c. 7. Mala res non habet causam efficientem sed deficientem That which is evill hath not an efficient but a deficient cause True if we speak properly for causa efficiens proprie dicta non producit effectum toto genere a se diversum as the Logick Schools informs us An efficient cause properly so called cannot produce an effect in its whole kinde differing from it self and there fore produceth an entative effect And we are taught in Metaphysicks quod bonum et ens convertuntur Every Being is good And e contrá for Entia per se mala non sunt sed entium defectus Beeings of themselves are not evill but the defects of Beeings The Devill though he be a cause of sinne yet is he not causa propria absoluta Diabolus non est causa absoluta immediata peccati et plenaria peccati nostri ac immediata The Devill is not the proper absolute plenarie and immediate cause of sin for nothing can properly be said to be the cause of sin but that which can movere voluntatem ad agendum move the Will inwardly to sinne which sinne being a defect an evill God cannot be the cause of it thus for Deus non irritat voluntatem ad peccandum infundendo malitiam aliquam in voluntatem ipsam Deus non infundit maliti am in volunt for God never infuseth any wickednesse into the Will it selfe by which he might provoke it to evill but failing from its obedience it inclinatively moves to sinne Sola voluntas hominis est directe causa peccati ejus Onely the Will of man saith Aquinas in the place before named Aquin. loco quo supâ—a is directly the cause of his sinne Now the Proper and immediate cause is such quod ea posita necessario sequitur effectus if that be put to work the effect doth necessarily follow but the Devill cannot alwayes in his suggestions cause them necessarily to take effect but he comes to have his suggestions executive Mediante corrupta nostra voluntate Our corrupt Will giving way to them and comming between the suggestion and the sinne And howsoever the motus Physicus or naturall motion of the Will in quantum simpliciter motus for so farre forth as it s considered as a motion be of God yea and the motus moralis tum in quantum ad bonum The morall motion also is of God so farre forth as it s moved to God Melchior Canus lib. 2. Melchior Canê° lib. 2. loc com cap. 4. locor commun cap. 4. Causa moralis non agat nisi per voluntatem movens id est movendo voluntatem A morall cause works not but by moving of the Will And Aquinas in his 1 Aquin. 1.2 qu. 80 art 1. 2. qu. 80. art 1. In corpore nihil inclinat interius voluntatem ad volendum nisi vel ipsa voluntas vel Deus Nothing inwardly inclines the Will to will but either the Will it self or else God The VVill it self quantum ad exercitium actus secundum rationem finis For as much as concerns the exercise of its act and in regard of the end But it may be objected that the Will cannot be both movens and mota the thing moving and the thing moved I answer eodem respectu in the same respect it cannot Non omne movens est actu quod movetur est in potentia I answer quod potentia voluntatis est sibi semper actu praesens sed ista potentia quae semper sibi sit actu praesens non semper est potentia actualis The power of the Will is alwayes indeed present to it but that power of it that is thus present is not alwayes actuated actus volitionis quo vult finem et ea quae sunt ad finem non semper est sibi praesens The act of volition for the end and those Mediums that are conducible to it are not alwayes present to it The Will as it is moved may be said to be in potentia in regard of these and yet hath potentiam actu sibi praesentem qua seipsam moveat A power actually in Being by which it may move it self ipsa movet seipsum in quantum per hoc quod vult finem reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio medianti So Aquinas 1.2 qu. 9. art 4. Aquin. 1.2 qu. 9. Art 4. in corpore in corpore It moves it self in as much as thus in that it would the end it reduceth it self to will those things that are conducible to the end this it cannot do except by counsell comming between Cajet com in locum Cajetan thus Semper cum voluntas moveâ— se utitur seipsa Alwayes when the Will moves it self it makes use of it self applicando se ad volendum vel nolendum By the applying of it self to be willing or nilling but Principium motionis quoad exercitium actus est ex fine quia omne agens agit propter finem appetitum The principle of the motion it regard of the exercise of the act of the Will is taken from the end because every agent works for the end desired of it for prima inter causas est causa finalis The finall cause is the first amongst the causes namely in intention and we are taught from the Logicians quod finis perse sua natura tantum est bonus That the end of it selfe and owne nature is onely good whence we say usually Finis bonum convertuntur The end and that which is good are things convertible and the object of the Will we know