joyned together by the said Verb is As for Example Man is a living creature or thus Man is not righteous whereof the former is called an Affirmation because the Appellation Living Creature is Positive the latter a Negative because not righteous is Privative 10. In every Proposition be it Affirmative or Negative the latter Appellation either comprehendeth the former as in this Proposition Charity is a Vertue the Name of Vertue comprehendeth the Name of Charity and many other Vertues beside and then is the Proposition said to be true or Truth For Truth and a true Proposition is all one Or else the latter Appellation comprehendeth not the former as in this Proposition Every Man is just the name of Just comprehendeth not Every Man for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men And the Proposition is said to be false or Falsity Falsity and a false Proposition being also the same Thing 11. In what manner of two Propositions whether both Affirmative or one Affirmative the other Negative is made a Syllogism I forbear to write All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions though necessary is but dry Discourse and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick which if I enter further into I ought to pursue Besides it is not needfull for there be few Men which have not so much natural Logick as thereby to discern well enough whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter be well or ill collected Only thus much I say in this Place that Making of Syllogisms is that we call Ratiocination or Reasoning 12. Now when a man reasoneth from Principles that are found indubitable by Experience all Deceptions of Sense and Aequivocation of Words avoided the Conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right Reason But when from his Conclusion a Man may by good Ratiocination derive that which is contradictory to any evident Truth whatsoever then he is said to have concluded against Reason And such a Conclusion is called Absurdity 13. As the Invention of Names hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance by calling to their Remembrance the necessary Coherence of one Conception to another so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into Errour Insomuch that whereas by the Benefit of Words and Ratiocination they exceed brute Beasts in Knowledge and the Commodities that accompany the same so they exceed them also in Errour For true and false are Things not incident to Beasts because they adhere not to Propositions and Language nor have they Ratiocination whereby to multiply one Untruth by another as Men have 14. It is the Nature almost of every Corporal Thing being often moved in one and the same Manner to receive continually a greater and greater Easiness and Aptitude to the same Motion insomuch as in Time the same becometh so habitual that to beget it there needs no more than to begin it The Passions of Man as they are the Beginning of voluntary Motions so are they the Beginning of Speech which is the Motion of the Tongue And Men desiring to shew others the Knowledge Opinions Conceptions and Passions which are in themselves and to that End having invented Language have by that Means transferred all that Discursion of their Mind mentioned in the former Chapter by the Motion of their Tongues into Discourse of Words And Ratio now is but Oratio for the most part wherein Custom hath so great a Power that the Mind suggesteth only the first Word the rest follow habitually and are not followed by the Mind as it is with Beggars when they saw their Pater noster putting together such Words and in such manner as in their Education they have learned from their Nurses from their Companies or from their Teachers having no Images or Conceptions in their Mind answering to the Words they speak and as they have learned themselves so they teach Posterity Now if we consider the Power of those Deceptions of the Sense mentioned Chap 2. Sect. 10 and also how unconstantly Names have been setled and how subject they are to Aequivocation and how diversified by Passion scarce two Men agreeing what is to be called Good and what Evil what Liberality what Prodigality what Valour what Temerity and how subject Men are to Paralogism or Fallacy in Reasoning I may in a Manner conclude that it is impossible to rectifie so many Errours of any one Man as must needs proceed from those Causes without beginning a-new from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense and instead of Books reading over orderly ones own Conceptions In which Meaning I take Noste teipsum for a Precept worthy the Reputation it hath gotten CHAP. VI 1. Of the two Kinds of Knowledge 2. Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge 3. Evidence defined 4. Science defined 5. Supposition defined 6. Opinion defined 7. Belief defined 8. Conscience defined 9. Belief in some Cases no less from Doubt than Knowledge 1. THere is a Story somewhere of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of Blindness wherewith he was born by St. Albane or other Saints at the Town of St. Albans and that the Duke of Glocester being there to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle asked the Man What Colour is this Who by answering It was Green discovered himself and was punished for a Counterfeit for though by his Sight newly received he might distinguish between Green and Red and all other Colours as well as any that should interrogate him yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green or Red or by any other Name By this we may understand there be two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the one is nothing else but Sense or Knowledge original as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter and Remembrance of the same the other is called Science or Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions and how Things are called and is derived from Vnderstanding Both of these Sorts are but Experience The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from without and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of Names in Language and all Experience being as I have said but Remembrance all Knowledge is Remembrance and of the former the Register we keep in Books is called History But the Registers of the latter are called the Sciences 2. There are two Things necessarily implied in this Word Knowledge the one is Truth the other Evidence for what is not Truth can never be known For let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well if the same shall afterwards appear false he is driven to Confession that it was not Knowledge but Opinion Likewise if the Truth be not evident though a Man holdeth it yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge all Truth were known which is not so 3.
Power of him that contendeth with us the Signs whereof besides those in the Countenance and other Gestures of the Body which cannot be described are Ostentation in Words and Insolency in Actions and this Passion of them whom it displeaseth is called Pride by them whom it pleaseth it is termed a just Valuation of himself This Imagination of our Power or Worth may be from an assured and certain Experience of our own Actions and then is that Glory just and well grounded and begetteth an Opinion of increasing the same by other Actions to follow in which consisteth the Appetite which we call Aspiring or Proceeding from one Degree of Power to another The same Passion may proceed not from any Conscience of our own Actions but from Fame and Trust of others whereby one may think well of himself and yet be deceived and this is false Glory and the Aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill Success Further the Fiction which is also Imagination of Actions done by our selves which never were done is Glorying but because it begetteth no Appetite nor endeavour to any further Attempt it is meerly vain and unprofitable as when a Man imagineth himself to do the Actions whereof he readeth in some Romance or to be like unto some other Man whose Acts he admireth And this is called Vain Glory and is exemplied in the Fable by the Fly sitting on the Axletree and saying to himself What a Dust do I make rise The expression of Vain Glory is that Wish which some of the School mistaking for some Appetite distinct from all the rest have called Velleity making a new Word as they made a new Passion which was not before Signs of Vain Glory in the Gesture are Imitation of others Counterfeiting and Usurping the Signs of Vertue they have not Affectation of Fashions Captation of Honour from their Dreams and other little Stories of themselves from their Country from their Names and from the like 2. The Passion contrary to Glory proceeding from Apprehension of our own Infirmity is called Humility by those by whom it is approved by the rest Dejection and Poorness which Conception may be well or ill grounded if well it produceth Fear to attempt any Thing rashly if ill it utterly cows a Man that he neither dares speak publickly nor expect good Success in any Action 3. It happeneth sometimes that he that hath a good Opinion of himself and upon good ground may nevertheless by Reason of the Frowardness which that Passion begetteth discover in himself some Defect or Infirmity the Remembrance whereof dejecteth him and this Passion is called Shame by which being cooled and checked in his Forwardness he is more wary for the Time to come This Passion as it is a Sign of Infirmity which is Dishonour so also it is a Sign of Knowledge which is Honour The Sign of it is Blushing which appeareth less in Men conscious of their own Defect because they less betray the Infirmities they acknowledge 4. Courage in a large Signification is the Absence of Fear in the Presence of any evil whatsoever but in a Strict and more common Meaning it is Contempt of Wounds and Death when they oppose a Man in the Way to his End 5. Anger or sudden Courage is nothing but the Appetite or desire of overcoming present Opposition It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an Opinion of Contempt which is confuted by the often Experience which we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate and without Sense and consequently incapable of contemning us 6. Revengefulness is that Passion which ariseth from an Expectation or Imagination of making him that hath hurt us find his own Action hurtful to himself and to acknowledge the same and this is the Height of Revenge for though it be not hard by returning Evil for Evil to make ones Adversary displeased with his own Fact yet to make him acknowledge the same is so difficult that many a Man had rather die than do it Revenge aimeth not at the Death but at the Captivity or Subjection of an Enemy which was well expressed in the Exclamation of Tiberius Caesar concerning one that to frustrate his Revenge had killed himself in Prison Hath he escaped me To kill is the aim of them that hate to rid themselves out of Fear Revenge aimeth at Triumph which over the Dead is not 7. Repentance is the Passion which proceedeth from Opinion or Knowledge that the Action they have done is out of the Way to the End they would attain the Effect whereof is to pursue that Way no longer but by the Consideration of the End to direct themselves into a better The first Motion therefore in this Passion is Grief but the Expectation or Conception of returning again into the Way is Joy and consequently the Passion of Repentance is compounded and allayed of both but the predominant is Joy else were the Whole Grief which cannot be forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End he conceiveth Good proceedeth with Appetite and Appetite is Joy as hath been said Chap. 7. Sect. 2. 