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A48874 An essay concerning humane understanding microform; Essay concerning human understanding Locke, John, 1632-1704. 1690 (1690) Wing L2738; ESTC R22993 485,017 398

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treat more at large of Reasoning Iudging Volition and Knowledge which are some of the most considerable Operations of the Mind and Modes of thinking § 3. But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable Digression nor wholly impertinent to our present Design if we reflect here upon the different State of the Mind in thinking which those instances of Attention Resvery and Dreaming c. before mentioned naturally enough suggest That there are Ideas some or other always present in the Mind of a waking Man every ones Experience convinces him though the Mind employs it self about them with several degrees of Attention Sometimes the Mind fixes it self with so much earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects that it turns their Ideas on all sides remarks their Relations and Circumstances and views every part so nicely and with such intention that it shuts out all other Thoughts and takes no notice of the ordinary Impressions made then on the Senses which at another Season would produce very sensible Perceptions At other times it barely observes the train of Ideas that succeed in the Understanding without directing and pursuing any of them And at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded as faint shadows that make no Impression § 4. This difference of Intention and Remission of the Mind in thinking with a great variety of Degrees between earnest Study and very near minding nothing at all Every one I think has experimented in himself Trace it a litte farther and you find the Mind in Sleep retired as it were from the Senses and out of the reach of those Motions made on the Organs of Sense which at other times produce very vivid and sensible Ideas I need not for this instance in those who sleep out whole stormy Nights without hearing the Thunder or seeing the Lightning or feeling the shaking of the House which are sensible enough to those who are waking But in this retirement of the Mind from the Senses it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking which we call Dreaming and last of all sound Sleep closes the Scene quite and puts an end to all Appearances This I think almost every one has Experience of in himself and his own Observation without difficulty leads him thus far That which I would farther conclude from hence is That since the Mind can sensibly put on at several times several degrees of Thinking and be sometimes even in a waking Man so remiss as to have Thoughts dim and obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all and at last in the dark retirements of sound Sleep loses the sight perfectly of all Ideas whatsoever Since I say this is evidently so in Matter of Fact and constant Experience I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission but the Essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation But this by the bye CHAP. XX. Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain § 1. Amongst the simple Ideas which we receive both from Sensation and Reflection Pain and Pleasure are two very considerable ones For as in the Body there is Sensation barely in its self or accompanied with Pain or Pleasure so the Thought or Perception of the Mind is simply so or else accompanied also with Pleasure or Pain Delight or Trouble call it how you please These like other simple Ideas cannot be described nor their Names defined the way of knowing them is as of the simple Ideas of the Senses only by Experience For to define them by the Presence of Good or Evil is no otherwise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves upon the several and various Operations of Good and Evil upon our Minds as they are differently applied to or considered by us 2. Things then are good or evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain That we call Good which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure or diminish Pain in us or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other Good or absence of any Evil. And on the contrary we name that Evil which is apt to produce or increase any Pain or diminish any Pleasure in us or else to procure us any Evil or deprive us of any Good By Pleasure and Pain I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind as they are commonly distinguished though in truth they be only different Constitutions of the Mind sometimes occasioned by disorder in the Body sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind § 3. Pleasure and Pain and that which causes them Good and Evil are the hinges on which our Passions turn and if we reflect on our selves how these under various Considerations operate in us what Modifications or Tempers of Mind what internal Sensations if I may so call them they produce in us we may thence form to our selves the Ideas of our Passions § 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the Thought he has of the Delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him has the Idea we call Love For when a Man declares in Autumn when he is eating them or in Spring when there are none that he loves Grapes it is no more but that the taste of Grapes delights him let an alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the delight of their Taste and he then can be said to love Grapes no longer § 5. On the contrary the Thought of the Pain which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us is what we call Hatred Were it my business here to enquire any farther than into the bare Ideas of our Passions as they depend on different Modifications of Pleasure and Pain I should remark that our Love and Hatred of inanimate insensible Beings is commonly founded on that Pleasure and Pain we receive from their use and application any way to our Senses though with their Destruction but Love and Hatred to Beings capable of Happiness or Misery is often the Pain or Delight we have in their very Being or Happiness Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends producing constant Delight in him he is said constantly to love them But it suffices to note that our Ideas of Love and Hatred are but the Dispositions of the Mind in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general however caused in us § 6. The uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing whose present enjoyment carries the Idea of Delight with it is that we call Desire which is greater or less as that uneasiness is more or less vehement § 7. Ioy is a delight of the Mind from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a Good and we are then possessed of any Good when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please
