thè soul were forced to do what it doth one might justly lay the blame on God who permits such a force to be offered it neither could it be properly evil which the soul was constrained to but since it acted freely and out of choice the soul must alone be accounted the author and cause of evil Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of reason be accounted the author of evil because he gave the soul of man a principle of internal freedom when the very freedom of acting which the soul had put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling And certainly he can never be said to be the cause of the breaking of a person who gave him a stock to set up with and supposed him able to manage it when he gave it him indeed had not man had this freedom of will he could not have fallen but then neither had he been a rational Agent which supposing no corruption doth speak freedom of action So that while we enquire after the Origine of evil we have no other cause to assign it to but mans abuse of that free power of acting which he had but if we will be so curious as to enquire further why God did create man with such a freedom of will and not rather fix his soul immutably on good if the order of beings be no satisfactory reason for it we can give no other then that why he made man or the world at all which was the good pleasure of his Will But secondly supposing Gods giving man this freedom of will doth not entitle him to be the author of evil doth not his leaving man to this liberty of his in the temptation make him the cause of sin I answer no and that on these accounts 1. Because man stood then upon such terms that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act he had a power to stand in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his faculties but he had a pure and undefiled soul which could not be polluted without its own consent Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which man stood which were the tryal of his obedience to his Creator had he been irresistibly determined any way Simplicius puts this question after the former discourse Whether God may not be called the author of sin because he permits the soul to use her liberty but saith he he that says God should not have permitted this use of its freedom to the soul must say one of these two things â—ither that the soul being of such a nature as is indifferent to good or evil it should have been wholly kept from the choosing evil or else that it should have been made of such a nature that it should not have had a power of choosing evil The first is irrational and absurd for what freedom and liberty had that been where there was no choice and what choice could there have been where the mind was necessitated onely to one part For the second we are to consider saith he that no evil is in its self desirable or to be chosen but withall if this power of determining its self â—ither way must be taken away it must be either as something not good or as some great evil and whoâ—ver saith so doth not consider how many things in the world there are which are accounted good and desirable things yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will For it excells all sublunary Beings and there is none would rather desire to be a Brute or Plant then man if God then shewed his goodness in giving to inferior beings such perfectiâ—â—s which are far below this is it any ways incongruous to Gods nature and goodness to give man the freedom of his actions and a self determining power thâ—ugh he permiâ—ted him the free use of it Besides as that author reasonâ— had God to prevent mans sin taken away the Liberty of his will he had likewise destroyed the foundation of all vertue and the very nature of man for vertue would not have been such had there been no possibility of acting contrary and mans nature would have been divine because impeccable Therefore saith â—e though we attribute this self-determining power to God as the author of it which was so necessary in the order of the Universe we have no reason to attribute the Origine of that evil to God which comes by the abuse of that liberty For as he further adds God doth not at all cause that aversion from Good which is in the soul when it sins but only gave such a power to the soul whereby it might turn its self to evil out of which God might afterwards produce so much good which could not otherwise have been without it So consonantly to the Scripture doth that Philosopher speak on this subject 2. God cannot be said to be the author of sin though he did not prevent the fall of man because he did not withdraw before his fall any grace or assistance which was necessary for his standing Had there been indeed a necessity of supernatural grace to be communicated to man for every moment to continue him in his Innocency and had God before mans fall withdrawn such assistance from him without which it were impossible for him to â—ave stood it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cause of the Fall of man But we are not put to such difficulties for acquitting God from being the author of sin for there appears no necessity at all for asserting any distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace in man before his Fall that the one should belong only to a radical power of standing the other to every act of good which Adam did For if God made man upright he certainly gave him such a power as might be brought into act without the necessity of any supervenient act of grace to elicite that habitual power into particular actions If the other were sufficient it was sufficient for its end and how could it be sufficient for its end if notwithstanding that there were no possibility of standing unless efficacious help were superadded to it God would not certainly require any thing from the creature in his integrity but what he had a power to obey and if there were necessary further grace to bring the power into act then the substracting of this grace must be by way of punishment to man which it is hard to conceive for what it should be before man had sinned or eâ—se God must substract this grace on purpose that man might â—all which would necessarily follow on this supposition in which case Man would be necessitated to fall veluti cum subductis columnis dom us necessario corruit as one expresseth it as a house must needs fall when the pillars on which it stood are taken away from it But now if God withdrew not any effectual grace from man whereby he must necessarily fall then
good and evil in the world which Socrates observed upon the rubbing of his thigh where the fetters made it itch 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What a strange thing is that which men are wont to call pleasure how near of kin is it to that which seems so contrary to it pain Now the observing the strange and sudden vicissitudes of these things and what near neighbours pain and pleasure were to each other so that there is frequently a passage out of one into the other did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origine of both these Those who believed there was a God who produced the world and ordered all things in it did easily attribute whatever was good in the world to the Fountain of all goodness but that any evil should come from him they thought it repugnant to the very notion of a Deity which they were so far right in as it concerned the evil of sin which we have already shewed God could not be the author of but therein they shewed their ignorance of the true cause of evil that they did noâ— look upon the miseries of life as effects of Gods Iustice upon the world for the evil of sin And therefore that they might set the Origine of evil far enough off from God they made two different Principles of things the one of good and the other of evil this Plutarch tells us was the most ancient and universal account which he could meet with of the origine of good and evil To which purpose we have this ample Testimony of his in his learned discourse de Iside Osiride 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which words I have the more largely cited because they give us the most full account of the antiquity universality and reason of that opinion which asserts two different principles of good and evil It is a Tradition saith he of great antiquity derived down from the ancient Masters of Dâ—vine knowledge and Formers of Commonwealths to the Poets and Philosophers whose first author cannot be found and yet hath met with firm and unshaken belief not only in ordinary discourses and reports but was spread into the mysteries and sacrifices both of Greeks and others that the Universe did not depend on chance and was destitute of a mind and reason to govern it neither was there one only reason which sate at the stern or held the reins whereby he did order and govern the world but since there is so much confusion and mixture of good and evil in the world that nature doth not produce any pure untainted good there is not any one who like a Drawer takes the liquor out of two several vessels and mixeth them together and after distributes them but there are two principles and powers contrary to each other whereof one draoes us to the right hand and directs us straight forward the other pulls us back and turns us the other way since we see the life of man so mixed as it is and not only that but the world too at least so much as is sublunary and terrestrial which is subject to many varieties irregularities and changes For if nothing he without a cause and good cannot be the cause of evil it necessarily follows that as there is a peculiar nature and principle which is the cause of good so there must be another which is the cause of evil But least we should think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen Manichees which held this opinion he tells us to prevent that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it was the opinion of the most and wisest of the Heathen Now these two principles some saith he call two opposite Gods whereof the one is the cause of good and the other of evil him they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By this one would imagine that this very ancient Tradition was nothing else but the true account of the Origine of evil a little disguised For the Scripture making the Devil the first author of evil himself and the first sollicitor and tempter of man to it who when God directed him straight forward pull'd man back and put him quite out of his way by which means all the miseries of the world came into it For while man kept close to his Maker his integrity and obedience were to him what the vasa umbilicalia are to the child in the Womb by them he received what ever tended to his subsistence and comfort but sin cut those vessels asunder and proved the Midwife of misery bringing man forth into a world of sorrow and sufferings Now I say the Scripture taking such especial notice of one as the chief of Devils through whose means evil came into the world this gave occasion to the Heathens when length of time had made the original Tradition more obscure to make these two God and the Daemon as two Anti-gods and so to be the causes the one of all good and the other of all evil Which at last came to that which was the Devils great design in thus corrupting the tradition that both these Anti-gods should have solemn worship by Sacrifices the one by way of impetration for bestowing of good the other by way of Deprecation for averting of evil Such Plutarch there tells us were the Oromasdes and Arimanius of Zoroastres which were worshipped by the Persians the one for doing good and the other for avoiding evil the one they resembled to light or fire the other to darkness and ignorance what animals were good and usefull they ascribed to Oromasdes and all venemous and noxious ones to Arimanius whom Plutarch elsewhere calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the evil Daemon of the Persians The same Diogenes Laertius relates of the Magi the Philosophers of Persia that they made two distinct principles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good and bad Daemon for which he quotes Dinon Aristotle Hermippus Eudoxus and others The same Plutarch makes to be the opinion of the ancient Greeks who attribute the good to Iupiter Olympius the bad to Hades the Chaldâ—ans saith he make the Planets their Gods of which two they suppose the cause of good two more of only a malignant influence and other three to be indifferent to either The same he affirms of the Egyptians that whatever was evil and irregular they ascribed to Typho what was good comely and usefull they attributed to Isis and Osiris to Isis as the passive Osiris as the active principle Thus we see how large a spread this opinion of the Origine of evil had in the Gentile world neither did it expire with Heathenism but Manes retained so much of the Religion of his Country being a Persian that he made a strange medley of the Persian and Christian doctrine together For that was his famous opinion of which St. Austin tells us Isâ—e duo principia inter se diversa at que adversa cadeâ—que aeterna eterna hoc est
The Iews derive them from Adam or Moses the Egyptians attribute their invention to Thoyt or Mercury the Grecians to Cadmus the Phoenicians to Taautus the Latins to Saturn others to the Aethiopians And lest the Pygmies should be without their enemies some think they were found out a gruum volatu from the manner of the flying of cranes Thus it hath happened with most Nations what was first among themselves they thought to be the first in the world But by whomsever they were first invented we are certain they were but lately in use in that Nation which hath most vainly arrogated the most to its self in point of Antiquity and yet had the least reason I mean the Graecians Thence the Egyptian Priest Patenit truly told Solon the Greeks were always children because they had nothing of the antiquities of former ages If we may believe Iosephus they had no writings earlier then Homer but herein he is conceived to have served his cause too much because of the Inscription of Amphytrio at Thebes in the Temple of Apollo Ismenius in the old Ionick letters and two others of the same age to be seen in Herodotus and because of the writings of Lynus Orpheus Musaeus Oroebantius Traezenius Thaletas Melesander and others This we are certain of the Grecians had not the use of letters among them till the time of Cadmus the Phoenicians coming into Greece whither he came to plant a Colony of Phoenicians there whence arose the story of his pursuit of Europa as Conon in Photius tels us And it is very probable which learned men have long since observed that the name Cadmus comes from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and may relate as an appellative either to his dignity as Iunius in his Academia conjectures or more probably to his Country the East which is frequently call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Scripture Some have conjectured further that his proper name was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon what reason I know not unless from hence that thence by a duplication of the word came the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who seems to have been no other then Cadmus as will appear by comparing their stories together Only one was the name his memory was preserved by at Athens where the Cadmeans inhabited as appears by the Gephyraei whom Herodotus tells us were Phoenicians that came with Cadmus and others fancy the Academia there was originally called Cadmea and the name Cadmus was preserved chiefly among the Baeotians in memory of the Country whence he came It being likely to be imposed by them upon his first landing in the Country as many learned persons conceive the name of an Hebrew was given to