Linguistic DNA - Concept Modelling Demonstrator

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	evil_a	good_a	work_n	6,191	5	6.9192	4	true

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A09553	The philosopher of the court, written by Philbert of Vienne in Champaigne, and Englished by George North, gentlema[n].; Philosophe de court. English	Philibert, de Vienne, 16th cent.; North, George, gentleman.	1575 (1575)	STC 19832; ESTC S114638	55,136	134

call that euill according to the ballance and measure wherewyth wÃ©e trie good and euill at these dayes whiche is muche iuster and harder than the tryall of Philosophers But since it bath bene corrupted and touched by oure enimye it styll abydeth lame and vnperfite And that is worse it cannot acknowledge what it was at the first nor conceyue from whence it tooke begynning except it bel ightned by a spirituall clearnesse which these Philosophers had not Euen so thys seconde Nature soyled in fylthe as shÃ©e is is the same that the Philosophers so muche speake of and meane for they knewe no better but this is nothing to satisfie Gods iustice or the good lyfe requyred of vs by hym but is rather a hurte and hinderance too the same Yet otherwyse to make a man iust wyse graue and vertuous among men which is the accomplishing of the precepts of Philosophie nature can doe all For the spirit of man can perceyue no imperfitenesse in this nature bÃ©eing so spoyled ignorant and weake yet hauing this vnderstanding and iudgement whiche is abyding in this seconde Nature that God hathe not made anye thing euyll and belÃ©euing that this seconde Nature is the first not corrupted but made of God as in dÃ©ede it is and that there is no other hÃ©e wÃ©enes all to bÃ©e well and supposes all operations procÃ©eding from this to bÃ©e perfite good and estemes whatsoeuer is done by the same for vertue This is as I coniecture all the science and ignorance of the Philosophers This is the knowledge of our graue and sage fellowes of the worlde that haue so arrogantly vaunted of this great dame vertue These are the causes that y lawes ciuil which is part of their Philosophie do suffer some things repugnant to gods roÌ„mandemeÌ„t as kÃ©eping of CoÌ„cubines to repell by forÃ©e which they say is natural any prescriptioÌ„ with brech of faith such like We will therefore speake as they and with them but with an other intent not intreating so much of their true vertue as of any other disguised and masking vertue which men doe followe and honour in steade of the right to the end the world may know theyr double follie and ignorance for hauing found this last and newe vertue they haue not that they suppose and thoughe they had it yet should they haue nothing Nature therefore to speake as a Philosopher is the mother of all good things and the same which prouokes vs to vertue Then it must nÃ©edes followe that we are naturally borne to doe good and that shÃ©e soweth in our myndes certaine small sparckles of good will which if we quench by wicked custome of doing euill we ought not to imputo the same to nature for none can iustly say that naturally any is euill These small sparkes are stirring sharp prickes that still do moue and incourage vs to doe those things which are good of themselues So that after the first prouoking motion whiche commeth of nature the alone and onely goodnesse of those causes is the finall ende which draweth â—s therevnto This is the same that Aristotle treates of in the first of his Ethikes who perswades what vertue is