a Man can will what he wills or be pleased with what he is pleased with A Question which I think needs no answer and they who can make a Question of it must suppose one Will to determine the Acts of another and another to determinate that and so on in infinitum an absurdity before taken notice of § 26. To avoid these and the like absurdities nothing can be of greater use than to establish in our Minds clear and steady Notions of the things under Consideration if the Ideas of Liberty and Volition were well fixed in our Understandings and carried along with us in our Minds as they ought through all the Questions are raised about them I suppose a great part of the Difficulties that perplex Mens Thoughts and entangle their Understandings would be much easier resolved and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity § 27. First then it is carefully to be remembred That Freedom consists in the dependence of the Existence or not Existence of any Action upon our Volition of it and not in the dependence of any Action or its contrary on our preference A Man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea not because he has a power to do the contrary Action which is to leap twenty Yards upwards for that he cannot do but he is therefore free because he has a power to leap or not to leap But if a greater force than his either hold him fast or tumble him down he is no longer free in that case because the doing or forbearance of that particular Action is no longer in his power He that is a close Prisoner in a Room twenty foot square being at the North-side of his Chamber is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward because he can walk or not walk it but is not at the same time at liberty to do the contrary i. e. to walk twenty foot Northward In this then consists Freedom viz. in our being able to act or not to act according as we shall choose or will § 28. Secondly In the next place we must remember that Volition or Willing regarding only what is in our power is nothing but the preferring the doing of any thing to the not doing of it Action to Rest contra Well but what is this Preferring It is nothing but the being pleased more with the one than the other Is then a Man indifferent to be pleased or not pleased more with one thing than another Is it in his choice whether he will or will not be better pleased with one thing than another And to this I think every one's Experience is ready to make answer No. From whence it follows § 29. Thirdly That the Will or Preference is determined by something without it self Let us see then what it is determined by If willing be but the being better pleased as has been shewn it is easie to know what 't is determines the Will what 't is pleases best every one knows 't is Happiness or that which makes any part of Happiness or contributes to it and that is it we call Good Happiness and Misery are the names of two extremes the utmost bounds whereof we know not 't is what Eye hath not seen Ear hath not heard nor hath entred into the Heart of Man to conceive But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions made by several instances of Delight and Joy on the one side and Torment and Sorrow on the other which for shortness sake I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain there being pleasure and pain of the Mind as well as the Body With Him is fulness of Ioy and Pleasures for evermore Or to speak truly they are all of the Mind though some have their rise in the Mind from Thought others in the Body from Motion Happiness then is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of and Misery the utmost Pain Now because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us by the operation of certain Objects either on our Minds or our Bodies and in different degrees therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we labour for and is that we call Good and what is apt to produce pain in us we avoid and call Evil for no other reason but for its aptness to produce Pleasure and Pain in us wherein consists our happiness or misery Farther because the degrees of Pleasure and Pain have also justly a preference though what is apt to produce any degree of Pleasure be in it self good and what is apt to produce any degree of Pain be evil yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort So that if we will rightly estimate what we call Good and Evil we shall find it lies much in comparison For the cause of every less degree of Pain as well as every greater degree of Pleasure has the nature of Good and vice versâ and is that which determines our Choice and challenges our Preference Good then the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will § 30. This is not an imperfection in Man it is the highest perfection of intellectual Natures it is so far from being a restraint or diminution of Freedom that it is the very improvement and benefit of it 't is not an Abrigdment 't is the end and use of our Liberty and the farther we are removed from such a determination to Good the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery A perfect Indifferency in the Will or Power of Preferring not determinable by the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of Indifferency to act or not to act till determined by the Will would be an imperfection on the other side A Man is at liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head or let it rest quiet He is perfectly indifferent to either and it would be an imperfection in him if he wanted that Power if he were deprived of that Indifferency But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same Indifferency whether he would prefer the li●ting up his Hand or its remaining in rest when it would ●ave his Head or Eyes from a blow he sees coming 't is as much a perfection that the power of Preferring should be determined by Good as that the power of Acting should be determined by the Will and the certainer such determination is the greater is the perfection § 31. If we look upon those superiour Beings above us who enjoy perfect Happiness we shall have reason to judge they are more steadily determined in their choice of Good than we and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy or less free than we
