〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or likeness of Nature between them but therefore we have the less cause to wonder if there be defects in some of their Arguments if some of their reasonings about the Trinity seem to look no further than a specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons This is as little to the advantage of the Animadvertor's cause as the former allegations The Arians would not allow so much as a specifick Unity between the Father and the Son Nicepho Callist Eccles His lib. 18. cap. 47. I would fain know what Hereticks ever did allow it Nicephorus Callistus charges indeed this Opinion upon Philoponus and his followers who are commonly called the Tritheit Hereticks but he is a later and fabulous Writer wrote in the fourteenth Century long after the prevailing of the School-Divinity Philoponus and his followers the Tritheit Hereticks of the seventh Century inclined nearer to Sabellianism than to a belief of a specifick Unity of the Trinity that hard name of Tritheit Hereticks was given them by reason of some uncouth Phrases which they used of which hereafter Secondly what consequence will the Animadvertor draw from the Arians not allowing a specifick Unity between the Father and the Son This is what he aims at that it sufficed to maintain a specifick Unity to confute the Arian Heresie I desire to know why the same Plea might not have served the Reverend Dean in his learned Vindication of this Article against the Socinians who no more allow a Specifick Unity of the Trinity than the Arians of old The Socinians deny them to be three infinite minds why will not that Apologize for the Reverend Dean Why is not this molified and called only a defect in the Reverend Dean as the Animadvertor here Stiles it in the Antient Fathers Thirdly the Arians objected Tritheism against the Orthodox Faith as the Socinians do to this day So that had the Ancient Fathers believed this Heresie a consequence of asserting a specifick Unity in the Trinity they would as carefully have avoided the asserting of it as the School-men and Moderns do on all occasions Fourthly The answer of the Antients to this Objection of Tritheism by the Arians is the clearest demonstration of their judgment this is the Objection Peter James and John are three Men therefore Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Gods The general answer of the Ancients is by denying the truth of the Antecedent that Peter James and John are improperly abusively called three Men that it is contrary to the rules of Philosophy to call them otherwise than one Man and three Human Persons as we say in the Blessed Trinity there are three Divine Persons and one God Now not one School-man or Modern as I believe ever gave such an answer Not one of them ever imagined that the affirming Father Son and Holy Ghost to be one God did in the least enforce them to affirm Peter James and John to be one Man The Animadvertor thinks this Objection only Jocular only fit to be Laughed at which the Antients thought so weighty that to get rid of it they endeavoured says the learned Dr. Cudworth reflectingly with their Logick to prove that three Human Persons ought not to be called three Men. I shall consider their Logicks afterwards at present I declare that is a manifest conviction to me that they did conceive the Unity of Nature between Human and Divine Persons parallel equal n. 9. Fifthly those words are very remarkable in our Animadvertor but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or likeness of Nature between them which insinuates as if the debate of the Catholicks and Arians in the Nicene Council were only about a Title whether the Son be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Father but this is to misrepresent the Fathers of that august Assembly The Arians liked neither the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God and a Creature are improperly said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again the Catholicks approved of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 provided it were understood without equivocation if there was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 added to it that is perfectly alike in their Essence is to the Catholicks the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Consubstantial The Arians never consented to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but when their Party was too weak and they were obliged to dissemble with some Catholicks who were otherwise favourable to their Persons and cause It must be confessed that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will not without great force suit with the Hypothesis of the Schools of the Singularity of the common Divine Essence A Singularity will not admit of a Comparison of likeness so saith Ricardus de S. Victor Lib. 6. de Trin. c. 20. Siquidem ubi est simplex Vnitas summa simplicitas quid ibi facit qualis talis It is less wonder therefore if the School-men charge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with Arianism or Semi-arrianism Vid. Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 6 per totum whereas it is capable of an Orthodox Exposition I thought it necessary to follow the Animadvertor thus closely in the examining of this Historical Truth viz. whether the Fathers of the Church believed the Modus of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity Two very great and learned Persons have said it have abundantly proved it saith the Reverend Dean Their Assertion has never yet been confuted They were not drawn into this Assertion by the heat of Disputation or to favour their own Hypothesis neither of them approve of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity The Reverend Dean rightly judged that those places they had already produced abundantly proved their conclusion and yet Petavius gives them but as an Essay and pronounces this Opinion to be the judgment of all the Greek Fathers especially Shall I ask the Animadvertor a few Questions Was not Petavius as capable of judging betwixt occasional and designed Expressions as himself as capable of judging betwixt an Allusion or an Argument a minore ad majus as himself Did not Petavius know that the Arians denyed a Specifick Unity of the Trinity Shall I ask the Animadvertor whether he ever consulted St. Basil's 43d Epistle and if he did whether he can have Brow enough to say That that Epistle was not designedly wrote of the difference of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or whether St. Basil has not in the fullest manner delivered his judgment in this point I particularly mention this Epistle because our Animadvertor quotes a passage out of it Pag. 149. of his Animadversions under the name of Greg. Nyssen de differentia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to whom in the Printed Editions it is also ascribed and because this Epistle being both in the Works of St. Basil and Gregory
second Substance So says Thomas Aquinas in his own quotation Anim. p. 272. Hoc nomen Hypostasis apud Graecos significat tantum substantiam particularem quoe est substantia prima sed Latini utuntur nomine substantioe tam pro primâ quam pro secundà P. 249. lin 24. n. 13. The word Subsistentia being by them looked upon as barbarous and not in use St. Augustin manifestly derived Substantia from Subsistere St. August lib. 7. de Tr. cap. 4. and in that Sense translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet argued against the Plurality of the Phrase Nam si hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere ita non erant dicendoe tres substantioe ut non dicuntur tres essentioe Si autem aliud est Deo esse aliud subsistere sicut aliud Deo esse aliud Patrem esse vel Dominum esse relativè ergo subsistet sicut relativè gignet relativè dominatur Ita substantia non erit substantia quia relativum erit Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus absurdum est autem ut substantia relativè dicatur omnis res ad seipsum subsistet quanto magis Deus Nothing is more evident than that St. Augustin thought relativè subsistere to be a great Absurdity which is his Objection against the Phrase of three Hypostases and also three Persons that they signified absolutely Ibid. cap. 6. yet the Animadverter has the Confidence to quote St. Augustin p. 267. As stating the divine Personalities upon Relation for founding Personality in and upon something relative Nor on the other side P. 249. lin 29. n. 14. would the Greeks acquiesce in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor admit of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for fear of falling thereby into the contrary Error of Sabellius I doubt not that the Sabellian Heresy was the cause why the Greeks were not content with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for they did not refuse to admit of the Phrase but thought it alone insufficient but required afterwards either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Addition of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vide Pet. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 2. S. 9. N. 15. I. that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are three kinds of Sabellianism The first is the most common the confounding the Persons of the Blessed Trinity which was otherwise called the Patri-passian Heresy which asserts That Father Son and Holy Ghost are only three Names or three Offices of one Person and consequently that the Father suffered this is properly the Heresy of Noetus and not of Sabellius Sabellius Petav. lib. 1. de Trin. cap. 6. S. 5. says Epiphanius expresly denied the Father to suffer However the Latin Fathers scarce knew any other Species of Sabellianism which with Submission I conceive to be one cause why they are less accurate in treating of this Mystery than the Greek Fathers II. A second Species of Sabellianism is the Contraction of the Trinity to the single Person of the Father acknowledging the Father to be a true proper Person asserting the Word or Son to be not strictly