good and evil in the world which Socrates observed upon the rubbing of his thigh where the fetters made it itch 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What a strange thing is that which men are wont to call pleasure how near of kin is it to that which seems so contrary to it pain Now the observing the strange and sudden vicissitudes of these things and what near neighbours pain and pleasure were to each other so that there is frequently a passage out of one into the other did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origine of both these Those who believed there was a God who produced the world and ordered all things in it did easily attribute whatever was good in the world to the Fountain of all goodness but that any evil should come from him they thought it repugnant to the very notion of a Deity which they were so far right in as it concerned the evil of sin which we have already shewed God could not be the author of but therein they shewed their ignorance of the true cause of evil that they did noâ— look upon the miseries of life as effects of Gods Iustice upon the world for the evil of sin And therefore that they might set the Origine of evil far enough off from God they made two different Principles of things the one of good and the other of evil this Plutarch tells us was the most ancient and universal account which he could meet with of the origine of good and evil To which purpose we have this ample Testimony of his in his learned discourse de Iside Osiride 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which words I have the more largely cited because they give us the most full account of the antiquity universality and reason of that opinion which asserts two different principles of good and evil It is a Tradition saith he of great antiquity derived down from the ancient Masters of Dâ—vine knowledge and Formers of Commonwealths to the Poets and Philosophers whose first author cannot be found and yet hath met with firm and unshaken belief not only in ordinary discourses and reports but was spread into the mysteries and sacrifices both of Greeks and others that the Universe did not depend on chance and was destitute of a mind and reason to govern it neither was there one only reason which sate at the stern or held the reins whereby he did order and govern the world but since there is so much confusion and mixture of good and evil in the world that nature doth not produce any pure untainted good there is not any one who like a Drawer takes the liquor out of two several vessels and mixeth them together and after distributes them but there are two principles and powers contrary to each other whereof one draoes us to the right hand and directs us straight forward the other pulls us back and turns us the other way since we see the life of man so mixed as it is and not only that but the world too at least so much as is sublunary and terrestrial which is subject to many varieties irregularities and changes For if nothing he without a cause and good cannot be the cause of evil it necessarily follows that as there is a peculiar nature and principle which is the cause of good so there must be another which is the cause of evil But least we should think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen Manichees which held this opinion he tells us to prevent that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it was the opinion of the most and wisest of the Heathen Now these two principles some saith he call two opposite Gods whereof the one is the cause of good and the other of evil him they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By this one would imagine that this very ancient Tradition was nothing else but the true account of the Origine of evil a little disguised For the Scripture making the Devil the first author of evil himself and the first sollicitor and tempter of man to it who when God directed him straight forward pull'd man back and put him quite out of his way by which means all the miseries of the world came into it For while man kept close to his Maker his integrity and obedience were to him what the vasa umbilicalia are to the child in the Womb by them he received what ever tended to his subsistence and comfort but sin cut those vessels asunder and proved the Midwife of misery bringing man forth into a world of sorrow and sufferings Now I say the Scripture taking such especial notice of one as the chief of Devils through whose means evil came into the world this gave occasion to the Heathens when length of time had made the original Tradition more obscure to make these two God and the Daemon as two Anti-gods and so to be the causes the one of all good and the other of all evil Which at last came to that which was the Devils great design in thus corrupting the tradition that both these Anti-gods should have solemn worship by Sacrifices the one by way of impetration for bestowing of good the other by way of Deprecation for averting of evil Such Plutarch there tells us were the Oromasdes and Arimanius of Zoroastres which were worshipped by the Persians the one for doing good and the other for avoiding evil the one they resembled to light or fire the other to darkness and ignorance what animals were good and usefull they ascribed to Oromasdes and all venemous and noxious ones to Arimanius whom Plutarch elsewhere calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the evil Daemon of the Persians The same Diogenes Laertius relates of the Magi the Philosophers of Persia that they made two distinct principles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good and bad Daemon for which he quotes Dinon Aristotle Hermippus Eudoxus and others The same Plutarch makes to be the opinion of the ancient Greeks who attribute the good to Iupiter Olympius the bad to Hades the Chaldâ—ans saith he make the Planets their Gods of which two they suppose the cause of good two more of only a malignant influence and other three to be indifferent to either The same he affirms of the Egyptians that whatever was evil and irregular they ascribed to Typho what was good comely and usefull they attributed to Isis and Osiris to Isis as the passive Osiris as the active principle Thus we see how large a spread this opinion of the Origine of evil had in the Gentile world neither did it expire with Heathenism but Manes retained so much of the Religion of his Country being a Persian that he made a strange medley of the Persian and Christian doctrine together For that was his famous opinion of which St. Austin tells us Isâ—e duo principia inter se diversa at que adversa cadeâ—que aeterna eterna hoc est
