that which bendeth to it it argueth that it is good You may reject my definition of Good because according to it it follows that God is conserved by his creatures since he is known to bend to them In no wise for God doth not properly bend to his creatures because he is every where with them But Gods creatures may be properly said to bend to him because bending doth follow a need and want of conservation which need being in all his creatures but not in God they do bend to their Creator IV. To avoid falsities and errors in this nice point it will not be amisse for you to observe a distinction between these two predicates to be good and to do good These are oftentimes confounded by many Divines and so thereby they fall into gross errors To be good denotes a formality of good as it doth concur to the further constitution of a Being by its modality To do good is an action whereby effects are produced from a good Being Now these actions are called good because they proceed from a good Being and not because they are essentially good and constitute an essential difference from its Being So that good actions are signs of goodnesse in a Being and not the goodnesse it self To do good therefore is onely to act from a good principle and to give signs of the goodnesse of a Being This distinction proveth very usefull and expedient to the discussing of the doubts touching Free-will Annex to this observation that in a large sense Moral good is taken for good as it is defined above and extendeth to other creatures than unto man onely for this reason because Moral good as it is synonimous to a mean and inferiour good is become so to all in being changed from the highest good through the deffecting of man from his highest good to a mean or moral good In a strict sense it is taken for the goodnesse of man in his actions or manners onely V. How doth Moral Good turn to Moral Evil This Question may be variously understood First as good importeth a natural good in the second acception and as it denotes a goodnesse in the Being and not in its action in this sense moral good cannot change into moral evil because nothing doth corrupt it self I mean its own Being and Essence If moral good is taken for a moral good action then it is coincident with a true action which is such as God doth require from us and is conformable to that action in which God did create us I say in which for all beings are created to be in action and not through which because that specifieth Creation According to this acception then are morally good actions said to be such as are true or conformable to their Pattern If these actions are false and difformable from their Pattern then they become evil These actions do proceed from a free cause and not necessary for then man could never have committed any evil The freedome of this causality consisteth in an indifferency to Good and Evil. The state of man wheren he is at present is neutral that is natural which is a state neither supernatural or preternatural I prove it A supernatural state is wherein man is most good or consisteth of good in the highest degree A Preternatural state is wherein a man is at the worst or consisteth of evil in the lowest degree But a man in a natural state is neither most good nor worst in evil Therefore he must needs be in a neutral state VI. Man as he is in a natural state is in a middle state between super-natural and preter-natural I prove it is a property of a Middle or Medium to participate of both extreams But man in a natural state participates of both the others Ergo He is in a middle state I confirm the Minor The good which man doth act is not the best good neither is the evil which man acteth the worst evil for the Devils act worse Ergo It participateth somewhat of good in the highest degree and of evil in the worst Or the actions which a natural man performeth are neither the worst or the best Therefore it participates of each Another property of a natural or middle state is to have a disposition or capacity of becoming to be either of its extreams This I prove also to be in man as he is in this present state Many natural men are glorified and many are damned Ergo A natural man hath a disposition to either Moral Evil doth corrupt a man in that it partially destroyeth his perfection Moral Evil is either an Evil of the soul or body or of both CHAP. V. Of Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Theologick Good 2. An Explication of the Definition of Theologick Evil. 3. What honest usefull and pleasant Good is 4. What Natural Sensible and Moral Good is 1. THeologick Good doth perfectionate a man in a supernatural state only For a natural man as long as he doth continue in a natural state cannot be theologically good or do a good act that is theologically good A supernatural state is wherein a man is above his natural state and is at his greatest perfection II. Theologick Evil is directly contrary to Theologick Good Neither is it possible that both these should be in one subject there being no greater contraries than Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. They are most remote from one another so that there is an infinite proportion of distance between them Theologick Evil doth make a man worst he cannot be worse than when he is theologically evil neither is there then any capacity or disposition remaining in him whereby he may be changed into Good So likewise a man who is Theologically Good hath no disposition to Theologick Evil. Theologick Good implieth a triple Good 1. It imports a Theological good cause or which doth make a man perfect in a supernatural state and so God is the only Theologick Good 2. It is taken for a Being which is theologically Good or for a Being which is at its greatest perfection and so may man in his entire state be termed Theologically Good 3. It may be understood for an action which is Theologically Good that is true and conformable to its pattern and of this Good is man also capable in a supernatural state The Theologick Good which is in God is called Good through it self or Bonum per se. This Bonum is otherwise called Summum Bonum objectivum or Beatitudo objectiva But the joy which we receive from that objective happinesse is called Beatitudo formalis The Theologick Good which was in all his creatures is a Derivative Good or Bonum per participationem The Peripateticks divide Good in that which is honest usefull and pleasant Honest Good Bonum bonestum is which is agreeable to Right Reason and therefore they say it is Desirable through it self 2. Useful Good is that which is desired for its