and howe it may be knowne saying Si quispiam rerum agendarum est finis quem nos propter seipsam expetimus constat hunc talem finem summum bonum ipsumque optimum esse If there bee in our doings any ende the which we desire for it selfe it confirmes that this ende is the soueraine good and that in the same consisteth vertue Wherefore wÃ©e muste belÃ©eue that if any other intent or cause make vs to doe anye act than suche as besÃ©emeth honestie and notwythstanding the same sÃ©eme lawfull laudable yet is it not good Vertue will bÃ©e loued only for hir owne sake which is a point wherin many but of meane vnderstaÌ„ding though of sufficient iudgement are oft deceyued wheÌ„ they sÃ©e a man of good courage enforce himself with great paine to do any thing that sÃ©emes good in itselfe as to helpe his neighbor or well to serue his master or to defende his subiects so soone as they knowe it done they straight estÃ©eme him an honest man nothing considering why he did it either for reputatioÌ„ to be a good man or to be better recompenced than be deserued whereby he might defraude another wel deseruer or for feare of reproch if he should not do it by which it may appÃ©ere vnto vs that those works which to vs sÃ©eme best are nothing worth we must not iudge any work according to the shew but according to the cause and intent of the doer For as Aristotle saith vertue and vice consist in the intent and not in the worke Therefore we must be more carefull to beware that the shew of good deceiue vs no more thaÌ„ the apparance of euill For a masked euill is a double mischief and no euil is so dangerous as prefered well seeming goodnesse which is called hypocrisie Wherein Cicero tooke some paine in the first booke of his Offices at the end of the Chapter beginning Sed ea animi elatio c. speaking of magnaniâ—itie where he sayth that it is rashly tauntingly spokeÌ„ â–ª that we shoulde take in hande interprise any hard dangerous and worthie attempt without desire of glorie for that there are few found as he affirmeth who after they haue done any thing valiantly or worthily are not glad to be praysed estÃ©eming this pompâ— of rurall brute a triumphant reward of their well doing But I beleue Cicero then thought of him selfe for supposing that some knew him very couetous of honour yet would sÃ©eme neble minded vertuous he would not altegither separat this desire of glory froÌ„ magnaniâ—ity The hope of prai se should incourage the euill to do well and to exercise the same by which exercise they may accustom theÌ„selues to vertue that by little little they may become good men and when they are become such the loue of vertue only will make them do well and no cause else We desire and loue many other things not for y loue of theÌ„selues but for the loue of others as money to be mery with health to be at our ease so that hauing both mony helth and wanting our ease we shuld not be satisfied But vertue is of greater value of more price with vs for she alone pleaseth vs and we desire to do well only for that it is good to do wel to none other ende Nature theÌ„ makes vs loue such things as ar good â–ª this loue by hir is so firmly fixed in vs that howsoeuer nature is corrupted altred yet is she stil inclined drawn to that which sÃ©emes to hir best this semblaÌ„ce daily foloweth the qualitie and condition of nature For as long as she is sound and not corrupted so loÌ„g good things in their perfection seeme also good and follow hir On the contrary part wheÌ„ nature is corrupted reasoÌ„ iudgemeÌ„t

