call that euill according to the ballance and measure wherewyth wée trie good and euill at these dayes whiche is muche iuster and harder than the tryall of Philosophers But since it bath bene corrupted and touched by oure enimye it styll abydeth lame and vnperfite And that is worse it cannot acknowledge what it was at the first nor conceyue from whence it tooke begynning except it bel ightned by a spirituall clearnesse which these Philosophers had not Euen so thys seconde Nature soyled in fylthe as shée is is the same that the Philosophers so muche speake of and meane for they knewe no better but this is nothing to satisfie Gods iustice or the good lyfe requyred of vs by hym but is rather a hurte and hinderance too the same Yet otherwyse to make a man iust wyse graue and vertuous among men which is the accomplishing of the precepts of Philosophie nature can doe all For the spirit of man can perceyue no imperfitenesse in this nature béeing so spoyled ignorant and weake yet hauing this vnderstanding and iudgement whiche is abyding in this seconde Nature that God hathe not made anye thing euyll and beléeuing that this seconde Nature is the first not corrupted but made of God as in déede it is and that there is no other hée wéenes all to bée well and supposes all operations procéeding from this to bée perfite good and estemes whatsoeuer is done by the same for vertue This is as I coniecture all the science and ignorance of the Philosophers This is the knowledge of our graue and sage fellowes of the worlde that haue so arrogantly vaunted of this great dame vertue These are the causes that y lawes ciuil which is part of their Philosophie do suffer some things repugnant to gods roÌ„mandemeÌ„t as kéeping of CoÌ„cubines to repell by forée which they say is natural any prescriptioÌ„ with brech of faith such like We will therefore speake as they and with them but with an other intent not intreating so much of their true vertue as of any other disguised and masking vertue which men doe followe and honour in steade of the right to the end the world may know theyr double follie and ignorance for hauing found this last and newe vertue they haue not that they suppose and thoughe they had it yet should they haue nothing Nature therefore to speake as a Philosopher is the mother of all good things and the same which prouokes vs to vertue Then it must néedes followe that we are naturally borne to doe good and that shée soweth in our myndes certaine small sparckles of good will which if we quench by wicked custome of doing euill we ought not to imputo the same to nature for none can iustly say that naturally any is euill These small sparkes are stirring sharp prickes that still do moue and incourage vs to doe those things which are good of themselues So that after the first prouoking motion whiche commeth of nature the alone and onely goodnesse of those causes is the finall ende which draweth â—s therevnto This is the same that Aristotle treates of in the first of his Ethikes who perswades what vertue is and howe it may be knowne saying Si quispiam rerum agendarum est finis quem nos propter seipsam expetimus constat hunc talem finem summum bonum ipsumque optimum esse If there bee in our doings any ende the which we desire for it selfe it confirmes that this ende is the soueraine good and that in the same consisteth vertue Wherefore wée muste beléeue that if any other intent or cause make vs to doe anye act than suche as beséemeth honestie and notwythstanding the same séeme lawfull laudable yet is it not good Vertue will bée loued only for hir owne sake which is a point wherin many but of meane vnderstaÌ„ding though of sufficient iudgement are oft deceyued wheÌ„ they sée a man of good courage enforce himself with great paine to do any thing that séemes good in itselfe as to helpe his neighbor or well to serue his master or to defende his subiects so soone as they knowe it done they straight estéeme him an honest man nothing considering why he did it either for reputatioÌ„ to be a good man or to be better recompenced than be deserued whereby he might defraude another wel deseruer or for feare of reproch if he should not do it by which it may appéere vnto vs that those works which to vs séeme best are nothing worth we must not iudge any work according to the shew but according to the cause and intent of the doer For as Aristotle saith vertue and vice consist in the intent and not in the worke Therefore we must be more carefull to beware that the shew of good deceiue vs no more thaÌ„ the apparance of euill For a masked euill is a double mischief and no euil is so dangerous as prefered well seeming goodnesse which is called hypocrisie Wherein Cicero tooke some paine in the first booke of his Offices at the end of the Chapter beginning Sed ea animi elatio c. speaking of magnaniâ—itie where he sayth that it is rashly tauntingly spokeÌ„ â–ª that we shoulde take in hande interprise any hard dangerous and worthie attempt without desire of glorie for that there are few found as he affirmeth who after they haue done any thing valiantly or worthily are not glad to be praysed estéeming this pompâ— of rurall brute a triumphant reward of their well doing But I beleue Cicero then thought of him selfe for supposing that some knew him very couetous of honour yet would séeme neble minded vertuous he would not altegither separat this desire of glory froÌ„ magnaniâ—ity The hope of prai se should incourage the euill to do well and to exercise the same by which exercise they may accustom theÌ„selues to vertue that by little little they may become good men and when they are become such the loue of vertue only will make them do well and no cause else We desire and loue many other things not for y loue of theÌ„selues but for the loue of others as money to be mery with health to be at our ease so that hauing both mony helth and wanting our ease we shuld not be satisfied But vertue is of greater value of more price with vs for she alone pleaseth vs and we desire to do well only for that it is good to do wel to none other ende Nature theÌ„ makes vs loue such things as ar good â–ª this loue by hir is so firmly fixed in vs that howsoeuer nature is corrupted altred yet is she stil inclined drawn to that which séemes to hir best this semblaÌ„ce daily foloweth the qualitie and condition of nature For as long as she is sound and not corrupted so loÌ„g good things in their perfection seeme also good and follow hir On the contrary part wheÌ„ nature is corrupted reasoÌ„ iudgemeÌ„t