both particularly to man for whose sake the same extended also to other creatures We are likewise to remember man in his twofold state to wit of Integrity and Deficience Gods Ordination then upon man was that he and all other Animals and Vegetables for his sake should encrease after their own kind during mans Integrity This Ordination upon Gods Creatures is answered and effected by Powers and Dispositions created by him in them According to which Powers all Creatures acted All the Actions of man did therefore depend from his Powers to wit his Propagation from his Generative Power which again was subjected to his Phansie and that to his will and understanding Wherefore as long as his will and understanding did will and understand nothing but what was perfect his Phansie could receive no other Impression but of Perfections which could not cause any Errour in the Generative power and therefore had man abided in his entire state he nor any other Creatures could have generated Monsters Man having through his deficience corrupted his Faculties no wonder if their Acts are also corrupted and their effects corrupted and corruptible Hence then it is beyond scruple that Gods Ordination did immediately relate to the Powers of all Creatures and herein are all beings true and answerable to their end and therefore perfect You may urge an Inconvenience to follow this Solution because thereby God seems to be the original cause of Monsters or evil for if God had conferred perfect powers upon man man could not have changed them of himself wherefore God must be supposed to alter them dispositions and faculties I Answer That God was not the original cause of this alteration but man himself through his sin which therefore was the first impulsive cause 'T is certain that God was the efficient cause of this Alteration of Powers yet Gods Act was not evil therein but good and perfect because his Justice did require it for this change upon man was his punishment If so none can or will attribute the evil following a punishment of a Malefactor to him that punisheth or to the punishment it self but to the Malefactor whose Default and Crime was the cause of that evil which befel him after his punishment IV. Austin in the 5th Chap. 2 Book of his Soliloquies states the Description of Truth Truth is that which it is and in the same Chapter openeth his meaning Truth is that which is so in it self as it appeareth to him that perceiveth it if he will and can perceive it Hence do Hurtad Disp. 7. Met. Sect. 1. and Soar Disp. 7 Sect. 5. infer the Nature of Truth to consist in a cognoscibility of a being to the understanding of that which it is This Opinion as it is obscure so it is expos'd to doubts if not to falshood The truth of a man doth not consist in my knowing a man to be a man and that he is no other thing but a man for that is a quidditative Concept of a man namely to know him to be a man but to know a man to be that which he was intended for is the concept of his truth Wherefore Soar in the same Chapter doth well recal himself in asserting that truth is relative to created and increated Knowledge Truth doth not superadd extrinsecally ex parte actus any denomination really distinct from a being since it is concurrent to the constituting of the nature of a being for take away truth and you take away the essence of a being V. Falshood is defined by most Philosophers to be that which appears to be that which it is not It is strange that falshood which is not in rerum natura should be defined It is not in rerum natura because all beings are true If it can be defined it is a being For nothing is definible unless it is a being had it been described by a Negative then indeterminatively we might have perceived it as thus Falshood is which doth not appear to be that which it is or which it was intended for I say indeterminatively because we know a falsum falshood to be a falshood because it doth not determinate our Concept through its truth so that this is a privative or accidental knowledge CHAP. XVIII Of Goodness 1. What Goodness is The Improbation of several Definitions of Goodness 2. The Difference between Goodness and Perfection 3. What Evil is 4. What the absolute active End of Goodness is 5. That Goodness is improperly divided in Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness 6. How Goodness is properly divided 7. That the Division of Good in Honest Delectable c. doth belong to Ethicks I. GOodness is an Attribute of a Being whereby it is for an end Many Philosophers do omit the Definition of Goodness because they can find no distinction between Truth and Goodness Others define it to be a convenience of a being with the Appetite which is erroneous for Goodness is in a being that is a partial being without the Appetite 2. Goodness is absolute a Convenience is relative Timpl. Chap. 9. of his Metaph. 2 Book defines Goodness to be an act of Good as far as it is good or is a Quality from which a being is denominated Good This is Idem per Idem and Obscurum per Obscurius II. Goodness is formally distinct from Perfection because a being according to what it is good only is not perfect Wherefore Goodness is erroneously defined by some to be a Perfection III. Evil Malum is that which doth not appear to us to be for any End IV. The Absolute active End of Goodness is to constitute that which it is The Passive is to be constitured that which it is V. Goodness is improperly divided into Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness because Good is that which is essential of it self to a being and therefore cannot be accidental as it is opposite to Essential It may be an Essential part because it concurs with the rest of the Attributes to the constitution of the Essence of a Being VI. Goodness is divisible according to the divisibility of a being which is either Natural Animal or Humane VII The Division of Goodness into Honest Delectable and Profitable or Useful doth not appertain to this Doctrine but is referred to Ethicks CHAP. XIX Of Distinction 1. The Authors Description of Distinction That the privative sense of not being moved is a Note of Distinction whereby the understanding distinguishes a Non Ens from an Ens. That the Positive sense of being moved in another manner than another Ens moves the understanding is a Note of Distinction between one Being and another 2. How Distinction is divided What a real Distinction is 3. What a Modal Difference is 4. That the vulgar Description of a real Distinction is Erroneous 5. That the terms of a Distinction between two or more real beings are requisite both or more to exist 6. That one term of Distinction although in existence cannot be really predicated of another not
