Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n
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A38061
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A preservative against Socinianism. The first part shewing the direct and plain opposition between it, and the religion revealed by God in the Holy Scriptures / by Jonath. Edwards.
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Edwards, Jonathan, 1629-1712.
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1693
(1693)
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Wing E217; ESTC R24310
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65,484
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89
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no religion and consequently neither good nor evil If our actions proceed not from freedom they lose their nature and may be any thing else but cannot be virtue and vice forasmuch as necessity takes way the distinction of actions good and bad 2. That Freedom and Necessity are so opposite one to another that Omnipotence it self cannot reconcile them forasmuch as they are plain contradictions and terms that destroy each other That necessity robs you not only of your freedom but of your will itself to which freedom is so necessary that without it it is no will it being an essential property of it proprium quarto modo and to say that the Will can subsist without its property that is it's essential liberty is absurditate ipsa absurdius Now let us put both these things together there is no Religion consequently neither Good nor Evil Virtue nor Vice where there is necessity and yet nihil prohibet saith Crell nothing consequently neither religion nor the nature of good and evil hinders but that God may absolutely decree things good to be done and decree them so as to become necessary by virtue of that decree Again the Will cannot be necessitated in any of its actions forasmuch as this would destroy its freedom which is a fundamental radical property of it and cannot be separated from it without destroying the Will itself And yet God can impose a necessity upon the wills of men of choosing this thing or another and Socinus will tell you that God usually leaves the wills of men to their freedom except it be when the judgements require him to lay them under a necessity Now how shall we reconcile these sayings which to us poor Christians seem to be plain contradictions and therefore impossible to be true But Socinus is not only a great admirer of reason but a great master of it too and therefore by the help of a distinction he doubts not but to bring himself fairly off for in the forementioned place having in order to give an account of some of the predictions of Scripture bin forced to bring in the Decrees of God into his assistance which could not one would think but entrench upon the freedom of mans will by making all actions subject to these Decrees necessary he gravely tells us and we are beholding to him for the discovery That notwithstanding his Decrees God hath left man entirely to his liberty for besides the direction and government of his external actions which indeed God hath reserved to himself he hath left every thing else in the power of mans will 4 That is when you say a man is a free Agent you must distinguish between the inward and outward Act between choosing and doing in the former sense a man is entirely at liberty for what can be freer than thought who can lay a restraint upon mans will or shackle his desires The decrees of God can put no force upon these and here Sapiens dominabitur astris they only govern mens outward actions which may indeed become thereby necessary but that 's no great matter animus cujusque est quisque the mind is the nobler part let a man but assert the honor and dignity of that and he need not be much concerned what becomes of his outward actions But against this it may be objected that a great part of Religion consists in the practice of many External actions of Piety towards God Iustice and Charity towards men and if these are not free they are no longer Acts of Religion any thing else but not Virtue and Vice as was said before To this he will tell you that God measures mens Obedience or Disobedience respectively not by the External Fact but by the Internal Actions and consent of the Will Which tho in some sense and with a just limitation it may be true yet as it is here brought in by him to serve his present purpose is a very loose and a dangerous determination in short this whole matter as it is stated by Socinus is lyable to very many and those unanswerable exceptions For 1 st whereas he saith the will even to the last is entirely at liberty tho the external actions are subject to the decrees of God and thereby become necessary this is a plain contradiction to what both he and Crellius before told us that God might necessitatem afferre voluntati necessitatem imponere hominibus hoc vel illud volendi force even the will as well as make the outward actions necessary 2 ly He asserts a freedom in men to little or no purpose for one would think if God gave man a principle of freedom he did it chiefly for the government of his actions and if these are not in his power he had even as good be without his liberty and that his will and his actions should run the same fate and be both equally subject to it For my part I should think I had as good be shackled and manacled as to have a full power of moving and yet not be able to stir either hand or foot 3 ly If Socinus should be asked how it can be imagined that the actions can be necessary when the principle from whence they proceed is absolutely free for it is of humane and voluntary actions that Socinus in that place is speaking I believe it would puzzle him to give a satisfactory answer 4 thly Tho Socinus takes care of the freedom of mans will which he in this place is concerned to vindicate yet as far as I can perceive he hath little care of Religion for if where there is necessity there can be no Religion as the Socin and Remonstrants said before and that a great part of Religion consists in external as well as internal actions I cannot see but that thereby Religion is left in great danger if not entirely overthrown and that Vertue and Morality are for any assistance that Socinus in this place affords them fairly left to shift for themselves Well but however tho Socinus by making good actions subject to Gods decrees and thereby necessary may be guilty of contradicting himself yet there is no great harm in all that his opinion may be absurd but he doth not design to encourage impiety thereby for tho he make God the cause of good actions yet he doth not as his adversaries do make him the Author of Sin In reference to what is Evil here man is left entirely to his own freedom the guilt of which cannot be transferred upon the decrees of God which are not in any wise concerned in them but the shame and blame of all must be laid at mans own door and imputed only to his own freedom But soft and fair there is no general rule but may have some exceptions for there are plain predictions in Scripture not only of some good but of many evil and wicked actions such for instance as were the Treachery of Judas and the