of Rambam or R. Moses Maimon It is said that the King of Persia desired of him a sign and he told him that he should cut off his head and he would rise again which he cunningly desired to avoid being tormented which the King was resolved to try and accordingly executed him but I suppose his resurrection and Mahomets will be both in a day although Maimonides tells us some of the Iews are yet such fools as to expect his resurrection Several other Impostors Maimonides mentions in his Epistle de Australi regione One who pretended to be the Messias because he cured himself of the leprosie in a night several others he mentions in Spain France and other parts and the issue of them all was only a further aggravation of the miseries and captivities of the poor Iews who were so credulous in following Impostors and yet such strange Infidels where there were plain and undoubted miracles to perswade them to believe in our blessed Saviour as the true Messias We freely grant then that many pretended miracles may be done in the world to deceive men with but doth it hence follow that either there are no true miracles done in the world or that there are no certain rules to distinguish the one from the other But as Origen yet further replyes to Celsus as a Woolf doth very much resemble a dog yet they are not of the same kind nor a turtle Dove and a Pigeon so that which is produced by a divine power is not of the same nature with that which is produced by Magick but as he argues Is it possible that there should be only deceits in the world and magical operations and can there be no true miracles at all wrought Is humane nature only capable of Impostures or can none work miracles but Devils Where there is a worse there may be a better and so from the impostures counterfeits we may inferr that there are true miracles wrought by a divine power otherwise it were all one as to say there are counterfeits but no Iewels or there are Sophisms and Paralogisms but no lâ—gitimate demonstrations if then there be such deceits there are true miraclâ—s too all the business is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 strictly and severely to examine the pretâ—nders to do them and that from the life and manners of those that do them and from the effâ—cts and consequents of them whethâ—r they do good or hurt in the world whâ—ther thâ—y correct mens manners or bring men to goodness holinâ—ss and truth and on this account we are neither to reject all miracles nor embrace all pretâ—nces but carefully and prudently examine the rational evidences whereby those which are true and divine may be known from such which are counterfeit and Diabolical And this now leads us to the main subjâ—ct of this Chapter viz. What rules we have to â—roceed by in judging miracles to be true or false which may be these following True Divine miracles are wrought in confirmation of some Divine Tâ—stimony Because we have manifested by all the precedent discourse that the intention of miracles is to seal some divine revelation Therefore if God should work miracles when no divine Tâ—stimony is to be confirmed God would set the broad Seal of heaven to a blank If it be said no because it will witness to us now the truth of that Testimony which was delivered so many ages since I answer 1. The truth of that Testimony was sufficiently sealed at the time of the delivery of it and is conveyed down in a certain way to us Is it not sufficient that the Chartâ—r of a Corporation had the Princes broad Seal in the time of the giving of it but that every succâ—ssion of men in that Corporation must have a new broad Seal or else they ought to question their Patent What ground can there be for that when the original Seal and Patent is preserved and is certainly conveyed down from age to age So I say it is as to us Gods Grand Charter of Grace and Mercy to the world through Iesus Christ was sealed by divine miracles at the delivery of it to the world the original Patent viz. the Scriptures wherein this Charter is contained is conveyed in a most certain manner to us to this Patent the Seal is annexed and in it are contained those undoubted miracles which were wrought in confirmation of it so that a new sealing of this Patent is wholly needless unless we had some cause of suspicion that the original Patent it self were lost or the first sealing was not true If the lattâ—r then Christian Religion is not true if the miracles wrought for confirmation of it were false because the truth of it depends so much on the verity and Divinity of the miracles which were then wrought If the first be suspected viz. the certain conveyance of the Patent viz. the Scriptures some certain grounds of such a suspicion must be discovered in a matter of so great moment especially when the great and many Societies of the Christian world do all consent unanimously in the contrary Nay it is impossible that any rational man can concâ—ive that the Patent which we now rely upon is supposititious or corrupted in any of those things which are of concernment to the Christian world and that on these accounts 1. From the watchfulness of Divine providâ—nce for the good of mankind Can we conceive that there is a God who rules and takes care of the world and who to manifest his signal Love to mankind should not only grant a Patent of Mercy to the world by his son Christ and then sealed it by divine miracles and in order to the certain conveyance of it to the world caused it by persons imployed by himself to be recordâ—d in a language fittest for its dispersing up and down the world all which I here suppose Can we I say conceive that this God should so far have cast off his care of the world and the good of mankind which was the original ground of the Grant it self as to suffer any wicked men or malignant spirits to corrupt or alter any of those Terms in it on which mens eternal salvation depends much less wholly to suppress and destroy it and to send forth one that is counterfeit and supposititious instead of it and which should not be discovered by the Christians of that age wherein that corrupt Copy was set forth nor by any of the most learned and inquisitive Christians ever since They who can give any the least entertainment to so wild absurd and irrational an imagination are so far from reason that they are in good disposition to Atheism and next to the suspecting the Scriptures to be corrupted they may rationally suspâ—ct there is no such thing as a God and providence in the world or that the world is governed by a spirit most malignant and envious of the good of mankind Which is a suspicion only becoming those Heathens among
possibility of existence what is it then which gives actual existence to it that cannot be its self for it would be necessarily existent if another then give existence this existence must wholly depend upon him who gave it for nothing can continue existence to its self but what may give it to its self for it gives it for the moment it continues it and what gives existence to its self must necessarily exist which is repugnant to the very notion of a created Being So that either we must deny a possibility of non-existence or annihilation in a creature which follows upon necessity of existence or else we must assert that the duration or continuance of a creature in its Being doth immediatly depend on Divine providence and Conservation which is with as much reason as frequency said to be a continued Creation But yet further was an Infinite Wisdom and power necessary to put things into that order they are in and is not the same necessary for the Governing of them I cannot see any reason to think that the power of matter when set in motion should either bring things into that exquisite order and dependence which the parts of the world have upon each other much less that by the meer force of that first motion all things should continue in the state they are in Perpetual motion is yet one of the desiderata of the world the most exquisite Mechanism cannot put an engine beyond the necessity of being looked after can we then think this dull unactive matter meerly by the force of its first motion should be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the world and to keep it from tumbling at least by degrees into its pristine Chaos It was an Infinite Power I grant which gave that first moâ—ion