' em What Pleasure can there be in Life when Friendship is banished and what Friendship can there be among the Ungrateful This being granted we must consequently suppose Gratitude to be our chief Duty For tho he who gives pretends to nothing else than giving nevertheless he seems to expect that he who is thereby obliged should acknowledge the Favour and if he don't he will be unjust In Truth tho the Donor expects no reward yet he who receives the Kindness is not therefore free from the Ingagement that lies upon him to recompense his Benefactor by all good Offices Certainly if Hesiod will have us return as we say with Usury the Things that have only been lent us for a time With how much greater Reason saith Cicero ought we to be thankful when we have received more signal Obligations Ought we not to imitate those fruitful Fields that return much more than they receive And if we are Officious to them from whom we expect good Deeds how much more ought we to be to them who have already been kind to us and obliged us There are two sorts of Liberality the one is to give the other to restore 't is in our Power to give or not to give but not to restore is a thing not to be allowed of in an honest Man But suppose a Person is incapable you 'l say Seneca answers That he who is willing to return a good Deed does in effect do it for his good Will is a sufficient discharge of his Obligation He saith moreover That they who are obliged may not only equal but also surpass in good Will and Generosity those who give we may reward also the greatest Princes Lords and Kings either by affording to them faithful Counsel or by a constant attendance and by a pleasing Converse free from Flattery and yet delightful or by a serious Attention to what they propose when they consult about difficult Affairs or by a constant Fidelity when they intrust any Secret Propose the richest and the happiest Man in the World I will tell you what he wants viz. a cordial Friend to whom he may impart his most secret Thoughts Don't you perceive how great Men by confining the liberty of those who attend 'em and limiting their Trust to certain slavish Offices lose and cast themselves away because no Body about 'em dares freely impart their Thoughts either to incline them to what is for their advantage or to persuade them from what tends to their hurt There is no Mischief nor Calamity but they are liable to from the very Moment that they are barr'd from hearing the Truth You may ask What good you can do to a prosperous Person Persuade him not to trust to his Prosperity Will it not be a good Office that you do him when you shall cause him to quit this foolish Confidence and let him see that this Power that he has may not always continue the same And that the Things that Fortune bestows are flitting and inconstant oftner flying away faster than they come You don't understand the value and true worth of Friendship if you don't perceive that in bestowing a Friend you bestow the most excellent Gift the World can afford and who is never more useful and necessary than where all Things are in great plenty and abundance But not to insist longer upon this Aristotle offers two or three Questions upon this Point First Whether Beneficence is to be esteemed or valued according to the advantage of him who receives or according to the Liberality of him who bestows it He Answers That in the Kindnesses that are done for advantage and which are grounded upon Profit these are to be valued by the advantage of him who receives 'em because he is in want and he who does them performs 'em but upon Condition to have the same returned But in Friendships and Kindnesses that are established upon Virtue we must measure or compute the good Deed by the good Will of the Donor because where Virtue is concerned the intention is chiefly to be considered therefore whether any gives much or little the Gift or Kindness is to be esteem'd great for the great Affection or extraordinary good Will of the Party giving The Second Question Why those who give have a greater affection for the Party they give to than the other hath for the giver To this he Answers That the cause is not as some suppose for that the Donor is as the Creditor and the other as the Debtor and because the Debtor wishes for the Death of the Creditor but the Creditor the Life and Health of the Debtor but because the Benefactor is as the Artificer who loves more his own Works than they should be otherwise beloved again if they were alive which is to be seen among Poets who love the Offspring of their Brain as tenderly as the Offspring of their Body And they who receive a good Deed are as it were the handy Work of him who gives The Third Why there is no Law to indite an ungrateful Person This Crime says he which is universal is truly punished by none tho disapproved by all But as the valuation of an uncertain Thing would be very difficult we have only condemned it to an universal dislike and hatred leaving it among those Things which we have referred to the Justice and Vengeance of the Gods Besides 't is not convenient that all ungrateful Persons should be known lest the vast number of those who are stained with this Vice should lessen the Shame of the Crime and lastly 't is no small Punishment that an ungrateful Person dares not desire a good turn from another whom he has disobliged and that he is taken notice of and condemn'd by all the World As to what remains to be treated of here concerning Affability sweetness of Temper Civility and such like Virtues they may be sufficiently understood by what hath been mentioned already about Gentleness and Mildness We shall finish this Treatise with a Passage out of Seneca which contains the Sum of all moral Duties What do we do saith he what Precepts do we enjoyn What a small matter is this not to hurt him whom we ought to serve This is a worthy business indeed for a Man to be kind and loving to his Fellow-Creature Shall we make Laws for a Man to hold out his helping Hand to one Shipwreckt and ready to sink or to direct him that is wandring and hath lost his Way or to divide our Bread to him that perisheth for Hunger To what purpose is it to reckon at large what is to be done seeing I can comprehend the whole Duties of Mankind in few Words This great All which thou seest and which contains all Things divine and human is but One we are the Members of this great Body Nature hath made us all Related and a Kin by bringing us forth from the same Principles and of the same Elements 'T is Nature hath given us a mutual Affection
hurts wilfully that is to say knowing to whom in what manner and how he injures From whence it follows that because 't is one thing to suffer an unjust Act or to receive Damage and another to suffer an injury a Man may willingly suffer an unjust Act but not suffer an injury For that Reason Aristotle observes that we define a Man who doth an injury He who hurts knowing to whom in what manner and how he hurts yet that is not sufficient but we must add this particular Against the Will of him whom he hurts This being supposed in the first place 't is impossible that we should do injury to our selves or that a Man should receive an injury from himself for a Man may do a damage to himself and act against his own advantage but not do an injury because the same Person is both Agent and Patient he acts and suffers willingly But we must nevertheless remember what we have already said and shall have occasion to mention again hereafter That he who wishes Evil to himself as he who desires his own death or kills himself wishes for it not as an Evil he desires not death as it is the destruction of Life but as it is some Advantage that is to say as 't is the end of the Evils from which he desires to be delivered and so he looks upon it as a considerable Benefit It is likewise certain according to that kind of Maxim Volenti non fit injuria that no injury can be done to him who consents and approves of it For as we have already said no man can suffer an injury but against his Will because as the injury is in it self an Evil it cannot be look'd upon as Good or the cause of any Good 'T is true it may be a Crime in him who takes the Goods of another though this other by mistake may seem to be consenting to it as for Example If he be frightned into a Consent under some pretence if he be deluded into it by fair Promises if he be flatter'd into it by Craft if he works upon his Weakness or the easiness of his Temper or if he conceals from him the true Value of the thing without afterward informing him of his Error and so of the rest but as for him who knowingly and willingly gives away his Goods consents that they may be taken this Man cannot be judged to receive an injury but a damage But since both doing and suffering injury is an Evil if you inquire which of the two is the worst Aristotle will readily resolve you that it is in doing an injury for that cannot be done without Injustice Therefore Plato gives us this Advice That we should be more careful to avoid doing an injury than suffering it Besides tho' he who receives any damage tho' he receives it not against his Will he who doth the mischief or wrong if he designs to do an injury is not in such a case excusable because it was not for want of his Will that the damage did not prove an injury Seneca explains this matter very well It may happen saith he that a Man may offer me an injury and that I may not receive it as if any one should put into my House what he had taken out of my Farm he had been guilty of a Theft and yet I may have lost nothing thereby If any one lies with his own Wife and believes her to be the Wife of another he is an Adulterer though the Woman be not Some body hath given me Poison but as it happens to be mixed with other Ingredients it hath lost its Operation he who hath administred the Poison is a Murderer though no mischief is done by it All designed Crimes are in respect of the Sin done and effected before the act is accomplished CHAP. IX Of the Virtues which accompany Justice namely of Religion of Piety of Observance Love Bounty Liberality Gratitude And first of Religion THere are two main Causes or Reasons why God ought to be Worship'd and Ador'd the First is the supreme excellency of his Nature the Second his Bounty to us First they who stile him most Good and most Great Optimum Maximum had doubtless these two Reasons in view because as he is most Good he is the most liberal and sovereign Benefactor and as he is most Great he is supremly Excellent So that we may very well approve of Epicurus's Maxim and say That God ought to be Honoured purely for himself without any further Expectation but only because of his supreme Majesty and of his sovereign Nature for that that is most Excellent deserves to be Reverenced and Honoured But yet with him to acknowledge no other Cause and notwithstanding to disown his Bounty is what cannot be too much blamed for as Seneca tells him very well Thou dost not acknowledge the Favours and Blessings of God but supposest that as it were at a far Distance and out of the noise of the Affairs of the World he enjoys a profound Rest and interrupted Felicity without being concerned for the good Deeds of Men any more than for the evil He who teacheth this Doctrin does not consider the Sighs and ardent Desires of those who pray from all parts of the World and with Hands lifted up towards Heaven make Vows either publick or private which certainly would not easily be nor is it easily to be suppos'd that the generality of Mankind would of their own accord fall into such a stupid Madness as to address themselves to deaf and senseless Divinities to no purpose They ought to have understood that the Gods sometimes deny and sometimes grant our Requests out of their bountiful Goodness and that often they assist us so powerfully and so seasonably that they divert the great Mischiefs and Calamities that threatned us Where is that Man so miserable so forsaken and under such unhappy Circumstances who hath not at some time experienced this great Bounty and Liberality of the Gods If you look upon them who lament and grieve for their ill Fortune and tire themselves in complaining you will meet with none but Heaven hath bestowed upon him some Favours some Drops of that large Fountain of Goodness have fallen upon him Ay but God saith he does us no Good From whence then comes all those things that thou possessest that thou bestowest that thou refusest that thou keepest and that thou receivest From whence proceed that vast number of grateful Objects that delight thine Eyes thine Ears and thy Mind He hath not only provided things needful his Love hath proceeded farther to furnish us with things Pleasant and Delightful with many pleasant Fruits wholesome Herbs and nourishing Meats for Food which succeed one another according to their Seasons The most careless ever and anon stumble upon some of 'em without labour or toil 'T is God who hath created for us all the several sorts of Creatures either upon the Earth or in the Waters or in the Air that