A Theologick good act is such as God doth require from us and as he first gave man a power of acting it since then we have not such a power as God first gave unto man of acting good it followeth that we cannot act such good acts through our selves as God doth require from us XIV Man hath a free-will of doing a Theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him If God doth concur with man in his actions in an extraordinary manner no doubt but God can and doth make them Theologically good that is good in the highest perfection and such as he himself doth require from us Man being so assisted through the extraordinary assistance of God acteth freely notwithstanding for it is still in his choice whether he will do such a Theologick good act or not When God doth assist us in an extraordinary manner it is not without our free-will for we must first will and desire it with a burning desire before God will assist us which burning desire doth move him to assist us neither will God refuse us because he is most good and most mercifull Now then when this desire ceaseth in us then Gods extraordinary assistance ceaseth with it if then we can forbear this desire and continue it we have still our free-wils Besides we also have a free-will of election that is of making choice of one good object before another XV. 1. Man as he is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance with and to him in his actions The means whereby a natural man doth appropriate it is by fervent prayer so that man having a free-will of procuring Gods extraordinary concurrence hath a free-will mediately to act a Theologick good act Before I prove the first branch of this sub-Conclusion you are to mark that we can do no action at all through our selves alone without the ordinary concurrence of God with us for God hath not given us an absolute power of being and acting without the concurrence of his preservating and assisting power if he had he would have given all the power over us out of his hands which is impossible and unsuitable to the King of Kings to give away all his Glory Honour and Dominion Again had he done so we should have returned the thanks due for so great a goodness in envying and reviling of him Wherefore it followeth that God hath reserved a preservating and assisting power to himself without which we cannot continue in our beings or do any action If the first man could have been and acted through himself and that without Gods assistance he could never have died but since that he died and could not maintain himself in his being and in that most perfect Essence wherein he was created without adhering to Gods power therefore he having deserted that power but for a moment and confiding upon his own immediately fell and was almost utterly corrupted and lost if then that the first man in that perfect Essence could not subsist or act through himself alone without Gods aid much less can we in this deflected state and weak nature subsist or act without Gods assistance This assistance is Gods ordinary assistance for were it extraordinary we should then act as perfectly as the first man did before his deficience 2. After the probation of the necessity of Gods ordinary and extraordinary concurrence I come now to prove that man being assisted with Gods ordinary power can and doth procure Gods extraordinary concurrence Man as he is in a natural state may and doth know that he hath still some spark of Theologick good remaining in him for all men can and do know naturally that there is a God that there is a Law enjoyned by God upon men as his subjects that that Law is perfect that his actions are observed and acknowledged by him to be evil and sinfull that through himself without Gods extraordinary aid he cannot act that which God doth require from him that God is Almighty good and mercifull and therefore God will not deny any request of good proceeding from a spark of Theologick good because therein man hath still something in him through which he resembleth God which God will not abolish and hath tyed himself through his bountifull promises not to destroy All these acts and knowledges proceed from a Theologick good principle and therefore man is partly Theologically good to whom if he useth that natural power and means remaining in him God will not deny a supply against his defect The natural power and means which a man doth naturally and ordinarily put in action to procure Gods extraordinary assistance is his power of praying with zeal and earnestness for a man whenever he is in danger great need and intollerable pain doth naturally beg and implore help Therefore a zealous and earnest praying is a natural power which nature doth prompt us to and means to procure Gods extraordinary assistance Lastly From all this it is undoubtedly true and evident that man through himself and with the ordinary concurss of God with him doth and can procure Gods extraordinary assistance Which having procured he hath a free-will of acting theologick good 3. That which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last A thing may properly be said to be good although at last it changeth into evil and corruption for as a Tree which is a good natural thing changeth to an intire corruption when it dieth so a natural man whilest he liveth is morally good and doth moral good acts but when he dieth he becomes entirely corrupted and altogether evil that is theologically evil XVI 4. To shut up this succinct dispute of free-will I say That man without free-will is no man but a Beast That man might justly be excused for his evil acts for had he no principle whereby he acted freely but did act necessarily and by compulsion or coaction of the Divine power he could not act evil it being impossible to God to act evil or if man did act evil it would be without a will and therefore it could be no sinne that man could not be termed the cause of his moral actions but God Many other inconveniencies and absurdities do ensue in denying this truth which to produce will prove tedious By this we may easily reconcile the Calvinists with the Arminians The Calvinists may rightly say That man through himself cannot act a good act that is cannot act a theological good act with the ordinary concurrence of God only The Arminians may with no lesse confidence assert That man hath a free will of doing good through himself that is hath a means and principle resting in him whereby he may mediately do a theologick good act through himself and by that means may procure God's extraordinary concurrence but the greatest controversie probable to arise between them in my opinion is