but that it gave power to continue that motion till the Constagration of the world remains yet to be proved Some therefore finding that in the present state of the world matter will not serve for all the noted and common Phoenomena of the world have called in the help of a Spirit of Nature which may serve instead of a Man-midwife to Matter to help her in her productions of things Or as though God had a Plurality of worlds to look after they have taken care to substitute him a Vicar in this which is this Spirit of Nature But we had rather believe God himself to be perpetually Resident in the world and that the power which gives life and being and motion to every thing in the world is nothing else but his own providence especially since we have learnt from himself that it is in him we live and move and have our being Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Providence whether we consider the Divine nature or the Phaenomena of the world but yet the case is not so clear but there are two grand objections behind which have been the continual exercise of the wits of inquisitive men almost in all Ages of the world The one concerns the first Origine of evil the other concerns the dispensations of providence whence it comes to pass that good men fare so hard in the world when the bad triumph and flourish if these two can be cleared with any satisfaction to reason it will be the highest vindication of Divine Providence and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures which gives us such clear light and direction in these profound speculations which the dim reason of man was so much to seek in I begin with the Origine of evil for if there be a hand of providence which orders all things in the world how comes evil then into it without Gods being the Author of it Which is a speculation of as great depth as necessity it highly concerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of Gods holiness and how far he is from being the author of sin and it is likewise a matter of some difficulty so to explain the Origine of evil as to make it appear that God is not the author of it I easily then assent to what Origen saith on this subject when Celsus upon some mistaken places of Scripture had charged the Scripture with laying the Origine of evil upon God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If any thing which calls for our enquiry be of difficult investigation that which concerns the Origine of evils is such a thing and as Simplicius well begins his discourse on this subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Dispute concerning the nature and origine of evil not being well stated is the cause of great impiety towards God and perverts the principles of good life anâ— involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it So much then is it our great concernment to fix on sure grounds in the resolution of this important question in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacyes of it as it relates to any internal purposes of Gods will which is beyond our present scope but I shall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the first man For the clearing of which I shall proceed in this method 1. That if the Scriptures be true God cannot be the author of sin 2. That the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil doth not charge it upon God 3. That no account given by Philosophers of the Origine of evil is so clear and rational as this is 4. That the most material circumstances of this account are attested by the Heathens themselves 1. That if the Scriptures be true God cannot be the author of sin For if the Scriptures be true we are bound without hesitation to yeild our assent to them in their plain and direct affirmations and there can be no ground of suspending assent as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth but the want of certain evidence whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the most effectual wayes to put an end to the numerous controversies of the Christian world especially to those bold disputes concerning the method and order of Gods decrees if the plain and undoubted assertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard whereby we ought to judge of such things as are more obscure and ambiguous And could men but rest contented with those things which concern their eternal happiness and the means in order to it which on that account are written with all imaginable perspicuity in Scripture and the moment of all other controversies be judged by their reference to these there would be fewer controversies and more Christians in the world Now there are two grand principles which concern mens eternal condition of which we have the greatest certainty from Scripture and on which we may with safety rely without perplexing our minds about those more nice and subtile speculations
which it may be are uncapable of full and particular resolution and those are That the ruine and destruction of man is wholly from himself and that his salvation is from God alone If then mans ruine and misery be from himself which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions then without controversie that which is the cause of all the misery of humane nature is wholly from himself too which is sin So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true God cannot be the author of that by which without the intervention of the mercy of God mans misery unavoidably falls upon him For with what authority and Majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of sin with what earnestness and importunity doth he woo the sinner to forsake his sin with what loathing and detestation doth he mention sin with what justice and severity doth he punish sin with what wrath and indignation doth he threaten contumacious sinners And is it possible after all this and much more recorded in the Scriptures to express the holiness of Gods nature his hatred of sin and his appointing a day of judgement for the solemn punishment of sinners to imagine that the Scriptures do in the least ascribe the Origine of evil to God or make him the Author of Sin Shall not the judge of all the world do right will a God of Infinite Iustice Purity and Holiness punish the sinner for that which himself was the cause of Far be such unworthy thoughts from our apprehensions of a Deity much more of that God whom we believe to have declared his mind so much to the contrary that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together Taking it then for granted in the general that God cannot be the author of sin we come to enquire whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil doth any way charge it upon God There are only two wayes which according to the history of the fall of man recorded in Scripture whereby men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of mans fall either first by the giving him that positive Law which was the occasion of his fall or secondly by leaving him to the liberty of his own will First The giving of that positive Law cannot be the least ground of laying mans fault on God because 1. It was most suitable to the nature of a rational creature to be governed by Laws or declarations of the Will of his Maker For considering man as a free agent there can be no way imagined so consonant to the nature of man as this was because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice For where there is a capacity of reward and punishment and acting in the consideration of