acknowledged by all Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God as Aristotle and his Followers have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe And therfore unles the contrary be prooved these Philosophers confuted we have herby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this truthe by the light of reason That there is a God and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost And therfore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense but rather you extende the word limites or boundes to a greater generalitie of signification in which sense you woulde have it supposed that All thinges besides God himselfe have limite and boundes of beinge not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable but in regard that they are Entia finita which is out of question In like sort the woord being is of ambiguous signification For it may be taken eyther for beinge of essence or for beinge of existence The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby thinges are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende and that at such a time or other But the limits boundes of thinges according to their essence are such in respect wherof Entia are sayde to be finiâ—a or infinita Nowe in this latter sense your proposition hathe bene very questionable amongst the most learned Philosophers that have bene For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted but that this visible World was finite Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it is no where evident Nay he opposethe Plato the rest before him who maynteyned that the World was made so accordingly that it had a beginninge wherby it seemes that he denyinge the creation of the World denyed therwithall that the World had any efficient cause And indeede whosoever maynteynes that the world had a beginning by creation must therwithall maynteyne that eyther it was made of somethinge or of nothinge You will not say that t is a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter which matter had existence without creation For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe Therfore you must be driven to maynteyne that it is a truthe evident of it selfe that the World was made originally out of nothinge or at least that it may be immediately concluded evidently by a principle which is evident of it selfe thus Whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made the World hath boundes of beinge therfore it hath bene made and seing it was not made of any thing pre-existent therfore it was made of nothing Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceaved it to be a thing impossible that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement herof not to any naturall evidence but only unto faithe as where the Apostle saythe by faithe we believe that the World was made so that things which we see were made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not of things that doe 2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position tell us that this maxime is simply convertible thus Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge because it hathe beginninge of beinge For omnis causa principium omne causatum principiatum There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this For to say that a proposition is simply convertible is in a Logicall phrase to say that it is a good consequence which is drawne from the proposition converted to the convertent that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made But this is untrue of the proposition convertible which you speake of For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion but only an Vniversall negative a particular affirmative But I leave your wordes and take your meaninge You say it is allso true that Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge Nowe bothe this proposition is naught and the reason worse For the Sonne of God the second person in Trinity hathe cause of beinge from his Father for he is begotten of him And the H. Ghost hathe cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne For he proceedethe from them bothe Yet neyther God the Sonne nor God the holy Ghost have any limits of their beinge If you say the Persons are limited thoughe the nature of the Godhead be not I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father For of the Sonne and H. Ghost I knowe no other limitation then this that the Sonne is not the Father nor the H. Ghost Likewise the H. Ghost is neyther the Father nor the Sonne And in this sense the Father is limited as much as eyther For as the Sonne is not the Father so the Father is not the Sonne and as the H. Ghost is not the Father so the Father is not the H. Ghost You shoulde have sayde All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation have allso limits or bounds of being Or thus All thinges that have cause of beinge in time and not from everlastinge have limits and boundes of beinge Or if you woulde apply it to generation thus All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge Yet none of these is to the purpose save the first And that first proposition supposethe the creation which yet is not evident but unto faithe So then you see howe weake this proposition is Yet the reasons you bring for the proofe of it are much woorse Your first reason is this because it hathe beginninge of beinge Nowe if by limits of beinge you meane limits of existence such as is the beginninge of duration then your proofe is merely identicall But if you meane by limits of beinge limits of essence wherby a thing is sayde to be Ens sinitum the consequence is true I confesse but nothing more evident is the conclusion by this reason then it was before of it selfe For that it hathe a cause efficient which producethe it dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced then that it hathe a beginninge Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue that the effect produced is finite unles the efficient cause be finite For to say that a finite thinge coulde produce an effect infinite is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity But there is no place for this exception in case the efficient cause be infinite And I have knowne some inferre herehence that the World is infinite Otherwise say they there shoude be no effect of God
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
