denie that it is from God Yea Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants That God is the cause of the act though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same and then to that objection of Alvarez That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itself to al those things unto which the causalitie and efficience of God extendes he replies That God decrees althings either absolutely or respectively But this is a very poor Pelagian evasion for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God as our Divines particularly Davenant Animadvers against Hoard pag. 226. have proved against the Arminians Lastly Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies That God decrees al sins specially the first sin which we shal in its place endeavor to prove with the solution of his objections against it Hence 2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed The Antithesis hereto is defended by Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirmes That it is not repugnant to the nature of God or of the thing itself that something be future which God has not predefined So c. 9. p. 628. he denies that God hath decreed al futures namely the fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost This Proposition is also violently impugned by Le Blanc de Concord Libert Hum. par 1. thes 55 c. But specially I can no way approve of what Twisse doth in many places assert That the Decree of God and his wil is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event And he instanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels His Arguments against the futurition of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God we shal examine in what follows Chap. 5. § 1. 3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but efficacious This Proposition is opposed by Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant what some affirme that the permissive Decree of God whereby he permits al sin is efficacious albeit not effective For so the fal of Adam and al other sins should procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree which is an hard saying Neither is that lesse hard which some affirme that God hath absolutely decreed that men do not more good than what they do and omit not more evil than what they omit This Hypothesis is so far from being hard as that I conceive Strangius's opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees as we shal shew in its place Yea Strangius himself in what follows pag. 557. grants what Lombard lib. 1. dist 47. assertes namely that the wil of God is always efficacious c. 4. Prop. Gods Prescience of things future and particularly of acts whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees Thus Hilarie de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do those things he knows in his wil. This sentence of Hilarie Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox but yet denies that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing althings So Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes â—3 I see no reason why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis asserting That God certainly knows al future contingents because his Divine Essence which is the reason of knowing representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the prescience of sin they hold That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such yet he predefines the permission of sins in which he knows them to be future Which is orthodox and that which we shal demonstrate hereafter Chap. 5. § 2. 5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists excepting Baronius grant but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts intrinsecally evil So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat abstracting from the object which he did eat of that cannot be Then he gives his reasons why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating abstracting it from the reference it has to its object And then he addes Moreover we denie that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence that he absolutely predefine al free acts and predetermin the Wil unto them The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shal endeavor to solve and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place Chap. 6. § 1. 6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Libertie Strangius and his Sectators grant That Predefinition and Predetermination destroyes not that Libertie which is essential to the Wil but only that which consistes in Indifference So Strangius l. 3. c. 14. p. 681 682 683 685 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is and how unapt to serve the designe for which it was coined we have already intimated c. 1. § 3. and intend more fully to demonstrate Chap. 6. § 5. 7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed do not make God the Author of Sin This is the principal point in controversie the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged though weakly defended by our Opponents Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctitie of God that he wil and decree sin to be the vitiositie to exist and that he predefine such acts whereunto the vitiositie is necessarily annexed specially the Fal of the evil Angels and our first Parents from whence al sins sprang So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission or from the Decree of God permitting or from the action of which God is the cause that sin is necessarily inferred truely the necessity of sinning is ascribed to God as the Author namely because he decreed and caused that from which sin necessarily follows The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the first cause neither was that act or its vitiositie necessarily inferred from the permission of God That this Antithesis of Strangius and his Sectators is most false
Wil to the entitative act of sin 1 From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree the objections against this argument solved 2 From the certitude of Divine Prescience with the solution of objections 3 From the Decree of Reprobation Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees 4 From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe and Origine 2 Its Nature Totalitie Vniversalitie Particularitie Immediation Prioritie and Independence 3 Its Efficace as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin strike as much against Predetermination to what is good 5 From the nature of sin its substrate mater and formal reason 6 From Gods permission of sin which is natural negative and positive 7 From Divine providence about sin both conservative restrictive gubernative 8 From the absolute immediate essential dependence of al creatures on God as the first cause § 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence which we shal reduce to the following Heads 1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree which we thus forme That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence The major is granted by our Adversaries particularly by Strangius who oft assertes That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event And what more rational than this assertion Yea what is predetermination of the event but predefinition in the Decree The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation as active Creation gives futurition to things and passive actual existence so predefinition and predetermination and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor which our Adversaries principally strike at and therefore needs our strongest forces This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature without some cause of its futurition How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie contingence and indifference but by some cause Do not possible and future differ and must there not be some cause of this difference 2 Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal This is most evident because whatever is future was so from Eternitie for God foreknew it to be so otherwise how could his knowlege be certain Hence 3 Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God For is there any thing but God eternal 4 Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things for things are not future because God foreknows them but he therefore foreknows them because future Hence it follows that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. § 9. whence also it necessarily follows 5 That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege but the wil of God which gives futurition to althings And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections 1 They replie to our minor That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but from the wil of man that gives existence to it Thus Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove That it is not repugnant that something should be future which God hath not absolutely predefined but left to the wil of man to effect So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes That God hath not decreed al futures namely the Fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost c. So pag. 631. he saith Nothing hinders but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc Concord Libert Hum. p. 1. thes 55 57. where he endeavors to prove That what is the cause why things existe in time the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time ergo c. A poor Response indeed or rather begging of the Question For is it possible that the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie yea in Nature that the cause is ever at least in order of nature before the effect and is the second cause confined by time before the eternal futurition of its effect 2 But Le Blanc answers hereto thes 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason and an extrinsec denomination of the thing which is said to be future not something really distinct from the thing future c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident for hereby it follows that the thing is not future before it is existent can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence How many absurdities would follow hereon But our Adversaries have one grand Objection which they lay much weight on against our minor and that is this If the wil of God gives futurition to sin then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God and so the futurition of sin must be God This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius Le Blanc and a Divine of name among us So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631 632. having pag. 626 c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin he replies thus Herein saith he lies the whole force of the argument that there can be no other cause of a
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
That in Actions intrinsecally evil there is a physic or natural entitie separable from the ethic or moral vitiositie 2 That the physic or natural entitie of al sinful Actions even such as are intrinsecally sinful is immediately from God as the first cause of Nature But I must confesse I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniforme in these his concessions but elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted For 1 He sometimes asserts that the natural act of hating God is so intrinsecally evil as that the vitiositie cannot be separated from it Again 2 albeit he seem frequently to grant an immediate concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby he doth too much verge unto if not wholly espouse Durandus's mediate concurse as to acts intrinsecally evil Thus also Amyraldus as it is wel noted by Le Blanc Thes Conciliat Arbitrii c. Thes 48. p. 436. 9. Prop. That Gods Providence is universally and efficaciously active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glorie This most of the new Methodists grant albeit some seem to denie it at least in part Our Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 3. c. 4. p. 469. Neither doth it follow from our opinion that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God if man doth that which God permits sithat whether it be good or evil that man doth God must foreknow and direct and order it to the end appointed by himself So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. ` Furthermore it must be observed which we have oft mentioned that God albeit he doth not wil sin as sin yet he doth advisedly permit direct and ordain it in the best manner to execute his righteous judgements and illustrate his glorie The like p. 764. Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to sin formally taken or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily annexed yet we acknowledge that God doth so rule and order the sinful wils of Men and Devils that by permitting tentations offering objects subministrating occasions denying Grace which he owes to none letting loose the reins to Satan removing impediments or by operating in any other secret manner the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows and specially that that work be performed for the effecting of which God useth their ministerie How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversie were our Adversaries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it Doth he not say here as much as we abating only the terme Predetermination and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted 10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin This Proposition we chearfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto although it be the grand designe and unwearied endeavors of our Adversaries both Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists to fasten the Antithesis on us namely That we make God to be the Author of sin Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurse as we shal shew in what follows Chap. 4. § 2. Having laid down the general Propositions wherein our Opponents generally though not without some variation concord with us it follows that we shew briefly wherein they differ among themselves Indeed so great is the difference of our Adversaries specially the New Methodists Amyraldus Baronius Strangius Le Blanc and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin as that it is very difficult for us to forme commun principes or Hypotheses wherein they al agree And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution suspension and hesitation of mind as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true Placeus Tractat. de Liber Arbit p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Question with this modest concelement of his mind Truely we according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majestie of God dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the first is It sufficeth us that too much dependence cannot be asserted provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins Which we readily close with renouncing al such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin So Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 147. having given us the mention of the Thomists previous predeterminative concurse namely that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God and efficaciously i. e. irresistibly moved first to act and then to act this rather than that before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us In the mean while we professe these two things 1 That we do much against our wil recede from this opinion and that because we conceive so honourably of those great men which are Patrones thereof 2 That we are ready if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith to reject it Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. Thes 55. pag. 438. seems to wave the Controversie yet Thes 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius That God cannot physically promove and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But Thes 57. he confesseth That provided God be not made the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted c. And Thes 58. he concludes That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about sinful acts is not to be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse but that God doth many ways procure promove direct and moderate sinful events So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries Yea how frequently do the very same persons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concurse immediately influencing al natural acts and yet elsewhere denie the same to acts intrinsecally evil And so in other points controverted by us But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the following Particulars 1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as to Gods Prescience of sinful acts Al the New Methodists generally grant Gods certain prescience of al sinful acts but yet they are at a great difference yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it 1 Strangius lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tels us That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated that seems the most probable which is taken from
this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this
concurse to the entitative act of sin for as it is granted by Strangius and others efficacious predetermination always follows as a necessary consequent of absolute predefinition if God absolutely decrees to leave men to sin it necessarily follows that he efficaciously determine men to the entitative act of sin 3 He goes higher than most of our Divines dare do in this point in asserting cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation excecation obduration are the effects of Reprobation But yet cap. 7. pag. 427. he answers the objection of such that argue hence That God lies in wait to destroy such as are reprobated assuring us that the sinner only is the culpable criminal cause of his own damnation And cap. 10. pag. 433. he demonstrates That Reprobates are not created unto damnation i. e. damnation as such is not the end of their creation which sufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cause of their sin or damnation As for the Jansenists that they are of the same persuasion with the Dominicans as touching our Hypothesis is evident from their concessions to the Jesuites in their Treatie begun Febr. 18. 1663. mentioned in the Refutation of Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. also Idea of Jansenisme pag. 82. The sum was this The Bishop of Comenge a friend of the Jansenists proposed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties That the Jansenists declare that they had no other sentiment about this mater but what was taught by the Thomists And because some of the Thomists flie higher than others the Jesuites demanded That the Jansenists should reduce themselves to the forme of speech used by Alvarez So that it seems the Jansenists in the point of efficacious Concurse are looked on by the Jesuites as indeed they are as those that went beyond the very Dominicans The Jansenists replied That the doctrine of Jansenius was not different from that of the Thomists albeit it was not his designe to render himself conforme to them but to Augustin And the true reason why the Jansenists do not maintain greater correspondence with the Dominicans is not their difference in doctrine but because many of the Dominicans have by a Spirit of Cabal or of Faction joined with the Jesuites Lastly that our Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious Concurse to al actions even to such as have sin appendent to them was generally owned not only by single Sects or Parties but by the generalitie of the Roman Church before the rise of the Jesuites is evident from the Doctrine of the Roman Catechisme published by the command of the Council of Trent where in the explication of the Apostles Creed about the end of the first Article par 1. cap. 2. § 20. pag. 23. edit 1619. we find this great testimonie to confirme our Hypothesis God doth not only preserve and administrate althings that are by his providence but also doth by an intime virtue impel those things that are moved and do act any thing to motion and action so that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of second causes yet he prevents them in as much as his most secret force reacheth unto althings and as the Wise-man testifies Wisd 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily and sweetly doth order althings Wherefore it is said by the Apostle Act. 17. 21. For in him we live and move and have our being What could have been said more clearly and fully for the asserting a predeterminative Concurse to al actions and motions of the creature even such as have sin annexed to them And by whom is this Doctrine taught By the Council of Trent which is the standard and measure of the Roman Faith and no great friend to the Doctrine of Christ Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea such as would be accounted Calvinists cannot allow the efficacious Concurse of God so much as Trent-Papists allow § 3. We have seen how far the Latin Fathers and those who lived in Communion with the Roman Church have openly espoused our Hypothesis let us now descend to Reformed Theologues and examine what their sentiments have been hereof And here indeed we have an ample field to exspatiate in albeit our Adversaries the new Methodists would confine us to a smal number of Adherents We shal begin with John Wiclef our first English Apostolic Reformer who following Bradwardine his Collegue in this as in many other points about Grace asserted That as God necessitates the futuritions of instants so also he necessitates al the events which in those instants are futures Art Constant damnat 278. Again he held That God necessitates al active creatures to each of their acts as Walden tom 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. cap. 23. pag. 37. also Wideford pag. 240 248. Again he asserted That to whatever Gods permission reached to that also his actual volition reached as Walden tom 1. pag. 39. which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis But we passe on to John Calvin whom some new Methodists particularly Strangius would force into their Campe. Thus Strang. pag. 384 554. where he endeavors to take off Calvin from our Partie but he that looks into Calvins Institutions l. 1. c. 18. wil find our assertion not only nakedly owned but fully explicated and demonstrated and that by a multitude of scriptural instances Particularly he proves 1 That God wils the existence of mens sins so that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence 2 That Gods permission of sin is not otiose but active and energetic 3 That Gods providence moderates and orders the sins of men And he concludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution As for those to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may seem rigid let them but a little think how tolerable their morositie may be who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of Scripture because it excedes their capacitie and count it a crime to bring to light things which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowlege he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apostles So in other parts of his Works as Resp contra Pighium de Libr. Arbitr pag. 225. also Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hypothesis This is wel taken notice of by judicious Davenant in his Animadversions on Gods love c. p. 322. It is saith he Calvins opinion de occult Dei provident resp ad 2. Lapsum Adae non fortuitum esse sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum God foresaw Adams fal he had power to have hindred it but he would not because himself had decreed otherwise This is the effect of Calvins doctrine But as for the involving of men in sin and damnation out of his only wil and pleasure these are consequents falsely inferred upon Calvins Doctrine by himself disclaimed c. How much Zuinglius favored this opinion of Gods efficacious
