and in blisse hereafter that so his earthly Crown may serve to enhanse and enrich his heavenly Grant this O King of Kings for the sake and intercession of our Blessed Mediator Jesus Christ THE END LONDON Printed for Richard Royston at the Angel in Ivie-lane 1660. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. Pet. 1. 5. Five Positions agreed on by all Three heads of difficulty Of reconciling Praescience with Liberty of Contingency Of the manner and measure of the cooperation of Effectuall Grace with the free will of man How to attribute all good to God and evil to our selves * Matth xi †Rom. x. Saint Pauls O the Depth An History of Doctor Sandersons thoughts in these points D. Twiss his way Causes of rejecting it * L. 1. digr 9. †Ibid. digr 10. The Supralapsarians way The Sublapsarians Reasons against both The negative part sufficient to Peace c Our Churches moderation The Kings Declaration in order to Peace Good life Difference between Opinions and Conjectures Three Propositions concerning Gods Decrees Mans Fall The giving of Christ for Mankind The new Covenant The Decree of publishing the Gospel to all the world Evangelical Obedience Matters of Conjecture The first The object of Scripture Election All Scripture decrees conditionate Temerity of introducing absolute Decrees Whether the heathens have Evangelical Grace Of the condition of those to whom the Gospel is not revealed Four Considerations concerning them The first The second The third De lib. Aâ—bit l. 3. c. 16 The fourth The second Conjecture an undoubted truth Inward grace annexed to the Ministry of the Gospel The third Conjecture of effectual Grace and Scripture-Election and Reprobation Animadversions on this Conjecture The first The second from Scripture And Reason In Ep. ad Epictes In libel de fide symbolo in Tom. iii. And the unreconcile ableness of this conjecture with making man preach'd to the object of the Decrees The Doctrine of supereffluence of Grace to some acknowledged But this of supereffluence no part of the Covenant of grace * â—â—d Beraâ—â—â—th Difficulties concerning supereffluence I. Whether it be not Resistible II. Whether it belong not rather to providence then Grace III. Whether this be it to which Election is determined Considerations from Scripture opposed to the former conjecture Luk. ix 62 Act. xiii 48. Jo. vii 17. Mat. xiii 8. Luc viii 15 Mat xiii 1â— Jam iv 6 Mat xi 5 Mat. xix 14. and v. 3. Luc. vi 22. 1 Cor. 1. 27. The ground of Effectualness of grace more probably deduced from probity of heart * â—er iv 3. This probity no natural preparation but of Gods planting by preventing grace The one objection against this satisfied * Mat. xiii 13. The safeness of this stating * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tit. Bostr Compared with the other * Cap. iv 5. An Anacephalaecsis of the Doctrine of Gods Decreess Of Election Of Reprobation The Conclusion Of the Efficacy of Grace The Power of Grace in conversion c What the freedome of will now it Ability to sin All good due to Grace Predetermination and irresistibility How unreconcileable with Christian principles Of Arminians attributing too little to Grace Of Judas whether he were not converted * Joh. xvii 12 Whence discrimination comes From mans liberty to resist From Gods Preventions Nothing imputed to man but power of resisting The whole work of conversion to Grace Of the congruous manner c. making Grace effectuall This a member of the former Conjecture Fortiter suaviter What is the only question here Mat. xi 21. a special prejudice to the Conjecture Consistance of Grace and free will The difficulties in the Schoolmens way whence How easily superseded Of falling from Grace Our Article Grounds of it in Scripture In the old Testament Ch. iii. 20. xviii 24. In the 〈◊〉 Luk. xxii 32 Joh. xxi 25. Mar. xiv 29 31. Joh. xvii 12. vi 37. 1 Tim. 1. 20. 2 Tim. ii 17. 1 Cor. x. 12. 2 Pet. ii 21. S. Augustin Of perseverance of the elect Mat. 24. 30. Heb. 10. 30. Temporary faith may be true The elect subject to intercisions The falls of those that have been once regenerate no more reconcileable with Gods favour then of the unregenerate Nay the advantage is on the unregenerates part 1 Tim. 1. 13. Certainty of the object Certatinty of the subject 〈…〉 Of Gods favour to rebellious children No comfort for such from 2 Tim. ii 19. The Marcusians heresie in this point a good warning The Conclusion Two difficultyes An argument from the unfathomableness of Gods providence The distinction between providence and grace The force thereof against the forementioned conjecture Other considerations to prejudice it The other way confirmed from the parable of the sower The question what makes sufficient grace effectuall Punctually answered by Christ The fourfold difference of soile The one question divided into foure The first The second The third The fourth The Character of the honest heart The Conjecture compared with this other way One pretension for the Conjecture From the finding the hidden treasure The conversion of Augustine Of Saul The distant fate of two children Answered The point of the difficulty Whether the barely sufficient Grace be universally inefficacious No pretense for this Providence allowed to assist Grace But is of no force to the Question A Phansie of Gods giving the Elect ipsam non-resistentiam Examined and found weake Considered in relation to this phansie Phil. ii 13. The second difficultye Concerning Gods withdrawing sufficient grace The severall wayes of Gods withdrawing grace The first rather with-holding Consists with his affording sufficient The second Not totall The third totall but only for the time and neither simply totall Rom. li. 4. The fourth total yet it self designed as a Grace most effectuall of any 2 Cor. xiii 10. 