and formally the Person of the Father but an Attribute of the Father His personal Wisdom in the same Analogy as Wisdom is an habit of Man in like manner asserting the Holy Spirit to be the personal Power of the Father This Sabellius himself embraced and explained the Trinity by the Similitude of the Body of the Sun its Light or Ray and its Heat The first Epiphan Hoer 62. he resembled to the Father the second to the Son the third to the Holy Ghost this the ancient Fathers called Judaism that is such a Trinity which a Jew would own and by the same reason it may be stiled a Socinian Trinity No Socinian in this Sense will scruple a Father Vide Sti. Basilii Ep. 64. a Word and an Holy Spirit A third Species of Sabellianism is the compounding the Divine Persons which is contrary to a Confusion of them this asserts a real distinction betwixt the Divine Persons but then it makes Father Son and Holy Ghost to be as three parts of some whole Petav. Addenda ad Tom. 2. de Trin. p. 866. So Petavius varius à seipso discrepans videtur Sabellius fuisse ut interdum personas tres quasi partes alicujus totius esse diceret ut ex Epiphanii loco colligitur Petavius undoubtly alludes to that other Similitude of the Trinity mentioned by Epiphanius Epiphan Haer. 62. That the Trinity was by Sabellius sometimes compared to the Body Soul and Spirit in one Man These three are but one Hypostasis These three are Co-essential Parts of one Man which possibly moved Sabellius to invent this Hypothesis to have an evasion to assert in some Sense an Homoousian Trinity Vide Pet. lib. 1. de Tr. cap. 6. S. 3. This kind of Sabellianism was by some of the Fathers called Atheism This Hypothesis in reality ungodding Father Son and Holy Ghost Not the Body alone or the Soul alone or the Spirit alone but all three conjoyntly are one Man so not the Father alone or Son alone or Holy Ghost alone but all three conjoyntly are God whereas the Catholick Faith is that each distinct Person is God The Father is God the Father the Son is God of God the Holy Spirit is in the Language of the Church God the Holy Ghost See both these kinds of Sabellianism condemned by Athanasius in his Oration contra gregales Sabellii Now the Phrase of three Hypostases is contrary to all the Forms of the Sabellian Heresy Of the first there is no doubt the second is as plain to be an Hypostasis and to be an Attribute are inconsistent and contradictory So also to be an incompleat Part a component Part and an Hypostasis are inconsistent It is essential to an Hypostasis to have totale attributum to be a compleat and perfect whole so the Words of the first Article of the Augustan Confession quoted by the Animadverter p. 278. Et utuntur nomine personae ea significatione qua usi sunt scriptores Ecclesiastici ut significet non partem aut qualitatem sed quod propriè subsistet That which properly subsists can neither be as a Part of any Whole nor as a Quality or Attribute of any Being The Scripture says the Reverend Dean of St. Paul s Im sure represents Father Son and Holy Ghost Vindication of Trinity p. 66. as three intelligent Beings not as three Powers or Faculties of the same Being which is downright Sabellianism The very Dreggs of Sabellianism as I take it worse than Sabellianism for as the Reverend Dean adds Faculties are not Persons no nor one Person neither A Million of Faculties and Attributes will not make one Person A Million of Qualities will never make one Substance and a Person is a Substance
one Divine Person as Generation is a Personal Act proper and peculiar to the Person of the Father and distinguishes the Father from the Son and Holy Spirit Now Self-consciousness is an Absolute Attribute and upon that account cannot be esteemed Personal by the Schoolmen Self-consciousness is but one conception of Omniscience and will the Animadverter say That the Father has a distinct Personal Omniscience If he does he multiplies Omniscience with the Persons that is he multiplies the Divine Nature in such Person Self-consciousness as well as Mutual Consciousness to the Schoolmen is an Essential Act Father Son and Holy Ghost according to the Schoolmen as they have but one singular Divine Nature so they have but one singular Omniscience but one singular Self-consciousness and one singular Mutual Consciousness Every Act proceeds not only from some Agent but by vertue of some power to produce that Act Therefore a Personal Act must have a Personal Power a Personal principium quo The Personal Act of Generation by the Father supposes a Personal Power to generate peculiar to the Father A Personal Act of Self-consciousness therefore will imply a Personal Power to exert such Act that is a Personal Omniscience or a Personal Divine Nature Not therefore the Phrase of Three Infinite Minds but the asserting that Self-consciousness is a Personal Act does in the Judgment of the Schoolmen unavoidably infer Three Gods The Personality of every One of the Divine Persons is purely and perfectly Relative P. 98. lin 12. N. 3. and therefore nothing Absolute