Abraham by the Canaanites upon his passing over the river Euphrates On this account then it stands to reason that the name which was given him as a stranger should be longest preserved in the place where it was first imposed Or if we take 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the other sense as it imports antiquity so there is still a higher probability of the assinity of the names of Cadmus and Ogyges for this is certain that the Greeks had no higher name for a matter of Antiquity then to call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Scholiast on Hesiod Hesychius Suidas Eustathius on Dionysius and many others observe And which yet advanceth the probability higher Lutatius or Lactantius the Scholiast on Statius tells us the other Greeks had this from the Thebans for saith he Thebani res antiquas Ogygias nominabant But that which puts it almost beyond meer probability is that Varro Festus Pausanias Apollonius Aeschylus and others make Ogyges the founder of the Baeotian Thebes which were thence called Ogygiae and Strabo and Stephanus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 further say that the whole Country of Baeotia was called Ogygia now all that mention the Story of Cadmus attribute to him the founding of the Baeotian Thebes And withal it is observable that in the Vatican Appendix of the Greek Proverbs we read Cadmus called Ogyges 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Meursius indeed would have it corrected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is read in Suidas but by the favour of so learned a man it seems more probable that Suidas should be corrected by that he bringing no other evidence of any such person as Cadmus a son of Ogyges but only that reading in Suidas whereas we have discovered many probable grounds to make them both the same That which I would now infer from hence is the utter impossibility of the Greeks giving us any certain account of ancient times when a thing so modern in comparison as Cadmus his coming into Greece is thought by them a matter of so great antiquity that when they would describe a thing very ancient they described it by the name of Ogyges who was the same with Cadmus Now Cadmus his coming into Greece is generally by Historians placed about the time of Ioshua whence some I will not say how happily have conjectured that Cadmus and his company were some of the Canaanites who fled from Ioshua as others are supposed to have done into Africa if Procopius his pillar hath strength enough to bear such a conjecture But there is too great a confusion about the time of Cadmus his arrival in Greece to affirm any thing with any great certainty about it Yet those who disagree to that former Computation place it yet lower Vossius makes Agenor Cadmus his Father cotemporary with the latter end of Moses or the beginning of Ioshua and so Cadmus his time must fall somewhat after Iac. Capellus placeth Cadmus in the third year of Othoniel Parius the Author of the Greek Chronicle in the Marmora Arundelliana makes his coming to Greece to be in the time of Hellen the son of Deucalion which Capellus fixeth on the 73. of Moses A. M. 2995. But Mr. Selden conceives it somewhat lower and so it must be if we follow Clemens Alexandrinus who placeth it in the time of Lynceus King of the Argives which he saith was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 11. Generation after Moses which will fall about the time of Samuel But though it should be so late it would be no wonder it should be reckoned a matter of so great antiquity among the Grecians for the eldest Records they have of any King at Athens begins at the time of Moses whose co-temporary Cecrops is generally thought to be for at his time it is the Parian Chronicle begins Now that the Grecians did receive their very letters from the Phoenicians by Cadmus is commonly acknowledged by the most learned of the Greeks themselves as appears by the ingenuous confession of Herodotus Philostratus Critius in Athenaeus Zenodotus in Laertius Timon Philiasius in Sixtus Empiricus and many others so that it were to no purpose to offer to prove that which they who arrogate so much to themselves do so freely acknowledge
Which yet hath been done to very good purpose by Ioseph Scaliger and Bochartus and many others from the form of the Letters the order and the names of them It seems probable that at first they might use the form of the Phoenician Letters in which Herodotus tells us the three old Inscriptions were extant and Diodorus tells us that the brass pot which Cadmus offered to Minerva Lyndia had an Inscription on it in the Phoenician Letters but afterwards the form of the Letters came by degrees to be changed when for their greater expedition in writing they left the old way of writing towards the left hand for the more natural and expedite way of writing towards the right by which they exchanged the site of the strekes in several Letters as is observed by the forecited Learned Authors Not that the old Ionick Letters were nearer the Phoenician and distinct from the modern as Ios. Scaliger in his learned Discourse on the original of the Greek Letters conceives for the Ionick Letters were nothing else but the full Alphabet of 24. with the additions of Palamedes and Simonides Cous as Pliny tells us that all the Greeks consented in the use of the Ionick Letters but the old Attick Letters came nearer the Phoenician because the Athenians long after the Alphabet was increased to 24. continued still in the use of the old 16. which were brought in by Cadmus which must needs much alter the way of writing for in the old Letters they writ THEOâ— for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which made Pliny with a great deal of learning and truth say that the old Greek Letters were the same with the Roman Thence the Greeks called their ancient Letters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as appears by Harpocration and Hesychius not that they were so much distinct from others but because they did not admit of the addition of the other eight Letters which difference of writing is in a great measure the cause of the different dialect between the Athenians and Ionians properly so called We see then the very Letters of the Greeks were no elder then Cadmus and for any considerable learning among them it was not near so old Some assert indeed that History began from the time of Cadmus but it is by a mistake of him for a younger Cadmus which was Cadmus Milesius whom Pliny makes to be the first Writer in Prose but that he after attributes to Pherecydes Syrius and History to Cadmus Milesius and therefore I think it far more probable that it was some writing of this latter Cadmus which was transcribed and epitomized by Bion Proconesius although Clemens Alexandrinus seems to attribute it to the Elder We see how unable then the Grecians were to give an account of elder times that were guilty of so much infancy and nonage as to begin to learn their Letters almost in the noon-tide of the World and yet long after this to the time of the first Olympiad all their relations are accounted fabulous A fair account then we are like to have from them of the first antiquities of the world who could not speak plain truth till the world was above 3000. years old for so it was when the Olympiads began So true is the observation of Iustin Martyr 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Greeks had no exact history of themselves before the Olympiads but of that more afterwards This is now the first defect which doth infringe the credibility of these Histories which is the want of timely and early records to digest their own history in CHAP. II. Of the Phoenician and Aegyptian History The particular defect in the Historys of the most learned Heathen Nations First the Phoenicians Of Sanchoniathon his Antiquity and Fidelity Of Jerom-baal Baal-Berith The Antiquity of Tyre Scaliger vindicated against Bochartus Abibalus The vanity of Phoenician Theology The imitation of it by the Gnosticks Of the Aegyptian History The Antiquity and Authority of Hermes Trismegistus Of his Inscriptions on Pillars transcribed by Manetho His Fabulousness thence discovered Terra Seriadica Of Seths Pillars in Josephus and an account whence they were taken HAving already shewed a general defect in the Ancient Heathen Histories as to an account of ancient times we now come to a closer and more particular consideration of the Histories of those several Nations which have born the greatest name in the world for learning and antiquity There are four Nations chiefly which have pretended the most to antiquity in the learned world and whose Historians have been thought to deliver any thing contrary to holy Writ in their account of ancient times whom on that account we are obliged more particularly to consider and those are the Phoenicians Chaldeans Aegyptians and Graecians we shall therefore see what evidence of credibility there can be in any of these as to the matter of antiquity of their Records or the Histories taken from them And the credibility of an Historian depending much upon the certainty and authority of the Records he makes use of we shall both consider of what value and antiquity the pretended Records are and particularly look into the age of the several Historians As to the Graecians we have seen already an utter impossibility of having any ancient Records among them because they wanted the means of preserving them having so lately borrowed their Letters from other Nations Unless as to their account of times they had been as carefull as the old Romans were to number their years by the several clavi or nails which they fixed on the Temple doors which yet they were not in any capacity to do not growing up in an entire body as the Roman Empire did but lying so much seattered and divided into so many petâ—y Republicks that they minded very little of concernment to the whole Nation The other three Nations have deseâ—vedly a name of far greater antiquity then any the Graecians could ever pretend to who yet were unmeasurably guilty of an impotent affectation of antiquity and arrogating to themselves as growing on their own ground what was with a great deal of pains and industry gathered but as the gleanings from the fuller harvest of those nations they resorted to Which is not only true as to the greatest part of their Learning but as to the account likewise they give of ancient times the chief and most ancient Histories among them being only a corruption of the History of the elder Nations especially Phoenicia and Aegypt for of these two Philo Biblius the Translator of the ancient Phoenician Historian Sanchoniathon saith they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The most ancient of all the Barbarians from whom the others derived their Theology which he there particularly instanceth in We begin therefore with the Phoenician History whose most ancient and famous Historian is Sanchoniathon so much admired and made use of by the shrewdest antagonist ever Christianity met with the Philosopher Porphyrius But therein was seen
impossibile yet taking that impossibility as relating to second causes and the ground of faith to be some divine prediction we see what reason there may be for them For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by second causes the greater evidence is it that the Prophets in foretelling it did not respect the meer order of things in the world but the unalterable counsels of the will of God which therefore would certainly have their timely accomplishments When therefore any Prophets did foretell things above the reach of natural causes and those things did not come to pass it was a certain evidence of a false Prophet as the contrary was of a true one for none could know so long before-hand such things as were above all humane power but such to whom God himself who alone was able to effect them did reveal and communicate the knowledge of them And hence we see in Scripture those predictions which have seemed to carry the greatest improbabilities with them have had the most punctual accomplishments as the Israelites returning out of Aegypt at the end of the 430 years their deliverance by Cyrus after the captivity in Babylon which seemed so improbable a thing that when God speaks of it he ushers it in with this preface that he frustrateth the tokens of the lyars and maketh the diviners mad but confirmeth the word of his servant and performeth the counsel of his messengers that saith to Ierusalem Thou shalt be inhabited c. The more unlikely then the thing was to come to pass the greater evidence there was in so clear a prophecie of it so long before above 100 years and so exact a fulfilling of it afterwards precisely at the expiring of the L X X years from the first Captivity Predictions concerning future events which are confirmed by an oath from God himself do express the immutable determinations of Gods will For which we have the greatest assurance we can desire from that remarkable expression of the Apostle to the Hebrews Heb. 6. 17 18. Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel confirmed it by an oath that by two immutable things in which it was impossible for God to lye we might have a strong consolation c. Wherein the Apostle obviates and removes all doubts and misprisions lest God after the declaring of his will should alter the event foretold in it and that he doth both by shewing that God had made an absolute promise and withall to prevent all doubts lest some tacite condition might hinder performance he tels us that God had annexed his oath to it which two things were the most undoubted evidences of the immutability of Gods counsel The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here used doth in Scripture often note the frustrating of mens hopes and expectations so it is used Habak 3. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we render it the labour of the Olive shall fail So Osea 9. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the new wine shall fail in her Thus the meaning here is that by two immutable things in which it is impossible that God should frustrate the expectations of men or alter the events of things after he had declared them For Gods oath is an evident demonstration of the immutability of his will in all predictions to which this is annexed and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God that is doing otherwise then the words did seem to express because of some tacite conditions understood in them So we find Psal. 89. 31 32 33 34 35 36. If they break my statutes and keep not my commandements then will I visit their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with stripes nevertheless my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him nor suffer my faithfulness to fail my Covenant will I not break nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips Once have I sworn by my holiness that I will not lye unto David His seed shall endure for ever and his throne as the Sun before me Wherein we see what way God takes to assure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people by the oath which he adjoyns to his promises whereby God doth most fully express the unalterable determinations of his own will in that he swears by his own holiness that he would not lye unto David i. e. that he would faithfully perform what he had promised to him And therefore Tertullian well saith Beati sumus quorum causa Deus jurat sed miseri detestabiles si ne juranti quidem credimus It is happy for us unbelieving creatures that God stoops so low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath but it will be sad and miserable for such as dare not venture their faith upon it when God hath annexed his oath unto it It is thought by expositors that there is a peculiar emphasis in those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Once have I sworn thereby noteing the irrevocable nature of Gods oath that there is no need of repetition of it as among men because when once God swears by himself it is the highest demonstration that no conditions whatever shall alter his declared purpose And therefore the Council of Toledo well explains the different nature of Gods Oath and his repentance in Scriptures Iurare namque Dei est à se ordinata nullatenus convellere poenitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare God is said to swear when he binds himself absolutely to performance and to repent when things fall out contrary to the declaration of Gods will concerning them for so it must be understood to be only mutatio sententiae and not consilii that the alteration may be only in the things and not in the eternal purpose of God But since it is evident in Scripture that many predictions do imply some tacite conditions and many declarations of Gods will do not express his internal purposes it seemed necessary in those things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purposes of his will there should be some peculiar mark and character set upon them for the confirmation of his peoples faith and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promises Thus it is in that grand Instrument of Peace between God and his people the Covenant of Grace wherein God was pleased so far to strengthen the faith of his people in it that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contained but especially the Act of Grace on his own part with an oath thereby to assure them it was never his purpose to repeal it nor to fail of performance in it For we are not to think that an Oath layes any greater obligation upon God for performance then the meer declaration of his will it being a part of immutable justice and consequently necessarily implyed in the Divine nature to perform promises when once made but Gods
