Hen Do Cary Baro de Leppington Comes Monmouthenâ—is et honble Ord Balniâ— Eques Politick DISCOURSES Written in ITALIAN BY PAOLO PARUTA A Noble VENETIAN Cavalier and Procurator of St. MARK Whereunto is added A short SOLILOQUY In which the AUTHOR briefly examines the whole Course of his Life Rendred into ENGLISH By the Right Honorable HENRY EARL of MONMOVTH LONDON Printed for H. Moseley and are to be sold at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Church-yard 1657 THE CONTENTS Of the Several DISCOURSES The First BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHat was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot pag. 1. II. What success the Roman affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his victorious Army into Italy 18 III. Whether was the better and more laudable advice That of the Carthaginians in offering to assist the Romans against King Pyrrhus Or that of the Romans in refusing their offer 23 IV. Which of the two famous Roman Commanders Quintus Fabiâ—s Maximus or P. Scipio Africanus brought more of 〈…〉 the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War 29 V. Whether war being to be made against the Romans Hannibals counsel was good to carry it into Italy 34 VI. Whether it was well done by the Romans to carry the War against the Carthaginians into Sicily and Spain and into Macedonia and Greece against King Philip whilst Hannibal waged War with them in Italy 39 VII Whether the destruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick 45 VIII Why Rome could not regain her liberty after the death of Julius Caesar as she had formerly done by driving the Tarquinâ— first out and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri 50 IX Which is the safer way to be taken to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth that which was held by Cato or that which was pursued by Caesar. 55 X. To what Age of the City of Rome the greatest praise and merit is to be given for the prosperity and greatness whereto she arrived 59 XI How the Roman Empire though it fell oftentimes into the hands of base and wicked mâ—n was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the Reign of many Emperors and how it came to be finally destroyed 67 XII Why the Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove victorious at last 78 XIII Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command if she had preserved her Librty and Form of Commonwealth then she did under the Government of Emperors 85 XIV Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their dominion as did the Romans and how Greece came to lose her liberty 93 XV. Whether Ostracism used by the Athenians be a just thing or no and whether it be useful for the preservation of a Commonwealth 104 The Second BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHy the Commonwealth of Venice hath not so for enlarged her Prâ—cincts as did the Roman Commonwealth 111 II. Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa when it was appâ—gneâ— by the Florentineâ— 1â—3 III. That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of War after the routing of the Venetian Army in the actioâ— of Giaradada 131 IV. Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charlâ— the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains 140 V. Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises 146 VI. Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the Antients 156 VII What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long peace and quiet in these latter times 164 VIII Whether Citadels and Strong-holds much used by our modern Princes be commodious and of true safety to a State or no. 168 IX Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo the Tenth were good or no and his counsel safe of driving Foreign Nations out of Italy by the help of other Transalpine Forces 179 X. Whether the Counsel taken by the Emperor Charls the Fifth and by his Commanders of not parting from the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come with very great strength from Constantinople to assault it deserve praise or blame 185 A TABLE Of all the more notable Things contained in the present Politick Discourses A. ADrian the Emperor why he resolved to go on progress over all his States and to visit every part thereof Pag. 71-91 Where he set the bounds of his Empire ibid. Agesilaus though he were King in Sparta was obedient to the Laws of the Country 48 Alcibiades by too much desire of glory ruined his Country 10. Had higher thoughts then the rest of the Greek Commanders 95 Alexander the Great the greatness of his enterprises 19. His Militia 20-83 An Indian Gymnosophist shews him how in a large Kingdom insurrections fall out 71. How far he extended his Empire and in how little time 157. and how 159. His artifices and laudable way for opening the way more easily to his great atchievements and greater glory 162 Ambition precipitated Rome into very grievous disorders 15-16-51 When discovered makes men distastefull 58. It and Fear raise in Princes minds a desire of innovation 164. The important mischief of it if once gotten into mens hearts 106. How it is to be cured in States-men ibid. An Army keeping the field how greatly beneficial 169 Armies maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts taken only out of Italy 64 Arragonian Kings of Naples what they did for fear of the French forces 138 Artillery of what use in warâ—â— 160. That in their stead the Antients had miraculous Engines called Tormenta 173 Assaulting the Enemy in his own State how advantagious 34 Attalaricus King of the Goths descends into Italy 76. is afterwards entertain'd for a Stipendiary to the Empire ibid. Attila content to lose the day so the Roman Commander might be slain in the battel 89 Athens why she soon lost her liberty 5-13-54 Athenians of great power in Greece 94. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Too hard for the rest in Sea-forces ibid. Hinder'd by the Spartans from taking in Sicily and from assaulting Persia 95. Why they could not enlarge their Dominion 98 Augustus Caesar in many places enlarged the Empire 68. Remained sole Lord of the whole World 71. Reduced it all to Peace though he was troubled with some Insurrections 7â— See Octavianus B. BAttails subject to divers unexpected accidents 31 When they are to be adventured upon 192 Brutus Junius Br. how he stirr'd up the people to Liberty 51. Why he condemned his own sons to death 52 Brutus Marcus Br. why he could not preserve the
Italy grew unlucky 138. Why they have not been able to make great atchievements in Italy nor to stay long there 166 Francesco Foscari Duke of Venice said That the Republick could not much increase in power unless she made some enterprises by Land 115 Francis the First King of France how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes 152. For endowments of the mind and other qualities most eminent ibid. Though his fortune gave way to that of Charls the Fifth whom yet he put to much trouble 157. Why his furious endeavor to assault Spain prov'd bootless 159. and as much in vain his enterprises in Italy 161 G. GEnoeses conquer'd by the Venetians 41. Whereupon it was that at first they entred into competition and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians 118 The Goths famous for the destruction of the Empire and of many Provinces 76 Their original and why they fell down into Italy ibid. Other actions of theirs under divers Commanders 77. They also took pay under the Emperors ibid. Government how the quality of every one may be known 1-2 What the right Form of it is ibid. What it was in Rome 2. What in Sparta ibid. What in Venice 54. Every Form is not convenient for every State 2 The Form of the Government is as it were the soul of the State 131 From a Popular government men come to Tyrannie 54. The Change thereof in Rome occasioned so much the sooner the end of her Empire 90 and of the corruption of her Militia 92 Greece why the Romans strove to keep her from falling into Philips hands 45 Had a general Council called the Amphictiones like the Diets of Germany 94 In many of her Cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth 93 Not being at unity in herself could not compass any great atchievements abroad 95. By reason of her dissentions could not make use of her victories against the Persians 97. minded Arts more then Arms ibid. Whence her victories against the Persians proceeded 98. How she came to fall into the hands of the Macedonians 100. then of another Philip 101 lastly of the Romans ibid. Why after the death of Alexander she could not recover her liberty 100. For the same reasons having afterwards the Empire of Constantinople she could not preserve herself in that dignity 103 How highly her Soldiers were esteemed by Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great ibid. 104 Guido Ubeldo Duke of Urbin why he would allow of no Forts in his Dominions 170-171 H. HAnnibal upon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy 34 What reasons should have removed him from that resolution 35 Honorius the Emperor his cowardise and simple saying 77 Hungary whence so called 77. The occasion of the Wars for her between the House of Austria and the Turks 195 I. ITaly how much she abounded in Soldiers 84. The Romans meetly out of their own Citizens and of their other Territories in Italy were furnish'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies 62. Was long obedient to the Western Emperors yet withdrew herself from under their command and submitted to Lords of her own 184 Italy through her own Princes fault at present under the Command of Strangers 140. Her late Quietness and Peace and from what causes 164 When it began 165. How it may be continued 167. Before the times of Pope Leo the Teath in great misery for thirty years 182 Italian Princes whether they were well advised in setting upon Charls the Eight King of France at his departing out of Italy 140 Iugurth with a bitter saying taxed the extreme grippleness and avarice of the Romans 13 Iulius Caesar what fierce people he conquer'd in France 91. Why it was difficult and troublesome for him to tame them 159. He would always charge his Enemy first 187 K. KIngdoms large and ample why apt and subject to Insurrections 72 L. LAws what benefit they bring 17. They ought to be confirmed by good Customs 11. Their aim ought to be to take away the abuse of things not the things themselves 109 Leagues or Confederacies why they are made their force and power 146 Made by the Christians against the Infidels 147-151-156-191 Which are the firmest 147. The defects which they may and use to have 148 For what causes they are made 154. How and when men may with reason expect benefit by them 154. Why they are no better esteemed ibid. That famous one of Cambray against the Venetians why made how soon dissolved and how unjust it was 154-155 Leonidas his famous victory against the Persians 98 Lewis the Twelfth King of France his nature and qualities of minde 135 Why he conspired against the Venetians and how injuriously 132 135 Lodowick Sforza Duke of Milain how fearful he shewed himself upon the League between the French