are represented to our view § 38. So that that which determines the choice of the Will and obtains the preference is still Good the greater Good But it is also only Good that appears that which carries with it the Expectation of Addition to our Happiness by the increase of our Pleasures either in Degrees Sorts or Duration or by the preventing lessening or shortning of pain Thus the Temptation of a pleasant Taste brings a Surfeit a Disease and perhaps Death too on one who looks no farther than that apparent Good than the present Pleasure who sees not the remote and concealed Evil and the hopes of easing or preventing some greater pain sweetens another Man's Draught and makes that willingly be swallowed which in it self is nauseous and unpleasant Both these Men were moved to what they did by the appearance of Good though the one found Ease and Health and the other a Disease and Destruction and therefore to him that looks beyond this World and is fully persuaded that God the righteous Judge will render to every Man according to his Deeds To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for Glory and Honour and Immortality Eternal Life but unto every Soul that doth Evil Indignation and Wrath Tribulation and Anguish To him I say who hath a prospect of the different State of perfect Happiness or Misery that attends all Men after this Life depending on their Behaviour here the measures of Good and Evil that govern his choice are mightily changed For since nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life can bear any proportion to endless Happiness or exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul hereafter Actions in his Power will have their preference not according to the transient Pleasure or Pain that accompanies or follows them here but as they serve to secure that perfect durable Happiness hereafter § 36. He then that will account for the Misery that Men often bring on themselves notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue Happiness and always prefer the greater apparent Good must consider how Things come to be represented to our choice under deceitful appearances and that is by the Iudgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them To see how far this reaches and what are the Causes of wrong Judgment we must remember that things are judged good or bad in a double Sense First That which is properly good or bad is nothing but barely Pleasure or Pain Secondly But because not only present Pleasure and Pain but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a distance cannot but move the Will and determine the choice of a Creature that has soresight therefore things also that draw after them Pleasure and Pain are considered as Good and Evil. § 40. The wrong Iudgment that misleads us and makes the Will often fasten on the worse side lies in misreporting upon the various Comparisons of these The wrong Judgment I am here speaking of is not what one Man may think of the determination of another but what every Man himself must confess to be wrong For since I lay it for a certain ground that every intelligent Being really seeks Happiness and would enjoy all the pleasures he could and suffer no pain 't is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter Ingredient or leave out any thing in his Power that could add to its sweetness but only by a wrong Judgment I shall not here speak of that mistake which is the consequence of invincible Error which scarce deserves the Name of wrong Judgment but of that wrong Judgment which every Man himself must confess to be so § 41. I. Therefore as to present Pleasure and Pain the Mind as has been said never mistakes that which is really good or evil that which is the greater Pleasure or the greater Pain is really just as it appears But though present Pleasure and Pain shew their difference and degrees so plainly as not to leave room for mistake yet when we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future we often make wrong Iudgments of them taking our measures of them in different positions of distance Objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size that are more remote and so it is with Pleasures and Pains the present is apt to carry it and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the Comparison Thus most Men like spend-thrift Heirs are apt to judge a little in Hand better than a great deal to come and so for small Matters in Possession part with great ones in Reversion but that this is a wrong Judgment every one must allow let his pleasure consist in whatever it will since that which is future will certainly come to be present and then having the same advantage of nearness will shew its self in its full dimensions and discover his wilful mistake who judged of it by unequal measures Were the Pleasure of Drinking accompanied the very moment a Man takes off his Glass with that sick Stomach and akeing Head which in some Men are sure to follow not many hours after I think no body whatever Pleasure he had in his Cups would on these Conditions ever let Wine touch his Lips which yet he gaily swallows and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time But if Pleasure or Pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal how much more will it be so by a farther distance to a Man that will not by a due consideration do what time will i. e. bring it home upon himself consider it as present and there take its true dimensions This is the way we usually impose on our selves in respect of bare Pleasure and Pain or the true degrees of Happiness or Misery The future loses its just proportion and what is present obtains the preference as the greater I mention not here the wrong Judgment whereby the absent are not only lessened but reduced to perfect nothing when Men enjoy what they can in present and make sure of that concluding amiss That no evil will thence follow For that lies not in comparing the greatness of future Good and Evil which is that we are here speaking of But in another sort of wrong Judgment which is concerning Good or Evil as it is considered to be the cause and procurement of Pleasure or Pain that will follow from it § 42. The cause of our judging amiss when we compare our present Pleasure or Pain with future seems to me to be the weak and narrow Constitutions of our Minds We cannot well enjoy two Pleasures at once much less any Pleasure almost whilst Pain possesses us The present Pleasure if it be not very languid and almost none at all fills our narrow Souls and so takes up all our Minds that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent Or if many of our Pleasures are not strong enough to