1 Tim. i. 20. Gods punishments instruments of his Grace The fifth totall and finall withdrawing of all Grace by excision The sixth before excision The word is not accompanied with Grace to the damned or the highest degree of obdurate Rom. 1. 1â— Where any softness none of that Pharaoh the onely example of it in Scripture Rom. ix 17. Necessitas ex hypothesi Objective being Socinus's doctrine Calvins Gods foresight of sins Difference betwixt Praedetermination and Praevision Omniscience proportionable to Omnipotence Future contingents with in Gods reach Proved by Gods immensity Socinus's argument answered Of the contradiction A second objection Inconveniences enumerated and answered The first The second The third The fourth The fifth The foreseeing of Judas's sin The argument from thence defended Hom. 83. â—â— Mat. The ground of our assertion Gods immensity and the no implicancy of a contradiction Gods immensity extends to the knowledge of all things possible An objection against that answered Gods immensity supposed not proved A second objection What is meant by commensuration to all time A third objection Answered What is future is objicible to God So what is meerly possible A fourth objection answered Orat. 4â— No proportion between our finite and Gods infinite Asist objection answered God may know that which actually is not A sixt objection answered Gods seeing every thing as it is A seventh objection answered An eigth objection answered Difference between possible and future All Gods acts are not ab aeterno A ninth objection answered Gods knowledge suitable to his power Gods coexistence to all that ever is not to what never shall be The enforcements of the former objections answered The first enforcement of the first The second Possible and meerly possible differ Scientia media The third de Fato The first nforcement of the second The second The third Great difference betwixt rendring and finding certain The great consequence of this difference The defence of the objected inconveniences answered The first The second Prescience makes not exhortations vain The example of Pharoah Acts of Gods wisdome not submitted to our censure Gods antecedent and consequent will The uneffectuallness of Gods acts not chargeable on him Force not competible to a rational vineyard The third Wilfull falls are not unavoidable Nor made so by Gods prescience Gods love to mankind engages him not to prevent them by death whose fall be foresees If it did it is nothing to the case of prescience here Adams sin foreseen by God yet not prevented Evidence that it was foreseen The same of all other sinnes That prescience derogates not from omnipotence Gods prescience derogates not from his goodness S. Augustine and Lud. Vives their sense of prescience Philocal c. 23. c. 11. Origens testimony p. 72. p. 73. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Hypothetical foreknowledg The fourth 's Salvability of Judas as conclusible from Prescience as damnation The fifth Gods serious call to those who he sees will die Gods foresight of mans rejecting his calls and the criminousness thereof a proof of the seriousnes of them The predictions of Judas could not be fulfilled in another Not conditionall So that of Peters denyall Prediction of sin cannot be conditionall The issue of the whole question whether prescience of contingents imply a contradiction The lawes of contradictions The argument holds equally against the Trinity and unity What is present to God is not eternall Two propositions The first of God immense science The proof of it The second of contingency and liberty The proof of it The conclusion
Grace and Decrees Dear Sir § 1. HAving had a sight of the Letter which you sent M. about the Antiremonstrant Controversies dated Mar. 26. and observing one of the reasons which you render of your having avoided to appear on that theme A loathness to engage in a quarrell whereof you should never hope to see an end I thought my self in some degree qualified to answer this reason of yours and thereby to do acceptable service to many who do not think fit that any considerations which have not real and weighty truth in them should obstruct that which may be so much to the common good I mean your writing and declaring your mind on any profitable subject § 2. That which qualifies me more then some others to evacuate the force of this one reason of yours and makes me willing to attempt it though not to appear in