and the Venetians 139. He calls Charls the Eight King of France into Italy and then to his own great damage repents himself of it 140 Lycurgus why his Laws proved good 11. Had many means to help him in the setling of his Laws 12. Ordered his Republick so that it should not much increase its Dominions 47 M. MAgistracies the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome 3 They ought to be of limited authority and for a short time 5 Malta why it preserved it self against the assaults of Bolyman 175 Marius by what ways he began his greatness 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth 10-47 His discreet carriage in the enterprise against the Cimbri which were come down into Italy 194 Medici how that Family got the superiority in Florence and kept it 105 The Militia of the Greeks or Macedonians what it was 21. Of the Carthaginians mercenary and incommodious 39. Of the Romans proved very profitable to the Commonwealth by being in the hands of many ibid. Well understood and practised by the Romans 38-49-61-80 Afterward grew corrupted and abject 69-73-74-75 Of the Turks how numerous well order'd and in continual Pay 186-193-195-196 Of the Christians much inferior to that of the Turks 186. Naval cannot of it self much enlarge the Dominion of a State 113. The Forces thereof are increased and maintained by those of the Land 114 N. NAtural inclination ought to be followed in the choise of our actions 58 Nicolo Orsino Count of Pitioliano like Fabius Maximus and not like him 135 Nobles why aâ— first of little authority in Rome 2. Opposing the Communalty and hated by it 4. Authors of the destruction of Tyrannies 12 O. OCtavianus why easily entertained by the Army after Caesars death 52 P. PEace how it remains of it self being brought into States 164. How in these last times it is established in the minds of the Italian Potentates 165 How Peace Concord and Unity amongst Citizens ought to be preserved by Laws 121 Plutarch prefers Lycurgus before Numa 11 Pompey set up by the Senate to take down Caesar 47. His triumphs ibid. After the war with Mithridates quitted the
the diversity of success in these two Commonwealths hath sprung from this diversity of institutions and from so many accidents and not from any one reason as was said at the beginning but in this diversity both of them have their praises and all those perfectâ—ons and felicity which is grantable to humane affairs Rome was Mistress of the World but could not long enjoy this greatness and prosperity nor yet with the quiet of her Citizens But Venice though of much meaner Precincts and condition hath preserved her self as an onely example in her liberty for so many Ages free from all domestick troubles and with the miraculous union and concord of her Citizens The Second DISCOURSE Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa when it was oppugned by the Florentines I Have often not without some to me appearing reason wondred that some Historians should so much blame the Commonwealth of Venice for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa against the Florentines whereby they may seem to reproach the counsels of those wise and stout Senators who had then the managing of publick affairs in their hands for those very things for which other Princes and States have been by other Writers much celebrated He who will know the truth of such judgements must take unto himself more particular and inward considerations for it often-times falls out that looking into the very pith and marrow of business the clean contrary is found to what did first appear and the face of things do seem to alter Such actions may then be measured either by the ordinary reasons of justice and equity else by the reasons of State which are the more proper If you consider 〈◊〉 action of the Commonwealth according to the first measure what is it that 〈…〉 consciences of these so â—eruplous meâ— to take upon ones self 〈…〉 a pioâ—â— action and beâ—itting great and generous Princes and how miserable was the condition of the poor Pisans how much it did deserve to be imbraced and favored both out of compassion and justice is demonstrated to omit for the present other particulars by what was done at the same time by Charls the Eight King of France whilst he was in Italy and by the so many favors afforded to the cause of Pisa by all the chief of his Court Charls had promised the Florentines to keep the City of Pisa under their Dominion being obliged unto them for their readiness in receiving them into his State and for having afforded them all assistance and accommodation yet did the afflictions of the Pisans appear to be so grievous as he was moved more by compassion then by his own interest or by his promise made to the Florentines A forein Prince used this charity to the Pisans with whom he nor his Kingdom had never held any friendship or confederacie his interests being not only separate from but contrary to their welfare And shall it be thought a strange and irrational thing that the Commonwealth of Venice which had had the Pisans for their friends and associates in divers enterprises and who kept still friendship and commerce with that City from whence also some of the noblest Families of the Commonwealth draw their original and whose cause for the same respects was straitly annex'd unto their own should interest herself in behalf of the Pisans to comfort them in their great affliction Nor ought the Commonwealth of Venice to use greater respect to the Florentines then they had used towards her against whose designs they had so opposed themselves in the Wars