as Self-consciousness is can be the Formal constituent reason of their Personality The Conclusion and Consequence are granted to the Animadverter The Antecedent viz. That the Personality of every one of the Divine Persons is purely and perfectly Relative is also the General Assertion of the Schoolmen as Petavius observes Lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 10. sect 6. Paucissimi quidem è Schola Theologi vel opinati sunt vel probabile judicant personales proprietatès absolutum non-nihil habere à quibus meritò dissentiunt coeteri How universally soever this Conclusion is embraced by the Schoolmen and from them by the Animadverter I can scarce persuade my self that the Animadverter understood the meaning of the very Conclusion this I am sure of That his pretended Arguments to prove this Conclusion are the greatest Objections against the truth of it and that he all along betrays the grossest Ignorance of the Schoolmens meaning I will give the Reader his own words and then examine them And that the Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative to one another and consequently that their Personalities are so many Relations is no less evident from this that two of them relate to one another as Father and Son and the third to both as proceeding from both and it is impossible for one thing to proceed from another especially by a continual act of Procession without importing a relation to that from which it so proceeds so that the very Personal Subsistence implies and carries in it a formal Relation For the Father subsists Personally as a Father by that Eternal Communication of his Nature to his Son which Act as proceeding from him is called Generation and renders him formally a Father and as terminated in the Son is called Filiation and constitutes him formally a Son and in like manner the Holy Ghost subsists personally by that Act of Procession by which he proceeds from and relates to both the Father and the Son So that that proper Mode of Subsistence by which in conjunction with the Divine Essence always included in it each of them is rendred a Person is wholly Relative and so belongs to one of them that it also bears a necessary reference to another From all which it undeniably follows that the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are in the formal Constitution of them Relative to one another and consequently that the Three Personalities by which they become formally Three Persons and are so denominated are Three Eternal Relations The Ancient Fathers confess That the Divine Relations constitute each of them a distinct Person that they enable us to conceive them distinct this therefore is not the question The question is Whether the Relations constitute each of them a Person indefinitely Spiration is a Relative Attribute in the Father relates the Father to the Holy Spirit but yet Spiration is not properly a Personality not properly the subsistential Form but a subsistential or personal Property A little to examine the Animadverter's proofs First The Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative This is too much more than ever any asserted before him A Person in the Blessed Trinity is God an infinite Mind but to be God to be an infinite Mind are confessedly absolute Attributes The Schoolmen say That the Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative in their Personalities that is purely Relative secundum quid or in one Respect The Animadverter turns the Proposition into a simple Affirmation that they are in all Respects purely Relative Secondly The Divine Persons are purely Relative because two of them relate to one another as Father and Son and the third to both The Animadverter knows not the difference betwixt a Relative Person and a Person who sustains a Relation Adam is related to God to Eve to Seth yet none ever stiled Adam a Relative Person The Personality of Adam is not a Relation but a proper Mode of Subsistence which can never be conceived otherwise than Absolute Thirdly The Father subsists personally as a Father This is the question it self and by the Rules of Logick ought to have been proved and not supposed The sole Enquiry is Whether to be a Father and to be a Person or subsist personally be formally the same Paternitas sc Divina rationem fundandi non postulat ut in rerum natura sit nam si aliquam talem fundandi rationem haberet maximè generationem activam Illam autem non respicit ut rationem sui esse sed potius est in suo genere ratio cur ipsa sit In quo etiam Paternitas illa aeterna antecellit omnem aliam Paternitatem quae in coelo in terra nominatur Omnis enim alius Pater ideo est Pater quia generat Pater autem aeternus ideo generat quia per Paternitatem est constitutus in suo esse Personali Suarez lib. 5. de Trin. cap. 8. N. 8. p. 437. Fourthly The Father subsists Personally by an Act of Generation How can a Personal Act which supposes the Person already constituted be the formal Cause of Personality in the same Person The Schoolmen were wiser in their Generation they confess that if the Father is denominated a Father from his Act of Generation it is impossible that the Father's Paternity should be his Mode of Subsistence since it is impossible not to suppose a Person subsisting before we can conceive of him acting The first Person of
