be the better or the worse As if a man should partake of the Supper of the Lord to that end to put himself in remembrance of the death of Christ the more entirely that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of his death the better he performes the duty of a true Communicant Again if a man should slander his neighbour intending the ruine of him by how much the more violently he intends it by so much the worse is his Act of Calumnation The quantity therefore of a good or an evil Act is correspondent to the quantity of the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Intention and is commensurate with it if the Intention be understood according to the Act of intending and not as to the thing intended But the intention taken either way doth not suffice to prove this that any Act which otherwise is evil should be made good V. This conclusion is proved by many and most strong arguments first by the words of the sacred Text in the third Chapter of the Romans where the Apostle not without indignation doth detest that grievous slander by which it was said to be taught That evil may be done that good should come thereof That the sence the scope and the force of this place may be the better understood that St. Paul amongst all the Apostles was abundantly the most copious in asserting every where the mercy of God by Grace making a Covenant of grace with sinfull men and faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promises notwithstanding all that unrighteousnesse and unbelief of men which lyeth within their hearts and openly and abundantly doth declare it self in their dayly lives and conversations which he professeth to be so far from making these promises of God by Grace to be in vain that on the contrary they do render the glory of his grace and truth to be far more illustrious Rom. 5. 2. for where that the offence abounded there it is manifest that Grace superabounded From hence the Sophisters and Imposters took on one side to themselves an advantage to slander and to diminish if they could the authority of the Apostle On the other side the Hypocrites and profane did take an occasion to live more licentiously and to sin more securely For if that be true said they which is preached by Paul that the sins of men do redound to the greater glory of God there is no reason that God should punish sins or be angry with sinners There is no reason that a man or woman should abstain from sinning nay they should sin more abundantly that God might receive the more abundant glory and evil things are altogether to be done that good things may come thereby The other objections the Apostle confuteth but to this let us do evil that good may come of it he doth not vouchsafe any answer at all he only cryeth out that it is a manifest slander and near of kin unto blasphemy and unless they repent the just judgment of God is threatened to such importunate slanderers as if this Sophism was of that kind of arguments which Aristotle adjudged not to deserve an answer but rather a reproof It is hence manifest and all Interpreters do acknowledge it that the Apostle most constantly denyeth that any evil ought to be done for any intention be it never so good It much availeth saith St. Augustine to consider what Aug. contra meudaciam what end what intention such a thing is done but those things which are manifest sins ought not to be done under any pretence of a good cause or a good end or of a good Intention This is the first argument VI. The second it is taken from the nature of evil or of sin which of its own nature is not first to be chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hiercl pag. 78. neither is it secondly ordinate to a good end neither is it thirdly apt of it self to produce any good first it is not eligible or it is not to be chosen by reason of its own nature qua tale as it is of such a nature for there is nothing eligible which is not also Expitible and all things that are desired are desired under the account of good Neither is evil of its own nature ordinable to any good end for if it were it were also to be desired for the appetite in Philosophy is not only carryed to the end propounded by the Agent but to those things also which seem to conduce for the obtaining of that end If you object God doth dispose of our evils into a good end of his own and therefore it is not against the nature of evil to be ordinated to a good end I answer in the first place that the ways of Almighty God who is the Lord of Nature and according to his good pleasure can produce good out of evil are farre different from ours who have not the same right or the same power neither is it for us either too curiously to enquire or too magisterially to pronounce any thing of the Providence of God concerning evil In the second place I answer that God indeed is able and accustomed to make use of our sins to serve his Glory Grace and Providence and that it is lawfull for us also as opportunity shall serve to follow his example and to make use of the sins of other men for our spirituall or temporall advantage Notwithstanding as God although he maketh use of the evil of others and produceth Good out of it yet he never doth evil himself that from thence he might abstract good so neither is it lawfull for us to do evil that good might proceed from it It is one thing to make use of the evil of others and turn it into good and another thing to do evil with an intent of good Thirdly I answer a thing may be said to be ordinated in a twofold respect either improperly in the same manner as a thing which way soever it is made use of by the Agent doth notwithstanding tend to its end being so done by the wisdome and power of the supremer Agent contrary to the will and intention of him that did it or it is taken more restrictly and properly and so that only is said to be ordinated to its end which antecedently is chosen by the Agent as a medium that by the nature of it is convenient and conducible to such an end In the first sence that is to be understood when we say that God doth ordinate and dispose of evil to a good end that is when God Non coâ—venire homo viro Vitiis uti Quint 6. Instit 1. out of his infinite mercy and power either abstracts good from evil or turneth evil into good But we must above all things take heed that these expressions be not understood in the latter and proper sence as if God antecedently did well approve or make choice of any evil as a medium convenient by the nature of it to the assecution of