hands and keepe us from falling into the hands of men yet if God calleth us thereunto to commit our selves unto God when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him certainly They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good even at such times when Lyons want and suffer hunger Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence but the revealed will of God For whatsoever Gods nature is hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us but hee hath revealed that he will never faile them that put their trust in him And this is that loving kindenesse of God as much as to say his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us which excites the sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature why God should give them a being neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature as you superficially use to discourse but meerely the love of himselfe For he made all things for himselfe And the creature before God made him was just nothing neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus It is a strange conceit to say that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being who is the Creator For what likenesse is there betweene an apple and a nut between an horne and a bagpipe an harp and an harrow Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator and the creature Certainly all do not love God whom he loves for he loved us when we were his enemies Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him as all shall either sooner or later it will not follow that all should bee saved For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase and such as Esau are hated rather And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncoth assertion That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine as denying Gods omnipotency then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it The apprehension of Gods love to us is the cause morall of our love to him though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love how dare you professe God loves the reprobate and that ardently and with excessive and infinite love Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption and not rather unlovelinesse throughout Neither will it serve your turne to say that he loves them as his creatures For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads yea and the Devills and damned Spirits 3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill as brethren in evill do love one another and our Saviour hath taught us as much Matt. 5. 49. If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have doe not the Publicanes even the same I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable The doing of things otherwise unlawfull in some cases may be dispensed with but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with it may be remitted but that is not to dispense with it I take your meaning and leave your words you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation I no way like such extravagant assertions though frequent in your writings as if you would innovate all both naturall reason and divinity I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost and finall impenitency which God will not pardon in his elect Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe as you doe of your selfe Be God never so louely yet if a man know him not how can hee love him And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God Suppose we doe know him to be most wise most powerfull yet if he be our enemie how should this move us to love him or put our trust in him If we know him to love us and to be our friend yet are not the best backward enough from loving him when we are easily drawne to sinne against him And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable what an uncomfortable doctrine is this and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements Ioh. 14. 5. Againe what is the love of God Is it not to love him above all things even above our selves as Gerson expresseth it Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui Is this naturall long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake is this sinne unpardonable You are a valliant Champion I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ. But alas what should become of poore Peter that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a follower of Christ denied that he knew him and that with oath and imprecation Yet Christ looked back upon him â—s before he had praied for him that his faith might not faile and Peter looked back upon himselfe and went forth and wept bitterly and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order that Peter by name should be acquainted with the first with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead that as he died for his sinnes so hee rose again for his justification The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate who take notice of it chiefly as touching blessings spirituall As for temporall blessings Gods love therein to man how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and bloud comming to passe onely by course of nature But that his intention in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked is to binde himselfe to instate them in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life which hee never meanes to performe is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes To the children of God there is
no light unto it but barely suppose the truthe of it Secondly because you limit it in comparison of the like causes before the flood As if there were no Anakims knowne since the flood Of late yeares in the place where I dwell hathe bene taken up the bone of a mans legge broken in the digging of a well the bare bone was measured to be two and twentie inches about in the calfe and the spurre about the heele was founde allso that of a very vast proportion It seemes the whole body lyethe there If King Iames were alive and heard of it it is like enoughe that out of his curious and Scholasticall Spirite wherby he was caryed to the investigation of strange things he woulde give order that the body might be digged up the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times As touching the stature of men in these dayes what dothe Capteyne Smith write by his owne experience of the Sasque Sahanocts borderers upon Virginia on the Northe He professethe they seemed like Gyants to the Englishe One of their weroâ—nees that came aboord the Englishe the calfe of his legge was 3. quartars of a yard about and the rest of his limbes answearable to that proportion Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood and Homer writinge of the stone that Aeneas tooke up to throwe at his enimies calleth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he was litle acquainted with Noahs flood that sayde Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos Thirdly in these dayes some are very lowe some very tall of stature in comparison yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each So in all likelihood both before the flood and after such difference was founde The Spyes sent by Iosuah to take a viewe of the land of Canaan having seene the Sonnes of Anak seemed in their owne sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them Yet the vigour of foode and nourishment was the same to both Farre better reasons might be alleaged if I mistake not of this difference and withall I see no reason to the contrary but that men might be of a great stature in these dayes as in former times and that by course of nature if it pleased God to have it so But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse it is unseasonable and I desire rather to deale with you in matter of Divinitie and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets The question followinge why vegetables of greatest vigour doe not ingrosse the properties of others lesse vigorous is a senseles question For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kinde or of a diverse kinde it is ridiculous As for example Woulde any sober man enquire after the cause why that vegetable which is of the greatest heate hathe not the propertie of such a vegetable that is of lesse heate Or why that which is vigourous in heate hathe not the propertie of that which is vigorous in colde or in any other disparate qualitie Nay why shoulde any man expect a reason why different kindes of thinges have different qualities Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider that they are different kindes of things and therfore no merveyle if they have different properties The cause herof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound For that which propagates and that which is propagated is of the same kinde and consequently of the same propertie And the question proceedes equally as well of the one as of the other If you shoulde aske how it comes to passe that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angell it were very absurde to say the reason is because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angell and therfore he coulde not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angell least so he shoulde propagate a more intelligent creature then himselfe I say this manner of answeare woulde give little satisfaction For the question was made of man not of this man in particular but of mankind which comprehendes the Father as wel as the Sonne And agayne the Sonne may be more intelligent then the Father though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angells are The followinge question is as litle worthe the proposinge as the former For what hostilitie is to be feared betweene the ayre and the water But you make choyse to instance in the hostilitie betweene the earthe and the water as a matter of dangerous consequence You demaunde the reason why the restles or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth I had thought the earthe had bene fitter to swallowe up water then water to swallowe up earthe For suppose the Sea shoulde overflowe the Land shoulde it therby be sayde to swallowe it up Then belike the bottome of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea And by the same reason the Element of the Ayre swalloweth up both Sea and Land because it covereth them and the Element of fire in the same sense swalloweth up the Element of the ayre And the heavens swallowe up all the Elements for as much as they doe encompasse them Every Naturalist conceaves that it is not out of any hostilitie that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth but out of inclination naturall to be above the earthe beinge not so heavy a body as the massie substance of the earth is And we knowe it is withdrawne into certeyne valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles as the Poet acknowledgethe who was but a mere naturalist that in commodaâ— habitationem animatium that the earthe might become a convenient habitation for such creatures in whose nostrills is the breathe of life of whome the cheife is man made after the likenes and image of his maker and made Lord over his visible creatures The last question is worst of all and all nothinge to the purpose but mere extravagants What sober man would demaund a cause why the heavens doe not dispossesse the elements of their place might you not as wel demaunde why the fire dothe not dispossesse the ayre and then why it dothe not dispossesse the water lastly why it dothe not dispossesse the earthe of her seate which is as much as to say why is not the heaven where the eartheis and the earthe where the havens are wheras every man knowes that the more spacious place is fitter for the more spacious bodies and the higher places more agreable to lighter bodies like as the lowest place is most fitt for the body of the earthe To say that the nature of the heavens hathe not so much as libertie of egresse into neighbour elements is as if you shoulde say that light thinges have not so much as libertie of mooving downewards nor have heavy thinges libertie of moovinge upwardes Yet there are cases extraordinary when a
together to doe whatsoever thy hand and thy counsaile had determined before to be done Iudas that betrayed him the High-Priests that hired Iudas to betray him the witnesse that testified against him the people that cryed away with him were of the people of Israell The souldiours that scourged him crowned him with thornes spate in his face crucified him pierced him with a speare were of the Gentlis yet all these together with Horod and Pontius Pilate are avouched by the Holy Ghost to have gathered themselves together to do what God had determined to bee done and was there not both Iewish and Gentilish blasphemy against the Sonne of God to be found in all this and shall wee feare to professe that they did in all this what God had decreed to be done when the Holy Ghost professeth that they did what God had determined to be done Could you be ignorant of this passage and dare you in so apparent termes draw your Reader to contradict it as some blasphemous assertion without taking any paines to interpret the place and so free your selfe from manifest contradiction thereunto as at first sight is obvious to every Reader that will but compare this of yours with that of the Acts Had you ventured upon an interpretation I would have taken paines to consider it I have shaken in peeces the rotten interpretation of Bellarmine and Arminius different each from other I would have tryed what I could have performed upon yours also And throughout the Scriptures we may perceive how jealous God is over the maintaining of his providence throughout even in the most sinfull things that come to passe and that in such phrases which when they are used by us they are cryed downe for blasphâ—my but in the meane tâ—me they consider not that if they be the phrases of the Holy Ghost ere thâ—y are aware they are found to charge the Holy Ghost with blasphemy And the truth being rightly uttered is farre enough off even from harshnesse also as well as from errour yea from harshnesse unto mens affections though never so corrupt As for example what good soever there is found in such actions wee acknowledge God to be the author of it but not of the the malice or evill that cleaves to it yet that also we say God will have come to pass but onely by his permission For Non aliquid sit nisi volente Deo Not any thing comes to passe saith Austin but God willing it and he comprehends both good and evill as appeares by that which followes vel sinendo vt siat as in case it be evill vel ipse faciendo as in case it be good But of both these hee pronounceth that not any thing comes to passe but God