Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	executor_n	pay_v	sum_n	2,814	5	9.0335	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A60117	Cases in Parliament, resolved and adjudged, upon petitions, and writs of error	Shower, Bartholomew, Sir, 1658-1701.	1698 (1698)	Wing S3650; ESTC R562	237,959	239

sufficient Orders to charge the Executor of P. S. with he prefers his Bill against the Appellants and by her Answer she own'd the Receipt of the two Sums but by order of P. S. and afterwards upon hearing of the Cause The Court declared that there appearing no positive orders from P. S. for these two Sums the Appellants ought to pay the Principal Interest and Costs And a Decree was made accordingly And now it was argued on the behalf of the Appellants That this was not just because the Respondent never paid any Money to any Body while Katharine boarded with him or afterwards but by the Order and upon the Credit of P.S. and charged it to his Account and the Respondent did not pretend but that all was repaid him excepting these two Sums that the Respondent and Katharine had never any Account or Dealings together upon her Credit and 't is to be presumed that the Respondent hath charged these Sums upon the Account of P. S. and not to her Account because the Receipts are so worded and that Katharine had released P. S. on their accounting together and therefore she could not charge the Executor of P. S. On the other side it was argued That here was a Badge of Fraud in the Appellant K that upon her Account with P. S. no mention was had of these Sums that the Debt was originally hers that she was obliged to pay it either to Slaughter or to Haynes that not having paid the same to Slaughter and Slaughter having released to her she was discharged from all Demands on that side and therefore 't was the more reasonable it should be answered by her to the Respondent that tho' the Credit might be at first given to Slaughter yet the Money being paid to her and not by her paid to Slaughter Haynes had a fair Claim against her even to avoid circuity of Suits for if this were otherwise 't would only turn Haynes upon the Executor of Slaughter and that Exeecutor upon Katharine the Appellant again in Equity to set aside the Release and to have an allowance of these Sums and that in Justice and Equity the Charge was placed upon the proper Party who at first was the Debtor for what she thus received And accordingly the Decree was affirmed Dormer Sheppard al' versus Joseph Wright al' APpeal from a Decree of Dismission of a Bill preferred in the Court of Chancery The Case was thus The Appellants did in the Year 1693. load on Board the Ship Vnion at Gallipoly 210 Tuns of Oyls of which Ship the Appellants were Owners and the Respondents loaded on Board her at Messina 85 Bales of Silk upon Freight by Contract both to be delivered at London The Ship homeward bound was chased into Malaga Mould by one of the Thoulon Fleet who were three or four days in sight then stood in for that Port as if designed to attack the Fort and thereupon the Master discoursed the Owner's Factor who sent him off a Lighter to save what they could of the Ships Cargo and because the Silk was of the greatest value the Silk was put on board the Lighter and carried ashore and to come at the Silk for it lay beyond the Oyls they were forced to rummage the Ship In saving of which and some small part of the Oyls many hours were spent and by the Seamen only and at Night the French left the Port whereupon no more was landed But about six days afterwards the French Fleet appeared again before Malaga and then all Endeavours were used to save the Oyls but were prevented by the Boats which the French Men of War sent into the Harbour and the Enemy forced them to their Guns and when they could defend the Ship no longer they bored holes to sink her but the Oyls kept her from sinking and the French took her and carried her away The Bales of Silk were afterwards put on board another Ship and delivered to the Respondents at London for which they paid the Freight c. The Appellants pretending that they ought to have a share of the Silk which was saved in proportion to the value of the Ship and Oyls which were lost they exhibited their Bill in Chancery to enforce the Respondents to come to an Average with the Appellants for the loss of their Ship and Oyls And after Examination of Witnesses on the hearing of the Cause the Bill was dismissed And it was argued on the behalf of the Appellants That this Dismission was not justifiable by the Rules of Equity for that it must be agreed If Goods are thrown overboard in stress of Weather or in danger or just fear of Enemy in order to save the Ship and rest of the Cargo that which is saved shall contribute to a Reparation of that which is lost and the Owners shall be Contributors in proportion and that there was the same Reason here that by preferring the salvage of the Silk being the best of the Cargo before the Oyls the Owners were deprived of the same opportunity for the salvage of the Oyls that as the Sea-law in Extremity directs the Master to preserve the best of his Cargo and the Goods saved ought to contribute to the loss of the Goods Ejected so where one is preferred before the other in case of Extremity there being not time to land the whole average is just and reasonable And as to the six days time there was then no apprehension of danger and consequently the Master could not justifie the landing of any thing after the reason of their Fears were removed That the prudence of their Master in saving the Silk before the Oyls ought not to be to the prejudice of the Owners interest the Oyls lying next to be preserved that the pretended neglect of the Master in not landing them during the absence of the Enemy is no Excuse because then there was no danger that the saying that the loss of the Ship and Oyls did not contribute to the salvage of the Silks is no reason seeing the salvage of the Silk which had otherwise been lost deprived the Owners of the same opportunity for the salvage of the other Goods that in such Adventures as the danger is common so ought the loss or damage to be common and equal that the Master is equally intrusted by and for all and were it otherwise it had been the Duty and will be the Interest of all Owners of Ships to order their Servants in Extremity to preserve their own Goods that the Silk being of the greatest value it was a National Service to preserve that before the Oyls and therefore equitable that all who embark in the same Bottom should share alike in the Service done for Salvage c. And further that if in Extremity the safety of the best of the Ships Cargo is not preferrable before that of the meaner value it will be of ill consequence and therefore the Sea-law provides first for the Safety of the best of the