Oath respects us and not himself viz. that it might be a testimony unto us that Gods will thereby declared is his eternal and unchangeable will and so the mercies thereby promised are sure mercies such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any repentance on Gods part Predictions made by the Prophets concerning blessings meerly spiritual do express Gods internal purpose and therefore must have their certain accomplishment in the time prefixed by the Prophets The grand reason of this Proposition is that the be stowing of blessings meerly spiritual doth immediately flow from the grace and favour of God and depend not upon conditions on our part as procuring causes of them and therefore there can be no account given why God should suspend the performance of such promises which would not more strongly have held why he should not have made any such promises at all And therefore when we see that notwithstanding the highest demerits God made such free promises we can have no reason to think that any other demerits interposing between the promises and performance should hinder the accomplishment of them unless it be inserted in the promises themselves which is contrary to the nature of free promises Upon this ground all the promises relating to the Gospel state and to the Covenant of grace therein contained must have their due accomplishment in the time and manner prefixed by the Prophets and therefore the Iews are miserably blind when they suppose the reason why the promise of the Messias is yet deferred after so long expectation of him is the sins of their people for this seems to suppose that Gods promise of the Messias did depend upon their own righteousness and worthiness above all other people which if it doth they are like to be the most miserable and desperate people the world hath and besides if Gods intuition of sin makes him deferr the coming of the Messias his foresight of sin would have hindred him from ever promising a Messias to come but this was so far from being a hinderance of Gods promise that the main end of the coming of the Messias was to make reconciliation for iniquity and to make an end of sin and to bring in everlasting righteousness And we see where-ever the Prophets insist on the Covenant of grace the great promise contained in it is the blotting out of transgressions and remembring sins no more and that meerly on the account of Gods free love and for his own names sake This can be no reason then why predictions concerning spiritual blessings should not have their exact accomplishment because there can be no bar against free Love and the bestowing of such mercies which do suppose the greatest unworthiness of them as Gospel blessings do The great difficulty lyes in explaining the Prophetical phrases concerning the Gospel state which seem to intimate a greater advancement and flourishing of peace and holiness therein then hath as yet been seen in the Christian world which gives the Iews the greater occasion to imagine that the state so much spoken of by the Prophets is not yet established in the world But all the difficulty herein ariseth from the want of consideration of the Idiotisms of the Prophetical language especially where it respects the state of things under the Gospel concerning which we may observe these following rules The Prophets under the old Testament when they speak of things to come to pass in the New do set them forth by the representation of such things as were then in use among themselves thus the spiritual worship of the Gospel is prophecyed of under the notion of the legal worship among the Iews the conversion of Aegypt to the Gospel is foretold Isaiah 19. 19 21. by the setting up of an Altar and offering sacrifice to the Lord and the Conversion of the Gentiles in general by the offering up of incense Malach. 1. 11. and the service of God under the Gospel is set forth by going up to Jerusalem and keeping the feast of Tabernacles there Zach. 14. 16. and the plentiful effusion of the spirit of God in the miraculous gifts which attended the preaching of the Gospel is set forth by the Prophet Ioel 2. 28 by prophecying and dreaming dreams and seeing visions not that these things should really be under Gospel times but that the Prophets meaning might be the better understood by those he spake unto he sets forth the great measure of gifts and Gospel light under those things which were accounted as the highest attainments among themselves So the great measure and degree of holiness which was to be under Gospel times is set forth by the Prophet Zachary Zach. 14. 20. by the placing of the motto which was among the Iews only upon the High Priests fore-head that this should be so common under the Gospel that even the bells of the horses should bear it i. e. those things which seem most remote from a spiritual use should be devoted to it as the bells were which were commonly hanged upon their war-horses in those mountainous Countries and in the latter part of that verse the height and progress of Gospel holiness is described under that phrase that the pots in the Lorás house should be as bowls before the Altar i. e. should be advanced from a lower and more ignoble service to a higher and more spiritual degree of holiness Now the Iews when they observe these and many other Prophetical passages relating to the time of the Messias to run in the old strain of the Law they presently conclude that the Messias must not innovate any thing concerning their way of worship but only be some great Prince to give them temporal deliverances and so expound all these texts in a litteral sense which were only expressed in such a strain the better to help the capacities of those they spake them to Things absolutely foretold to come to pass in Gospel times in a general manner are to be understood comparatively in reference to what was before For when the measure of either grace or knowledge was so far above what was then among the Iews that there was scarce any proportion between them the Prophets made use of such expressions to set it forth by which might raise up the dull apprehension of the Iews to conceive the just measure and fullness of it Thus when the Prophets fore-tell the grand increase of spiritual knowledge in Gospel times they do it in this phrase thâ—y shall not teach every man his neighbour and every man his brother saying Know the Lord for all shall know me from the least to the greatest Ierem. 31. 33 Where it was far from the Prophets meaning to exclude all use of teaching under the Gospel which is contrary to the end of all the Ordinances of the Gospel but because teaching doth commonly suppose great Ignorance he sets forth the abundance of knowledge which should be then by the exclusion of that which doth imply it So
Ceremonial Law and if he makes any scruple of deciding on which side the over-weight lies we may have cause to suspect him forsaken of that little reason which gave him the name of man Let but the fifth of Matthew be laid against the whole book of Leviticus and then see whether contains the more excellent precepts and more suitable to the Divine nature I speak not this to disparage any thing which had once God for the Author of it but to let us see how far God was from the necessity of natural agents to act to the height of his strength in that discovery of his Will. God is wise as well as righteous in all his wayes as he can command nothing but what was just so he will command nothing but what is good nay excellent in its kind But though all the Starrâ— be in the same firmament yet one star differs from another in glory though they may be all pearls yet some may be more orient then others are every place of holy Scripture may have its crown but some may have their aureolae a greater excellency a fuller and larger capacity then the other hath every parcel of Divine revelation may have some perfection in its kind yet there may be some monstra perfectionis in Scaligers expression that may far outvy the glory and excellency of the rest Can we think the mists and umbrages of the Law could ever cast so glorious a light as the Sun of righteousness himself in his Meridian elevation As well may we think a dark shady passage more magnificent and glorious then the most Princely Pallace a picture drawn in Charcoale more exquisite and curious then the lines of Apelles some imperfect rudiments more exact and accurate then the most elabarate work as go about to compare the Law of Moses with the Gospel of Iesus Christ in point of excellency and perfection Let the Iews then boast never so much of their gradus Mosaicus and how much it exceeded the degree of revelation in other Prophets we know if his light be compared with what the Gospel communicates Moses himself saw but as in a glass darkly and not in speculo lucido as the Iews are wont to speak We honour Moses much but we have learnt to honour him at whose transfiguration he was present more neither can that be thought any disparagement to him who accounted the reproach of Christ greater riches then the treasures of Aegypt But it may be though the Law in its self be not so absolutely perfect yet God may have declared he will never alter it and then it is not consistent with Divine wisdom to repeal it Very true God will never alter what he hath said he will not but where is it that he hath thus bound up himself Is it in that noted place to this purpose Thou shalt not add thereto nor diminish from it So indeed Maimonides argues but therein more like a Iew then himself and yet one of his own Nation therein far more ingenuous then he gives a most sufficient answer to it which is R. Ios. Albo whose words are thus produced by Vorstius and others the Scripture only admonisheth us that we should not add to nor diminish from Gods commands according to our own wills but what hinders saith he but God himself may according to his own wisdom add or diminish what he pleaseth But are they in good earnest when they say God bound up himself by this speech whence came then all the Prophetical revelations among the Iews did these add nothing to the Law of Moses which was as much the will of God when revealed by them as any thing was revealed by Moses himself or will they say that all those things were contained for the substance in the Law of Moses as to what concerned practice very true but not in the Ceremonial but the Moral Law and so we shall not stick to grant that the whole duty of man may be reduced to that But if adding to the precepts be the doing of Gods commands in another way then he hath prescribed and diminishing from them be meerly not to do what God hath commanded as some conceive then these words are still more remote from the sense affixed on them by the incredulous Iews For why may not God himself add to his own Laws or alter the form of them although we are alwayes bound directly to follow Gods declared will May not God enlarge his own will and bring his Schollars from the rudiments of their nonage to the higher knowledge of those who are full grown or must the world of necessity do that which the old Roman so much abhorred senescere in elementis wax gray in learning this A B C or was the Ceremonial Law like the China Characters that the world râ—ight spend its age in conning of them But it appears that there was no other meaning in that strict prohibition then that men should not of their own heads offer to finde out new ways of worship as Ieroboam did but that Gods revelation of his own will in all its different degrees was to be the adaequate rule of the way and parts of his own worship And I would fain know of the Iews whether their own severe and strict prohibitions of things not at all forbidden in the Law of God and that on a religious account as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a boundary to the Law come not nearer the adding to Gods Law then Gods own further declaration of his will doth All the dispute then must be not whether God may add to his own Law but whether the Gospel be a prohibited addition to the Law of Moses that is whether it be only the invention of men or it be the express declaration of the will of God As to which controversie he is no true Christian who dare not readily joyn issue with them and undertake to prove by all the arguments by which they believe the Law of Moses to have been of Divine revelation that the Gospel of Christ is a clear manifestation of the Will of God But of that afterwards From hence it is evident that God hath not by this place tyed up himself from any surther manifestation of his mind beyond the Law of Moses but it may be they may put greater confidence in those expressions which seem necessarily to imply a perpetual and unalterable obligation in the Law of Moses For saith the late learned Rabbi Manasse Ben Israel If by such expressions as those are used in Scripture which seem to import the perpetuity of the Law of Moses somewhat â—lse should be meant then they seem to express what did Moses and the Prophets in using them but lay a stumbling block in the wayes of men whereas they might have spoken clearly and told us there should a time come when the Ceremonial Law should oblige no longer This being a charge of so high a nature must not be dismissed without a particular enquiry