willing it The like may bee manifested to have beene acknowledged by Anselmus Hugo de Sancto Victore and Bradwardine yea and our greatest adversaries For Bellarmine even in the midst of his heat against us professeth that Bonum est esse malum Deo permittente It is good that there should bee evill by Gods permission and if it be good I pray you why is it not lawfull for GOD to will it seeâ—ng upon the same ground it was affirmed long agoe by St. Austin that God doth will it But as for Arminius never any man was knowne to be smitten with the spirit of giddinesse in opposing this truth more then he for sometimes he professeth It was Gods will that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sinnes and how I pray could that be but by adding sinne unto sinne Againe hee professeth that it was Gods will that the Iewes should proceed so farre as they did proceed in their ignominious handling of Christ and every man knowes that they proceeded to a very foule degree of blasphemy and impiety therein Last of all it is true that Aquinas and Durandus both oppose this but herein Aquinas manifestly opposeth Austin though he names him not And againe I desire no better triall of this truth then their oppositions For if I doe not make it appeare that their arguments are meerly sophisticall and manifestly unsound let me be accompted a blasphemer in the maintaining of this Tenet All which I have already performed and taken in Valentianus his more copious and frothy exceptions also but in another language Lastly yet were it tolerable if you did onely deny that sinnes of men were decreed by God but you will have nothing that comes to passe contingently and freely to be decreed by God contingency you say is decreed but not the things that fall out contingently whence it followeth that by your opinion God did decree no mans faith no mans repentance no mans obedience but onely did decree the contingency of this This is the mysterious iniquity of your doctrine which you conceale and make choice rather to give instance in sinne and blasphemy and to represent the harshnesse of maintaining that to be decreed by God onely that you may the better insinuate the approbation of your unlearned Tenets into vulgar and popular affections Yet you give me cause to guesse that you would have your reader beleeve more herein then you beleeve your selfe You would have your Reader beleeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne but your beleefe is onely that God did not decree the obliquity of it and yet forthwith you doubt whether the obliquity may bee distinguished from the act Againe you would have your Reader beleeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne but your beleefe here expressed is onely this that God did not inevitably decree the Iewish blasphemy implying that God did decree it but not mevitably And not any of our Divines that I know ever said any more then that God did decree it You adde another absurd errour hereunto concerning Gods decrees that forsooth some of them are evitable some inevitable Now the meaning of our Divines in saying that God did decree any obliquity is onely this God did decree that such an obliquity should come to passe by his permission directly answering to the profâ—ssing of Austin Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit vel sinendo ut siat vel ipse faciendo It is true Arminius disputes and that acutely as hee thinkes that in some actions the obliquity cannot bee distinguished from the actions themselves I have dealt with him in this point I am ready to deale with you also But it is enough for you to shew your affection to Armenius his Tenets as for your sufficiency to maintaine them that you doe dispense very sparingly as if you affected state in this Further you tell us to admit your former coÌ„clusion that the aeternall foreknows all things because he decreeth them or that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree the disjunctive here should be a copulative for that which followeth is not verified of either of them disjunctively but copulatively of them both were
It is manifestly untrue first in generall that to produce a reward and punishment no cause is required but the producing of the fact which is to bee rewarded or punished Consequents naturall follow I confesse upon antecedents naturall but it is not so with consequents morall such as are rewards and punishments And in particular the case is cleare that something else was required to Absolons defiling Davids Concubines then Davids defilâ—ng of Bethsheba For both the counsell of Achitophel and Absolons corruption in yeelding thereto and the pâ—nishing hand of God herein were found in this and none of all these was found in Davids sinne Or doe you meane this of the possibility of Absolons sinning as he did so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absolons reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act Now this I confesse is a truth but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himselfe to the grave profession of it though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein For t is as much as to say that to defile Davids Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them for this is to reduce possibility granted as you say by Gods decree into act and that is enough But by your leave it is not enough to salve your credit to say that a possibility hereof was granted by Gods decree For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not a possibility of a proportionate end or correspondent consequent to every cogitation but a proportionate end and correspondent consequent And therefore if the defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon was a proportionate end or correspondent consequent to Davids former cogitations and actions then by your doctrine this deiling of Davids concubines by Absolon his sonne was everlastingly decreed by God and not the possibility of it And how absurd a thing it is to say that God decreed the possibility of any thing whereas all contingent things are possible in their owne nature without the decree of God as the whole world was possible and that not by the decree of God But it seemes you have reference to the possibility not of the punishment but of the time for which correspondent punishment is decreed as appeares by that which followes as when you say Did we that which we doe not but might doe many things would immediately follow which now doe not which though it be granted you yet herehence it would not follow that No other cause should be required to the producing of them then our producing of the antecedent But by this you justifie that upon Davids adultery Absolon his defiling Davids concubines and upon Sennacheribs blasphemy against the God of Israel Adâ—amelech and Sharezar his sonnes slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nisroch his god did inevitably follow For these things did befall them and those things which doe befall you and us doe come to passe as you professe in the next place though