is bonum that which is good Yet it may be objected that finis non est actus qui sit principium agendi but finis est propter quem principio agendi agens agit The end is not that act that is the beginning of the doing of a thing but the end is that for which the great Agent worketh from the Principle of acting To which it may be answered that finis ut objectum voluntatis est ratio agendi tali potentiae cujus est objectum proprium That the end considered as an object of the Will may be a reason of the working of that faculty whereof it is the proper object Thomas Thom. 1.2 qu. 9. art 4. respond ad 1. prima primae qu. 9. art 4. respond ad primum Vnde motus voluntarius etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum tamen principium primum est ab extra The voluntarie motion of the Will although it have the next principle intrinsecall or within it self yet notwithstanding the first principle is from without it Thus we may see that the Will hath Principium internum et formale suae motionis The Will hath an internall and formall Principle of its motion See for the like Scaliger de subtilitate contra Cardan Scaliger exercit contra Hier Card. 307. sect
sometime move the appetite intellective which is the Will yet it moves it not necessario necessarily but ex parte objecti sub ratione boni by way of an object and under the shew of that which is good Jam. 1.14 Iam. 1.14 Every man is tempted when he is drawne away of his own lust and enticed now non abstraheretur a concupiscentia nisi moveretur voluntas ab appetitu sensitivo qui sedes est concupiscentiae it should not be drawn away of lust except it were moved from the sensitive appetite which is the Seat of concupiscence Aug. in Ps 58. And Augustine saith of the Devill in Psalm 58. Certe princeps est omnium peccatorum certe seductor est ad peccandum Truly the Devill is the Prince of all sinne surely he is the seducer to it but we must consider how and that is indirecte et occasionaliter indirectly and occasionally and so he may be said to have been causa omnium nostrorum peccatorum in quantum induxit primum hominem ad peccandum ex cujus peccato in tantum vitiata est humana natura ut omnes ad peccandum proclives sumus He may be said indeed to have been the cause of all our sins in as much as he allured the first man to sinne from whose sinne our humane nature comes to be so much defiled that by reason of it we are all prone to sinne If any object quod sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum honestum et per hoc est directe causa bont ita Diabolus movet ad consilium malum et per hoc Diabolus sit directe causa peccati thus as God moves to that counsell which is good and honest and by this means is directly the cause of good so on the other side the Devill moves to that counsell which is evill and if one by that means may be said directly to be the cause of sinne to this receive this answer that God so causeth that which is good Vt interius movet voluntatem quod Diabolus non potest differunt ergo in modo causandi God inwardly moves the Will as Phil. 2.13 Phil. 2.13 It is God that works in you both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perficere Deus non tantum habet fluxum si multaneum cum voluntate sed etiam fluxum praecedaneum in voluntatem to will and to do c this the Devill cannot do as I have shown therefore they differ in the manner of causation God doing it interne movendo by moving the Will inwardly secundum conditionem according to the nature and condition of it the Devill externe suadendo appetibilia proponendo by externally perswading and proposall of appetible objects Gerard. Voss Thes Theol. Thes 4. de primo pec Adami To which Gerard Vossius accords Thes Theolog. Thes 4. de primo peccato Adami nec necessitas ulla a Diabolo fuit quia consilium dare potuit cogere non potuit The Devill did not any way necessitate Adam to sinn he could counsell him but he could not compell him Aug. lib 1. c. 13 de civit Dei which assertion he strengthens from August in lib. 14. de Civit. Dei cap. 13. Diabolus hominem non cepisset nisi jam ille sibi ipsi placere cepisset The Devill had never so catched and deceived man if he himself had not first begun to please himself in what he heard And the Fathers falling upon this point send their judgements all down one Channell to quote so many as may evidence the point and such as are most pregnant for it Aug. de correptione gratia c. cap. 11 August de correptione gratia ad Valent. c. 11. Acceperat posse sed si vellet non habuit velle quod posset nam si habuisset perseverasset posset enim perseverare etiam si vellet quod ut nollet de libero descendit arbitrio He had received an ability to have stood if he had would but he had not a willingnesse to do what he could for had he been willing to have so willed he had still persevered for he might have persevered in his created Estate if he had would the which that he would not