out the strangest means to deliver our selves from it and to procure our Death Et saepe usque adeo mortis formidine vitae Percipit ingratos odium lucisque videnda Vt sibi conciscant moerenti pectore lethum But this extraordinary Fear causeth by degrees a certain kind of Melancholy which depresseth the Heart enfeebles the Spirits and obstructs all the operations of Life It stops Digestion and draws upon us many Diseases that are the immediate Causes of Death However the Opinion of the Stoicks is not only contrary to the Sacred Precepts of our Religion but is also contrary to Nature and right Reason We must except some certain Persons who being directed by a Particular and Divine Instinct have been instrumental in procuring their own Deaths as Samson and others in the Old-Testament and Sophronia and Pelagia since the New for Nature furnishes all sorts of Animals with a Natural love of Life and there is none besides Man let them be tormented with never so grievous pain but labours to preserve Life as much as they can and to avoid Death This is a sign that none but Man doth by his mistaken Opinions corrupt the Institution of Nature when he refuseth the benefit of Life and advanceth his Death he acts then by a wickedness peculiar to himself for the true state of Nature is to be consider'd in the general body of the Creatures and not in some few individuals of one single Species that hasten their own destruction and cast away themselves before the time appointed by Nature From hence we may conclude that such are injurious to God and Nature who being design'd and order'd to perform a certain Race stop in the middle of their Course of their own accord and who being appointed to watch forsake and abandon their Post without waiting for Orders from their Superiors Besides Reason forbids us to be Cruel against the Innocent who never did us any harm and by consequence it don't allow that we should act inhumanly upon our selves from whom we never experienced any Hatred but rather too much Love Moreover upon what occasion can our Vertue appear more conspicuous than in suffering Courageously the Evils that our hard Fortune imposes upon us To die saith Aristotle because of our Poverty or for Love or for some other mischievous accident is not the act of a Man of Spirit and Courage but of a mean and timorous Soul for it is the part of a weak Mind to shun and flye from things hard to be endured Stout Men saith Curtius are wont to despise Death rather than to hate Life 'T is the trouble and impatience of Suffering that carries the Cowards to base Actions that makes them despised and scorned Vertue leaves nothing unattempted and Death is the last thing with which we must Encounter but not as timerous lazy and unwilling Souls I shall not here stay to examin the Opinion of those who imagining saith Lactantius that the Souls are Eternal have therefore kill'd themselves as Cleanthes Chrysippus and Zeno expecting to be transported at the same time to Heaven or as Empedocles who cast himself in the Night into the Flames of Mount-Aetna that by disappearing so suddenly the World might think that he was gone to the Gods or as Cato who was during his Life-time a Follower of the vanity of the Stoicks who before he kill'd himself as it is Reported had read Plato 's Book of the Eternity of the Soul or finally as Cleombrotus who after he had read the same Book cast himself down a Precipice This is a Cursed and Abominable Doctrin that drives Men out of their Lives Neither shall I trouble my self with that Cyrenaick of Hegesius who Disputed so Elegantly concerning the Miseries of Life and the Blessed Place of the Souls after Death that King Ptolomy was forced to forbid him to speak in Publick because so many of his Disciples after they had heard him destroyed themselves as Cicero Reports and some others For the Evils that we indure in this Life may happen to be so great and increase in such a manner that when the time of Death is come the loss of Life may not be unpleasant and that in such a Case Death may be esteem'd as the Haven that shelters us from the Miseries and Torments of Life But to aggravate our Afflictions so far as to beget in us a scorn and hatred of Life is to be injurious and unthankful to Nature as if the Gift of Life that hath been bestowed upon us for our use were to be rashly cast away or as if we were not to accept of it any longer nor honestly and quietly to enjoy it as long as is possible 'T is true what Theognis said formerly That it were much better for Men not to be Born or to Die as soon as they are Born is a Celebrated Saying Non nasci res est mortalibus optima longe Nec Solis radiis acre videre Jubar Aut natum Ditis quamprimum lumen adire This is confirmed by the Example of Cleobis of Biton of Agamedes of Pindarus and of some others who having Petitioned the Gods to grant to them the thing which was best and most desirable were admitted to this great favour To die in a short time Answerable to this is the Custom of the Thracians who wept at the Birth of their Children but Congratulated the Happiness of such as Died. Not to mention Menander who wish'd a young Man dead because he was well beloved by the Gods Quem diligunt Dii Juvenis ipse interit Nor to say any thing of that Famous Sentence Vitam nemo acciperet si daretur scientibus That no body would accept of Life willingly if it were given to them that knew what it were But pray who will believe that Theognis and the rest have spoken seriously and without any Restriction I say without any Restriction for if they would have it that it is better for such only who are to be miserable all their Lives that they had not been Born or to have Died at the very moment of their Birth the Saying might be tolerable and allowable but to speak this in relation to all Men is to affront Nature the Mistriss both of our Life and Death that hath ordered and appointed our Birth and our Dissolution as she hath all other things for the preservation of the Universe It were to expose our selves to be contradicted if not by all yet by the most part of Men who are not weary of Life but seek to preserve it as carefully as they can For Life as we have already observed hath something in it very pleasing and lovely therefore he that speaks in this manner shall feel himself bound and held fast and I am apt to believe that he may be like the Old Man in Aesop who sent Death back again tho' he had often called for it before or like another who refused to make use of the Dagger that he had desired to be
respect of it self always exalted and content If so you may then say that you are arrived to the most accomplish'd pitch of Happiness that Men are capable of But if you are still in pursuit of all sorts of Pleasures and seek them every where know that in such a case you want as much Wisdom as content You desire to attain this Chief Happiness but you are deceived if you expect to procure it by the means of Riches if you seek Delight amongst Honours 't is to seek it amongst Cares and Troubles That which you fancy will give you Pleasure is the Origin and Cause of a thousand Torments Pleasure and Content are the Universal desire of all Men but they generally are ignorant of the Methods how to obtain such Content as may be fix'd and permanent Some seek it in Feastings and Luxury others in Riches and Great Offices and Dominion others in the Favors and Smiles of their Dalilah's others in a vain ostentation of their Learning and Parts which oftentimes stand the Soul in little stead Their short-liv'd and deceitful Pastimes delude them such as Ebriety which for the seeming Pleasure of an hour causeth many Months of real Sorrow and Trouble Or the Applauses and Acclamations of the People which we have already purchased by much unquietness and which will not fail to draw upon us as much more Remember therefore that a Wise-Man ought to procure to himself such a satisfaction of Mind as is always firm constant and equal His Soul ought to be like that part of the World above the Moon where a continual Serenity reigns You have reason therefore to endeavour to be Wise seeing the Wise-Man is always full of Content This satisfaction proceeds from his own Conscience and from his knowledge of being a vertuous Man It is impossible to enjoy this quiet unless we be Just Magnanimous and Temperate But what will you say Don't Fools and Wicked Men rejoyce No more than Lyons when they have found a Prey When such have spent the Night in Debauchery when they have gorged themselves with Wine and consumed their strength in the Converse of Women and that their Stomachs can no longer contain the quantity of Meats they have devoured they may then well cry out What miserable Wretches are we We now plainly perceive that this Night hath been spent in vain and deceitful Pleasures Námque ut supremam falsa inter gaudia noctem Egerimus nosti The Joys and Pleasures of the Gods and of those that imitate 'em are never interrupted and never have an end Their satisfaction would fail if it came from without That which Fortune never gave it can never take from us That the Pains and Pleasures of the Mind are greater than those of the Body THE last difference that Laertius puts between Epicurus and Aristippus is that as Aristippus esteems the Pains of the Body greater and more troublesom than those of the Mind he supposes likewise the Pleasures of the Body much greater and more considerable than those of the Mind whereas Epicurus is of a contrary Opinion In the Body saith he we can feel only things present but the Mind can be sensible of things past and to come 'T is manifest that a great degree of Pleasure or an extream Affliction of the Mind contributes more to an happy or to an unhappy Life than much Pleasure or much Pain of the Body If the painful Diseases of the Body imbitter the sweetness of our Lives those of the Mind ought to render it much more unhappy Now the Principal Distempers of the Mind are the greedy extravagant Desires of Riches of Glory of Dominion of Sordid and Unlawful Pleasures Moreover the Disturbances Gripings and Sorrows that overwhelm the Mind those anxious Cares that consume it c. This seems to be what Ovid thought when he upbraids us because we can readily undergo the scorching heat of the Fire the sharpnesess of Iron and the trouble of Thirst to free our selves from some Distempers of the Body but to heal the Mind which is of a far greater value we scruple to suffer any thing Vt Corpus redimas ferrum patieris ignes Arida nec sitiens ora lavabis aqua Vt valeas Animo quicquam tolerare negabis At pretium pars haec Corpore majus habet And I suppose Horace had the same Fancy in the forementioned Passage Nam cur Quae feriant oculos festinas demere si quid Est animum differs curandi tempus in annum Truly as the Soul is infinitely more Noble than the Body and according to the Opinion of Aristotle it alone makes up almost the entire Man it must therefore necessarily be much more susceptible as well of the impressions of Good of Pleasure and Delight as of Evil Trouble and Disquietness Besides the Diseases of the Mind are so much the more dangerous than the Diseases of the Body because these have signs to make us understand them but the other are often concealed from us for our Reason that ought to ponder them is disturb'd and cannot make a right estimation Therefore such as are Sick in Body seek a Remedy from Physick but such as are Distemper'd in Mind from Philosophy yet will not obey its Directions Again amongst the Diseases of the Body those are the greatest and the most dangerous of all which cast us into a slumber and are not felt by the Patient as a Lethargy the Falling-Sickness and that burning Fever which causeth a Dilirium Now there is scarce any Distemper of the Mind but ought to be reckon'd of as dangerous a Consequence and the rather because they are not known to be what they are and oftimes are covered over with a fair shew and pretence of contrary Vertues for Example Fury and Wrath are stiled Courage Fear and Cowardise usurp the name of Prudence In short Discontent which is a grief of the Mind and a Distemper which generally causeth the other Diseases to be more unpleasant sad and troublesom affects nothing more than to seem to be taken and caused not without great Provocation and just Resentments Neither are we to pretend with Aristippus That Criminals are commonly punished with Pains and bodily Torments as being more severe and uneasy to be undergone For as the Legislator or the Judge hath not the same power over the Mind as over the Body so it is as true that he cannot appoint that the Offender should be tortured in his Mind but in his Body that so a visible Punishment might be inflicted upon the Offender whereby the People might be kept in stricter awe from Offending But it follows not from thence that there is no greater pain than that or that the pain of the Mind may not be a more grievous Torment Besides when a Man is really under the actual sufferings of the Body or when he supposes that he shall shortly be so he fancies in his Mind that he shall be tied to the Rack or perhaps that his Head shall be
lest by shunning of these they might fall into greater From hence we may learn that Debauchery is not to be shunn'd for its own sake nor Sobriety to be desired because it declines some Pleasures but because it procureth greater and more substantial ones We shall find the same Arguments for Fortitude for it is neither Labour nor Pain nor Patience nor Constancy nor Industry nor Courage nor Watchfulness that draw us of themselves but we are perswaded by these actions that we may live without Trouble or Fear and that we might free our selves as much as is possible from that which incommodes either the Mind or the Body for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is disturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death and it is a miserable thing to be oppress'd with Pain and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage insomuch that by this weakness of Spirit many have lost their Parents many their Friends and many their Native Country nay have altogether lost themselves But a generous stout and couragious Spirit is free from such Cares and Troubles because it despiseth Death and is so provided to receive Grief and Pain that it knows the greatest are cur'd by Death and the least have divers intervals of Rest and that as for moderate Griefs we are Masters of them Besides a noble Spirit considers that if the Pains be not extraordinary they are easily suffered but if they be very grievous we shall then willingly surrender and quit our Life which in such a case becomes unpleasant to us so that we leave it in the same manner as we go off a Theatre From hence we may conclude that Fear and Cowardise are not in themselves blame-worthy neither do Courage and Patience of themselves merit Praise But the first are slighted because they increase Pain and Sorrow and the other are desired because they procure real Pleasure There remains nothing else to be examin'd but Justice of which we may almost say the same For as I have already demonstrated that Wisdom Temperance and Fortitude are so joyned with Pleasure that they cannot be separated from it we ought to say the same of Justice which is not only inoffensive to all Men but does also constantly bring with it such advantages as by the strength of its own nature does quiet and settle the Thoughts by affording continual hopes of never wanting those things which an honest Mind may desire And as Timerousness Covetousness and Cowardise do perpetually torment the Mind and are continually vexing and disturbing its quiet So where Injustice bears sway in the Soul it begets much Trouble and Vexation and if it hath committed any evil action tho' never so secretly yet it can never be assured that it shall always remain undiscover'd Jealousy and fear of being found out do commonly attend evil Actions and we suppose every one to be our Accuser and ready to Inform against us Nay some out of fear of being Discovered have been their own Accusers If some think their Riches a sufficient shelter and capable of quieting their Conscience yet they have such a dread of the Justice of God in punishing their Crimes that upon a due resentment of this their Thoughts labour under a perpetual Agony and Disturbance Now their wicked Actions can never be able so much to lessen the anxiety of their Life as the gripings of a Wounded Conscience or the Laws of the Country and the hatred of their Acquaintance have to increase it Nevertheless such is the unsatiable desire of some Men after Riches Luxury Honour Dominion c. that in the obtaining of them they will stick at no indirect Means so that nothing but a severe Punishment inflicted on them by the