who contend for the corruptions crept into the Christian Church who make use of the same pretences for them viz. that they were delivered down from the Fathers tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis ut inquirere in eam scelus esse dicatur who are we who will see further then Antiquity But it is no wonder if Antiquity be accompanied with dimness of sight and so it was undoubtedly as to the Pagan world and as to the Christian too when such a mixture of Heathenism came into it And the very same arguments by which the pleaders for Christianity did justifie the truth of their religion notwithstanding this pretended antiquity will with equal force hold for a reformation of such inveterate abuses which under a pretence of antiquity have crept into the Christian Church Nullus pudor est ad meliora transire saith Ambrose in his answer to Symmachus what shame is it to grow better Quid facies saith Lactantius majores ne potius an rationem sequeris Sirationem mavis discedere te necesse est ab institutis auctoritate majorum quoniam id solum rectum est quod ratio praescribit Sin autem â—ietas majores sequi suadet sateris igitur stultos illos esse qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus servierint te ineptum qui id colas quod falsum esse conviceris Where reason and meer authority of forefathers stand in competition he is more a child then a man that knows not on which side to give his suffrage But with the greatest strength and clearest reason Arnobius speaks in this case Itaque cum nobis intenditis aversionem à religione priorum causam convenit ut inspiciat is non sactum nec quid reliquerimus opponere sed secuti quid simus potissimum contueri When you charge us saith he that we are revolted from the religion of our forefathers you ought not presently to condemn the fact but to examine the reasons of it neither ought you so much to look at what we have left as what it is we have embraced Nam simutare sententiam culpa est ulla vel crimen i veteribus institutis in alias res novas voluntatesque migrare criminatio ista vos spectat qui totics vitam consuetudinem que mutastis qui in mores alios atque alios ritus priorum condemnatione transistis If meer departing from the religion of our ancestors be the great sault all those who own themselves to be Christians were themselves guilty of it when they revolted from Heathenism If it be here said that the case is different because there was sufficient reason for it which there is not as to the corruptions of the Christian Church if so then all the dispute is taken off from the matter of fact or the revolt to the causes inducing to it and if the Protestant be not able as to the causes of our separation from Rome to manifest that they were sufficient let him then be triumphed over by the Romanist and not before I affert then and that with much assurance of mind that the principles of the Reformation are justifiable upon the same grounds of reason which the embracing Christianity was when men of Heathens became Christians and that the arguments made use of by the Romanists against our separation from them are such as would have justified a Pagan Philosopher in not embracing Christianity For if it be unlawful for any party of men to divide from others in a matter of religion which pretends antiquity and universality it had been unlawful for a Philosopher to have deserted Paganism as well as for a Protestâ—nt to depart from Rome For according to the principles of the Romanists the judgement in the cause of the separation and of the truth of religion lies in that party from which we depart if we do now but apply this to the old Roman Senate or Emperors in the case of Christian religion and dividing from Heathen worship we shall quickly see how easie a matter it will be to make Christianity its self a Schism and the doctrine of Christ the greatest here sie But as strong as those pretences were then or have been since the power of the doctrine of Christ hath been so great as to conquer them and thereby to manifest that it was of God when such potent prejudices were not able to withstand it Of which Antiquity is the first 2. The large and universal spread of Pagan religion when Christianity came into the world there was never so great Catholicism as in Heathen worship when the Apostles first appeared in the Gentile world Inde adeo per universa imperia provincias oppida videmus singulos sacrorum ritus gentiles babere Dcos colere municipes saith Caecilius in Minutius Felix The great charge against the Christians was Novellism that they brought in a strange and unheard of religion The common Question was Where was your religion before Iesus of Nazareth as it hath been since Where was your religion before Luther and the same answer which served then will stand unmovable now there where no other religion is in the Word of God For this was the weapon whereby the Primitive Christians defended themselves against the assaults of Paganism and the evidences they brought that the doctrine preached by them and contained in the Scriptures was originally from God were the only means of overthrowing Paganism notwithstanding its pretended universality 3. Settlement by Laws of Heathen worship This was so much pretended and pleaded for that as far as we can finde by the history of the Primitive Church the pretence on which the Christians suffered was sedition and opposing the established Laws The Christians were reckoned inter illicitas factiones as appears by Tertullian among unlawful corporations the Politicians and Statesmen were all for preserving the Laws they troubled not themselves much about any religion but only that which was settled by Law they sought to uphold because the acting contrary to it might bring some disturbance to the civil state There were several Laws which the Christians were then brought under and condemned for the breach of 1. The Law against hetaeriae or conventicles as they were pleased frequently to stile the meeting of Christians together thence the places where the Christians assembled for worship were commonly called Conventicula it a appellabant loca saith Heraldus ubi congregabantur Christiani oraturi verbi divini interpretationem accepturi ac sacras Synaxes habituri but Elmenhorstius more shortly Conventicula loca sunt ubi Christiani Congregati orare consucverunt The places where the Christians did meet and pray together were called Conventicles in Basiâ—ica Siciunini ubi ritus Christiani est conventiculum saith Ammianus Marccllinus cur immaniter conventicula dirui saith Arnobius qui universum populum cum ipso pariter conventiculo concremavit as Lactantius likewise speaks Now the reason of the name was
the admirable wisdom of God in contriving the several parts of the body of man So that that whole book contains in it a most full and pregnant demonstration of a Deity which every man carries about with him in the structure of his body on which account men need not go out of themselves to find proof of a Deity whether they consider their minds or their bodies of which it may be more truly said then Heraclitus of old did of his Stove Etiam hic Dii sunt So that of all persons I should most wonder at those whose imployment particularly leads them to the understanding the parts and nature of mans body if the proverb be not a great injury to them since they have fuller insight into this demonstration of a Deity in the Fabrick of mans body then many others who converse only with some jejune and sapless writings And certainly whatever is imagined to the contrary by men of weak understandings the best way to cure the world of Atheism is true Philosophy or a search into the natures of things which the more deep and profound it is the more impossible will it be found to explicate all the phaenomena of nature by meer matter and Motion It was wisely observed of a great person and Philosopher that a narrow and slight inspection into nature enclined men of weak heads to Atheism but a more through insight into the causes of things made them more evidently see the necessary dependence of things on the great and wise Creator of them A little knowledge of Philosophy is apt to make mens heads dizzy and then in danger of falling into the gulf of Atheism but a more careful and diligent view of it brings them into sobriety and their right wits again Such a slight inspection had the followers of Epicurus into the nature of things for when they found how in the present state of the world the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter would handsomly salve many appearances of nature they drunk with the success reel presently into an Infinite space and there imagine they behold infinite worlds made of the concretion of Atoms and ever since their eyes have been so dusted with these little Atoms that they could see nothing else in the world but them Which how gross and unreasonable it is will appear from our present subject for who but Lucretius or Epicurus could ever think that our nostrils were at first fashioned as they are meerly by the violent impulse of the air within which would force its self a passage out But how came the air into the body before it was forced out did it first break open the lips make all that round cavity in the mouth for a passage through the aspera arteria but if when it was in it would come out again was not the mouth wide enough to let it go or did the first man shut his mouth on purpose to finde another vent for the air if so how chance the force of the air did not carry away the epiglottis or if it got safely up to the nose how came it not to force a passage out about the eyes rather then to go down so low first But if we believe these rare contrivers of mans body all the inward vessels of the body were made by the course of water as channels are but how is it possible to imagine that the Oesophagus and the stomack should be so curiously contrived by the meer force of water and that all the Intestines should be made only as channels to let it out again when it was once in but how comes then such a kind of reciprocation and Peristactick motion in those vessels how come the several coats of them to be so firme if it had been only a forced passage it would have been direct and through the substance of the parts as we finde it to be in all forced passages in the body of the earth Besides if the water received into the stomack forced the passage through the guts how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for its self or did it not like that passage when other things came into it and therefore found out a more secret one into the bladder but if that were made by the water how came it to be so full of membranes and so subject to dilatation Thus ridiculous will men make themselves rather then shew themselves men in owning and adoring that infinitely wise and powerful God who orders all things in the world according to the counsel of his Will What can be more plain and evident then the peculiar usefulness of the several parts of mans body is What other intent can be imagined that man is formed with a mouth but only for taking in of nourishment and for receiving and letting forth of air or that an infant is so ready to open his mouth but that there are breasts and milk for him to suck in order to his nourishment Why should the Oesophagus be so hollow and the stomack so wide but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the meat down and the other for the fermentation of it whence come all the other vessels to be so conveniently placed were it not for the distribution of nourishment into the several parts or for conveying away the excrements of it Can any one think that the several muscles and tendons should be placed in the more solid parts for any other end then for the better motion of them or that the nerves should be derived from the brain into the several parts of the body for any other design then to be the instruments of sense and motion or that the continual motion of the heart should be for any other purpose then for receiving and distribution of the blood through the arteries into the parts of the body or that the eye with all its curious fabrick should be only accidentally imployed in seeing These things are so plain that however the Epicureans may more easily lose themselves and deceive others in explaining the appearances of nature in some inanimate beings yet when they come with their blind concourse of Atoms to give an account of the parts of animals they miserably befool themselves and expose themselves only to contempt and pitty It were easie to multiply examples in this kind but I shall only mention one thing more which is if all the parts of mans body have no higher original then the concourse of Atoms in the first man and woman by what were the umbilical vessels formed whereby the Child in the womb receives its nourishment by what atoms was the passage of the succus nutritius framed from the mother to the child how come those vessels to close up so naturally upon the birth of the child and it to seek its nourishment in quite another way Will the particles of matter which by their concretion formed the first pair salve this too Thus still we see how
opposition whose power is so great that nothing can hinder it by which power he produced the world 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which hath no other cause either of its beginning or of its being or continuance but only his Will Who sully answers in a Philosophical manner the particular Allegations out of Aristotle concerning the eternity of the world his design being as he saith to shew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Greek Philosophers in their discourses concerning God and the creation were very far from being as good as their word to observe the Laws of demonstration but instead of them proceeded only upon opinions and conjectures And as to this particular of the possibility of another way of production besides that of generation he proves it from Aristotles own opinion from the equal necessity of the existence of matter as of God For saith he if God can produce any thing out of matter which is as necessarily existent as himself he may produce something out of nothing For the same repugnancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produced the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent How then can God produce something out of matter which necessarily exists not be able to produce something out of nothing For if matter have its original from its self how can it be subject to the power of another And besides if we acknowledge God to have his being from himself and on that account attribute infinite power to him by the same reason we must attribute it to matter But whatever hath infinite power in its self hath a power upon something beyond its self but if God and matter have it both they can never have power upon each other or without themselves Which is a far greater absurdity then the meer asserting a power to produce something out of nothing which is implyed in the very notion of infinite power for if it be confined to any matter the power is not infinite because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it for it extends no further then matter doth So that a power of creation is implyed in the very notion of a Deity and therefore it is a meer Sophism to argue because the world could not be generated therefore it could not be produced unless any other way of production but by generation be proved impossible A third false hypothesis they proceeded on was this that the Being of the world was no effect of Gods will but of the necessity of nature For although the Philosophers we now speak of did-assert a Deity which in some sense might be called the cause of the world yet they withall asserted that the world was Coaeval with God himself and so though there might be some priority in order of causes between them yet there was none in order of time or duration as we see the light though it flows from the Sun yet the Sun is never without light This Aristotle he proves from the necessity of motion and time For saith he what ever is moved must be moved by something else and consâ—quently there must be a running in Infinitum but this runs on a false supposition of the necessity of a continual Physical motion in things which we deny since God by his infinite power may give motion to that which had it not before and so all that can be