curae grataque forma sua est The prayse of beautie vertuous maydes doe like and loue full well They like the name they loue the formâ— â–ª wherein they doe excell â–ª This desire of â–ª glory notwithstanding should not be inordinate for so might it blynde â–ª the iudgemente in suche vayne sorte that the true vse and knowledge of it woulde leaue vs whereby it commonlye happeneth that those whiche are sottes in déede and not gloriouse supposing too doe worthilye and honestlye whereof myght proceede a kynde of prayse and glorye doe it so foolishly that they are as they deserue moâ—ked of the people And surelye I doe not a lyttle lamente too sée this erroure so common in all men Therefore wée describe suche gallauntes by the glorious Souldiers in the Poets Comâ—dies who were so meshed in this kynde of follie that they knewe neither what they sayde â–ª nor what they did â–ª As he that vaunted the King coulde no way hée without him howe he gouerned all and that there was none but loued reuerenced him saying thus to his seruant â–ª Est istuc datum Profecto mihi grata sint quae facio omnia The Gods in byrth to me assignde this glorious gyft from heauen aboue Thaâ— all things yeelde vnto my minde my wordes and deedes all men approue And he yet more foole in Plautus whome his malaparâ—e â—qâ—â—â—e made tóo beléeue that all women accompâ—ed him so fayre as they ran in euery place after him The patche supposing it to be true sayd Nimia est miseria pulchruÌ„ esse homineÌ„ nimis It is sayeth he a greate paine to be an ouer fayre man Héereby wée perceiue y to be glorious is not euill so the vse of it be not matched with folly Cicero in his Offices sheweth how the magnificall man should not be melaÌ„choly or angry that magnanimitie doth principallie consist in y brideling of this affection for bicause as hée affirmeth in his Tâ—sâ—ulans it troubleth â—â—reth y minâ— more thaÌ„ an other passion And Plutarche in his treatise of TeÌ„perance declareth y those whiche are delicatlye nourished are most subiect to fre 〈◊〉 â—s sonest angrâ— The fury of this passion was well seene by Hecâ—ba in Eurypides and by Progne and Pâ—iâ—omela in Quids Meâ—amorphosis â–ª Notwithstanding this argument whatsoeuer it pleased them to say we are of contrary opinion that iâ— anye Gentleman or Courtyer bée wronged cheefly when the outrage toucheth his honor or reputation and hee seeme noâ— to take the matter in greate gréese althoughe 〈◊〉 can dissemble hée is not valiant nor magâ—â—â—icall And those that moste 〈◊〉 â—e fume in any suche quarell are men of moâ—â— courage and thoughte haâ—â—yest of harte So that sundry are proude to say I am cholericke of Nature and accompt of this as a vertue Of Temperance THe last fountaine from whence floweth the perfeaction of â—onestie is that that gyueth force and light to others without whiche nothing can bée well doone â–ª And is called Temperaâ—ce whiche is a moderation of perturbations and troubles of the mynde and a measurable mildnesse or meane in all things â–ª Wherof I can particulie speake no more but that it very â—â—re coÌ„prehendeth all the reste and is the principall spring from whence 〈◊〉 all gold behauâ—our The modest man is hée that pleaseth â—uery man who takâ—th nothing in malice or displeasure and frames his quietnesse to all purposes On the coÌ„trary he that doth arrogantlye impresse in his sprightes his first opinions and imaginations will not any way yeeld to reasonable chaunge is hated of all men â–ª And of him it is sayde Malum consilium quod mutori non potest â–ª The counsel of that man is euill which may not bee alterâ—d For althoughe suche aduyce bée good and reasonable â–ª yet it muste bée moderated masked according to the pleasure of others These kind of people we shold not accoÌ„pany our selues with as wilful men hedstroÌ„g â–ª hasty suche as are subiect to their owne affections for since eche one hathâ— his proper imperfections if wée should still be obstinate or stoute and would not yéeld nor apply our selues one to another nor supporte and footh one the other there shoulde bée nothing but deuocion contention particularity among men Therfore is it most proper to PrudeÌ„ce to know the persons place time with the rest of their circumstances And this beeyng knowen Temperance entreth our harts mollifieth all the parts of it â–ª 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it not to taâ—ke â—â—ill or be offended at any thing though the same be imperseâ—â— in suche sorte that partâ—ye it dissembleth and partlie it applyeth and obeyeeth to all these cirâ—â—â—â—â—ances So wée maye knowe that those offenders are vexed with tâ—â— vâ—ees with Ignorance and that is â—â—â—â—sable when it is alone and with naturall presumption engendred and bâ—â—ne in our â—yndes â—â—y this seconde Nature â–ª wheâ—â—â—â— treate which opreâ—umption 〈◊〉 hâ—â—det 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mildenesse and â—o makâ—â—â— vs 〈◊〉 â—â—â—ogant and stubborne agaynste others â–ª and causeth oure anger to be obstinate furious and spightfull in opinion But this vertue expulseth these vices and maketh our hartes â—â—eke lowly huÌ„ble obedient As touching those that offende but of ignorance they are as I haue sayde excusable when the minde is tractable the desire good and the heart milde gentle and not stubborne for though good naturall people are ignoraunt of those sircuÌ„stances know nothing nor haue séenâ— any thing to purpose yet we may then perceyue them to haue good entrance and beginning of knowledge when they do not wylfully stande in their ignorance And for that we dayly frequenâ— and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 company as are neyther found in our Philosophie â–ª nor good Courtiers to finde out suche we muste note that of all the foure vertues we haue spoken of this is the same which makes vs perfitely to vnderstande and knowe when any are ciuill honest and Courtiers to bée lyked Some are seene verie sumptuous and magnificall in moste of their doings and others attempt great matters of a loftie â–ª hart to shew a desire to râ—uenge their honora â—â—d yet â—â—ste of nothinglesse than of our Philosophie â–ª 〈◊〉 that is modest â—â—ractable and temperate is not without the other â–ª vertues also And to y ende that the force of this vertue may be the better perceiued we wil procéed to speake of a good grace which chiefly amongst al y rest springeth out of this vertue Of a good Grace These foure vertues that wée haue treated of afore are the assured and certain causes and very springs from wheÌ„ce procedeth honesty which we like wise call Courtly ciuilitie Of the which ciuilitie well framed according to the circuÌ„stances that we haue mentioned of applyed is formed borne and nourished this aâ—â— grace â–ª which Ciceâ—o in his Offices calleth â—â—coruâ—â— genezale And for that the mâ—tter to him séemeth so confused as it is not yet framed into direct and right rules he sayde it might be better