formerly made against the Dukes of Milan and Ferrara assisting their Enemies both with men and monies as they were thought to be the chief hinderance why the business undertaken by the Commonwealth with great hopes of good success had no better an end The Venetians were thereunto likewise moved by the example of others For if the Duke of Milan the Genoeses the Lucheses and those of Sienna had assisted the Pisans as much as they were able how could the Venetians whose Forces in Italy were much superior to theirs stand idly looking upon the Pisans miseries and upon the prosperity and greatness of the Florentines whereby the common troubles of Italy were augmented since they alone adhered to the French faction But let us consider a little more particularly the cause which was undertaken to be defended by protecting the Pisans and what it was that they did endeavour Certainly nothing but the recovery of their antient liberty whereof they were bereaved either by their several misfortunes and by the violence of others or at least as they said to reduce themselves to a less severe government then that of the Florentines under whose dominion being faâ—n but a little before and the City of Pisa being sold at a low rate by the Visâ—onti the Pisans pretended first by the favor of Charls the Eight King of France and afterwards by the like of Maximilian the Emperor to be returned to their former liberty The former having used his power and the other his antiâ—nt pretences of the Empire to put them into that condition And grant that respect were to be had to the possession which the Florentines had of that City which notwithstanding was but of later times the Florentines were likewise to have released the Haven of Ligoâ—n to the Gâ—noeses from whom they had taken it by violence The Venetians did not perswade the Pisans to forgo their obedience to the Florentines as Lodovick Sfoza had formerly done for they minded 〈◊〉 the appeasing of the commotions of Italy then the raising of more they did not free them from the bond of obedience to the Florentines as did the Emperor and the King of France because they 〈◊〉 such an action did not belong unto them they were not the first that did 〈◊〉 the 〈…〉 of that City as the Genoeses and those of Sienna had done because they had no intention to advantage themselves by the discord and ruine of others But the City having already totally rejected the obedience of the Florentines being thereof â—â—eed by the authority of other puissant Princes and assisted by other more petty Princes to maintain their liberties the Venetians being requested and conjur'd by the Pisans when they saw them ready to fall into the depth of misery if not assisted by them and that their ruine would draw along with it great prejudice to the peace and liberty of all Italy they at last took upon them their protection and defence And I herein say nothing but what is most true and confirm'd by the testimony of those who have written upon the passages of those times But let us consider other more particular accidents and more weighty respects Charls the Eight King of France was at that time pass'd into Italy to get the Kingdom of Naples an undertaking wherein he had prosperous success which was an ill
friendship with Caesar which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselvs but had taken up Arms to defend and preserve for that King their Friend and Confederate the State of Milan little mindful of such a service as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst Princes conspires her ruine and tuâ—ns those Arms against her which through their friendship were grown so powerful in Italy What should move him thereunto Not desire of revenge for there appeared no injury Not any fear of his own affairs for he had found them already very constant unto them No self-interest for he ought to have been jealous of Caesars greatness who had been his perpetual Enemy and to have wished well unto the Venetians who had been his antient Friends But what shall I say of the rest Had not Caesar the like obligations to the Venetians as the King of France had which should have kept him from such a confederacie Nay had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary The injuries which the French had done to the Empire the King of France his particular hatred to him the high aspiring thoughts of that King pernicious to the dignity of the Empire and to the German liberty Wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the French so be ought rather to have obviated their power then have help'd to advance it But who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of Ferdinand King of Spain so unusual and so harmful to himself by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive in not preserving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of Naples in peace and quiet For which cause the greatness of the French their fidelity and natural desire of novelty ought to have been â—â—spected by him yet he assented to the increase of their power and of his own danger But how did those generous thoughts which Pope Iulius the Second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of Italy correspond with his joining in confederacie with the Transaâ—pine Princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that Commonwealth which was confest by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of Italy and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation What safety could the Apostolick Sea expect by increasing the power of those Princes in Italy who were great of themselves