not as absolutely decreed by God and in the first place yet because he decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which hee knew he would doe By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absolon defiling his fathes concubines in speciall and all the sinnes of man whereby God doth punish former sinnes in generall are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevitable consequents of some things which God knâ—w would be done Now let us examine this a little further You speake indifferently of good and evill that doth befall men And these indifferently you prosesse to be ordayned by God upon the foresight of some thing in man So then like as the damnation of any man is ordayned by God not absolutely and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evill thing in the person damned so the salvation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God and in the first place but upon the fore sight of some good in the person saved or to be saved which good must be eyther faith or good workes or both or which is worst of all some thing which is lesse evill as suppose naturall humilitie in the state of nature Yet you will not seeme to be an abetter of their opinion that maintayne election to be upon the foresight of faith or workes Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also God foreseeing some evill in man say you doth purpose to condemne him Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission so God could not foâ—see evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it it followeth that the decree to permit sinne is before the decree of God to damne for sinne therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation and consequently it must be after it in execution as much as to say God doth first damne men for sinne and afterwards permit them to sinne Hereupon you will reflâ—ct upon us with an interrogatorie saying Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne and secondly to permit them to sinne I answere If I did maintayne this I should looke to be confuted by reason and not to be cried downe without reason or contrarie to all reason Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason Secondly I answere by negation For I doe not mayntayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention but rather coordinate because neither of these thinges decreed is the end of the other but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice according to that of Aquinas who professeth that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sinne and of inferring damnation for sinne Now let us proceed to that which followes It is absurde to say we have a possibilitie to doe what we doe not but rather you should say we have an abilitie to doe what we doe not For possibilitie is of a passive signification not active And abilitie to obey God I confesse we had in Adam and in Adam we have lost it That which you call the absolute necessitie of Gods decres is not in respect of Gods act in 〈◊〉 For his decrees are most free but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree So then thinges freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to passe Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike you say from the absolute necessitie of Gods decree Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power but of his wisedome that you might not seeme beside the text you tell us in the close that herein is seene Gods incomprehensible wisedome that nothing falls out without the circumference of it whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed it is rather the fruit of his power
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love Of the distinction of Singula generum and Genera singulorum Of the distinction of Voluntas signi and Voluntas beneplaciti WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in certaine points of religion I know not neither am I acquainted with any such course I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will according to his good pleasure and passing by others as any Church in Christendome which I do not speake upon snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good as your fashion is but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England Yet you would perswade your Readers the Church of England concurreth with you in extending the love of God towards all But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause by walking in the cloudes of generalities as if you feared to come to the light and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde but you define not in what kinde but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal and that in an unspeakable manner But the question onely is whether God doth bestow or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all or salvation upon all If Gods love in these respects in your opinion doth extend to all say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus and predestinated all For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae gloriae Now the Church of England in her publicke and authorized doctrine plainly professeth that God hath predestinated none but those whom he hath chosen in Christ as vessells of honour If you say that the reason why God did not predestinate all nor elect all in Christ proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one and disobedience of the other he elected those and reprobated these for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft observes in his fifth proposition that In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God some are elected and not others unto salvation And he just fieth it by holy Scripture Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election not of works but of him that calleth Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and another to dishonour But consider the Article it selfe They which are indued with so excellent a benefit to wit as election and predestination is are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit working in due season they through grace obey their calling they be justified freely they be made sonnes of God by adoption they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ they walke religiously in good workes and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity Whereby it appeares that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance Againe consider these alone whom God hath elected in Christ and predestinated are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption But you make all to bee the sonnes of God and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one even towards them that have hated God all their life Lastly onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour not that any others are made unto honour which is nothing answerable to your tenet But proceed we along with you You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde which no Christian ever called in question but your meaning is that it extends to all and every one