proved is the necessity of some first cause which we assert but no necessity at all of his continual acting since he may cause motion when he please And for Time continually existing it denotes nothing real in its self existing but only our manner of conception of the duration of things as it is conceived to belong to motion and so can argue nothing as to the real existence of things from all eternity But the later Platonists look upon these as insufficient wayes of probation and therefore argue from those attributes of God which they conceive most necessary and agreeable to Gods nature and by which the world was produced if at all so that by the same arguments whereby we prove that the world was made by God they prove it to have been from all eternity It was well and truly said of Plato in his Timaeus that the goodness of God was the cause of the production of the world from which speech the more modern Platonists gather a necessity of the worlds eternity for from hence they infer that since God was always good he must always have an object to exercise his goodness upon as the Sun disperseth his light assoon as he is himself True were God of the nature of the Sun it would be so with him or were the Sun of the nature of God it would not be so with it But there is this vast difference between them that though God be essentially and necessarily good yet the communications of this goodness are the effect of his Will and not meerly of his nature For were not the acts of beneficence and goodness in God the free acts of his will man must be made as happy as he was capable of being not only upon his first existence in the world but as long as it should continue by meer necessity of nature without any intervention of the will or actions of men And so there could be no such difference as that of good and bad men in the world for if the lettings forth of Gods goodness to the world be so necessary all men must become necessarily good if Gods goodness be so great as to be able to make men so which I suppose will not be questioned By this then we see that the communications of Gods goodness to the world are free and depend upon the eternal counsels of his will which is a depth too great for us to approach or look into by what necessity then if God be a free Agent and of Infinite wisdom as well as goodness must we either assert the eternity of the world or fear to deprive God of his essential Goodness Whereas to make the communications of Gods goodness ad extra necessary and therefore to make the world from eternity that he might have an object to exercise his goodness on is to take as much off from the Infinite perfection and self sufficiency of the divine nature as it would seem to flatter his goodness For God cannot be himself without his goodness and if his goodness cannot be without some creature to shew or display it upon God cannot be perfect nor happy without his creatures because these are necessary issues of his goodness and consequently we make the Being of the creatures necessary to his Being God Which is the highest derogation from the absolute perfection of the Divine nature We assert then so much goodness in God as none can be imagined greater we assert that it was the communication of this Divine goodness which gave being to the world but withall we acknowledge God to be an Agent infinitely
he likewise asserted although one would think if gravity were the cause of motion then the more gravity the swister the motion would be from hence I say it were not easie to conceive how the Atoms should embrace each other in a parallel line if they fell down as Lucretius expresseth it like drops of rain and therefore they saw a necessity to make their motion decline a little that so they might justle and hit one upon another But this oblique motion of the Atoms though it be the only refuge left to salve the Origine of things by a concourse of Atoms is yet as precarious and without reason as any other supposition of theirs whatsoever Tully chargeth this motion of declination with two great faults futility and inâ—fficacy quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter tum ne efficit quidem quod vult It is a childish fancy and to no purpose For first it is asserted without any reason at all given for it which is unworthy a Philosopher neither is it to any purpose for if all Atoms saith he decline in their motion then none of them will stick together if some decline and others do not thâ—s is as precarious as any thing can be imagined to assign a diversity of motion in indivisible particles which yet have all the same velocity of motion and as Tully saith Hoc erit quasi provincias atomis dare quae recte quae oblique fâ—rantur as though Epicurus were the General at this Rendesvous of Atoms who stands ready to appoint every one his task and motion This Plutarch tells us was the great charge against Epicurus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he introduced such a motion of declination out of nothing upon no pretence of reason And Turnebus tells us that the ground why they desired so small a declination was because they were conscious to themselves that it was founded upon no ground of reason Et Epicurei sibi conscii culpae timide eam ponebant minimam sibi post ulabant To which purpose Turnebus cites those verses of Lucretius Quare etiam at que etiam paulum inclinare necesse est Corpora nec plusquam minimum ne fingere motus Obliquos videamur id res vera refutet Namque hoc in promptu manifest unique esse videmus Pondera quantum in se est non posse obliqua meare Esupero cum praecipitant quod cernere possis Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai Declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese But this argument of Lucretius will hold if at all further then this little declination for it is no more they desire then as little as may be imagined quo nihil possit fieri minus Tully expresseth it but if they may decline a little why not a great deal more nay it is impossible to conceive but a little oblique motion at first will in an infinite space grow to be very oblique for there is nothing to hinder the motion which way it bends now if there be never so little motion of declination the Atom will be inclined that way and what then should hinder but that the obliquity in a motion through a great space should at last come to be very great there being no center at all to guide the motion towards and the gravity not hindering this little declination Therefore Tully asks that question Cur declinet uno minimo non declinet duobus aut tribus why only it declines one minime and not two or three for saith he it is no impulsion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minime neither is there any impediment in the space to hinder it from declining more so that as he well saith optare hoc quidem est non disputare this is to beg Hypotheses and not to prove them which is the thing we have proved Epicurus to do Which was the first thing promised viz. that this Hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious and is built on no foundation of reason 2. It is unsatisfactory and insufficient as well as precarious for should we grant his two main principles Atoms and his infinite empty space yet we deny that ever his Atoms with all their occursions would ever produce those things which are in the Universe To run through the noted Phaenomena of the Universe and to shew how insufficient an account the Epicureans are able to give of them from a fortuitous concourse of Atoms is a task too large to be here undertaken There are only three things which I shall rather suggest then insist upon to see what miserable shifts the Epicureans are driven to for the salving of them and shall then leave it with the reader to judge what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the sake of the Epicurean Hypothesis and whether it be not the height of credulity as well as infidelity to believe the world ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms 1. The great varieiy of appearances in nature which are attributed to particles of the same nature only with the alteration of size shape and motion That some things in the world should have no other reason given of them may not only be tolerable but rational as in the objects and operations on the organs of sense those affections which are mistaken for real qualities c. But that all those effects which are seen in nature should have no other cause but the different configuration and motion of Atoms is the height of folly as well as impiâ—ty to imagine that the particles of matter as they are in men should be capable of sensation memory Intellâ—ction volition c. meerly because of a diffâ—rent shape size and motion from what they have in a piece of wood is a riddle that requires a new configuration of Atoms in us to make us understand May it not be hoped that at least one time or other by this casual concourse of Atoms the particles may light to be of such a nature in stones as to make them flic in plants to make them all sensitive and in beasts to make them reason and discourse What may hinder such a configuration or motion of particles if all these effâ—cts are to be imputed to no higher principle We see in other bodies what different appearances are caused by a sudden alteration of the particles of the matter of which they are compounded why may it not fall out so in the things mentioned neither can this be unreasonable to demand 1. Because the motion of these particles of matter is casual still according to them and who knows what chance may do for the seminal principles themselves are I suppose according to them of the same uniform matter with the rest of the world and so are liable to different motion and configuration 2. Because all particles of matter are supposed to be in continual motion becausâ— of that
possibility of existence what is it then which gives actual existence to it that cannot be its self for it would be necessarily existent if another then give existence this existence must wholly depend upon him who gave it for nothing can continue existence to its self but what may give it to its self for it gives it for the moment it continues it and what gives existence to its self must necessarily exist which is repugnant to the very notion of a created Being So that either we must deny a possibility of non-existence or annihilation in a creature which follows upon necessity of existence or else we must assert that the duration or continuance of a creature in its Being doth immediatly depend on Divine providence and Conservation which is with as much reason as frequency said to be a continued Creation But yet further was an Infinite Wisdom and power necessary to put things into that order they are in and is not the same necessary for the Governing of them I cannot see any reason to think that the power of matter when set in motion should either bring things into that exquisite order and dependence which the parts of the world have upon each other much less that by the meer force of that first motion all things should continue in the state they are in Perpetual motion is yet one of the desiderata of the world the most exquisite Mechanism cannot put an engine beyond the necessity of being looked after can we then think this dull unactive matter meerly by the force of its first motion should be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the world and to keep it from tumbling at least by degrees into its pristine Chaos It was an Infinite Power I grant which gave that first moâ—ion but that it gave power to continue that motion till the Constagration of the world remains yet to be proved Some therefore finding that in the present state of the world matter will not serve for all the noted and common Phoenomena of the world have called in the help of a Spirit of Nature which may serve instead of a Man-midwife to Matter to help her in her productions of things Or as though God had a Plurality of worlds to look after they have taken care to substitute him a Vicar in this which is this Spirit of Nature But we had rather believe God himself to be perpetually Resident in the world and that the power which gives life and being and motion to every thing in the world is nothing else but his own providence especially since we have learnt from himself that it is in him we live and move and have our being Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Providence whether we consider the Divine nature or the Phaenomena of the world but yet the case is not so clear but there are two grand objections behind which have been the continual exercise of the wits of inquisitive men almost in all Ages of the world The one concerns the first Origine of evil the other concerns the dispensations of providence whence it comes to pass that good men fare so hard in the world when the bad triumph and flourish if these two can be cleared with any satisfaction to reason it will be the highest vindication of Divine Providence and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures which gives us such clear light and direction in these profound speculations which the dim reason of man was so much to seek in I begin with the Origine of evil for if there be a hand of providence which orders all things in the world how comes evil then into it without Gods being the Author of it Which is a speculation of as great depth as necessity it highly concerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of Gods holiness and how far he is from being the author of sin and it is likewise a matter of some difficulty so to explain the Origine of evil as to make it appear that God is not the author of it I easily then assent to what Origen saith on this subject when Celsus upon some mistaken places of Scripture had charged the Scripture with laying the Origine of evil upon God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If any thing which calls for our enquiry be of difficult investigation that which concerns the Origine of evils is such a thing and as Simplicius well begins his discourse on this subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Dispute concerning the nature and origine of evil not being well stated is the cause of great impiety towards God and perverts the principles of good life anâ— involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it So much then is it our great concernment to fix on sure grounds in the resolution of this important question in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacyes of it as it relates to any internal purposes of Gods will which is beyond our present scope but I shall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the first man For the clearing of which I shall proceed in this method 1. That if the Scriptures be true God cannot be the author of sin 2. That the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil doth not charge it upon God 3. That no account given by Philosophers of the Origine of evil is so clear and rational as this is 4. That the most material circumstances of this account are attested by the Heathens themselves 1. That if the Scriptures be true God cannot be the author of sin For if the Scriptures be true we are bound without hesitation to yeild our assent to them in their plain and direct affirmations and there can be no ground of suspending assent as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth but the want of certain evidence whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the most effectual wayes to put an end to the numerous controversies of the Christian world especially to those bold disputes concerning the method and order of Gods decrees if the plain and undoubted assertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard whereby we ought to judge of such things as are more obscure and ambiguous And could men but rest contented with those things which concern their eternal happiness and the means in order to it which on that account are written with all imaginable perspicuity in Scripture and the moment of all other controversies be judged by their reference to these there would be fewer controversies and more Christians in the world Now there are two grand principles which concern mens eternal condition of which we have the greatest certainty from Scripture and on which we may with safety rely without perplexing our minds about those more nice and subtile speculations