descended from his own free-will for as the same godly and learned Father saith l. 3. contra Iulaianum c. 5. Aug. cont Iul. lib. 3. cap. 5. sicut voluntas mala ipsa est origo peccati id est a voluntate mala peccatum exortum est peccati origo voluntas mala est ita nisi voluntas mala non est cujusquam ulla origo peccati c. as an evill will is the originall of sinne that is to say from an evill will sinne did arise and an evill will is the beginning of sin so except the will were evill there should not be the beginning of any sinne Tertullian lib. 2. adversus Martionem cap. 8. Tertul lib. 2. advers Marc. cap. 8. Sicut Deus homini vitae statum induxit ita homo sibi mortis statum attraxit hoc non per infirmitatem c. As God brought man into the state of Life so man attracted to himself the state of death but not by infirmity c. for we have heard how able his Maker had made him so that this defect for want of ability given him could not be imputed to his Maker Chrysost in Gen. 3. Chrys in Gen. 3. Hom. 15. Hom. 15. Nusquam necessitas nusquam violentia He was no where necessitated to sinne nor from any place had he any violence offered him And the same father in Hom. de interdictione arboris ad Adam utcumque habuit in potestate Deo parere quod noluit Diabolo non consentire quod voluit He had both in his power either to obey God and he would not or to consent to the Devill and that would he Fulgentius de Incarnatione gratia to the same purpose chap. 6. he was so created ut bonum facere in propria facultate haberet male si vellet He had it in his power to have done good if he would or to have done evill now he that God had made thus able to stand could cast no just fault upon his Maker if he did fall his failing was from his own mutable Will his Maker had not promised to continue him immutably good without any condition and himself implored not his aid in his temptation but not relying upon the truth of God he was inticed willingly to give way to his Wife and the Devill so that from the truth of this point so farre discovered unto us we may by the way discover three errours to be confuted First that of the Manichees Manichees qui crediderunt peccatum omne esse a necessitate naturae quia Deus coagmentavit hominem ex bona malaque substantia and that sanatio was per separationem malae substantiae non per
25. exercitat 307. sect 25. in ipso limin Aquinas prima secundae quaest 9. artic 6. motus voluntatis est ab intrinseco Aluar de auxiliis grat lib. 9. disp 85. sect 3. Ostendens quod lib. arbitrium subordinatur gratiae efficaci c. subordinatur Deo ut causae priori non so lum suadenti vel moraliter moventi interius sed tanquam causae vere efficienti c. The motion of the Will is from an intrinsecall principle Secondly God inclines the Will morally to good yet inclines it freely according to its nature suasione but not suasione tantum quamvis non excludit quia inserviat ad movendam voluntatem humanam ad agendum congruenter naturae suae libere et deliberate By swasion but not by it onely although it be not excluded seeing it may serve to move the Will of man to act congruously to its nature deliberately and freely but motio sola suasoria non est motio vera realis ac immediata sed remota et quasi metaphorica Guil. Twiss in his vindic Gratiae lib. 2. c. 15. digres 3. sect 2. as acute Dr. Twisse in his Vindiciae gratiae A motion of the Will onely by way of swasion is not a true reall and immediate motion but a remote and as it were a metaphoricall motion for swasion works but per modum proponentis objectum ut Bellarmin ' et objectum quantumvis idonee propositum non agit genere causae efficientis sed finalis alliciendo tantum non vere et realiter in ipsam voluntatem operando at gratiadei est efficax c. agit potenter naturae tamen uniuscujusque convenienter it works but by way of proposall of the Object as Bellarmine hath it and the object although it be fitly proposed works not in the kinde or nature of an efficient cause but finall onely by way of inticing or alluring not truly and really working upon the will or in having efflux or operation into the Will it self but the grace of God is effectuall c. and works powerfully yet agreeable to the nature of every thing Aqu. 1.2 qu. 9 art 4. respond ad 3. Aquinas prima secundae quest 9. art respondend ad tert confesseth Aluar de auxilas grat li◠3. disp 18. sect 3. Necessarius est previus Dei influxus in ipsas causas quo ad operandum moveantur c. not only that God moves the VVill sicut universalis motor ad universale objectum voluntatis quod est bonum c. sed tamen interdum specialiter movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum quod est bonum sicut in his quos movet per gratiam As an universall Mover to the universall or generall object of the VVill which is good c. but sometime notwithstanding he specially moves some men to will determinately that which is good as it is with those that he