free-will might be allowed and yet not be repugnant to Gods fore-knowledge for thought he doth God fore-know our actions then man must act necessarily and consequently infers the truth of Fate but since he could not grant a Fate over men because he saw they acted contingently therefore he did impiously rob God of his fore-knowledge Hence saith Austin de Civ D. Lib. 5. cap. 9. Atque it a dum vult facere liberos fecit sacrilegos and so since he endeavoureth to make men free-willers he makes them commit sacriledge As for this doubt it is little touched upon by Christians who certainly know that God fore-knoweth contingent things as contingent and to fall out contingently Necessary things as necessary and to fall out necessarily Psalm 33. 14. 1 Sam. 10. 9 26. Prov. 21. 1. Exod. 12. 13. Prov. 16. 33. Matth. 10. This subject is very well treated of by Anselmus in his Book of God's fore-knowledge and predestination This by the way And now I return to prove that God's Predestination is in no wise coactive upon the will of man for then the will of man would be a not willing Voluntas esset noluntas God is most just in predestinating man through Election and of his grace and mercy to salvation Eph 1. 5 6. and in predestinating others through reprobation and of his justice to damnation 2 Cor. 13. 5. Because his predestination is founded upon his fore-knowledge God therefore fore-knowing the evil wherein man is enhardened doth predestinate him to damnation This I prove God damneth man of his justice and God's justice hath a particular respect to man's evil actions Wherefore it is of God's justice and for man's sinne or evil actions that he is damned That God's justice hath a particular respect to judge and punish man with damnation for his sins the Scripture doth evidently testifie Luc. 12. 47 48. Aud that servant which knew his Lords will and prepared not himself neither did according to his will shall be beaten with many stripes Ergo Man is punished for not doing the Lord's will and not because he was predestinated without God's fore-knowledge of his evil and unbelief Matth. 11. 21. Mat. 25. 41 42. Here Christ pronounceth the sentence of everlasting damnation against the wicked because they had not done his will in feeding the hungry and cloathing the naked Gen. 2. 17. Deut. 7. 26. Exod. 32. 33. So then if God doth damn man onely for his trespasses and sinnes he doth also for the same reason predestinate him to damnation Again Were God's predestination the sole and first moving cause of mans reprobation then Adam could have had no free-will of remaining in the state of innocency or of deflecting to the state of sinne but must necessarily and coactively have deflected to the state of depravation because God had predestinate him to it This assertion is impious Ergo God's predestination is not the first moving cause of man's reprobation What should God predestinate man to damnation without fore-knowing his guilt or without being thereunto moved through the fore-knowledge of his sinne then these Texts would be written to no purpose Hos. 6. 6. Ephes. 4. 22 23 24 c. John 3. 16 17 18. John 3. 36. Rom. 9. 22 23. Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O house of Israel Wherefore it is not of God's purpose to damn any unlesse being moved to it of his justice through their unbelief Likewise the Scripture doth reveal that predestination to life eternal is of God's grace and justice being thereunto moved by the saith of the righteous Mat. 9. 22. Rom. 4. 20 21. Ephes. 3. 12. Mat. 9. 2. Gal. 2. 20. Ephes. 2. 8 9. First Summarily I say that God's Will Decree and Predestination is the efficient cause of Reprobation and Election his grace mercy and justice are the moving causes Man's unbelief and belief are the objects of this motion in which or upon which and by which the fore-mentioned moving causes are moved which objects God fore-knowing determinates mans salvation or damnation from all eternity Wherefore we may observe that in many places of Scripture where predestination is held forth that God's fore-knowledge of mans belief or unbelief doth precede Rom. 8. 29. For whom he did fore-know he also predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son What can be more evident Secondly Faith or good works for saith it self is the best of works and the fountain of all good works are the means whereby we are saved yet it is not faith or good works which dâ— meritoriously or efficiently save us but God is the efficient cause of our salvation Rom. 4. 6. So likewise unbelief which is the worst of works and the original of all evil works and sins or Atheismis the means through which we are damned yet it is not that which is the principal moving cause of our damnation but God's justice which doth reject and predestinate man to damnation Rom. â— 8. Thirdly God's will is either absolute whereby he can will all things and this is concomitant to Gods absolute power whereby he can do all things although they never are effected for if he can do them he hath also a power of willing them although he doth not will all them things which he can will or his ordained will whereby he willeth that which he doth will This ordained will is unchangeable hence God is said to have loved because he loved that is when God willeth to love he cannot but love because he willeth it and therefore his will is unchangeable God's ordained will is that man shall be saved through his belief and therefore cannot but save a believer because his will endureth for ever and is unchangeable Wherefore I said in the first Assertion That man's belief moved God's mercy because God hath willed it through his ordained will otherwise were it not for this what could man's belief avail in meriting salvation for at the best we are but unprofitable servants Luc. 17. 10. and so man's unbelief moveth God's justice to damne him because God willeth justice Wherfore I conceive that belief and unbelief are remote moving causes as from us by which we move God's mercy and justice And that God's mercy and justice are moving causes as from himself Fourthly Man hath then a power of disposing and preparing himself partially to and for the admission of God's extraordinary concurss and to a conversion from the state of sinne to the state of grace for to what effect or end would all the reachings of Ministers serve All their exhortations their labour and pains would be to no purpose 1. They strive to bend men into a care for their salvation by working that carnal security out of them according to that of Acts 2. 37. 16. 33. 2. They lay the Law