unto him that his Kingdom should be taken from him If any man shall think this example not congruous to prove this truth because it doth not appear that Saul did this with any good intention neither was the end which afterwards he pretended fixed and grounded in his resolution when he did it but it is more likely that he looked after his temporal advantage and commodity both because it was objected to him by the Prophet and laid unto his charge that he obeyed not the commandment of God and because which is common with Hypocrits he did make an excuse for his disobedience That this exception may be waved create no more trouble or scruple it is to be observed that where Hypocrisy is joyned to disobedience the crime is not so much increased as it is doubled There is no man doubteth but that Saul was guilty of a double fault of disobedience and dissimulation not to make mention of the third crime which was the root of the two former viz. a mundane affection and a desire of gain and of his own glory The sins of disobedience and of dissimulation were distinct in Saul neither conjoyned by nature or by time not by nature for one of them can be in any man without the other nor by time for disobedience had the precedency to w ch afterwards upon another occasion was added Dssiimulation which not obscurely may be collected from the very words of Samuel himself who making no mention of the dissimulation of the King did only sharply and securely reprehend him for his disobedience obedience saith he is more acceptable than sacrifice as if he should have said What do you tell me of sacrifices which if you did in earnest before intend them or now to excuse your disobedience you do pretend them it is all one in relation to your duty You ought to have obeyed the commandment of God and without the least murmuring or dispute to have fullfilled that which he prescribed But whatsoever this miscarriage of Saul was most certain it is that Uzzah whose History is written 2 Sam. 6. did put forth his hand to the holy Ark not deceitfully but devoutly and with a most pious Intention that the Ark of the Covenant should not fall on the ground which at that time under the â—economy of the old Testament was a dreadfull Symbol of the Divine presence when the Cart in which it was carryed being violently shaken it seemed even ready to slip down out of it By this slight as some have thought but importunate temerity although he had not the least ill intent yet he merited a multitude of people beholding it that he should suffer the punishment of a sudden death w ch God then did inflict upon him Num. 7. 9. Indeed the Lord Jehovah had before declared that the Ark of the Covenant should not be carryed in a Cart but on the shoulders of the Priests neither was it lawful for any who was not of the order of the Priesthood of the Family of the Koathites to carry the Ark or to touch that sacred vessel Numb 4. 15. he that should presume to do it was to perish by an evil death Therefore by this severe punishment on the first violator of that Law God did strike into the hearts of men a reverence to the more strict observation of the Law and preserved its Authority that no man under any pretence whatsoever should boldly presume to do or to attempt against that which he had ordained And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Uzzah and God smote him there for his rashnesse and he dyed by the Ark of God 2. Sam. 6. 7. XIIII The last argument is taken from the inconveniences that do attend the contrary opinion And they are many I shall only urge but one instead of all and it is often mentioned by St. Augustine which is that the restraint of the Law being taken away all things would be carried at random as the barrs being broken when once the waves of the Sea do exceed their banks they will not endure to be contained within any bounds but will grow upon all places by an unruly usurpation that are farre or near them He who hath once transgressed the bounds of modesty will quickly grow into a heighth of impudence saith Petronius But let us rather be attentive to St. Augustine Quod seeleratissimum facinus quod turpissimum flagitium quod impiissimum sacrilegium non dicatur fieri posse recte atque juste si semel concesserimus in omnibus malis operibus hominum ideo non quid fiat sed quare fiat quaerendum ut quaecunque propter bonas causas facta obtendantur nec ipsa mala esse judicentur What abom nable act what most filthy wickednesse what most impious sacriledge Ah do you not guesse that he prophesyed of this our age and of our affairs may not be said to be done justly and uprightly if we shall once grant that in all the evil works of men we are not to demand so much what is done as wherefore it is done that so those things which are pretended to be done for good causes may not at all of themselves be judged to be evil And again Cum concesseris