Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n
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A52266
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An introduction to the art of logick composed for the use of English schools, and all such who having no opportunity of being instructed in the Latine tongue ... / by John Newton ...
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Newton, John, 1622-1678.
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1671
(1671)
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Wing N1063; ESTC R20761
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67,588
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216
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the earth doth not alwaies find gold 4. In a cause not sufficient of it self as he is not alwaies learned that is industrious nor that ground alwaies fertil that is well tilled because to both these more is required The latter part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In a cause by accident as he that doth not dig into the earth may find a treasure 2. In a cause that may but is not as a building may stand though the Architect be dead 3. As oft as the effect may be produced by diverse causes as Socrateâ may die though he doth not drink poyson 2. The effect being granted the cause is also granted and the effect being taken away the cause is taken away also The first part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a treasure may be found though the earth be not digged 2. In an effect that doth remain after the cause as the house may remain though the builder be dead 3. In an effect that may be produced by diverse causes as a man may die though not by poyson The latter part hath also three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a man may dig in the earth and not find a treasure 2. In an effect which was but is not as a building may be destroyed though the builder be living 3. In an effect produced by a free agent as there may be a Physician although he doth not cure any disease 3. Such as the cause is such is the effect and the contrary as if the tree be good the fruit will be good and the contrary both parts of this Canon have two limitations 1. In aequivocal causes and effects as the draught may be beautiful though the painter be deformed 2. In a material cause for some thing that is extrinsecal as ice is not fluid because water is so 4. That for which any thing is such is much more such it self as the air being hot by reason of fire doth argue that fire is much hotter than air This rule faileth 1. Where both are not such as wine which maketh a man drunk is not it self more drunk because drunkenness cannot be said to be in wine 2. Where it doth not receive more and less as a father is not more a man than a son although he be the cause why the son is a man for humanity doth not receive more and less 3. In a cause not sufficient of it self as a Master which maketh his schollar learned is not alwaies more learned than his schollar for by his ingenuity and industry it sometimes so comes to pass that the schollar is more learned than the master 5. The cause is in nature before the effect as reason before risibility and this never faileth for a final cause in which it only seems to fail although it be in act and execution after the effect yet it is before it in the intention of the agent for which only reason it is the cause CHAP. XII Of the Topicks from the Subject and the Accident WE do not here take the subject for substance in which the accident is inherent or accident for that which doth precisely and adequately adhere to the substance but subject is here taken for all that to which any thing not belonging to its essence is attributed An accident is here taken for every such attribute as number is the subject of equality that is it is an accident of an accident An accident may be divided many ways and so may a subject for an accident is 1. either proper or common 2. Separable or inseparable 3. Inherent or internal and adherent or external 4. And chiefly it is either accidental as weariness doth accompany a feaver a pale Moon rain and all prognosticating signs Concomitant as an Eclipse of the Full-Moon and consequent as a day to the twilight signs and circumstances do also belong to this Topick The Canons or Rules are five 1. The subject being granted the proper accident is also granted and being taken away the proper accident is taken away also and the contrary as if he be a man he is risible and the contrary and if he be not a man he is not risible nor the contrary This rule never faileth by reason of the reciprocation of the subject and the proper accident 2. The subject being granted the common accident is also granted but not the contrary as if it be snow it is white but if it be white it is not therefore snow The first part of âhis rule faileth in separable accidents as if ât be water it is not therefore cold And the âatter part faileth 1. In a proper accident âhe first way as if there be knowledge there âs a man 2. In an individual accident as âf there be this whiteness there is snow because an accident doth not change its subâect 3. A common accident being taken away âhe subject is taken away but not the contraây as if it be not white it is not snow but yet there may be white though there be no snow The first part faileth in a separable accident the latter in a proper accident the first way and in an individual accident and subject as in the former rule 4. The thing being granted the circumstance of time and place is granted and the circumstance being taken away the thing is taken away as if Milo did kill Clodius then Milo was living and present if he was neither living nor present he did not kill him This rule never faileth in any requisite circumstance necessarily 5. The antecedent concomitant consequent being granted the consequent concomitant and antecedent for every exigence is also granted to wit a concomitant in being an antecedent in being or that hath been a consequent in being or that will be and being taken away the other is taken away also as if there be an Eclipse there is a full Moon if there be a birth there was a conception if there be a twilight the Sun will rise This rule faileth 1. In a thing not cohering necessarily as he which is a Philosopher must not of necessity be therefore poor and if there be a Comet it doth not follow there must be war 2. In things cohering necessarily if there be not a mutual necessity for though it be true that if there be an Eclipse there is a Full Moon yet it doth not follow that if there be a Full Moon there must always be an Eclipse yet these things not necessary are of great force to beget belief especially if many of them shall be joined together in one Hence Astrologers Physiognomers and Orators do highly value this Topick in questions of fact especially CHAP. XIII Of the Topicks from Dissentany and Comparison DIssentanies are either Opposites or Disparates as a Horse and a Bull. There are four kinds of Opposites of which Book I. Chap. 13. Comparisons are either in respect of quality as like and unlike or in respect of quantity or also of