them there must be a declaration of the will of the Law-giver according to which man may expect either his reward or punishment If it were suitable to Gods nature to promise life to man upon obedience it was not unsuitable to it to expect obedience to every declaration of his will considering the absolute soveraignty and Dominion which God had over man as being his creature and the indispensable obligation which was in the nature of man to obey whatever his Mâ—ker did command him So that God had full and absolute right to require from man what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey and in the general we cannot conceive how there should be a testimony of mans obedience towards hâ—s Creator without some declaration of his Creators Will. Secondly God had full power and authority not only to govern man by Laws but to determine mans general obligation to obedience to that particular positive precept by the breach of which man fell If Gods power over man was universal and unlimited what reason can there be to imagine it should not extend to such a positive Law Was it because the matter of this Law seemed too low for God to command his creature but whatever the matter of the Law was obedience to God was the great end of it which man had testified as much in that Instance of it as in any other whatsoever and in the violation of it were implyed the highest aggravations of disobedience for Gods power and authority was as much contemned his goodness slighted his Truth and faithfulness questioned his Name dishonoured his Majâ—sty affronted in the breach of that as of any other Law whatsoever it had been If the Law were easie to be observed the greater was the sin of disobedience if the weight of the matter was not so great in its self yet Gods authority added the greatest weight to it and the ground of obedience is not to be fetched from the nature of the thing required but from the authority of the Legislator Or was it then because God concealed from man his counsel in giving of that positive precept Hath not then a Legislator power to require any thing but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it if so what becomes of obedience and subjection it will be impossible to make any probative precepts on this account and the Legislator must be charged with the disobedience of his subjects where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires which as it concerns humane Legislators who have not that absolute power and authority which God hath is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general sense of the world This Plutarch gives a good account of when he discourseth â—o rationally of the sobriety which men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of Gods actions for saith he Physitians will give prescriptions without giving the patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither have humane Laws alwayes apparent reason for them nay some of them are to appearance ridiculous for which he instanceth in that Law of the Lacedaemonian Ephori 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to which no other reason was annexed but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his office to â—have himself and gave this reason for it that they might learn to obey Laws themselves He further instanceth in the Roman custom of manumission their Laws about testaments Solons Law against neutrality in seditions and concludes thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Any one would easily find many absurdities in Laws who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator or the ground of what he requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What wonder is it if we are so puzled to give an account of the actions of men that we should be to seek as to those of the Deity This cannot be then any ground on the account of meer reason to lay the charge of mans disobedience upon God because he required from
thè soul were forced to do what it doth one might justly lay the blame on God who permits such a force to be offered it neither could it be properly evil which the soul was constrained to but since it acted freely and out of choice the soul must alone be accounted the author and cause of evil Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of reason be accounted the author of evil because he gave the soul of man a principle of internal freedom when the very freedom of acting which the soul had put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling And certainly he can never be said to be the cause of the breaking of a person who gave him a stock to set up with and supposed him able to manage it when he gave it him indeed had not man had this freedom of will he could not have fallen but then neither had he been a rational Agent which supposing no corruption doth speak freedom of action So that while we enquire after the Origine of evil we have no other cause to assign it to but mans abuse of that free power of acting which he had but if we will be so curious as to enquire further why God did create man with such a freedom of will and not rather fix his soul immutably on good if the order of beings be no satisfactory reason for it we can give no other then that why he made man or the world at all which was the good pleasure of his Will But secondly supposing Gods giving man this freedom of will doth not entitle him to be the author of evil doth not his leaving man to this liberty of his in the temptation make him the cause of sin I answer no and that on these accounts 1. Because man stood then upon such terms that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act he had a power to stand in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his faculties but he had a pure and undefiled soul which could not be polluted without its own consent Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which man stood which were the tryal of his obedience to his Creator had he been irresistibly determined any way Simplicius puts this question after the former discourse Whether God may not be called the author of sin because he permits the soul to use her liberty but saith he he that says God should not have permitted this use of its freedom to the soul must say one of these two things â—ither that the soul being of such a nature as is indifferent to good or evil it should have been wholly kept from the choosing evil or else that it should have been made of such a nature that it should not have had a power of choosing evil The first is irrational and absurd for what freedom and liberty had that been where there was no choice and what choice could there have been where the mind was necessitated onely to one part For the second we are to consider saith he that no evil is in its self desirable or to be chosen but withall if this power of determining its self â—ither way must be taken away it must be either as something not good or as some great evil and whoâ—ver saith so doth not consider how many things in the world there are which are accounted good and desirable things yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will For it excells all sublunary Beings and there is none would rather desire to be a Brute or Plant then man if God then shewed his goodness in giving to inferior beings such perfectiâ—â—s which are far below this is it any ways incongruous to Gods nature and goodness to give man the freedom of his actions and a self determining power thâ—ugh he permiâ—ted him the free use