admittendum esse aliquod malum ne aliquid gravius admittatur non ex regula veritatis sedex sua quisque cupiditate aut consuetudine metietur malum et id putabit gravius quod ipse amplius exhorrescit non quod ampliùs revera fugiendum est When you grant that some evil is to be admitted that a greater one may be omitted every one will be ready to measure that evil not by the Rule of truth but by his own desires or by Custome and will think that to be most grievous which he doth most abhorre and not that which indeed is most to be avoyded The strength of the argument is in this If evil things are to be done that good things may come thereby when most sure it is that all things evil are not to be done and not for all things that are good we must put some limitation or rule to both these doubts as first to know what evil is to be done that good may come thereof and what not and Secondly for what good things some things evil are to be done and for what they are not to be done or it must be left to every mans judgment to arbitrate according to the nature of the thing and as himself shall think good what is to be done and what is not to be done and for what it is to be done If any of which be granted there will be nothing safe amongst men nothing sacred nothing free from injuries perjuries deceits rapine slaughter and destruction Those things without which Common-wealths and the societies of men cannot be preserved must all be banished from the earth in which number are Religion Justice Righteousnesse Faith and Peace XV. The conclusion which I undertook to
said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that iâ— cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have menâ—ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usuâ—ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so
NEMO ME IMPUNE LACESSIT SERO SED SERIO The Most honble William Marquiss of Lothian TEN Lectures ON THE OBLIGATION OF Humane Conscience READ In the Divinity School at OXFORD In the Year 1647 By that most Learned and Reverend Father in God Doctor Robert Sanderson Bishop of Lincoln c. Translated by Robert Codrington Master of Arts. LONDON Printed by Tho. Leach and are to be sold by John Martin James Alâ—stry and Tho. Dicas at the Sâ—gn of the Bell in St. Pâ—uls-Church Yâ—rd 1660. SEVERAL CASES OF CONSCIENCE Discussed In Ten Lectures IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL AT OXFORD By that most Learned and Reverend Father in God Doctor Robert Sanderson now Lord Bishop of Lincoln LONDON Printed by Tho. Leach and are to be sold by John Martin James Allestry and Tho. Dicas at the Sign of the Bell in St. Pauls-Church-Yard 1660. To the most Noble Robert Boyle Son to the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Cork deceased and Brother to Richard Earl of Cork now living Honourable SIR THis small present whatsoever it is coveteth to preferre it self to your Trust and Patronage and to come abroad into the world under the protection of your name Most willingly therefore I do here make a tender of it unto you who as I understand by Fame and in Subjects of worth Fame is seldom found a Liar are not only Illustrious by the splendor of your Birth but far more Illustrious by the nobility of a generous mind by your love to Learning your Humanity Piety and all manner of Virtue howsoever to me living privately and contentedly in a smal Cottage and not much solicitous what is done abroad especially as the times noware never known by your face nor by your name until within these few Months no nor as yet known unto me but only by your MUNIFICENCE Nevertheless I hope this poor gift will find some acceptance with you because having already obtained my Rod of Liberty you endeavour to enclose me again in my antient circle and to draw me back to my discontinued exercise by proposing to me some honest Salary by the excellently learned Mr. Thomas Barlow chief Keeper of Bodleys Library in the famous University of Oxford It is indeed wellâ—done that in this deplorable state of Civil and Ecclesiastical affairs if we may call 〈…〉 and a hideous confusion of all things there are peradventure found one or two of a more refined clay who either by their encouragment or their bounty are careful to comfort the sad Muses and the Retainers to them of whatsoever condition those especially who being Professors of true and Christian Philosophy are every where neglected and dispised as the refuse of the world Iâ— any thing therefore by the permission of the Almighty shall hereafter be undertaken and published by me in this kind of writing which pertaineth to moral Philosophy that may be either profitable to the Publick or useful to any private man for the better Institution of his life and the framing of his manners by the prescript of the Divine Law and Gospel whether it be in the Latin tongue or in the English which I perceive to be more acceptable of to many of our Nation I do here willingly acknowledge and freely professe that for the greatest part it is due unto you who were both the Author to me to undertake it and an Assistant cheerfully to proceed in it And do you most wâ—râ—hy Sir proceed to do good that is to do that which you do already to adorn Learning to favour learned men to advance Piety to procure you faithful friends at the charges of unfaithful Mammon that so ouâ— of the abundance of good works sowed in this world there may redound unto you a most fruitful Harvest of eternal blessednesse in the world to come Amen From Botheby Pannel◠〈◊〉 Lincolnshirâ— 10 Cal. Decemb. 