opposition to any other passage that ever you have written is the true friendship that hath passed between us and the sweet conversation that for sometime we enjoyed without any allay or unequableness sharp word or unkind or jealous thought The remembrance whereof assures me unquestionably that you and I may engage in this question as far as either of us shall think profitable without any the least beginning of a quarrel and then that will competently be removed from such as of which you cannot hope to see an end § 3. And before I go any farther I appeal to your own judgement whether herein I do not at least speak probably and then whether it were not a misprision which you are in all reason to deposite to apprehend such insuperable difficulties or impossibilities at a distance which when they are prudently approached and examined so presently vanish before you If this one reflection do not convince you it remains that the speculation be brought to practice and exemplified to your senses § 4. You set out with a mention of some positions wherein you say Divines though of contrary Judgements do yet all agree And then it is not credible that you and I should be so singular as to differ in them endlesly of this number you propose five 1. That the will of man is free in all his actions 2. That very many things in the world happen contingently 3. That God from all eternity foreseeth all even the most free and contingent events 4. That whatsoever God foreseeth shall infallibly come to pass 5 That sinners are converted by the effectual working of Gods grace Of each of these you say we have from Scripture Reason and Experience as good and ful assurance as can be desired for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or truth of them that they are so And I who fully subscribe to the undoubted truth of each of the Propositions and do it also upon the very same three grounds of Scripture Reason and Experience which you mention need not the intercession of our friendship to render it impossible to give you any the least trouble of so much as explaining your sence in any of these § 5. Next when you resolve that all the difficulty is about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 referring that to no more then three heads 1. How to reconcile the certain futurition of what God foreseeth with the liberty of the rational creature and the contingency of casual effects as they proceed from inferiour causes 2. In what manner or measure the effectual Grace of God cooperateth and concurreth with the free will of man in the conversion of a sinner 3. How to cut so even a thread as to take the whole of what we do amiss to our selves and leave the whole glory of what we do well to his grace You are again as secure as any amulet can make you that this resolution of abbreviating the Controversies and confining them to these few heads shall never engage you in the least degree of Debate And then I shall challenge you to feign how it can remain possible without contradicting ones self which still is not quarrelling with you to engage you in any uneasie contention unless it be on one of these three heads and when I have by promise obliged my self which now I do not to raise any Dispute or attempt to ensnare or intangle you in any of these three you have then nothing to retract but your fears to which if I tell you you cannot adhere discerning a sure and near period to that which you apprehended endless this is all the victory I shall project or be capable of in this matter § 6. Of the first of these three Difficulties the reconciling the certain futurition of what God foresees with the liberty of the rational creature and the contingency and casual effects It falls out that you have in your shorter Letter dated Ap. 8. given that account which evidenceth it to be in your opinion no invincible difficulty your words are these That Gods praescience layeth no necessity at all upon any event but that yet all events as they are foreseen of God so shall they certainly and infallibly come to pass in such sort as they are foreseen else the knowledge of God should be fallible which certainty of the event may in some sort be called necessity to wit consequentis or ex hypothesi according as all the most contingent things are necessary when they actually exist which is a necessity infinitely distant from that which praedetermination importeth This I take to be so clear an explication of that difficulty and so solid a determining of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the manner of reconciling praescience with contingency that as I fully consent to it in every part of your period so I doubt not but the last part alone hath made it as intelligible to any ordinary understanding as whole books of Philosophers have attempted to do § 7. For Gods praescience from all eternity being but the seeing every thing that ever exists as it is contingents as contingents necessary as necessary can neither work any change in the object by thus seeing it convert a contingent into a necessary nor it self be deceived in what it sees which it must be if any thing in process of time should be otherwise then from all eternity God saw it to be § 8. I was lately advised with by a Divine to me unknown but one that seems to be a man of good learning about the distinction frequently made in this matter betwixt inevitably and infallibly and my answer and replyes to his severall objections because I would demonstrate the perfect accordance betwixt you and me in this which within this year or two is put into a very grave attire and revered as a great difficulty I will give you at large by way of Appendage at the end of this Letter having by hap a copy retained by me and though it cost you some minutes to survey them yet I know your patience of all such exercises so well that I doubt not of