may be dtawn from their own words although it was against their intentions The Synod held at Rochel in the year 1607. in the moneth of March rendreth her self in these words as further appears by their Confession We believe that whole mankind ever since Adam is corrupted with such an infection as original sinne is to wit an original defect And in the 11th Artie We believe that this defect is a sinne and is sufficient to damn whole mankind from the highest to the lowest yea moreover the Infants in their Mothers womb What can any body apprehend by this original defect but an actual sin or how could Infants be guilty of it CHAP. XX. Of the manner of Man's multiplication 1. The state of the controversie 2. That the Rational Soul is not generated or produced by generation That there are three kinds of productions out of nothing 3. That the Soul is not propagated either from the Father or Mother 4. That impious opinion concluding the Rational Soul to be generated tanquam ex traduce confuted 5. An Objection against the Authors opinion answered 6. That the foetus before the advent of the Rational Soul is informated with a form analogal to a sentient form 7. That God is the remote cause of man's generation 8. That man doth generate man naturally and per se. 9. The opinion of Austin Jerome and others upon this matter 1. I Had almost in the last Chapter fallen unawares into that intricate Controversie about man's multiplication and increase but fore seeing the extent of it I thought it fitter to retire my self to this Chapter and treat of it here singly Man consisteth of body and soul as touching the body there is no doubt made of it but that it is propagated tanquam ex traduce All the stumbling is at the rational soul whether she be infused or propagated in like manner as the body or I may state the Question thus Whether the soul of man is created or produced by generation Conclus The Rational Soul is not generated or produced through generation I prove it That which is indivisible is produced in an indivisible part of time namely in an instant But the Soul of man is indivisible and therefore is produced in an instant Again that which is produced in an instant is created and not generated Because generation doth follow alteration which is by succession Ergo The Soul would not be constituted in an instant but successively and consequently would be corporeal 2. If the Soul had a power of generating a Soul it had also a power of destroying it by means contrary to those wherby she had produced it 3. Generatio unius est corruptio alterius vice versa Ergo Quicquid est generabile est corruptibile The generation of one form or being is the corruption of another and the corruption of one is the generation of the other Ergo What ever is generable is corruptible and what ever is corruptible is generable So then when ever the soul is generated another soul or form is corrupted And when the soul is corrupted another form or soul is generated which may be as the Indians hold the soul of an horse or of an asse c. and so the soul is made material To this possibly your answer will be That it is so in natural productions but not in supernatural I ask you then Why do you object this for an argument to prove the propagation of the soul viz. that man Homo generat sibi similem doth generate his like otherwise he would be inferiour to a beast Ergo You assert that man doth generate naturally like unto other creatures 4. If otherwise to generate its like were a property belonging to supernatural beings then Angels would have a power of generating other Angels which they have not Or if this power of generating were onely superadded to one kind of supernatural beings namely to souls then a soul would be more noble than an Angel 5. There are but two wayes of producing a substance to wit è materia praeexistente vel è nihilo out of a preexistent matter or out of nothing What is the soul produced out of a preexistent matter as out of a potentia eductiva If you grant this you expose your self to be suspected for a Plinianist and to assert the soul to be material Ergo It must be created out of nothing Now there are three kinds of productions out of nothing 1. Enihilo termini ulterioris sed aliquo materiae 2. Enihilo materiae sed aliquo termini 3. Enihilo materiae nihilo termini Here you must take terminus for forma for what is it that doth terminate the matter but the form and so the world was created ex aliquo materia sed nihilo termini for it was created out of the Chaos which was a rude matter without an ulterior forma or terminus After the same manner was the body of man created for neither the Chaos or dust out of which man was created had an ultimate form Neither are you to imagine here that generation and this kind of creation is one for although in generation there is not that form existent in the matter which is intended in it yet generation is ab aliquo formae ultimae in eadem materia praeexistent is The last kind of creation is exemplified by the creation of the Chaos of the dust of Angels and of Souls This manner of production is proper only to an infinite power But you may demand Why cannot God invest the soul with this power I answer It is impossible to God Non simpliciter sed secundum quid and to the nature of the soul. As to God it is impossible because should he confer his infinite power upon man he would make him equal to himself 2. It is impossible to the nature of the soul because she being limited cannot be unlimited or infinite at the same time Omne quod est idem quod est necesse est esse IV. Were the soul extraduce then she would be propagated either from the Father or Mother or from both Not from the Father for then the rational soul would be inherent in the geniture at the same moment of conception which all grant is not then from the Mother as James Hostius his opinion was which is absurd for all grant that the Mother is a passive and the Father an active principle besides if so men's souls would be extreamly weak not from both for then the soul would be of a mixt nature which is no lesse absurd Give me leave here to examine Sealiger's notion which Sennert Kyper and others do assume to demonstrate the manner of the souls propagation Seal Exerc. 6. D. 11. An anima catelli sit pars animae patris Cur non dividitur ad materiae divisionem material is anima totaque est in sui parte quod in plant is manifestum est Gignit autem animam anima sui promotione eadem sanè ratione