whom he feared and upon whose authority he foresaw the Popes of Rome must depend These certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have faln into the imagination of the Venetian Senators or of any other men how wise soever Nor was the immensity of the danger less nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a War The King of France his Forces were of themselves very powerful that Kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before and become more formidable by the possession which the French had got of the Dukedom of Milan which afforded them mighty conveniencies to assault the Coâ—fines of the Common-wealth And though Caesars Forces were not of themselves greatly considerable yet were they increased by the fame he gave out that he led his Army into Italy to make a certain and noble prey thereof and with a mind to restore the Empire to its almost lost greatness whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people and got them to joyn their Forces with his Moreover the King of Spains Naval preparation was in particular to be feared to prevent the which those Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be imployed which should all of them have been imployed in defending the State by Land from so fierce an assault The Pope added no small reputation to the League by his authority and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces became the more dreadful And though the other petty Princes forces were but small yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great and the Kings of England Poland and Hungary were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them and to declare enmity to the Venetians If then the Venetians had yielded to this so new and great preparation for War which like Thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once what could have been said unto them Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no ways good For as an object of immensurable force does not move but corrupt the sense so the encountring with so weighty a conspiracie was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to shew her vertue but rather to disorder and to confound her Yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels as from a thing that was in her own power that she was not worth much or that she did any thing unworthy of herself of her fame or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring What did she resolve to yield up of free-will What noise what complaints were heard which shewed that she would terminate that contention with vain words which could not be ended but with Arms The Answer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them that the King was upon his march in Arms against the Commonwealth was onely that that War was intimated them from the King when they had more reason to expect Amity and Peace from him but that they would not be wanting to their own defence being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own Forces and through the right of their cause The effects were answerable to their words for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a War The most expert Commanders were sent for from all parts veteran Soldiers mustered in all places in so great numbers and so qualified as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all that neither that Age nor any other for many years before had seen such an Army of meer Italians in Italy Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their Country at so great a need There appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the last gasp as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the Venetians in other things do praise these proceedings being forced so
mans Country with an Army intending to possess himself thereof must first win all the Castles and strong Holds upon the Frontiers for it were ill advised to advance forwards and leave such places behind them since his victuals may be thereby hindred and he may several waies suffer much damage and be greatly disturbed Moreover to be â—aster of the field leave the Cities and strong Holds unreduced would be but to labor hard to get possession for a few daies which being founded only upon the Forces of a field-Army when that should be worsted all things formerly won must of necessity fall of themselves Hence it is that since much time must be spent in lying before a Fort or Citadel and that many men are requisite to take it and all this often-times in vain the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this difficulty are not so soon nor so sadly compast as they were by the Antients who met not with such obstacles And how can it be expected therefore that many great victories should be won since they meet with so many rubs by means of these strong Holds whereof we see many clear examples in the actions of the aforementioned Princes The Emperor Charls made War several times with numerous Armies against the King of France propounding great matters unto himself which proved all but vain at last by his having met with strong Cities well munited such as required much time and labor to take them wherefore though his success in War was sometimes prosperous yet it came so late as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby as was seen when after much time spenâ— and mâ—ny men lost before the Fort of St. Desir which was seaâ—ed in the midst of France whither he was fortunately advanced though he reduced it to his own power yet was he at last forced to come to agreement with the Enemy as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquisition that he might fall upon another Enterprise The same and for the same cause befell Francis King of France who having sent his Son the Dolphin with powerful Forces to the Pyrenean Mountains to the end that he might break into Spain promising himself easier success therein by an unexpected assault and because he had assaulted at the same time other parts of Caesars Dominions with other Armies The Dolphin being at the very first to take Perpignano a Fort placed upon those Frontiers he there met with such and with so many difficulties as this sole encounter was sufficient to keep those Forces from penâ—trating any further Solyman being entred with a powerful Army into Hungarie intending to pass into Austria wasted so much time in expugning the strong Hold of Buda as it proved the safety of that Country and chiefly of Vienna before the which he was in that respect the longer a coming and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own security so as the City being of it self very renable it may be said that she did not onely save her self but by the preservation thereof all Austria and other Provinces of Germany were preserved then and several times since So likewise in the War which was made by the same Solyman against the Venetians though he was come thither himself in person with powerful Forces both by Sea and Land yet his Forces being repulst by the Fort of Câ—rfir which was forcibly but in vain attempted by the Turks he was forced to withdraw from before it whereas without the help and advantage of such a strong Hold both the Island of Câ—rfee and other places belonging to that State must have submitted to so great and warlike a preparation By reason then of these difficulties and such occasions the undertaking of later times have proved less glorious for matter of action then those of former daies When Alexander had overcome in Battel Darius the powerful King of Persia he soon made himself Master of his whole Kingdom and passing further into the Country even to the ocean Sea he found the way so opeâ— as the onely difficulty he met withal was the overcoming of those Fortresses of Rivers and Seas which nature had furnished the Country with Insomuch as those who writ his actions speak but of two strong Holds of any importance about which he was necessitated to spend some time amongst the Indians in his victorious over-running so many Countries But Pompey made such way in following Mithridates and in planting Trophies of victories in all places whereby he past in so many Eastern Provinces amongst people that he had rather march'd over then over-come as it may be easily conceived that he mâ—â— no where with any impediments by strong Holds which were able to stop the course of his victorious Forces Caesar found it somewhat a harder business to subjugate those people of Europe with whom he was to fight but this was more out of the nature of the situations and the savageness of the people then by reason of any stout resistance made by any well fortified Cities yet in the space of Ten years he compleated so many victories as he subjugated There hundred several sorts of People It these though great Princes and most valiant Commanders had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort certainly their atchievements would have been fewer and their glory not so much cry'd up This was manifestly known by the example of other Ages For it may be observed that the so great progresses of War have been made chiefly in the Eastern parts where at all times peradventure by reason of the largeness of the Country the use of strong Holds hath been least had so as not only Alexander the Great and Pomâ—ey both of them more famous then all other Commanders but some of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains subjugated spacious Countries in a short time And in later times Selymus the Great Turk by the same reason was able totally to subjugate the Soldan of Caire's Empire For having had the better in many Battels and not meeting with any strong Hold to withstand him the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the Turks who were Victors and Masters of the Field But such acquisitions as they are very easie to be made so are they but seldom peacefully possest which was the cause why the Roman Emperors could never so govern those furthest Eastern parts but that either by the Inhabitants themselves or by their neighboring Kings â—umults were continually raised So as it behoved them to subjugate the same Provinces several times But if these difficulties of winning Forts and strong Holds did retard the course of Victories certainly they ought not to lessen the praise of modern Princes and Commanders but when they deserve it by their own military worth and industry as great discipline cunning constancie and sufferance is discovered in this sort of Militia and as such acquisitions