coÌ„câ—â—ed in imagination â–ª than set forth â–ª in wryting we will after him declare that little we knowe as well by wryting as by experience And to the end thâ—â— the difference â–ª betwene Ciuilitie and good grace â–ª 〈◊〉 be discerned and vnderstanded â–ª All causes prâ—â—eeding from the vertues before mentioned 〈◊〉 Ciuill actions though they aâ—e 〈…〉 to all persones for the vse â—â—everie 〈◊〉 tion shoulde be digested and moderated according to the circumstances This agreement and good grace commes of ciuilitie and honestie whereby we knowe that nothing shoulde precisely be called good grace vnlesse it be honest â–ª And honestie shoulde be measured according to our vertues before shewed Notwithstanding oftentimes abusing the terme we attribute it to villanous and dishonest actes â–ª as when we say that a theft or pickâ—ric is done with a good grace when the frâ—â—bes â—â—â—â—els and subtilties of théeues and theeuing is well obserued Cicero sayeth there are two kindes of good graces one speciall whiche 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to euery one of the vertue 〈◊〉 as that which we 〈◊〉 doth smell or taste of any particular vertue The other generall proceeding from all the vertues which is a certayne framing and agreeing â—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the pleesing of the worlde where of we now speake Wherby we may perteyâ—â— and iudge that they are much abâ—sed are not of the number of our Philosophers that will euer haue their countenance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of great vnderstanding â–ª and also they that will not make other 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 but as magnificall and liberall For 〈◊〉 chéere and our countenaunce must tast of Prudence Justice Magnanimitie aboue all of Temperance or Modestie Of the which foure so assembled and vnited is perfitely séene and proued to come a good grace Where are nowe out lâ—stie youthes that are so liuely and braue and take so great payne to be gallant that speake friendlye marche delicately and looke loftily â–ª counterfeyâ—ing countenances in all and supposing by this to haue a good grace and yet are meerly ignorant of our vertues whereof that good grace springeth Then these pleasant apparances that proceede from the honest actes of good Courtiers is this good grace which cannot be deuided 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 vertue nor our vertue from hir And wherein is so great force to come to this perfection of honour as nothing more so that you may see our Gentlemen to â—aâ—e moâ—â— honor and reputation among Citizens and Marchants and conâ—ent them better with their borrowing persuasions than any of these rude and rustickes can do with giftes Socrates the fiâ—st morall Philosopher gaue one precepte among others whereby wee might easily come to honour â–ª which is that we should not maske or disguise our selues and that we shoulde be ashamed to séeme otherwise in déed than we are For sayth he when any shewe themselues other than they be it is a playne argument they are of no value And further their sayning and ypocrisie cannot but be spyed For glorie gotten in such subtile sorte will perishe And there is nothing so finely feyned cunningly couched nor craftily couered but time will reueale the same and all causes conueyed by dissimulation are subiect to tyme and are of substance like white blossomes wheras true vertue encreaseth dayly and groweth with time to immortall perfection To the ende that this appeare not contrarie to that we haue sâ—yde of Dissimulation which we affirm to be of so great force in our Philosophie we muste better vnderstande the sentence of Socrates for we followe him in this and his opinion is verie good True it is that he that sheweth himselfe other than he is indéede dissembleth and he that dissembleth sheweth himselfe otherwise than he is But we must consider the ende of dissimulation which will agree with vs easily Socrates forbiddâ—s such masking and general 〈◊〉 by cause â—e shoulde not appeere to be others thaâ— we are and we also allowe the sâ—onâ— â–ª For it wâ—re very foolish and rashly spoken to say that a Gentlemen Courtier hathe a minde to be séene or accounted too shew him selfe contrarie to that he séemeth or to doe any thing to that ende But Socrates letteth vs not that hauing no desire to shew ourselues contrarie to that we would be estéemed notwithstanding we dissemble and accommodate our selues to the imperfections of euerie one when the same doth present vs daunger and is preiudiciall vnto vs For such dissembling is not euill and in it is neyther deceyte nor fraude but all good fayth as it were done not of purpose to shewe our selues otherwise than we be but to the ende to please the worlde Himselfe doeth serue vs for example for although he was euer like vnto himself constant and not variable and desirous not to be séene other than he séemed yet was he the greatest dissembler in the worlde It is therefore worthie great prayse to moderate our affections that they appeare not any way to others and so to dissemble and accommodate oure selues to euerie one For this is an easie meane to wynne and drawe to vs the good willes of all men whereof commeth honor and reputation And although somtimes in dissimulation is founde an euill intent as in those that vnder their fayre and fawning chéere doe couertly hyde hatred yet for all that they doe not leaue to be good men and vertuous so that theyr euill will appeare not too much for it sufficeth to vs if the means â—e good vnder the which he that deceyueth his companion most cunningly and subtlely is most wyse We sée the lyke in loue which is a place where oure vertue and god grace is moste allowed and best proued as wée haue sayde And is not then this dissimulation requisite and necessarie to gayne by the deceyuing of one another as Ouid maketh mention in his thirde Booke de arte 〈◊〉 Saepe virifallunt tenere non saepè puellâ— Paucaque si queras crimina fraudis habent Gâ—ile is most part graft in men in maydens rare to finde Most maydes are full of fayth most men haue fayth resignde And further Non tamen expositas mensa deprendat Amator Pyxidas ars facâ—em dissimulâ—ta iuuet In place when thou thy mystresse spyes hir best to please â—hy countenance frame The easiest arte to beare hir eyes well to dissemble is the same Sometimes we must dissemble to blind the worlde and to shadowe our hote affections with colde regarde and countenances or otherwise as Helen admonished Paris fearing least his loue should be suspected which he made to hir in the absence of hir husband Menelaus when she cunningly counselled him saying At tu dissimula nisi tu desistere mauis Sed cur desistas dissimulare licet Vnlesse thou minde to ceasse dissemble thou therefore But why shouldest thou now stint thy sute thou canst dissemble sore And on the contrarie to be open and simple is méete for beastes and ydiotes for this presumption being still among vs that is euery one to deceyue