Privation only An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices the sum whereof is this The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good and so wel-pleasing unto God the Author of Nature yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie so it is infinitely displeasing to God This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solution to al objections against us so that at present we need say no more than this that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions than that of our Adversaries Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto Are not those very Acts which are morally evil as to the Sinner both naturally and morally good as to God Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin yet must we thence necessarily conclude that he predetermines men to sin formally considered Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause and not to the first universal cause It 's true the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law and therefore sins but doth God come short of any Law Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy even because he wils it The sin which he governs is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil not in regard of his wil It is confest that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered but yet is their Concurse the same Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse include any more than a natural act which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good but doth it not as to mans Concurse speake moral vitiositie Again what doth Gods permission of sin implie but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act Is there any thing in the world purely simply and of it self sinful without some substrate mater naturally good What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater without prejudice to his Sanctitie § 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God both Preceptive and Promissive which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin doth according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries render uselesse impossible yea collusive and unsincere For say they Gods Precepts Promises and Comminations whereof mans Nature is capable should be al made Impertinences through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them 1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse yea naturally and simply impossible This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with But having God and Truth though naked and simple on our side we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery or venimous darts And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions we answer 1 That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible or impossible which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion Chap. 1. § 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature as to divine Commands 2 We are to know that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator i. e. to subserve his ends which principally regard the Elect. 3 Yet we grant that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates 1 In that it lays a great restraint on them not only as to wicked actions but also as to lusts in some measure as Exod. 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts backed with many severe Curses leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits and so keeps their lusts from open violences 2 The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates albeit they have no power to observe them in that they are thereby instructed how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse The Precept shews us what we ought to do not what we can do it is always imperative albeit not always operative and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them What excuse is it for the Sinner to say it is impossible for him to obey the Precept whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil not in any force or defect on Gods part Doth he not in that very moment wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin voluntarily espouse and wil that act And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin in the same moment of time though not of nature that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act 4 We affirme that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins with the conditional Decree of Reprobation Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good which are al granted by our Adversaries bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party I shal mention only the Response of Davenant Animadv p. 341. As for Gods Law which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace we say that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius And p. 418. he strongly proves That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of
difference between the Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants in 7 particulars 40 c. CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis 1. FRom Gods prime Causalitie 45 c. 2. From Gods predetermining natural actions to which sin is annexed 52 c. 1 The Vendition of Joseph ibid. Evasions as to Josephs Vendition solved 56 2 The Crucifixion of Christ 58 Evasions about Christs Crucifixion taken off 65 3 From Gods making use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his people 69 4. From Gods immediate hand in the Acts of Sin 72 Shimei's cursing David from God 73 God moved David to number the People 75 Other Acts of sin from God 76 c. 5. From Gods efficacious permission of sin 85 6. From Gods judicial Induration 90 The false Comments of Adversaries reselled 94 Gods concurse to the individual act which is sinful 96 How God judicially hardens men without being the Author of sin 97 7. From Gods efficacious ordering mens sins for his own glorie 101 CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants THe Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 108 Augustins Sentiments touching it 109 Prosper and Fulgentius 110 Anselme Hugo de Sancto Victore accord hereto 111 Aquinas expresse herein 112 Scotus also positive herein 114 Greg. Ariminensis demonstrates the same 116 So Holcot and Altissiodorensis 117 Thomas Bradwardine his Character and zele for efficacious Grace 118 Also for efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin ibid. His Sentiments touching Gods willing sin 119 Also how the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse 121 Moreover how God spontaneously impels men to the entitative act of sin 122 The Sentiments of Dominicans Alvarez c. 123 The doctrin of Jansenius concordant with ours 125 The Jansenists sentiments agree also 126 The Roman Catechisme consonant 127 Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius fully agree 128 Chamiers defense of our Hypothesis 130 The Testimonie of Lud. Crocius for us 131 The Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Ward Abbot c. for us 132 Such as denie Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin 136 Marcion Manes Pelagius Nic. Bonetus 137 Durandus against Gods immediate concurse ib. Who they are that symbolise with Durandus 138 The Consentiments of Jesuites and Molinisis 139 Lud. Ã Dola a sectator of Durandus 140 Arminius's Consentiments 141 The Remonstrants and Anabaptists consent 142 The New Methodists how far consentient 143 Camero and Amyraldus their consent 144 Placeus in suspense 145 Le Blanc and Baronius how far they agree 146 Strangius our principal Adversary 147 How these New Methodists fel into this their New Method in imitation of Semipelagians 149 Who of the New Methodists may be estimed orthodoxe 150 CHAP. V. Rational Demonstrations of our Hypothesis ARguments for Predetermination to the substrate mater of al sin 1. From the Futurition of althings 151 Objections against this Argument solved 152 2. From the Certitude of divine Prescience 155 Our Adversaries Evasions from the force of this Argument 157 3. From the divine Wil and Decrees specially that of Reprobation 159 Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation 161 4. From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe 163 2 Its Nature 1 Totalitie ibid. 2 Vniversalitie as to Effects 164 3 Particularitie as to manner of working ib. 4 Immediation 166 5 Prioritie and Antecedence 167 6 Absolute Independence 169 3 From the Efficace of Gods Concurse 170 1 As to al natural acts 170 2 As to supernatural Acts and Effects 172 The Objections urged by the New Methodists against Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin urged with as much force by Arminians against predetermination to good 174 5. From the Nature of Sin 1 It s Mater 176 2 Its formal Reason 178 6. From Gods Permission of sin 179 Divine Permission explicated 180 7. From Gods Providence about Sin 182 8. From Creatural Dependence 185 CHAP. VI. The Objections against Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin solved 1. OBject That this Hypothesis makes God the Author of Sin 189 1. This Objection as urged by Baronius ib. 2. The Objection as urged by Strangius 191 General Solutions for the freeing God from being the Author of Sin 195 1 Gods Wil the effective cause of the substrate mater not a defective cause of Sin ibid. 2 None the Author of sin but the particular moral cause thereof 196 3 God concurs only to what is naturally good in sin ibid. 2. Object From Gods Essence and Attributes 197 1 Gods Sinceritie and Fidelitie vindicated ib. 2 His Justice also cleared 198 3 The Vindication of his Mercie 199 4 His Sanctitie also vindicated 200 3. Object From Gods Word 1 Preceptive 202 2 Promissive and Inviting ibid. 1 Al Promises primarily for the Elect. 204 2 Their use as to Reprobates ib. 3 The Antithesis of Antipredeterminants destroyeth the use of Promisses c. as much as our Hypothesis 206 4 What Power we allow Reprobates 207 4. Object From the Overthrow of Religion 208 5. Object From the Libertie of the Wil. ib. The injustice of the New Methodists in urging this Objection and its inconsistence with their own Sentiments 209 CHAP. VII The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants with their Consequents THe genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants with the false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on them 211 The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants with their dangerous Consequents 215 Table of SCRIPTURES Explicated Genesis Ch. Vers Pag. 45. 5 7 8. 53 Exodus Ch. Vers Pag. 9. 14 15 16. 102 1 Samuel Ch. Vers Pag. 2. 25. 86 26. 19. 76 2 Samuel Ch. Vers Pag. 12. 11. 72 16. 10 11. 73 16. 22. 72 24. 1. 75 1 Kings Ch. Vers Pag. 11. 31 37. 77 12. 15 24. 77 22. 23. 79 2 Kings Ch. Vers Pag. 9. 3 10. 78 10. 30. ibid. Job Ch. Vers Pag. 1. 21. 71 12. 16 17. 88 Psalmes Ps Vers Pag. 33. 15. 47 69. 22. 81. 12. 90 105. 25. 71 Proverbs Ch. Vers Pag. 16. 4. 103 21. 1. 49 Esaias Ch. Vers Pag. 6. 10. 91 10. 5 6 7. 69 19. 14. 92 26. 12. 45 29. 10. 91 44. 18 19. 92 60. 2. ib. 63. 17. 89 Jeremie Ch. Vers Pag. 16. 16. 70 Habakkuk Ch. Vers Pag. 3. 4. 49 Matthew Ch. Vers Pag. 26. 24. 58 Luke Ch. Vers Pag. 22. 22. 24 60 John Ch. Vers Pag. 19. 10 11. 61 Acts. Ch. Vers Pag. 2. 23. 24 62 4. 28. 63 7. 9. 55 11. 21. 49 17. 26. 23 17. 28. 51 18. 21. 52 Romans Ch. Vers Pag. 1. 28. 93 8. 29 30. 24 9. 17 18. 102 103 9. 21 22. 104 11. 8 10. 92 91 11. 36. 45 1 Corinthians Ch. Vers Pag. 2. 7. 24 4. 19. 52 4. 28. 24. 12. 6 11. 22. 2 Corinthians Ch. Vers Pag. 4. 12. 22. Ephesians Ch. Vers Pag. 1. 11. 22 24 46 1. 19. 3. 7. 22. Philippians Ch. Vers Pag. 3. 21. 22. 2 Thessalonians Ch. Vers Pag.
sin it is suggested by some and believed by others that we make the holy God the Author of sin which is the dregs of blasphemie and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout but that with divine assistance we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacitie of Divine concurse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majestie from that blasphemous Imputation of being the Author of sin And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us 1 To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in or virtually relating to the subject in controversie 2 To shew wherein the opposite parties agree and wherein they differ both among themselves and each from other together with the original and principal motives grounds and causes of such Differences 3 To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful with an answer to those false glosses and comments which our Adversaries the Jesuites Arminians and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them 4 To draw up a brief Historie or Narrative of this controversie and its state in al periods of the Christian Churches to this day 5 To give the Demonstration of our Hypothesis from Reasons grounded on Scripture with the Vindication of those Reasons from the ungrounded invalid answers given to them by our opponents Strangius and others 6 To solve and answer the Objections urged by those that oppose our Hypothesis particularly Strangius Baranius Le Blanc with others 7 And finally to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheses of the Orthodoxe about this subject in opposition to those false Opinions which their Adversaries charge upon them as also to produce the proper opinions of the adverse party and the dangerous consequences that naturally and necessarily flow from them § 2. Our first and indeed principal task in order to a clear and demonstrative procedure in this controversie wil be to explicate the termes and disabuse them from those ambiguities confusions and false impositions in which at present they are involved And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding state of the Churches of Christ by reason of those vexatious controversies which rend and tear out their very bowels and al from the sophistic abuse or Ambiguitie of termes And I no way dout but to make it most manifest when opportunitie is offered that most of the controversies of this Age are somented and maintained from the obscuritie and abuse of termes misapplyed by subtile wits for the establishment of their own Hypotheses This is most evident in our present case which makes it a duty absolutely necessary before we enter on our province to clear up the way by a distinct and particular explication of those termes that relate thereunto The first Terme we are to consider is Sin wherein we are to examine its Origne Causes Constitution both material and formal and Kinds particularly the nature of Acts substantially or intrinsecally sinful al which we shal discusse with that Brevitie and Perspicuitie the mater wil admit 1. As for the Origine of Sin it came first into the world from the Defectibilitie of our first Parents their Free-wil and has been ever since maintained and fomented by the Vitiositie of human nature depraved by Adams sin as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 2. and Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 3. 2. Sin as to its material constitution has for its substrate mater or subject some natural good For al sin being as to its formal nature but a moral privation or relation it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject The wise Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law so constituted al moral Beings both Virtues and Vices as that they cannot subsist but in something natural albeit sin be according to its formal reason a mere privation yet it requires some positive real natural Being for its subject according to the nature of al other privations Thus Augustin That which is evil by reason of vice is good by nature Again he saith That sin is not nature but the vice of nature And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients That al evil is founded in some good i. e. natural sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion Thus Augustin Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things sinful as sinful are not good yet not only that good things but also that sinful be is good i. e. things sinful are good not morally but naturally as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie for albeit they oppose the bonitie of the creature yet materially considered they oppose not the bonitie of the Creator who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God to permit sins to be Yea doth not the ingresse of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good This is wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 11. sect 3. p. 252. Sin as sin has a material cause which is always some good So Augustin saith That there can be no evil but in good because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself and the reason is because sin as to its formal cause is not purely positive or a pure negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is due which subject must be some good c. Yea Strangius himself our principal Adversary in this Controversie grants in this particular as much as we demand pag. 629. That it is absurd to say any sin or defect can exist of itself sithat there can be no separate evil but al evil is seated in good Yea he ingenuously confesseth pag. 245. That hatred of God which is an action intrinsecally evil as it is an Act and Being so it is from God namely as it is hatred For adds he So hatred truly as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action to which the metaphysic bonitie of Ens or Being agrees and it is morally indifferent but as it is determined to God hence is its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquitie This concession of Strangius if wel considered would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis but also put a period to this Controversie as in what follows we shal demonstrate Chap. 6. § 1. 3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason which we shal endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions 1 Al human
acts considered in their generic physic Entitie or natural Being abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil but morally indifferent Al moral Beings or Acts are scated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in proper nature as Cyril neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat it 's true there may be nature where there is no moralitie yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not some nature to sustain the same Now al human nature as also al natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea albeit capable of virtue or vice yet are in themselves morally indifferent Al thoughts words and actions considered physically and abstractly without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God are neither good nor evil For Moralitie is a mode not physically or intrinsecally inherent in human acts but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law The very acts of loving and hating God considered in their generic physic and entitative nature as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object are morally neither good nor evil because moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant Thus much Strangius frequently grants as pag. 158. he saith That moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are accidents of natural Actions So pag. 875. The action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent neither may it be lesse subject to virtue than to vice Hence 2 Al Moralitie and moral Acts whether good or evil receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus and other Scholemen and that on the highest reasons For the Divine Wil is the supreme measure and rule of al Justice and Sanctitie Things are therefore just and good because God wils them and whatever God wils is for that very reason because God wils it good and just Therefore that Platonic notion defended by some learned men That the reasons of good and evil are eternal is of dangerous consequence albeit it hath somewhat of Truth as other errors have mixed with it we grant that in things morally good there is a natural condecence or congruitie to human nature even antecedent to the Divine wil and constitution As on supposition of mans being created he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God hating sin c. These are duties naturally congruous yea morally necessary to human nature Whence it is that Divines usually determine That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam i. e. most condecent congruous and morally necessary to his Nature Yet all this hinders not but that the formal Determination of al Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine wil and Law The Law of God is the great Expansum or firmament which God has spread over the rational world whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts and by which they shall be at last day judged whence it necessarily follows that al moral constitution must procede hence as we have more amply demonstrated Court Gentiles P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 2. Thus also Voetius Disput Theolog. Par. 1. de jure justit Probl. 10. p. 351. proves That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodness So much also Strangius grants us p. 89. namely That as whatever is true is therefore true because conform to the first Truth so whatever is good is therefore good because conform to the first Goodness and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect so Goodness to his Wil. The like Mr. Baxter Catholick Theolog. Part 1. p. 100. Al created Justice and Holiness is such i. e. good for goodness is their essence because Gods efficient wil made them so Hence 3 The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a Deordination or Transgression of the Divine Law This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie as we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 1. and Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration Hence 4 Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive real Being but privative This Hypothesis has found general assent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and Christians excepting some few Marcion and Manes with others It 's true the Manichees held Sin to be a positive Being and they took up principes suited thereto namely That there were two first Beings or Causes one of good the other of evil But the sober Philosophers and Christians abhorred such sentiments Simplicius on Epictetus c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that sin is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Good which we have largely explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 § 4. § 2. And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fathers Thus the spurious Dionysius assures us that Sin must necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without nature without subsistence So Greg. Nyssen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is an insubsistent Being or privation And it was a general conclusion in the Greek Scholes that sin resulted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the absence of good as darkness from the absence of light Thus also among the Latins Augustin asserted that Sin was not Nature but the evil of Nature Again the Amission of Good has taken up the name of Sin And Strangius who is our principal adversary in this controversie yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97 c. he strongly demonstrates this Hypothesis That the formal reason of sin consists in Privation This I conceive deserves a particular remarque because some late Authors and those not of inferior note make great use of this Antithesis namely That Sin is as to its formal nature positive as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful They tel us that Sin as to its forme is not a mere privation but a moral Relation which has so much Realitie as a relation But to obviate al mistakes and verbal contests we grant 1 That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation or rather relative privation as it is a transgression of and so must have relation to the Moral Law 2 That Sin is not a mere nothing but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entitie so far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Proposition as we have more fully shewen Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 2. But 3 We may not yield that Sin is a moral positive Relation much less a positive act or real Being such as
