Commission was and both determined the same day 17 Car. 1. Aug. 1. This Court was erected for extraordinary Civil Jurisdiction as the High Commission was for Spiritual but by the Act 17 Car. 1. c. 10. it was taken away much in the same manner with the Court of High-Commission For there is a Recital of the Statutes on which it was grounded 3 Hen. 7. c. 1. 21 Hen. 8. c. 20. And then it is alledged That they had exceeded the Bounds which the Law had given them in these Words But the said Judges have not kept themselves to the Points limited by the said Statute but have undertaken to punish where no Law doth warrant and to make Decrees for things having no such Authority and to inflict heavier punishments than by any Law is warranted And so by this very same way of Reasoning which the Vindicator uses another Court of Star-Chamber may be set up if it keeps it self within the Bounds of the Statutes But we are not to judge of the force of a Law by the particular Reason assigned but by the Enacting Clause Be it Ordained and Enacted by the Authority of this present Parliament That the said Court commonly called the Star-Chamber and all Jurisdictions Power and Authority belonging unto or exercised in the same Court c. be from the first of August 1641. clearly and absolutely dissolved taken away and determined If another Star-Chamber cannot be set up with some Limitations for Extraordinary Civil Jurisdictions how can another Ecclesiastical Court for extraordinary Spiritual Jurisdiction which is taken away after the same manner Only the Act against the High Commission is more express in the Conclusion against Setting up any other Court with like Power Jurisdiction or Authority for it was then foreseen that some other Court might be set up with some Alterations and to prevent any thing of that Nature the last Clause was annexed 2. The prohibiting Clause 17 Car. 1. c. 11. is very considerable to the purpose For the Force of the former Act was taken away by the Repealing Clause but that was not thought sufficient to prevent another Court rising up which might be like to it A Court may be like although not altogether the same It may be like in Jurisdiction although not in a Power to Fine and imprison But the Act saith That no new Court shall be Erected which shall or may have the like Power Jurisdiction or Authority as the said High-Commission now hath or pretendeth to have but that all and every such Letters Patents made or to be made by his Majesty or Successors and all Powers and Authorities granted or pretended or mentioned to be granted thereby ana all Asts Sentences and Decrees to be made by vertue or colour thereof shall be utterly void and of none effect Was all this meant only of such a Court as should proceed to Fine and Imprison Why was not this set down in as plain a manner as such a Law required But we are to observe 1. It not only voids the Letters Patents but declares the Constitution of the Court it self to be illegal but that doth not depend upon the Power to Fine and Imprison If it had been said No New Court shall be erected with a Power to Fine and Imprison the Matter had been clear for a New Court might have been erected proceeding by Ecclesiastical Censures without a Power to Fine and Imprison But the Act takes no notice here of any such Power but absolutely forbids any Court with the like Power Jurisdiction or Authority Had the High-Commission no Power Jurisdiction or Authority but only to Fine and Imprison Their Power and Authority by Act of Parliament was general to reform Abuses c. In case there had been no such Clause as Fining and Imprisoning in the Letters Patents had there been no Court no Power Jurisdiction or Authority belonging to it If then there be a Power Jurisdiction or Authority of a High Commission Court without a Power to Fine and Imprison then all such Power and Authority is taken away by the Prohibiting Clause 2. It forbids the Jurisdiction of such a Court But Jurisdiction is quite another thing from a Power to Fine and Imprison Jurisdictio saith Bracton is Authoritas judicandi sive juris dicendi inter partes and to the same purpose Fleta They both distinguish two kinds of Jurisdiction Ecclesiastical and Civil Ecclesiastical saith Bracton is that which belongs to Ecclesiastical Causes Which shews That they looked on Ecclesiastical Proceedings by Censures as part of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction The first General Exception saith Fleta is against the Jurisdiction of a Court which is allowed to be made to those quibus deficit autoritas judicandi From hence it appears That the Power and Authority of medling in Ecclesiastical Causes is that which is implied in the Jurisdiction of the Court if it
hath no Jurisdiction it is no Court if it have Jurisdiction it is void in Law for the Act of Parliament takes away all Power Jurisdiction and Authority from any such Court. 3. The Explanatory Act 13 Car. 2. c. 12. makes this more evident for there being a Clause inserted 17 Car. 1. c. 11. which seemed to take away the Ordinary Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts it was thought fit to make that Act on purpose to clear that Matter by repealing that Clause But that Clause being part of the Act which took away the High-Commission Court lest by such a Repeal the Act it self should be thought repealed therefore there is only an Exception put in not barely as to the Old High-Commission but as to the new erecting some such like Court by Commission And a particular Proviso is added That neither this Act nor any thing herein contained shall extend or be construed to revive or give force to the said Branch of the said Statute made in the said first Year of the Reign of the said late Queen Elizabeth mentioned in the said Act of Parliament made in the seventeenth Year of the Reign of the