Laws is able to stop their Career True Reason therefore directs all Men of sound Judgment to observe the Rules of Justice Equity and Fidelity which are the best means to procure to our selves the good Esteem and Love of others and which is absolutely necessary to render our Lives Pleasant and Sedate And the rather because hereby we have no temptation to do what is ill because that the desires which proceed from Nature may easily be appeased without doing wrong to any Person and as for other vain Desires we are not to regard them for they prompt us to nothing that is really worthy seeking after and Injustice it self brings a greater damage to us than the recompence it can be able to make us by the seeming good things it brings along with it Therefore we cannot say That Justice is of it self desirable but only because it is attended with a great deal of Pleasure and Content for we are not a little pleased with the esteem and good will of others which renders our Life Comfortable and Pleasant Thus we don't believe that we ought to shun Vice only because of the inconveniencies that fall upon the Wicked but chiefly because it never suffers the Mind to be at rest where it hath once taken possession I might here mention the Objections that are brought against this Opinion but they relate to nothing but sensual and dishonest Pleasures which Epicurus abhors in express words I will only take notice that the Pleasure that is here understood is such true real and natural Pleasure in which our Happiness consists We therefore say That Vertue is inseparably accompanied with it being the real and genuine cause of it for where that is supposed Happiness immediately attends and when that is removed Pleasure it self must needs decay In the same manner as the Sun is said to be inseparable from the Day because it alone is the true and necessary cause thereof for as soon as the Sun appears over our Horizon the Day must needs be and when it withdraws the Day dis-appears Now the reason why Epicurus supposes Vertue to be the efficient cause of Happiness is because he thinks that Prudence doth as it were contain all other Vertues for all the rest proceed from this and have in a great measure a dependence upon her CHAP. III. Wherein an Happy Life doth consist WHat we have already discours'd of tends to little else than to make a plain discovery of Epicurus's Opinion But now we must come closer to the Matter and strictly examin whether he had sufficient ground to say That Pleasure is the main End Here we must weigh two of his chief Maxims First That all Pleasure is of it self and of its own nature a real Good and on the contrary That all Grief and Pain is an Evil. The Second is That notwithstanding sometimes we must prefer some sort of Pains before some sort of Pleasures Whether all Pleasure be good of it self IN respect of the first Maxim It is not without ground that Epicurus asserts That all Pleasure is of it self good tho' by accident it happens sometimes otherwise for all Creatures are of themselves so inclinable to Pleasure and Delight that it is the first and chief thing that they naturally covet nor
means to be made strait But Aristotle answers That it is not convenient to entertain them with these kind of Discourses because when it concerns us as in the case of the Passions and Actions we give not so much credit to the Words as to the Thing it self From whence it happens that when the Words agree not with what the Senses apprehend they are despised and tho' they comprehend something that is good yet they are thereby baffled Therefore Aristotle seems to intimate That it is more reasonable not to place the Pleasures amongst the Evils seeing the Senses are of a contrary persuasion and when they are barely look'd upon as Pleasures they approve of them and judge them good but it is more reasonable to discover and lay open the Evils that frequently accompany such Pleasures which cause a prudent and considering Man to abstain from them lest he being tempted thereby should be drawn into so great Mischiefs If these Answers of Aristotle will not satisfie nothing can hinder us from exclaiming against Pleasure it self supposing those to be Pleasures which cause much more Evil than they procure Good For when it concerns us to persuade it is the same thing to say That Pleasure or the Action that accompanies the Pleasure is Wicked to conclude that we are therefore to shun it by reason of the Evils which infallibly attend and proceed from both Whether the Opinion of the Stoicks in respect of Good and Evil be Justifiable WE might here enter into a large Field of Dispute with the Stoicks who pretend That there is nothing Good but that which is Honest and nothing Evil but that which is Dishonest But hereby we should only trifle away our time in unnecessary Disputes for in short it is manifest that they have rais'd a Dispute about the bare Name when at the same time they have limited and confined the thing it self viz. the Notion of Good according to their own Fancy which all Mankind besides take in a large Sense For whereas other Men place several things besides Vertues in the number of good things as Health Pleasure Glory Riches Friends c. And besides Vices they reckon several other things amongst Evils as Sickness Pain Shame Poverty Enemies c. The Stoicks have rather named these things Indifferent or neither Good nor Evil. But this seems very absurd and contradictory to take Health and Sickness Pleasure and Pain for the same things c. They have endeavoured to feign new Words and call Health Pleasure Glory and other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Promota Assistants As if they should say that they were not really Good but such things as did approach the nearest to Vertue and lead us to that which is the chief and only Good The same Fancy they have had of Diseases and Pain they have named them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abducta remota As if they should say that they were things less Noble and separated from Vertue for when it concerns us to make a Choice those are preferred and these are forsaken This is their way of Discourse which I think not worth Answering any otherwise than as Cicero doth when he cries out O the great strength of Mind and the brave Subject to raise a new Doctrin O magnam vim ingenii causamque justam cur nova existeret disciplina The Stoicks argue and with their weak Reasonings would maintain That Pain is no Evil Concludunt ratiunculis Stoici cur dolor non sit malum c. As if Men were only troubled about the Word and not the Thing Wherefore must you Zeno deceive me with your subtil Niceties and new coin'd Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when you tell me that what looks grievous is no Evil you put me at a stand I would desire to know how that which seems to me most prejudicial and hurtful is no Evil in it self Nothing is Evil as you pretend but that which is Dishonest and Vicious These are but Words neither can you hereby remove the difficulty I understand very well that Pain and Grief are not criminal Evils You need not trouble your self to tell me that but shew me whether it be an indifferent thing to suffer Pain or to be free from it You say That it is indifferent as to the Happiness of Life seeing that consists in Vertue alone But in the mean while what you call Pain is to be reckoned amongst those things that you are to avoid and by consequence is an Evil. When you pretend that Pain is no real Evil but only something uneasie to be suffered c. It is to speak at large what all the World besides name in one word Evil. And when you say That there is nothing Good but what is Honest and nothing Evil but what is Dishonest it is to vanquish in Words but not in Sense it is to express Desires and prove Nothing Doubtless this is an undeniable Truth All that Nature hates ought to be esteem'd in the number of Evils and all that is grateful to it is to be reckoned on the contrary Whether at any time Pain ought to be preferr'd before Pleasure THE Second thing to be Examin'd before we conclude about Epicurus's Opinion is Whether we should sometimes avoid Pleasure to embrace Pain This Question depends very much upon the former for if any Pleasure offers it self of that sort which Plato calls Pure and disengaged from any mixture of Grief and Trouble that is to say such as is never to be succeeded by any future Pain neither in this Life nor in that which is to come or if any Pain offers it self such as may be stiled Pure and free from any Pleasure that is such as can never be supposed to yield any Satisfaction No Man can give any reason why such a Pleasure ought not to be accepted and such a Pain avoided But if any Pleasure offer it self which might hinder us from obtaining a greater or which will be attended by a Pain that may cause us to repent the suffering our selves to be drawn away to it or if a Pain offers it self which may turn away a greater or which may be followed by a Pleasure very great there is no Reason can persuade us the shunning such a Pleasure and embracing such a Pain Therefore Aristotle observes That Pleasure and Pain are the Criteria or distinguishing Marks by which we ought to judge whether any thing is to be accepted or avoided Now any Wise Man will decline Pleasure and embrace Pain if he sees that Repentance will follow or that by admitting a little Pain he may avoid a greater But Torquatus plainly clears the Doubt And to the end we may easily see from whence the Mistake arises among those who accuse Pleasure and approve of Pain I will briefly tell you how it is and expound unto you what that Author of Truth and Encourager of an happy Life hath said No Man despises hates or shuns Pleasure because it is
just and lawful Moderation It is not without Reason that this Desire is Judg'd to be Natural for we may see it appear very early in Children and the very Bruits themselves are governed by it Nay tho' some may seem to neglect and despise yet there is no body that can absolutely and altogether free themselves from the desire of it 'T is also very requisite that it should be so highly esteem'd for it is commonly proposed as the reward of Vertue and that there is neither Kingdom nor Common-wealth but encourages their Subjects to Noble Actions by the expectation of it There is likewise this difference between a Noble Generous Mind and a base and mean Spirit that whereas the latter seeks nothing but Gain and Profit in the Undertakings the former desires nothing but Glory and Renown Besides Experience teacheth us and all Ages can Witness That where we remove from the minds of Men the desire of Honour and Glory there is never any mention made of those great Exploits by which Kingdoms are obtain'd Now this being supposed we may here take notice of two sorts of Pleasure for which Honour is desirable The First is that extraordinary Satisfaction that a Man expects to receive when his Fame shall be spread abroad and he shall become Renowned in the World The Story of Damocles is not unknown and the hopes that he proposed to himself of an unexpressible Joy for the Royal Honours they would bestow upon him And that of Demosthenes is no less Remarkable This Great Man confesseth ingenuously That he was well pleased to hear a mean Woman coming from a Fountain whisper softly to her Friend There is Demosthenes pointing at him with her Finger And we may without any wrong to Vertue believe the same of other Illustrious Men when in their Walks they hear themselves named and the People say of them publickly There is Chappellus the finest Wit of the Kingdom Here is Despreaux the Horace of our Age the everlasting speaker of Truths There is that famous Racinus who by the charming efficacy of his Verses knows when he Pleases how to force us to Weep Here is the Learned and unparallel'd Lady Sabbiere How pleasant is it to be thus taken Notice of in the World for some Perfection and pointed at by eminent Persons At pulchrum est digito monstrari dicier hic est And we know what is reported of Themistocles when after a notable Victory he observed That all the Spectators neglecting the publick Pomp had their Eyes wholly fixed upon him which transported him with so great Joy that he could not forbear thus to express himself This day says he I receive sufficient recompence for all the Toils that I have undergone for Greece The other sort of Pleasure that carries Men to the desire of Honour is that great Security that attends us the enjoyment of which is so pleasant and the rather because he that lives in a perfect and entire Security finds himself in power to act what seemeth him good and to enjoy all the Pleasures that he fancies without any controll Now we easily believe that Security is obtained by Honour because Honour is bestowed for Vertue 's sake or because of Offices and Performances that suppose Vertue to be there If it be for Vertue 's sake then it is certainly free from Contempt and the Reverenced Person can by no means sink into that Estate which is exposed to Injuries and Affronts If it be for the sake of Offices or Dignities and consequently for some Advantage expected or some Evil that we dread even for that cause we look upon them commonly as a great and strong Support But herein we may find this difference That the Honour that is rendred for the sake of Dignities is more Splendid and taking with the Common People therefore we see a great many very desirous of Dignities and noble Employments and very few look after Vertue As if those who are promoted to Dignities had wherewith they may Injure some and Pleasure others and therefore can secure themselves from the Power of some by Hope and of others by Fear CHAP. IV. What Advantage Moral Vertue procures NOw to mention something of Vertue it self Aristotle and Cicero declare Wonders about the delights and pleasures of Knowledge and Learning which make the first part of Moral Vertue Nature saith Aristotle the common Parent stirs up and gives unspeakable Pleasures to such as can attain to understand the Causes of things and study Philosophy truly and to purpose If we cannot without Delight look upon the bare Images of Nature because in casting our Eyes upon them we behold the ingenuity and skill of the Painter or the Graver that made them How much more ought the Contemplation of Nature it self and of its admirable Wisdom and Contrivances to fill our Minds with Joy and Satisfaction Cicero also speaks of it to no less Advantage The Consideration saith he and Contemplation of Nature is the real and natural Food of the Soul It is that which raiseth and elevates our Thoughts for when we think upon the Coelestial things which are so Great Large and of such a vast Extent we despise these here below as Mean and of no Value Seneca's Expressions are no less Remarkable O! how Contemptible is Man saith he if he raiseth not himself above Human things We may say That then the Spirit of Man hath attain'd to its greatest Happiness that its Nature is capable of when it hath trampled upon all Vice and raiseth it self to sublime Matters and searches into the Secrets of Nature 'T is then that walking among the Coelestial Orbs it disdains the green Fields and all the Gold that the Earth produces for our covetous Posterity There are above us spacious Heavens which our Souls take then Possession of When it is there arrived it is nourish'd and increases and being free'd from its Earthly Prison it returns to its first Principle for it is a certain sign of its being of a Divine Nature that the Divine Objects are pleasing to it which it looks upon not as belonging to others but as its own Here it will not be amiss to mention the Pleasures and Transports of Joy that the Mathematical Sciences cause Plutarch relates That Eudoxius would have been willing to have been Burnt as Phaeton was if he could first have been admitted to approach so near the Sun as to have a full inspection of its Figure Greatness and Beauty The same Author tells us That Pythagoras was so ravish'd with Joy when he had found that famous Theorem which is the Forty seventh of Euclid's Book that immediately he offered a solemn Sacrifice He writes also of Archimedes That many times they have been forced to divert him from his deep Contemplations Nay so great a Pleasure he found in them that his excess of Joy was like to have cost him his Life when by laborious and tedious Study he had arrived to discover how much Brass might be mingled