of it Besides as that author reasonâ— had God to prevent mans sin taken away the Liberty of his will he had likewise destroyed the foundation of all vertue and the very nature of man for vertue would not have been such had there been no possibility of acting contrary and mans nature would have been divine because impeccable Therefore saith â—e though we attribute this self-determining power to God as the author of it which was so necessary in the order of the Universe we have no reason to attribute the Origine of that evil to God which comes by the abuse of that liberty For as he further adds God doth not at all cause that aversion from Good which is in the soul when it sins but only gave such a power to the soul whereby it might turn its self to evil out of which God might afterwards produce so much good which could not otherwise have been without it So consonantly to the Scripture doth that Philosopher speak on this subject 2. God cannot be said to be the author of sin though he did not prevent the fall of man because he did not withdraw before his fall any grace or assistance which was necessary for his standing Had there been indeed a necessity of supernatural grace to be communicated to man for every moment to continue him in his Innocency and had God before mans fall withdrawn such assistance from him without which it were impossible for him to â—ave stood it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cause of the Fall of man But we are not put to such difficulties for acquitting God from being the author of sin for there appears no necessity at all for asserting any distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace in man before his Fall that the one should belong only to a radical power of standing the other to every act of good which Adam did For if God made man upright he certainly gave him such a power as might be brought into act without the necessity of any supervenient act of grace to elicite that habitual power into particular actions If the other were sufficient it was sufficient for its end and how could it be sufficient for its end if notwithstanding that there were no possibility of standing unless efficacious help were superadded to it God would not certainly require any thing from the creature in his integrity but what he had a power to obey and if there were necessary further grace to bring the power into act then the substracting of this grace must be by way of punishment to man which it is hard to conceive for what it should be before man had sinned or eâ—se God must substract this grace on purpose that man might â—all which would necessarily follow on this supposition in which case Man would be necessitated to fall veluti cum subductis columnis dom us necessario corruit as one expresseth it as a house must needs fall when the pillars on which it stood are taken away from it But now if God withdrew not any effectual grace from man whereby he must necessarily fall then
though God permit man to use his liberty yet he cannot be said to be any ways the author of evil because man had still a posse si vellet a power of standing if he had made right use of his Liberty and God never took from man his adjutorium quo potuit stare sine quo non potuit as Divines call it man enjoying still his power though by the abuse of his Liberty he fell into sin so that granting Godâ—o â—o leave man to the use of his Liberty yet we see God cannot in the lâ—ast be charged with being the Author of sin or of the Origine of evil by the History of the fall of man in Scripture which was the thing to be cleared We come now in the third place to compare that account given of the Origine of evil in Scripture with that which was embraced by Heathen Philosophers in point of reason and evidence There was no one inquiry whatsoever in which those who had nothing but natural light to guide them were more to seek for satisfaction in then this concerning the Origine of evil They saw by continual experience how great a Torrent of both sorts of evils of sin and punishment did over flow the world but they were like the Egyptians who had sufficient evidence of the overflowing their banks by the River Nile but could not find out the spring or the head of it The reason was as corruption increased in the world so the means of instruction and knowledge decayed and so as the Phoenomena grew greater the reason of them was less understood the knowledge of the History of the first Ages of the world through which they could alone come to the full understanding of the true cause of evil insensibly decaying in the several Nations Insomuch that those who were not at all acquainted with that History of the world which was preserved in Sacred Records among the Iews had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by and some kind of obscure traditions which were preserved among them which while they sought to rectifie by their interpretations they made them more obscure and false then they found them They were certain of nothing but that mankind was in a low and degenerate condition and subject to continual miseries and calamities they who cryed up the most the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the self-determining power of the soul could not certainly but strangely wonder that a Principle indifferent to be carried either way should be so almost fatally inclined to the worst of them It was very strange that since Reason ought to have the command of Passions by their own acknowledgement the brutish part of the soul should so master and enslave the rational and the beast should still cast the rider in man the sensitive appetite should throw off the power of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that faculty of the soul which was designed for the Government of all the rest The Philosophers could not be ignorant what slaves they were themselves to this terrestrial Hyle how easily their most mettalsom souls were mired in the dirt how deep they were sunk into corporeal pleasures that it was past the power of their reason to help them out Nay when the soul begins to be fledged again after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or moulting at her entrance into the body which Plato speaks of and strives to raise her self above his lower world she then feels the weight of such Plummets hanging at her feet that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of earth So Hierocles complains that when reason begins to carry the soul to the perception of the most noble objects the soul with a generous flight would soar above this world 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were it not horn down to that which is evil by the force of passions which hang like leads upon the souls feet What a strange unaccountable thing must this needs be to those who beheld the constancy of the effect but were to seek for the cause of it it could not but be clear to them that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were wont to extoll so high was in the state man was now in but a more noble name for slavery when themselves could not but confess the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or inclination in the soul was so strong to the evil and could that be an even balance where there was so much down-weight in one of the scales unless they made as some of them did the voluntary inclinations of the soul to evil an evidence of her liberty in this most degenerate condition as though it were any argument that the prisoner was