exclude the consideration of things at a distance yet we have so great an abhorrence of Pain that a little of it extinguishes all our Pleasures A little bitter mingled in our Cup leaves no relish of the sweet and hence it comes that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present Evil which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal since while the Pain remains we find not our selves capable of any the least degree of Happiness Hence we see the present Pain any one suffers is always the worst and 't is with anguish they cry out Any other rather than this nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer And therefore our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent to get rid of the present Evil before all things as the first necessary step towards Happiness let what will follow Nothing as we passionately think can exceed or almost equal the Pain we feel and because the abstinence from a present Pleasure that offers it self is a sort of Pain nay oftentimes a very great one 't is no wonder that that operates after the same manner Pain does and lessens in our Thoughts what is future and so forces us as it were blindfold into its embraces Thus much of the wrong Judgment we make of present and future Pleasure and Pain when they are compared together and so the absent considered as future § 43. II. As to things good or bad in their Consequences and by the aptness is in them to procure us good or Evil in the future we judge amiss several ways 1. When we judge that so much Evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does 2. When we judge that though the Consequence be of that moment yet it is not of that certainty but that it may otherwise fall out or else by some means be avoided as by industry address change repentance c. But that these are wrong ways of judging were easie to shew in every particular if I would examine them at large singly but I shall only mention this in general viz. That it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding to venture a greater Good and Evil for a less upon uncertain guesses and before due and through examination as far as a Man's knowledge can by any endeavours or assistance attain This I think every one must confess especially if he considers the usual Causes of this wrong Iudgment whereof these following are some § 44. I. Ignorance He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable cannot acquit himself of judging amiss II. Inadvertency When a Man overlooks even that which he does know This is an affected and present Ignorance which misleads our Judgments as much as the other Judging is as it were balancing an account and determining on which side the odds lies If therefore either side be hudled up in haste and several of the Summs that should have gone into the reckoning be overlook'd and left out this Precipitancy causes as wrong a Judgment as if it were a perfect Ignorance That which most commonly causes this is the prevalency of some present Pleasure heightned by our feeble passionate Nature most strongly wrought on by what is present To check this Precipitancy our Understanding and Reason was given us if we will make a right use of it to search and see and then judge thereupon How much sloth and negligence heat and passion the prevalency of fashion or acquired indispositions do severally contribute on occasion to these wrong Judgments I shall not here farther enquire § 45. This I think is certain That the choice of the Will is every-where determined by the greater apparent Good however it may be wrong represented by the Understanding and it would be impossible Men should pursue so different Courses as they do in the World had they not different Measures of Good and Evil. But yet Morality established upon its true Foundations cannot but determine the Choice in any one that will but consider and he that will not be so far a rational Creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite Happiness and Misery must needs condemn himself as not making that use of his Understanding he should The Rewards and Punishments of another Life which the Almighty has established as the Enforcements of his Law are of weight enough to determine the Choice against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew when the eternal State is considered in its bare possibility which no Body can deny He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good Life here or the contrary state the possible Reward of a bad one must own himself to judge very much amiss if he does not conclude That a vertuous Life with the certain expectation of everlasting Bliss which may come is to be preferred to a vicious one with the fear of that dreadful state of Misery which 't is very possible may overtake the guilty or at best the terrible uncertain hope of Annihilation This is evidently so though the vertuous Life here had nothing but Pain and the vicious continual pleasure which yet is for the most part quite otherwise and wicked Men have not much the odds to brag of even in their present possession nay all things rightly considered have I think even the worse part here But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale against infinite Misery in the other if the worst that comes to the pious Man if he mistake be the best that the wicked can attain to if he be in the right Who can without madness run the venture Who in his Wits would chuse to come within a possibility of infinite Misery which if he miss there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard Whereas on the other side the sober Man ventures nothing against infinite Happiness to be got if his Expectation comes to pass If the good Man be in the right he is eternally happy if he mistake he is not miserable he feels nothing On the other side if the wicked be in the right he is not happy if he mistake he is infinitely miserable Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment that does not presently see to which side in this case the preference is to be given I have forborn to mention any thing of the certainty or probability of a ●uture State designing here to shew the wrong Judgment that any one must allow he makes upon his own Principles laid how he pleases who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious Life upon any consideration whilst he knows and cannot but be certain that a future Life is at least possible § 46. Under this simple Idea of Power I have taken occasion to explain our Ideas of Will Volition Liberty and Necessity which having a greater mixture in them than belongs barely to simple Modes might perhaps be better placed amongst the more complex For Will for example contains in it