other that most cunninglye can Those that with open hart declare and shewe themselues not willing to vse fraude are reputed ignorant and haue not the courage to speake to a man For this the Almaynes are best estéemed as sometymes heretofore we the French men were yet nowe God be thanked they haue pretily learned to liue And further when the sutteltie of dissimulation is subiect to reprehension We should not therfore generally blame dissimulation For euill people doe makeseuill theyr profite in all things As Oâ—d sayeth de Tristibus dâ—â—laring to Cesar that althoughe sâ—me women had euyll â–ª â—â—â—d hys Arte of loue the booke was not therefore the worse For sayth he euill persons abuse the goodnesse of fire whiche is notwithstanding good And so of all other good things And more Quodcunque attigâ—rit â–ª si qâ—â—est studiese smistriâ— â—d vitium mores instruit indâ— suos This facilitie of the Spirite is not therefore to be blamed which snakes man according to the pleasure of others to chatinge and transforme hymselfe â–ª For in so doing he shall be accounted wise â–ª winne honour and be frée of repreâ—ension euery where which Proteus knewe verie well to whom his diuerse Metamorphosis and oft transfiguration was verie commodious Thus haue you principally the profite whiche Temperance brings vs for the better obteyning of this good grace We haue declared howe particularly we shoulde gouerne oure selues in obeying others â–ª nowe wée muste knowe howe wee shall generally vse oure actes of good grace without regarde of the complexions conditions and priuate imperfections of anye Aâ— amongest â—â—aungers and â–ª iâ— an vnknowne companys â–ª or in a multitude or greate assemblye where dyuerse are of sundrie â—â—inions which will not be content nor thinke it good that we shoulde frame oure following more to the one than to the other iâ— it bée not to some noble person aboue the rest wherein it is lawfull wythout offence to the companie to serue and obey â–ª his pleasure â–ª I cannot here forget the ignorance and brutishnesse of the people who in feasts banquettes and assembliâ—s gouerne and order themselues not according to the maner of the Court whiche is the best rule but according to theyr particular pleasures and opinions Wherefore it is not to be marueyled at if oute of suche a companye manye come discontented when euerye one of the assistaunces hauing their proper imperfections contrarie the one tâ—â— the other it were impossyble but in pleasing of one wée shoulde â–ª and muste offende the other So that if any frame themselues to obserue theyr rule and common manner â–ª euerye one wyll constrayne hys desyre â–ª â—â—â— lyke well of it And for that the Spirite is the principall parte of manne hauing ys cert ayne mouyngs whiche are the affections euen as the bodie hath It is then the same wée shoulde moste care of For if the mouinges be honest and according â–ª too vertue whiche is too saye if the affections are not contrarye too the foure kyndes whereof wée haue spoken afore but are vnyted concorded and ruled by them the gesture of the bodye wyll easilye followe and nothing shall passe before the eyes of men whiche shall not bée well done and of a good grace For the bodye is the Organe and Instrument of the Spirite by the whiche it doeth shewe it selfe and makes knowne what it is It was not wythoute cause that certayne Philosophers sayde home that the Spirite is euer lyke it selfe and neuer commes wyth more cunning nor better learned from the Schooles than shee was béefore For those that are Tutours and Teachers do not instruct the Spirites of Infants But only open and stretch out the cunduytes of the bodie to the ende that the Spirite being deliuered may know and shewe hir selfe whereby wée see that menne of weake and féeble Spirites cannot become learned What payne and studys soeuer they take what tyme and charge so euer they spende and what maister or learner so euer they haue The reason is that the Vesselles and powers of the bodye béeing once opened nothing more can bée done and no cunnyng industrie or labour can any way alter or chaunge the condition of the Spirite Wherein it séemeth too mée néedelesse in a master and case so cleare too vse anye Argument for too shewe whether the qualitye of the Spirite of manne bée vertuous or no when it is too bée knowne by the gesture and outwarde countenaunce of the bodye as it were impossible for the bodye to serue for a maske or false Visarde to the Spright which is euen so For where as sundry ssiâ—gular good Authours haue desyred to make vs vnderstande the conditions and propertyes of persones paste eyther howe they were learned wyse magnificall or suche lyke and woulde perfitely represent them and descrybe them vntoo vs they coulde not otherwyse make them better knowne than by theyr actes gestures and maner of lyuing As wée may sée in Salust who doeth so lyuely counterfeyte Cateline and in the Poetes who had greate delyghte in suche descriptions And wée oure selues when wée sée a manne styll busie wythoute purpose or reason wée saye hée is wauering and inconstant and when we heare one speake muche and lyke or allowe of hys talke wée saye hée is wyse and of a good iudgement And so wee commonly iudge others by theyr outwarde signes For too speake a truth howe shoulde we otherwise haue the knowledge of things inuisible secrete and hidden if not by the exteriour apparaunces that be presented to some one of oure senses Then wée must néedes conclude that the countenaunce of manne reuealeth and bewrayeth the knowledge of his Spirite the whiche can bée no other in outwarde shewe than shée doeth forme them Wherefore we ought not to blame the maner of liuyng of a learned man wyse bountyfull or liberall thoughe hée haue not doctrine prudence liberalitie and other qualities of the Spirite And for that there are many whiche haue not the true knowledge of hir propertyes which is no other but vertue or vyce and consequently vnderstande not that it is parte of oure Philosophie this is the cause that knowyng nothing of the manners gesture and liuing of men wée commonlye iudge of them otherwise than they are As of a yong sotte or foole braynlesse and full of prattling they will estéeme wise pleasaunt and a good speaker â–ª and on the contrarie of one prudent modest and a ciuill Courtier they wyll regarde as proude glorious and of no vnderstanding These kinde of noddies be of the number of the ignorant multitude whiche are nothing certaine but so blinded that they followe in iudgement of all thinges their first opinion whatsoeuer it be Of whom it is sayd Quot capita tot sensus As many heads so many wittes Agaynst whom whosoeuer will contende is like Hercules fighting with the Serpent Hidra hauing many heades who as soone as he had cut of one there presently sprang out in his place fiue or six more as euill or