the freer because he delighted himself in the noise of his shackles Neither was this disorder alone at home in the soul where there was still a Xantippe scolding with Socrates passion striving with reason but when they looked abroad in the world they could not but observe some strange irregularities in the Converse among men What debaucheries contentions rapines fightings and destroying each other and that with the greatest cruelty and that frequently among Country-men Friends nay relations and kindreds and could this hostility between those of the same nature and under the most sacred bonds of union be the result of nature when even beasts of prey are not such to those of their own kind Besides all this when they summed up the life of man together and took an account of the weaknesses and follies of Childhood the heats and extravagancies of youth the passions disquietments and disappointments of men in their strength and height of business the inquietude aches and infirmities of old age besides the miseries which through every one of these all men are subject to and few escape into how small a sum will the solid pleasure and contentment of the life of man be reduced Nay if we take those things in the world which men please themselves the most in enjoyment of and consider but with what care they are got with what fear they are kept and with what certainty they must be lost and how much the possession of any thing fails of the expectation of it and how near men are upon the top of Tenariff to fall into the depth of the Sea how often they are precipitated from the height of prosperity into the depth of adversity we shall finde yet much less that by the greatest Chymistrie can be extracted of real satisfaction out of these things Whence then should it come that mens souls should so delight to seed on these husks and to embrace these clouds and shadows instead of that real good which is the true object of the souls desire They could easily see there was no pure unmixed good in the world but there was a contemperation of both together according to that of Euripides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is a kind of continual mixture of
semper fuisse composuit duâ—sque naturas at que substantias boni scilicet mali sequens alios antiquos haereticos opinatus est St. Austin thinks that Manes had hâ—s opinion concerning two principles from the ancient Hereticks by whom I suppose he means the Marcicnists and Valentinians but it seems more probable that Manes had his doctrine immediately from hâ—s Countrymen though it be generally thought that Scythianus and Buddas were his masters iâ— it But from whomsoever it came the opinion was meâ—rly Heathen and not more contrary to Scripture then it is to reason the former I meddâ—â— not with that opinion being now extinct in the Christian world I only briefly consider the unreasonableness of it to shew what a far better account of the Origine of evil the Scriptures give us then was discovered by the Heathen Philosophers For on both sides that opinion is repugnant to the notion of a Deity so that while they would make two such Gods they make none at all For how can the principle of good be God if he hath not Infinite power as well as goodness and how can he have infinite power if he hath not the management of things in the world and how can he have the management of things if they be lyable to evil which the other God which is the principle of evil may lay upon it from which according to this supposition the principle of good cannot rescue it So that they who hold this opinion cannot as Simâ—licius tells us give God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the half of that infinite power which belongs to him for neither can he keep the good creatures which he makes from the power of the evil Daemon and therefore if he loves them must be in continual fears of the power of the contrary principle neither can he free them from the evil which the other lays upon them for then Gods power would be far greater then the evil Daemons and so he could be no Anti-god And on the other side the notion or Idea of an Infinitely evil Being is in its self an inconsistent Idea for it is an Infinite non-entity if we suppose his very Being to lie in Being evil which is only a privation of goodness and besides if he be Infinitely evil he must be infinitely contrary to the good Principle and how can he be infinitely contrary which enjoys several of the same perfections which the other hath which are infinity of essence and necessity of existence Now if this Principle of evil be absolutely contrary to the other it must be contrary in all his perfections for whatever is a perfection belongs to that which is good and now if it be contrary in every perfection Infinity of essence and necessity of existence being two it must be as contrary as is imaginable to them by which this evil Principle must be infinitely defective in Being and existence and so it will be an infinite non entity which yet exists which is the height of contradiction Again if there be such a contrary principle which is the cause of all evil then all evil falls out unavoidably and by the power of this Infinitely evil principle by which means not only all Religion but all vertue and goodness will be taken out of the world if this evil principle be infinite and if not infinite no Anti-god and not only so but all difference of good and evil will be taken away and then what need making two such contrary principles to give an account of the Origine of evil for when once evil becomes thus necessary it loseth its nature as a moral evil for a moral evil implyes in it a voluntary breach of some known Law but how can that breach be voluntary which was caused by an Infinite power in the most proper way of efficiency and thus if all freedom of will be destroyed as it is necessarily by this supposition then no Government of the world by Laws can be supposed and consequently no reward or punishment which suppose liberty of action and by this means all Religion Laws and Providence are banished out of the world and so this evil Daemon will get all into his own hands and instead of two contrary principles there will be but one infinitely evil Demon. Which that there is not appears by this that notwithstanding all the evil in the world there is so much good left in it of which there would be none if thâ—s evil Daemon had Infinite power By this we see there cannot be a principle infinitely evil for while they go about to make two such contrary principles infinite they make neither of them so and so while they make two Gods they take away any at all So that this opinion of the Origine of evil is manifestly absurd irrational and contradictions But all the Heathen Philosophers were not so gross as to imagine two such Anti-Gods with infinitely active power but yet those who would not in terms assert it might be driven to it by the consequence of their opinion concerning the Origine of evil which did suppose a necessity of it in nature as flowing from that passive principle out of which the world was produced Hence it was that Heraclitus as Plutarch tells us attributed the Origine of all things to discord and antipathy and was wont to say that when Homer wished 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that all contention were banished out of the world that he did secretly curse the Origine of things and wished the ruine of the world So Empedocles called the active principle whâ—ch did good