not seek long for Instances of his Ignorance The meanest and most obvious Things that come in our way have dark sides that the quickest Sight cannot penetrate into The clearest and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men find themselves puzled and at a loss in every Particle of Matter which we shall the less wonder at when we consider the Causes of our Ignorance which from what has been said I suppose will be found to be chiefly these three First Want of Ideas Secondly Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our Ideas § 23. First There are some Things and those not a few that we are ignorant of for want of Ideas First all the simple Ideas we have are confined as I have shewn to the Observation of our Senses and the Operations of our own Minds that we are conscious of in our selves But how much these few and narrow ●nlets are disproportionate to the vast whole Extent of all Beings will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all Things What other simple Ideas 't is possible the Creatures in other parts of the Universe may have by the Assistence of Senses and Faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours 't is not for us to determine But to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an Argument than if a blind Man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours because he had no manner of Idea of any such thing nor could by any means frame to himself any Notions about Seeing The Ignorance and Darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the Knowledge that is in others than the Blindness of a Mole is an Argument against the quick sightedness of an Eagle He that will consider the infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator of all Things will find Reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable mean and impotent a Creature as he will find Man to be who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost Constitutions of Things what Ideas they may receive of them far different from ours we know not This we know and certainly find that we want several other views of them besides those we have to make Discoveries of them more perfect And we may be convinced that the Ideas we can attain to by our Faculties are very disproportionate to Things themselves when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self which is the Foundation of all the rest is concealed from us But want of Ideas of this kind being a Part as well as Cause of our Ignorance cannot be described Only this I think I may confidently say of it That the intellectual and sensible World are in this perfectly alike That that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not And whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest § 24. Secondly Another great Cause of Ignorance is the want of Ideas we are capable of As the want of Ideas which our Faculties are not able to give us shuts us wholly from those views of Things which 't is reasonable to think other perfecter Beings than we have of which we know nothing so the want of Ideas I now speak of keeps us in Ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known to us Bulk Figure and Motion we have Ideas of But though we are not without Ideas of these primary Qualities of Bodies in general yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Figure and Motion of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and Ways of Operation whereby the Effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some Things by being too remote and in others by being too minute When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World and the Reasons we have to think that what lies within our Ken is but a small part of the immense Universe we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter which make up the whole stupendious frame of corporeal Beings how far they are extended what is their Motion and how continued or communicated and what Influence they have one upon another are Contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in If we narrow our Contemplation and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton I mean this System of our Sun and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it what several sorts of Vegetables Animals and intellectual corporeal Beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth may probably be in the other Planets to the Knowledge of which even of their outward Figures and Parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this Earth there being no natural Means either by Sensation or Reflection to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds They are out of the reach of those Inlets of all our Knowledge and what sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess much less have clear and distinct Ideas of them § 25. If a great nay for the greatest part of the several ranks of Bodies in the Universe scape our notice by their remoteness there are others that are no less concealed from us by their Minuteness These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter and the great Instruments of Nature on which depend not only all their secondary Qualities but also most of their natural Operations our want of precise distinct Ideas of their primary Qualities keeps us in an uncureable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure Size Connexion and Motion of the minute constituent parts of any two Bodies we should know without Trial several of their Operations one upon another as we do now the Properties of a Square or a Triangle and we should be able to tell before Hand that Rubarb would purge Hemlock kill and Opium make a Man sleep as well as a Watch-maker does that a little piece of Paper laid on the Ballance will keep the Watch from going till it be removed or that some small part of it being rubb'd by a File the Machin would quite lose its Motion and the Watch go no more Did we know the mechanical Affections of the Particles of Rubarb Hemlock Opium and a Man as a Watch-maker does those of a Watch whereby it performs all its Operations and of a File which by rubbing on them will alter
