imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
is not manifest in his sight because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie as they fancied Argus ful of eyes or al eye would it not discerne althings round about it without the least turne or mutation of its posture So God being ful of eyes or al eye and present with al Beings is it possible that any thing should be hid from him Hence Plato held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 althings are ful of God and therefore nothing could he hid from him 3 Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas or Decrees Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being by reason of his Divine Ideas which were the original Exemplar of althings This Plato much insistes on both in his Timaeus and Parmenides as hereafter 4 Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings So Act. 15.18 Act. 15.18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world 5 Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings Plato Leg. 10. pag. 901 c. proves That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things whereof he has an accurate knowlege being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most wise Opificer and Framer of althings For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful knowlege of his own worke in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al. But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science The Object of Gods Omniscience we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe or incomplexe Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses Incomplexe 1. Complexe Intelligibles real things 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles or propositions and discourses both divine and human mental oral and scriptural Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God or subsequent 1 Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God are such as belong to the Divine Essence as that there is a God That God is eternal immutable c. These God knows by his Essence alone and not by his Wil because antecedent thereto Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Wil are al such whose truth is caused by and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Essence simply considered nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings so al propositions that belong to them depend on and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying The Reasons of good and evil are eternal if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil it is most false For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby see Bradwardine de Caus l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible or future 1 Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence 2 Things future in his Wil which gives futurition to althings Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent but things contingent as to us are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil and therefore necessarily known by God That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil and so certainly known by him is most evident because they are al present to God For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us but because it is future When it is present it is certainly known what it is wherefore althings being present to God by reason of his Divine Wil which gives suturition to althings therefore they must be al even things most contingent as to us certainly known by him Even among men those that understand the causes of things and their certain coherence with the effects may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse and shal not the omniscient God who gives Being to al Causes and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects Thus Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Who knows things present to come and past There is nothing so vile so inconsiderable but it fals under the omniscient eye of God Prov. 15.3 as Prov. 15.3 The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil the productive Cause thereof and whatever is evil by its opposite good as also by the positive Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated which also fals under the determination of the Divine Wil so far as it is a real positive Being For he that perfectly knows a thing must needs know al the accidents modes and appendents thereof now al Evil being but a privation of what is good it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation Again Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation which being known to God thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man if this be known by God Gods Omniscience as to the human Soul then surely nothing can be hid Now that the human Soul and al its Principes Habits Cogitations Inclinations Ends Designes and Acts are al known to God is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie it is in nothing more positive and expresse To begin with that great series of Demonstrations Psal 139.1 c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me Psal 139.1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast searched me narrowly sifted me to the bran thou so knowest me and al that is in me as he who knoweth a thing exactly after the most diligent and accurate inquisition So much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off The sense is there is no part of my life hid from thee whether I sit or rise thou knowest it al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee as 2 Kings 19.27 al my thoughts are present to thee long before they are existent Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee before they were mine Thence it follows v. 3. Thou compassest my path v. 3. and my lying down and
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens or nothing And such is sin not simply and purely nothing yet according to its formal reason not a positive real Being but a moral privation or as others a privative relation That Sin according to its formal Idea and Nature is privative was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers both Platonists and others Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the moral cause of sins because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive idea of sin So Proclus argues from this place That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idea of sins because then it would follow that God should be the Cause and Author of sin And Plato himself informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an irregular affection and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of order also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice against Law Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privative Being and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of moral Being as the night is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the privation of the Suns light But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis than Simplicius on Epicbet cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin really is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of good Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dâ—st 34. Quaest 1. Suarez in 1.2 Tract 3. Disput 7. sect 3. pag. 275-278 Barlow Exercit. 