plead those Sacred words of their Law I am the Lord thy God Thou shalt have no other Gods before me That all their Doctors for the space of two thousand Years interpreted those words in their Natural sense viz. as spoke of one Divine Person What shall we say to this Objection Did God suffer the wisest of the Heathen Philosophers the most Pious Persons of the Jewish Religion to believe an Heresie of him for so many Ages Did God speak of himself in the most Sacred part of the Law in such words which Naturally lead to Heresie For I and me Naturally lead to the belief of one Person speaking This is the great Objection with which the Socinians flourish An Answer to which would be of more worth than a thousand such Books of Inadversions as the Socinian Considerer calls these Animadversions Considerations on the Explications c p. 23. For my own part I cannot be so fond of the Subtilties of the Schools as for the sake of them to confess so harsh a Conclusion I do most firmly believe that the Faith of a Trinity of Divine Persons and the Article of the Unity of God as it was believed by the wisest of the Heathens and the Jewish Church are by no means inconsistent The whole Truth was not revealed to the Jewish Church or at least so very obscurely that very few of them understood it But yet I verily believe that what was revealed was a most Sacred truth I believe that the God whom the Heathen Philosophers by the Light of Nature worshipped was one Divine Person I believe that the same one Divine Person spake of Himself in those Sacred words of the Law I am the Lord thy God c. I also believe that this One Divine Person was the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ Nor does this contradict that common Article of the Christian Faith viz. That God is Three Persons as the Socinians vainly pretend and some others unwarily grant them God is not three Persons as he is Just or Good or Holy as if three Persons were Essentially included in the Divine Nature For then no one single Person could by himself be God then there could not be a Son of God or a Spirit of God When God is said to be three Persons the term God is taken in a Logical sense equivalent in Predication to a terminus communis or a Species and signifies that the Divine Nature subsists in three Persons that this term God is truly predicable of three distinct Persons But a further disquisition of this Difficulty belongs to my Second Part. The Animadvertor accuses the Reverend Dean of giving a scurvy stroke at the Trinity p. 135. lin 7. n. 19. p. 89. where he the Reverend Dean affirms that the Expression of the one true God and the only true God cannot properly be attributed to the Son nor Holy Ghost Ibid. l. 19. and consequently if he asserts that these terms cannot with equal Propriety be attributed to and predicated of the Son and Holy Ghost we have him both Arian and Macedonian together in this Assertion First The Reverend Dean never asserted that the Son or Holy Ghost could not properly be called the one God or only true God only that they could not so properly be stiled so as the Father The Fathers of the Nicene Council indeed of the whole Eastern Church did expresly appropriate the Title of One God to the Father and God of God to the Son by which Opposition it appears that by One God in the first Article of the Creed they meant a God of himself which is a Personal Attribute and peculiar to the Father Our Saviour appropriates this Title of Only true God to the Person of the Father Hilary lib. 3. de Trin. and St. Hilary who was never hitherto esteemed either an Arian or Macedonian expresly asserts this to be Debitum Honorem Patri St. Paul has patronized this Appropriation Ephes 4.6 To us there is one God and Father Now for my part I had rather be esteemed an Heretick Arian and Macedonian with my Saviour St. Paul St. Hilary all the Oriental Fathers than Orthodox with the Animadvertor and Bellarmin I do assure him that I am neither afraid of him nor the Socinians I crave no Favour at either of their Hands for this Profession of my Faith That the Title of one God only true God is a Proper Personal Prerogative of the Father alone p. 138. lin 21. n. 20. And as for the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity I hope he looks upon the Expression only as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native sense for fear the Consequences of it may engage him too far to be able to make an handsome Retreat which I assure him if he does not take heed they certainly will Oratio contra gregales Sabellii propè initium Athanasius tells us that we might rightly call the Father the only God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he only is unbegotten and he only is the Fountain of the Deity This learned