asunder out of this companie Notwithstanding after the time that the good disposition and affection of men procéeding onely of nature was ouerthrowen and corrupted as I haue sayde at the beginning and that the Goddesse Astrea had lefte the worlde for that mankind began to deuide scatter and leaue the one the other as Ouide doth excellently describe in his Metamorphosis and that this societie and conuersante coÌ„panying of men lost familiar felowship cleane contrarie to the will and intent of him that placed them héere It hath bene and is needefull to giue them reynes bits to bridle bynde hold in and entertaine them togither which are the lawes Ciuill wherby such men as at the first of their owne naturall accorde were good iuste and loyall are now constrayned to follow Iustice not hir selfe for shee hath lefte and forsaken the earthe but one so like hir as maye bée And those that lyue and gouerne themselues in suche orderly sorte as the lawes cannot reprehend them nor any way touch them wée say to haue in them Iustice Legall the which howe muche it is different from this firste Iustice whiche was before the gyuing and constituting of lawes and that whiche is the same of the Auncient Philosophers in whose place oures is succéeded I leaue for this tyme too thinke of Notwithstanding I may saye thus muche that the lawes Ciuill forbidde all offices so farre onely as they are borne nourished and raigne among men But the Philosophers forbidde all that they imagine in their mynds too bee contrarye too reason whiche commaundementes are ouer strayghte and rygorous This argumente is Ciceros and therefore I will not séeme too deceyue him in his Offices where hée sayeth Aliter leges aliter Philosophi tollunt astutias Leges quatenusmanus tenere possunt Philosophi quatenus ratione intelligentia Nowe further to oure purpose Of Justice Legall and of the Lawes Ciuill LEgall Iustice commeth of obseruing the ciuill lawes the keepers whereof are called iuste and good whiche hathe béene heeretoofore diuyded in Commutatiue and Distributiue wherein wée haue followed the opinion of the auncientes and also of Melancton that Noble personage and beste Philosopher in oure tyme as appeareth in one Epitome whiche hée made of Morall Philosophie whiche notwithstanding is contrary to this In this diuision is comprised all that oure Counsellers and lawe makers haue written whose volumes studies trauelles and workes beeing gathered togither haue made an entyer and perfect bodye yet there haue bene many good doctors that haue written sundry matters which smell neither of CoÌ„mutatiue nor Distributiue The Commutatiue consysteth in causes touching contractes titles obligations and actions and consequently in the right of any too knowe who vseth or enioyeth that hée hath rightfully or no who may contract or bargayne and wherefore wee may contract or no Of contractes some are voluntarie as buying selling â—â—ring lending gyuing and others of the which doth also procéede supposed contractes whence commeth the ryghte of succession The others are compelled or constrayned as all crymes and offences so that moste part of the Ciuill lawes are comprehended in Commutatiue And it is called Commutatiue for that the firste kinde of contracting and bargayning whiche was then in custome and vsage was comâ—â—tation or exchaunge For at the beginning before this poysened infection of monie was forged the good people of the worlde did chaunge that which they might spare for that they wanted and as Homer sayth there was no talke of buying nor selling for the price and estimation of profite that grew by the customable encrease of coÌ„tracting bargayning was not yet knoweÌ„ to them but after they had entred the entrayles of the earth and broken vp the bowels of their first mother and that this thrice mischieuous insaciable execrable and gréedie famine of Golde and Siluer had assaulted and vanquished the harts of men straight way was found the glutted gaine of practise by trafficke that exchaunge permutation election had no more place among them for there was nothing so worthie holy godly or religious that coulde then saue it selfe from the deuouring hurlepitte of greedie gayners The other part of Iustice legall is Distributiue so called for that it consisteth in distributing of honors dignities magistrateships personages offices benefices immunities exemptions priuileges franchises and liberties and of all other profites bestowed on persons worthie and well deseruing in publike causes and also the institution howe such people should gouerne and beare themselues in these estates and dignities The which Distributiue for that it is no other thaÌ„ the rewarde of vertue I esteeme to be worthie so great commendation and prayse as nothing more and therefore at this time wil touche it no further but repose my selfe on that whiche the noble Orator Demosthenes hath sayde in the Oration he made of Immunitie agaynst Leptinus who would haue disanulled and taken it away where he hath so sagely and profoundly set it out and with such wise and graue modestie shewed howe we shoulde recompence and regarde worthie persons and well deseruers And I among the rest of the opinions doe best allow of this for it is sayeth he a most fayre and commendable thing not by flatterie or fraud nor by reproch and tyrannie but rightly and iustly with our companions familiars and like in the lawes and the Citie to shewe our selues among others to haue deserued some dignitie which estimation and credit if you take away take also away your Common-wealth for so will it be without gouerners gouernment Thus haue you of the lawes Ciuill and Legall iustice so much as serueth to our purpose Of morall Iustice OVr iustice wherby we must attaine to our vertue that is to say to be weltome and well liked euery where accounted wise and good liuers according to the maner of the Court is much otherwyse than the same we haue yet spoken of as in some places alowing more liberty in some other more strictnesse and scrupulousnesse And for y it doth extende further than the other vertues as we haue saide afore so much is it the harder to shewe and name hir extremities wherin I can say no more but affirm that whatsoeuer is not done according to our vertue how in what sort or whose act soeuer it be is no other than manifest wrong and iniurie And to speake of Commutatiue as concerning contractes bargayning one with an other this must euer be the principle or maxime that we ought not to abuse or wrong any yet by this is to be vnderstanded if the iniurie be not couered or hild with some shew or likelihood of reason for we are not accustomed to consider of causes so neare as what he is or whether he be honest or no that taketh away or withholdeth the goodes of an other For it is not onelye sufferable in bargaynyng in buying and sellyng for euery man to make his most profite be it by fraude or otherwise but also verie commendable For