1659. To the Courteous READER Friendly Reader whosoever you are BEfore you advance into the House it self you are â—ere in the first entrance to be encountred and desired in some few things to suffer your self to be informed of the cause that chiefly compelled us to the publishing of these papers which here we represent unto you I had rather indeed if others had been of the same mind with me that they should never have seen the light for the proof whereof this may be one Argument and of force enough that part of these Lectures written by me some yâ—ars since were never for the space of ten years and more reserved in any Desk but lay in corners up and down amongst my rejected as mâ—ch as neglected papers had I not another Argument of far greater force than the former viz. The Imperfection of the worke which of it self doth betray it self For a Writer that understands himself and makes provision for his Reputation and Dignity mâ—st carefully finish the work he hath begun Lib. 2. de Natur. deorum and not so much as think of sending it abroad before to speak with Cicero it be every where apt and polished and made compleat and perfect in all the parts and numbers of it For in vain from thence you may look for Praise where you may think you come off very handsomely if for Praise you deserve Pardon What â—hâ—â—…fore Were friends the cause of it Who are accustomed to encourage and give more rains to those who of their own accord are running into those hazards and to spur on others who draw back I will not affirm this neither for although I may grant that the exhortations and desires of friends the common refuge of the greatest part of Scriblers may serve oftentimes for an honest excuse yet they could never seem to me to be the just and allowable grounds for such a Cause Nevertheless as most frequently it is seen there were not wanting some ergodioctists some Brain-Exacters who demanded of me and that I may use the words of Fabius with daily and reproaching Importunities did efflagitate that I would present those things to the eys of all men to be read which heretofore in reading were so grateful to their ears but I who was not ignorant how acuter was the judgement of the eye than of the ear did constantly deny it They on the other side were more instant with me and more vehemently did urge me and as oft in like cases it comes to pass they did gently chide me But I who was resolved to be obstinate stood fixed to my self for whatsoever they could object unto me I was ready always to answer them that a work begun and not half of it nor the third part of it peradventure hardly accomplished was not rashly to be communicated to the publick But they again were as ready to reply Why cease you then Why do you not set your self close unto your study and put your last hand unto that work which your first hand hath so happily begun What shall I say for my self in this case I am ashamed to confesse and I may not be
my Judgment In the first place therefore I say That he who de facto is chief Magistrate in a City or Nation although he hath attained to that power by evil Arts is neverthheless to be esteemed by the Citizen as his lawful Prince and by the obligation of his Conscience he is accordingly bound to obey him provided there be no just cause of any doubt to the contrary And in this case this seems to be the only and just cause of doubt when most certainly it is manifest or at least when it seems very probable to the Citizen that there is some other person to whom the chief power is due by greater right If this be not so the Citizen cannot in a good Conscience refuse the commands of the present Possessor For ordinarily it doth not belong unto a Citizen too curiously to enquire by what right the possessor doth possesse it may suffice him for the security of his Conscience that he doth possesse de facto and there is no other man at least so far as he knows who ought by right to possesse that place And besides that which I have already spoken concerning the Roman Emperors the Government of that Common-wealth being subverted to this the whole History almost of all the Kings of Israel doth pertain many of whom relyiug not so much as on the least shaddow of Right but having obtained the Kingdom by unjust Arms and nefarious wickednesse the Royal off-spring of their Predecessors being utterly extinguished that not one of them might remain to succeed in their Fathers Dignities did ascend the Royal Throne and governed the Kingdom by a full and as it were a proper Power and the people rendred obedience to them no otherwise than if they had been invested in it by the greatest right Neither do we find that the people were ever blamed for it But right reason rather perswaded that it so ought to be done For it concerned the publick safety that there should be one who should sit at the Helm of Government and it could not otherwise be better provided for the affairs of his people and himself than that he should be esteemed to have the greatest right who as a true possessor had no right at all And by the Law of Nations those things which belong to none do passe into the right of the present possessors of them XV. In the second place I say That in an Hereditary Kingdom where the right is doubtful betwixt two or more Competitors it is the part of a good Citizen whiles the contention is yet depending and the right to be descerned by a friendly treaty or by war to obey him as his lawful Prince who is in present possession of the Soveraign command Of this Histories can every where afford us very many examples amongst those which are most remarkable are the many differences which happened amongst the competitors of the Kingdom of Portugall after the death of King Sebastian And the six contestations at least for the Kingdom of Scotland after the death of Alexander the King And