Father has hitherto been esteemed the very Test of Orthodoxy in this Mystery The Reverend Dean's Notion and Phrase is borrowed from him who would not have thought himself safe under so Venerable a Name But alas the World is strangely altered Athanasius himself must come to School to the Animadvertor to learn how to speak I hope he that poor Novice Athanasius looks on the Expression as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native sense I hope also that I may be allowed to vindicate this Phrase of that great Light of the Church from the Exceptions of a bold Animadvertor May I in the Name of Athanasius enquire of this great Critick which of these two words Fountain or Deity are to be interpreted Metaphorically That of Fountain is plainly Metaphorical Athanasius was never so weak as to believe that the Deity was a River of Waters and the Father the Fountain of it If the Animadvertor means that this term Deity is Metaphorical I must require his Proof and not his Affirmation Again neither Athanasius nor any of the Ancient Fathers ever intended by this Phrase that the Father is the Fountain of the Deity that he was the positive Fountain of the Divinity in his own Person any more than Philosophers and Divines mean that God was the cause of Himself when they say that God is of Himself Athanasius added to avoid the suspicion of such an absurd sense that he was unbegotten as well as the Fountain of the Deity What then is the fault of this Phrase of Athanasius Why alas poor Athanasius was unacquainted with the subtilties of the Schools He said plainly and bluntly that the Father was the Fountain of the Deity whereas he ought to have said Animadv c. p. 191. lin 10. That he was the Fountain of the two other Divine Persons To say
suppose some will object P. 78. lin 1. N. 8. That the Soul in a state of separation is not properly a Part for as much as it exists not in any Compound nor goes to the composition of it To which I answer That an actual inexistence in a Compound is not the only Condition which makes the thing a part but its essential relation to a Compound which relation is founded partly upon its original designation and partly upon its natural aptitude to be an ingredient in the constitution of a Compound This Objection lies very obvious That the Soul in a state of separation is a Person as subsisting by it self neither being a part in any Whole nor an adjunct to any Subject Animad c. p. 34. which is his own Definition of subsistence or personality The Animadverter answers That the Soul is then a part notwithstanding it exists in no whole Now in Logicks totum and pars whole and part are Relatives and mutually infer one another There can no more then be a Part without an actual Whole than a Son without a Father Adam was originally designed by God to be a Father and had a natural aptitude to become such What then Will the Animadverter or any one else affirm That he was a Father before he had a Son as the Animadverter here tells us That the Soul in a state of separation is a part tho there is no whole to which such part can belong However Secondly I confess that there is more of truth in this Answer than I believe the Animadverter was aware of viz. That when to be a Part and a Person are opposed as Contradictions We do not take this Term Part in a nice Logical sense of the Term but in a Physical sense for an incomplete Being which naturally requires to be compleated perfected by some other Co-part And thus his own Answer will be strongly retorted against himself viz. That an actual Inexistence in a Compound is not that which absolutely denies any thing to be a Person but its existing incompleatly in the Composition its Existence ad modum adjuncti instrumenti vel principii quo to some superior nature Now in this sense the WORD is not a Part the WORD is not perfected compleated by the Composition The Soul of Man is indeed compleated perfected in its Operations by the Composition is capable of the actions of sense by the Composition but yet the Soul is not perfected in its Metaphysical Suppositality the Soul is not less a principium quod of its own actions in the Composition than in a state of Separation N. 9. Thirdly This Socinian Objection falls as heavy upon the Socinians and the Animadverter in the instance of a Human Person Both will confess that the Soul is a Part and Man a Whole From whence in the Animadverter's words I argue A Whole compounded of Soul and Body as Man is and a Simple uncompounded Part as the Soul is can never be numerically one and the same Being for that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two Beings whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound Being as such including in it several Parts compounding it and a Simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if a Man while alive be one Being and his Soul after Death be a Being too it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Being with the Man And from these Premises I can also add P. 77. lin 1. That wheresoever there