is Water and Ayr mixt together in such a proportion that the tenuity of the air may render the water attenuated and fluid that so it may be apt to penetrate through the depth of the Mixture for otherwise water of it self is of that thickness that it exceeds Ice or Chrystal Now this Ayr incrassated or Water attenuated doth open and expand the density of the earth makes way for the fire to enter and at last retaines the whole mixture in a coherence and compactness Of this more hereafter Again A body consists of the same Principles or Elements into which it is dissolveable but all natural bodies are dissolveable into the first Elements therefore all bodies consist of the said first Elements I shall only instance in some few examples for proof of the Minor Milk in its dissolution is changed into Curds which through their weight go down to the bottom are analogal to earth 2. Into Butter which containeth in it incrassated ayir and fire for it is also inflammable a sign of fire Lastly Into Whey which is responding to attenuated water The like is observable in Blood dividing it self into Melancholy expressing earth in its weight colour and Substance for drying it it becomes perfect Sand into Choler agreeing with fire in its motive and alterative qualities into pure blood through its gluing quality or lentor not unlike to incrassated ayr Lastly into Flegm or Phlegme resembling water Doth not the ordinary division of mans body in spirits impetum facientes humors and solid parts demonstrate its composition or constitution out of the Elements For the Spirits are nothing else but fire and ayr Humors contain most water and the solid parts most earth The Spagyrick Art proves the same by distillation through which water Spirits and Oyl the two latter being made up most of Fire and Ayr are separated from the Caput mortuum Sal fixum or earth and Subsidencies 'T is true Sal Sulphur and Mercurius are different Names but re ipsa are the Elements What is Sal but Earth Sulphur but fire and ayr Mercurius but water Hereby I have not only proved the existence of elements but also their Number nominatim atque in specie III. Give me leave to expound the Definition in the first place quantum ad nomen In the word Element is considerable its Etymology from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 capio quod element a in sese omnia capiunt mixta It s name is likewise homonymous in a large sense promiscuously convertibiliter denoting a Principle or Cause In a strict sense it is differing from both Eudemus Alexander and Thomas Aq. opiniate that through Principle Principium is only meant an agent cause through Cause a formal and final Cause through elements Matter Averrhoes and Albert. by Principles intend an efficient cause through Causes final Causes by elements Matter and Form Generally Principles are understood to be of a larger extent then Causes and Causes then elements So that Aristotle B. 5. of Metaph. Ch. 1. describes a Principle to be that from whence a thing is is made or is known by this you see that a principle is of a more large signification then either of the others but a cause is which contributeth to the being of a thing either by substituting it self for a Subject as the Matter or through actuating and giving it an essence and its consequence as the Form or by determining it to an end as the final cause IV. The distinction which I have made between them is that cause is of a larger extent then Principles are taken in Physicks but in Theology a Principle is larger then it these denoting the internal causes of a natural being as matter and form but remotely as I have already hinted Elements point out to sensible and immediate internal causes of a natural being V. A natural cause is which hath a vertue of acting naturally or which acteth according to that power which God hath conferred upon it at its first Creation So that Van Helmont saith well in his Physic. Arist. Dist. 3. Ego vero credo naturam jussum Dei quo res est id quod est agit quod agere jussa est But I believe that Nature is Gods Command through which a thing is that which it is and acteth that which it is commanded to act They are Causes to wit internal causes or principles of a being because they contribute themselves to the constitution of that being I said out of which because they are the matter of all natural beings and through which because they are also the Form of all the said beings How they are or become so you may expect to read below The elements are described and taken singly or separately ratione only or ex supposito and not realiter for they never did exist singly neither could they exist so supposing they were created in that nature in which they were because of their relative forms but confusedly in the Chaos Aristotle nameth the bodies constituted by those mixt bodies as if they were different from naturals but that was only to make good the first part of his Metaphysical Physicks and thereby to distinguish them from the others namely his proper and elementary Physicks VI. Three causes do concur to the production of a natural being whereof two are internal to wit natural matter and form the other is external namely the Efficient I prove the necessity of these three first there must be a Subject or Matter out of which a being is produced for ex nihilo nihil fit out of nothing nothing can be produced But I instance in some particulars the good wives know that for to make a Pudding they need Matter namely Flower Eggs c. to make it out of or to build a House a Mason will require Stones for his Matter c. Now when they have these materials they endeavour to make somthing of them that is to introduce a new thing shape or face into it or educe a new thing out of it which locution is more proper then the former it being the efficient doth ex intrinseco quasi formam educere and what is that but the Form And lastly Experience tels us that quod nihil fit a seipso nothing is produced from it self but from another which is the Efficient as in the building of a house you may have stones and Morter for your matter yet unless a Mason who is the Efficient place them together and introduce or rather educe the form of a House the matter will abide matter CHAP. V. Of New Philosophy and the Authours of it 1. Helmontius his Arrogance and Vainglory How and wherein he rejects the Peripatetick Philosophy His own Principles 2. The Life and Death of the said Helmontius 3. A Confutation of all his Physical Principles in particular 4. Some few Arguments against Rerè des Cartes his Principles in general I. I Thought fit to make a stop in my Discourse and before I proceed