so remote from that internal real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend and are made up of nothing but an imperfect Collection of those apparent Qualities our Senses can discover there can be very few general Propositions concerning Substances of whose real Truth we can be certainly assured since there are but few simple Ideas of whose connexion and necessary co-existence we can have certain and undoubted Knowledge I imagine amongst all the secundary Qualities of Substances and the Powers relating to them there cannot any two be named whose necessary co-existence or repugnance to co-exist can certainly be known unless in those of the same sense which necessarily exclude one another as I have elsewhere shewed No one I think by the Colour that is in any Body can certainly know what Smell Taste Sound or tangible Qualities it has nor what Alterations it is capable to make or receive on or from other Bodies the same may be said of the Sound or Taste c. Our specifick Names of Substances signifying any Collections of such Ideas 't is not to be wondred that we can with them make very few general Propositions of undoubted real certainty but yet so far as any complex Idea of any sort of Substances contains in it any simple Idea whose necessary co-existence with any other may be discovered so far universal Propositions may with certainty be made concerning it v. g. Could any one discover a necessary connexion between Malleableness and the Colour or Weight of Gold or any other part of the complex Idea signified by that Name he might make a certain universal Proposition concerning Gold in this respect and the real Truth of this Proposition That all Gold is malleable would be as certain as of this The three Angles of all right-lined Triangles are equal to two right ones § 11. Had we such Ideas of Substances as to know what real Constitutions produce those sensible Qualities we find in them and how those Qualities flowed from thence we could by the specifick Ideas of their real Essences in our own Minds more certainly find out their Properties and discover what Qualities they had or had not than we can now by our Senses and to know the Properties of Gold it would be no more necessary that Gold should exist and that we should make Experiments upon it than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle that a Triangle should exist in any Matter the Idea in our Minds would serve for the one as well as the other But we are so far from being admitted into the Secrets of Nature that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance towards them For we are wont to consider the Substances we meet with each of them as an entire thing by it self having all its Qualities in it self and independent of other Things overlooking for the most part the Operations of those invisible Fluids they are encompassed with and upon whose Motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them and are made by us the inherent marks of Distinction whereby we know and denominate them Put a piece of Gold any where by it self let no other Body encompass it it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight and perhaps Malleableness too which for ought I know would be changed into a perfect Friability Water in which to us Fluidity is an essential Quality left to it self would cease to be fluid But if inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present state to other Bodies without them that they would not be what they appear to us were those Bodies that environ them removed it is yet more so in Vegetables which are nourished grow and produce Leaves Flowers and Seeds in a constant Succession And if we look a little nearer into the state of Animals we shall find that their Dependence as to Life Motion and the most considerable Qualities to be observed in them is so wholly on extrinsical Causes and Qualities of other Bodies that make no part of them that they cannot subsist a moment without them though yet those Bodies on which they depend are little taken notice of and make no part of the complex Ideas we frame of those Animals Take the Air but a minute from the greatest part of living Creatures and they presently lose Sense Life and Motion This the necessity of breathing has forced into our Knowledge But how many other extrinsical and possibly very remote Bodies do the Springs of those admirable Machines depend on which are not vulgarly observed or so much as thought on and how many are there which the severest Enquiry can never discover The Inhabitants of this spot of the Universe though removed so many millions of Miles from the Sun yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of Particles coming from or agitated by it that were this Earth removed but a small part of that distance out of its present situation and placed a little farther or nearer that Source of Heat 't is more than probable that the greatest part of the Animals in it would immediately perish since we find them so often destroy'd by an excess or defect of the Sun's warmth which an accidental position in some parts of this our little Globe exposes them to The Qualities observed in a Load-stone must needs have their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body and the ravage made often on several sorts of Animals by invisible Causes the certain death as we are told of some of them by barely passing the Line or as 't is certain of others by being removed into a Neighbouring-Country evidently shew that the Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us and to preserve those Qualities we know and distinguish them by We are then quite out of the way when we think that Things contain within themselves the Qualities that appear to us in them And we in vain search for that Constitution within the Body of a Fly or an Elephant upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we observe in them for which perhaps to understand them aright we ought to look not only beyond this our Earth and Atmosphere but even beyond the Sun or remotest Star our Eyes have yet discovered For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances in this our Globe depend on Causes utterly beyond our view is impossible for us to determine We see and perceive some of the Motions and grosser Operations of Things here about us but whence the Streams come that keep all these curious Machines in motion and repair how conveyed and modified is beyond our notice and apprehension and the great Parts and Wheels as I may so say of this stupendious Structure of the Universe may for ought we know have such a connexion and dependence in their Influences