are two distinct Beings we do and must by all the Rules of Grammar and Logick say that one of them is not the other and where one is not the other we cannot in Truth or Justice say that one ought to account for what was done or not done by the other c. Let the Animadverter answer this and he answers himself A Simple and Compounded Person may as well be the same Person as a Simple and Compounded Being be the same Being These two differ modally and not really And now to return from the Mystery of the Incarnation N. 10. to that of the Sacred Trinity and to the Question the Animadverter is considering as preparatory to it viz. What is the Formal Reason of Personality in Finite Created Persons This is I confess a very proper Enquiry but there is another as proper that is unfortunately omitted by most who treat of this Sacred Mystery viz. Not what that is which strictly and formally denominates any Finite Being a Suppositum or Person but What that is which denominates it this particular Person These are two Questions What strictly and properly denominates Adam a Person And what that is which denominates him the singular Person of Adam To be a Human Person is a common indefinite universal Attribute but to be the Person of Adam is proper to the first Man That which strictly and properly denominates Adam a Person is a Mode of Subsistence totale Attributum the being a compleat Whole as the Fathers often speak That which denominates Adam the particular Person of Adam is unknown to us that which the Schoolmen call Haecceity cannot be defined Ancients and Moderns supply the place of the Individuating difference by a Collection of Accidents says Porphyry by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Personal Properties say the Ancient Fathers It is says the Author of Expositio Fidei the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Adam to be immediately formed by the hands of God to be the Husband of Eve the First Man the Father of Cain Abel Seth c. Again since the Formal Cause of any thing denominates that thing Res omnes communiter denominavi a suis formis sicut album ab albedine homo ab humanitate quare omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae Ut si dicam iste est indutus vestimento iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae formalis quamvis non sit forma Aquin. 1. Par. Q. 37. Art 2. of which it is the Formal Cause hence from what any thing is denominated that thing is conceived by us in the similitude of a Formal Cause nay and often so stiled In which sense * Porphyr Introd ad Arist Organon cap. 2. Porphyry says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Singulars or Individuals are so called for that each is constituted by certain Properties the Collection of which is in no other Individual Not that a Property or Proprium is a Form or Differentia but because it supplies the place of such in the imperfect description of Individuals To apply this to the Divine Persons 't is a double Enquiry What denominates the Father a Person and what denominates him the Person of the Father Subsistence totale Attributum denominates the Father a Person which is a common Attribute to Father Son and Holy Ghost Paternity to be unbegotten to send his Son c.
is justly esteemed by all the Moderns who follow the Schools one of the difficultest Objections against the Faith of the Trinity viz. that if three Humane Persons have three singular Humane Natures and consequently are so many Men why three Divine Persons should not also infer three singular Divine Natures and consequently be three Gods And the Answer that the School men and Moderns give is that the case is vastly different that the Unity of three Humane Persons is only Notional the Unity of the Divine Persons strictly real The Animadvertor himself p. 300. can tell you of a better Allusion and Similitude to the Union of the three Divine Persons The Vnion of Vnderstanding Memory and Will as one and the same Soul One simple Being with three Faculties is a nearer resemblance of one simple Being under three Relations than three simple Beings n. 6. But let us hear the Animadvertor himself explain this Argument p. 175. à minore ad majus If several individual Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature much less could this be said of the three Divine Persons To which I answer First Does the Animadvertor really believe that three Men cannot properly be said to have more than one Nature or not If he believes it What will become of his Objection that a Specifick Unity implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in the several Individuals What becomes of that famous Passage of his P. 270. that Substantiis Consubstantialibus will neither be Truth nor Sense I suppose he will not deny that several individual Men are Substantioe Substances in the plural Number nor yet that Consubstantialibus signifies of one Substance of one Nature I intreat him to answer this Question Are several Men Consubstantial or not Is Christ according to his Humanity Consubstantial