Denbigh and Montgomery leaving three Daughters and Coheirs Mary Penelope and Susan Susan married Sidney Godolphin one of the present Appellants In July 1674. Mary and Penelope in consideration of 4000 l. paid to the said Mary by Richard Carew Esq and in consideration of a Marriage to be had and which was afterwards had between Penelope and the said Richard Carew by Lease and Release convey all those their two Parts of the said Lands in Denbigh Salop and Montgomery to Trustees and their Heirs to the use of Richard Carew for Life then to Penelope for Life for her Jointure then to the said Trustees and their Heirs during the Lives of Richard and Penelope to preserve contingent Remainders then to the first and other Sons of Richard and Penelope in Tail-Male successively And in default of Issue-Male to the Daughters of Richard and Penelope in Tail And in default of such Issue as to one Moiety of the said two Parts to the first and other Sons of the said Penelope by any other Husband in Tail the Remainder of all and singular the Premisses to the said Richard Carew and his Heirs for ever subject to this Proviso That if it should happen that no Issue of the said Richard upon the Body of the said Penelope should be living at the decease of the Survivor of them and the Heirs of the said Penelope should within Twelve Months after the decease of the Survivor of the said Richard and Penelope dying without Issue as aforesaid pay to the Heirs or Assigns of the said Richard Carew the Sum of 4000 l. that then the Remainder in Fee-simple so limited to the said Richard Carew and his Heirs should cease and that then and from thenceforth the Premisses should remain to the use of the right Heirs of the said Penelope for ever After this Mary intermarried with the Appellant Sir Evan Lloyd and a Partition was made of the Premisses and the same had been enjoyed accordingly ever since and Mr. Carew and his Lady levied a Fine to Mr. Godolphin and his Lady of his part who did thereupon by their Deed dated 23 Sept. 1676. covenant to levy a Fine of Mr. Carew's two Parts to such uses as he and his Lady should limit and appoint but have not yet levied the said Fine Richard Carew and Penelope his Wife to avoid all Controversies that might happen whereby the Estate of the said Richard Carew or his Heirs might be question'd or incumbred by the Heirs of Penelope and to the End to extinguish and destroy and barr all such Estate Right Title Equitable or other Interest as the said Penelope then had or her Issue and Heirs might have or claim to the same by any Power Settlement or Condition on payment of 4000 l. or otherwise to the Heirs of Richard Carew by the Heirs of the said Penelope and for the settling of the same on the said Richard Carew and his Heirs did in Michaelmas Term 1681. levy a Fine of the Share and Part allotted to them and by Deed of 10 Decemb. 1681. declare that the said Fine should be to the use of the said Richard for Life Remainder to Penelope for Life the Remainder to the said Richard Carew his Heirs and Assigns for ever And do further declare That the Fine agreed to be levied by the Appellants Sidney Godolphin and Susan his Wife by their Deed dated the 23 Sept. 1676. should be to the same uses and then direct the Trustees by the first Settlement to convey to those uses Penelope died without Issue in 1690. Richard Carew made his Will in Aug. 1691. and devised the said Lands to Sir John Carew Baronet his Brother subject to pay all his Debts and Legacies and made Sir John Carew his Executor In Decemb. 1691. Richard Carew died without Issue and Sir John Carew entred and was seized and possessed of the Premisses and paid 4855 l. for the Debts of Richard Carew Sir John Carew died and the Respondent Sir Richard Carew an Infant is his Son Heir and Executor The Appellants Mary and Susan claiming the Lands as Heirs to Penelope by virtue of the said Proviso in the first Settlement upon payment of the 4000 l. exhibited their Bill in Chancery to compel the Trustees to convey the Estate to them upon such payment Upon hearing of this Cause on Bill and Answer the Court ordered a State of the Case to be drawn which was as above and afterwards the Court assisted by the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Mr. Justice Rooksby seeing no Cause to relieve the Plaintiffs dismissed their Bill And now it was argued on behalf of the Appellants That such Dismission ought to be set aside and amongst other things it was insisted on in favour of the Appeal that this Proviso was not void that it was within the reason of the Contingent Limitations allowed by the late Lord Chancellor Nottingham in the Case of the Duke of Norfolk and there were quoted several Paragraphs in the Argument made by the said Lord Chancellor as that future Interests springing Trusts or Trusts Executory Remainders that are to emerge or arise upon Contingency are quite out of the Rules and Reasons of Perpetuities nay out of the Reason upon which the Policy of the Law is founded in those Cases especially if they be not of remote or long Consideration but such as by a natural and easie Interpretation will speedily wear out and so things come to the right Channel again That tho' there can be no Remainders limited after a Fee-simple yet there may be a Contingent Fee-simple arise out of the first Fee that the ultimum quod sit or the utmost Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee is not yet plainly determined that tho' it be impossible to limit a Remainder of a Fee upon a Fee yet 't is not impossible to limit a Contingent Fee upon a Fee that no Conveyance is ever to be set aside in Chancery where it can be supported by a reasonable Construction especially where 't is a Family Settlement Then these Paragraphs were applied and further urged That there could not in reason be any difference between a Contingency to happen during Life or Lives or within one year afterwards that the true reason of such Opinions which allowed them if happening within the time of the Parties lives or upon their deceases was because no Inconvenience could be apprehended thereby and the same Reason will hold to one year afterwards and the true Rule is to fix Limits and Boundaries to such Limitations when so made as that they prove Inconvenient and not otherwise That this Limitation upon this Contingency happening was the considerate Intention of the Family the Circumstances whereof required Consideration and this Settlement was the Result of it and made by good Advice That the Fine could not barr the Benefit of this Proviso for that the same never was nor ever could be in Penelope who levied the Fine As to the Pretence That if the