moves by grace but God moves no man to evill formally so called as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 iniquitas or inordinatio iniquitie or disorder Deus volens iniquitatem tu non es Thou art not a God that wils or takes pleasure in wickednesse God wills it not voluntate approbationis et effectionis Paraeus in castig Bell. de amiss gratiae statu peccati as Paraeus in his Castigation of Bellarmine De amissione gratiae et statu peccati With an approbative and an effective will he wills not evill Aquin Aqu. 1.2 qu. 49. art 2. respond ad 2. in his prima secundae qu. 49. art 2. resp ad secundum effectus causae secundae deficientis reducitur in causam primam non deficientem Aluer de auxilii◠gratiae l. 3. disp 18. sect 21 quantum ad id quod habet entitatis et perfectionis non autem quantum ad id quod habet de defectu The effect of the second cause deficient is so farre forth reduced to the first cause not deficient as it hath any thing of Entitie or perfection not in regard of that which is defective in it for that is to be imputed to the second cause Actio non est mala in ratione Entis c. sed mala moraliter defectiva sive in quantum est peccatum sub hac ratione solum reducitur ad causam deficient as is claudication in motion the motion is from the motive power in the creature but claudication in the motion is a curvitate cruris from some lame legge of the thing moved thus conconceive of the Will of man as it is a Will and taken as a depraved Will and then Paraeus in cacastig Bell. de amiss lib. cap 5 as Pareus in castigat Bellarmine de amission gratiae c. lib. 2. cap. 5. Per se et proxime actionis malae causa semper est mala hominis vel Sathanae voluntas The evill will of man or of the Devill is by it self the next or nearest cause of an evill deed For I conceive him to take the word action simply there for the aberration of of the action or the evill in the action And the Devill cannot compell or move the Will to sinne without the concurring willingnesse of it selfe Aqu. speaks most excellently to this point in his 1.2 qu. 80. art 1. Aqu. 1.2 qu. 80 art 1. in corp in corp Diabolus non sit causa peccati directe vel sufficienter sed solum per modum persuadentis vel proponentis appetibile The Devil cannot directly or sufficiently be said to be the cause of sinne but by the way of perswading or proposing such objects as are appetible or such as we affect and so one may also be the cause of sinne to another The Devill did propose the forbidden fruit as objectum appetibile cum intentione tentandi As an appetible object with an intent to tempt our first Parents to eat it and so to sinne and that he might the better and more easily prevail he perswades them sub specie alicujus boni under the shew of some good that should redound unto them by it Gen. 3.5 Eritis tanquam Dij Ye shall be as Gods c. Yet as Augustine hath it in Psalm 91. Though the Devill hath astutiam suadendi August in Psal 91. yet he hath not potentiam cogendi he hath craft and cunning enough to perswade but he hath not power or strength to compell voluntas non necessario movetur ab objecto appetibili proposito but the causa immediata et interior peccati est voluntas The Will of man is the immediat cause of sinne and the inward moving to it Now indeed apprehensio partis sensitivae et appetitus sensitivus esse potest causa remota peccati nam appetitus sensitivus aliquando moveat appetitum intellectivum qui est voluntas The apprehension of the sensitive part and the sensitive appetite may be a remote cause of sinne for the sensitive appetite may
of this point in hand It is commonly observed in Fishes that in great Winds they have alwayes a care by natures instinct to swimme against them if they be occasioned to move especially in violent water or swift heady currents any considerable distance lest if the winds in their swimming coming behinde them should by the violence of the waves and water beat up and beat off their scales ruffle their Fins and often clash in Branchias into their Gills which would much vex and disquiet them but if they be affraid or in eminent danger then will they move contrary to their naturall bent though with danger of their lives I have observed in fishes of small quantity and such as usually shove shoale or swimme together by many in a company that even in a calm season and quiet current yet when they have come to the fall of a stream or break of water they have all together made head against the stream and suffered the water to drive them down backward So of this no more I now come to the way how they became subiect to vanitie as thus First if we consider the meritorious cause why they were made thus subiect to vanity it was the sinne or disobedience of man as in part you have heard After the whole creation was finished God made him lord of the sublunarie creatures but he soon abused the honour conferred upon him true it is Psal 