Grace but also in others that are commun according to his own pleasure he determines it with the preservation of its own native libertie sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature See more on this argument in what follows c. 3. § 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts without any violence offered to its Libertie why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts without prejudice to its Libertie The force of this consequence is so strong that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination See Chap. 5. § 4. 6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts even of such as are not intrinsecally evil This Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although in the actions of wicked men when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works it may peradventure be said that God doth determine their wils yet it seems more incommode to say that God moves and predetermines to al other acts as to acts of hatred of God blasphemie c. So that he yieldeth that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts and indeed it cannot be rationally denied sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful When I say that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful As here must not yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively but only Specificatively as it specifies one and the same Act and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil So that the meaning is no more than this that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good as our Adversaries grant he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis Of this Argument see Chap. 5. § 4 5. 7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature whereof God is not the efficient cause This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being So Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entitie and no action as it is an action or has any realitie whereof God is not the cause or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God as the first cause on whose concurse and influxe it dependes So a Reverend Divine Cathol Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. ` It is certain that as motus vel actio is quid naturale it is of God as the first cause of Nature and so when a sinner acteth it is not without the first Universal Cause One would think that this concession if well stated and prosecuted would put an end to our controversie For al that we demand is that the real positive act whereunto sin is annexed be from God as the first cause of Nature But yet what our Opponents grant as limited by them wil not answer our expectations For some hold with Durandus that the action is from God but not immediately others that it is immediately from God yet not by a predeterminative concurse Hence 8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense yet by others it is Thus Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person For as God himself so his virtue is every where present and energetic For the proof whereof he cites Isa 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and efficace of God whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself so that whatever they are or do act they essentially depend on him in both respects Whereby he seems to evince that Gods Influxe doth not only render the subject habile to act but also immediately reach the very act even that has sin annexed to it The like he addes l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truely be said and men are wont so to speak That God is the cause of vitiose actions albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been said it may in some manner be understood how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin when yet he is void of al sin specially if these things be observed 1 That it be not understood that God moves or inclines men to sin in general 2 Neither that it be said that God moves to al sin but only to such in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his good works 3 Neither that it be understood that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken or sin as sin but only to the material of sin i. e. not to the sin of the Action but to the Action as substrate to the sin so that he be not the Author of the vitiositie which he only permits but of the substrate Act and of his own direction and ordination which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action c. Yea in Actions intrinsecally sinful he seems to grant that the Act as it is a physic or natural Being is from God So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsecally evil such as the hatred of God perjurie c. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil That God concurs to the physic action but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shewen There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius which if he were candid and uniforme in granting us would put a period to the controversie 1
the presence of althings in Eternitie Wherein he follows the Dominicans and so must by consequence resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it which overthrows his Hypothesis Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he resolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes Lastly cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confesseth That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision Which is al that we contend for and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin into the act of his wil permitting it Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science Thus Le Blanc De Concord Libert p 444. Thes 39. As for the fourth opinion which secketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate Yet Thes 40. he confesseth That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question nor take away the principal difficultie For that which is here most difficult to be understood is how future contingents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of futures that so under that reason they may be perceived by God Which knot he endeavors to untie by telling us that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition But this is a very jejune and poor evasion as we shal hereafter shew Chap. 5. § 1. 3 Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites middle science whereby God foresees that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes circumstances and providential concurrences the effect wil certainly follow albeit in itself merely contingent Thus Lud. Crocius Dyodec Dissert Dissert 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle science which Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 449. Thes 26 c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others Le Blanc himself pag. 444. Thes 42. confesseth That it wants not great difficultie how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not nor yet change the nature of its object Whence he concludes Thes 43. That seing there is so much darknesse on al sides our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture A poor refuge indeed why then do they so daringly sift and prie into the Divine prescience and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason We easily grant that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof but this we assert that it is impossible the Divine prescience which is in itself most certain should depend on the most incertain ambulatory wil of man and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate 2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the futurition of sin and Gods predefinition thereof Strangius l. 3. c. 11. holds That some free acts are absolutely future and knowen of God as such without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts and yet he denies that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition Whence it wil follow that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future but what he first decreed to be absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 455. 3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves touching Gods concurse its immediation totalitie prioritie efficace and predetermination as to sinful acts 1 How many of them incline to the sentiments of Durandus denying al immediate concurse to sinful acts And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes how many yet denie it in realitie Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith yea repugnant thereto 2 Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Some grant a total concurse to the physic entitative act in the general but not in particular others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular abstracting the reference it has to its object Thus Strangius lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically which is al that we contend for Others on the contrary make Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general asserting with Molina Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin So a Divine of name among us yea he asserts that God never totally permits sin 3 Our Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Prioritie of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Some grant Gods concurse hereto previous though not predeterminative so Strangius but others make it to be only simultaneous asserting that God concurs with the wil of man in the same moment of nature and reason to the same act So Baronius wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians 4 Lastly the principal difference among our Adversaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurse as to the substrate mater of sin Some make the concurse of God to be only general and indifferent and so determinable by the second cause as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 73 74 75. pag. 142 c. where he makes Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse Wherein he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuites more particularly Molina Concord Liber Arbitr cum Grat. donis c. Quaest 14. Disput 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our selves openly asserts that Gods concurse is determinable by the creature But Strangius albeit he too far fals in with the sentiments of Baronius against predetermination yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concurse as too grosse and Pelagian So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore that God concurs only by a general concurse as the Sun concurs in the same manner to
the generation of a man and of an horse and of a mouse but we determine that the influxe of God is special to special effects as they are physically distinguished specie and unto al kind of entitie but not to the reason of moral iniquitie which consistes in privation Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius's Hypothesis touching a general indifferent concurse but yet I must confesse upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficace yet he makes it be but commun and no way determinative and therefore only indifferent The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very positive in this that no man living can rationally exemt themselves from the imputation of the Jesuites indifferent concurse and assert an efficacious special concurse but what is determinative as to the subject it workes on And thence Le Blanc Concil Arbitr part 3. thes 36. p. 434. confesseth That Strangius ' s opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius Lastly Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78 c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good and to many other acts of the wil whensoever God pleaseth or need requireth yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures specially to such as are intrinsecally evil as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis but wil at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius the Remonstrants and Jesuites or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with of which hereafter Chap. 5. § 4. 4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods permission of sin its nature and efficace 1 A Divine of repute among our selves assertet◠that no act of sin no not the active selling of Joseph or crucifying of Christ was willed by God but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect yea he saith That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense but others allow that God wils the acts of sin as penal or conducible to his own glorie though not as sinful acts Thus Strangius l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction at first framed by Bellarmine and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves of active and passive vendition and crucifixion he concludes thus Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself as hereafter Chap. 3. § 2. 2 Some of our Opponents assert Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious yea idle and unactive but others allow it an efficace and energie for the limiting directing and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends albeit not about the act itself which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction for how can Gods permission limit direct and order sinful acts but by influencing the very act itself materially considered See more of this Chap. 5. § 6. 5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about the Nature of sin its formal Reason c. Some and those of no smal repute among our selves hold sin as to its formal reason to be a positive real Being which indeed is most agreable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which they denie to be as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes one of good the other of evil but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin without making God the Author of sin or making mans corrupt wil independent and so the first cause of a real positive act Therefore Strangius lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strongly argues with the Orthodoxe that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation But withal we are here to note that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater of which more hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves as wel as from us namely touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil natural impossibilitie and possibilitie Gods decretive and approbative wil of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions for how is it possible that they should agree among themselves when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part Chap. 5. § 3. We procede now to shew Wherein we differ from those of the new method Strangius Baronius Le Blanc and others about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted there sprang up some Divines who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod but yet contrived a new method specially as to universal Grace Reprobation and Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie as we shal hereafter demonstrate And the principal Agent who undertook the new modelling this last head was Strangius which he has copiosely treated of according to the new method in his Book De Voluntate Actionibus Dei circa peccatum whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurse to the mater of sin We assert 1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate mater or entitative act of al sin This Proposition Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but sin specially the first sin and such acts as are intrinsecally evil which sufficiently proves our Proposition for we say and are ready to demonstrate that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful but naturally good What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby in which regard we peremptorily
and our Hypothesis most true it remains on us to demonstrate Chap. 5. Thus we have given the true and ful state of our Controversie which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion and indeed it is to me a deplorable case and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cause that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena and yet never explicate the termes or state the Question in controversie I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Scriptural Demonstration 1 That God is the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. 2 That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Joseph's vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. 2 The Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10 11. Acts 2. 23. 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off 3 That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People Esa 10. 5 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal 105. 25. Job 1. 21. 4 God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin 2 Sam. 12. 11. 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. 1 Kings 22 23. Rev. 17. 17. 5 Gods efficacious permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17 20. 6 Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. 69. 22-27 Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. 29. 10. 19. 11 14. 44. 18 19. 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions 7 Gods ordering Sin for his glorie Exod. 9. 14-16 Rom. 9. 17 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis namely That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men to al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them we now procede to the Demonstration hereof And because al demonstration must be grounded on some first principes which give evidence firmitude and force thereto and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie but what are originally in the Scriptures we are therefore to begin our Demonstration with Scriptural Arguments which we shal reduce to these seven heads 1 Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 2 Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate That God doth predefine predetermine and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed 3 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt 4 Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent 5 Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin 6 Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration 7 Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glorie § 1. We shal begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such Texts as universally affirme That God is the first cause of al natural Actions and Things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things are many and great we shal mention some as Esa 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our works in us or for us This Text is urged by Strangius p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men which have much sin annexed to them Again this universal prime Causalitie of God efficaciously influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. 11. 36. For of him and through him and to him are althings Of him as he frames althings By him as he operates in and cooperates with althings and for him as the final cause of althings Thus Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme energie as Cyril stiles it reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects and if so then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them Is there any sin so intrinsecally evil which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof And if althings are of God and by him and for him must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil be so Strangius p. 342. replies thus Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie But what Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God blasphemie c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make 1 Was there not much Hatred of God and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this Yea 2 Doth not Strangius himself and those of his partie grant that God directs disposeth and over-rules al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil so as that they conduce to his glorie And how can God direct dispose and over-rule them unless he concur yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act Again Strangius p. 561. answers to this Text thus None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins as if sins were of God by God and for him c. 1 Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered 2 But must we thence necessarily conclude that the entitative act whereto sin is only accidentally appendent is not from God nor by him nor for him Yea 3 May we not say with Divines that sin formally considered although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient yet it is for him i. e. conducing to his Glorie as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates as De Genes ad liter lib. Imperfecto cap. 5. For God is not the Author of our sins yet he is the Ordinator of them c. And thus much indeed Strangius p. 860. confesseth Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is Ephes 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al
they may be extended to althings which God hath decreed So that it 's clear by his own confession that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was predestined predefined constituted foreordained and predetermined by God Whence by a paritie of reason we demonstrate our Hypothesis that the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereunto intrinsecal sin is necessarily annexed is predefined and predetermined by God The inference and conclusion to me is so natural and evident that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Opponents frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christs Crucifixion gives to our Hypothesis 1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among our selves replie That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God not the active i. e. Christs Passion and the effects of it was from God but not the actions of those that crucified him 1 How poor and shiftlesse this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of Joseph from Gen. 45. 5 7 8. 2 But more particularly as to this Head I cannot but wonder how any who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds can satisfie themselves with such jejune notions and evasions Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christs crucifixion how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul which wholly dependes on the death of Christ Again what fine-spun nonsense is this God predetermined the Passion of Christs crucifixion but not the Action as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by Judas but not that Judas should kisse and betray Christ again that Christ should be mocked blasphemed scourged c. by the Souldiers and Jews but that these should not mock blaspheme scourge c. Christ Lastly that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ but yet not that any thrust it in What Logic Reason or sense is this Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us That action and passion are not really but only modally distinct As the way from Athens to Thebes and so back again from Thebes to Athens is but one and the same way diversified only from its relation to different termes so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called Action and as it termines on the patient Passion Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the passion and not to the action of crucifixion But enough of this which is so strongly refuted by Strangius lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772. 2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and pietie evades thus Christs crucifixion was a thing which Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done Act. 4. 28. i. e. foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterprise his sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge so only and not with lesse latitude to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie than to let it procede to this execution And to deliver him up not by any formal resignation or surrender as we wel know but permitting him thereunto Though the same phrase of delivering him hath elsewhere another notion of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men by dying which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties c. This replie of this learned pious Divine so far as I can penetrate and understand it which seems involved under much obscuritie may be resolved into the following parts 1 He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition thereof Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites middle Science making Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree and so dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin which he elsewhere seems to intimate whereas the Scripture which he refers to Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Christs crucifixion subsequent to the predifinition of his determinate Counsel or Decree And certainly al the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate how God should have a certain prescience of Christs crucifixion which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil. 2 He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God Whereas the Text saith categorically That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed 3 He gives us a new Glosse or Paraphrase on that phrase delivering him Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation c. But how little this glosse wil accord with the sense of these Texts is evident For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him and that according to the determinate counsel of God 3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of Strangius whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of those Texts which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He answers lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus The occision and crucifixion of Christ also the kind of death were from God and as they were from God they were good and greatly gloriose and properly the means to procure our salvation and God is deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them Who by his determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them whom with wicked hands they killed on the crosse Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God neither was it willed or predefined by God who cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin Therefore speaking absolutely the occision of Christ was not sin otherwise God should be the Author of sin as to kil a man is not sin And truly if God had commanded men to kil Christ and they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God they had not sinned But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil neither can that be any way wel done or commanded by God Observe here 1 he grants that the crucifixion of Christ with al its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God as the God of nature and so naturally good yea that they were morally good and
greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation and therefore God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them as Act. 2. 23. And 2 we denie with him that the wickednesse and malice of those acts was from God 3 He also grants That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin Whereunto we retort That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its object is sin But 4 he concludes But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil c. Whence we argue That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsecally evil and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice yea malice blowen up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them And was not in this good work of crucifixion the good action of God and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the substrate mater or natural entitative act This pincheth Strangius closely and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews For he saith Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action and therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God Here we grant 1 his consequence or conclusion That their malice was not from God 2 We thus far also grant his Antecedent That the good action of God considered both naturally and morally was distinguished from their evil action considered formally and morally for the malice and vitiositie which formalised the action as theirs is no way imputable to Gods act considered either naturally or morally 3 But yet we stil avouch and no way dout but to demonstrate in its place that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered materially naturally and entitatively was one and the same with Gods act So much al these Texts clearly evince so much also reason dictates For if there were two acts the one primarily yea only from the wicked instruments the other from God the prime Efficient then how could they be said to be the instruments of Gods Efficience Must we not then also suppose two Crucifixions one from God and the other from the Jews What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered entitatively materially and naturally was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered entitatively materially and naturally But to conclude we find an excellent solution to al these evasions and subterfuges in Augustin Epist 48. ad Vincentium thus When the Father delivered his Son and Christ his own Bodie and Judas his Lord why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty but because in one and the same thing which they did the cause was not one and the same A solution sufficient to satisfie any sober mind Wherein note 1 That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ was one and the same entitatively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner 2 That the difference sprang from the Causes God delivered his Son to Death thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wisn for their Salvation but Judas and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death with wicked hands out of an avaricious humor malice c. Hence 3 The Action was most just and gloriose on Gods part but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part This answer of Augustin is so great that it might serve to answer al the objections against our Hypothesis were not men bent to cavil against the truth § 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments namely such wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt I shal divide this Head into two members 1 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people 2 Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments 1. We shal begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people So Esa 10. 5 6. O Assyrian the rod of mine anger I will send him against an hypocritical Nation The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people and every stroke of this rod was from God his hand guiding ordering and actuating the rod in al its motions And yet how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing Israel How little did he intend to serve God herein were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action Thence it 's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so neither doth his heart think so c. whence v. 12. God threatens to punish him for his sin So that it 's evident this sending of the Assyrian by God mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concurse and Providence of God ordering what should come to pass So Jer. 16. 16. Behold I wil send for many fishers saith the Lord and they shal fish them and after wil I send for many hunters and they shal hunt them from every mountain c. Note 1 That these words contain not a promisse but threat begun v. 9. This is evident from v. 17. 2 By Fishers and Hunters in the general we must understand enemies to the Jews To fish and to hunt is to take and destroy War has a great ressemblance with fishing and hunting which is a kind of war against bestes as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men whence Nimrod the first Warrier after the Floud is stiled Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter i. e. of men Ay but more particularly 3 Who are these fishers Why as it is supposed the Egyptians who are called Fishers Esa 19. 8. 4 And who are the Hunters The Babylonians as it is generally said But 5 Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters It is God I wil send c. 6 Why doth God send for them To punish his sinful People and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided and to whom they had so much conformed as is intimated v. 17. And what more just than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments as have been the ground of their confidence and the exemplars of their sins 7 How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters Surely not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them but providentially by exciting their minds applying their wils and drawing forth yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews whereunto there was
much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficaâ—… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wâ—… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods
efficacious Moderation and Direction of the sinful act denotes his efficacious Preservation of the act which is as sinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter Chap. 5 6. Another Scripture which speaks Gods immediate predeterminative concurse in the entitative act of Sin is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David saith of Shimei That the Lord said unto him Curse David And v. 11. Let him curse for the Lord hath bidden him Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei which must be here taken either morally for a divine precept and injunction or physicly for an efficacious Concurse and influence 1 That it cannot be here taken morally for a preceptive word is most evident because had God commanded Shimei to curse David he had been the moral cause and so the Author of his sin 2 Therefore it remains that it be here taken only physicly for Gods efficacious Concurse secretly and powerfully inclining and applying Shimei's wil to the entitative act of this cursing And in this sense the Word of God is frequently taken in Scripture namely for his efficacious predeterminative concurse in the Creation Conservation and Gubernation of things Now what doth Strangius replie to this Why l. 4. c. 4. p. 786. he saith That Shimei's Cursings being intrinsecally evil we may not say that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of speech neither that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions as they were determined to such an object but only as directed by God to his just judgements and that most certain direction of God with the administration of Circumstances and Occasions was as a Precept In which Response note 1 That he grants that Shimei his cursing was an action intrinsecally evil which is a great concession and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypothesis and prove ours That God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if Shimei's Cursing was an action intrinsecally evil then surely such also was the Vendition of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God But 2 he denies that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions as determined to such an object In the last clause of this Antithesis lies the spirit and force of al his objections against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin which we intend more fully to examine Chap. 6. § 1. at present we say 1 That Shimei was not the instrument of any moral but physic influence from God the precept or bidding here specified was not moral but physic and real God did not morally command Shimei to curse David but physicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Cursing him which was as a Precept this Strangius grants in the close as to Gods direction 2 Hence if we consider Shimei's cursing as physicly determined to such an object it was not morally evil but good and so from God It 's true as it was morally determined by Shimei the moral Agent to its object David so it was intrinsecally evil but as it was physicly or naturally determined by God for the punishment of David so it was both naturally and morally good and from God 3 He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act in directing his Actions to his just judgements c. To which I answer 1 How could God direct these actions of Shimei specially the immanent acts of his wil which were the worst part of his malediction but by an efficacious predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts 2 He grants that this Direction of God was most certain and efficacious if so then certainly predeterminative and if the direction be predeterminative is not Gods concurse to the sinful act considered materially and entitatively predeterminative 3 If Gods directive concurse be predeterminative as Strangius must by his concessions grant wil not those ugly consequences which he lodes our Hypothesis with be al retorted on him Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on Shimei's cursing as determined to such an object namely David And was he not the Instrument of this efficacious direction Baronius Metaph. S. 8. Disp 3. p. 158. answers this Text thus To that malediction of Shimei it is answered That God commanded Shimei to curse David not by bending his wil but by opening to him the way to this evil and by shutting it to al other evils i. e. by permitting him to act this only whenas he was ready for many other evils A poor evasion indeed and such as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Nose of Waxe 1 Doth not David say categoricly that God bid i. e. not morally but physicly Shimei to curse And what can this implie but the bending his wil to the substrate mater or entitative Act 2 Can it be imagined that David could mean only a mere otiose and speculative permission and not an active concurrence to the act it self entitatively considered 3 Doth not Baronius confess that God opened to him the way to this evil And if so must he not then open Shimei's heart to the mater of it Did not the main act of malediction arise from his wil And if that were not opened to the entitative act would the way to this evil have been ever opened Again Gods immediate predeterminative hand in those acts whereunto sin is necessarily appendent may be demonstrated from 2 Sam. 24. 1. And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel and he moved David against them to say Go number Israel and Judah Here it is expressely said that God moved David to number the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and he moved or excited i. e. efficaciously determined and applied his wil to the substrate mater of this command to number the people Hence Strangius pag. 790. answers 1 That the He here must be meant of Satan who is said 1 Chron. 21. 1. to stir up David to number the people And he cites for this Comment Junius with others But alas what poor subterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light Doth not Grammatic construction as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject such a glosse The Particle He here is not a distinct Pronoun as our English Version reads it but included in the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part and the anger of the Lord was kindled so that if the passive was kindled belongs to the Lords anger then also must what follows and he moved Neither is this sense aliene from other Scriptures for 1 Sam. 26. 19. David saith That God had stirred up Saul against him i. e. efficaciously moved him to the entitative act of persecuting David Thence 2 Strangius fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another thus But if
ours 2 How doth God judicially punish one sin by another but to use his own words by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error And if so then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God Of this hereafter § 6. But 2 I passe on to his second answer whereon he seems to lay the most weight though indeed most feeble But saith he because those words Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which points out the reason of that which next follows namely that those ten Kings having changed their opinion should destroy the Whore and Antichrist it seems to me more commodious if in that vers 17. there be a reason given of this famose change that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him namely because God hath put this into their heart And the first words of vers 17. sufficiently accord to this Exposition But what is subjoined That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste until the word of God should be consummate I should think ought to be expounded negatively c. Thus Strangius A strange comment indeed let us a little inquire into it 1 How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make what follows the fulfilling of Gods wil to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist whereas the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse and more particularly to the last clause until the Word of God shal be fulfilled and so it notes that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil 1 In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste and 2 When the words of God were fulfilled i. e. Antichrists reign expired then to hate the Whore c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to and enemies against Antichrist 2 As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste certainly if such glosses should be admitted we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities Why may not the most profane debauched wretch when he is pressed with those Commands Thou shalt not commit adulterie Thou shalt not kill c. replie that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively Thou shalt commit adulterie c But Strangius saw ful wel that the affirmative sense of those words That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words and therefore he saw no way left but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words But 3 being after al his glosses sensible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this response he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge telling us That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient but that beyond it there must be also signified that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste I have no mind to contend about this mater sithat the sense is sufficiently sane which ever way the words be understood In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil but of the substrate act and punishment or Judgement which is annected to the sin but in good works not only of the substrate act but also of the moral Bonitie c. Who of us denies this would our Adversaries but stick here how soon would our Controversie be ended But here lies the sting even in this plausible concession Strangius with the rest would fain perswade us that there are some acts of sin so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral Vitiositie § 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious Permission of sin The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin but this sin in its formal nature Our Adversaries the Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodists al grant Gods permission of Sin but only such as is otiose speculative negative and naked without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act or direction of it to its proper ends But the sacred Scriptures ascribe to God a positive efficacious directive and ordinative permission of sin arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it So it 's said of Eli's Sons 1 Sam. 2. 25. They hearkened not to the voice of their father because the Lord would slay them The conjunction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is Causal and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God The Soverain Lord had by an absolute peremtorie decree predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine and thence it 's said they hearkened not because the Lord would slay them the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be I am not ignorant that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a more soft as they phrase it Version and among these some make it conclusive and so render it ideo idcirco quapropter others render it quamvis as Turnovius others otherwise But certainly our English Version which renders it causally because seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions So the LXX who render the words thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them In willing willed i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome peremtorily efficaciously immutablely and absolutely willed Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions with some later Munster Pagnine Arias Montanus Junius and Tremelius Osiander Piscator Malvenda with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions yea Castalio not excepted render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causally because according to our sense and interpretament Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809 c. He answers 1 That the sons of Eli were for their flagitiose impieties destined and devoted by God to ruine 2 That the punishment of death here mentioned seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal not eternal 3 That however it be as it is manifest that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting
of punishment so it 's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God of damning and inflicting punishment whether temporal or eternal 4 That the particle Quia Because here used doth not alwayes denote a proper cause but a reason of consequence which may be taken from the effect and other arguments besides the cause c. Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text but to answer briefly 1 We say that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination but the Soverain God destined by an absolute decree to leave them to those flagitiose sins and for them to destroy them What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation we intend more fully to shew hereafter c. 5. § 3. 2 That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath Yea Strangius confesseth that they merited eternal wrath and how then could they be exemted from it who had rejected the Merits of their Messias 3 What he addes touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins yea of final Impenitence be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men then it wil by a paritie of reason necessarily follow that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men for if Reprobation be conditional Election must be so also as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate Davenant in his Animadvers against Hoard invictly proves p. 226. and elsewhere That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows c. 5. § 3. 4 As for the Particle Quia Because 1 We grant that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause but a reason of Consequence and that taken sometimes from the effect But 2 that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text is most evident because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them 3 Take notice that we do not say that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine but only that the later was the consequent of the former God in his most soverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins as should prove the cause of their ruine both temporal and eternal and hereupon their sin and ruine followed as Darknesse is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere Again Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be demonstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates I understand this not only of false Worship but also of al errors that are committed every where although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed where God stirs up some who draw others into error that they might follow their fallacious counsel and enter on a perniciose course for their own dammage God therefore impels and draws some into error not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin but that their sin and defection from God leads them thereto God not only merely permitting but also ordaining c. Whence it 's added v. 17. He leadeth counsellers away spoiled and maketh the Judges fools spoiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of their wisdom and counsel as it follows So it 's taken Psal 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart i. e. deprived of their courage And maketh the Judges fools 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 infatuat or ad insaniam adigit as Mercer He infatuates them Again v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty and taketh away the understanding of the aged 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Judgement Discretion Counsel Prudence Sense Hebr. the savor or experimental tast So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth and causeth them to wander in a Wildernesse where there is no way The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa 19. 11 12 13 14. Now let us see what answer Strangius l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto It must be observed saith he that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so ordering things that nothing comes to pass casually or fortuitously nothing without his destinated counsel that nothing is done but what he wils either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it as August Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good and also wisely foreknowing the future event doth permit sins which he directs to good ends ordained by him Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes that it is from Divine Providence that some erre and draw others into error and that both as to maters of Religion and in other maters of this life not that is he the Author of seduction and errors but because God for the contemt and abuse of his light delivers them destitute thereof into a mind void of judgement and presenting objects and occasions opens a way wherein they wander c. Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis and subvert his own Antithesis For 1 he grants That nothing happens casually without Gods destinated counsel according to that of Augustin That nothing is done but what God wils c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. 2 He grants that God wisely foreknows al future events even the sins of men and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same neither Strangius himself nor any of his sectators could ever yet make out 3 He grants also That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts and permission of the vitiositie 4 He yet further grants That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement
and what do we say more Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin But then 5 his last clause presenting objects and occasions c. overthrows al his former concessions for the wise God doth not only present objects and occasions and thereby open a way to mens infatuation but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act and efficaciously permits the vitiositie without the least finger in the sin There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin as Esa 63. 17. O Lord why hast thou made us erre from thy ways and hardened our hearts from thy fear Strangius pag. 839. grants that the Verbe in both Members being in Hiphil oft notes a double action as when we say That one makes another to do a thing though he pretends that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action But it is certain that it cannot here denote a mere naked permission but such as procedes from the efficacious wil of God The like Jer. 20. 7. O Lord thou hast deceived me and I was deceived Whereto answers Ezech. 14. 9. And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing I the Lord have deceived that Prophet Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission namely such as resultes from the active efficacious directive and ordinative wil of God as Strangius lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 840 844. grants What this permission of God is and how far it extendes see what follows Chap. 5. § 6. § 6. Let us now passe on to such Scriptures as mention Gods tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation and induration or hardnesse of heart which wil give a more evident demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Not to insiste on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart Exod. 4. 21. which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine in his Letter to a Friend c. pag. 28 30. I shal begin with Psal 81. 12. So I gave them up to their own hearts lusts or to the hardnesse of their own hearts as Kimhi Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart LXX render it Deut. 29. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Jer. 3. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence it follows and they walked in their own counsels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in their own depraved imaginations It 's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardnesse which they affect his way of hardening is mysterious and invisible he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts and then lets them enjoy what they lust after when men adde acquired hardnesse to natural God justly inflicts on them judicial hardnesse And oh how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully yea voluntarily harden themselves And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual is as wax towards sin and Satans tentations And what is the effect of this judicial hardnesse but to seal up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel Thus God albeit he be not the Author of sin yet is the Orderer of it and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is annexed The like Psal 69. 22. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not and make their loins continually to shake Let their eyes i. e. their minds be darkened 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be made so obscure and dark as that they may not see their way let al true wisdome be taken from them and make their loins continually to shake i. e. take from them al force vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought let them stagger and reel like to a drunken man The shaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force which is chiefly seated in the loins Thus he procedes and then vers 17. brings Divine wrath to a black conclusion Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which implies that God addes the punishment of judicial hardnesse to the iniquitie of their voluntary acquired hardnesse We find this piece of judicial hardnesse cited by Paul Rom. 11. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see and bow down their back alway The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is here rendred by Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bow down the sense being the same for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of strength in the loins To these Texts we may adde Esa 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make the heart fat or grosse i. e. stupid and senselesse for the fat of animals has little sense It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrowen and oppressed with fat These words are six times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows and shut their eyes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is rendred by some dim them or make them dim by others daub them as with plaister or other like mater by others close them al which notes the efficacitie of error and blindnesse that follows on judicial hardnesse The like curse we find Esa 29. 10. For the Lord hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep and hath closed your eyes LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by Theodotion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Act. 10. 11. notes a deep sleep or ecstasie and the radix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to overwhelme with deep sleep and it 's rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dan. 10. 9. So that by the spirit of deep sleep must be understood such a stupor of spirit as leaves men without al sense The allusion is to some soporiferous stupifying wine or potion or medicine which being given to a man or sprinkled on him casts him into a deep sleep Hence the Prophet ushers in these words with a direful exclamation vers 9. Stay your selves and wonder they are drunken but not with wine c. i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a soporiferous stupifying potion As for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pricke Act. 2. 27. but from the ancient word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also remains among the Latins as nuo nutus nutare Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to nod or shake the head as they are wont to do who have drunk any stupifying potion So that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is such a spirituose stupifying potion as deprives men of their senses makes them shake the head stagger and reel as drunken men Thence it follows and hath closed your eyes When God judicially pours out a
10. 20 27. 11. 10. 14. 4 8. Deut. 2. 30. Josh 11. 20. Whence Strangius concludes That this phrase of Scripture oft occurring denotes much more than a mere naked permission Though what this should be he is at a great losse 2. Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 99. pag. 159 160. answers That there are four actions of God in induration 1 He punisheth former sins by permitting men to fal into greater 2 He offers to them an occasion of repentance c. 3 He gives them not grace to improve the occasion whence they are said to be blinded and hardened 4 He offers to them occasions of greater sins by such things as objectively move them to sin But al this which Baronius allows God in judicial execation and Induration comes far short of what the forecited Scriptures mention For besides the mere permission of Sin privation of Grace and offering occasions and objects the Scripture mentions a Tradition and delivering up to the very act of sin yea Gods immediate efficacious hand in the very act of sin considered entitatively and materially 3. But we come to Strangius who in his concessions goes beyond the former Divines yet comes short of the genuine mind and spirit of those Texts which speak of Gods judicial Excecation and Induration 1 He grants contrary to the sentiment of a reverend Divine among us that active excecation is ascribed unto God So l. 4. c. 8. p. 819. Active excecation saith he is ascribed to God Satan and the Sinner himself Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly sin but God actes most justly God can as justly punish Sinners with excecation of mind as he punished Elymas the sorcerer with corporal excecation Act. 13. 11. 2 Thence p. 822. he addes Herein the whole difficultie lies that in this action we rightly distinguish that which is sin and the cause of sin whereof God is not the cause from the punishment which God in just judgement inflicts So p. 829. In al vitiose action the action substrate to the vice or whatever there is of entitie and positive therein must be reduced to God as the first cause who doth concur therewith as considered separate from the vice or defect annexed thereto and therefore whatever entitative or positive is found in any obduration in like manner it must be referred to God albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action This ingenuous concession of Strangius did he not overthrow it by other positions were sufficient to period our controversie for what do or need we desire more than what he here grants If whatever be entitative or positive in obduration be from God then surely the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereto sin is annexed is from God But here lies the point of our Controversie with Strangius he holds that there be some acts so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the entitative act from the sinful reference it has to its object But 3 Strangius addes p. 831. That in the same Indutation the sin and punishment are conjunct c. This indeed is a great concession that which overthrows Strangius's Antithesis for if in the same Act the sin and punishment be conjunct then how can God concur to the act as a punishment and not concur to the substrate mater or entitative act which has sin annexed to it This Knot the acutest of Strangius's Sectators wil never untie Again 4 He addes p. 831. That the very Permission of God is the act and effect of the wil of God For to wil to permit and advisedly to permit is also to act What is done by God negatively in regard of his transient act is done also positively in regard of his interne immanent act Herein also he lays before us a pregnant Truth which is directly contradictory to his own Hypothesis for 1 If Gods permissive Wil as to sin be not only negative but also positive then it must be efficacious Again 2 If Gods permission of sin be positive and efficacious then also his Decree of Reprobation to permit sin must be positive and absolute which directly impugneth Strangius's Opinion 5 He addes p. 832. That other actions also concur with Gods Permission because he also rules moderates and ordains what he permits and concurs to the actions substrate to the sin it self Is it so indeed What then do we contend so vehemently for what made Strangius write such a voluminous discourse and oppose Rutherford Twisse and other Calvinists with so much violence when as here he grants whatever they contend for But to speak the truth there yet lies a Snake under the herbe albeit Strangius seems to grant so liberally Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate act of sin yet indeed when he comes else-where to state this concurse he makes it be only a remote concurse to the act considered in genere in its generic nature not to the individual particular act as so or so circumstantiated And herein he is followed by a Divine of Name among us wherein lies the spirit of al their solutions and oppositions But how inept and evanid this subterfuge is wil be very evident if we consider the nature of al physic or natural acts Is not every natural or entitative act individual or singular Are not al natural Acts the effluxes of singular Supposites or persons and if the subject be singular must not the Action be also singular To talk of a natural action in genere or specie what a wild conceit is this that which al true Logic and Philosophie both new and old contradicts It 's true human acts as to their moral consideration may be distinguished into generic specific or individual but if we consider human acts in their natural entitative Being so there neither is nor can be any such thing as actio in genere action in general but al are singular and individual So that if God concur to the act of sin it must be to the act in its individual singular nature not morally but physically and entitatively considered of which more hereafter Chap. 6. § 1. But to give a distinct and Theologic Idea of Gods Judicial Excecation and Induration with the Vindication of his Sacred Majestie from being the Author of Sin the following Distinctions and Determinations may be of use to us 1 We are to distinguish Gods concurse in Judicial Induration or Hardnesse from that of the Sinner 2 Gods Concurse in Judicial Hardnesse may be considered either in regard of his Decree or in regard of his Providence and actual execution 3 Induration may be distinguished into Moral and Natural or into sinful and penal These things being premissed the true nature of Gods judicial excecation and Induration wil appear in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods Decree is not properly the cause of mans Hardnesse of heart or Damnation but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace which God is no way bound to give
The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper efficient or formal cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation but his own wilful obstinacie This sufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Justice of God 2. Prop. Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation the sinners Induration or Hardnesse follows infallibly and in some sense necessarily i. e. by a modal hypothetic necessitie not brutish or coactive such as should destroy Libertie The holy God doth not infuse hardnesse or by any compulsion hurrie men into it but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts which violently hurrie them into such courses as necessarily harden This also cleareth Gods Justice from the imputation of sin 3. Prop. Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious 1 God leaves men to the Blandishments Allurements and Ensnarements of an heart-bewitching world which insensibly harden 2 He delivers up men to the power of Satan the God of this world whose subjects and vassals they willingly become 2 Cor. 4. 3 4. and so are taken alive captive at his wil 2 Tim. 2. 26. 3 God so disposeth and orders al his Providences as that they do al accidentally by reason of mens lusts conspire to harden them Mercies become Curses to them Rom. 11. 9 10 11. Yea 4 The very means of Grace become the means of their hardening their Food and Physic become Poyson to them 2 Cor. 2. 16. Esa 28. 12 13 14 15. 5 Christ himself the chief Corner-stone of salvation becomes to them a stone of stumbling and offence Esa 8. 14. a stone of stumbling 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of smiting such as lying in the way the foot may smite against and thence stumble and receive hurt It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 scandal in the New Testament Thence it follows and for a rock of offence Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not a bare Stumbling-stone or block such as a man may make a shift to avoid or get over or if he stumble yet recover himself again but he is a rock of offence which notes 1 The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable as the removing of a rock 2 The ruine to be certain as that of a Ship falling on a rock Whence he addes for a gin and for a snare such as men should neither by power wit or craft escape Whence it follows v. 15. And many among them shal stumble and fal and be broken and be snared and be taken The like Rom. 9. 33. 6 God puts a period to the day of Grace and leaves men to the plague of their own heart Esa 22. 14. Surely this iniquitie shal not be purged from you til you die Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If this iniquitie be purged It is the concise forme of an Oath frequently used in Scripture as Chap. 5. 18. whereby God sweareth that their iniquitie should not be purged So Luke 19. 41 42. Heb. 3. 7. 7 God doth positively yea efficaciously concur to al that is positive material entitative and natural in judicial hardnesse without the least hand in the obliquitie or vitiositie 4. Prop. The suspension of restraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature but a negation or withdrawment of undeserved and abused Grace For the clearing whereof we are to consider the difference between Man and God in this particular No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to sin or hardnesse if it be in his power to hinder 1 Because al men are under a Law and obligation of subjection to their Creator whereby they are obliged to promove his Glorie and prevent sin and rebellion against him the most they can 2 Because al men are under a communion of Natures and therefore bound to afford assistance each to other so far as they may for their natural and moral good But now the soverain Creator of man is under no such obligation and therefore may as he please dispose of his own grace or suspend it specially when abused by sinners 5. Prop. God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardnesse simply as hardnesse under that reduplication but penally as it conduceth to the vindication of his Justice For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we are to remember that there is nothing in the world of itself purely and simply evil for if there were any pure and chiefest evil in the world then God who is the chiefest good could not wil it but the greatest evil has something of good mixed with it and this God wils Thus in judicial hardnesse there is a penal vindictive good which God wils for the illustration of his Justice 6. Prop. In judicial hardnesse that which is morally evil in regard of man and his transgression is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence For albeit God doth concur with the sinner who is deficient as to his dutie yet God is no way deficient 1 Al moral evil of sin is only such to him whose it is or to whom it doth belong as the Author thereof by virtue of some Law he offends against But now this judicial hardnesse or sin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it but only to the sinner neither doth the holy God offend against any Law 2 The specific qualitie of an effect is not to be ascribed to the universal first cause but to the second particular cause from which it receives specification 3 The sinner is only the moral cause of his own hardnesse because he is the meritorious cause thereof and also a voluntary yea wilful Agent therein Al his hardnesse is voluntarily contracted albeit judicially inflicted by God he suffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by sinful objects God threatens to suspend his Divine influence and the obstinate sinner cries Content Satan comes and blinds his eyes and he hugges him for it So that the whole deficience or moral causalitie is on the sinners part not on Gods The sinner wants Divine influence and is willing yea glad to want it therefore his depraved wil is the sole formal vital subjective and moral efficient cause of his own hardnesse and sin § 7. We come in the last place to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious ordering disposing and directing the sins of men unto his own glorie which evidently demonstrates his immediate concurse and predetermination to the substrate mater or entitative act thereof Thus Exod. 9. 14 15 16. God threatens Pharaoh vers 14. to send al his plagues on his heart i. e. in a way of judicial excecation and induration And why That thou mayst know there is none like me in al the earth i. e. that I may magnifie my vindictive Justice and Power on thee Whence he addes v. 15. For now I wil stretch out mine hand that I may smite thee and thy people with pestilence and thou shalt be cut off from the earth It runs in the
of further grace 4 Whereas he saith That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto is not sin but ruine the consequent of their sin the word stumbling and falling signifying their destruction it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie according to our precedent explication of them primarily their sin and then their ruine or destruction as the consequent of their sin This also is evident from that parallel Text Jude 4. For there are certain men crept in unawares who were of old ordained to this condemnation ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse and denying the only Lord God These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination to be given up to this condemnation of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse c. So that it is evident that God foreordained and decreed not only their destruction but to leave them to those sins which should cause the same But to sum up the whole of this Head we grant 1 That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins or damnation It 's true elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation 2 That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated Yet we denie 1 That it is injust for God by an absolute efficacious Decree to reprobate some for the glorifying of his own Justice For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any 2 We denie also that there is any motive cause or condition of Reprobation as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also 3 we denie that the act of Reprobation is merely negative but affirme that it is positive and absolute of which see Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprobat p. 113. Hence 4 It necessarily follows that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation he predestines and preordains in like manner by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil to leave men to their own sinful courses and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins See more Chap. 5. § 3. CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 1 Fathers Augustin Prosper Fulgentius 2 Such as succeeded in the Roman Church Hugo de Sancto Victore Aquinas Scotus Ariminensis Holcot Altissiodorensis Bradwardine his Conversion Parts both natural and acquired zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin How God wils Sin How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators also of the Tridentine Catechisme 3 The Sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius Beza Chamier Lud. Crocius the Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Sam. Ward c. 4 Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin more ancient Durandus his proper Hypothesis and who may be accounted his Sectators Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe Arminius and his Adherents the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes The New Methodistes Camero Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments and who may be estimed such § 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis touching the efficacious predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in al Ages of the Church and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries First among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries as Strangius by name are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works Thus de Grat. Lib. Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture saith he be diligently inspected it wil appear that not only the good wils of men but also the bad are so in Gods power that he can incline them where and when he wil to performe his benefices or to inflict his punishments by his most secret yet most just judgement Again in the same book he saith That God workes in the hearts of men to incline them which way he please either to Good out of his Mercie or to evil according to their deserts by his Judgement sometimes open sometimes secret but always just So De Praedestinat Sanct. c. 16. It is saith he in the power of wicked men to sin but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that is not in their power but of God dividing the darkness and ordering it that so hence what they do against the wil of God might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God Again De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto c. 5. Some things saith he God makes and orders other things he only orders righteous men he makes and orders but sinners as sinners he makes not but only orders i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good and of the action but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin but only of the act ordering it for his glorie Again De Civitate Dei l. 13. c. 22. he saith That Sin as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law that is the Divine Wil or Decree Moreover Augustin frequently asserts that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another So Contra Julian l. 5. c. 3. de Civitate Dei l. 15. c. 6. libro de Natura Gratia from cap. 20. to the end To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Augustin which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin As 1 He asserted that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil and so in it self positive and absolute 2 He held That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation of which see Jansenius August de Gâ—…t Christ l. 10. c. 3 4. 3 He maintained That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary because punishments as Jansen de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly that Augustin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians who
and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in