of Thirty years when in the time of the Popedom of Leo the Tenth she seemed to have some hopes of quiet and of enjoying some better condition after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the Northern Armies But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured for two noble members of this Province were faln into the hands of forein Princes the State of Milan being at the devotion of Francis King of France and the Emperor Charls the Fifth being possest of the Kingdom of Naples which Princes being now weakned and weary with so many Wars so as the one could not exceed the other and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent being governed more by necessitie peradventure then by their own wills they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in Italy and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations In this posture of Affairs Pope Leo who had often negotiated with several Princes about the business of Arms and had endeavored as he said the liberty of Italy and chiefly the preservation of the Dukedom of Milan in the Government of the Sforza's was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued and particularly that the Church should be berest of two noble Cities Parma and Piacenza which were become members of the State of Milan Therefore with a haughty and generous mind he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet before some present troubles so to shun other molestations and dangers which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace in future if not to himself at least to the Church And knowing that he should not be able either of himself nor by joining with other Italians to drive forein Potentates out of Italy he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foremers with design as he said that when some of them should be forced to forgo Italy it might be the easier to expel the rest Leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution it may seem to merit praise by all men as to the intention but as for the means he took to compass it it is not so easily to be agreed upon for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto for some of which this action may seem to be as wise as glorious and if we will reflect upon other some there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein then of security and hopes That all Transalpinâ—rs might be driven out of Italy was a thing desired and not without cause by all Italians and which ought to be his chiâ—fest care and endeavor who had such Territories degree and authority in that Province as Leo had The antient dignity of the Italian honor seemed to appear in the Popâ—s majesty and in the splendor of the Court of Rome â—ut as for the effecting of this business it did planly appear that all the power of the Italian Potâ—ntates was too weak since two great Princes and warlike Nations had foâ— many past years though with various fortune got footing there and still kept their possession so as their power could suffer no disturbance but must be confirmed and consolidated and must become more formidable to the Church and to all the Italian Princes unless it were by some of the same forein Nations If the sole Forces of the Italian Princes when Italy by reason of a long Peace did flourish most were not sufficient to stop the French Forces which were then but new in those parts and but meanly assisted what reason was there to believe that this Province should ever be raised up again of herself and should by means of her own Forces return to her pristine fortune and digniâ—y after having been so long vexed by cruel Wars and having lost two of her noblest Members Wherefore though to administer fresh fuel as it were to this fire of War as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apostolick Sea if they should joâ—n with Caesar or with the King of France might be troublesom and dangerous yet might it be beneficial or at least hopeful since it might so fall out that the fortune of War being various and subject to unexpected chances some good effect might ensuâ— thereupon for the liberty of Italy the Forces of those Princes who did oppose her growing much the weaker or else by their growing weary of the work and by their tuâ—ning themselves to some other undertaking Whereas on the contrary to suffer them to settle there and to get in time greater authority over the people and more love to the States which they had gotten was a certain and irreparable ruine and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the States which were postest by strangers into the hands of the Italian Princes But the fear lest both these Princes who were grown so powerful in Italy might join together against the Territories of the Church or those of other Italian Princes to divide them amongst themselves as had happened not many years before when the Emperor Maximilian and Lewis the Twelfth King of France who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the Venetians might chiefly perswade the Pope to quit neutrality and to side with the one or the other of these Princes Leo knew that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction but of much disgust to both these Princes and Nations more particularly to the French who were alwaies jealous of his cunning so as great emulation growing in them both and a desire of commanding over all Italy and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this Province as the one could not much exceed the other nor make any new acquisition it was with reason to be feared that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to side with either of them from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the Liberty of Italy Nor was Leo's Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up Arms in company with others and chiefly since the French knew that he was no waies pleased with their Dominion in Italy as well for the common affairs as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the Cities of Parma and Piacensa which were returned to the obedience of the Apostolick Sea by his Predecessor Iulius So as the Churches State and that of the Florentines which was under the same Popes protection and government grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men for the Venetians