in that Crown of Gold which the King had Dedicated to the Gods He thereupon as he was going out of the Bath transporred with Joy cried out 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is nothing saith Cicero more Pleasant than the sweet repose of a Learned Old Age. We see Gallus your Father's Friend dying for Joy in the Speculation of the Stars and measuring the Heavens and the Earth How many times hath he Surpriz'd him from Morning until the Evening when he had undertaken to describe something of the Stars And how many a Night hath he found him in the Evening when he had begun from the Morning O what Pleasure did he take to foretell the Eclipses of the Sun and Moon For the other Liberal Arts it is known what Recreation the Knowledg of History and Antiquity the Beauty of Poetry and the Grace of Rhetorick give These Studies saith Cicero are delightful Employments for Youth are pleasing to Old Age are Ornaments in Prosperity and a grateful security in Adversity Haec studia Adolescentiam alunt Senectutem oblectant secundas res ornant adversis perfugium solatium praebent delectant domi non impudiunt foris pernoctant nobiscum peregrinantur rusticantur They afford Pleasure at Home they are not Troublesom to us Abroad they continue with us Sleeping they accompany us in our Travels they go along with us in the Fields How mean are the delights of Banquetting of Plays of Women when compared with these Pleasures Men freely spend whole days and nights in pursuit of Learning and think no pains too great to be bestowed in obtaining it so great and exquisit is the Pleasure thereof when acquired Omnia prepetiuntur ipsa cognitione scientia capti cum maximis curis laboribus compensant eam quam ex discendo capiunt voluptatem For the other part of Vertue which is commonly called Moral Vertue we shall be obliged hereafter to treat of it more at large where we shall speak of its four Kinds viz. Prudence Fortitude Temperance and Justice Only supposing at present that 't is an undoubted Truth That there is nothing more Pleasant than to lead a Life not liable to Reproach a Life that 's Innocent and void of Offence free from the Checks and Remorses of a guilty Conscience and so to govern all our Actions according to the Rules of Honesty and Prudence as not to fail in any of the Duties of Life to wrong no Body to do good to every one as much as is possible Suppose I say such Maxims to be True which we shall have hereafter occasion to mention I shall here take notice of three things First That it is not without great Reason that we compare Vertue to a Plant whose Root is Bitter but the Fruit very Sweet and that Plato Xenophon and several others have highly commended those Verses of Hesiod that inform us That Vertue is not to be attain'd without Labour and Sweat and that the way that leads to it is truly Long and Difficult and of an uneasie access in the beginning but when e'er mounted to the top there is nothing Sweeter nor more Pleasant The Gods through Sweat and Pains to Vertue lead But long and arduous is the Path we tread Rugged and steep when first you venture on But at the top arriv'd with easy speed you run Unto which we ought to add that Sentence of Epicharmus That the Gods afford to us no good things but for our Labours and Pains Labore nobis cuncta Dii vendunt bona Which gives us to understand that we ought freely to endure the Labours that occur in the way to Vertue because they are attended with wonderful Pleasure and Satisfaction Nor is that Story without Ground Where Pleasure and Vertue are supposed to meet in a double Way and each of them to use the strongest Motives to encline Hercules to follow them in their different Paths for that confirms the truth of those Rules that are before alledged when we took notice That we ought to shun that Pleasure which is attended with a greater Mischief as we ought to embrace those Labours and Toils which will procure us greater Advantages and Delights I know very well how they have represented Hercules rejecting Pleasure that is to say an easie and Effeminate Life to pursue Vertue which is a Life full of Labour and Difficulty Nevertheless Maximus of Tyre saith very well That when he was under the greatest Labours he felt or had a prospect of wonderful Pleasures You see saith he in Hercules extraordinary Labours but you see not the incredible Pleasures that either attend or succeed them Whosoever takes away Pleasure from Vertue takes from it all Strength and Efficacy for were it not for Pleasure Men would never undertake any great Matter And he who out of Zeal for Vertue willingly undergoes any Trouble this is purely for the sake of some Pleasure he feels or expects For as in hoarding up of Treasure no Man will prefer a Pebble before a Ruby nor Brass before Gold unless he be utterly destitute of all Reason and Understanding So in respect of Labour and Trouble no Man labours meerly and purely for Labour's sake this would turn to a very sorry account but we willingly exchange the present Labours for Vertue that is in plain English as the Stoicks term it for Pleasure for who speaks of Vertue speaks of Delight and Vertue it self would be much neglected if at the same time it were not attended with Delight For my part I must declare that I run quite counter to the common Vogue for I look upon Pleasure to be the most Beautiful the most Desirable thing in the World and that which we ought the most strictly to pursue and for its sake it is I believe that Men so frequently expose themselves to all Hazards and Dangers and even encounter Death it self for tho' we are apt to give divers Names to the Cause that first moves us to undertake such great things as for Instance That which put Achilles upon dying voluntarily for Patrocles we call Friendship that which enclined Agamemnon to enter into and carry on a War with so much Care and Fatigue was the care of preserving his Kingdom that of Hector's so frequent Encamping and defeating his Enemies was the desire to preserve his Country All these several Terms are but other Names for Pleasure And as in the Distempers of the Body the Patient for want of Health not only freely submits himself to Hunger and Thirst but also willingly undergoes the most virulent Pains and Torments of Surgeons Instruments but if it were not for this hope he would never endure such Tortures So in the actions of Life there is a compensation for the Troubles that we undergo with Pleasure which you truly term Vertue and which I allow so to be But at the same time I demand Whether your Mind does embrace Vertue without any love for it And if you yield to this that you have such
might be done calmly and sedately as we have already said As he allows not that the Life of a Wise Man should be as a Torrent so he don't approve that it should be like a still and stinking Pool but rather like the Water of a River that glides along quietly and without Noise This is one of his Maxims That when Pain is removed Pleasure is not increas'd but only diversified and altered As if he would have said That when we have attain'd to this quiet State free from Pain there is truly nothing to be desired greater or to be compared to it but in the mean while there remain several pure and innocent Pleasures wherewith this State if not abused is Embelished in the manner of a Field which becoming Fruitful affords divers Fruits or in the manner of a Meadow which we see covered over with an admirable diversity of Flowers when the Earth is brought to be in a good Temper For this State is like a Spring out of which all the Pleasures that are Pure and Sincere are drawn For this cause therefore it ought to be esteem'd as the chief Pleasure in regard it is an universal Relish by which all the Actions of our Life are seasoned and by which consequently all our Pleasures are sweetned and become grateful And to speak all in a Word Without which no Pleasure can be Pleasure In reality What Satisfaction can there be if the Mind be troubled or the Body tormented with Pain It is a Proverb That if the Vessel be not clean it Sowers whatever is put into it Sincerum est nisi vas quodcumque infundis acescit Whoever therefore is desirous of pure sincere Pleasures he must prepare himself to receive them without any Mixture or Alloy that is By attaining as much as is possible to this State of Rest and Tranquility that we have described I add the words as much as is possible for As we have observed already The frailty of our human Nature wont suffer us to be absolutely and perfectly Happy for so compleat a Felicity altogether free from Trouble and Pain and crowned with all manner of Delights belongs to God alone and to them whom he calls to a better Life So that in this present World some have a greater some a less share of Afflictions and Pains He that will deal wisely ought to endeavour as much as the weakness of his Nature will permit to settle himself in that condition in which he may be as little sensible of Grief and Pain as is possible for by this means he will obtain these two Advantages which chiefly contribute to his present Happiness and which Wise Men have acknowledged to be almost the only solid and desirable Advantages of Life The Health of the Body and of the Mind Sunt Sanitas Mens gemina vitae bona Optandum est ut sit Mens sana in Corpore sano And that Epicurus never designed that his Pleasure should extend to a Sottishness or a privation of Sense and Action may be proved by what he was pleased with in his Retirements either in Meditating or in Teaching or in taking care of his Friends But let it suffice us here to say That from that state and condition of Life did arise certain Thoughts which of all things in the World were the most pleasing and delightful Namely when any shall call to mind the Storms that he hath couragiously weather'd in which some are yet tossed up and down he fancies himself as it were in a safe Haven possessing a calm and a serene Tranquility which Lucretius in his Second Book pleasantly sets forth 'T is pleasant when the Seas are rough to stand And view another's Danger safe at Land Not ' cause he 's Troubled but 't is sweet to see Those Cares and Fears from which our selves are free He tells us also That it is very pleasant to look from a high Tower upon two great Armies drawn up in Battel without being concerned in the Danger 'T is also Pleasant to behold from far How Troops Engage secure our selves from War But there is nothing so pleasant as to see our selves by the help of Learning and Knowledge advanc'd to the Top of Wisdom's Temple from whence as from an high Station serene and quiet we may see Men involved in a thousand Miseries without being concern'd But above all 'T is pleasantest to get The top of high Philosophy and sit On the calm peaceful flourishing Head of it Whence we may view deep wond'rous deep below How poor forsaken Mortals Wandring go Seeking the path to Happiness some aim At Learning Wit Nobility or Fame Others with Cares and Dangers vex each Hour To reach the Top of Wealth and Sovereign Power Whilst frugal Nature seeks for only Ease A Body free from Pains free from Disease A Mind from Cares and Jealousies at Peace Of the Tranquility of the Mind in particular BUt to say something more particularly of the Tranquility of the Mind let us again repeat That by this Expression we don't understand a slow and lazy Temper nor a sluggish and languishing Idleness But as Cicero Explains it out of Pythagoras and Plato Placida quietaque constantia in animi parte rationis principe A sweet and peaceable Constacy of Mind Or as Democritus says An excellent equal and sweet Constitution and Temper of Mind which makes the Man settl'd and unshaken in such a manner and to such a degree that whether he be Employed or at Leisure whether Prosperity favour him or Adversity frowns upon him he continues always Equal always like Himself and will not suffer himself to be Transported by an excess of Joy nor dejected by Grief and Sorrow In a Word he is at no time disturbed by such-like Passions Therefore this Tranquility of Mind was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies freedom from Trouble and Disquietness for in the same manner as a Ship is said to be in quiet not only when it is becalm'd in the middle of the Sea but likewise chiefly when it is driven by a favourable Gale which indeed causeth it to sail swift but nevertheless quietly and steddily Thus the Mind is said to be in Tranquility not only when it is at rest but more especially when it undertakes great and excellent Things without being disturb'd inwardly and without losing any part of its Steddiness On the contrary as a Ship is said to be disturb'd not only when it is carried away with the contrary Winds but when it is beaten by those that rise out of the very Waters thus the Mind is said to be disquieted not only when in its proceedings it is carried away with divers Passions but likewise when in the midst of Rest Care Grief and Fear are continually gnawing and fretting it and rendring it uneasy These therefore and such like are the Passions which by disturbing our Tranquility interrupt the Happiness of our Lives Cicero Speaks of them in this manner The turbulent Motions and the