apostacy now become the son of perdition was by God given to Christ and therefore he came to Christ i. e. was converted which also his being lost his very Apostacy testifies for how could he Apostatize from Christ that was never come to him From hence it seems to me necessary either to interpret your speech of final perseverance as if none were effectually converted but such who persevere which as it belongs to another question that of perseverance to which you after proceed and not to this of reconciling irresistibility and free will so it would seem to state it otherwise then I perceive you afterwards do or to avoid that to understand no more by Judas and Peter then any other two names suppose Robert and Richard John at Noke and John at Stile as you since tell me your meaning was the one converted effectually i. e. really the other not when both are supposed to have the same outward means of conversion equally applied to them § 82. Now to the question thus set of any two and supposing what hath been granted between you and me that the outward means are accompanyed to both with a sufficient measure of inward Grace My answer you discern already that the Discrimination comes immediately from one mans resisting sufficient Grace which the other doth not resist but makes use of In this should I add no more there could be no difficulty because as it is from corruption and liberty to do evil that meeting with the resistibility of this sufficient grace that one resists it so it is wholly from the work of Grace upon an obedient heart that the other is converted And so this stating ascribes all the good to the work of Grace i. e. to that power which by supernatural Grace is given him and all the ill to man and his liberty or ability to resist § 83. But from what hath been said there is yet more to be added viz. that the obedience of the one to the call of Grace when the other supposed to have sufficient if not an equal measure obeyes not may reasonably be imputed to the humble malleable melting temper which the other wanted and that again owing to the preventing Graces of God and not to the naturall probity or free will of Man whereas the other having resisted those preparing Graces or not made use of them lyeth under some degree of obduration pride sloth voluptuousness c. and that makes the discrimination on his side i. e. renders him unqualified and uncapable to be wrought on by sufficient Grace and so still if it be attentively weighed this attributes nothing to free will considered by it self but the power of resisting and frustrating Gods methods which I should think they that are such assertors of the corruption of our nature should make no difficulty to yield him but that they also assert the irresistibility of Grace and that is not reconcileable with it yielding the glory of all the work of conversion and all the first preparations to it to his sole Grace by which the will is first set free then fitted and cultivated and then the seed of eternal life successfully sowed in it § 84. If the Remonstrants yield not this you see my profession of dissent from them if they do as for ought I ever heard or read which indeed hath been but little in their works that I might reserve my self to judge of these things without prepossession they doubt not to do you see you have had them misrepresented to you But this either way is extrinsecall and unconcernant to the merit of the cause which is not to be defended or patronized by names but arguments much less to be prejudged or blasted by them § 85. You now add as a reason to inforce your last proposition That although the Grace of God work not by any physical determination of the will but by way of moral suasion onely and therefore in what degree soever supposed must needs be granted ex natura rei possible to be resisted yet God by his infinite wisdome can so sweetly order and attemper the outward means in such a congruous manner and make such gracious inward applications and insinuations by the secret imperceptible operation of his holy Spirit into the hearts of his chosen as that de sacto the will shall not finally resist That you say of the son of Syrach Fortiter Suaviter is an excellent Motto and fit to be affixed as to all the wayes of Gods providence in generall so to this of the effectuall working of his Grace in particular § 86. This for the substance falls in