the most fierce and lasting contention for the Government of the English Nation between the most noble families of York and Lancaster Most certain it is by the consent of all nations throughout the world that the Law did alwayes favour the Person possessing And in these Cases that remarkable saying of the Civilians always prevailed In rebus dubiis melior est conditio possidentis In doubtful things the condition of the Possessor is always the better XVI But again the lawful Prince and Heir of the Kingdom being forced away by the Power of Arms or being so oppressed that he cannot prosecute his own Right If any person whatsoever the said Prince yet living shall violently take into his own hands the Reigns of Government and deport himself as a King when he is more truly an Usurper so that now it is no longer a doubtful right but an open injury If you demand of me what a good Ciâ—â—zen shall do in this condition who peradventure hath taken the Oath of Allegiance in the bâ—halâ— of his lawfull Prince or if he hath not yet he is no lesse indutyed to him than if he had taken it I say in the third place that a good Citizen may not only lawfuly obey the Laws of him who Governs de facto and not de jure that is by present power and not by right and perform all his commands provided there be nothing in them that is uniust or foul but according to the condition of humane affairs there may be such an exigence of necessity as oftentimes it so comes to passe that he may be adjudged to fail even in his duty if he doth not do it It may be objected that but even now it was said that Laws made by one who hath no lawful power do not oblige in Conscience It was so said indeed and it was truly said so and I believe what I have now proposed is not repugnant to it For suppose that a Subject be obliged to perform what by the Law is forbidden yet he is not bound to the Law but to himself and to his Country The obligation is annexed to that Law which is truly so of it self as it is a Law and it necessarily followeth it as the Effect followeth its Cause We have already said that a Law made by one who hath no right unto the Government is not a Law properly but aequivocally therfore hath no power to oblige Therefore whatsoever obligation doth from hence appear to charge the Conscience of the Subject doth arise from another account and not from the Law it self to whom this obligation comes extrinsecally and only by accident as if a professor of Musick should act the part of a Mason XVII You will demand If not from the Law from whence then proceedeth this obligation of the Subject I answer It being the part of a pious and prudent man not only to attend on that which is lawful but also to observe what becometh himself and is expedient for others A good Citizen may be obliged to do that for the advantage of himself and his fellow-Citizens to the performance whereof he is not upon any account or by any right obliged For this obligation doth arise from that double part of duty by which every man is a debtor to himself and a debtor to his Country In the first place it belongs to a prudent man to provide for himself and for his own affairs and it belongs to an honest man to consider in what present condition he is For no man will deny even by the Dictates of Nature but that all must endeavour by all lawful ways and means to defend their lively-hood and themselves and so to deport themselves that they may live safely and in peace to have and to hold to themselves their own Fields Houses and possessions and be careful not to offend those who at their pleasure can take from them both their lives
intention but unprofitable to the publick nay in some sence obnoxious yet the Subject is bound to obey it provided it be made by just Authority and the matter of the Law or the thing commanded be such that it may be done without Sin The reason is because every man ought to be careful and diligent in the performance of that which belongs to his own part Gal. 6. 5. and not too scrupulous of what concerns another For every man shall bear his own Burthen If a Law-giver shall be wanting in his Duty what is that to you Do you perform your Office howsoever As for his intentions whether they be right or not let himself look to it for he must give to God an account of all his actions and intentions And do you look to your self for if you shall refuse to obey him you shall give to the same God an account of your disobedience XII The fourth Dout of the Changing of Laws if they seem to be unprofitable or obnoxious to the Common-wealth whether and how far the Change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be required and urged by the People The reason of the Doubt in one respect is because in a body Civil as in a body natural every change especially if it be sudden and great is dangerous and on the other side because it concerns the Common-wealth that the Laws be accommodated to the Times and Customes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 4. Phys text 128. and if the one doth change that the other be changed with them For answer to this I say in the first place it is certain that the Laws may be changed yea and sometimes that they ought to be changed for they have heretofore been changed with great profit to the Common-wealth therefore they may now be changed again and may be so in all future times if occasion shall require it shall be found profitable to the Commonwealth And why may not that be lawful to be done again which hath been lawful heretofore There are every day new emergencies new inconveniencies new evils and if there are not new Laws made to redresse them there will be no remedy Arist 2. And all men saith Aristotle