what follows touching Bradwardine I now come to Thomas Bradwardine our pious learned and profound Bradwardine whom might I be allowed my libertie I should rather reckon among our first Reformers than among the Sons of Antichrist for indeed he was a zelose Patron of and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion specially efficacious free Grace which he with so much courage strength of argument and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days This Thomas Bradwardine borne at Hartfield in Sussex flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie which he greatly polisht by al manner of acquired Sciences specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations which in his first studies he greedily drank in even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures because they favored not of a metaphysic style as he himself informes us in his Book de Causa Dei When saith he in the state of my unregeneracie I came into the Scholes and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace c. it did no way relish with me quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum because it savored not of a metaphysic style It was with me as it was with Augustin of old nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil c. But after his Conversion he was as another Augustin the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace Balaeus de Script Brit. cent 5. cap. 87. tels us That John Baconthorp that famose Divine and English-man returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination to whom at last Bradwardine assents in al those points as the same Baconthorp declares in Sent. lib. 4. Dist 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbishop of Canterbury without any desire of his own thereto He was indeed a good Mathematician a great Philosopher and excellent Divine being communly stiled Doctor profundus the profound Doctor Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the Cause of God against the Pelagians which he defended with great fervor as wel as acumen of spirit which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei specially lib. 1. c. 30 31 32 33 34. He demonstrates 1 That al voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence cap. 30 31. p. 271 c. 2 That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them and not merely permitting Which he demonstrates many ways as 1 Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. 2 Because otherwise the whole Vniverse would not be disposed in the best manner 3 Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names Thus cap. 32. p. 288. 3 That about whatever Gods Permission is his actual Volition is also employed about the same And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good yet it is good that there should be not only good things but also evil For unless it were good that evils be the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be as Cap. 33. Hence 4 He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie How God wils sin and how he wils it not 1 He proves p. 294 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin because he permits it also God doth voluntarily provide for yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil with al their positive circumstances which necessarily import sin Again This Proposition Sin is is true and therefore there must be some cause of its truth which can be no other than the divine wil from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination Again ` Whatever is good must procede from the first good but that Sin existe is good according to Augustin So Hugo saith That God wils that sins existe because this is good Moreover he brings in Hugo speaking thus which deserves a great remarque If it be said God wils sin this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear and therefore some pious mind doth refute this not because that which is spoken is il spoken but because that which is wel spoken is il understood 2 Thence Bradwardine procedes to refute Lombard who asserts That God wils sin as a punishment not under this reason as it is sin i. e. materially or entitatively considered which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes by shewing That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin so that if God wils sin as a punishment he must necessarily wil the existence of sin Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined and wils that they should be so conjoined and knowingly and rationally wils one the same person wils also the other specially if about both he employ an act of his wil But now God knows and wils that those two Sin and Punishment be conjoined together and rationally wils the one namely the punishment of sin therefore also the sin Again he that wils an Antecedent wils also the Consequent at least in an universal albeit not in a particular for he that wils a whole wils al the parts necessary thereto 3 Thence he procedes p. 300. to shew how God wils sin God saith he doth no way wil Sin simply but only in some limited respect For to say that God wils something simply is according to the commun manner of speech to say that he loves it and approves of it as good Yea addes he may it not be said that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination Deformitie or Sin simply considered but only Sin in some respect Because in regard of the prime and supreme Cause al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdome beautie and justice Whence 4 He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful acts and to such as are good p. 302. God saith he is not the Author of sin as of that which is done wel For of this he is the Author so as that he alone doth supernaturally create and give to the wel-doer Faith Hope and Love c. But it is not so as to sin i. e. As to good God produceth not only the natural act but also the moral Bonitie but as to Sin he produceth only the natural entitative Act. 5 He thence p. 302. explicates how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied that God wils Sin When saith he Augustin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin the cause of this negation seems
point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans it 's certain that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth and particularly Alvarez who is principally struck at by the adverse partie deserves great honor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations Strangius and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis but the Jesuites themselves who are his most puissant Impugnators give him a more candid and favorable treatment For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius whom they judged more severe they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted in order to an accommodement and the reasons they allege are of moment For say they Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis there is a grand apparence that he and those others who writ at the same time and since took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had albeit they made no Decree on this mater of which see Refutat de Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme p. 82. wherein remarque 1 That the Jesuites Alvarez's sworne enemies give him a more favorable character as one who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination Yea 2 That the Popes themselves Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had the same sentiments with Alvarez Is it not strange then that the Jesuites who are professed enemies to Predetermination and the Popes themselves who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination than Protestant Divines whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination For mine own part I cannot but confesse that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination I read Alvarez with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit and found therein so penetrant an acumen so profound soliditie and such masculine Demonstrations as that I never met with his equal excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us have loaded him with His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations de Auxil l. 3. Disput 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate That God doth by a previous motion truely and efficiently or according to the mode of a physical cause premove free-wil to the act of sin as it is an Act or Being His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible namely from the Participation Limitation and Dependence of every Second cause c. Of which hereafter c. 5. Lastly that the Scholemen generally besides such as are Pelagian assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin see Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress 2. I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers For 1 It 's evident that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin Thus in his August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77 c. he proves That there is no manner of speech among the Scholemen so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie and thence the true opinion of Augustin Again cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract but also in the concrete Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen So that it 's evident he was not averse from the thing albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues as also to confine himself to the termes used by Augustin 2 That reverend Divine among us who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination doth yet grant that Jansenius held the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment Wherein he opposeth Jansenius and also Augustin who held that sin as a punishment was willed and caused by God as before 3 Jansenius August de Statu Nat. Laps l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us That men in their lapsed state before Faith be introduced are under the captivitie of lust and can do nothing but sin which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 1 He proves cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive 2 He demonstrates cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation according to its comparative consideration is the absolute wil of God This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. part 3. Sect. 7. § 22. pag. 93. in these words Jansenius's Doctrine is that the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil of men in original sin and the effect of it excecation and obduration This being his proper opinion it necessarily follows that he asserted Gods predeterminative
Concurse to the entitative act of sin is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it which he wiped off with this answer That the same action which is sinful in regard of man is not so in regard of God because he is not under the same Law with man Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 87. pag. 152. The third mode saith he is peculiar to Zuinglius who teacheth that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin because God hath no Law set to him but man hath To which Baronius answers That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature not to deal injustly or cruelly with men This replie although borrowed from Bellarmine is now become commun with our Adversaries yet without the least shadow of reason for they do but beg the question in saying That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature As for Zuinglius's proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of sin they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei cap. 6. tom 1. of his Workes pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man he always sins when he actes against the Law albeit he neither be nor live nor operate but in God and from God and by God But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin but not in like manner to God for man is under a law but God is free Therefore one and the same wickednesse suppose adulterie or homicide as from God the Author Motor and Impulsor it is a work not a crime but as it is from man so it is a crime and wickednesse for God is not bound up by law but man is condemned by law Thus he procedes to illustrate by many exemples of David c. Thence pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh c. wherein note 1 That he cals God the Author Motor and Impulsor of the act which must be understood not morally but physically as he excites and applies the wil to its act 2 That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin because he actes not against any law a distinction which was valid in his time albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines yea Calvinists Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade but in use long before Zuinglius by Scotus Ariminensis and other scholastic Theologues who followed Augustin herein Thus Scotus in Sent. 2. Dist 37. Quaest 2. saith The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil but not as to Gods concurse quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere Deus autem non debet because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law to give rectitude to the action but God is not as before How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313 c. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God he saith 1 That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God Thence he procedes 2 to demonstrate That albeit God wil and know and decree althings in the world yet that he is not the Author of sin So pag. 315. 3 He proves That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative This he demonstrates pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph the robbing of Job the ravishing of Davids wives by Absolon Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto Shimei's cursing of David the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam c. 4 He procedes pag. 319. to the fal of Adam which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God c. The same Controversie he manageth against Castellio de aeterna Dei praedestinatione p. 360. where he proves That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God The like pag. 401. where he proves That God doth not compel men to sin or infuse sin into them but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators but also by that of Arminius who objectes the very same things against them as are objected against us namely That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose by which opinion saith he God is made the Author of Adams fal and sin of which see Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes in this as in other points which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession and signed by their Ministers and Professors for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus and others in the French Churches That not only the German and Helvetian but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis is most evident by the most elaborate acute and demonstrative determinations of great Chamier the greatest light that ever France Reformed had Calvin only excepted who in his Panstrat Cathol tom 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose distinct and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists He titles this Book Of the Author of sin and proves cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin Martyr and Beza therewith Thence cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines namely That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David Absoloms incest c. Whence cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin which they make to be only by speculative idle permission as some new Methodists Cap. 4. he procedes to prove That God wils the existence of sin Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists namely that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God Thence cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration Whence cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument from Gods energie in sinful acts which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally And thence cap. 8. he gives us Augustins opinion consonant to Calvins
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed must hold That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause whence by consequence such must assert That there are two first Causes one of Good and the other of Evil which was the error of Marcion and Manes who held there were two first Principes the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme good who was the cause of al good the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme evil God who was the cause of al evil And certainly they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes Again Hieronymus Epist ad Ctesiphontem makes this Antithesis of Durandus to be the Doctrine of Pelagius who saith he held That God having once conferred free-wil it is not necessary that he further operate with us and he speaks of natural operations as of the motion of the hand c. which was Durandus's opinion Though I cannot but confesse Jansenius August Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us the Pelagians granted That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurse to al operations in termes but denied it in effect and consequences as our Adversaries now-a-days Compton Carleton in his Philosoph Vnivers Disput 28. Sect. 1. § 3. assures us that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him by Nicolaus Bonetus lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others But yet it cannot be denied but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was Durandus whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme which they cal a rash erroneous dangerous error little better than Arianisme Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. lib. Arb. saith it is repugnant to the Scriptures Testimonies of the Fathers and manifest Reason Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith It is erroneous in Faith de Concursu l. 1. he assertes That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended but also rejected by al approved Theologues as an error in Faith Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse and so much decried by Papists themselves But to give a convictive demonstration that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators Durandus proposeth his opinion in sentent l. 2. Dist 1. Q. 5. in these words Vtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature which he denies and the principal reasons of his negation are these 1 Because then God should be the author of Sin 2 Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie in that it determines the wil and so puts an end to its Indifference of which see Strangius p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus yet I must freely declare my mind I cannot conceive how they can without apparent contradiction defend their own but by espousing that of Durandus which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth And that the most of our Adversaries even among the New Methodists who in profession disown it fal under the imputation of Durandisme we shal anon make evident when we come to treat of their particular sentiments at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme 1 Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only and not immediate unto the Act fal under the imputation of Durandisme This is wel observed by Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause moving it to act without a continued concurse to the action fal into the error of Durandus Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus a professed abettor of Durandisme Thus also Amyraldus and a Divine of name among our selves 2 Al those who hold only a general immediate concurse to the act such as is determinable by the mater it workes on as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme Thus Baronius together with the Remonstrants and Molinists 3 Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience justly fal under the marque of Durandisme Thus Camero and our Adversaries generally who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil 4 Al those who affirme That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse must necessarily symbolise with Durandus This is acknowledged by Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse sithat this involves no contradiction To which he answers wel in the Negative that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence involves a flat contradiction because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with as hereafter in our account of Strangius But we descend to the particular Sects who oppose our Thesis with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of Durandus And we shal begin with the Jesuites who now generally passe under the name of Molinists from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr cum Gratiae donis c. Quaest 14. Disp 26. assertes 1 That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act but only on the act it self and effect Whence 2 That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act but only simultaneous i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act and conserves the same Thence 3 That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative at least as to human acts but only indifferent and determinable like that of the
Sun Whence 4 That as to the substrate mater of Sin immediate Concurse doth no way determine the wil or applie it to its act but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner so as the wil stil retains its innate indifference and libertie of acting or not acting Such are the Sentiments of the Molinists or Jesuites wherein they are greatly opposed both by Dominicans and Jansenists Thus Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul c. 14. p. 58. where he proves That this simultaneous Concurse confers no forces or aide to second Agents but only accommodates it self to the forces of the create power c. which sufficiently demonstrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandisme albeit the avouchers of it oppose Durandus with great vehemence But of late there started up Ludovicus à Dola a Capucine Friar yet learned and acute who espoused the Hypothesis of Durandus as the only Medium for the reconciling those two opposite parties the Dominicans and Jesuites His book he termes A Quadripartite Disputation touching the mode how the Concurse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked He bends his Disputation both against the Predeterminants as also against the Assertors of Middle Science His first part is general stating the controversie between the Jesuites who assert a Middle Science and the Dominicans the Assertors of Predetermination and withal explicating the origine of the Controversie from the presupposed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurse His Second Part is against the Jesuites to demonstrate That a next immediate and identific concurse of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans proving That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked by a physic Predetermination and moreover by an identific and simultaneous concurse In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth with al the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation wil admit the Hypothesis of Durandus That the general Concurse of God to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked is not proxime immediate and identific but remote mediate and really distinct from the act of the creature This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurse with human Libertie the vindication of Gods Sacred Majestie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concurse And I cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point that it is impossible for our Adversaries the New Methodists or any others to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistences with it self or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputations they charge upon us unless they betake themselves to this stratageme and subterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola and therefore I do no way wonder that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of Durandus it being the only refuge to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation Among the Reformed Churches the first Impugnators of our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants communly stiled Arminians from Arminius their first Founder Professor of Theologie at Leyden who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down Disputat publica Thes 7. § 8 9 10. p. 193. but more fully Thes 9. de justitia efficacia Providentiae Dei in malo p. 198. where he distinguisheth Gods efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the beginning progresse and consummation of Sin 1 As for Gods efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into 1 Impedition both sufficient and efficacious whereby God puts an impediment to sin and 2 Permission which is contrary to Impedition the suspension of al impediments which might hinder the execution of Sin The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil 2 Gods Efficience about the progresse of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination 1 Direction of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth passing on from one extreme to the other mightily and yet disposing althings sweetly according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome c. 8. v. 1. 2 Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God puts measures to his Permission and termes to sin that it run not into infinite according to the pleasure of the creature 3 Gods Efficience about the consummation and terme of Sin he placeth in Punition and Remission As for Gods Concurse to the Act of Sin as naturally good he doth craftily according to his wonted mode in such cases wave that difficult point Yet in his Articles De Peccati Causa Vniverse p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists to prove That we make God the Author of Sin But to sum up Arminius's Sentiments in this point Albeit he placeth Gods Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments which is no way influential on the Act yet in that he allows also a providential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due measures we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hypothesis that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin of which hereafter Chap. 5. Arminius's Sectators usually stiled Remonstrants from their Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort Grevincovius Vorstius Episcopius Corvinus c. who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of Holland gave themselves the confidence but those poor Churches the peste of divulging their Pelagian Poison which by the interposure of King James who was a professed enemie to that faction occasioned the Synod of Dort An. 1618. where Divines out of England France and Germanie resorted to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes The Remonstrants in opposition to that Synod writ their Acta Scripta Synodalia Dordracena wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for Absolute Reprobation and Gods Providence in sinful Acts falsely charging on our Divines 1 That they held the Reprobate were destined to Incredulitie Impietie and Sins as the Means and Causes of Damnation 2 That they made God the Author of Sin and the like of which see Acta Synodalia Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica p. 40 41. I shal here only adde what is wel remarqued by Le Blanc Conciliat Arbit Humani Thes 32. p. 434. That