this part of the World where Knowledge and Plenty seem to vie each with other yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it I suppose it will appear past doubt that were the use of Iron lost among us we should in a few Ages be unavoidably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the ancient savage Americans whose natural Endowments and Provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite Notions So that he who first made known the use of that one contemptible Mineral may be truly styled the Father of Arts and Author of Plenty § 12. I would not therefore be thought to dis-esteem or dissuade the Study of Nature I readily agree the Contemplation of his Works gives us occasion to admire revere and glorifie their Author and if rightly directed may be of greater benefit to Mankind than the Monuments of exemplary Charity that have at so great Charge been raised by the Founders of Hospitals and Alms-houses He that first invented Printing discovered the Use of the Compass or made publick the Virtue and right Use of Kin Kina did more for the propagation of Knowledge for the acquisition of Conveniencies of Life and saved more from the Grave than those who built Colleges Work-houses and Hospitals All that I would say is that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the Opinion or Expectation of Knowledge where it is not to be had or by Ways that will not attain it That we should not take doubtful Systems for compleat Sciences nor unintelligible Notions for scientifical Demonstrations In the Knowledge of Bodies we must be content to glean what we can from particular Experiments since we cannot from a Discovery of their real Essences grasp at a time whole Sheaves and in bundles comprehend the Nature and Properties of whole Species together Where our Enquiry is concerning Co-existence or Repugnancy to co-exist which by Contemplation of our Ideas we cannot discover there Experience Observation and natural History must give us by our Senses and by retail an insight into corporeal Substances The Knowledge of Bodies we must get by our Senses warily employed in taking notice of their Qualities and Operations on one another and what we hope to know of separated Spirits in this World we must I think expect only from Revelation He that shall consider how little general Maxims precarious Principles and Hypotheses laid down at Pleasure have promoted true Knowledge or helped to satisfie the Enquiries of rational Men after real Improvements How little I say the setting out at the end has for many Ages together advanced Men's Progress towards the Knowledge of natural Philosophy will think we have Reason to thank those Men who in this latter Age have taken another Course and have trod out to us though not an easier way to learned Ignorance yet a surer way to profitable Knowledge § 13. Not that we may not to explain any Phoenomena of Nature make use of any probable Hypothesis whatsoever Hypotheses if they are well made are at least great helps to the Memory and often direct us to new Discoveries But my Meaning is that we should not take up any one too hastily which the Mind that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things and have Principles to rest on is very apt to do till we have very well examined Particulars and made several Experiments in that thing we would explain by our Hypothesis and see whether it will agree to them all whether our Principles will carry us quite through and not be as inconsistent with one Phaenomenon of Nature as they seem to accommodate and explain another And at least that we take care that the Name of Principles deceive us not nor impose on us by making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture such as are most I had almost said all of the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy § 14. But whether natural Philosophy be capable of Certainty or no the ways to enlarge our Knowledge as far as we are capable seem to me in short to be these two First The First is to get and settle in our Minds as far as we can clear distinct and constant Ideas of those Things we would consider and know For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas where they are either imperfect or obscure we cannot expect to have certain and perfect Knowledge Secondly The other is the Art of finding out those intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other Ideas which cannot be immediately compared § 15. That these two and not the relying on Maxims and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions are the right Method of improving our Knowledge in other Ideas of Modes the Consideration of Mathematical Knowledge will easily inform us Where first we shall find that he that has not a perfect and clear Idea of those Angles or Figures of which he desires to know any thing is utterly thereby uncapable of any Knowledge about them Suppose but a Man not to have a perfect exact Idea of a right Angle a Scalenum or Trapezium and there is nothing more clear that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them And farther it is evident that it was not the influence of those Maxims which are taken for Principles in Mathematicks that hath led the Masters of that Science into those wonderful Discoveries they have made Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims generally made use of in Mathematicks never so perfectly and contemplate their Extent and and Consequences as much as he pleases he will by their Assistence I suppose scarce ever come to know that the square of the Hypotieneuson in a right angled Triangle is equal to the squares of the two other sides The Knowledge that the Whole is equal to all its Parts and if you take Equal from Equal the remainder will be Equal c. helped him not I presume to this Demonstration And a Man may I think pore long enough on those Axioms without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical Truths They have been discovered by the Thoughts otherways applied The Mind had other Objects other Views before it far different from those Maxims when it first got the Knowledge of such kind of Truths in Mathematicks which Men well enough acquainted with those received Axioms but ignorant of their Method who first made these Demonstrations can never sufficiently admire And who knows what Methods may hereafter be found out to enlarge our Knowledge in other Things as well as that of Algebra in Mathematicks which so readily finds out Ideas of Quantities to measure others by whose Equality or Proportion we could otherwise very hardly or perhaps never come to know CHAP. XIII Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge § 1. OVr Knowledge as in other Things so in this has a great Conformity with our Sight that it is neither wholly necessary nor