which it may be are uncapable of full and particular resolution and those are That the ruine and destruction of man is wholly from himself and that his salvation is from God alone If then mans ruine and misery be from himself which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions then without controversie that which is the cause of all the misery of humane nature is wholly from himself too which is sin So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true God cannot be the author of that by which without the intervention of the mercy of God mans misery unavoidably falls upon him For with what authority and Majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of sin with what earnestness and importunity doth he woo the sinner to forsake his sin with what loathing and detestation doth he mention sin with what justice and severity doth he punish sin with what wrath and indignation doth he threaten contumacious sinners And is it possible after all this and much more recorded in the Scriptures to express the holiness of Gods nature his hatred of sin and his appointing a day of judgement for the solemn punishment of sinners to imagine that the Scriptures do in the least ascribe the Origine of evil to God or make him the Author of Sin Shall not the judge of all the world do right will a God of Infinite Iustice Purity and Holiness punish the sinner for that which himself was the cause of Far be such unworthy thoughts from our apprehensions of a Deity much more of that God whom we believe to have declared his mind so much to the contrary that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together Taking it then for granted in the general that God cannot be the author of sin we come to enquire whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil doth any way charge it upon God There are only two wayes which according to the history of the fall of man recorded in Scripture whereby men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of mans fall either first by the giving him that positive Law which was the occasion of his fall or secondly by leaving him to the liberty of his own will First The giving of that positive Law cannot be the least ground of laying mans fault on God because 1. It was most suitable to the nature of a rational creature to be governed by Laws or declarations of the Will of his Maker For considering man as a free agent there can be no way imagined so consonant to the nature of man as this was because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice For where there is a capacity of reward and punishment and acting in the consideration of them there must be a declaration of the will of the Law-giver according to which man may expect either his reward or punishment If it were suitable to Gods nature to promise life to man upon obedience it was not unsuitable to it to expect obedience to every declaration of his will considering the absolute soveraignty and Dominion which God had over man as being his creature and the indispensable obligation which was in the nature of man to obey whatever his Mâ—ker did command him So that God had full and absolute right to require from man what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey and in the general we cannot conceive how there should be a testimony of mans obedience towards hâ—s Creator without some declaration of his Creators Will. Secondly God had full power and authority not only to govern man by Laws but to determine mans general obligation to obedience to that particular positive precept by the breach of which man fell If Gods power over man was universal and unlimited what reason can there be to imagine it should not extend to such a positive Law Was it because the matter of this Law seemed too low for God to command his creature but whatever the matter of the Law was obedience to God was the great end of it which man had testified as much in that Instance of it as in any other whatsoever and in the violation of it were implyed the highest aggravations of disobedience for Gods power and authority was as much contemned his goodness slighted his Truth and faithfulness questioned his Name dishonoured his Majâ—sty affronted in the breach of that as of any other Law whatsoever it had been If the Law were easie to be observed the greater was the sin of disobedience if the weight of the matter was not so great in its self yet Gods authority added the greatest weight to it and the ground of obedience is not to be fetched from the nature of the thing required but from the authority of the Legislator Or was it then because God concealed from man his counsel in giving of that positive precept Hath not then a Legislator power to require any thing but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it if so what becomes of obedience and subjection it will be impossible to make any probative precepts on this account and the Legislator must be charged with the disobedience of his subjects where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires which as it concerns humane Legislators who have not that absolute power and authority which God hath is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general sense of the world This Plutarch gives a good account of when he discourseth â—o rationally of the sobriety which men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of Gods actions for saith he Physitians will give prescriptions without giving the patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither have humane Laws alwayes apparent reason for them nay some of them are to appearance ridiculous for which he instanceth in that Law of the Lacedaemonian Ephori 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to which no other reason was annexed but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his office to â—have himself and gave this reason for it that they might learn to obey Laws themselves He further instanceth in the Roman custom of manumission their Laws about testaments Solons Law against neutrality in seditions and concludes thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Any one would easily find many absurdities in Laws who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator or the ground of what he requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What wonder is it if we are so puzled to give an account of the actions of men that we should be to seek as to those of the Deity This cannot be then any ground on the account of meer reason to lay the charge of mans disobedience upon God because he required from
though God permit man to use his liberty yet he cannot be said to be any ways the author of evil because man had still a posse si vellet a power of standing if he had made right use of his Liberty and God never took from man his adjutorium quo potuit stare sine quo non potuit as Divines call it man enjoying still his power though by the abuse of his Liberty he fell into sin so that granting Godâ—o â—o leave man to the use of his Liberty yet we see God cannot in the lâ—ast be charged with being the Author of sin or of the Origine of evil by the History of the fall of man in Scripture which was the thing to be cleared We come now in the third place to compare that account given of the Origine of evil in Scripture with that which was embraced by Heathen Philosophers in point of reason and evidence There was no one inquiry whatsoever in which those who had nothing but natural light to guide them were more to seek for satisfaction in then this concerning the Origine of evil They saw by continual experience how great a Torrent of both sorts of evils of sin and punishment did over flow the world but they were like the Egyptians who had sufficient evidence of the overflowing their banks by the River Nile but could not find out the spring or the head of it The reason was as corruption increased in the world so the means of instruction and knowledge decayed and so as the Phoenomena grew greater the reason of them was less understood the knowledge of the History of the first Ages of the world through which they could alone come to the full understanding of the true cause of evil insensibly decaying in the several Nations Insomuch that those who were not at all acquainted with that History of the world which was preserved in Sacred Records among the Iews had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by and some kind of obscure traditions which were preserved among them which while they sought to rectifie by their interpretations they made them more obscure and false then they found them They were certain of nothing but that mankind was in a low and degenerate condition and subject to continual miseries and calamities they who cryed up the most the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the self-determining power of the soul could not certainly but strangely wonder that a Principle indifferent to be carried either way should be so almost fatally inclined to the worst of them It was very strange that since Reason ought to have the command of Passions by their own acknowledgement the brutish part of the soul should so master and enslave the rational and the beast should still cast the rider in man the sensitive appetite should throw off the power of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that faculty of the soul which was designed for the Government of all the rest The Philosophers could not be ignorant what slaves they were themselves to this terrestrial Hyle how easily their most mettalsom souls were mired in the dirt how deep they were sunk into corporeal pleasures that it was past the power of their reason to help them out Nay when the soul begins to be fledged again after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or moulting at her entrance into the body which Plato speaks of and strives to raise her self above his lower world she then feels the weight of such Plummets hanging at her feet that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of earth So Hierocles complains that when reason begins to carry the soul to the perception of the most noble objects the soul with a generous flight would soar above this world 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were it not horn down to that which is evil by the force of passions which hang like leads upon the souls feet What a strange unaccountable thing must this needs be to those who beheld the constancy of the effect but were to seek for the cause of it it could not but be clear to them that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were wont to extoll so high was in the state man was now in but a more noble name for slavery when themselves could not but confess the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or inclination in the soul was so strong to the evil and could that be an even balance where there was so much down-weight in one of the scales unless they made as some of them did the voluntary inclinations of the soul to evil an evidence of her liberty in this most degenerate condition as though it were any argument that the prisoner was the freer because he delighted himself in the noise of his shackles Neither was this disorder alone at home in the soul where there was still a Xantippe scolding with Socrates passion striving with reason but when they looked abroad in the world they could not but observe some strange irregularities in the Converse among men What debaucheries contentions rapines fightings and destroying each other and that with the greatest cruelty and that frequently among Country-men Friends nay relations and kindreds and could this hostility between those of the same nature and under the most sacred bonds of union be the result of nature when even beasts of prey are not such to those of their own kind Besides all this when they summed up the life of man together and took an account of the weaknesses and follies of Childhood the heats and extravagancies of youth the passions disquietments and disappointments of men in their strength and height of business the inquietude aches and infirmities of old age besides the miseries which through every one of these all men are subject to and few escape into how small a sum will the solid pleasure and contentment of the life of man be reduced Nay if we take those things in the world which men please themselves the most in enjoyment of and consider but with what care they are got with what fear they are kept and with what certainty they must be lost and how much the possession of any thing fails of the expectation of it and how near men are upon the top of Tenariff to fall into the depth of the Sea how often they are precipitated from the height of prosperity into the depth of adversity we shall finde yet much less that by the greatest Chymistrie can be extracted of real satisfaction out of these things Whence then should it come that mens souls should so delight to seed on these husks and to embrace these clouds and shadows instead of that real good which is the true object of the souls desire They could easily see there was no pure unmixed good in the world but there was a contemperation of both together according to that of Euripides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is a kind of continual mixture of