any further to propose the Opinions of others concerning the first Principles Elements and Constitution of natural Bodies Baptista van Helmont impropriating the knowledge of true Philosophy and Physick to himself alone cals Hippocrates Galen Aristotle and all other wise men Fooles and terms their Dictates figments but withal propounds new foundations of Philosophy and Physick threatning a great danger to those who did obstinately adhere to their Tenents and promising an infinite treasure to such as should receive his Wherefore I shall first contractly relate his Philosophick Principles then examine them Fol. 33. of his Ort. Med. Dist. 3. He reproves the heathens for falsly teaching the Number of Elements to be four as also for asserting three Principles to wit Matter Form and Privation All things saith he are idle empty and dead and therefore stand only in need of a vital and seminal Principle which besides life have also an order in them He denieth the four Genders of Causes the first matter the causality of a form receiving it for an effect alone Further he states only two causes namely Matter and her internal Agent Efficient or Archeus In the same place he terms Matter a co-agent not a subject which he saith was improperly attributed to her by Philosophers And in Dist. 21. he denieth the congress of the four Elements yea not of two of them to concur to the constitution of mixt bodies His two Causes or Principles he cals bodies in one place in another as you may read below he detracts it from the latter The first of the said Principles is called ex quo out of which the latter per quod through which Dist. 23. he concludes water to be a beginning out of which initium ex quo and the Ferment to be the seminal beginning through which that is Disposing whence the Semen Seed is immediately produced in the matter which it having acquired becometh through it life or the media materia the middle matter of that being extending to the period of the thing it self or to the last matter Dist. 24. The Ferment is a created formal being which is neither a Substance or Accident but neither in the manner of light fire magnal forms c. created from the beginning of the world in the places of their Monarchy for to prepare and excite the semina seeds and to precede them I consider the ferments to be truly and actually existing and to be individually distinguisht through Species kinds Wherefore the ferments are Gifts and Roots establisht from the Lord the Creator to all ages being sufficient and durable through their continual propagation that they might raise and make seeds proper to themselves out of the water to wit wherein he gave the earth a virtue of germinating he gave it as many ferments as there are expectations of fruits Wherefore the ferments produce their own seeds and not others That is each according to its Nature and Properties as the Poet saith For nature is underneath the earth Neither doth all ground bring forth all things For in all places there is a certain order placed from God a certain manner and unchangeable root of producing some determinate effects or fruits not only of Vegetables but also of Minerals and Insects For the bottomes of the earth and its Properties differ and that for some cause which is connatural and coeval to that earth This I do attribute namely to the formal ferment that is created therein Whence consequently several fruits bud forth and break out of themselves in several places whose seeds we see being carried over to other places come forth more weakly like to an undercast child That which I have said concerning the ferment cast into the earth the same you shall also find in the Ayr and the Water The difference which there is between the ferment and efficient is that the former is the remote Principle of Generation and produceth the latter which is the semen which is the immediate active Principle of a thing Here you have a Synopsis of his Philosophy which in the progress throughout his Book he repeats ad nauseam usque II. When I first took a view of the Title of his Volume which was The Rise of Medicine that is The unheard of Beginnings of Physick A new Progress of Medicine to a long Life for the revenge of Diseases by the Author John Babtista van Helmont Governour in Merode Royenlorch Oorschot Pellines c. He might be Governour of himself in those places but not of c. I wonder what those places signified since the people of Brussel admired upon what his Heir liveth This old man in his life-time was strangely melancholy and by Fits transported into Phanatick Extasies questionless had he been of a Religious House he would much have added by help of these Raptures to the incredible Bulk of the Golden Legends but his Daemon turned them to Physick He had a great Design in Christening his Son Mercurius to have made another Trismegistus of him and not unlikely for wherever he is he is all-knowing I was much abused by the Title of his Tract hoping to have found a new sound Archologia and lighting upon ignorance of Terms abuse of words but a most exact Orthography limiting almost every second word with a Comma or a stop as being measured by his asâ—matick breathing The Fame which he deserved from his Countrey-folkes was equal to a famous Mountebank The Church-yard was the surer Register of his Patients His Arrogance and Boastings were Symptomes of his depravate conceptions His Cruelty fell it last upon his own bowels through which he lost his Life for the neglect of very ordinary means This is the account I had at Brussels of his Life and Transactions which I thought was not unworthy of my insertion in this place thereby to disadvise some from a rash belief to his vain words that so they might avoid the same Dangers and Cruelties upon their own and other mens Lives III. But in reference to his Dictates He rejects the number of four Elements without proposing any Argument for Confutation He denieth the existence of a first matter also without giving proof for the contrary Both which we have already demonstrated The form is an effect saith he and not a cause this argueth his misseapprehension of a cause and effect for most Authors agree that a cause in a large sense is whatever produceth an effect now the form produceth an effect in giving a specification to the whole It seems he intends nothing for a cause unless it be really distinct from its effect which in a strict and proper sense may be allowed but if granted nevertheless he is in an Errour for asserting Matter and the Archeus to be causes neither of which are really distinct from the being constituted by them Further it is no reason that because the form is an effect therefore it can be no cause for all beings in respect to their own production are effects and yet