Harmony and Friendship but the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by which he makes it to be a quarrelsome pernicious and bloody principle The same Plutarch tells us of those two renowned Philosophers Pythagoras and Plato Thence he tells us the Pythagoreans called the principle of good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Unity finite quiescent straight uneven number square right and splendid the principle of evil they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Binary Infinite moving crooked even long of one side unequal left obscure The opinion of Plato he tells us is very obscure it being his purpose to conceal it but he saith in his old age in his book de Legibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any if's or and 's he asserts the world to be moved by more then one principle by two at the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The one of a good and benigne nature the other contrary to it both in its nature and operations Numenius in Chalcidius thus delivers the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato de originibus as he speaks Igitur Pythagoras quoque inquit Numenius fluidam sine qualitate sylvam esse censet nec tamen ut Stoici naturae mediae interque malorum bonorumque viciniam sed plane noxiam Deum quippe esse ut etiam Platoni videtur initium causam bonorum sylvam malorum so that according to Numenius both
Plato and Pythagoras attributed the origine of evil to the malignity of matter and so they make evils to be necessarily consequent upon the Being of things For thus he delivers expresly the opinion of Pythagoras qui ait existente providentia mala quoque necessario substitisse propterea quod sylva sit eadem sit malitia praedita Platonemque idem Numenius laudat quod duas mundi â—â—mas autumet Unam beneficentissimam malignam alteram sc. Sylvam Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei tanquam Patris liberalitate collata sunt mala vero matris sylvae vitio cohaeserunt But Plutarch will by no means admit that Plato attributes the Origine of evil meerly to matter but he makes the principle of evil to be something distinct from matter which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a confused infinite self-moving stirring principle which saith he he else where calls Necessity and in his de Legibus plainly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a disorderly and malignant Soul which cannot be understood of meer matter when he makes his Hyle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Without form or figure and destitute of all qualities and power of operation and it is impossible saith he that that which is of its self such an inert principle as matter is should by Plato be supposed to be the cause and principle of evil which he elsewhere calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Necessity which often resisted God and cast off his reins So that according to Plutarch Plato acquits both God and Hyle from being the Origine of evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore attributes it to that malignant spirit which moves the matter and is the cause of all the disorderly motions in the world But what this spirit should be neither he nor any one else could ever understand what darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of Philosophers concerning the Origine of evil when they were so consused and obscure in the account which they gave of it that their greatest admirers could not understand them But though Plato seemed so ambiguous in his judgment of the Origine of evil whether he should attribute it to the Hyle or some malignant spirit in it the Stoicks were more dogmatical and plainly imputed the cause of evil to the perversity of matter So Chalcidius tells us that the Stoicks made matter not to be evil in its self as Pythagoras but that it was indifferent to either perrogati igitur unde mala perversitatem seminarium malorum causati sunt they made the perversity of matter the Origine of evil but as he well observes nec expediunt adhuâ— undeâ—â—psa perversitas cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia rerum Dâ—â—â—â— sylva Deus summum praecellens bonum sylva ut censent nec bonum nec malum They give no rational account whence this perversity of matter should arise when according to the Stoicks there are but two principles of things God and matter whereof the one is perfectly good the other neither good nor evil But this perversity they tell us is something necessarily consequent upon the Generation of things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 these are affections viz. the disorders in the world which follow the Generation of things as rust comes upon brass and filth upon the body as the counterfeit Trismegistus speaks so Maximus Tyrius saith that evils in the world are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not any works of art but the affections of matter Non potest artifex mutare materiam saith Seneca when he is giving an account why God suffers evils in the world and elsewhere gives thâ—s account why evils came into he world non quia cessat ars sed quia id in quo exercetur inobsequens arti est So that the Origine of evil by this account of it lyes wholly upon the perversity of matter which it seems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produced the world out of that matter which the Stoicks supposed to be eternal And the truth is the avoiding the attributing the cause of evil to God seems to have been the great reason why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and coexistent with God and this was the only plausible pretence which Hermogenes had for following the Platonists and Stoicks in this opinion that he might set God far enough off from being the author of sin but I cannot sâ—e what advantage comes at all by this Hypothesis but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other For 1. It either destroyes Gods omnipotency or else makes him the approver of evil so that if he be not auctor he must be assentator mali as Tertullian speaks against Hermogenes because he suffered evil to be in matter for as he argues aut enim potuit emendare sed noluit aut voluit quidem verum non potuit infirmus Deus si potuit noluit malus ipse quia malâ— savit fic jam habetur ejus licet non instituerit quia tamen si noluisset illud essâ— non esset ipse jam fecit esse quod noluit non esse quo quid â—st â—urpius si voluit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse adversum semetipsum egit cum voluit esse quod noluit fecisse noluit fecisse quod voluit esse So that little advantage is gained for the clearing the true origine of evil by this opinion for either God could have taken away evil out of matter but would not or else would but could not this latter destroyes Gods omnipotency the former his good-ness for by that means evil is in the world by his consent and approbation for if God would not remove it when he might the Being of it will come from him when if he would have hindred it it would not have been and so God by not rooting out of evil will be found an assertor of it male si per voluntatem turpiter si per necessitatem aut famulus erit mali Deus aut amicus if Gods will were the cause why sin was it reflects on his goodness if Gods power could not hinder it it destroyes his omnipotency So that by this opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to evil 2. This principle overturns the foundations of Religion and all transactions between God and mens souls in order to their welfare because it makes evil to be necessarily existent in the world which appears from hence in that evil doth result from the Being of matter and so it must necessarily be as matter is supposed to be for whatever results from the Being of a thing must be coexistent with it and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist must have the same mode of existence which the Being its self hath as is evident in all the attributes of God which have the same immutability with his nature now then if evil did exist