seek not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 8. And if heretofore it were expedient that a Law should be made because it was profitable to the Commonwealth it being found afterwards by the change of the conditions of Times and manners to become unprofitable why is it not expedient that it should be taken away again XIII I say in the second place That the change of particular Laws is not without danger and therefore not to be attempted unlesse it be upon some great and urgent necessity Aristotle acutely and briefly as his custom is produceth divers reasons 2. Poli. 8. These three are the chiefest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These often changes do very much derogate from the authority of the Law and the Law-giver As we conceive that person to be of a very slender and weak judgement who for no sound or evident reason is easily enduced to change his Opinion Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It maketh the people wanton and petulant This is true enough we not long since have had the experience of it and apt to fly at any thing if they shall find their Law-giver easy on this account and departing from his own right to humour the Votes and unsatisfied desires of the people Therefore the chief Philosopher most gravely and deservedly doth reprove the Law of Hippodamus a Law-maker of Miletum viz. That whosoever had discovered or found out something profitable to the City should be recompenced for his good service with a publick reward This Law was specious enough at the first sight and plausible to the people but look throughly into it and you will find nothing in it either of prudence or safety or Advantage For what could be found more dangerous to disturb the publick Peace than that factious men and of a turbulent and cunning Spirit under the shaddow of a publick good should not only occasion the subversion of the Laws but also call in question the Form of the whole Civil Government and obtrude unto the State a new Idaea of Government according to the humour of their own Invention Do you hear I beseech you a Philosopher famous in his times or rather a Prophet and a foreteller of the manners and the times in which now we live Gravâ—ora inserre vulnera dum minoâ—â—bus medeâ—i defidâ— amus Ambros 2. Oâ—sic 2. Thirdly the Innovation of Laws being ordained for the removing of some present Inconvenience and being it may come to passe and oftentimes it doth so come to passe that from this suddain Immutation many and more grievous Inconveniencies may arise though not peradventure at the first discovered the most grave Philosopher did judge it to be far safer to tolerate endure some Inconveniencies and those not slight ones neither in a Common wealth which may be avouched of the Church also which is a kind of a Common-wealth than in pretence of Reformation either Ecclesiastical or Political to cancel old Laws Statutes turn all things upside down Of a far different judgment to those of our times were the wise men of former Ages whose Rules Principles were as are here these folowing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Malum benè positum non est movendum Imperiti medici est pejus malo remedium adhibere an Evil well placed is not to be removed It is the part of an unskilful Physician to apply a Remedy worse than the disease XIV I say in the third place That although the changing of Laws may seem to be necessary by reason of some great and evident Cause yet it is not to be attempted by the people without the consent of the Prince but modestly they are to crave and patiently to expect it of him and this may aptly be collected from the Analogy of the Head and the Members for how like a monster were it and destructive to the whole body if the Arms the Breast or the Feet should assume unto themselves the office of the Head This is abundantly enough demonstrated in those things which not long since we declared to you when we spake of the efficient Cause of Laws viz. That the principal Act of Jurisdiction cannot be exercised but by him only who is the Head and chief of the whole Commonalty Therefore the Constitution the abrogation and any Immutation of Laws whatsoever which are all of them the principal Acts of the chiefest Jurisdiction cannot pertain unto the people unless where the people are Prince as in a State Democratical but to him only who doth exercise a Soveraignty of Dominion over the whole Commonalty in a State Monarchical and who hath the undoubted power of a transcendent Command by himself In a businesse of so great an importance the duties of the people are these
from our own meditations or the Institution of other men II. I affirmed that all these and every one of them do oblige the Consciences of men and only these absolutely and primarily by themselves and by their proper virtue for all these and these alone do exhibite to us the will of God who alone of himself hath an absolute and a direct command over the Consciences of men But I gave you to understand that there were many other things which Secondarily and relatively and by Virtue of the Law or the Divine will in which they are founded do in their manner oblige the Consciences And all of them do agree in this that they owe all the force of obliging which they have to the Divine will for otherwise the Divine Law would not be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience nevertheless they do all differ among themselves both in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter and also in the degree according to the power of obliging Moreover there are three degrees of those who do thus oblige The first is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the