of mankinde and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one as appeares by the sequele and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church though it be not contradictory to our doctrine But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable and such as might be performed with a good conscience which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion it is rather to receive correction from the Articles then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe You enter upon it after your course with great state discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God in drawing those Articles for you tell us that No Nationall Councell though assembled for that purpose could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love then the Church our Mother even from the beginning of reformation hath done as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes Here we have a pretty Comedy towards and you have a poeticall wit for fiction Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point where I pray was it fit that she should doe this but in the Articles of Religion But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love but in the Liturgy and Catechisme Was that think you a fit place to fit
onely voluntate signi that he doth not will it is voluntate beneplaciti and this will which is called the will of good pleasure is onely the will of God in proper speech and that S. Paul speakes of when he saith Who hath resisted his will the other to wit voluntas signi is improperly though usually called the will of God It being indeed nothing else but Gods commandement in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his sonne yet who doubts but that it was Gods will in proper speech that Isaak should not be sacrificed And because you perceived how easily the shew of contradiction might be washed off if it were proposed in this manner therfore you made bold upon dame Logicke and without her leave and in despight of her faine a contradiction under another forme by way of consequence which indeed proves most inconsequent Thirdly you speake in a strange language when you say that the affirmation and negation of salvation falling upon the personall being of men containes contradiction implying that it might fall otherwise then upon the personall being of men and in that case it would not prove contradictious both which are not onely untrue but absurd also For the affirmation of the salvation of man cannot fall otherwise then upon the person of man and consequently upon the personall being of man whatsoever be the cause of it which cause you most preposterously conceive to give unto man a being different from his personall being whereupon and not upon his personall being his salvation should fall Againe no distinction of personall being and other being will serve your turne to save the affirmation and negation of salvation of one and the same man from contradiction I say of one and the same man which is of principall consideration in the course of contradiction and yet wholly permitted by you in this proposition though therein you talke of the strictest point of contradiction Straine your invention while you will you shall never be able to free these propositions from contradiction Peter shall be saved Peter shall not be saved But to change the nature of these propositions and of absolute to make them conditionall thus Peter shall be saved if he beleeve and repent Peter shall not be saved if he beleeve and repent not is neither to affirme nor deny the salvation of Peter For to affirme or deny the salvation of Peter is categoricall not hypotheticall What you want of force of argument you supply with devotion as if you came to enchant your reader and not to informe him as when you say Farre be it from us to thinke that God should sweare to this universall negative I will not the death of him that dieth and yet beleeve withall that he wils the death of some men that die as they are men or as they are the sonnes of Adam This is proposed by way of an holy and confident asseveration but consider how sottish it is and most averse from sobriety For first what if God had not sworne it but onely said it had there been the lesse truth in it for this Is not Gods word sure enough without an oath yet before wee heard that in things determined by divine oath the distinction of voluntas signi and voluntas beneplaciti could have no place Secondly where were your logicall wits when you said this was an universall negative I will not the death of a sinner I pray examine your rules well and see whether it bee not a singular will you measure the quantity of a proportion by the predicate and not rather by the subject Yet if you should doe so it would not serve your turne For both Aristotle of old hath taught us that it is absurd to put an universall signe to the predicate and here is no universality added either to the whole predicate which is Nolens mortem peccatoris nor to any part of it which you seeme to confound For he that dyeth is a terme indefinite Neither is it in a necessary matter For the most holy Angell God could turne into nothing if it pleased him And in the 18. chapter of Ezekiel it is apparant that this is restrained to him that repenteth without any mentall reservation but by plaine evidence of the Text it selfe Thirdly you harpe upon a false string and an erroneous translation as it were in spight of the most authorized translation of our owne Church and follow the vulgar Latine herein And withall in opposition to manifest reason to the contrary for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon every one that dyeth and is damned and he doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will Eph. 1. 11. it is impossible he should doe any thing and not will it that he should inflict death on him that dieth and not will it Fourthly be it as you will have it that God doth not will the death of him that dieth will you herehence inferre that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth as man or as the son of Adam implying that notwithstanding hee may will the death of him that dieth in some other respect without any prejudice to his oath what a senselesse collection and interpretation is this You may as well say God willeth the life of him that liveth ergo farre be it from us to say that hee willeth not the life of him that liveth as he is a man or as he is the son of Adam implying that for all this God may be said not to will the life of him that liveth in some other respect But I say that if God willeth not the death of any man that dieth as you will have it and to be confirmed also with the Lords oath then in no respect can it be said that hee willeth the death of any man that dieth For it is both ad idem death is the same in both and it is secundum idem for we speak of the same man in both and it is eodem modo for we speake of the will of God in the same sense in both and it is at the same time and must be for Gods will is everlasting and therefore willing whatsoever he doth everlastingly he cannot bee said at any time not to will it As for the cause of death and damnation willed by God we maintaine that God willeth not the death of any man or the condemnation of any man but for sinne But I pray what thinke you of infants perishing in originall sin If Goth doth not will their death as the sonnes of Adam how doth he will it Or had you rather shake hands with Arminius in this also and professe that no man is damned for originall sinne onely but that all the children of Turkes and Sarazens and Iewes and Caniballs that die in their infancie are saved and enjoy the joyes of heaven as well as the children of the faithfull You proceede in your devout asseveration and will have it to bee farre from us to thinke