no difference in this case many devices may be in mans heart but the counsel of the Lord that shall stand Prov. 19. 21. however men may alter and the dealings and dispensations of Gods providence in several acts of mercy and justice upon that score may be different towards them yet this is without alteration or change in his purposes towards them who remains still the same yesterday and to day and for ever The Socinians utter many bold and dangerous expressions in opposition to this plain truth which is the unavoydable consequence of their denyal of Gods Omniscience Forasmuch as there are many events which depend upon the actions of men which arising from the freedom of their Will are therefore purely contingent and consequently out of the reach of Gods knowledge this must according to them unavoidably cause God to alter his counsels to take new measures to change his affections towards men and alter his purposes concerning them that is he who is a Reprobate to day may be an Elect person to morrow and he who at present is elect may afterwards be reprobated and those may finally perish quos Deus saluti destinavit whom God once designed for eternal happiness Socin de Off. hominis Christiani cap. 11. Now this one would think should be an Argument of inconstancy and consequently not fit to be ascribed to God Crellius will tell you there is no such matter this is only an instance of his freedom it shews you only that there is a variety in the acts of Gods will but no inconstancy For a man is then said to be constant to his purpose who persists in it till some good reason obliges him to alter it and therefore what you would call wavering he will say is the result of wisdome God accommodating his decrees to the nature of things and the actions of men so that in short God is subject to change but not without good reason he may alter his purposes as wise men usually do according to the different circumstances of things and as the exigence of his affairs shall require But with the leave of this bold man another would be apt to think that tho men may without the imputation of levity alter their counsels yet this arises from the imperfection of their natures and particularly of their knowledge of future events which tho it be no fault yet it must be acknowledged a weakness tho such an one as they are no more accountable for than they are because they cannot restore sight to a man born blind or raise the dead But it cannot be ascribed to God without a derogation to his infinite knowledge and unerring judgement and is therefore an argument of weakness notwithstanding all that Crellius urges very weakly to the contrary Ibid. Therefore that we may return where we first began to the Decrees of God concerning the future and final state of men this is certain that they with relation to their several and respective objects are fixed and unmoveable for be they antecedent or subsequent to his foresight of mens faith or infidelity it matters not in this case the Scriptures however assure us and right reason would confirm the same that they are immutable more stable then the Foundations of the Earth or the Poles of the World which may and shall be shaken and stagger out of their places like drunken men but the Counsel of the Lord that shall stand For let holyness and perseverance be the cause or the effect of Gods election yet all sober persons agree in this that whoever lives an holy life and perseveres in it is undoubtedly chosen by God to eternal life and whosoever lives and dies in his sins and impenitence is certainly designed and shall be doomed to everlasting punishment here the foundation of the Lord standeth sure the Lord knoweth them that are his and them that are not so But Socinus who denies the certainty of Gods knowledge of many future events viz. those which are contingent such as are the actions of men as depending upon the uncertain because free motions of their will must in pursuance of this principle deny the certainty of Gods Election because he cannot foresee who will obey his commands and continue to do so against all the temptations which they will meet with in the world to the contrary and consequently he must say what another would account Impiety to think that God Almighty for want of knowing the determination of mens choice must likewise be ignorant of the final event of their actions and therefore he who at present is the object of his Love and designed by him for the joyes of Heaven may in the conclusion for ought he knows merit his displeasure and be tumbled down to hell Now that men may make such uncertain conjectures concerning their final state and thereupon meet with a fatal and terrible disappointment may be a certain tho a sad truth and therefore no great wonder But to think that it should thus happen to the Allwise Creator of men is to have too mean and dishonourable conceptions of him and such the Socinians have doubting not to aver that God finds reason to alter not only his dispensations towards men according to their behaviour but his own intentions of kindness and displeasure choosing what at first he refused and refusing afterwards what once he thought worthy of his Approbation and choice Socin prael Th. cap. 7. A fifth attribute in God and which indeed cannot be separated from him without overthrowing all Religion is his Justice and that not only as it signifies his holiness and righteousness but as it betokens his anger indignation his severity and displeasure against Sin and Sinners And this the Scripture speaks very often of Psal 5. the Psalmist describes God as one not only that hath no pleasure in wickedness ver 4. which arises from the holiness and righteousness of his nature but as one likewise that hates all the workers of iniquity ver 5. and particularly who abhors the deceitful and will destroy the Lying man The wicked and him that loveth violence his Soul abhors Psal 11. 5. Hence he stiles himself a jealous God jealous of his authority and honour and will revenge the contempt of it he is slow to anger but yet will not acquit the wicked forasmuch as he is jealous and furious who will take vengeance on his adversaries and reserves wrath for his enemies Nahum 2 3. and when God proclaims his name the name by which he desires to be known it is the God merciful and gracious c. but yet one that will by no means clear the guilty Exod. 34. 6. Numb 14. 18. he is Deus ultionum the God to whom vengeance belongeth Ps 94. 1. the God of recompences Jer. 51. 56. and in short a consuming fire Heb. 12. 29. All which expressions seem plainly to denote that Justice in God is a necessary and an essential attribute and which you can no more separate