semper fuisse composuit duâ—sque naturas at que substantias boni scilicet mali sequens alios antiquos haereticos opinatus est St. Austin thinks that Manes had hâ—s opinion concerning two principles from the ancient Hereticks by whom I suppose he means the Marcicnists and Valentinians but it seems more probable that Manes had his doctrine immediately from hâ—s Countrymen though it be generally thought that Scythianus and Buddas were his masters iâ— it But from whomsoever it came the opinion was meâ—rly Heathen and not more contrary to Scripture then it is to reason the former I meddâ—â— not with that opinion being now extinct in the Christian world I only briefly consider the unreasonableness of it to shew what a far better account of the Origine of evil the Scriptures give us then was discovered by the Heathen Philosophers For on both sides that opinion is repugnant to the notion of a Deity so that while they would make two such Gods they make none at all For how can the principle of good be God if he hath not Infinite power as well as goodness and how can he have infinite power if he hath not the management of things in the world and how can he have the management of things if they be lyable to evil which the other God which is the principle of evil may lay upon it from which according to this supposition the principle of good cannot rescue it So that they who hold this opinion cannot as Simâ—licius tells us give God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the half of that infinite power which belongs to him for neither can he keep the good creatures which he makes from the power of the evil Daemon and therefore if he loves them must be in continual fears of the power of the contrary principle neither can he free them from the evil which the other lays upon them for then Gods power would be far greater then the evil Daemons and so he could be no Anti-god And on the other side the notion or Idea of an Infinitely evil Being is in its self an inconsistent Idea for it is an Infinite non-entity if we suppose his very Being to lie in Being evil which is only a privation of goodness and besides if he be Infinitely evil he must be infinitely contrary to the good Principle and how can he be infinitely contrary which enjoys several of the same perfections which the other hath which are infinity of essence and necessity of existence Now if this Principle of evil be absolutely contrary to the other it must be contrary in all his perfections for whatever is a perfection belongs to that which is good and now if it be contrary in every perfection Infinity of essence and necessity of existence being two it must be as contrary as is imaginable to them by which this evil Principle must be infinitely defective in Being and existence and so it will be an infinite non entity which yet exists which is the height of contradiction Again if there be such a contrary principle which is the cause of all evil then all evil falls out unavoidably and by the power of this Infinitely evil principle by which means not only all Religion but all vertue and goodness will be taken out of the world if this evil principle be infinite and if not infinite no Anti-god and not only so but all difference of good and evil will be taken away and then what need making two such contrary principles to give an account of the Origine of evil for when once evil becomes thus necessary it loseth its nature as a moral evil for a moral evil implyes in it a voluntary breach of some known Law but how can that breach be voluntary which was caused by an Infinite power in the most proper way of efficiency and thus if all freedom of will be destroyed as it is necessarily by this supposition then no Government of the world by Laws can be supposed and consequently no reward or punishment which suppose liberty of action and by this means all Religion Laws and Providence are banished out of the world and so this evil Daemon will get all into his own hands and instead of two contrary principles there will be but one infinitely evil Demon. Which that there is not appears by this that notwithstanding all the evil in the world there is so much good left in it of which there would be none if thâ—s evil Daemon had Infinite power By this we see there cannot be a principle infinitely evil for while they go about to make two such contrary principles infinite they make neither of them so and so while they make two Gods they take away any at all So that this opinion of the Origine of evil is manifestly absurd irrational and contradictions But all the Heathen Philosophers were not so gross as to imagine two such Anti-Gods with infinitely active power but yet those who would not in terms assert it might be driven to it by the consequence of their opinion concerning the Origine of evil which did suppose a necessity of it in nature as flowing from that passive principle out of which the world was produced Hence it was that Heraclitus as Plutarch tells us attributed the Origine of all things to discord and antipathy and was wont to say that when Homer wished 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that all contention were banished out of the world that he did secretly curse the Origine of things and wished the ruine of the world So Empedocles called the active principle whâ—ch did good Harmony and Friendship but the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by which he makes it to be a quarrelsome pernicious and bloody principle The same Plutarch tells us of those two renowned Philosophers Pythagoras and Plato Thence he tells us the Pythagoreans called the principle of good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Unity finite quiescent straight uneven number square right and splendid the principle of evil they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Binary Infinite moving crooked even long of one side unequal left obscure The opinion of Plato he tells us is very obscure it being his purpose to conceal it but he saith in his old age in his book de Legibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any if's or and 's he asserts the world to be moved by more then one principle by two at the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The one of a good and benigne nature the other contrary to it both in its nature and operations Numenius in Chalcidius thus delivers the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato de originibus as he speaks Igitur Pythagoras quoque inquit Numenius fluidam sine qualitate sylvam esse censet nec tamen ut Stoici naturae mediae interque malorum bonorumque viciniam sed plane noxiam Deum quippe esse ut etiam Platoni videtur initium causam bonorum sylvam malorum so that according to Numenius both
Plato and Pythagoras attributed the origine of evil to the malignity of matter and so they make evils to be necessarily consequent upon the Being of things For thus he delivers expresly the opinion of Pythagoras qui ait existente providentia mala quoque necessario substitisse propterea quod sylva sit eadem sit malitia praedita Platonemque idem Numenius laudat quod duas mundi â—â—mas autumet Unam beneficentissimam malignam alteram sc. Sylvam Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei tanquam Patris liberalitate collata sunt mala vero matris sylvae vitio cohaeserunt But Plutarch will by no means admit that Plato attributes the Origine of evil meerly to matter but he makes the principle of evil to be something distinct from matter which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a confused infinite self-moving stirring principle which saith he he else where calls Necessity and in his de Legibus plainly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a disorderly and malignant Soul which cannot be understood of meer matter when he makes his Hyle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Without form or figure and destitute of all qualities and power of operation and it is impossible saith he that that which is of its self such an inert principle as matter is should by Plato be supposed to be the cause and principle of evil which he elsewhere calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Necessity which often resisted God and cast off his reins So that according to Plutarch Plato acquits both God and Hyle from being the Origine of evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore attributes it to that malignant spirit which moves the matter and is the cause of all the disorderly motions in the world But what this spirit should be neither he nor any one else could ever understand what darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of Philosophers concerning the Origine of evil when they were so consused and obscure in the account which they gave of it that their greatest admirers could not understand them But though Plato seemed so ambiguous in his judgment of the Origine of evil whether he should attribute it to the Hyle or some malignant spirit in it the Stoicks were more dogmatical and plainly imputed the cause of evil to the perversity of matter So Chalcidius tells us that the Stoicks made matter not to be evil in its self as Pythagoras but that it was indifferent to either perrogati igitur unde mala perversitatem seminarium malorum causati sunt they made the perversity of matter the Origine of evil but as he well observes nec expediunt adhuâ— undeâ—â—psa perversitas cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia rerum Dâ—â—â—â— sylva Deus summum praecellens bonum sylva ut censent nec bonum nec malum They give no rational account whence this perversity of matter should arise when according to the Stoicks there are but two principles of things God and matter whereof the one is perfectly good the other neither good nor evil But this perversity they tell us is something necessarily consequent upon the Generation of things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 these are affections viz. the disorders in the world which follow the Generation of things as rust comes upon brass and filth upon the body as the counterfeit Trismegistus speaks so Maximus Tyrius saith that evils in the world are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not any works of art but the affections of matter Non potest artifex mutare materiam saith Seneca when he is giving an account why God suffers evils in the world and elsewhere gives thâ—s account why evils came into he world non quia cessat ars sed quia id in quo exercetur inobsequens arti est So that the Origine of evil by this account of it lyes wholly upon the perversity of matter which it seems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produced the world out of that matter which the Stoicks supposed to be eternal And the truth is the avoiding the attributing the cause of evil to God seems to have been the great reason why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and coexistent with God and this was the only plausible pretence which Hermogenes had for following the Platonists and Stoicks in this opinion that he might set God far enough off from being the author of sin but I cannot sâ—e what advantage comes at all by this Hypothesis but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other For 1. It either destroyes Gods omnipotency or else makes him the approver of evil so that if he be not auctor he must be assentator mali as Tertullian speaks against Hermogenes because he suffered evil to be in matter for as he argues aut enim potuit emendare sed noluit aut voluit quidem verum non potuit infirmus Deus si potuit noluit malus ipse quia malâ— savit fic jam habetur ejus licet non instituerit quia tamen si noluisset illud essâ— non esset ipse jam fecit esse quod noluit non esse quo quid â—st â—urpius si voluit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse adversum semetipsum egit cum voluit esse quod noluit fecisse noluit fecisse quod voluit esse So that little advantage is gained for the clearing the true origine of evil by this opinion for either God could have taken away evil out of matter but would not or else would but could not this latter destroyes Gods omnipotency the former his good-ness for by that means evil is in the world by his consent and approbation for if God would not remove it when he might the Being of it will come from him when if he would have hindred it it would not have been and so God by not rooting out of evil will be found an assertor of it male si per voluntatem turpiter si per necessitatem aut famulus erit mali Deus aut amicus if Gods will were the cause why sin was it reflects on his goodness if Gods power could not hinder it it destroyes his omnipotency So that by this opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to evil 2. This principle overturns the foundations of Religion and all transactions between God and mens souls in order to their welfare because it makes evil to be necessarily existent in the world which appears from hence in that evil doth result from the Being of matter and so it must necessarily be as matter is supposed to be for whatever results from the Being of a thing must be coexistent with it and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist must have the same mode of existence which the Being its self hath as is evident in all the attributes of God which have the same immutability with his nature now then if evil did exist
of Heathen Fables insists on this very story of Ophioneus as the groundwâ—rk of that relation in Genesis concerning the Fall But Origen well answers him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargâ—â—h us with impiâ—â—y in corrupting and altâ—â—ing the Heathen Fables be not himself â—erâ— justly chargeable with the same fault not understanding the far greater antiquity of the writings of Moâ—es then either of Heraclitus or Pherecydes or Homer himself which reports the story of that evil one which fell from heaven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Serpent from which O hioneus in Pherecydes derived his name which was the cause why man was cast forth of Paradise doth intimate some such thing while under a pretence of Divinity and of a 〈◊〉 condition 〈◊〉 fi st deceived the woman and by her means 〈◊〉 man Câ—lius Rhodiginus câ—lls this Ophioneus Daemonicum Serpentem qui antesignanus fuâ—rit agminis à Divinae mentis placito deficientis This Pherecydes as appears by Eusebius had much converse with the Phaenicians where he purposely speaks concerning this Ophioneus Now the Phaenicians as Eusebius likewise tells us worshipped their God under the Form of a Serpent which probably might be occasioned by the Devils ambition and Tyranny over men that he would be worshipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done so much mischief to the world It was very early in the world when the Phaenicians and Aegyptians did begin to adore their Gods under the Form of Serpents for the beginning of it is attributed to Taautus by Eusebius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither was this only among the Phaenicians and Aegyptians but whereever the Devil raigned the Serpent was had in some peculiar veneration thence Iustin Martyr saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Serpent was the Symbol of adoration among them and was the proper Indicium or note of a consecrated place as is evident by that of Persius Pinge duos angues pueri sacer est locus Thence the Scholiast on Aristophanes on that place in Plutus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that where ever any God or Heroe was to be worshipped there were Serpents painted to denote so much So Orus Apollo saith of the Aegyptians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were wont to put the form of a golden basilisk to their Gods Heinsius conceives that the first worship of Apollo at Delphi was under the form of a Serpent whether Nonnus tells us that Cadmus the Phaenician went upon his first coming into Baeotia and from hence he derives the name Pytho from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a Serpent Ut non dubitandum sit saith he quin Pythius Apollo hoc est Spurcus ille spiritus quem Hebraei Ob Abaddon Hellenistâ—â— ad verbum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 caeteri 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dixerunt sub hac 〈◊〉 qua miseriam humano generi invexit primo cultus sit in Graecia And which is further observable the Devil was alwayes ambitious to have the world think that the knowledge of good and evil was to come by the Serpent still thence the famous oracle of Apollo here at Delphi thence came the use of Serpents so much in Divination thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to divine from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Serpent and so among the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is taken in the same sense from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Serpent So that excellent Glossographer Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Serpent was reckoned among the pedestria auspicia by the Romans and Homer tells in that solemn divination concerning the Greeks success at Troy there appears 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which saith Heinsius is an exact description of the Nachas whom they would have so called from the marks on hâ—s back which they accurately observed in divination Thus we see how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the world under that Form wherein he had deceived mankind into so much folly and misery We meet with some remainders of mans being cast out of Paradise upon his fall among the Heathens Origen thinks that Plato by his converse with the Iews in Aegypt did understand the history of the fall of man which he after his way aenigmatically describes in his Symposiacks