2. § 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin we now procede to its Causes among which Mans Defectibilitie the first Origine of Sin if we wil ascend up to its first Origine we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature as the original cause of al sin For to speak in the Platonic mode Man as al other Creatures being composed of something and nothing yea more of nothing than something hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing Where there is place for Proficience there also remains a capacitie of Deficience Every Creature because made by God is capable of Proficience but because made out of nothing it is also capable of Deficience It 's true Man as made by God was void of al moral deficience or sin yet as Man he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie he had a moral free-wil for good but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin This is wel explicated by Suarez In a free Agent saith he the mode of failing in an act ariseth from the dominion he has over his act hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature which is good That the Wil of Adam in his innocent state was capable of sinning was a natural defect conjoined with a natural perfection for it was also capable not to sin and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object was the first origine and root of al sin Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good but evilly applied Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin The Vitiositie of human Nature he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature Yea his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato and other Philosophers Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in our head which I understand of Adam whereby our nature from the first generation is corrupted And Timaeus Locrus from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners because we never depart from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents A great confession of a Pagan beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow So Plato in his Critias saith That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men i. e. in the state of Innocence but at length it being mixed with mortal i. e. upon the Fal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 human custome or sin prevailed to the ruine of mankind and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls And Grotius assures us That the Philosophers confessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of an evil nature which Definit Plat. pag. 416. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Vitiositie in nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural disease or disease of nature Thence Plato in his Politicus pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie gives this demonstration of its necessitie because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts as by so many wild Horses And thence he concludes That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions The like Stobaeus Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Phy how depraved is mans nature altogether otherwise there were no need of Laws Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes Truly but little except only in figure Brutes look towards the earth but man has an erect countenance Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a brutish nature And it is said of Democritus that he affirmed The diseases of the Soul to be so great that if it were opened it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils Yea Aristotle albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturally repugnant to right reason But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves our evil is not from without it is fixed in our very bowels Again Al Sins are in al men but al do not appear in each man He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate avaricious luxurious maligne
it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
Republics which whatever way they incline draw on other things with them i. e. if a Republic be given to sloth and sensualitie it is near ruine Thus Repub. 9. pag. 564. he saith That idlenesse and prodigalitie are the peste of Republics and where these two il humors are found they infeste a Bodie politic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as choler and phlegme the natural bodie Thence Aristotle in his Politics saith That Husbandmen and Sheepherds make the best Citizens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because such converse according to Laws for they get their livelihood by working neither can they be idle Whereas other Vocations are more obnoxious to idlenesse and luxurie 3. 3. Prosperitie and Povertie Also excesse of Prosperitie or Povertie greatly promoves the ruine of Republics Prosperitie hastens the ruine of Republics as it oft causeth Luxurie Insolence and Divisions Povertie as it produceth Injustice and Idlenesse How much excesse of prosperitie promoveth the ruine of a Republic Plato Repub. 9. pag. 564. illustrates by the Republic of the Bees which when it abounds with much honey the Drones come and devour al 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rich men therefore according to my opinion are deservedly stiled the Herbe of Drones which they devour Thence Plato Repub. 4. pag. 421. saith That there are two things that corrupt and debauch Citizens and so bring ruine to Republics namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Richesse and Penurie And he gives the reason of both Richesse makes men idle and factiose An Artificer saith he when he grows rich casts off his Trade Again povertie hinders men from worke in that it deprives them of necessaries Whence he concludes That Magistrates ought to take diligent heed that a Citie be not brought to ruine by the excesse of these two Richesse and Povertie whereof the former breeds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Luxurie Sloth and Innovation and the later 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sordidnesse evil Practice as also desires of innovation Again Repub. 8. pag. 552. he saith Excesse of richesse or povertie threaten ruine because the former makes men Drones and the later makes men Thieves sacrilegious and addicted to evil practices 4. Animosities Factions and Divisions are a principal cause of State-ruine 4. Divisions It 's a Maxime of Politicians concordant with Plato's Politics That the principal causes of ruine to politic Bodies is from themselves as in Bodies natural And what more potent principe of self-dissolution is there than Division Sacred Philosophie teacheth us That a kingdome divided cannot stand Mat. 12.25 as Mat. 12.25 for indeed Division in althings naturally draws on dissolution Plato Repub. 4. assures us That Vnitie is the best bond of any Societie whereas divisions cause dissolution Thence Repub. 