what it industriously gathered in Summer as Horace observes Quae simul inversum contristat Aquarius annum Non usquam prorepit et illis utitur ante Quaesitis Sapiens For when we behold the greatest part of Mankind labouring continually to gain Riches one would think that we had forgot to use them and that we were born and designed for no other end but to heap 'em up And if we consider Men in a Civil Society you will scarce find any who uses never so little Care and Industry but is able to find enough to satisfy his Hunger and Thirst and to secure himself from the Inconveniences and Mischiefs of the open Air. And if he hath a plentiful Table delicious Wines rich Cloathing a glorious Palace Servants well cloathed and so of the rest these are Things for which we are not to return thanks to kind Nature as being absolutely necessary The use of those Things that are easily to be obtained is certainly no less pleasing than of those that are difficultly come at and it is a mistake to think that none but rich Men can truly relish Joy and Pleasure Nam neque divitibus contingunt gaudia solis But we shall speak of this hereafter it will be sufficient in the mean while to take notice of that excellent Passage of Seneca which makes very much for this purpose Whatsoever is subservient to our good God saith he the common Father of Mankind hath put it into our Hands He hath not expected that we should desire it he hath freely bestowed it upon us and of his own accord and the things that are able to hurt as he hath hid away far from us So that we can complain of none but our selves because in spight of Nature we are endeavouring to fetch them out of the very Bowels of the Earth We have cast our selves blindfold into sensual Pleasures which are the source of all Evils We have suffered our selves to be carried away with Ambition Glory and Vanity What Advice therefore can I now give you Nothing new for they be not new only for which we seek a Remedy The first thing that we should do is to look into our selves and to distinguish well between Things necessary and Things superfluous Necessary offer themselves in every place there is nothing but what is Superfluous which gives Trouble and Vexation in the procuring it Dont think that you have any great cause to value your selves if you have despised soft Couches rich Jewels and costly and stately Furniture You will wonder at your selves when you shall have contemned things necessary It is no great matter to be able to subsist without this great and Royal State without being repasted with the Brains of Peacocks or the Wings of Pheasants nor for the other extravagancies of Luxury which put us upon chusing some certain Members of Animals and despising the rest I shall value you when you will not despise a piece of dry Bread when you shall be persuaded That the Herbs grow not only in time of need for the benefit of the Beasts but for Men also and when you shall have learned That the Fruits of the Trees are sufficient to satisfy you O the miserable blindness of Mankind says Lucretius Dont we see plainly that Nature adviseth us nothing but that we our selves should aim at a freedom from Pain and a Tranquility of Mind That we should be content with little and that without these needless Dainties we should spend our Lives quietly and pleasantly O Miseras Hominum mentes c. Qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque periclis Degitur hoc aevi quodcumque'st Nonne videre Nil aliud sibi Naturam latrare nisi ut cum Corpore sejunctus dolor absit mente fruatur Jucundo sensu cura semota metuque Ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus Esse opus omnino quae demant quemque dolorem Delicias quoque uti nullus substernere possint Gratius interdum neque Natura ipsa requirit That Diet saith Epicurus in Cicero which is the most Natural such as Broth Bread Cheese pure Water affords as much Pleasure and more Health to the Body than the most costly Dishes and richest Wines ' And in Stobaeus he speaks in this manner ' My Body is abundantly delighted with Bread and Water and I renounce the Pleasures that proceed from magnificent Tables Elian saith If I may have wholsome Bread and clear Water I think my self as happy as Jupiter himself And in Seneca he speaks thus We must return to the Law of Nature her Riches are ready provided and offered to all the World for whatsoever we stand in need of is either freely exposed or very easily obtain'd Nature requires Bread and Water no Person becomes hereby the poorer and he who confines his Desires within these Limits may secure his own Happiness Look to the true Riches learn to be satisfied with little and speak out courageously Let us have Water let us have Bread which are the necessary supports of Life and then we may vye with the Gods for Happiness If in your Night Revels your Chambers are not adorn'd and perfum'd nor entertain'd with soft charming Musick yet you may upon the brink of a purling Stream under a shady Grove sweetly repose your self upon the Grass and without all this Noise there take your small Repast pleasantly diverting your selves with what variety Nature hath deckt the Earth Si non aurea sunt juvenum simulacra per aedes Lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris Lumina nocturnis epulis ut suppeditentur Nec domus argento fulget auroque renidet Nec citharis reboant laqueata aurataque Templa Attamen inter se prostrati in gramine molli Propter aquae rivum sub ramis arboris altae Non magnis opibus jucunde corpora curant Praesertim cum tempestas arridet anni Tempora conspergunt viridantes floribus herbas Are you sooner cur'd of a Fever by reposing your self on a Down-Bed in a Chamber curiously Painted over and richly Gilt than by lying on a plain Bed with a convenient Coverlid Truly we must take heed of entertaining any such Fancy That an Apricius takes more Pleasure in his rare and exquisite Dainties than a labouring Man in his plain and ordinary Fair for such a one being always full finds his Appetite continually pall'd whereas the Labourer daily renews his Appetite and relishes the sweetness of every thing that he Eats So that when the former despises his Pheasant and his Mullet the latter finds a savouriness in his Nuts and his Onions Truly he scarce seems to have well experienced Hunger and Thirst who can't be persuaded that an ordinary Person may eat with as much Pleasure and Delight as a Prince only that he defers to sit at his little plain Table an Hour later than the Prince at his magnificent Entertainment If men could but once understand these Truths they would quickly perceive that there is no need to endeavour so much
to get great and excessive Riches to indulge their Gluttony seeing that they may without so much Toil obtain the same Pleasures and that these Pleasures are more Pure and Innocent It seems the Poet had this Fancy when he advises to shun Grandeur for it is certain That one may live more contentedly in a small Cottage than Kings and Princes in their Royal Pallaces fuge magna licet sub paupere tecto Reges Regum vita praecurrere Amicos But let us understand from Porphyry how far Epicurus hath advanc'd a plain and abstemious Life even so far as to suppose it to extend to a total abstinence from Flesh Thus he says We have found what the common People will not believe that the Epicureans themselves who hold Pleasure to be the End for the most part are content since the Days of their Chieftain with Fruits Pulse and Broth and that the chief of their Discourses tend to Teach nothing more but that Nature is satisfied with a little that the plainest Food and the easiest attain'd to satisfies plentifully our Wants and that what is over and above is only to gratify our unsatiated Appetites which is neither in it self needful nor can be occasioned by the usefulness of that which being wanting might cause the ruin of the whole but that it proceeds from vain and foolish Mistakes with which we are prejudiced They say also That a Philosopher ought to have this Persuasion That nothing shall be wanting to him the remainder of his Days Now there is nothing better able to beget that Opinion in him than to believe by his own Experience that he hath need but of very little and that these things are common and easy to be got and what is over and above is needless relating to nothing but Luxury and Excess and that such things are acquired with a great deal of Pains and Difficulty So that all the Benefit and Pleasure that might redound from thence ' don 't compensate the Labour and Toil we must undergo in the obtaining of 'em and our continual Care to preserve ' em Besides when the Thoughts of Death approach we easily forsake little things or such as are of a mean value and common They say moreover That the use of Flesh prejudices our Health more than it benefits because our Health is preserved by those very things by which it is recovered when we have lost it Now it is recovered by a light Diet and abstinence from Flesh it is therefore preserved by the same means But it is no wonder if the Vulgar believe That the use of Flesh is necessary for our Health for they are persuaded that all the Pleasures which are in Motion and Flattering are assisting to it the Pleasures of Love not excepted which are never good for any thing but commonly very mischievous Horace also seems to have understood the Advantages that a frugal and sober Life procures when he tell us That there is nothing that contributes so much to our Health as to Eat and Drink sparingly and to be content with the plainest Diet and that to be persuaded of these Truths we need but remember a little sober and frugal Meal that we have formerly made whereas when we glut our selves with all manner of Varieties part turns into Choler Flegm and Humours which causeth Flatus's and Indigestion in the Stomach Acippe nunc victus tenuis quae quantaque secum Afferat imprimis valeas bene nam variae res Vt noceant homini credas memor illius escae Quae simplex olim tibi cesserit At simul assis Miscueris elixa simul conchylia turdis Dulcia se in bilem vertent Stomachoque tumultum Lenta feret pituita Vides ut pallidus omnis Caena desurgat dubia Truly we have cause to wonder that Men who in all other actions are Rational and Discreet have so little regard to the manner of their Eating and Drinking heeding this the least of all other Things For First we ought to stay for the most necessary or convenient time of Eating for the which we need nothing but an Appetite to direct us and as Hunger is the most innocent so it is the most relishing and pleasant Sawce Secondly a plain and frugal Meal recovers the Strength of the Body and adds Vigour to the Spirits which seldom happens when we are accosted with great plenty and variety of Meals which we generally meet with at rich Mens Tables And these Persons who thus indulge their sensual Appetites their Pleasures are commonly but of a short continuance they thereby dulling their Spirits and weakning their Bodies and if at the same moment no Fevers Gouts or other Distempers attend them yet the Seeds of these Mischiess are hereby laid in the Body and afterwards conveyed to the several Members by a corrupted Mass of Blood first occasion'd by a superfluous indigested Diet. Thirdly That when our Hunger is satisfied and the Table withdrawn there remains to him who hath Eaten and Drunk moderately this pleasant Thought That he hath done nothing to prejudice his Health his Moderation being his Preservative and Safeguard Neither is he dissatisfied not to have enjoyed that Pleasure wherewith a Glutton seems delighted because such Pleasure is of short continuance leaving nothing behind but cause for Repentance unto which he is not so subject as he who thus gormandizes and overcharges his Stomach with variety of rich Dainties Such a one repents soon or thinks he shall ere long have cause to repent nay he is sure at last to pay dear for his Debauchery Fourthly That it is a great piece of Wisdom to take heed how and what we swallow for the sake of a little short-liv'd Pleasure the Causes of so many Diseases so cruel and so tedious which Causes we cannot be afterwards freed from but by nauseus Potions and a tedious continued Course of Physick which weakens the Body and might easily be prevented meerly by Abstinence So that we should not be oblig'd to say as Lysimachus did after he had surrendred himself into the Hands of the Getae to allay the Thirst that troubled him and his whole Army O ye Gods what a great Advantage have I now lost for a little Pleasure of a short continuance Fifthly If we except some few hereditary Distempers and which may if not be perfectly cured at least much alleviated the Grounds of all other Diseases are frequently occasion'd by Irregularities or Excess in our Eating or Drinking For tho' violent Exercise Heats Colds and other such things may incline us to Diseases yet this commonly happens because they set afloat the superfluous Humours which were before ingendred in our Bodies by excess of Wine and good Chear Therefore it was observed during that great Plague that spread all over Attica that none but Socrates by his extraordinary Sobriety escaped the Infection And we are not unacquainted with one in our days who by the like Method was secured from a great Pestilence I might mention also a