liketh your youthful yeres to carrie you though it somewhat yeldeth to naturall affection follow I pray you your first intent and there shall want no good will in me seeing I prepare my self to matters of greater importance than this and other matters also but that your desire shall be satisfied Yet I knowe that this worde Philosophie doeth sounde so hatefull in the eares of manye thoughe some false and euyll opinion they haue of Philosophie too them vnknowne that they will thinke it straunge and absurde to peruert or mar for so â—hey terme it so excellent a perfection of naâ—ure as is in you with so melancholike opiniâ—ns Therefore this I will say seeing they neiâ—her know nor hate Philosophie but onely for â—he name let vs leaue the worde and speake no more of it but let vs say that you do learne howe to lyue in the worlde which all persons do couet too knowe and yet too liue in the worlde is no other thing than the same which we call or tearme Philosophie as we wil proue hereafter wherein it would greeue mee following my purpose if you and I shoulde so much vse our iudgements and with such hote affection that wee forget to knowe our selues and so make vs mockeries and laughingstockes to the worlde I thinke it not good to haue my house of a tunne as Diogenes had nor to scratch out my eyes as Democritus did or die for hunger as hee that had his Malissa the better too know and vnderstand Philosophie But I commend and prayse him who making good ohere louing good wine and seeking good felowship can by the waye contemplate and marke the maner and liuing of euery one and consider of those that do both good and euill the vantage of either In thus vsing the mother of all Sciences she will neuer make any heauie nor angrie or as some report by inordinate study malancholie but she may drawe them from manie and sundry follies that smell more brutishe than manlie And if any will say that withoute this euery man may liue I dare affirme that he is so farre from reason as his opinion deserues no answere As for the pleasure desire and coÌ„tentment that comes of it thus muche may be sayde that if in the morning when you attire your selfe amoÌ„g your maidens the cleere christall and good looking glasse delightes you in shewing the perfit Image of your outward proportion how much more shoulde you reioyce to beholde and see your selfe in this Science to knowe what is your life what it ought too bee what you are and what is the substance of eueâ—ie thing Heereby you shall learne howe the wyfe ought too gouerne and behaue hir selfe with hir husbande it sheweth howe you shall well instruct and guyde your householde your â—ittle priuate common wealth shall be so neate â—nd polished as nothing better you shall know â—owe to vse your selfe towarde straungers and â—ou may bee assured by this without reproofe â—o do any thing freelie for infamie and slaunâ—er shall no way torment you VVhat woulde â—ou wishe or desire more On the contrarie withoute this knowledge you remaine in suspence and doubt like too a traueler beeing in the open fielde and pressed on his iourney not knowing his way you haue no other guide than that blinde beast of common and popular iudgement who as ignorant and vnexpert in all things sayeth and doth one while one thing and an other while an other For what is more inconstant than Ignorance Thus being bound to this foolishe variable and common opinion and hauing no other reason or councell but to followe others you shall soone vnderstand in what miseries and care you liue Knowing therfore your so good affection and to the end to deliuer you out of his prison and miserable darkenesse of Ignorance I haue written to you this little treatise altogither rude and impolished as a wâ—nderer through the countrie In the which you shall breefely see the summe of that I euer thought in Philosophy wherin the auncient Sages past reposed their soueraine bountie Then howe it is in these dayes disguised and masked grounded onely on mans opinions and not on Nature And last you shall amply finde yet not so much as I gladly would what I thinke of this newe Philosophie which is the order and manner of liuing in these dayes â–ª In writing whereof I haue played Democrates applyed the whole too a pleasant conclusion Therefore when you vnderstande the one and the other you will vse it I know so discretely that it shall not let you froÌ„ your necessarie causes of more importance And if in the discourse of the booke I speak more vnciuilly and boldly than is meete or conuenient to your excellencie It may please you payse those woordes and sentences in the balance apte and conuenient to the matter heere treated whiche hath ofte in many places made me forget the sweete and gentle style that ye might desire To conclude I humbly request you to receyue this my little labour as the frute of your owne possession inheritance wherby I shall seeme to haue gained great profit if it please you to preserue it close it in the coffer of your gracious fauour wherewith I haue nothing too wishe or desire but the immortalitie of the same The Philosophie of the Court. THe auncient Philosophers past whose morall iudgementes were allowed for doctrine in their time did all affirme that nature hath giuen vs nothing euil and if in our life we would follow or do no more than we are naturally enclined vnto and that which she prescribeth we should neuer doe any thing but well But if wÃ©e growe dÃ©eper into consideration of the cause and come nearer the quicke whiche they could not so well attaine to as we may who haue our eyes open and clÃ©ered by him from whence procÃ©edeth this nature of which they speake so much and which tooke that name through ignorance of him For who is it else that we should cal Nature if we belÃ©eue God to be the creator of all things It will manifestly appeare that thiâ—â—entence is truer than they thinke for They say the instinct of nature sufficeth only to liue will and we likewise affirme the samâ— yet they knowe not that the well liuing whereof we speake is perfiter than their Philosophicall liuing which in respect of ours is most vnlike well liuing Notwithstanding wÃ©e affirme as they and agrÃ©e with them that nature hath giuen vs sufficient ayde and helpe too lyue well But to the ende wÃ©e enter not intoo errour or sÃ©eme to depraue God of due glorie which I speake for his honour I will not say that this nature which I now speake of and the philosophicall reason is all one For the nature whereof I now write is the first nature not corrupt or filthie or blinde but such as knew no sinne nor tasted of any other thing than the blessing of god This I am sure hath no parte in euill I

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