spirits How the Air happens to burst through a sudden great light That a sudden great Light may blind kill or cast a man into an Apoplexy 8. How Light renders all Objects visible Why a piece of Money cast into a Basin filled with water appears bigger than it is The causes of apparent Colours Why a great Object appears but small to one afar off The difference between lux and lumen What a Beam is What a Splendour is That the Lights begot by the Stars and other flames are not distinguished specie How the Coelum Empyreum is said to be Lucid. I. VVE are now to ennumerate and unfold the remaining qualities risen from the mixture of the Elements such are Light Colours Sounds Odors and Sapors We will first begin with Light as being the excellentest among them Light is a quality emanating from flaming fire A flame is nothing else but incrassated Air expanded and deducted in rotundity by condensed fire which is detained and imprisoned within the foresaid qualified Air. The difficulties requiring illustration are 1. How the fire comes to be condensed 2. How imprisoned 3. Why the Air doth immediately surround it 4. How light is propagated and the manner of its action As to the first Fire I have told you will not burn unless it be condensed for being naturally rare it penetrates through the incrassated Air with ease but being condensed it doth not because it is adjoyned to a heavy gross body namely the minima's of the Earth and Water which doth put a stop to its pass but nevertheless the force of fire is stronger by reason of those adjoyned heavy minima's For fire being violently detained by them is grown stronger 2. Fire being to divide another thick body makes use of the compressing accuteness of Earth to divide it which it effects by protruding those dense parts before it for through its single rarity it could not 2. Fire flying out and being expulsed out of a mixt body if it doth not meet with incrassated Air to retain it will pass and vanish but hitting against incrassated Air it strives to pass the Air again being continuous doth maintain her continuity with all her force and thirdly the fire moving circularly makes a circular dent into the mass of the said thickned Ayr which it beats against the advenient Ayr also striving from all parts to recover its situation and therefore necessarily surrounding the fire The Ayr again is also become stronger because of its violent detention notwithstanding the fire being the more potent doth diduct it into an oval or round Figure in the same manner as Wind striving to pass the water doth blow it up into a bubble Fire being thus condensed imprisoned and surrounded with thick ayr and diducting the same ayr into an oval or round Figure is called a flame II. The properties of a flame are 1. to be burning hot 2. to be an lux illuminans illuminating light The burning proceeds from the particles of condensed fire violently striking through the moisture of a mixt body whereby it divides it into ashes or a black crust tending to ashes Before I shew the manner of emanation of Light let us first examine what it is we call Light Light is that which is visible and renders all things about it visible Wherefore you do mark that Light is nothing but that which affects and moves the eye-sight If then I make it appear to you whereby it is that fire doth affect the Eye-sight therein I shew you the manner of emanation or operation of Light You must apprehend the optick spirits to be a thin continuous body equally interwoven through all its parts with a proportion of thin yet a little condensed fire for were it not a little dense it could not heat so that it is very like to the ambient ayr in substance and its other qualities 2. Supposing it to be an ayr we must conceive it to be continuous with the ambient ayr when the eyes are open This premitted I infer light to be nothing else but a continuous obduction of the Ayr caused by a flaming fire But let me here intreat your serious intention upon what I shall discover concerning the nature of Light it being one of the difficultest mysteries of all Philosophy and although its effects are luminous to the Eye yet its nature is obscure to the Understanding The search of this moved Plato to leave Athens and set saile for Sicily to speculate those flames of the mount AEtna Empedocles the Philosopher hazarded himself so far for to make a discovery of the nature of a flame and its light that he left his body in the Mongibell fire for an experiment although much beyond his purpose It is almost known to all how that the Learned Pliny took shipping from the promontory Misenas to be traversed to the Mount Pomponianus whither curiosity had driven him to fathom the depths of the Vesuvian flames but before he could feel the heat the smoak smothered him III. First then I prove that Light is an effect of a flame There is no flame but it causeth light and by the light we know it is a flame Ergo Light is an inseparable accident and a propriety quartimodi of a flame the Antecedence is undoubted Doth not a Candle a Torch a focall flame cause lights Or did you ever see light and doubted of the flame of it What is the reason when we hit our fore-heads against any hard thing we say there strikes a light out of our eyes It is because the violence of the stroke did discontinuate the optick ayr through which the condensed fire did unite and diduct the intrinsick ayr which was incrassated through the same stroke and so made a flame or rather a flash which is a sudden flame that is quickly lighted and quickly laid Secondly Light is not a single quality inhering in fire alone for were it so then where ever fire is there should be light but to the contrary we find that there is fire inherent in the ayr and many other bodies yet the ayr remains dark after the descent of the Planets 2. Were fire naturally light we could never be in darkness because the vast Region of fire is so large that it could not but illuminate thrice the extent of the ayr Thirdly Light is not fire rarefied and exporrected throughout all the dimensions of the ayr for who could ever imagine that a Candle being so small a flame should serve to be drawn out through the ayr and fill it with light to the extent of six or eight Leagues for a Candle may be seen at Sea in a clear dark night six or eight Leagues off or further so that it is absurd to imagine this and unworthy of a Philosophers maintaining it 2. It is impossible that fire could be so exactly mixt with ayr in an instant for so large an extent 3. There is never a particle of illuminated ayr but it is light to the full extent