or controlled It is known what Socrates and Aristotle relate of a certain Persian who being asked what it was chiefly that made his Horse so fat answer'd The Eye of his Master And we have likewise heard the answer of that African from whom they inquired What was the best means to improve Land and make the Fields fertile answer'd The Foot-steps of the Landlord From whence we may conclude that commonly a Business is never better manag'd than when those who are chiefly concerned take care of it themselves Now because some would have the preservation and increase of an Estate patrimonial or an Estate otherwise obtained to belong to this kind of Prudence this doubtless is to be understood where our Estate is not so large as to spend our Days in Ease and Leasure and have sufficient to leave to our Posterity In such a Case 't is not only Honorable but also needful to employ our Cares to increase our Estate But to think upon nothing else but how to heap Riches and to purchase Lands to add Houses to Houses and Fields to Fields is to run into that Covetousness and unsatiable greedy Desire of which we have been Discoursing before But as there are Three expedients of gathering Wealth Husbandry Industry or honest Labour and Usury Cicero tells us that of all those means by which we get an Estate there is none better more pleasant and more suitable and worthy of a Freeman than Husbandry He Speaks of Merchandise that if the Traffick and Gain be small it is Sordid and Base but if great and large and gives an Opportunity of being Bountiful without Vanity or Presumption it is not to be slighted But for Usury saith Aristotle and Cicero 't is hated not without cause but chiefly when it is excessive For as the Poet observes constant Usury destroys the Poor Velox inopes usura trucidat I know there are other Means to grow Rich as the Service of great Men Flattery c. But it is not requisite that we should speak of those that take these Courses nor of such as purchase Offices and make Parties by Bribery nor of such as going to the Wars not contented with their Pay plunder and take the Goods of other Men seeing such kind of Men differ in nothing from those who make themselves Rich by Cheating by Perjury and Robbing But not to stay too long upon this Master let us examin Two great Complaints that are made against Epicurus The First because he saith That a wise Man ought not to be Married nor trouble himself in the Education of Children which seems not only to overthrow the very Foundations of Families but even of Common-wealths The Second is they seem to charge him with having said That there is no natural communication among Men and that the great Affection of Parents toward their Children is not the effect of Nature As to the First it is certain that he never intended this as a general direction to all Mankind but only to a few wise Men neither hath he prescribed that wise Men may not nor ought not to Marry if the good of the Common-wealth or some other weighty Consideration require it Now how can this be to overthrow the Foundation of the Commonwealth Is not this I pray more Holy and Religious than the practice of Aristotle who promulg'd a Law That such Children as were deficient in their Members should be destroyed that the number of such as should be brought up might be limited and that as many as should happen to be Born beyond that Number should be expos'd but if any Constitution of the Country prohibits such Practices they should cause the Fruit of the Womb to perish before it comes to have Life or Feeling And as to the Reason or Excuse he pretends of the privation or want of Sense and Life in the Foetus it is but a meer Mockery for he cannot prove that when a Woman Miscarries the Fruit or Foetus hath neither Sense nor Life and that to destroy any such Fruit which would be alive in a very short time if it be not already is the same thing as to destroy a Corps or a Body altogether incapable of Life For the Second 't is true Epictetus represents Epicurus exclaiming against that vulgar Error That there is a natural Communication between Men and that the Affection of Parents to their Children is Natural or Born with them Be not deceived as he represents him Speaking Ne decipiamini O Mortales Non est ratione praeditis ulla inter se naturalis Communicatio Amor Parentum erga Liberos non est Naturalis Mihi credite qui secus loquuntur in errorem inducunt vos ac rationibus falsis circumveniunt vos But doubtless the Envy and Hatred against Epicurus hath caused many to make him say things that he never imagined For certain it is that he allows a natural Communication between Nations and among Men who live under the same Laws Now if this be granted 't is plain that there is more reason to allow a natural Communication between those of the same Blood and between Parents and Children who are immediately united together by Blood and Nature Epictetus himself acknowledges that Epicurus was of Opinion That we are naturally inclined to Communication and that when we have a Child Born 't is not in our Power not to Love it or to Slight and Disregard it It seems they will have him maintain this Doctrin Nevertheless I will say That if they will absolutely make him hold this that the Love of Parents to their Children is not Natural they should at least give him liberty to interpret his own Words His Meaning is That this Affection is begot in us and increases by degrees not so much by a certain blind instinct of Nature as by a persuasion of the Father that it is his Child and a part of himself and by the Hopes that he shall be Beloved and Honoured or Relieved and Supported by him or because he judges his Name to be eternized and conveyed to Posterity by this means and that the plain and ingenuous Conversation of a Child that promiseth much rejoyceth his Heart Epicurus seems to have very good Reasons to be of that Opinion First because we see many that have equal Affection for Children that are none of their own but Bastards as they have for their own if they believe them to be lawfully begotten Secondly we find not that Love in those whose Children are lawfully Begotten if they are otherwise persuaded Thirdly we find as great a Love in those who have adopted Children when the Resolution or Will supplies the defects of the Persuasion Fourthly That if the Fruit is Abortive the Father and the Mother are not so much afflicted as if it had continued with them a longer time and been conversant with 'em not so much when it dies a young Infant as when it departs in a more advanc'd Age when it hath many Brethren as when it
natural Law or according to Nature not only because there is nothing more Natural or more according to Nature than Society and Society being not able to subsist without this Precept it ought also to be esteemed Natural But also because God seems to have imprinted it in the Hearts of all Men and that this Law contains in such a full manner all the other Laws of Society that no Man can invade the Right of another but he must violate this Law Therefore this Law alone ought to be look'd upon as the Rule of all our Actions that concern our Neighbour And truly as every one desires that his Right may be Religiously preserved to him so that no Man may attempt upon it he need but think the same thing of others and to put himself in their Place and Condition to understand what he ought or what he ought not to do Therefore as there is nothing nearer at Hand and more ready nor more infallible than our own Conscience every one may consult himself and he alone may be his own proper and true Casuist So that he who seeks for others seems not so much disposed to be willing to do to another what he would not have done to himself as to not dare to do it if he hath not some Body upon whom he may cast the Blame And upon this Point Cicero treats very well in his Offices That those who prohibit any thing to be done whereof there is a Question whether it be Just or Unjust cannot prescribe any Rule nor Precept more useful and reasonable because Equity here appears and is plainly discoverable and that our doubting is a sign that we think or design to do Evil. Bene praecipiunt qui vetant quidquam agere quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum aequitas enim lucet ipsa per se dubitatio autem cogitationem significat injuriae Upon this Subject I remember what Monsieur de la Moignon first President of the Parliament of Paris a wise and learned Judge said to us one Day as we were walking in his shady Retirement in the Wood de Baville That that Maxim of Cicero if it were duly practis'd among Men would be of a wonderful use and that for what concerns those who have such sort of doubts and trouble themselves to seek for Casuists to support them he had read an excellent Saying in a Spanish Author That such Persons seek to pick a Quarrel or to play the Cheat with the Law of God Quieren pley tear contra la lay de Dios. Let us observe more-over that the Holy Scriptures have said very well That the Law was not made for the Just because he who is truly Just observes it not out of fear of the Punishments that the Law threatens but out of a love for Justice it self and out of a respect for it so that if there were no Law nor Magistrates he would notwithstanding still live in Obedience to Law and Justice Therefore that excellent Expression of Menander is thought praise-worthy If you be Just your Manners will be to you instead of Laws And the Answer of Aristotle is remarkable when he was questioned what Profit he had found and received from the study of Philosophy To do said he of my own accord and without constraint what others do for fear of the Laws This obliged Horace to say That we ought not to do any thing for fear of Punishment Nihil esse faciendum formidine poenae From whence we may remark that Corrections and Punishments are not only ordained for the Wicked and Criminals that they may perish and be extinct but that by their Destruction they may also terrify and restrain others as Seneca observes and according to Lactantius who brings in Plato saying That a wise and prudent Man punishes not because 't is a Crime for he cannot make that which is already done to be undone but that others may not commit the same Crimes But let us hearken to Epicurus discoursing of the great Advantages that there are in observing Justice That there is great Reason to live up to Justice JVstice having been established by a common Agreement every one ought to think that he is born and admitted into the Society whereof he is a Member upon this Condition either express or understood That he shall do wrong to no Man nor no Man to him and thus we must either keep to this Agreement or depart out of the Society seeing that he is suffered there but upon the same Condition that he was admitted From whence it follows that as naturally he don't desire to be evilly dealt withal he ought not to deal ill with others nor do to others what he would not that others should do to him This being granted we may say that the Laws have been established in favour and for the sake of wise Men not to hinder them from committing Injustice but to prevent others from doing them wrong for of their own accord they are so inclined that if there were no Laws they would injure no body for they have limited their Desires and confined them to the necessities of Nature to supply which there is no need of doing Injustice for there is no Pleasure Nature allows of which will cause us to wrong any body for those exorbitances and irregular Desires which proceed from our vain and unruly Passions and Lusts are the only Causes of Mischief The Truth is the Products of the Earth such as Corn Fruits Water c. are to be obtain'd without any great difficulty and the enjoyment of these as often as Hunger and Thirst excite us afford us no small Pleasure and Satisfaction without being hereby tempted to Riot and Excess or to commit Robberies or other enormous Crimes upon our Neighbours which Men are more apt to become liable to and guilty of when they indulge their extravagant Lusts in living splendidly and sumptuously and by unjustly heaping up of Riches to maintain such their Extravagances Nor shall I here stand to take notice of Particulars such who are not satisfied with decent Habits with one Habitation nor one Wife and so of the like who passing the Bounds that Nature hath appointed are daily hurried away by their Passions and endless Desires beyond all Limits Moreover as the wise Man acts all things for himself and for his own Good and Satisfaction there is nothing that will contribute more to this purpose than in carefully observing the Rules of Justice for when he renders unto every one what belongs to him and that he does wrong to no Man he preserves and supports as much as in him lies the Society in which his own Safety is involved he provokes no body to do him Injury neither doth he fear the Penalties and Punishments which the Publick Laws threaten So that his Conscience being free from Guilt he is at quiet and ease within himself without any private Checks or Gripes which is one main design of Justice to procure and the most excellent
leave to bury his Father sold himself purchasing that Liberty with the loss of his own The Second Duty is to comply with their Wills and be obedient to their Commands for that is the chief part of the Respect and Reverence that we owe them and on the contrary to be Disobedient is a sign of Disrespect and Contempt I confess we are not bound to obey them when they command any thing against God against the welfare of our Country and contrary to Right and Justice but 't is very seldom that Fathers or Mothers lay any such Commands on their Children Nor ought a Child rashly and inconsiderately to make an uncharitable Construction of his Father's Commands but if for plain and convincing Reasons he finds himself forced to disobey him this ought to be done with such respect and Deference as becomes him From hence it follows that Children should undertake nothing of moment against their Wills but in all Matters of the greatest Concern such as Matrimony c. they should be directed by 'em for as it is supposed they best understand so likewise they most desire their Childrens Welfare and Happiness We must also conclude from hence that if there be any thing in the Behaviour of Parents to their Children that savours of Austerity or hard Usage they ought to undergo it patiently and to be so far from aggravating or complaining of it as not to endure their Names to be reproached or ill spoken of by others The Third Duty is to help them in all their Necessities and to remember the Cares Pains and Trouble which we gave them in our Infancy and in the following course of our Life and not to forget that excellent Sentence of Aristotle That there is more Honour and greatness of Mind to think upon the Authors of our Being than upon our selves and that we are bound to Honour them as we do the immortal Gods Let us remember the Divine Commandment which promiseth a long and happy Life to Children who shall Honour their Fathers and Mothers Honora Patrem Matrem si vis esse longaevus super terram Which we may call a Commandment and a moral Precept proper to all Ages Senes Parentes nutriens diu vives 'T is not improper here to mention a Word of that Piety and Love we owe to our Country which doubtless ought to be yet dearer to us than our Parents themselves We cannot excuse our selves from speaking of it and the rather because we have already taken notice that it is even lawful to accuse our Parents themselves where they have been found guilty of betraying our Country or endeavouring to invade it and become Conquerours of it when all our Prayers and Intreaties to desist from such a wicked Purpose prove ineffectual and we cannot persuade them to right Reason 'T is not without just Cause doubtless that we have mentioned and maintain this Opinion for as the Love that we bear for our Country is named Piety because our Country is as the common Mother that brings us forth nourisheth and maintains us 't is plain that our Country which is as the Parent of our Fathers and Mothers of all our Relations and Friends ought to be dearer to us than all the rest 'T is what Cicero proves very well Can there be any Parentage nearer to us than our Country in which all Parents are comprehended If our Fathers our Mothers our Children our Relations and Friends are dear to us how much more should our Country be dearer which contains them all Is there any honest Man that ought not to venture his Life for his Country if he can render to it thereby any Service Is there any Evil more abominable than to destroy it or to endeavour to ruin it as some have