this case our Assent has a sufficient foundation to raise it self to a degree which we may call Confidence § 8. Thirdly In matters that happen indifferently as that a Bird should fly this or that way that it should thunder on a Man's right or left Hand c. when any particular matter of fact comes attested by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses there our Assent is also unavoidable Thus That there is such a City in Italy as Rome That about 1700 years ago there lived in it a Man called Iulius Caesar that he was a General and that he won a Battel again another called Pompey This though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it yet being related by Historians of credit and contradicted by no one Writer a Man cannot avoid believing it and can as little doubt of it as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance whereof he himself is a Witness § 9. Thus far the matter goes easie enough Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it that it naturally determines the Judgment and leaves us as little at liberty to believe or disbelieve as a Demonstration does whether we will know or be ignorant The difficulty is when Testimonies contradict common Experience and the report of History and Witnesses clashes with the ordinary course of Nature or with one another there it is where Diligence Attention and Exactness is required to form a right Judgment and to proportion the Assent to the different Evidence and Probability of the thing which rises and falls according as those two foundations of Credibility viz. Common Observation in like cases and particular Testimonies in that particular instance favours or contradicts it These are liable to so great variety of contrary Observations Circumstances Reports different Qualifications Tempers Designs Over-sights c. of the Reporters that 't is impossible to reduce to precise Rules the various degrees wherein Men give their Assent This only may be said in general That as the Arguments and Proofs pro and con upon due examination nicely weighing every particular circumstance shall to any one appear upon the whole matter in a greater or less degree to preponderate on either side so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different entertainment as we call Belief Conjecture Guess Doubt Wavering Distrust Disbelief c. § 10. This is what concerns Assent in matters wherein Testimony is made use of concerning which I think it may not be amiss to take notice of a Rule observed in the Law of England which is That though the attested Copy of a Record be good proof yet the Copy of a Copy never so well attested and by never so credible Witnesses will not be admitted as a proof in Judicature This is so generally approved as reasonable and suited to the Wisdom and Caution to be used in our Enquiry after material Truths that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it This practice if it be allowable in the Decisions of Right and Wrong carries this Observation along with it viz. That any Testimony the farther off it is from the original Truth the less force and proof it has The Being and Existence of the thing it self is what I call the original Truth A credible Man vouching his Knowledge of it is a good proof But if another equally credible do witness it from his Report the Testimony is weaker and a third that attests the Hearsay of an Hearsay is yet less considerable So that in traditional Truths each remove weakens the force of the proof And the more hands the Tradition has successively passed through the less strength and evidence does it receive from them This I thought necessary to be taken notice of Because I find amongst some Men the quite contrary commonly practised who look on Opinions to gain force by growing older and what a thousand year since would not to a rational Man contemporary with the first Voucher have appeared at all probable is now urged as certain beyond all question only because several have since from him said it one after another Upon this ground Propositions evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning come by an inverted Rule of Probability to pass for authentick Truths and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first Authors are thought to grow venerable by Age and are urged as undeniable § 11. I would not be thought here to lessen the Credit and use of History 't is all the light we have in many cases and we receive from it a great part of the useful Truths we have with a convincing evidence I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity I wish we had more of them and more uncorrupted But this Truth it self forces me to say That no Probability can arise higher than its first Original What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one onely Witness must stand or fall by his onely Testimony whether good bad or indifferent and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others one after another is so far from receiving any strength thereby that it is only the Weaker Passion Interest Inadvertency Mistake of his Meaning and a thousand odd Reasons or Caprichios Men's Minds are acted by impossible to be discovered may make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meaning wrong He that has but ever so little examined the Citations of Writers cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotations deserve where the Originals are wanting and consequently how much less Quotations of Quotations can be relied on This is certain that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated But the farther still it is from the Original the less valid it is and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he received it § 12. The Probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such as concern matter of fact and such Things as are capable of Observation and Testimony there remains that other sort concerning which Men entertain Opinions with variety of Assent though the Things be such that falling not under the reach of our Senses are not capable of Testimony and such are 1. The Existence Nature and Operations of finite immaterial Beings without us as Spirits Angels Devils c. or the Existence of material Beings which either for their smalness in themselves or remoteness from us our Senses cannot take notice of as whether there be any Plants Animals and intelligent Inhabitants of the Planets and other Mansions of the vast Universe 2. Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the Works of Nature wherein though we see the sensible effects yet their causes are unknown and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced We see Animals are generated nourished and move the