THis vertue consisteth in the distributing of three things in teÌ„porall goods and this belongeth to great Lords In reuerences and honor and that is the duetie of inferiour companions and in spirituall gifts which is the office of those that are learned As touching y first the principle which we ought to regarde is to vse no liberalitie but to such as deserue it by whose meanes wée may bée accounted Philosophers â–ª of the Court and worthie of this reputation To good souldidurs and men of warre that know theyr obedience to theyr Capitaine and to such as I haue spoken of afore â–ª braue Gentlemen gallant curteous and ciuil that haue their hand neuer froÌ„ their Cap and one knée on the grounde so seruiceable so obedient â–ª with a thousande courtesies and as manys reuerences such are worthie the liberalitie of Princes And not those churlish repyners vnto whom when you haue giuen the one halfe of your goodes they will thinke styll you are beholden vnto them and by circumstaunce refuse youre courtesse to confirme the more theyr glowming grauitie and as for receyuing any honour or reuerence of them it is as muche as nothing yet will they not sticke too malaperly to checke you and say you liue â—uill and will speake to you as to theyr seruants To be beneficiall or doe good to these surly sort is euill done and is an extremitie of our vertue whiche wée call prodigalitie whereof wée maye saye with the good Ennius Benefacta male locata male facta arbitror A good turne euill bestowed is euill imployed or a pleasure done to one vnworthie is a hatefull vice The other maxime of our vertue is too measure liberalitie according to oure facultie or abilitye For none ought too gyue so muche as hee â—ee compelled to begge himselfe after yet there are some of sundrye opinions â–ª that saye withoute respecte or regarde of goodes and worldlye wealth wée shoulde not locke vp oure liberalitie for they goe and come and increase dayly and that it is better to be poore wyth honour and estimation than riche wyth villanye and reproute â–ª But I am not of theyr opinion For the Auncientes woulde not that in pleasuring of anye wée shoulde so â—nable ourâ— owne state that wée should take away the â—eane and benefit from ourselues to be able to be friendly still we must then gouerne our bounty in such sort as he doth which sheweth the way to a straunger or he that lighteth an other mans candell at his for the teacher leseth not his knowledge nor the candel his clearnesse and I thinke the grauest wisest sort of our Philosophers wil sonest agrée with me in this And further he that is falnâ— in decay although by the same he haue deserued honor is estéemed liberal yet will it be hard for him in his pouertie to continue that credite and maintayne that reputation for we ordinarily disdayne the poore and those that be in necessitie Our thirde Maxime is to ioyne liberalitie with iustice for it is neither good coÌ„mendable nor decent to be bountifull of that belongs to others and as they say of an other mans leather to cut large thongs wherein wée must consider of that wée haue spoken of Iustice that to withholde or violently too kéepe anye mans goodes from hym is no other then a gentle brauerie so that the same bée cloaked and couered wyth some likelyhoode of reason For as we haue oft sayâ— afore the semblances and apparaunces of all things cunningly couched are the pâ—yncipall supporters of oure Philosophie for suche as wée séeme suche are wée iudged here for by shiftes and some charge we may peruert iudgements and informations with cunning conueyance but this is straunge to such as haue not felt the swéetenesse thereof for we kepe this géere close in our budgets Also we ought to regarde that in the vse of liberalitie eyther wée doe the first pleasure or we acquit such good turnes and pleasures as we haue before receyued wherein when we render and restore we must not in any wise shew our selues niggards nere and sparing for those obligations of thankfulnesse are no lesse with vs than if it were in a Ciuill cause This is a great Argument to be obserued that where wée are liberall it shoulde bee done so voluntarily and with so francke a minde as the name it selfe importeth hauing regarde too consider the conclusion of euerie Diuisiâ—n to the ende the better too vse our vertue what wée are how able wée are and what they bée vppon whom wée bestowe anye bountie or pleasure eyther oure Parent Neighbour familiar or friend or any other such lyke In all the Circumstaunces there is one pretexed poynt that séemes of so greate efficacie as it were a perfite and good loue grounded on vertue whiche wée sée to be finely flourished in Gentlemen to Gentlemen and souldiers to souldiers when they are all Courtiers or of our Courtly crew wherein it is not néedfull â–ª nearely to regarde or search the occasioÌ„ causes of such friendship or friendly amitie For it sufficeth that vpon this fouÌ„dation of honestie and Courtly ciuilitie there be certaine shadowed graces and countenances of weake loue and faint fauour whiche may well be called if the terme were tollerable a fawing flatterie that tyeth them togither with mutuall curtesie Of the two other partes of Liberalitie THe other two partes of our liberalitieâ— consist in distributing and hoste wing of Dueties Honours and Reuerances â–ª whiche belongs to inferiour followers and to the good felowship of Courtly companions â–ª And as for gyuing of aduicâ— and counsell â–ª that belongs to the learned and lettered men be they superiours equalles or inferiours Touching the first they must â—arâ—fullâ— regarde that they be not sparing slanke or negligent in lowe â—ointing and humblie reuâ—rencing â–ª suche as desâ—ruâ— it â–ª For then men might call them eyther arrogant proude or ignorant neyther must they be prodigall to euery man with their salutations in words or déedes for so they may be accounted déepe dissemblers flatterers or very simple soules As for y lerned they should haue care partly enforce themselues to giue counsell to others yet not alwayes with the truth but aâ—â—ording to the appetâ—â—e and pleasure of shose they speake and giue aduice vnto for if they holde follow and affyrme their owne iudgementes and opinions howe true and good so euer they bée they shall be called obstinate fooles wilfull headstrong so they can neuer come is the perfectioÌ„ of our vertue This is very much vsed in consulting with Lawyers of our right whâ— coÌ„monly frame their councell according to the humor of the partie whoÌ„ they counsell This is not onely vsed at these dayes but in times past Cicero did the same in his pleadings as himselfe doth witnesse in his oration for Plancus In causis sayth he adhibemur vt ea dicamus non quae nostâ—a auctoritate coastituantur sed quae ex reipsa causaque due anâ—ur