attempted to do Of Observance or Respect THE Third Virtue that belongs to Justice is that which Cicero calls Observance by which we are inclined to reverence and respect those who are raised above us in Dignity exceed us in Age or excel us in Wisdom For as Dignity or Beneficence are the occasion of Reverence and Honour and that those who are promoted to Dignities are deemed worthy and seem as it were born and designed for the publick Good either by governing or conducting the People or by composing their Differences and Sutes or by defending them from the Enemy or by procuring the publick Safety or Plenty by this 't is certain that we ought to Honour and Respect them and the rather because if this were not performed there would be no body to take upon 'em the necessary Cares and Troubles of managing the publick Concerns which would be at length the cause of confusion and disorder which in this case by paying a due deference and respect may in a great measure be prevented 'T is unquestionable also that old Age is of it self Venerable because it hath the experience of Things and consequently hath that Prudence that it is able to advise young People and direct 'em for their good Young Folk saith Sopater in Stobaeus ought to Honour them who are their Elders make choice of the honestest and most experienced follow their Counsel and rely upon their Authority 'T is for this Cause that the great Captain of the Greeks had always a greater respect for Nestor than for the rest and rather wished to find out Ten like Nestor than like Ajax But old Age will be so much the more worthy of Honour and Veneration when it shall not only be adorn'd with gray Hairs but with Wisdom and Prudence when it is able to afford good Advice and that it is become commendable by its Virtues and by its good Deeds Lastly It is manifest that we ought to have Respect and Veneration for those who are Wise or Virtuous seeing that Wisdom or Virtue is the true and solid Foundation of all Honour that is rendered Indeed Virtue alone as they say is its own sufficient Reward But tho those who are Virtuous seek not to draw from thence Honour and Respect yet they who know them to be such are obliged to pay this Deference to 'em otherwise they would not do Right and Justice to their Merits and give a due estimate to that which of all Things in the World is the most valuable Potior est illa Argento Auroque purissimo This the wise Man ascribes to Virtue 't is of more worth than Gold and the finest Silver 't is more precious than all the Pearls and Jewels yea than all that is desirable There is nothing to be compared with it Of Friendship WE cannot but say something of Friendship unto which such are obliged who are reciprocally beloved Of all the things saith Cicero according to Epicurus which tend toward the making our Lives happy there is nothing more considerable and advantageous than Friendship For indeed there is nothing in the Life of a wise Man more pleasing than when like a Philosopher he may say to a Friend of whose Sincerity he is
fantastical and of no use to save our Freedom and remove the absolute Necessity of Things for if the right and perpendicular Motion of the Atoms proceeds from a Necessity of Nature that of the Declension will also be of the same Necessity So that tho' we may say that Epicurus deserves to be commended for having endeavoured to preserve human Liberty we may also say that he hath not succeeded well in it and that he could never do it by continuing in his own Principles and Doctrin Therefore we shall take our leave here of Epicurvs with his Clinamen Principiorum and endeavour to explain it by some other Means CHAP. III. How Destiny may be reconciled or consist with Fortune and Liberty HAving explained the several Opinions of the Philosophers concerning Destiny we must now examin whether we are to allow it or not and in what manner and how we may reconcile it with Liberty First The Opinion of Democritus ought to be rejected because he takes from God the Creation and Government of the World nor is it consistent with the Doctrin of our Faith Besides it is repugnant to the Light of Nature which shews us by our own experience that we are Free and at Liberty That of Aristotle and Epicurus may be allowed as to this That it makes Destiny and Nature or natural Causes to be the same thing and that it endeavours to preserve our Liberty but it ought also to be laid aside as to this That it allows not in God the Knowledge of Things and that it supposeth that there is neither Creation nor Providence So that there remains none but Plato's Opinion and that of the Stoicks unto which we may adhere and the rather because they hold that it is God who hath created and disposes and governs the World But now as the chief Difficulty which appears here is to reconcile Destiny with Liberty it will not be very needful that we should reconcile it with Fortune for in a word we may say that Destiny and Fortune may be allowed upon Condition that we agree that Destiny is the Decree of the Divine Will without which nothing is done and Fortune the Concourse or the Event which tho' it is not foreseen by Men hath been nevertheless foreseen by God and placed among the Series of Causes We shall not therefore so much busie our selves to reconcile Fortune as to make Free-will agree with Destiny It seems that we cannot better proceed than by supposing with St. Thomas That Destiny in respect of Men is nothing else but that part of Providence that the Divines term Predestination for by this means we shall reconcile both Predestination and Destiny with Liberty We shall say That God hath created necessary Causes and free Causes and that both are so subject to the Divine Providence that they all act after their own manner the necessary in a necessary manner and the free freely But we meet here with two great Difficulties The first Difficulty is that which proceeds from the Fore-knowledge or the Divine Prescience which Ammonius saith is so obscure that it hath obliged many learned Men to reject that which we name Contingency For 't is not only among the Divines that this way of Argument is in Vogue viz. Either God knows infallibly and certainly that Peter will deny him or he knows it not We cannot say that he knows it not for he foretold it and is no Liar and if he knows it not he would not know all things and consequently he would not be God he therefore knew it infallibly and certainly It could not therefore otherwise happen but Peter must deny him for if it could have otherwise been and that making use of his Liberty he had not really denied him we might then say that God's Fore-knowledge had been deceitful and his Prediction false But if that cannot be he was not free either to deny or not to deny he had therefore no Free-will I say 't is not only among the Divines alone that this way of Reasoning is usual we have the like among the Philosophers In this manner they speak in the Writings of Ammonius Either the Gods know infallibly the Event or Justice of things that are contingent that is to say which of the things shall happen or they know not We cannot say c. Know then that the Divines solve this Difficulty by distinguishing two sorts of Necessities the one absolute the other conditional or upon supposition for Example it is absolutely necessary that two times two should make four or that Winter should be past but yet 't is not necessary that you shall lay the Foundation of a Building or that you should depart out of Town however if you will suppose that you are to Build or that you should be in the Country then 't is required that you shall lay Foundations or that you should go out of Town but this Necessity is still a Necessity upon Supposition which takes not away our Liberty because he who lays Foundations might chuse whether he would lay them or no as he who goes out of Town might not go out if he pleased So in respect of Peter 't is true say they the denyal of Peter which God foresaw shall be infallible but it shall only be through a Necessity upon Supposition which as we have said injures not our Freedom And 't is doubtless no wonder say they that this Necessity is not repugnant to Liberty because it don't precede or go before it but follows after and that it is not so much in the Thing as in the Circumstance of the Time For when we say that it is necessary that Peter should have denied we don't understand that there was any thing in Peter antecedently to constrain him to act so but only that now there is something in the Time which hath caused him to act in the time I say which as it is past and cannot but be past So the thing that hath been done in what time in what manner soever it hath been done cannot but be done So that all the Necessity falls upon the Time past Now as God knows all things he truly foresees that Peter would deny him but the foreseeing of this Denyal follows the foreseeing of the free Determination So that he only foresees plainly that Peter would deny him because he foresees that Peter would determin himself or freely resolve to deny him From whence it is that we commonly say That Peter will not deny because God foresaw but God foresaw because Peter will deny In truth all Knowledge is outward and exterior to the thing known and that a thing borrows not what it hath from that Knowledge but it hath it of it self or from its Cause As the Snow is not white because 't is known to be white but it is known to be white because 't is white I confess that there is this difference between the Divine Knowledge and Ours that ours cannot extend to things that are contingent
not possibly Conceive because her Womb was closed up Another tells her that doubtless she was with Child because nothing is sealed or closed up in vain and without cause What ought we to think of that Conjectural Art which is to no other end but to delude and deceive us by the subtilty of Wit Is it that the great number of Observations and Precepts that the Stoicks have gathered concerning this matter signifies any thing else but a little Cunning and Subtilty which from some likelyhood carries its Conjecture now this way than another Suppose one should now find a Serpent twin'd about the young Roscius yet in his Cradle which perhaps was false but if there should be found one in the Cradle there is no great wonder because the Serpents are very common and numerous at Celoin they being often found by the Fire-side I know that these Soothsayers pretend that there is nothing more Illustrious nothing more Noble more Excellent than their Art I wonder why the Immortal Gods should be willing to shew such strange and miraculous Thing in favour of a Charlatan and that they would never shew so much Favour to a Scipio Africanus For as to that Divination which is without Art we might justly take for Fabulous such as that related amongst the Heathens of certain Spirits that appeared openly and familiarly discoursed and foretold things that were to come For to mention something of that of Brutus that told him that he should lose the Day at the Battel in the Fields of Philippi and that he would there appear to him We must observe that Brutus having revealed this Apparition the foregoing Night to Cassius the next Morning Cassius told him that this supposed Apparition or Spirit was but a Mist before his Eyes or of his deluded Imagination And that this was the more probable because Brutus was of a Melancholy Temper as Plutarch observes that the troubles of his Mind so oppressed him that he seldom slept and when he considered in what danger the Common-wealth was and remembred that Pompey had been unhappy in a like cause he pondred what Resolution he might take if things succeeded not well and that which is considerable ruminating and thinking upon these and such like things when the Night was well spent all his Camp very silent all their Lights out and he half asleep 't is no wonder that he then thought he had seen and heard his Genius or Spirit because he was perswaded by the Doctrines of his Sect being a Stoick that there were good and evil Spirits besides there are four Circumstances that discover in what disturbance his Mind was then in and that we may suppose him to have been but in a Slumber or as we say Dreaming or half asleep The first is that he enquired of his Servants if they had heard nothing This shews that he himself was doubtful whether this had happened to him awake or asleep The second that the Domesticks answered him that they had neither seen nor heard any thing nevertheless if it had been so they could not but have seen that monstrous Image or Appearance at least to have heard its Voice which Brutus declared to be to this effect I am O Brutus thy evil Genius thou shalt see me again at the Fields of Philippi The third that his Servants should have heard the Speech of Brutus to the Spirit when he askt it whether it was a God or Man and what it would have Ecquis tu Deorum aut hominum es Ecquid tibi vis qui ad nos venisti And that Word which he spake without being daunted after the Spirit had discoursed with him Videbo The fourth is that Brutus according to the Relation of Plutarch was settled in his Mind after that he had heard and advised with Cassius by whose reasoning he understood that all this was but a meer Dream But what shall we say of that famous Genius or Demon of Socrates 'T is true Socrates himself speaks of it diversly in several Places but as this Philosopher was altogether employed about prescribing Precepts of good Manners he may perhaps make use of this cunning to add a greater weight to his wholsome Admonitions for we may know well enough with what authority he speaks who is supposed to be divinely Inspired Besides when Simias in Plutarch made it his business to inquire of Socrates himself what this Genius was Socrates never answered him a Word This shews sufficiently that Socrates would not tell a lie by confirming it nor would deny it by answering for fear that his wholsome and good Councils should lose thereby their Authority and Influence So that we may suppose that the Genius of Socrates was nothing else but his Reason his Wisdom and Natural Prudence which had been empowered by a constant and continual Study of Philosophy and which discover'd to him what was best to be done and furnished him with those good Counsels which he imparted to his Auditors and this is so much the more probable because Xenocrates one of the Disciples and Successors of Plato and who consequently ought to know the Thoughts of Plato and of Socrates saith That he is happy who is inriched with a good Soul and that such a Soul is to every one of us a Genius or advising Spirit And Plato speaks in this manner of that most excellent part our Soul That God hath bestowed it upon us to be as our Demon that inhabits in the highest and loftiest Fortress of our Bodies and that he who takes care of that divine Spark within him and who emproves well his familiar Spirit becomes extraordinary Happy Clemens Alexandrius speaks almost to the same Purpose when he teaches That Happiness is nothing else but to emprove well our Spirit or Genius and that the principal part of our Souls is called by the name of Demon. As to what concerns that supposed Agitation by which the Spirit being as it were out of it self and seperated from all Matter foretold things to come this supposeth that the Spirit is a Particle of God or of the Soul of the World and by that means knows all things as being of the same Nature with God who is present in all Actions and every where and therefore is ignorant of nothing Now the Disciples of Plato and generally all those who are perswaded that our Soul is part of the Soul of the World fancy that when the Soul is ingaged in the Body it sees not plainly all things as that Soul doth whereof it is a Particle but nevertheless that it is in a possibility to see and know them first when it is stirred up by the strength of certain Diseases for Aristotle acknowledgeth that in those Persons who are troubled with Melancholy there seems something Divine which predicts the time to come Secondly when it withdraws its self in its own Being and is in a perfect Tranquility and Sequestring it self at the same moment from the Thoughts and Incumbrances of Corporeal