of Heathen Fables insists on this very story of Ophioneus as the groundwâ—rk of that relation in Genesis concerning the Fall But Origen well answers him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargâ—â—h us with impiâ—â—y in corrupting and altâ—â—ing the Heathen Fables be not himself â—erâ— justly chargeable with the same fault not understanding the far greater antiquity of the writings of Moâ—es then either of Heraclitus or Pherecydes or Homer himself which reports the story of that evil one which fell from heaven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Serpent from which O hioneus in Pherecydes derived his name which was the cause why man was cast forth of Paradise doth intimate some such thing while under a pretence of Divinity and of a 〈◊〉 condition 〈◊〉 fi st deceived the woman and by her means 〈◊〉 man Câ—lius Rhodiginus câ—lls this Ophioneus Daemonicum Serpentem qui antesignanus fuâ—rit agminis à Divinae mentis placito deficientis This Pherecydes as appears by Eusebius had much converse with the Phaenicians where he purposely speaks concerning this Ophioneus Now the Phaenicians as Eusebius likewise tells us worshipped their God under the Form of a Serpent which probably might be occasioned by the Devils ambition and Tyranny over men that he would be worshipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done so much mischief to the world It was very early in the world when the Phaenicians and Aegyptians did begin to adore their Gods under the Form of Serpents for the beginning of it is attributed to Taautus by Eusebius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither was this only among the Phaenicians and Aegyptians but whereever the Devil raigned the Serpent was had in some peculiar veneration thence Iustin Martyr saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Serpent was the Symbol of adoration among them and was the proper Indicium or note of a consecrated place as is evident by that of Persius Pinge duos angues pueri sacer est locus Thence the Scholiast on Aristophanes on that place in Plutus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that where ever any God or Heroe was to be worshipped there were Serpents painted to denote so much So Orus Apollo saith of the Aegyptians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were wont to put the form of a golden basilisk to their Gods Heinsius conceives that the first worship of Apollo at Delphi was under the form of a Serpent whether Nonnus tells us that Cadmus the Phaenician went upon his first coming into Baeotia and from hence he derives the name Pytho from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a Serpent Ut non dubitandum sit saith he quin Pythius Apollo hoc est Spurcus ille spiritus quem Hebraei Ob Abaddon Hellenistâ—â— ad verbum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 caeteri 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dixerunt sub hac 〈◊〉 qua miseriam humano generi invexit primo cultus sit in Graecia And which is further observable the Devil was alwayes ambitious to have the world think that the knowledge of good and evil was to come by the Serpent still thence the famous oracle of Apollo here at Delphi thence came the use of Serpents so much in Divination thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to divine from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Serpent and so among the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is taken in the same sense from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Serpent So that excellent Glossographer Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Serpent was reckoned among the pedestria auspicia by the Romans and Homer tells in that solemn divination concerning the Greeks success at Troy there appears 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which saith Heinsius is an exact description of the Nachas whom they would have so called from the marks on hâ—s back which they accurately observed in divination Thus we see how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the world under that Form wherein he had deceived mankind into so much folly and misery We meet with some remainders of mans being cast out of Paradise upon his fall among the Heathens Origen thinks that Plato by his converse with the Iews in Aegypt did understand the history of the fall of man which he after his way aenigmatically describes in his Symposiacks Where he brings in Porus the God of plenty feasting with the rest of the Gods after supper Penia comes a begging to the door Porus being drunk with Nectar goes into Jupiters garden and there falls asleep Penia observing it steals to him and by this deceit conceived by him In this Fable of Plato Origen takes notice what a near resemblance the garden of Iupiter hath to Paradise Penia to the Serpent which circumvented Adam and Porus to man who was deceived by the Serpent Which he conceives more probable because of Plato his custom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wrap up thoâ—e excellent things he knew under some fables because of the vâ—gar for which he after speaks of his custom in altering and disguising what he had from the Iews lest he should too much displease the fabulous Greeks if he should adhere too close to the Iews who were so infamous among them Some have thought the story of Paradise was preserved among the Heathens in the fable of the gardens of Adonis which comes near that of Eden but what footsteps may be gathered of the truth of Scripture history in the Heathen Mythology will appear afterwards Thus much here then may serve to have manifested the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil by the fall of man to be in its self rational and attested by the consent of such persons who cannot be suspected of any partiality to the Scriptures We come now to consider the other grand difficulty which concerns the Origine of evil and the truth of Divine providence together Which is that if sin be the cause of misery and there be a God which governs the world whence comes it to pass that the worst of men do so frequently escape sufferings and the best do so commonly undergo them This hath been in all ages of the world where men have been Philosophical and inquisitive one of the great inquiries which the minds of men have been perplexed about The true and full resolution of which question depends much upon those grounds and principles which are discovered to us by Divine revelation in the Scriptures concerning the grounds of Gods patience towards wicked men the nature and end of sufferings which good men are exercised with And certainly this should very much commend the Scriptures to all sober and inquisitive persons that they contain in them the most clear and certain grounds of satisfaction to the minds of men in such things wherein they are otherwise so irresolved But of that afterwards Our present business is