soul Therefore a plant doth not breath 3. A Demonstration from the effect may be affirmative in Barbara and sometimes negative though seldome in Camestres 4. A demonstration from a remote cause iâ negative very seldome affirmative and consequently is restrained to the third figure iâ Camestres for example Every risible thing is an animal No Tree is an animal Therefore no Tree is risible 5. Demonstration from the effect ãâã more excellent than from a remote cause 1. In respect of the form the one being affirmative in Barbara the other negatiâ in Camestres 2. In respect of the matter for in the one the propositions are most necessarily true and differeth nothing from the most perfect Demonstration but in placing of the terms and begetteth a perfect knowledge not simply but in its kind but the Demonstration from the remote cause is made of less necessary and not immediate propositions nor doth it beget a knowâedge that is perfect in its own kind and ân which the mind may rest satisfied yet both of them are so perfect that they are either of them sufficientl to beget such a knowledge as to give us satisfaction of the being or not being of a thing CHAP. IX Of Demonstration in respect of thâ form and of the Affections oâ the most perfect Demonstration HItherto we have spoken of the twâ kinds of demonstration in respect ãâã the matter we are now to speak of them iâ respect of the form 2. The form of a demonstration is parâly discerned from the quantity partly froâ the quality and partly from the manner ãâã the proof 3. The form of a demonstration in respect of the quantity is universal or particâlar An universal demonstration is that iâ which an affection is demonstrated of the fiâ adaequate and universal subject by an immediaâ cause as when we demonstrate risibility iâ man by his rationality and all the most peâfect demonstrations are of this kind Wâ a thing is so And a Demonstration provinâ from the effect That a thing is is of thâ kind also A Particular demonstration not so called âs if the terms were particular is a demonâration in which an affection is demonstrated âom an inadequate and a less universal subject or âom one part of the first subject only as when âe demonstrate a man to be sensible by his ânsible soul The form of demonstration in respect âf quality is affirmative or negative An affirmative demonstration is that in âhose conclusion the predicate is affirmed of âe subject which happens in all demonstrations âcept the particular which is sometimes neâtive A Negative Demonstration is that in whose ânclusion the predicate is denied of the subject as Every thing that breatheth is an animal A wall is not an animal Therefore a wall doth not breath And this doth often come to pass in the âemonstrate That from a remote cause it may âso happen in all other demonstrations âough very seldome and that by conseâuence only for an affirmation is before neâation both in reference to the thing and âur knowledge of it 5. The form of a demonstration in respect of the manner of the proof is either ostensive or by reduction to impossibility An Ostensive Demonstration is that in which the conclusion is evidently and directly inferred from former and more knâwn premisses c. Of which sort are all the before named kinds of demonstration A Demonstration by reduction to impossibility is when from granted premisses we prove thâ conclusions to be therefore true because theiâ contradictories are apparently false for example Every rational thing is risible Every man is rational Therefore every man is risible Here if the major be denied we may reduce the respondent to an absurdity bâ taking the contradictory of the major thus No rational thing is risible Every man is rational Therefore no man is risible Which conclusion being manifestly false we infer that the major in the former syllogism ãâã well as the conclusion were both true or thâ the two contradictories are together true or false and this kind of Demonstration is the meanest of them all But here we must observe that an universal contrary proposition is rather to be taken than a particular contradictory both because particular propositions have no place in demonstration as also because contrary propositions in necessary matter stand in the place of contradictory Zabarel lib. 1. post c. 22. sect 176. And thus having done with the kinds of demonstration I come in the next place to speak of the affections of the chiefest and most perfect demonstration and they are chiefly three Analysis Regressus and Conversion into a Definition 1. Analysis is the resolution of effects into their first causes to beget a perfect knowledge thereof for when there is a certain chain and subordination of efficients and effects although the latter may be demonstrated by the former yet the mind is not satisfied in that but inquireth further for the cause of that effect also and so forward to the first cause which is the form of the subject of which no cause can be given and in which alone the mind is satisfied as if Augmentation in all things living were demonstrated by nourishment and that again by the vegetative faculty and that by the soul 1. Regressus is the reciprocation of the cause and effect by demonstration which effect we do reciprocally demonstrate by that cause by which the said effect was it self demonstrated this affection or power is called Regressus because after our understanding hath proceeded from la kind of confused and experimental knowledge of the effect as nearer to sense to the âike confused knowledge of the cause and hath ripened that knowledge by often meditating on and comparing of the cause to the effect till it come from a confused to a distinct knowledge then it returns from that distinct knowledge of the cause to the like distinct knowledge of the effect Progress is therefore made by the demonstration That and by an after demonstration and hath respect unto the confused knowledge of the cause by the effect But regress is by the demonstration Why and by a former demonstration and hath respect unto the distinct knowledge of the effect by the cause and differs from that vitious demonstration which they call a circle in three things 1. In the form for a circle doth from the premisses demonstrate the conclusion and from the conclusion put into the place of the Major and the Minor simply converted it doth again demonstrate the Major then again from the same conclusion put into the place of the Minor and the Major simply converted in the place of that it doth demonstrate the Minor which any one that will may experiment by this instance Every rational thing is resible Every man is rational Therefore every man is risible But in regress we only demonstrate the minor from the major simply converted and the conclusion put into the place of the minor And so there will be a natural