They will haue vs in pleading not to say at all times what séemes to vs good but to speake that only which serueth y tâ—me place and persons belonging to our purpose And furthermore Non solùm meo consilio vti consueui sed multum etiam eius quem defendo consilio voluntati obtempero I haue not sayth he beene accustomed to doe all after my owne head or iudgement but rather applied my selfe to the counsell will and opinion of my clyent I sée none please mée more in this respect than holye mother Churche men and not without cause for moste of them take great payne to attayne to oure vertue And it shoulde séeme greate iniurie too learning if the ignoraunt and vnlettered shoulde haue this vertue too restrayne theyr affections to frame and accommodate themselues to the qualitie and condition of those they talke too better than the learned much lyke the néedie Norman that procured him selfe a Prebendshippe and yet so ignoraunt for learning as hée could not reade kept his Hymnes Houres and tymes of Seruice with the best who when a friende of hys saw him chaunting in the Chauncel knew his ignorance asked him how he prayed and what he sayd I haue quoth he learned the Alphabet or .xxiiij. letters whereof all prayers are made and them I dayly and wholy deliuer in my singing and saying to God who I knowe may make what prayers he will of them But for the ignorant we will speake more when we write of modesty And that whiche wée haue sayde of the liberall in their temporall goods may serue well for example to the Clergy in their spiritual deuotions Therefore it is néedeles to recyte it any more And nowe to the twoo extremities of this our vertue Prodigalitie and Couetousnesse THe distributing of goods magnificall expeÌ„ces is towards vs so gracious honest and fauorable that I know no way how to auoyde the feare of excesse in this vertue whiche is prodigalitie And on the other side the auaricious nigarde and miser is so hatefull and reprochfull to all men that to shunne and flye the euill opinion of the worlde touching this vice wée muste recoyle backe so farre that wee become as it were somewhat prodigall And if it bée tollerable too mingle golden gayne and profitee of mony with honestie whiche the beste and wisest Philosophers past would not do wée shall prooue and finde the couetous and nigarde to loose more of their goods by their misery than they kéepe or get by their wretched policye Therefore wheÌ„ we sée a churle welthy or rich we ought not to say that his auarice or néerenesse hath gathered it For if hée were like liberall to vse it as he is pining to preserue it he should by the same without coÌ„parison encrease his cofers with treble gayne For as by his ouer muche care and diligence hee hath gotten it so by his endlesse follye and feare to loose iâ— hee leaues to imploy it to his greter profite â–ª As when hée sayeth Fertilior seges est alieno semper in aruo Vicinúmque pecus grandius vber babet The frute more fertile seemes that growes within my neyghbours groundâ— â–ª The vdder of my neighbours beaste with milke doth more abounde This is the couâ—touse cause hée will buy no more lanâ—s nor beasts but miserably horde and byde his money in the grounde or locke it vp for allurement to Theeues For euen as the ielouse feare of fonde and foolishe husbands makes their wiues the more soughte vnto shewing by their suspicion signe of some occasion either y she is willing or y she loues nothir husband or else some other cause whiche makes and mouâ—s yong men to enter in assured hope of obtayning their desyre So likewise the pyning payne and so nudging solitarinesse whiche wée sée the myser and couetous endure too kéepe and garde his goods and treasure wyth his head still in his cubbarde and his nose euer in his coffer stirres vp the hungrie théefe and showes him where plentye is to bée purchased by his pyking pollicie Whereof it is commonly spoken Malus est custos diuturnit atis metus Hee that feareth looseth And Ouide writing to the ielious whiche watche their wiues so narowly dothe properly say Quicquid seruatur cupimus magis ipsaque furem Praedafacit quod sinit alter amant The harder kept the more is sought the price doth make eche thing a pray The thing that others way as nought who seekes we wyshe not what we may For the better example of this I maye alleadge the cunning varlet Strophilus in Plautus who séeing the greate payne and toyle that the most vnfortunate Eriliâ—s had in hiding his golde carying it sometime into one place and sometyme into another fraughte with continuall feare leaste hée shoude bee spyed supposing there was good too bee doone soughte the cause and fynding the money robbed hym of it Lykewyse the filth of this vice is such that there is nonâ— which hateth not a nigarde and are glad and desirous too doe him all the displeasure that may be so that he lacketh the grace and good wil of others wherby he might make a more profit For as Cicero sayeth Rerum omnium nec aptius quicquam est ad opes tuendas as tenendas quà m diligi nec alienius quà m timere There is no meane more profitable to man to make him riche and better to garde his goods than to deserue the fauor and loue of euery one nor any thing more contrary than to haue fewe friends and be in continuall feare We reade amongest the Romanes of one named Mamercus a riche man and of greate credit who for that he did nothing magnifically or sumptuously whilst hee was Edile according too their custome fell into the slaunder and reproche of auarice and couetousnesse for the which he was so euill beloued of the people that after hée following the dignitie of the Consulship for this onely cause they refused him And if we will consider from the beginning to our tyme what estimation was therâ—uer had of a couetous man what sayeth all the worlde of a miser the villaine will not giue a glasse of wine to any of credit or honestie or as our prouerb is he will not parts from the dropping of his nose hée dare kéepe no companie for feare of spending hée dooth no good to himselfe nor to any other hée eateth his otes in his owne sacke he neuer fedeth but in his bosome many other suche like hatefull reproches In so muche that there is no Gentleman how noble-borne â—o euer hée bée that is not reputed and accompted a villaine if he giue at any time neuer so little occasion to be séene in any thing miserable or pinching So that I rather allowe and better agrée with them who haue theyr hartes so noble their mindes so franke and their sprightes so glorious that they will soner coÌ„sume their goods in braueries pomps and magnificall expences than to bee