that they shall worke agreably he setteth them going in working agreably to their natures the one contingently the other necessarily So that whatsoever the will of God is shall fall out contingently the same falleth-out in such sort as it might have fallen out otherwise if good so as it might have fallen out woorse bene marred if ill yet so as it might have fallen out better bene amended And the eleventhe Article of Irelande having professed that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to passe addethe herunto by way of explication that so this was ordeyned as therby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures neyther the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent are opinions of your owne makinge not of others maynteyninge And to sett an ende to his owne fancyes every man may take liberty when he pleasethe without any great paynes takinge about argument to overthrowe them SECT I. IN the first Section and before the first Chapter accordinge to exact method as you professe in reference unto your former Discourse you propose two thinges to be enquired 1. How this truthe of Gods being most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some may by force of speculative argument be made manifest unto others Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled The latter of which two I shoulde never have expected in a Philosophicall or Theologicall discourse Yet I will prescribe to none but give every vessell leave to vent his owne humour to be delivered of such notions wherwith his braynes have bene conceaved If we have any use to make of them we may if none we are litle the woorse for that Every beinge hathe three passions denominating it For there is a truthe of it there is a goodnes of it there is an unity of it Therfore allso all these are to be founde in the beinge of God But it seemeth not to be your meaninge to speake of this truthe which is a passion of beinge a simple terme but rather of the truthe of this proposition There is a good to witt howe it may be made manifest by speculative argument you desire to inquire grantinge it to be most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some wherby unles you understande our Christian Faithe I discerne not your meanninge Vpon the first point you will not have us to looke for much as yet and the reason you give is enoughe to put us out of expectation of any thinge at all For allbeit a desperate enimy despayring of his life Is therby the more animated to sight yet an Adversary in discourse by evidence of argument brought to despayre of maynteyning his Tenet is not therby the more provoked to dispute And therfore I see no iust restraynt to hinder you from bestowinge your best ability upon this argument even in this place And your selfe confesse that notwithstandinge all this you may proceede upon such advantages as groundes of nature give you And your mayne purpose extendes no further CHAP. I. YOVR first Argument is not like to strike your enimye with any great feare or despayre Arguments weake or weakely prosecuted weakneth the cause maynteyned strengthenethe the cause oppugned And first it is not handsomly caryed thus If every particular generation hath causes then all generations have some cause implyinge that every generation hath many causes all have but one But cary it howe you will it is not capable of any sound inference It is true Every generation hath his cause therfore all generations have causes But what causes only the same causes which every one hathe a part aggregated together For as you make an aggregation of particular generations so the cause of this aggregation inferred can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises much lesse the being of the Godhead herby evidenced Then your second inference is as wilde when you adde Otherwise all shoulde not be of one kinde or nature For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation to be of the same kinde or nature with every particular For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu potentia But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens consisting of many particulars each wherof is unum per se heaped together not by any naturall union vnited into one As we doe not say the bushel of corne is of the same kinde with every particular grayne as allso it cannot be sayde to be of a diverse kinde in any congruitie allthough there were diverse kindes of graynes therin But rather an heape of graynes whether of the same kinde or of diverse kindes Agayne you propose your argument not only of the generation of Man who is of one kinde but of all generable bodies who are well knowne to be of diverse kindes therfore why should you accoumpt it any absurdity for all these to be not of one kinde or nature Furthermore when you make shewe of such an Inference as this All must have some cause otherwise they be not of one kinde or nature you doe herby imply that All that have some cause are in a fayre way to be of the same kinde or nature which upon consideration you will finde to be utterly untrue For all creatures have some cause yet are they not any thing the more of one kinde or nature Allthoughe they have not only some cause but the same cause allso namely God Like as though thinges have different causes yet it followeth not that they are of different kindes As all mise are of the same kinde though some are bred equivocally some univocally so of lise and diverse others For although Averroes were of opinion that mise bred equivocally mise bred univocally by generation were of different kindes therupon maynteyned that such as were bred equivocall did never propagate their like by generation yet I doe not thinke you are of that opinion it being contrary to manifest experience And to us it is manifest who believe the creation that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation yet did propagate their like were of the same kinde with creatures propagated from them But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians denyed all creation I am sory you are so unhappy in defendâ—nge truthe especially such a truthe as the being of God but thâ— best is that truthe needethe no mans defense I hope you will proove nothing more happy in defending errours Yet I deny not but that the greatest Divines doe conclude that there is a first cause that is God because the progresse from effects to causes from causes infâ—rior to causes superior cannot be infinite According wherunto your argument shouldâ— have proceeded thus In