with the last of those which you so cautiously set down for meer conjectures seeming to you not improbable And so here you continue to propose it 1 as that which God can do and thus no Christian can doubt of it 2. by the one testimony which you tender for the proof of it the words of Ecclesiasticus strongly but sweetly which though it be there most probably interpreted of the works of Gods providence not particularly of his Grace so if it were most fully expresses their thoughts who building on the promise of sufficient Grace and the way of the working of that by moral suasion will apply the fortiter to the sufficiency and the suaviter to the suasion and yet resolve what frequent experience tells us that those that are thus wrought on strongly and sweetly too and as strongly and sweetly if not sometimes more so as they that are converted by it are yet very very many times not converted § 87. Here therefore the point lyes not whether God can thus effectually work upon all that he tenders sufficient grace unto nor again whether sometimes and whensoever he pleaseth he doth thus work for as this is the most that you demand so this is most evident and readily granted but 1. whether all are effectually converted and persevere and so are finally saved on whom God doth work thus sweetly and powerfully attempering the outward and inward means applications and insinuations by the secret imperceptible operations of his spirit and that in a congruous manner I add time also 2. Whether his doing thus is such an act of his Election as that all to whom this is not done shall be said in Scripture to be left past by and reprobated § 88. If thus it is not onely can be and if it may be convincingly testified by any text of Scripture that this really is the Scripture Election it shall be most willingly and gladly yielded to But till this be done 1. that other Scheme which I so lately set down may be allowed to maintain it's competition against this and 2. it is to be remembred from the premises that the glory of Gods Grace in every one's conversion is abundantly taken care of and secured without the assistance of this 3. that the ground of the Anti-remonstrants exception to the Arminian
knew he would not by his very mercy to him and for other most wise ends that he would actually deliver him up to the wills of the malicious able to destroy the body but no more which again is founded in his foresight of their malice and must suppose it All which makes it as infallible that God might have prevented it as that he would not did not therefore this is far from derogating from his omnipotence in this of his not being able to prevent it the contrary to which is by this our Scheme expressly established § 70. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for my positive answer you cannot but know already all the necessity consequent to prescience is the necessity ex hypothesi it is necessary to be while it is and because it will be therefore God foresees it will be and if men would have done otherwise God would have foreseen otherwise § 71. When you take it for mine acknowledgment then that God cannot change that which is future so as to make it not future I answer that sensu diviso it is most false for whatsoever is future God can change and make it not future and then foresee it not future But if you meant Conjunctim that remaining future he could not make it not future 1. That is a great impropriety of speech and most unreasonable that he that speakes of changing should mean keeping it still as it is unchanged and 2. You see the fallacy that most palpable one of a benè divisis ad male Conjuncta which I hope will no longer impose upon you The ill consequences you feare and exaggerate should God be thought not to have been able to have prevented it I shall not need insist on detesting the thought as much as is possible and having so far secured our Scheme from it that if God foresees not that he could prevent any future whatsoever I shall not think he foresees any thing § 72. So likewise for his goodness you cannot doubt but I acknowledge that as fully as you in relation to our salvation Let us see then how I am obliged to deny this again by admitting his Prescience Why say you if God willingly suffer so many to be damned whom he might have saved where is his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I answer just where you your self will and must place it unlesse you believe many shall not be damned finally For 't is most certain God by his absolute power might have saved all them that yet are now damned and the shew of inconvenience is exactly the same whether God be believed to foresee all things ab aeterno or no. For suppose we that God foresaw not but saw in time as we do every thing that happens in our presence and suppose we a wicked man filling up the measure of his iniquityes or ready to die in his sins I demand might not God if he would rescue him out of that state convert him into a Saint and assume him as he did Elias in the sanctified state Questionlesse he might yet without all controversy he doth not thus to every wicked man