countenaunce and open shewe of oure lyuing For as it is sayde Abeunt studia in mores Oure studies and affections are transformed into manners Whereof commeth oure ordinarie graces gestures and countenaunces whiche is easylye séene and knowne in all oure actes And thoughe particularly eâ—â—rye one dothe enforce hym selfe to dissemble and disgâ—iâ—e hys proper affections as muche for the ignoraunce of those he is conuersaunâ— wyth as sometymes for hys owne imperfections whyche hee woulde haue secrete or â—â—d wherein principallye consisteth a good grace as wée wyll shewe héereafter notwythstanding this dissimnlation is no practyâ—e of the affectious and opynions common to anye one Nation Prouince or Countrey or to anye one certayne state of persons what so euer For suche affections causeth in vs one certayne manner of 〈◊〉 ◠〈◊〉 I haue sayde by the whiche couâ—nâ—onlye euerye one in hys countenaunce will be knowne what hée is and from whence hée is Whereby wée maye well discerue the Italyan the Frenche man and the Almayne one from the other and by theyr gestures and countenaunces onely And for as muche as suche opynions and manners of lyuing generally are the more harde to be taken from vs béeing so déepe rooted in vs by continuance as they are turned into nature So muche the more ought they to be estéemed that according to the eâ—igent of euery cause for theyr honor or profite can séeme to be of any other nation estate or condition than they are The which we dayly sée do attaine great reputation and atchieue their enterprizes worthyly as maye perfectly be perceiued in those that are spyes in the wars an example meete and sufficient for this purpose though they in the execution be not regarded nor estéemed as they ought On the contrarie the mostâ— part of people albeit they haue the wisdoms to knowe where and when to dissemble and that they are so magnificall and modest as they thinke to do well yet are they masked in so many follies and fond loue of their couÌ„tries and are in so great a gealosy of their doings that notwithstanding any honor reputation or profite might happen them by this dissimulation they wil still be like theÌ„selues estéeming it a great offence to vse any fashion not in custome among them for feare to be iudged of any other nation than they are And will be offended if by them the stranger knowe not the vices and imperfectious of his countrie But to returne to our purpose the RomaÌ„ines haue so flourished in this vertue that they estéemed nothing for euill but dishonor and regarded nothing for good but honor reputation And although there were many Philosophers that spake otherwise of this vertue than we doe saying that goodnesse honestie consisteth else where which we alow noâ— â–ª let them know that the most part are with vs and of ours affirming the onely bountie vertue hir selfe to bée in the good reputation of men for the whiche the greatest paynes trauelles and tormentes were most delyghtfull pleasures vnto them And not withoute cause For if wee haue care too keepe cleane neate and orderlye oure outwarde bodie regarding that it bee not bounde â—o any 〈…〉 we should be muche more vigilante to sée that oure inwarde spright receyue no villanie touched with dishonor Among all the remembred histories of noble and famous Ladies I wyll speake but of one named Lucrece who to deface the little dishonor she had suffred by hir rauishment killed hir selfe What hart of a woman had she was it not vertuously done in regard of hir honor to leaue life despise death nothing remebring the will of God who woulde not as shee knewe and as the world was theÌ„ of opinion y the soule should passe out of the â—â—die without leaue of him that placed it there no â—ore than a Souldier may departe from vnder his ensighe â—â— oute of the Campe withoute licence of his Captaine It is 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 at ie ielious fowles and sâ—spicious paâ—es doe commonly gyue their wiues the picture of Luâ—râ—ce killing hiâ— selfe For the example â–ª as they suppose may strongly and straungely moue them â–ª and also their wiues theÌ„selues haue greate delight to behold the same Wée muste not forget one notable poynt in this vertue For Cicero in his firste bóoke of Offices sayeth that commonlie haught y mindes and inuincible courages fall into déepe desire â–ª of glory and gâ—â—â—â—â— affection of gouernmenâ—e whereby they bée prouoked stirred and occasioned to doe euill â–ª so as incontinent they leaue and forsake this vertue For as wée haue fayâ—e aâ—ore if shée become straunge and conâ—rarie too Iusticâ—â— â–ª shée is â—o better than â—yâ—â— boldnesse and 〈◊〉 yet for that wée measure not Iustice to strictly as they haue done so muâ—h the lesse wee oughte or â—eeâ—â—â—oo feare this consequentâ— â–ª And further if the â—â—â—de of man bée noâ—â—â—ftye and 〈◊〉 hée â—â—â—ll very hardlye and with 〈…〉 â—ecome magnificall â–ª Foâ— what is â—t that â—â—â—ld encourage vs too contemne so many thingâ— â–ª and too bée strong and constante in induring all â–ª if it were not the desire and hope of glorie â–ª whiche is the onely ende of oure Philosophie Also who is too bee founde so senselesse â–ª blockishe or voyde of reason â–ª that hauing atchieued any valiant acte or worthilye â–ª perfourmed any notable enterprise is not gladde and desyrous of renewmed prayse The Gods be so ielous of themselues â–ª that they wyll and commaunde to be incessantly â–ª honored As Ouid writeth to Câ—sâ—â— in his second booke de Tristibus Fama Iouis superest tamen hunc sua factareferri â–ª 〈…〉 esse iuicat Aye lasting is the fame of loue and yet he doth delyght â–ª To gyue the trumpe new matter still his prayses to recyte Cicero likewise thinking of himselfe and applying vertue according too his affection â–ª chaunged his opinion â–ª and acknowledged the debte as wée haue noted at the beginning of this worke The dâ—sire of glory is so naturallye boâ—ne â–ª anâ— nourished â—ithin oure myndes â–ª that wée maâ—e well maintayne and appróoueâ— that thâ—â— Philosophye is in some soote grounded on Nature as well as the same of the auncyâ—ntes There is none â–ª who haue occasion to be praysed for â—ny excellencie eyther by nature accident education or industrie that is not wylling and desirous to bée spoken of It may bée aptlye séene in women who althoughe they bée naturally bashefull shame â–ª fast â–ª and modeste and that they dare not so boldlye shewe their affections as men yet they cannot so dissemble but that they séeme gladde and reioyce too bée called fayre and for the same are not a lyttle glorious As the Poet that knewe them so well affirmes of them Fastus inest pulchris â–ª seâ—uiturque super â—ia forman Disdayne doth still depende vpon dame beauties trayne â–ª And pride to hir alwayes â–ª as handmayde doth remayne â–ª And after in his Arte of Loue Delectant etiam cast as praeconia formae Virginibus