generations as of thâ— Sonne by the Father the progresse upwardes cannot be infinite Therfore at lengthe we must ascend to thâ— first of Men as Adam who was not borne by generation of Man for then he had not bene thâ— first but otherwise and in like sort of the generations of all other thinges that they had their beginninge from some superior cause to their owne natures which supreame cause of all we accoumpt to be God But yet I thinke you are not ignorant that some Schoolemen maynteyne the world might have bene everlastinge and that by creation in which case there shoulde be an infinite progressâ— in generations unles as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeminge contradictions in Aristotle to praevent an infinite number of immortall soules hence ensuinge devisethe that thoughe the World had bene from everlastinge yet shoulde it not be necessary that there shoulde have bene an infinite number of Men deceased because saythe he God coulde have praeserved the first Man from generation propagation of his like untill some five or sixe thousand yeares agoe so you shoulde take some such course to praevent an infinite progresse in naturall generations But I meane not to put you to any such shifts For I holde creation from everlastinge to be a thing impossible and that the impossibility therof may be made evident by demonstration and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned to be of a thing merely impossible allso So that in fine this argument of yours though with litle accuratenes proposed by you is drawne from the creation which kinde of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of till another time yet in the first place you have fallen upon it ere you are aware Bradwardine writinge against the Pelagians layethe downe two suppositions as the ground of all wherof this is the second that there is no infinite progresse in entities but that in every kinde there is one supreame The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more And least he should seeme to suppose this without all proofe one argument but one he produceth to prove this And the proofe is to this effect It implyeth no contradiction to say such a one there is therfore it is necessary that such a one have beinge it is impossible there shoulde be no God If any Man deniethe the Antecedent it behooveth him to shewe wherin the contradiction dothe consist And it is very strange so strange as incredible that for the best nature to have existence it shoulde imply contadiction As for example we finde these manifest capitall degrees of perfection amongst entities corporall Some liave only beinge some have beinge life allso some have beinge life and sence some unto all these adde reason allso Nowe that nature which includes bothe being life is of greater perfection then such as have beinge without life and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist Agayne that nature which includes bothe beinge life and sense is of greater perfection then that which includes only beinge and life without sense and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist Agayne that nature which besides all these in the notion therof includes reason allso is of farre greater perfection then the former and it implyeth no contradiction for natures of such perfection to existâ— Lastly there are besides all these natures purely spirituall which we call Angells or Intelligences of farre greater perfection then natures materiall corporall it implyethe no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist as the Philosopher hathe demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all materiall concretion Why then shoulde it imply any contradiction for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist unles they are supposed to be of greatest perfection even able to make a World out of nothinge and consequently to be of a necessary beinge themselves For if possible not to be howe is it possible they shoulde atteyne to beinge Not of themselves For that which is not hathe no power to give being to it selfe Nor of any other whether of a nature superior or inferior Not of any of inferior nature For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angell neyther by generation nor by creation If by a superior this is to acknowledge that there is a nature existent superior in perfection unto Angells And if Angells had a necessary being then seinge they are of a certeyne number their number allso must be necessary Nowe if it implyeth no contradiction that God shoulde be it is most necessary that he is and must necessarily be granted that he is For being supposed to include greatest perfection if he had no being it were impossible he shoulde have beinge seing nothinge can bring it selfe from nothinge to beinge neyther can ought els produce him For if any thinge coulde then that whatsoever it were shoulde be of greater perfection then he This is the argument of Bradwardin And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before and but one of the five wayes which he takes in the proofe of this The first way more manifest as he saythe is that which is taken from the consideration of motion wher hence he concludethe that we must at lengthe ascend to one who moovethe and is not mooved that is the first moover which saythe he all understand to be God The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient For saythe he we finde even in insensible thinges an order of efficient causes one subordinate to another wherin he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progresse secondly that nothing can be the efficient cause of itselfe Hence it followeth saythe he we must ascend rest in one supreame efficient which acknowledgethe no efficient of it and that all understand to be God The third way is that which hathe bene allready prosecuted from the consideration comparison of thinges possible with thinges necessary The fourthe is from the degrees that we finde in thinges as some thinges are more or lesse true more or lesse good more or lesse noble whence he concludes that somethinge must be acknowledged to be most true most good most noble that to be the cause of truthe goodnes perfection in all others as fire is the cause of all heate And that which is the cause of all others we acknowledge to be God The first and lastis drawne from the governement of the World the consideration of the order of thinges amongst themselves whence he concludethe there is some thinge that orderethe them and that must be God This last argument is that which Raymund Sebond dothe so much dilate insist upon And wherof he is very confident like as of the successe of his undertakings in generall as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine within the space of a monthe and that without any knowledge to