5. pag. 464. he requires in his Republic That there be a Communitie as wel of Goods as Affections 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whence truely it comes to passe that men are free from al contentions and divisions 5. The last cause we shal mention of State-ruine is Injustice 5. Injustice Thus Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. makes Injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the vitiositie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the disease of persons and Republics This is wel set forth by Augustin de Civit. l. 4. c. 4. Without Justice what are Kingdomes but great places of Robberie And what are places of Robberie but little Kingdomes For indeed the Pirate taken by Alexander being asked by the King What he meant thus to infeste the Sea answered elegantly and truely And what meanest thou thus to infeste the whole World But because I play the Pirate in a little Ship therefore I passe for a Robber whereas thou doing the same with a great Navie passest for an Emperor See more of politic Justice and Injustice in what precedes § 7. Parag. 4. REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie wherein Plato's Metaphysic Philosophemes are methodised and improved CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie in general A general Idea of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie It s generic notion Sapience Its Object things most excellent c. It s difference from Theologie as a natural Sapience It s formal Act Contemplation § 1. Metaphysic or prime Philosophie in general BEfore we enter on the bodie of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie it wil be necessary that we give some general Notion thereof thereby to disabuse the minds of men who have been so long imposed on by false Ideas collected out of Aristotle's supposed Metaphysics For since Aristotle's Metaphysics possessed the Scholes al men have endeavored to conforme their metaphysic Philosophemes to them as the original Exemplar on a supposition that they were a part of Aristotle's genuine Workes But I conceive it no difficult thing to demonstrate what some Learned men have undertaken that those Metaphysics which passe under Aristotle's name are spurious and not to be reckoned among his genuine Workes For who can imagine that such a learned and accurate man as Aristotle was should be guilty of so great an absurditie as to stuffe up a great part of his Metaphysics with the ten Predicaments and other Logic Notions which he had so prolixely handled in his Organ of Logic May we not take it for granted that nothing properly belongs to Metaphysics but what is supernatural as the name importes Yea doth not the synonymous title that Aristotle is said to give this Science cut off above the moitie of his Metaphysics For Stobaeus tels us That it was Aristotles manner to cal Metaphysic Theologie And this indeed he learned from his Master Plato who seems to attribute unto Metaphysic one and the same Idea with natural Theologie the object whereof is God and things supernatural so far as they may be contemplated by natural light Hence we may define Metaphysic or Prime Philosophic according to Plato's mind A natural Sapience or Theologie for the contemplation of things supernatural and divine As for the generic Idea or Notion of Metaphysic the Platonists general terme is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sapience which is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophe Metaphysic Sapience a Speculator or Contemplator because the ancient wise men were Contemplators specially of things divine Indeed Cicero Tusc 4. cals al Philosophie the studie of Sapience but the Grecian Philosophers Socrates Plato and Aristotle seem to confine Sapience to Metaphysic wherefore they define it the knowlege of things most excellent and divine specially the first Being and Cause of althings Whence they make the Object of this Sapience to be in the general 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things most excellent and eximious as the first Being and Cause 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things wonderful i. e. such oriental Traditions as Thales Pythagoras and Plato brought from the Barbarics namely the Hebrews c. touching the first Origine of Things the Wonders of Providence the Worship of God and Mysteries of Religion which Aristotle estimed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things inutile
has had no smal influence on Atheisme in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature or to the various modifications of mater or to some mundane Spirit exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece Democritus Epicurus c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie 3 Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme as Plato Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate telling us That young men by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other at last come to disbelieve every thing For Scepticisme naturally tends to Atheisme he that disputes every thing at length comes to believe nothing even in things divine 4 But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome when it became the Seat of State-policie For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only but also diffused it self throughout the European World Hence Machiavel that great secular Politician of Florence layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us some are so bold and daring as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it others by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives could with as much facilitie turne Atheists It is natural to carnal reason and policie to step up into the Throne of God and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4.30 Dan. 4.30 Is not this great Babylon that I have built i. e. by my wisdome and power c. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind Pride c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man This Plato has wel observed in the place fore-cited de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Atheists who opposed the existence and providence of God as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophistic spurious Philosophers Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist but a great deal cures him of Atheisme And indeed to speak the truth it is not Philosophie simply in it self but the infidelitie carnal reason and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists Psal 10.4 This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie as Psal 10.4 The wicked through the pride of his countenance The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through is causal denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme The countenance here is brought in not as the formal subject or proper seat but as the Index of his pride that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self though the proper subject of it be the heart Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the pride of his spirit Thence it follows wil not seek after God This notes his practic Atheisme founded in speculative Whence it follows al his thoughts are that there is no God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies mischievous thoughts politic designing imaginations The wicked through the pride of his heart is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God Thus Psal 14.1 Psal 14.1 The fool hath said in his heart there is no God The fool here is not such an one as wants reason but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme This I am bold to assert that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme which covers the face of this politic World is the carnal Reason Infidelitie and spiritual Pride of mens hearts not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith This is very clear because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way as any other of the simplest of men Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined Certainly this so great credulitie in things natural or politic is a sufficient demonstration that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith that makes men Atheists as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons which they idolise It is a thing most prodigiose that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations to believe yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheisme Threesorts of Atheisme but also of its kinds Thus de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age under the Symbol of a young man in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. My Son thou art yet young neither do I dout but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion Expect therefore I beseech thee that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment is indeed a point of the highest consequence namely that any one thinking rightly of God lives wel or il But first touching this mater I wil signifie to thee one great thing lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater and it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Not thou alone nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this Atheistic sentiment of God but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease And I wil tel thee what has happened to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 namely no one of them who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not hath persevered therein even unto old age We find a great instance hereof in Bion mentioned by Laertius in his Life who in his health said The Gods were nothing but being worne out by a long disease and fearing death he acknowleged their existence c. Plato addes As for the two other opinions about God namely 1
also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God saith he knows things future by that whereby they are future namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle 1. Post 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause But now God knows al futures certainly therefore by their most true cause even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues as of Augustin before them So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS De Libero Arbitrio Thus Scotus assures us That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez de Anxil Grat. l. 2. Disp 7. p. 106. God saith he in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil predetermining in particular al future Contingents as also free acts knows certainly and infallibly those to be future as to al circumstances as wel as to their substance Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs which are not morally evil And he thus proves his Hypothesis A determinate cause which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause must needs infallibly produce its effect but such is the Divine Decree Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of sin so far as the act is ens and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin c. as before 3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision Scientia media Scientia Media a middle Science whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted This Middle Science 1. supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God which is altogether impossibly for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition without some cause of that transmutation now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Wil as we shall prove hereafter Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future but only possible Doth not this Middle Science by feigning that future which is only possible overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future Is it not impossible that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition So Avarez de Auxil l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future but what gives futurition thereto And what gives futurition to any thing but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil 2 It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object which also is impossible because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is Yea to speak properly the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie at least as to essence or existence what is not either necessarily existent or future cannot be known now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future therefore not cognoscible Again God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under which are al variable but from the invariable determination of his own Wil as before It 's true our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive reception of species from its object Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis non sic intuitio divina and therefore it is murable and variable according to the variations of the object but can we imagine that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object must not God also be finite passive and dependent Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate yea eternal How then can it depend thereon 3 This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain For such as the object is such is the Science thereof a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie That which may otherwise be cannot be necessarily known as Gods knowlege would be false if he knew those things to be future which shal never be so would it be incertain if the object be not certainly future if the object be certainly future it must have a certain cause of its futurition which can be no other than the Wil of God But now according to this hypothetic Middle Science God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self before it hath inclined to this or that object and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural yea no knowlege at al For how can a thing be certainly known to be future without some cause determining it to be such That Gods knows althings future though never so contingent in themselves most certainly in the determination of his own Wil see Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. also Grosseteste de Libero Arbitrio Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents as without al peradventure he has we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience not in the extrinsec objects which can never give it but in God himself and in the determination of his own Wil in regard of which al future contingents are necessary not absolutely but hypothetically on supposition of the said determination 4 This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God 1 It destroyes the Grace of Election in that it supposeth that Peter could from his own free-wil consent to the Cal of God provided he were put under such circumstances and invested with such commun aides even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science 2 It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely but only on