for if he did none should be damned Do you now reconcile this with Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his words and many vehement asseverations as I doubt not but you are well able to do and then review your own question If God willingly suffer so many to be damned whom he might have saved where is his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 'T is not possible you should need more words to disintangle this snarle and in my former papers I shewd you in this place to what Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belongs giving sufficient grace c. to which you reply nothing and therefore I suppose consent to the truth of it though 't is sure both that God by his absolute power might do more then he doth and therefore I like not your expression that he does what omnipotence could performe citing Isa v. 4. In place of it I should have said what his covenant promise mercy justice equity wisdom obliged him to do or what was reconcileable with all these without interesting his absolute power or omnipotence in it and that obstinate sinners do actually resist and frustrate all the methods that are used by him § 73. Of the manner of S. Austin's asserting prescience I need not farther insist then that by the expresse words of that period I produced he will have it reconciled with the free will of man which if all would do there were little more to be required of them Yet because you have endeavoured to take off the force of S. Austin's words and from Vives's words on Chapter IX Quod si indignum c. Dicamus à providentia voluntateque Dei cognitionem ejus prosicisci voluntatem statuere quod futurum sit scientiam quod volunt as statuerit nosse to draw him to Calvins sence I shall read over that IX Chapter both Text and Comment and give you some passages out of it In the Text 1. That they are much more tolerable that bring in Syderea Fata a fatality depending on the starrs then they which take away praescientiam futurorum foreknowledg of futures and that it is a most open madness confiteri Deum negare praescium futurorum to confess God and to deny his prescience 2. Nos ut confitemur summum verum Deum it a voluntatem summamque potestatem praescientiam ejus consitemur nec timemus ne ideò voluntate non faciamus quod voluntate facimus quia id nos facturos esse praescivit cujus praescientia falli non potest as we confess the supreme and true God so we confess his will and supreme power and prescience neither do we scare least we should not do voluntarily what we do voluntarily because he foresaw it whose prescience cannot be deceived making it the heathen feare of Cicero which now is yours lest the infallibility of the prescience should impose necessity and frustrate Lawes exhortations c. 3. Nos adversus sacrilegos ausus Deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant marke omnia voluntate nos facere c. Contrary to the darings of sacrilegious men we both affirm that God knowes all things before they are done and that we do them voluntarily 4. Novit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura sunt quae ipse facturus est he knowes unchangeably all things which are to come and which he will do not onely the latter but the former and all of one as well as the other 5. He that foreknew all the causes of things among them could not be ignorant of our wills quas nostrorum operum causas esse praescivit Which he foresaw to be the causes of our workes 6. Qui non est praescius omnium futurorum non est utique Deus he that foresees not things to come is not God 7. Of our liberty Voluntates nostrae tantum valent quantum Deus eas
those God that sees them as they are both in their causes and most casuall or voluntary mutations and progression and all circumstances concomitant sees one thing following though but freely not necessarily out of another first this and then that and because this or upon this motive therefore that Which as it is far from asserting any necessary chain of causes contrary to the freedome of mans will which in that very place Origen largely establishes so it is far from a knowledge meerly hypothetical for that is not the knowledge of what is but what will be if somewhat else make way for it which being uncertain whether it will be or not there can be no determinate knowledge that the other will be which is quite contrary to his instances of Judas's betraying Christ c. Which were as really and determinately foreseen and foretold as they were really acted And therefore I must desire you not to think this favourable to the Socinian's opinion of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents being onely or meerly hypothetical though God foresee hypothetically yet not onely so or that this key will fit all places of Scripture which foretell things to come because it fits the case of Keilah and Jer. 38 17. and some few others § 77. I have the more largely insisted on this because it seemed so likely to mislead you there being some examples of foreknowledge meerly hypothetical from whence yet to infer that Gods foreknowledge indefinitely is meerly such i. e. that he hath