THREE DISCOURSES OF HAPPINESS VIRTUE AND LIBERTY Collected from the WORKS of the Learn'd GASSENDI By Monsieur Bernier Translated out of French LONDON Printed for Awnsham and John Churchil at the Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row MDCXCIX THE PREFACE THE Epicurean Philosophers placing the Happiness of Man in the Satisfaction of the Mind and Health of the Body assure us that those two are no otherwise to be procured than by a constant Practice of Virtue And because they have had the hard Fate to be misrepresented by most of the other Sects as well Ancient as Modern and their Principles traduced as favouring the most brutal Sensuality the Learned Gassendi who had either examined their Doctrin with more Diligence or interpreted their Sentiments with more Candour and Justice thought he could not employ his Time better than to vindicate the Morals of Epicurus and his Followers from the Slanders of Mistake and Malice and to shew that their principal Design was to lead Men by smooth and easie Paths to a just sober wise and virtuous Behaviour as the only way to true Happiness This he proved at large and illustrated with the Sentiments of many great and excellent Men among the Greeks and Romans But because these Things were diffused through the voluminous Works of that Great Man Monsieur Bernier whose Name is a sufficient Commendation in the Common-wealth of Learning took the Pains to put them together and to form them into several intire Discourses which on account of their great importance to Mankind are here presented to the Publick OF Moral Philosophy IN GENERAL MAnkind having a natural Inclination to be happy the main bent and design of all his Actions and Endeavours tend chiefly that way It is therefore an undeniable Truth that Happiness or a Life free from Pain and Misery are such things as influence and direct all our Actions and Purposes to the obtaining of them And tho' several Persons who neither want the Necessities nor Conveniences of Life possessing great Riches promoted to Dignites and Honours blessed with a beautiful and hopeful Off-spring in a word who want nothing that may seem requisite to compleat their present Happiness tho' I say we find many who have all these Advantages yet they lead an anxious and uneasy Life disquieted with Cares Troubles and perpetual Disturbances From whence the wiser sort of Mankind have concluded That the Source of this Evil proceeds from the Ignorance of the Cause wherein our true Happiness consists and of the last end which every one should propose to himself in all his Actions which being neglected we are led blind-fold by our Passions and forsake Honesty Vertue and good Manners without which it is impossible to live happily For this Reason they have therefore undertaken to instruct us wherein true Happiness consists and to propose such useful Precepts for the due regulation of our Passions whereby our Minds may be less liable to be disturb'd This Collection of Precepts Reflections and Reasonings they name The Art of Living or The Art of leading an happy Life And which they commonly call Moral Philosophy because it comprehends such Doctrins as relate to the Manners of Men that is to say the accustomed and habitual Actions of Life From hence we may understand That this part of Philosophy is not only speculative and rests in the bare Contemplation of its Object but proceeds to Action and that it is as we usually say active and practical for it directs and governs our Manners rendring them regular and agreeable with the Rules of Justice and Honesty So that in this respect it may be said to be The Science or if this Term be scrupled at we may call it The Art of doing well I only make this Supposition for let it be stiled Art or Science 't is a difference only in Name which depends upon the manner of understanding those two Words and therefore requires no further Scrutiny into the matter We will rather take notice that Democritus Epicurus and divers others of no small Eminency have had so high an esteem for Moral Philosophy that they have judged the Natural to be no further regarded than only as it was found useful in freeing us from certain Errors and Mistakes in our Understanding which might disturb the Repose and Tranquility of our Life and wherein it might be serviceable to Moral Philosophy or to the better obtaining of that Knowledge which teaches us to live happily and comfortably I shall not mention the Followers of Socrates Aristippius Anthistenes with the Cyrenaicks and Cynicks who altogether neglecting the Natural gave themselves entirely over to the study of Moral Philosophy considering with Socrates what might make for the Good or Ill of Families and what might contribute to the Grief and Disturbance of Man's Life Quid siet in domibus fortasse malumve bonumve We may also here observe That tho' Socrates is supposed to be the Inventer of Moral Philosophy this is only to be understood so far as he did cultivate and improve a new and considerable part not that he laid the first and Original Precepts of it for it is certain that before him Pythagoras had much improved this sort of Knowledge And 't is well known that he commonly asserted That the Discourser of a Philosopher that cures not the Mind of some Passion is vain and useless as the Physick that drives not away the Distemper from the Body is insignificant It is likewise very certain That the wise Men of Greece who lived a little before Pythagoras were named wise only because they addicted themselves to the Study of Moral Wisdom Therefore at this present time their famous Sentences that relate to Mens Manners are generally known all over the World We might add if we would make farther search into the Antiquity of the Heroes that we shall find Orpheus by this same Study of Moral Philosophy drawing the Men of his time off from their barbarous and savage way of Living which gave occasion of that Saying of him That he tamed the Tygers and the Lions as Horace describes Orpheus inspir'd by more than human Power Did not as Poets feign tame savage Beasts But Men as lawless and as wild as they And first disswaded them from Rage and Blood Thus when Amphion built the Theban Wall They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute In a word it was Morality that first set a Mark of Distinction between publick and private Good setled our Rights and Authority and gave Laws and Rules for regulating Societies as the same Poet expresses When Man yet new No Rule but uncorrupted Reason knew And with a native bent did Good pursue Vnforc'd by Punishment unaw'd by Fear His Words were simple and his Soul sincere No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd No Court erected yet no Cause was heard But all was safe for Conscience was their Guard However we must acknowledge our selves much indebted to Socrates as to Moral Philosophy since by his applying himself
to the study thereof it hath given us Opportunity of great Improvement by reducing it to a more distinct and easy method than formerly and we find that the Disciples of the great Plato and of Xenophon also have left behind them curious and excellent Monuments nor have those who succeeded them as Aristotle and the Stoicks come short of handling it more methodically and at large THE First BOOK CONCERNING HAPPINESS CHAP. I. What Happiness is THo' Felicity or Happiness be properly the enjoyment of the Sovereign or Chief Good and therefore the most blessed Estate that can be desired yet because this Estate of Enjoyment comprehends this Sovereign Good it is for that Reason called by this Name It is also termed the Chief or the Ultimate Happiness the End of all Ends or The End for its Excellency because all other things are desired and sought after for it's sake And lastly that it is desired alone for it's own sake To this purpose Aristotle tells us That amongst the things that are desirable there must be something at last which is most desirable that so we might avoid an Infinity But here we may make two considerable Remarks The First is That we don't concern our selves here with that Happiness mentioned by the Sacred Pen-Men when they tell us how happy that Man is who being assisted with the Divine Influences betakes himself entirely to the Service of God and being filled with Faith and Hope and inflamed with Charity spends his Life in Peace and Tranquility Nor shall we Treat of that which may be called Natural Happiness because it may be obtained by the strength of Nature being such as the ancient Philosophers did not doubt but to enjoy here on Earth The Second is That by this Natural Felicity that we here Treat of is not to be understood such a state of Life as we can't imagin a better a more pleasant and more desirable in the which we cannot apprehend any evil nor think of any good thing which we shall not possess nor of any thing that we have a desire to do but we shall be able to accomplish it and that it shall remain fix'd and unchangeable But we understand such a certain state of Life in which we may be as happy as is possible in which there are abundance of good things and very few of any sort of evil and in which consequently we may lead as easie quiet and undisturbed a Life as the Condition of the Country the Society we Converse with the Constitution of our Bodies the manner of our Life our Age and other Circumstances will permit For to propose to our selves more than this or to affect during the Course of our Natural Life the highest Felicity is not to acknowledge but rather forget our selves to be Men that is to say weak and feeble Animals who by the Laws of Nature are subject to an infinite number of Mischiefs and Evils And in this sense it is that we usually say a Wise Man tho' tormented with exquisite Pains may nevertheless be happy not in a perfect and compleat sense but he may attain to that degree that we call Human Happiness which the Wise Man always enjoys in that measure that the Circumstances will permit because he don't increase his Misery either by Impatience or Despair but rather abates it by his Constancy And by this means he is happier or to speak more properly he is less miserable than if he suffered himself to be dejected as others in like Cases who bear not their Misfortunes with the same patience and constancy of Mind and who besides are not supplied with the same Encouragements from Wisdom as he hath such I mean as an innocent Life and a good Conscience void of offence which always afford great quiet and satisfaction to the Mind Wherefore 't is improper to use this kind of Expression That it is the same thing for a Wise Man to be burning in Phalaris 's Bull as to be solacing himself upon a Bed of Roses for it is of such things as Fire and Torments that he desires to be exempt and wishes much rather that they were not or that he might not suffer by them but when they come upon him he considers them as unavoidable Evils and suffers them with Courage so that he may say Vror sed invictus I burn it is true and suffer and sometimes I sigh and weep but for all this I am not vanquish'd nor overcome nor do I suffer my self to be transported with Despair which would render my Condition much more miserable Several Opinions concerning the efficient Cause of Happiness AT our first entring upon this Discourse we may observe that the efficient Causes of Happiness being nothing else but the Goods of the Soul of the Body or of Fortune some of the Philosophers have highly extolled the first some the second and others have included them all Those who chiefly recommend the Riches of the Mind as Anaxagoras propose for the obtaining of Happiness A Contemplative Life together with such a kind of Freedom which proceeds from profound Knowledge Possidonius requires Contemplation with a Dominion over the irrational part of Man Herillus generally and simply Learning or Knowledge Apollodorus and Lycus generally the Pleasures of the Mind Leucinus the Pleasures that proceed from honest things The Stoicks Zenon Cleanthes Aristus and the rest require Vertue Therefore these last proceeded so far as to say That if a Man possess'd Vertue it matter'd not whether he were sick or well All the rest by common Consent maintain'd that to live happily was nothing else but to live a Vertuous Life or as they express it according to Nature As for those who prefer the Riches and advantages of the Body and who chiefly aim at sensual Pleasures they were for that Reason Named the Voluptuous Voluptuarii Philosophi of whom we shall have occasion to discourse hereafter when we shall compare them with Epicurus At present we shall only take notice that they have had Aristippus for their Leader and with him the Cyrenaicks of whom we shall make mention afterwards and that the Annicerians who proceed from the Cyrenaicks aimed at no certain end of Life but at the Pleasure of every particular Action of what kind or Nature soever Lastly amongst such as prefer the Goods of Fortune they are generally the vulgar sort of People who look with a greedy desire some upon Riches some upon Honours some upon other things But amongst the Philosophers none are mention'd but such as joyn to these outward Advantages the perfections also both of the Mind and Body for this hath given occasion to the Poets to make these excellent representations of Happiness which they have borrowed from several Opinions of the Philosophers such as this which requires that good Fortune might accompany Vertue Virtus colenda Sors petenda a Diis bona Haec quippe duo cui suppetunt is vivere Et vir beatus bonus simul potest Another desires