said King Charles but that the said Branch of the said Statute made in the said first Year of the Reign of the said late Queen Elizabeth shall stand and be repealed in such sort as if this Act had never been made Now it ought to be considered That even this Parliament doth not fix upon the Power to Fine and Imprison to take that away but upon the Original Clause in the Act which gave Power to erect such a Court. And this Parliament was zealous to assert the Ordinary Jurisdiction and as zealous to prevent any such extraordinary Jurisdictions as was in the High-Commission which it shewed by continuing the Repeal of that Power by which it was established CHAP. II. The King's Supremacy by Common-Law enquired into Coke 's fifth Report de Jure Regis Ecclesiastico examined BUT against this it is pleaded with some Appearance of Reason That in Caudry 's Case the Judges resolved That the Act of the first Year of the late Queen was not introductory of a new Law but declaratory of the Old and that the King by the Ancient Law might make such an Ecclesiastical Commission And since the Act 13 Car. 2. c. 12. saith That we are not to abridg or diminish the King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters and Affairs Therefore we are still to suppose That the King hath a Power by Law to appoint such a Commission for Ecclesiastical Matters This is the Substance of what is pleaded for the Legality of the Court And since the Argument is confined to Matter of Law to clear this Matter it will be necessary to give an Account of these two things I. What the Ancient Law was as to this Matter II. How far the Legal Supremacy is abridged by these Statutes I. As to the Ancient Law in this matter It 's true that the Lord Coke in Caudry's Case hath endeavoured to prove That the Statute 1 Eliz. was not introductory of a new Law but declaratory of the Old but the Instances he produces fall very short of being Demonstrative Proofs as he calls them For the true Case is not 1. Whether the King ought not to interpose in Ecclesiastical Matters so far as the Peace and good Government of his Realm was concerned Nor 2. Whether he might not order things which concerned the Right of Ecclesiastical Possessions as in Bishopricks Commendams Right of Patronage Pleas of Tiths c. Nor 3. Whether the King by his Supreme Authority might not limit the Proceedings of ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts in Matters concerning his Crown and Dignity by granting Prohibitions Nor 4. Whether the King by Common Law cannot grant a Commission of Review after the Proceedings of the Ecclesiastical Courts which Judge Hutton affirmed Was all that was determined in Caudry 's Case Nor 5. Whether the King in Parliament may not make Law for Reformation of Religion and establishing good Order therein Nor 6. Whether the Supreme Coactive Jurisdiction were not always a Right of the Crown however it were in a great Measure usurped by the Pope after King John 's Resignation But Whether our Ancient Law doth give the King a Power by virtue of his Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction to appoint Commissioners by an extraordinary way of Jurisdiction to proceed in prima instantia against Persons by Ecclesiastical Censures And to prove this I cannot find one sufficient Example as I shall make appear by a short Account of the Instances he produces and the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction exercised at that time In the Time of the Saxons In the Saxon Times he brings first an Instance of Kenulphus King of Mercia granting an Exemption to the Abbot of Abingdon But what does this signifie to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction to prove That the King gave the Abbot an Exemption from the Temporal Jurisdiction of the Bishops for in those Days there were great Disputes between the Bishops and Abbots about the Temporal Jurisdiction over the Lands of their Abbies which the Bishops claimed and the Abbots refused and put themselves under the Protection of Princes and Great Men as appears by the Councils of Cloveshoo and Becanceld in the time of Kenulphus But Stamford puts this Matter out of Dispute in the Confirmation of the Charter of Kenulphus by Edwin for the Words are Quod praefatum Monastrium omnis terrenae servitatis esset liberum And what is this now to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction But we have manifest Proof in the Saxon Times That the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction was never exercised by such a Commission but that all extraordinary Cases were dispatched in Parliamentary Assemblies and the Ordinary Jurisdiction was exercised by the Archbishop of Canterbury in Chief and by the rest of the Bishops The first extraordinary Instance of proceeding against an Ecclesiastical Person in the Saxon Times was that of Wilfred Archbishop of York who because he would not consent to the making three Bishopricks in his Province was deposed by Theodore Archbishop of Canterbury the King himself being present and the great Council of the Nation For so King Alfrith saith that he was bis à toto Anglorum Concilio damnatus as the Words are in Malmsbury and Eddius who lived at that time saith That King Alfrith gave this Reason against restoring him because he had been condemned by the Kings his Predecessors with their Council the Archbishop assisting and himself had judged him cum omnibus pene Britanniae vestrae Praesulibus all the Bishops almost being present In the Council of Nester field in his Case it is said The King was present and Berthwaldus Archbishop of Canterbury cum totius pene Britanniae Episcopis In the Council at Nid it is said sedentibus Rege Episcopis cum Principibus eorum in loco Synodali which was a Parliamentary Assembly Not long after Tunbert was deposed from his Bishoprick but it