8. Hope is Expectation of Good to come as Fear is the Expectation of Evil But when there be Causes some that make us expect Good and some that make us expect Evil alternately working in our Mind if the Causes that make us expect Good be greater than those that make us expect Evil the whole Passion is Hope if contrarily the Whole is Fear Absolute Privation of hope is Despair a degree whereof is Diffidence 9. Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for Good so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust is manifest from this that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold 10. Pity is Imagination or Fiction of future Calamity to our selves proceeding from the Sense of another Mans Calamity But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same the Compassion is greater because then there appeareth more Probability that the same may happen to us for the Evil that happeneth to an innocent Man may happen to every Man But when we see a Man suffer for great Crimes which we cannot easily think will fall upon our selves the Pity is the less And therefore Men are apt to pity those whom they love for whom they love they think worthy of Good and therefore not worthy of Calamity Thence it is also that Men pity the Vices of some Persons at the first Sight only out of Love to their Aspect The Contrary of Pity is Hardness of Heart proceeding either from Slowness of Imagination or some extreme great Opinion of their own Exemption from the like Calamity or from hatred of
when there is it is by Chance which must needs proceed from this That the Brain in Dreams is not restored to its Motion in every Part alike whereby it cometh to pass that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits 4. As when the Water or any liquid Thing moved at once by divers Movents receiveth one Motion compounded of them all so also the Brain or Spirit therein having been stirred by divers Objects composeth an Imagination of divers Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense As for Example the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a Mountain and at another Time the Colour of Gold but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden Mountain From the same Cause it is there appear unto us Castles in the Air Chimaera's and other Monsters which are not in Rerum Natura but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces at several Times And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind 5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination which for Clearness contendeth with Sense as well as a Dream and that is when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the Sense of Seeing than the rest An Example whereof is the Image remaining before the Eye after looking upon the Sun Also those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the dark whereof I think every Man hath Experience but they most of all who are timorous or superstitious are Examples of the same And these for Distinction-sake may be called Phantasms 6. By the Senses which are numbred according to the Organs to be five we take Notice as hath been said already of the Objects without us and that Notice is our Conception thereof but we take Notice also some Way or other of our Conceptions for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh again we take Notice that is again that is to say that we have had the same Conception before which is as much as to imagine a Thing past which is impossible to the Sense which is only of Things present This therefore may be accounted a Sixth Sense but internal not external as the rest and is commonly called Remembrance 7. For the Manner by which we take Notice of a Conception past we are to remember that in the Definition of Imagination it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying or growing more obscure An obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole Object together but none of the smaller Parts by themselves and as more or fewer Parts be represented so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear Seeing then the Conception which when it was first produced by Sense was clear and represented the Parts of the 0bject distinctly and when it cometh again is obscure we find missing somewhat that we expected by which we judge it past and decayed For Example a Man that is present in a Foreign City seeth not only whole Streets but can also distinguish particular Houses and Parts of Houses but departed thence he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did some House or Turning escaping him yet is this to remember when afterwards there escape him more Particulars this is also to