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
futurition made from Eternitie but what is eternal To which he answers with a scoffe thus A pretty argumentation indeed why may we not by the same reason prove that the futurition of sin is God The same is urged by Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes 55 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God it is God which makes God manifestly the Author of sin The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us But in answer hereto I must confesse I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned and in other points judicious on such infirme and rotten grounds For when we speak of the futurition of sin which is a complexe aggregate thing we must distinguish its material from its formal part 1 If we speak of the material entitative part of sin which is in itself a natural good so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme that its futurition is the same or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof and why not is not the futurition of al natural Beings good And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good Yea was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God and sonot really distinct from him So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings even the most gratiose acts from the same wil for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil specially in Adams innocent state who had then perfect free-wil But yet 2 if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie so we utterly denie that its futurition is the same with God for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God but permissive God decrees to effect the entitative act but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto which follows on the act as other privations do on the absence of their habit To make this evident by a parallel instance God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere whence darknesse necessarily follows may we thence argue that the futurition of darknesse or darknesse itself is the same with God Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes And yet who dares denie but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God as also its futurition The like may be instanced in al other privations which have no real being and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition but what has a real efficient cause of its existence what is the first efficient of the existence of things Is it not the wil of God and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition give them also in their appointed periods of time their existence So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true That the same cause that gives things their existence gives them also their futurition this I say holds true of the first cause but not of second causes as they would needs persuade us So that to conclude this argument in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason or vitiositie of sin hence it necessarily follows that the predeterminative Concurse of God whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin § 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude of Gods Prescience and we may forme it thus God can certainly foreknow nothing but what he certainly decrees predefines and predetermines to be But God certainly foreknows al sin Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none that I know except Atheists and Socinians Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God but what has some certain Reasons Principes and Causes of such a foreknowledge Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience 1 A certitude of the Object for if the object be uncertain the Science can never be certain can the Structure or Edifice be firme if the foundation be infirme 2 A certain Medium which is the principal fundamen of al Science 3 A certitude of the Subject for be the Object and Medium never so certain yet there can be no certain Science unless the Subject apprehend the same And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude Must there not be a certitude of the Object Medium and Subject 2 Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree 1 How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so 2 What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience but the divine Wil and Decree 3 And thence how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil Hence 3 Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages Scotus Ricardus Hervaeus Bradwardine Johannes Major and others not a few as Le Blanc de Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 33. p. 443. confesseth Yea Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea Le Blanc De Concord Libert Hum. Par. 1. Thes 59. c. p. 455. proves strongly That according to Strangius's opinion there can no contingent i. e. sinful act be foreknown by God as absolutely future but what God first decreed to be absolutely future His words are these But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future and as such to be foreknown by God without any Decree
possibilitie to a state of futurition c. Whence he concludes Thes 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions and absurdities to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience Yea some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie as to professe That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture The like others But is it so indeed Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience Why then 1 are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages How comes it to passe that they contend with so much heat and passion for that which they confesse is not expressely delivered in Scripture Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession But 2 We easily grant them that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out as indeed al Divine Perfections are but yet must we thence necessarily conclude that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture 1 Doth not the Scripture evidently declare That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science as much as Heaven is above the Earth yea infinitely more 2 Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections much more Contradictions And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man But see more hereof Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 2. § 3. We passe on to our third Argument which shal be taken from the Divine Wil and Decrees and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation And here we shal lay down this Principe which is granted by Strangius and others of the New Method That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant saith he that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us he must also determine our Wil to the same This he inculcates c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on for we no way dout but to demonstrate That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive proper condition or cause This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists who grant That God decrees al good absolutely but as for Sin say they God decrees that only respectively and conditionally So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548 But we no way dout but before we have finisht this Demonstration to make it evident that Gods Decree of Reprobation whereby he determines to leave men to sin is absolute as wel as the Decree of Election Yea it is to me a thing altogether impossible to defend an absolute Decree of Election and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other It 's true our Divines that follow the Sublapsarian mode as Davenant c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another for nothing can move the divine Wil but what is some way antecedent to it Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. 2 Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative but positive and efficacious It 's granted that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation which they terme Non-election or Preterition yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil but include also a positive efficacious act Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin That Gods negative Reprobation is positive So Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprob p. 113. But we must take heed saith he lest with Scotus we think that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates which he electes not but passeth by is merely negative for in this very act which we expresse by a Negation is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God So in his Determinations Quaest 25. p. 117. he tels us That it 's most certain there can be no Decree permitting sin to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree And p. 118. he instructs us That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious not in a way of efficience but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil 3 Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord not as a Righteous Judge The Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge not as a supreme absolute Lord whence they conclude that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins not considering that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment but of denying Benefits wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended according to that of the Apostle Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay c What is soverain Dominion but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law more than what is in his own nature and wil Hence it follows 4 That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation And Augustin complains That it is a great injurie to God when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil for his Wil
total and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect but also the wil itself is granted by Strangius lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither faith he do we say that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect but not the efficient cause sithat the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Energie of the second cause must be from God and the action is not lesse an effect than the work c. 2 The Vniversalitie of Divine concurse as to al effects whatsoever gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil as wel as to al other objects by giving forces and assistances to faculties exciting and appling them to their acts and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. § 2. pag. 296 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative Yea to speak properly is there or can there be any real efficience influxe or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of althings which is not predeterminative To talke of an universal general concurse of God which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts and yet doth not predetermine i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction 3 The Particularitie of Gods concurse as to its manner of working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin Divine concurse albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object yet it 's most particular and proper as to its manner of working Our Adversaries generally both Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists talke much of a general indifferent concurse alike commun to al effects and determinable by its substrate mater as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on But alas how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concurse Doth not this make the first cause to be second because dependent and the second cause first because independent And doth it not hence also necessarily follow that the first cause may by the indisposition of the mater or resistence of second Agents be frustrated of its intended effect What more expressely overthrows the soverain Dominion and universal Concurse of God than such a general indifferent Concurse And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under They object If God should by a particular predeterminative concurse determine the wil to act in sins intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like then the specification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis to which we intend a more ful answer in the next Chapter § 1. at present let this suffice 1 We say not that God is a particular cause but universal working in and by a particular concurse suitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on 2 We say not that this particular Concurse of God doth morally specifie or determine the sinful act to its object but only physically individuate or naturally modifie the substrate mater of the sinful act This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward that great Professor of Theologie in his Determination of Gods Concurse pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates That the previous Concurse of God as the first cause doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of second causes and if so then surely the substrate entitative act of sin as hereafter 3 That general indifferent concurse which our Adversaries so warmly contend for sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin as our predeter minative concurse For if it be causative and effective of the act then surely of that individual act as determined to such an object for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere in the general and not in individuo in its individual determination to its object is such an absurditie in Philosophie that al awakened Philosophers wil decrie it for what Tyro cannot informe us that al physical acts are suppositorum of individual singular substances and so without al peradventure individual and singular and if so then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general but also individually considered as relating to its object not morally but physically And wil it not hence follow that their general concurse is causative of the entitative act as determined to its object and so makes God the Author of sin as much at least as wel as our predeterminative concurse as more fully Chap. 6. § 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 4 The Immediation of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby Our Adversaries generally both Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists excepting some very few that adhere to Durandus grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative concurse specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists who say That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act which the Jesuites and Arminians grant but also the very wil itself as the immediate efficient of the act Touching this immediate Concurse see Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54 c. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this than Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton in his Philos Vnivers Disp 28. Sect. 2 3. pag. Disput 29. Sect. 1 2. pag. 323 324. where he demonstrates strongly against Lud. à Dola That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin Now hence we thus argue If God together with the human wil immediately produceth the very act of sin then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act For suppose the sinful act be motus primò primus as they phrase it or a mere simple volition of the wil how is it possible that
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
of the new Methodists Baronius Strangius and others about Concurse fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only albeit some of them in termes disown it 6 Lastly the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Concurse gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 412 c. And indeed what more absurd yea impossible than such a conditionate Concurse whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progresse into infinite For if God concur on condition that man concur doth God concur to that condition or not If not is there not then some act of the creature produced without Gods concurse If God concur to the working of that condition then absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then his former Concurse is not conditional if conditionally then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence We take it then for granted that Gods Concurse is not conditional but absolute and independent And hence we thus argue If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin then he doth predetermine the wil thereto the consequence is rational and clear For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect the one must necessarily depend on the other and that which depends on another must be determined by that other for every cause that is dependent on another is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby It 's true natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun without being determined thereby because the Sun is a limited cause and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on but is rather determined thereby and so in that respect dependent thereon But as for God the first cause whose wil the principe of his concurse is omnipotent and most efficacious it 's impossible that he should have any dependence on or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on he being the most universal cause infinitely perfect and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts but be determined by none But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurse we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse whereby he concurs to the mater of sin to be predeterminative yet he grants it is efficacious calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force and efficace of God whereby he subordinates second causes to himself so that whatever they are or act they essentially depend on him in both respects And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse is al that we require to build our present Demonstration on which we shal distribute into two branches 1 Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects 2 Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects 1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects which evidently appears in the following particulars 1 Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes motions and effects is most efficacious This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme as Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us as before c. 2. § 1. 2 The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse considered actively but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 3 Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects Is it not impossible but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil the said action or effect must necessarily follow Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great that not only those things are done which God wils shal be done but in that manner as he wils them Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266. Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine that the human wil should produce such or such an action suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord expressed Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by the decreed fixed determined wil of God The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 4 The efficacious concurse of God modifies and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes not only necessarily but freely Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect and may it not yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties acts and effects as are subject to its Empire and has not the Divine wil which is infinitely more efficacious power to determine al inferior powers acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion And doth it not hence follow that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil which necessarily fal under its Empire and modification See this wel demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward Determinat de Concursu Dei pag. 118 c. Whence 5 The efficacious predeterminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good even to the substrate mater of sinful acts Strangius and others of our Opponents grant That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good but also to al natural good that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it whence we may by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of al actions though never so intrinsecally evil for
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