with us Men or not Will he dare to say that the whole Catholick Church has neither spoke Truth nor Sense For the whole Church has ever professed a Belief of Christ's Consubstantiality with us Men. If the Animadvertor shall plead that it was the Sense of the Fathers that three Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature even that is sufficient for my purpose who am now enquiring only into the Judgment of the Fathers This is sufficient ad Hominem to the Animadvertor but for my Reader 's fuller Satisfaction I answer to the Point that so far as this Allegation is true 't is Impertinent and that so far as 't is pertinent 't is false 'T is an acknowledged Truth that the strictest Union that can be betwixt Humane Persons is but a resemblance an Allusion to that inseparable incomprehensible Union betwixt the Divine Persons But this is not the question concerning the Union of the Divine Persons indefinitely but concerning the Unity of their Nature The Fathers maintained that the Unity of the common Divine Nature was of the same kind and degree with the Unity of the common Humane Nature There is certainly a greater Union betwixt two Humane Persons who are dear and intimate Friends than betwixt two who are mortal Enemies There is a greater Union betwixt two Saints in Heaven than betwixt the best Friends on Earth And yet two mortal Enemies have the same Unity of Nature with the Saints in Heaven The Union of the Saints in Heaven is by our Saviour himself resembled to the Union of the Father and the Son John 17.22 That they may be one as we are one But these words no more denote an illimited equality than those other words of our Lord Matt. 5.48 Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect denote an equality in Perfection If we suppose three unbegotten unproduced Divine Persons three Fathers I cannot see how we can deny such to be Consubstantial since we acknowledge three Angelical Persons to be of one Nature and Substance yet three unbegotten Divine Persons three Fathers are to all the Ancient Fathers three Gods They did not therefore believe that a Specifick Unity was the only Unity of the Divine Persons that they were one upon no other account but if we can know their meaning by their words they did certainly believe a Specifick Unity And this I perswade my self the Animadvertor's Heart misgave him n. 7. He therefore comes in with a third Salvo p. 176. That he does not in the least deny but several Expressions may have dropped from the Fathers which if we looked no further might be drawn to a very inconvenient Sense That is in plain English several Expressions have dropped from them which assert if we look no further a Specifick Unity What from those Fathers who never alledged this Example as a parallel Instance but always used it by way of Allusion or à minore ad majus It seems the Animadvertor's always and never will bear an exception What Salvoe has he for this He gives it us in the following words But then also it is as little to be deny'd that the same Fathers professedly and designedly treating of the same Points here declared themselves in such terms as are very hardly if at all reconcileable to those occasional and accidental Expressions And therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from both it ought much rather to be taken from what was asserted by them designedly than what was asserted only occasionally Now it is well contrived to take the conclusion for granted he is to prove It seems that the Animadvertor would have things come to that pass that we must take his bare affirmation of a thing for a proof of it Petavius Dr. Cudworth the Reverend Dean of St. Paul's have asserted the quite contrary they have already equivalently denied it and the Animadvertor gives us his own ipse dixit that it is little to be denied Again the Animadvertor pretends no more than a difficulty or a doubt whether these designed expressions may not be reconciled to the occasional expressions The Animadvertor makes an if of it to him these latter are hardly if at all reconcileable with the former which is no great wonder since he believes tribus substantiis consubstantialibus to be neither truth nor sense since he believes a numerical Unity absolutely inconsistent with a Specifick Unity Lastly Why is the conclusion stronger than the premises Why does he make the conclusion positive Their meaning cannot be taken from both is the conclusion whereas the premises mentioned only a difficulty or a doubt They are hardly if at all reconcileable The Animadvertor was I believe n. 8. in some measure sensible of the weakness of these answers and therefore He provides a fourth Salvoe Ib. p. 176. viz. that the Orthodox Writers of the fourth and part of the fifth Century were chiefly exercised with the Arian Controversie And the Arians would not allow so much as a specifick Unity of Nature between the Father and the Son but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or sameness held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