remember but not so well In Process of Time the Image of the City returneth but as a Mass of Building only which is almost to have forgotten it Seeing then Remembrance is more or less as we find more or less Obscurity Why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of Parts which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the Whole To see at a great Distance of Place and to remember at great Distance of Time is to have like Conceptions of the Thing for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance the other by Decay 8. And from this that hath been said there followeth That a Man can never know he dreameth he may dream he doubteth whether it be a Dream or no but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self and consequently he can take Notice of nothing but as present whereas to think he dreameth is to think those his Conceptions that is to say obscurer than they were in the Sense so that he must think them both as clear and not as clear as Sense which is impossible 9. From the same Ground it proceedeth that Men wonder not in their Dreams at Place and Persons as they would do waking for waking a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before and remember nothing of how he came there but in a Dream there cometh little of that kind into Consideration The Clearness of Conception in a Dream taketh away Distrust unless the Strangeness be excessive as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt and then most commonly he waketh 10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far deceived as when his Dream is past to think it real for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind and in such Order as he useth to do waking and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place were he findeth himself when he awaketh all which may happen I know no {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth or to take it for a Vision CHAP. IV. 1. Discourse 2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts 3. Ranging 4. Sagacity 5. Reminiscence 6. Experience 7. Expectation 8. Conjecture 9. Signs 10. Prudence 11. Caveats of concluding from Experience 1. THe Succession of Conceptions in the Mind Series or Consequence of one after another may be casual and incoherent as in Dreams for the most part and it may be orderly as when the former Thought introduceth the latter and this is Discourse of the Mind But because the Word Discourse is commonly taken for the Coherence and Consequence of Words I will to avoid Aequivocation call it Discursion 2. The Cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one Conception to another is their first Coherence or Consequence at that Time when they are produced by Sense As for Example from St. Andrew the Mind runneth to St. Peter because their Names are read together from S. Peter to a Stone for the same Cause from Stone to Foundation because we see them together and for the same Cause from Foundation to Church and from Church to People and from People to Tumult and according to this Example the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any
thence proceeding 1. SEeing the Succession of Conceptions in the Mind are caused as hath been said before by the Succession they had one to another when they were produced by the Senses and that there is no Conception that hath not bin produced immediately before or after innumerable others by the innumerable Acts of Sense it must needs follow that one Conception followeth not another according to our Election and the need we have of them but as it chanceth us to hear or see such Things as shall bring them to our Mind The Experience we have hereof is in such Brute Beasts which having the providence to hide the Remains and Superfluity of their Meat do nevertheless want the Remembrance of the Place where they hide it and thereby make no Benefit thereof in their Hunger but Man who in this Point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the Nature of Beasts hath observed and remembred the Cause of this Defect and to amend the same hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible Mark the which when he seeth it again may bring to his Mind the Thought he had when he set it up A Mark therefore is a sensible Object which a Man erecteth voluntarily to himself to the End to remember thereby somewhat past when the same is objected to his Sense again As men that have past by a Rock at Sea set up some Mark thereby to remember their former Danger and avoid it 2. In the Number of these Marks are those Humane Voices which we call the Names or Appellations of Things sensible by the Ear by which we recall into our Mind some Conceptions of the Things to which we gave those Names or Appellations as the Appellation White bringeth to remembrance the Quality of such Objects as produce that Colour or Conception in us A Name or Appellation therefore is the Voice of a Man arbitrary imposed for a Mark to bring into his Mind some Conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed 3. Things named are either the Objects themselves as a Man or the Conception it self that we have of Man as Shape and Motion or some Privation which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive not in him as when we conceive he is not just not finite we give him the Name of unjust of infinite which signifie Privation or Defect and to the Privations themselves we give the Names of Injustice and Infiniteness so that here be