49. Psal 49. last last Homo cum esset in honore Man in honour had no understanding but is become like unto the Beasts that Perish as it hath been vulgarly read and then some of the Ancients have understood it of man in the estate of innocency Aug. in locum August in locum Factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei homo praelatus jumentis c. God having made man according to his own Image or similitude preferred him before the Beasts of the field and Fecit Deus Hominem cui servirent jumenta made him such as that the Beasts should do him service yet non intellexit he understood not he well considered not this height of honor in which God had placed him but being made in the Image of God he made himself like unto the Beasts that perish For though superstites a morte erunt eorum animae id minime obstabit quo minus in aeternum dedecus mors ipsos demergat as Calvin notes Although their souls remain after death yet that hinders not but that death may swallow them down into eternall shame and infamy But if the place be well pondered it will rather make for man indefinite indefinitely not Adam in particular but what man soever The Originall is thus Adam bicar viso jabin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homo in excellentia et non intelligit A man in his excellency yet understands not Iunius Iunius Homo qui est in precio neque intelligens A man that is in esteem and understands not bicar for the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 comes of the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 preciosum esse in honore jacar gloria et pretio esse To be precious or of great value to be in honour in glory or renown or account a man that is such and not considerate of it similis fit jumentis quae intereunt may be said indeed to be like unto the Beasts that perish Though the Lord had said to man Psa 32.9 Psal 32.9 Ne estote ut Equus et Mulus expertes intelligentiae Be not as the Horse or the Mule which have no understanding yet a man in honour and not understanding it is like unto these Propriam dignitatem non advertit nec rationaliter vixit nec Coelestem et Angelicam beatitudinem concupivit sed in rebus temporalibus at que carnalibus se immersit nec per rationem passionibus suis praevaluit Dyonys Carthus in loc as Dionysius Carthasianus in locum He considers not his own dignity nor guides his life by the rule and law of reason nor covets after that Heavenly and Angelicall happinesse but plungeth himself in the carnall cares and affairs of this life and makes not use of his reason that God hath given him to subdue or controll his affections God gave Adam a Law in Paradice where he had put him Gerard. Vossiê° Thes Theol. Thes 1. de primo pecc Adami potuit facile potuit evitare and when he had made him able to keep it and was no way necessitated or straitned to break it but willingly failed in his obedience he had voluntatem a Deo but he had abusum voluntatis a Diabolo defectum a seipso He had his Will from God but the abuse of it from the Devill and the defect of it from himself Aug. in Enchirid ad Leur. See August in Enchirid. ad Laurentium chap. 27. Praeceptum sui Creatoris quod custodire facillime posset sua male utens potestate calcavit c. The command of his Maker which he then might most easily have kept by the ill use of his power he trod under foot The Will which he had of God was good Aug. lib. 5. de civit Dei c. 9. August lib. 5. de Civit. Dei cap. 9. Malae voluntates a Deo non sunt quia contra naturam sunt quae ab illo c. Ill Wills are not of God because they are contrary to that nature which God created good in man Aug lib 83. qu. qu. 3. August lib. 83. qu. qu. 3. Est vitium voluntatis quo homo fit deterior It s the fault of mans own Will by which he became worse then God made him for voluntas potuit deficere a nullo incitante multo magis a Diabolo seducente A created Will might faile though none incited it much more when the Devill inticed it Gregorie Deus Author est naturae non culpae God is the Author of our nature Gregor magn lib. 19. Moral cap. 21. Aquin in 1 2. qu 80. art 1. in corpore not of our sinne Moral lib. 29. cap. 21. Aquinas in 1 2. Summ. qu. 80. artic 1. In corpore proprium principium actus peccati voluntas est c. The Will is the proper principle Pet Martyr clas 1 locor com cap. 14. sect 12. or cause of sinne Peter Martyr classe prima locorum communium cap. 14. sect 12. Malarum ergo actionum causa deficiens quaerenda est et inter caetera pravi affectus et inclinationes reperientur c. istae causae sunt interiores peccati sed potius deficientes quant efficientes A deficient cause is to be sought for of evill deeds and amongst the rest our depraved affections and inclinations will be found to have an hand in them these are more inward causes of sinne but rather deficient than efficient causes Much like Augustine lib. 12. de Civitate Dei cap. 7. Aug. lib. 12. de civit Dei