Sin Yea let them but grant as they do Gods certain prescience of sin and the same black Imputations which they lode us with wil al fal with as much weight on themselves as before Chap. 5. § 2. 2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God that our Hypothesis is contradictory thereto in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin which he predetermines men unto we answer 1 That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act 2 The wil doth in the very same moment wherein it is predetermined by God voluntarily and freely as a deficient depraved facultie elect the very act it is predetermined unto so that it doth as freely deliberately and fully espouse the act as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part and what more just than that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert 3 Here is in this objection a poor Sophisme which they cal No-cause for a cause For Gods predeterminative Concurse is not the cause of mens sins albeit mens sins be a necessary consequent thereof 4 The same difficulties which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice return on them who assert an immediate previous Concurse to the Mater of Sin neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto 3. They urge us with an Imputation on the Clemence and Mercie of God in that predeterminative Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature and this two ways As 1 In that it makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their Sins 2 In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto as Baron Metaph. p. 151. This Objection our Adversaries adorne and exaggerate with many specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy as they pretend and for our confusion Yet we no way dout but to make it appear that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun Therefore to answer 1 to the first branch of the Objection That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their sins 1 We grant that the Decree of Reprobation is and must be according to our Hypothesis absolute because there is an adequate commensuration between absolute Predefinition and Predetermination as our Adversaries also maintain of which before Chap. 5. § 3. 2 Yet we peremtorily denie that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins Divines say that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men yet it is considered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God wil at last condemn men It 's true the Supralapsarian Divines who make man as labile the object of Reprobation differ somewhat from those of the sublapsarian perswasion who make the corrupt masse or lapsed man the object of Election and Reprobation yet they both take in the consideration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute for the Sublapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse not distinctive or discriminative of Reprobates from the Elect as Davenant Animadvers on Gods Love p. 84. proves That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way But 3 Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice which regards the object as already constituted and not the constitution thereof This is incomparably wel observed by judicious Davenant in his answer to Hoard Animadvers p. 229. For those Inferences therefore That if absolute Reprobation be granted God may be properly called a Father of Crueltie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I marvel how he trembled to thinke of them and how he never trembled to utter them That wherein he perpetually is mistaken is the making of Non-election or Negative Reprobation a Vindicative act the confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation the conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie of committing Sin with such like monstrous fansies which he takes for Principles needing no proof whereas they are such grosse errors as need no confutation 2 The second part of the Objection which supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes § 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse and wil also come under consideration in what follows 4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance to the Sanctitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature in that by asserting Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves who in the confutation of Twisse argues thus If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission 1 He willeth Sin Yea 2 God wils sin as much as man Yea 3 This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness Yea 4 Then God takes complacence in Sin Answer These are high charges indeed and if they could be made good against us we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State for what more inconsistent with civil Government than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holinesse But these Calumnies and Reproches are not of yesterday but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concurse and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them § 1. of this Chapter Thus Bradwardine De Caus l. 2. c. 28. p. 572. When it is argued saith he that the sinful act doth please God Wel 1 The Adverbe Wel may determine the Verbe to please God in regard of the Divine complacence and so there is no dout but that as the evil Act entitatively considered doth please him so it is highly wel-pleasing to him or 2 in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing and that either in regard of the substance of the act or in regard of its vitiositie 1 If we regard the act naturally so it 's true that it is wel-pleasing to God but if we regard it morally so it 's false 2 If we regard the vitiositie of the act so it is not properly effected by man nor yet by God it being not properly an effect but pure
the act but also to the goodnesse thereof 16. Sin is committed against Gods wil of complacence and approbation but not against his wil of natural permission 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very wel consistent with the natural libertie of the wil and its natural passive remote power of receiving Laws and obeying the same 18. Gods predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very wel be reconciled with his wisdome veracitie and sinceritie in the prohibition and punishment of sin 19. God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another yet without being guilty of the least sin 20. Sin by Divine wisdome is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glorie albeit it hath no moral bonitie in it 21. Al Gods invitations comminations exhortations and promisses argue in God a real wil of approbation and Evangelic intention that Sinners repent and live albeit they never repent 22. Gods physic complacence is towards the entitative natural act of sin and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquitie and vitiositie The false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on the Predeterminants by Molinists Arminians and New Methodists 1. GOds absolute Decrees which give futurition to things take away al power from the creature of acting contrarily yea make the contrary naturally and simply impossible 2. The futurition of sin is from the effective wil of God yea very God Str. 631 632 635. Le Bl. Concord Libert par 1. Thes 55 c. p. 454. as before c. 5. § 1. 3. The Decree of God giving futurition to sin necessitates men to sin 4. The existence of sin is from Reprobation as the proper cause thereof 5. God impelled and necessiated Adam to fal Baron Metaphys 150 151. 6. Gods efficacious Decree to permit sin makes him the Author of sin 7. God wils and decrees sin as sin yea simply wils and intendes the damnation of Sinners 8. Gods absolute Decree of Reprobation impels men to sin 9. In acts intrinsecally evil the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act considered in its individual nature 10. Predeterminative concurse brings men under a fatal and Hobbian necessitie of sinning 11. In acts intrinsecally evil God predetermines the wil to the act as sinfully relating to its object Strangius pag. 206 234 240 c. 12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act of sin makes him the cause of sin Strang. pag. 341 342. Baron Metaph. 150 151. 13. The Sinner doth not determine himself to any sinful act any other way than God Strang. pag. 242 243. 14. God doth more than temt men to sin in that he predetermines the wil thereto Strang. pag. 269. 15. Predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worst of actions as to the best Strang. pag. 277. 16. God doth not only permit sin but approve of it yea take complacence in it 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin destroys the libertie of the wil introduceth a fatal necessitie and makes the mater of al Gods Laws to Adam and his posteritie a natural simple and absolute impossibilitie Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150. 18. Gods predetermination to the entivative act of sin is irreconcileable with his wisdome and sinceritie in prohibiting and punishing sin Baron Metaphys pag. 151. 19. God in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin becomes guilty of sin 20. God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and morally conducing to his glorie 21. That Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by al his invitations promisses comminations and exbortations to repent 22. God takes not only physic complacence in the entitative act but moral complacence in sin by predetermining the wil to the entitative act thereof § 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predeterminants with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries we now procede to lay down the proper Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants and more particularly of the New Methodists and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants 1. THE Futurition of althings is not from the Divine wil and decree Strang. 628 631. 2. The futurition of althings is not simple but complexe Strang. 640. 3. The futurition of althings is not eternal 4. The same particular cause that gives existence to any thing gives futurition to it 5. The futurition of the entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but the wil of man Strang. 585 628 631 632. Le Blanc 454. 6. Whatever God wils he approves or complacence is essential to al acts of Gods wil Strang. 546 548. 7. God decrees not the entitative act unto which sin is intrinsecally appendent Strang. 562 587. 8. There is a twofold Decree in God one absolute the other respective conditionate and consequent Strang. 546. 9. Al Gods Decrees are not particular but some general only Strang. 558. 10. Reprobation is not absolute but conditional dependent on the prevision of mens actual sins 11. Gods prescience of mens sins is conditional and dependent on mens free-wil not on the Decree of God Strang. 642 647. 12. Gods permission of sin is only privative and inefficacious Baron Metaphys 157 158. 13. God wils only his own permission of sin not the existence of sin by his permission Arminius 14. There is a twofold Concurse of God the one predeterminative the other only general 15. It doth not belong to the perfection of Gods Providence absolutely to predefine and predetermine al free acts of the human wil Baron Metaphys 147. Strang. 568 584. 16. Al positive real Beings and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature Strang. 584 630. 17. God predetermines to what is good but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsecally evil 18. What is predetermined is naturally and simply impossible 19. Man in his lapsed state has a moral power to close with Divine exhortations and offers 20. Unregenerate men may prepare themselves for the entertainment of Grace 21. To predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin is to impel men to sin 22. Divine predetermination to the entitative act of sin puts an end to human libertie 23. Some human acts are indifferent in individu◠and so neither good nor evil 24. Some human acts are so intrinsecally evil that the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act The dangerous Consequents of those Antitheses 1. NOthing is certainly and infiallibly future 2. Complexe Propositions are in order of Nature before their simple termes 3. God did not from al Eternitie foresee althings future 4. Nothing is future before it is existent at least in its particular causes 5. The futurition of sinful acts is a mere contingence to God 6. There is in
12. 11. 2 Sam. 16. 22. Shimei ' s cursing David how from God 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 2 Sam. 24. 1. 1 Sam. 26. 19. 1 King 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. Answer 1 Kings 22. 23. Rev. 17. 17. Gods efficacious Permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17. h. e. Justo judicio permittit errare seduci Vatablus Esa 63. 17. Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. Psal 69. 22. Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. Esa 29. 10. Rom. 11. 8. Esa 19. 14. Esa 44. 18 19. Esa 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thes 2. 11. The false comments of Adversaries refuted Gods Concurse to the individual act which is sinful How God judicially hardens men without being the cause of sin Gods efficacious ordering mens sins for his own glorie Exod. 9. 14 15 16. Vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator August Rom. 9. 17. Rom. 9. 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Jude 4. The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin Augustin Si ergo servi sunt peccati quid se jactant de libero arbitrio August libr. de Spirit lit c. 30. Prosper and Fulgentius Such as succeeded the Fathers Anselme Hugo de Sancto Victore * Malum esse vult Deus tamen malum non vult vult esse malum quia bonum est malum esse non vult ipsum malum quia bonum non est ipsum malum Deum malas voluntates praesidendo occultâ invisibili operatione ad suum arbitrium temperare inclinare Aquinas Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. Scotus Scotistae nihil hujusmodi physicum intrinsecum creaturae inditum esse volunt sed eam dicunt per decretum Dei extrinsecum absolutum efficax ad agendum applicari ac determinari Carleton Philos Disp. 30. sect 1. pag. 327. Gregorius Ariminensis Object 1. Object 2. Holcot Altissiodorensis Thomas Bradwardine his character and zele for efficacious Grace His zele for efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin How God wils Sin Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur sed quia quod bene dicitur non bene intelligītur Hugo How the entitative act is from Gods Predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans sentiments Alvarez The Doctrine of Jansenius concordant with our Hypothesis C. T. p. 3. p. 93. The Jansenists sentiments The Roman Catechisme Non solùm Deus universa quae sunt providentiâ suâ tuetur atque administrat verùm etiam quae moventur agunt aliquid intimâ virtute ad motum atque actionem ita impellit ut quamvis secundarum causarum efficientiam non impediat praeveniat tamen cùm ejus occultissima vis ad singula pertinear Sapient 8. 1. Act. 17. The sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Interdum bonâ voluntate hominem velle aliquid quod Deus non vult Rursus fieri posse ut idem velit homo voluntate malâ quod Deus vult bonâ Calv. ix August Zuinglius Umim igitur atque idem facinus quantum Dei est Authoris Motoris ac Impulsoris opus est crimen non est quantum autem hominis est crimen ac scelus est Ille enim lege non tenetur hic autem lege etiam damnatur Zuing. prov cap. 2. pag. 365. Beza Chamiers Difence of our Hypothesis The Testimonie of Lud. Crocius Illam scil actionem non verò hanc scil malitiam Deus vult ac decernit hanc non illam permittit The Synod of Dort The Church of England Davenant Ward George Abbot Dr. Holland Prideaux Barlow Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sin Dicebat Pelagius Deum collato semel libero arbitrio ulteriùs nobis ad operandum non esse necessarium Hieronym ad Ctesiph Durandus against Gods immediate Concurse The Jesuites and Molinists Lud. à Dola his following Durandus Arminius's Sentiments The Remonstrants and their Sectators The Anabaptists of Germanie that fel in with the Remonstrants The New Methodists John Camero Quod negem omne ens est à Deo tanquam à causa efficiente immediata Ep. ad Jac. Gallovaeum Moses Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodists fel into their new Model Who of the new Methodists may be estimed orthodox Arguments for Predetermination to the substrate mater of al sin 1. Arg. from the futurition of althings Objections against this Argument solved 2 Arg. from the Certitude of Divine Prescience 3 Arg. from the Decree of Reprobation Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation 4. Arg. from Divine Concurse 1. It s Principe Cùm voluntas Divina sit efficacissima non solùm sequitur quòd fiant ea quae Deus fieri vult sed quòd eo modo fiant quo Deus ea fieri velit Aquin part 1. 2. It s Nature 1. Totalitie Adeò ut tota actio pendeat à Deo tota à Creatura 2. Vniversalitie 3. Particularitie 4. Immediation 5. Prioritie 6. Absolute Independence 3. The efficace of Divine Concurse proves predetermination Nos autem eo nomine sc influxus communis non determinationem seu praedeterminationem intelligimus sed vim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficaciam Dei quâ causas secundas sibi subordinat c. Strang. l. 1. c. 11. 1. Efficacious Concurse as to natural acts Non solùm sunt ea quae Deus vult fieri sed etiam eo modo fiunt quo Deus vult fieri Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 266. Act. 2. 23. Et sic quantum ad concursum attinet dicimus Deum concurrere eodem modo ad generationem ex legitimo matrimonio adulterio quia physicè eadem est specie utrobique actio Strang. l. 2. c. ◠p. 254. 2. Efficacious Concurse as to supernatural Acts and Effects 5. Arg. from the Nature of Sin 1. It s mater Fatemur quidem malitiam non sequi actum peccati ut est actus alioqui omnis actus esset peccatum c. Strang. 2. From the formal reason of sin 6. Arg. from Gods Permission of Sin Mars's his parallel with Nimrod Vulcan the same with Tubalcain Gen. 4. 22. Vade nisi à Tubalcain Vulcanus Sandf de Desc l. 1. §. 21. Gen. 4. 22. Silenus the same with Silo. Gen. 49. 10. Nysa where Silenus reigned the same with Sina or Nissi Silenus's Genealogie as Silo's unknown Heb. 7. 3. Silenus and Silo agrees in offices Gen. 49. 10. Silenus the great Doctor as Silo is stiled Silenus's riding on an Asse from Silo's Gen. 49. 11. Silenus's being filled with wine from Gen. 49. 12. Silenus's meat Cows milk from Gen. 49. 12. Silenus's parallel with Balaam Num. 22. 28. Num. 22. 5. The Theogonie of Pan and his parallel with the Jewish Messias Josh 2. 9 24. Josh 5. 1. Pan the same with Silenus Pan the same with Faunus Satyrus the same with Pan and Silenus Pan a falle of the Messias Pan Abel Pan Israel Israel Patriartha verus sortē Pan Gentilium Park ex Sandf Pan Cham. Prometheus his Theogonie and parallel with Noah 2. Prometheus's parallel with Magog Neptune the same with Japhet Unde etiam Japetus nisi à Japhet Sandf Desc l. 1. §. 22. The parallel 'twixt Japhet and Neptune Gen. 9. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same origination with Japh ◠Neptune the God of the Sea from Japhets possessing the Islands Janus's Theogonie and Parallel 1. With Noah 2. With Javan Of Aeolus his Origination Grecian Goddesses of Phenician and Hebrew extract 1. Rhea from Gen. 29. 20. 2. Minerva 3. Ceres 4. Niobe 5. Sirenes The Theogonie of the Phenician Gods Hebraick Of Baal from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Bel from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hos 2. 16 17. The Supreme Baal stiled Beelsamen The Theogonie of Baalzebub 2 King 1. 2. 2 Kings 23. 24. 2 Kings 1. 2. Mat. 12. 24. The Theogonie of Baal Peor Hebraick Num. 25. 2 3 6. Hos 9. 10. Psal 106. 28. Num. 25. 1 2 3. Psal 106. 28. Moloch amongst the Ammonites the same with Baal 1 King 11. 7. Lev. 18. 21. Lev. 20. 2 3 4 5. 2 Kings 23. 10. Amos 5. 26. Act. 7. 43. Ps 106. 37. 38. Adramelech and Anamelech 2 King 17. 31. Job 17. 6. Esa 30. 33. 2 King 23. 10. Jer. 7. 31 32. The Samothracian Cabiri Phenician Gods 2. From Divine Justice 3. From Gods Clemence and Mercie 4. From Divine Sanctitis Object 3. From Gods word ◠Preceptive 2. From Gods Promisses and Invitations 1 Al Promisses primarily intended for the Elect. 2 The use of evangelic Promisses as to Reprobates 3 The Antithesis of Antipredeterminants destroyeth the use of Promisses c. as much as our Hypothesis 4. What Power we allow to Reprobates Object 4. From the overthrow of Religion Object 5. From the libertie of the Wil. The injustice of the New Methodists in urging this objection and its inconsistence with their own sentiments The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants with their consiquents
Bellarmine and the Remonstrants in this point of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin yet at long-run fals in with each of these parties in some one if not al their sentiments about this mater 1 That he comes very near Durandisme is evident in that he holds the Concurse of God not to be necessary to al acts of the creature particularly to such as are intrinsecally evil For to suppose any real positive Being that fals not under Gods efficacious concurse is to me no lesse than Durandisme It 's true Strangius in words appears against Durandus in owning an immediate Concurse of God to al actions of the creatures as lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. But when he comes to explicate this immediate Concurse as to actions intrinsecally evil he placeth it only as some now adays among us in Gods conserving the nature and innate disposition of natural Agents and giving them a self-determining power whereby they are rendred apt and habile for any congenerous action as they now phrase it Thus pag. 164. Ergo si una Dei determinatio sufficiat quâ Deus Agentium naturalium naturam ac indolem à se insitam ac conservatam determinavit quid opus est multiplicibus imò innumeris determinationibus ad eundem effectum c. So lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 584. he layes down this as his Hypothesis That God doth not in althings determine the wil but sometimes permit it a free election to chuse this or that to do this or that and therefore in such acts he has not decreed that man should precisely chuse this or that c. And he proves it by this argument That it is not impossible for God who hath made man a free Agent and conserves his nature and forces to permit something to mans free-wil it a ut per Deum non stet quin homo possit eligere alterutrum agere aliquid aut non agere c. Wherein he proves that it is not impossible for God to leave some things to mans indifference without determining him to either extreme and he proves this is not impossible because it implies not any contradiction which is Durandus's very argument against immediate Concurse 2 That Strangius conspires with and espouseth the sentiments of the Molinists and Arminians about indifferent simultaneous Concurse is partly acknowleged by his friend Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 36. pag. 434. having shewen the agreament of Baronius with the Molinists and Remonstrants he addes Neither doth John Strangius seem to differ much from this opinion for albeit he thinkes lib. 1. cap. 11. That the action whereunto God and the creature concur is in order of nature first from God before from the creature and moreover l. 2. p. 3. denies That God concurs only by a general concurse as the Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man and horse but determines that the influxe of God is special to special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically yet he doth by many arguments contend and prove that the premotion and predetermination of God which the Schole of Thomas defendes to al and singular acts of the creature is not necessary Note here that albeit Strangius seems to differ from the Molinists Remonstrants and Baronius in asserting Gods Concurse to be previous particular and special yet in that he denies Divine predetermination to al creatural acts Le Blanc makes him not to differ much from the Molinists and Remonstrants which to me indeed is a great observation for I am under a very strong and I am apt to persuade my self rational presumtion that predetermination to good acts can never be rationally defended by these New Methodists who denie predetermination to the substrate mater of al evil acts as Strangius doth pag. 167 584. of which more hereafter chap. 5. § 4 5. Here it were worthy of some labor to inquire How these New Methodists fel into those novel sentiments about Divine Concurse and on what reasons or grounds As it was with the Semipelagians of old so it has befel these New Methodists or Semiarminians when the Pelagians were by Augustin driven from their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Diana of Free-wil and the potence of corrupt nature the Semipelagians come with fresh forces and assault him in the point of Reprobation and pretend that he asserted That God by a fatal necessitie compelled men to sin and then damned them for what he had compelled them to Just so the Arminians having been suppressed by the Synod of Dort these New Methodists owning absolute particular Election and efficacious Grace with the Calvinists thought they might more securely fal in with the Arminians in the points of universal Grace conditional Reprobation and that of denying Predetermination as to the entitative act of sin Thus they divide the battel between the Calvinist and Arminian But as Jansenius has wel observed out of Augustin If there be the least point granted to Pelagius al wil be at last granted so I am very apt to fear that these New Methodists by going so far in symbolising with the Arminians wil at last be wholly drawen over into their Campe. Thus much I am very confident of they can never rationally defend absolute Election and efficacious Grace against Jesuites and Arminians so long as they denie absolute Reprobation and Predetermination to the entitative act of al sins As for the principal grounds which induce these New Methodists to take up those sentiments we shal endeavor to lay them down when we come to treat of their proper Opinions and the consequents that attend them Chap. 7. But whiles we are thus characterising the Authors of this new Method we must do such Calvinists who incline to them in some points that justice as to free them from al imputation or suspicion of Arminianisme It 's wel known that some of great worth and truly orthodox in point of Grace have yet somewhat inclined towards the new Method in point of universal objective Grace as pious and learned Vsher Davenant and others both in our and the French Churches who hold Christs death to be an universal remedie applicable to al but yet are far from asserting an universal subjective Grace or any velleitie in God of saving al men which Amyraldus and others assert As for those who hold absolute and particular Election and Reprobation Original sin in its ful extent mens natural impotence and being dead in sin efficacious Grace in the conversion of sinners with Gods absolute efficacious immediate total and predeterminative concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural actions as Davenant and some others who incline to an objective universal Grace do I have no controversie with them but can owne them as friends of Grace albeit in some modes of explicating it they differ from us CHAP. V. Rational Demonstration of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin Arguments for Divine predetermination of the