Two Sorts of Names One of Things in which we conceive something or of the Conceptions themselves which are called positive the other of Things wherein we conceive Privation or Defect and those Names are called Privative 4. By the Advantage of Names it is that we are capable of Science which Beasts for want of them are not nor Man without the Use of them for as a Beast misseth not one or two out of many her young Ones for want of those Names of order One Two and Three and which we call Number so neither would a Man without repeating orally or mentally the Words of Number know how many Pieces of Money or other Things lie before him 5. Seeing there be many Conceptions of one and the same Thing and for every Conception we give it a several Name it followeth that for one and the same Thing we have many Names or Attributes as to the same Man we give the Appellations of Just Valiant c. for divers Vertues of Strong Comely c. for divers Qualities of the Body And again because from divers Things we receive like Conceptions many Things must needs have the same Appellation as to all Things we see we give the same Name of Visible and to all Things we see moveable we give the Appellation of Moveable and those Names we give to many are called universal to them all as the Name of Man to every particular of Mankind such Appellation as we give to one only Thing we call individual or singular as Socrates and other proper Names or by Circumlocution he that writ the Iliads for Homer 6. The Universality of one Name to many Things hath been the Cause that Men think the Things are themselves universal and so seriously contend that besides Peter and John and all the rest of the Men that are have been or shall be in the World there is yet something else that we call Man viz. Man in general deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general Appellation for the thing it signifieth For if one should desire the Painter to make him the Picture of a Man which is as much as to say of a Man in general he meaneth no more but that the Painter should chuse what Man he pleaseth to draw which must needs be some of them that are or have been or may be none of which are universal But when he would have him to draw the Picture of the King or any particular Person he limiteth the Painter to that one Person he chuseth It is plain therefore that there is nothing universal but Names which are therefore called indefinite because we limit them not our selves but leave them to be applied by the Hearer whereas a singular Name is limited and restrained to one of the many Things it signifieth as when we say This Man pointing to him or giving him his proper Name or by some such other Way 7. The Appellations that be universal and common to many Things are not always given to all the particulars as they ought to be for like Conceptions and like Considerations in them all which is the Cause that many of them are not of constant Signification but bring into our Mind other Thoughts than these for which they were ordained and those are called aequivocal As for Example the Word Faith signifieth the same with Belief sometimes it signifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Christian and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a Promise Also all Metaphors are by Profession aequivocal and there is scarce any Word that is not made aequivocal by divers Contextures of Speech or by Diversity of Pronunciation and Gesture 8. This Aequivocation of Names maketh it difficult to recover those Conceptions for which the Name was ordained and that not only in the Language of other Men wherein we are to consider the Drift and Occasion and Contexture of the Speech as well as the Words themselves but also in our Discourse which being derived from the Custom and common Use of Speech representeth unto us not our own Conceptions It is therefore a great Ability in a Man out of the Words Contexture and other Circumstances of Language to deliver himself from Aequivocation and to find out the true Meaning of what it said And this is it we call Vnderstanding 9. Of two Appellations by the Help of this little Verb is or something equivalent we make an Affirmation or Negation either of which in the Schools we call also a Proposition and consisteth of two Appellations
Thing But as in the Sense the Conception of Cause and Effect may succeed one another so may they after Sense in the Imagination And for the most part they do so the Cause whereof is the Appetite of them who having a Conception of the End have next unto it a Conception of the next Means to that End As when a Man from a Thought of Honour to which he hath an Appetite cometh to the Thought of Wisdom which is the next Means thereunto and from thence to the Thought of Study which is the next Means to Wisdom 3. To omit that kind of Discursion by which we proceed from any Thing to any Thing there are of the other Kind divers Sorts As first in the Senses there are certain Coherences of Conceptions which we may call ranging Examples whereof are A Man casteth his Eye upon the Ground to look about for some small Thing lost the Hounds casting about at a Fault in hunting and the Ranging of Spaniels and herein we take a Beginning arbitrary 4. Another sort of Discursion is when the Appetite giveth a Man his Beginning as in the Example before where Honour to which a Man hath Appetite maketh him think upon the next Means of attaining it and that again of the next c. And this