no other is the same errour as from particular premisses or from one or two examples to make an universal conclusion § 78. On view of your fourth objected inconvenience you grant all I said in answer to it onely say you the former difficulty seemes to recurre how A. B. may be truly salvable when if absolute prescience be granted his damnation was as certain before he was borne as it will be when he is in Hell I answer 1. That in answer to objected inconveniences all that can be required of any man is to shew that that inconvenience doth not follow not to establish the principal doctrine again which before had been done by the no implicancy of contradiction which left it possible for God to foresee future contingents and then by consideration of his omniscience which qualifies him to know every thing which is scibile or the knowing of which implyes no contradiction and then by the testimonies of the Prophets who from Gods prescience foretold such futures having therefore done all that was incumbent on me I had hoped the difficulty would not still have remained when all I said was granted But seeing it doth I answer 2. That supposing Gods eternal prescience it cannot but as clearly appeare that A. B. not onely may be but is truly salvable whilst he is in Viâ as that he is damned or no longer salvable when he is in Hell For supposing A. B. in viâ to be one for whom in Gods decree Christ dyed and supposing Gods eternall prescience of all that is unquestionably of all that he himself will do as he sure will all that is under his decree It must thence necessarily follow that God foresees him salvable and supposing that at length he is damned it doth but follow that God foresees him damned These two things then by force of praescience are equally cleer that he is one while salvable another while damned and so they are equally certain and if his having been salvable do not hinder his being damned then neither will his being damned hinder his having been salvable He is truly salvable who God foresees will not be saved How so because God truly bestows upon him all means necessary to salvation and that being all that is required to make him salvable this is as truly done when the effect followes not as when the meanes are most successfull And Gods prescience of the successlessness makes no change hath no influence either on the meanes or the man any more then my seeing a thing done hath causality in the doing it Now if he be salvable though in event he never be saved but damned and Gods praescience that he is salvable be as efficacious to conclude him salvable as his prescience that he is damned to infer him damned what a palpable partiality is it to infer from prescience that his damnation is certain before he is borne and yet not to infer from the same principle that his salvability was certain before he was borne Nothing can more irrefragably prove the weakness of your inference then that it is so obvious to retort it § 79. The short is that which is future onely contingently it is certain that it is foreseen by God yet till it is it may be otherwise and if it be otherwise God sees it to be otherwise and what may be otherwise is not certain to be so and therefore his damnation is not certain before he is born which is the direct contradictory to your inference and that method which will equally infer contradictories of what force it is to establish truth I leave you to judge who propounded the difficulty § 80. Here then is the errour because God cannot erre in his foresight therefore you conclude from supposition of his prescience that the thing which you speake of is certain when yet it no way appeares to you or me that God ever foresaw it but by our supposing that it comes to pass Hence then comes all the supposed certainty from supposing it to come to pass which is the certitudo ex hypothesi a certainty that it is as long as it is supposed to be and then Gods prescience hath nothing to do with it but it would be as certain without supposing Gods prescience as now it is by supposing it And now would you have me shew you how A. B. is truly salvable whilst you retain your supposition that he is damned This if you marke is your difficulty for you have no other ground to suppose that God foresees him damned but because you suppose him damned and seeing it is you see what a taske you have set me even to make two members of a contradiction true together This I confesse I cannot do and I grant God cannot yet thus much I will do for you I will mind you that even when A. B. is in Hell the proposition is still true that A. B. when he was on earth was salvable and if it be true when he is in Hell I appeale to you whether it be not true when God foresees he will be in Hell doth Gods foreseeing him in hell impede more then his actuall being in it If not then notwithstanding Gods prescience A. B. is salvable and so now I hope you see both that and how he is so § 81. In your fifth inconvenience you still adhere that you think it scarcely reconcileable with that determinate prescience which I hold for God seriously to call those whom he foresees