Authority of another having a right or power in which number are Humane Laws The second is of those things whose obligation doth arise from a free act of the proper will such as are Vowes Oathes Promises and Spontaneous Contracts The third degree is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the intuition of brotherly Charity in which classis is ranked the Law or the Consideration of Scandal or offence III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws I have spoken much more than at the first I propounded to my self yet it may be much less than the weight of the thing deserved of which in our dayly Conversations there is a most frequent Use or the Abundance and Variety of those Doubts required which might cast a scruple into the minds of men In the resolution where of I proceeded so far in the former Terms that having gone over those difficulties which I thought could not improperly be reduced to the material efficient and formal Causes of Laws in my last Lecture I came to treat of those which more properly did pertain to their final Cause where at first having laid this foundation for the whole following Discourse That the good of the Commonalty or which is the same that the publick Peace and Happinesse is the End of Humane Laws with what brevity and perspicuity that I could I answered to the six following Questions First Whether there be any Use or at least any necessary Use of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in order to the Common Good Secondly It belonging to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reverenced and Vices restrained whether a Law-maker could command all the Acts and Offices of all Vertues and prohibit all Vices and Enormities whatsoever Which if he were not able to perform whether he were at least bound to command and prohibit as many as he could of either kind by Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Consciences Whether and how far it be required to the effect of the obliging of the Subjects that the Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick Good Fourthly If the Laws made already shall appear less profitable to the publick whether and how far the change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be urged by the Subject Fifthly The Common good being the end of Laws and even of Government it self whether it be lawful and how far lawful for the said Common good to change the form it self of the whole Government or to attempt the change thereof Lastly how that common saying The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood IV. These things I thought necessary to repeat more fully to you that after so long an interruption of Academical exercitations my whole proceedings in these Lectures and the order I have observed therein might better appear unto you and that I might recall into your memory the heads of those things which having heard before with so much humanity I justly do believe that in so long an interval of time you have almost forgotten You will expect I conceive and not undeservedly that I should now proceed in my intended course and go directly on to those next Doubts which yet remain to be resolved As of those of Privileges of Dispensations and to others which some ways do belong to the final kind of a Cause I do confess it indeed and I ought to do it But my friends do interrupt me they advise me that the stubborn and intolerable boldnesse of some men do rather efflagitate that seeing so precisely and so impudently they abuse the Aphorism to the publick ruine although I expounded it but in my last Lecture in the former Term yet that I would take it under examination again and open the genuine sense thereof more clearly and fully than before I had done This in my Construction was nothing else but in a new pomp of words to do over that which I had done before and to the loathing of your Stomacks to give you that meat you before were cloyd with This desire was not pleasing to me but they did grow upon me with new importunities to take it in hand again It will be your humanity to resent and excuse that modesty which I granted to my persisting friends especially having used such a prevalent Argument to overcome me to it not doubting but it would be grateful to the most of you if I should again undertake it V. It is therefore my present businesse to declare unto you what is the meaning of that common Axiom The safety of the people is the supreme Law and how it is to be understood Some men within these few years not well imployed have invented and brought at last into the Common-wealth a new state of Government as before they had brought into the Church a new Religion and as they have earnestly endeavoured under the pretence of Conscience or of Christian liberty to overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastick Government so under the preâ—ence of Civil liberty or the liberty of the Subject they labour in this confusion of times and with incredible heat of spirit and military terrour to shake and from the very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick of the Government of State These as often as they are accused of the Royal Dignity trod under feet of the despised Authority of all holy Laws of the disturbance of the publick peace of an unbridled and horrible tyranny exercised on their fellow Subjects all barrs of Right and Justice being broken down of an affected parity in the Church and in the Common-wealth all difference of birth and honours and States being taken away and many more such Anabaptistical impieties they presently defend themselves and their manners with this safety of the people as with a Buckler and think this alone to be preferred