the Latines call Sagacitas and We may call Hunting or Tracing as Dogs trace Beasts by the Smell and Men hunt them by their Footsteps or as Men hunt after Riches Place or Knowledge 5. There is yet another Kind of Discursion beginning with the Appetite to recover something lost proceeding from the present backward from Thought of the Place where we miss at to the Thought of the Place from whence we came last and from the Thought of that to the Thought of a Place before till we have in our Mind some Place wherein we had the Thing we miss and this is called Reminiscence 6. The Remembrance of Succession of one Thing to another that is of what was antecedent and what consequent and what concomitant is called an Experiment whether the same be made by us voluntarily as when a Man putteth any Thing into the Fire to see what Effect the Fire will produce upon it or not made by us as when we remember a fair Morning after a red Evening To have had many Experiments is that we call Experience which is nothing else but Remembrance of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents 7. No man can have in his Mind a Conception of the future for the future is not yet but of our Conceptions of the past we make a future or rather call past future relatively Thus after a Man hath been accustomed to see like Antecedents follow by like Consequents whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any Thing he had seen before he looks there should follow it the same that followed then As for Example because a Man hath often seen Offences followed by Punishment when he seeth an Offence in present he thinketh Punishment to be consequent thereto but consequent unto that which is present Men call future And thus we make Remembrance to be the Prevision of Things to come or Expectation or Presumption of the future 8. In the same Manner if a Man seeth in present that which he hath seen before he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before is also antecedent to that he presently seeth As for Example He that hath seen the Ashes remain after the Fire and now again seeth ashes concludeth again there hath been Fire And this is called again Conjecture of the past or Presumption of the Fact 9. When a Man hath so often observed like Antecedents to be followed by like Consequents that whensoever he seeth the Antecedent he looketh again for the Consequent or when he seeth the Consequent maketh account there hath been the like Antecedent then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Consequent Signs one of another as Clouds are Signs of Rain to come and Rain of Clouds past 10. This taking of Signs by Experience is that wherein Men do ordinarily think the Difference stands between Man and Man in Wisdom by which they commonly understand a Mans whole Ability or Power cognitive but this is an Errour for the Signs are but conjectural and according as they have often or seldom failed so their Assurance is more or less but never full and evident for though a Man have always seen the Day and Night to follow one another hitherto yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so or that they have done so eternally Experience concludeth nothing universally If the Signs hit twenty times for one missing a Man may lay a Wager of Twenty to One of the Event but may not conclude it for a Truth But by this it is plain that they shall conjecture best that have most Experience because they have most Signs to conjecture by which is the Reason old Men are more prudent that is conjecture better caeteris paribus than young for being old they remember more and Experience is but remembrance And men of quick imagination caeteris paribus are more prudent than those whose Imaginations are slow for they observe more in less Time Prudence is nothing but Conjecture from Experience or taking of Signs from Experience warily that is that the Experiments from which he taketh such Signs be all remembred for else the Cases are not alike that seem so 11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future it is Prudence to conclude from Experience what is like to come to pass or to have passed already so it is an errour to conclude from it that it is so or so called that is to say We cannot from Experience conclude that any Thing is to be called just or unjust true or false or any Proposition universal whatsoever except it be from Remembrance of the Use of Names imposed arbitrarily by Men For Example to have heard a Sentence given in the like Case the like Sentence a thousand times is not enough to conclude that the Sentence is just though most Men have no other Means to conclude by But it is necessary for the drawing of such Conclusion to trace and find out by many Experiences what Men do mean by calling Things just and unjust Further there is another Caveat to be taken in concluding by Experience from the tenth Section of the second Chapter that is That we conclude such Things to be without that are within us CHAP. V. 1. Of Marks 2. Names or Appellations 3. Names positive and privative 4. Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Science 5. Names universal and singular 6. Vniversals not in Rerum Natura 7. Aequivocal Names 8. Vnderstanding 9. Affirmation Negation Proposition 10. Truth Falsity 11. Ratiocination 12. According to Reason against Reason 13. Names Causes of Knowledge so of Errour 14. Translation of the Discourse of the Mind into the Discourse of the Tongue and of the Errours