Where he brings in Porus the God of plenty feasting with the rest of the Gods after supper Penia comes a begging to the door Porus being drunk with Nectar goes into Jupiters garden and there falls asleep Penia observing it steals to him and by this deceit conceived by him In this Fable of Plato Origen takes notice what a near resemblance the garden of Iupiter hath to Paradise Penia to the Serpent which circumvented Adam and Porus to man who was deceived by the Serpent Which he conceives more probable because of Plato his custom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wrap up thoâ—e excellent things he knew under some fables because of the vâ—gar for which he after speaks of his custom in altering and disguising what he had from the Iews lest he should too much displease the fabulous Greeks if he should adhere too close to the Iews who were so infamous among them Some have thought the story of Paradise was preserved among the Heathens in the fable of the gardens of Adonis which comes near that of Eden but what footsteps may be gathered of the truth of Scripture history in the Heathen Mythology will appear afterwards Thus much here then may serve to have manifested the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil by the fall of man to be in its self rational and attested by the consent of such persons who cannot be suspected of any partiality to the Scriptures We come now to consider the other grand difficulty which concerns the Origine of evil and the truth of Divine providence together Which is that if sin be the cause of misery and there be a God which governs the world whence comes it to pass that the worst of men do so frequently escape sufferings and the best do so commonly undergo them This hath been in all ages of the world where men have been Philosophical and inquisitive one of the great inquiries which the minds of men have been perplexed about The true and full resolution of which question depends much upon those grounds and principles which are discovered to us by Divine revelation in the Scriptures concerning the grounds of Gods patience towards wicked men the nature and end of sufferings which good men are exercised with And certainly this should very much commend the Scriptures to all sober and inquisitive persons that they contain in them the most clear and certain grounds of satisfaction to the minds of men in such things wherein they are otherwise so irresolved But of that afterwards Our present business is
their dispersion that these several heads of families should use the same tongue Another reason against the common opinion is this whâ—ch seems to have a great deal of force in it If tongues were divided at Babel as it is imagined whence was it that the nearer any Nation lay to those who had the primitive language the Ebrew they did participate more of that tongue then those who were more remote as is plain in the Chaldeans Canaanites Greeks and others whereas if their languages were divided at Babel they would have retained their own language as well as others This very argument prevailed so far with the learned Is. Casaubon as appears by his adversaria on this subject published by the learned Dr. his son as to make him leave the common opinion and to conclude the several tongues to be only some variations from the Ebrew but yet so as many new words were invented too Hence he observes that the Asiatick Greeks came nearer to the Ebrew then the European And if this opinion hold true it is the best foundation for deriving other languages from the Ebrew a thing attempted by the same learned person as you may see in the book forecited and endeavoured by Guichardus Avenarius and others Thus we see there is no agreement in mens minds concerning the division of tongues at Babel But having set down this opinion with its reasons I shall not so leave the received opinion but shall first see what may be said for that and leave the judgement concerning the probability of either to the understanding reader And it seems to be grounded on these reasons 1. That had it been left to mens own choice there cannot be a sufficient reason assigned of the diversity of languages in the world For there being one language originally in the world whereby men did represent their conceptions to one another we cannot imagine that men should of themselves introduce so great an alteration as whereby to take off that necessary society and converse with each other which even nature it self did put men upon Hence Calvin and others conclude that prodigii loâ—o habenda est linguarum diversitas because there having been that freedom of converse among men it is not to be supposed they should of themselves cut it off to their mutual disadvantage But to this it is said that the long tract of time and diversity of customs might alter the language I grant it much but not wholly and they would only therein differ in their languages wherein their customs differed so that there would remain still such an agreement as whereby they might understand each other which it will be hard to find in many of the eldest languages As for the length of time though that doth alter much in reference to words and phrases in which that of Horace holds true Multa renascentur quae jam cecidere c. Yet it will be yet more difficult to find where meer length of time hath brought a whole language out of use and another in the room of it But that which I think deserves well to be confidered is this that the greatest alteration of languages in the world hath risen from Colonyes of Nations that used another language and so by the mixture of both together the language might be much altered as the Hebrew by the Chaldees in Babylon the Spanish Italian and others by tâ—e Latin as Breerwood shews our own by the Normans and others So that were there not a diversity of languages supposed this enterfereing of people would bring no considerable alteration along with it no more then a Colony from New England would alter our language here And as for another cause assigned of the change of languages the difference of climates which Bodin gives as the reason why the Northern people use consonants and aspirates so much especially the Saxâ—ns and those that live by the Baltick sea who pronounce thus Per theum ferum pibimus ponum finum And so R. D. Kimchi observes of the Ephraimites Judg. 12. 6. that it was the air was the cause of their lisping and calling it Sibboleth as he there observes of the men of Sarphath that is the French that they could not pronounce Schin but pronounced like Thau Raphe But by these examples we see that this would cause only an alteration as to some letters and syllables and rather as to the pronunciation then any variety of the language So that we see that seting aside the confusion of languages at Babel there can be no reason sufficient assigned for the variety of languages in the world 2. Though it be granted that a confusion in their minds without distinct languages were enough to make them desist from their work yet the context in that place Gen. 11. doth infer a diversity of tongues as will appear from the anteâ—dents and consequents as from the first verse where it is not conceivable why it should be there taken notice of as such a remarkable circumstance that then they had but one language before they set upon this work if there was not a diversity of tongues caused by the work they went about but especially ver 6. where God takes such notice of this very thing that they had but one language wherein they were so confident to carry on their work therefore ver 7. when he would destroy their work by confounding their language it must be by multiplying that language into many more for it must be taken in opposition to what is said in the other verse And what is there added their not understanding one anothers speech seems to refer not to the inward conceptions as though they did not understand one anothers minds but to the outward expressions as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth apparently relate to them further in ver 8. this is set down as the cause of their dispersion which had the tongue been the same afterwards as it was before could have been no reason for it Again some argue from the name Babel given to the place from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to confound and mingle things of several kinds together So used Iudg. 19. 21. Esay 30 24. Iob 6. 5. c. thence the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 left out as in Golgotha for Golgoltha Kikaltha for Kilkaltha and others of a like nature Besides there seems to be somewhat in what is said that the families were divided according to their tongues Gen. 10. 5 20 31. which doth at least imply a diversity of tongues among them the cause of which must be assigned by them who will not allow of the confusion and division of languages at Babel Further this seems most agreeable to Gods â—nd in making of them thus leave off their work that there might be not only a present judgement upon them but that which might remain to postâ—rity as a note of the folly
writers speak so much of viz. of dreams and visions the inspirations of the Holy Spirit the gradus Mosaicus the external voyce c. Now in every one of these degrees the Prophet could go no further then his present revelation extended and therefore Aquinas determines that the understandings of the Prophets were instrumenta deficientia respectu principalis agentis i. e. that in prophetical illumination the mind of the Prophet was so moved by the Spirit of God as an instrument in the hand of an Artificer which bears no proportion with the skill of the workman And therefore the mind of a Prophet is moved sometimes only to apprehend the thing represented which they call instinctus divinus of which they say a Prophet may have no certainty whether it comes from God or no sometimes it is moved so far as to know certainly that this revelation is from God this they call lumen Propheticum sometimes a Prophet may be moved to speak those things which he fully understands so it was with most of the true Psophets but sometimes men may be moved to speak that which they understand not as is plain in Caiaphas and probable in Balaam Sometimes a thing was represented to the fancy of one without any possibility of understanding the meaning of those imaginary species as in Pharaohs and Nebnchadnezzars dreams and to another may be given the true judgement of those motions of fancy without the representation of the things to them as in Ioseph and Daniel Now in these and many other different impressions of this prophetical spirit the Prophets to whom the things were revealed could go no further then the degree of the revelation made to them did extend God did not always reveal to the Prophets the internal counsels and decrees of his own will but often only the method and series of his providence in the administration of things in the world Which is the ground of that three-fold distinction of Prophecy in the Schools into prophetia praedestinationis prophetia praescientiae and prophetia comminationis which is taken from the ordinary gloss upon Matth. 1. where they are thus explained the Prophecie of Predestination is when the event depends wholly upon Gods will without any respect to ours as the Prophecie of the Incarnation of Christ the Prophecie of Praescience is of such things as depend upon the liberty of mans will and the Prophecie of Commination only denotes Gods denunciations of heavy judgements against a people But Aquinas doth better reduce the two former to one and so the ground of the difference is to be fetched from the different ways whereby God knows things in the world which is either as they are in their causes and so they note the order and series of things in the world with the mutual respects and dependencies they have one upon another and this refers to Gods administration of things in the world or else God looks upon them as they are in themselves or according to his own positive determinations of them and now in this sense they are unalterable but in the other they are not but God may alter those respects of things when he pleaseth Now though this different manner of knowledge can never be conceived separate from one another in the Divine understanding yet in the revelation made to the mind of a Prophet they may be disjoyned from each other because God doth not always reveal things in the highest degree to the Prophets for no free agent doth always act as far as he can And therefore prophetical revelation is sometimes a representation of Gods internal decrees and then they always take effect and sometimes only the order of causes and effects and they may admit of an alteration and the prophecie nevertheless be true because then it referred only to the series of causes in the world according to which the events would follow if God himself did not interpose These things being thus premised we come to particular resolutions which must arise from the evidences that may be given when prophetical predictions did express Gods internal purpose and decree and when only the order of causes in the world for in these latter it is apparent that events might not answer predictions and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet which is a matter of greater difficulty viz. to find out the exact differences of these two till the event hath made it apparent which came from Gods unalterable purpose and which not But though it be a subject little spoken to either by Iewish or Christian Writers yet we are in hopes there may be some such clear notes of distinction discovered between them even à priori which may sufficiently clear Gods faithfulnes and the Prophets truth though the event be not always correspondent to the words of a prediction I begin then with the evidences that may be given when predictions do flow from internal purpose and decree Every prediction confirmed by a present miracle doth not express meerly the order of causes but the determinations of Gods will because there can be no sufficient reason given why the order of causes in nature should be altered to express the dependences of things on each other for herein a miracle would rather ten d to weaken then strengthen faith because the end of the miracle would be to confirm their faith as to events following upon their causes but now the medium used for that end seems to prove the contrary viz. that God can alter the series of causes when he pleases himself by working miracles and therein going contrary to the course of nature and therefore a miracle seems to be a very incongruous argument in this because its self is an evidence that may be which it comes to prove shall not be But when Prophets come to declare the internal purposes of the will of God concerning future contingencies no argument can be more suitable to demonstrate the truth of what is spoken then the working of a present miracle for this demonstrates to the senses of men that however unlikely the event may be to them which is foretold yet with God all things are possible and that it is very unlikely God would send such a messenger to declare a falshood whom he entrusted so great a power with as that of working miracles Thus it was in that remarkable prophecie concerning Iosias by the man of God at Bethel 260 years before his birth which though it were to come to pass so long after God confirmed it by a sign which was the renting of the altar and the pouring out of the ashes upon it and the withering of Jeroboams hand We cannot therefore in reason think that God would set so clear a seal to any deed which he did intend himself to cancel afterward Praedictions express Gods inward purpose when the things foretold do exceed all probabilities of second causes in which case those words of Tertullian seem very harsh credo quia