that insuperably he that produceth the act and that immediatly shall he be blameless What is this but to condemn an accessary and acquit the principal Diotrephes But there is a great difference betwixt Gods concourse unto our good and evil works to good works he concurs not only efficiently Ex parte Potentiae predetermining the very faculty to the work but also morally Ex parte Objecti in that he doth counsel command perswade and aâ—â—ure us unto the lawful object In sinful acts he does only the first and not the latter so that of our sinful actions he is the physical cause only not the moral but of our good he is as well the moral as the physical Paganus You should consider that moral motion doth not give God the honour of a true and proper cause but only of a Metaphorical for the influence it hath into the Agent is not ipsum agere the very act it self and consequently the effect doth not follow that motion If therefore God should move us no otherwise than after such a manner your Partizans do conclude that while we work God should not discriminate us but we should discriminate our selves from such as work not therefore though God concurs unto the good act by a physical predetermination and morally too but unto the evil act by a physical predetermination only yet there remains the same manner of working in respect of good and evil in that which is chiefly considerable and by it self alone attributes the true and proper nature of a cause to God and assigns him the first and perfect original of that determination that this act should rather be than not be But 2. What is this moral motion and from whence and what doth it work upon in its seduction of us to an evil work be it in the understanding or the will in the imagination or the sensitiue appetite if you allow it to be an act you must confess according to your principels that it is from God and of his product on seeing therefore that the total sum of Gods concurse unto the act of sin amounts fully to thus much in your own account That he predetermines man to produce the whole entity of it and the whole reality also of every other act prerequired unto it that besides he predetermines and applies the Divel * Imoâ—â—ne ipse quidem Diabolus quicquam potest nisi determinante Deo Proinde pro certo tenendum Dominum omnes actiones decâ—rnere atque agendo concurrere suo sancto modo cooperari quando peccatum est in fiâ—â—i c. Malcom Com. ad Act. 4. 24. Passio Christi in individuo fuit a Dâ—o praedefinita praedefinitione perfecta Ergo omnes circumstantiae quae concurrunt ad individuationem illius praedeterminatae sunt aeterno Deâ— decreto sed ad talem individuation in etiam concuâ—rit inâ—â—â—sio actus extensio ad tales personas Alvarez Disp 22. 19. Câ—tance approbante Amesio iâ— Bel. ener Tom 4. lib. 2. cap. 2. n. 12. p. 27. and every other cause de facto conâ—urring to propound the unlawful object and allure to it since he predetermines the will and directs the intention and provides the object and applies the Tempter and addresseth all other circumstances that concur to the individuation of the sinful act there seems to be no moral or physical causality wanting that God should therefore be said to produce mens evil works otherwise than he effects their good works Diotrephes But the efficiency of God though he be Author of the act of sin doth not reach the formal malice of it Paganus No more do Men nor Divels in their most importunate contrivances solicitations and actings towards the sins of others notwithstanding they communicate in the fault * Quatenus incredulit adhabâ—t rationem peccati Deus illam non efficit sed Diabolus juxta illud 2. Cor. 4. 4. Piscator Apol. Resp Amicae Collat. Oppos cap. 3. and guilt by impelling to them such acts as are inseparably attended with a moral pravity neither doth any man produce the formal malice of his own wicked act but inasmuch as he produceth the entity of that act * Aquin. 12ae q. 79. ar 2. 2. to which that malice is annexed If the resolution of your Casuist * Amesius ubi supra lately mentioned be authentick he doth indirectly cooperate and so communicate in the sin of others who is deficient in his diligence to prevent it and he is sufficiently diligent to prevent sin who doth predetermine the will to it Diotrephes Now I have freed God so fully from having any hand in sin by a Metaphorical distinction you endeavour to make him communicate therein by a moral interpretation but that one may be accounted the Author of sin he must be culpably deficient saith Dr. Twiss * Ubi supra p. 72. and thus man may beguilty saith he either by doing what he ought to omit or by omitting what he ought to do but this cannot be incident to God He could I confess saith he keep any Creature from sin â—f it pleased him but if he will not and doth not he commits not any culpable defect for he is not bound to preserve any man from sin Therefore all that can be infer'd from hence is this * R. B. Prid. ubi supra p. 13. That man doth necessarily fall into sin if God doth not uphold him not that God sins because he doth not give what he doth not owe him Paganus You grant then that God is the cause of mans fall though inculpable but your Doctors do acknowledge That to love God in such a measure as to contemn our selves in comparison of him and his service is above the power of nature A Dr. Twiss nbi supra p. 49. man mvst be endued with heavenly grace and the Spirit of God to enable him hereunto and that accordingly God created our first parents in a state of grace and endued them with the Spirit that in this capacity such a law of love might be justly impos'd upon them Now I would fain be satisfied with what equity God could withdraw * from his innocent creatures and such were our first parents before the fall * Si Deus hominem sibi obedientem a pietate deturbat bene currentem cadere facit ergo pro bonis mala retribuit injuste punit quod ut fiat impellit Quid tam perversum quid tam insanum dici aut cogitari potest Prosp Aquit ad 12. Gal. Object that supernatural and necessary assistance and yet being thus without any fault in them strip't off their abilities leave them under the obligation of that now become an impossible Commandment that they might inevitably fall and perish yet this he did as you concluded above out of your Divines Diotrephes We satisfie our selves in that God did this for a greater good and that we may have no cause to complain our Divines conclude *
to follow Gods example in disposing of his own But God as his own most gracious * Micah 7. 18. nature abhors it so his Law forbids all such intolerable cruelty And as a good man regards the life of his Bâ—â—st * Prov. 12. 10. Jonah 4. 11. so doth our good God too But unto men he is a faithful Creatour 1 Pet. 4. 19. Who will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the Truth 1 Tim. 2. 4. Not willing that any should perish but that all should come to Repentance the end and means too Salvation and Repentance And extendeth the riches * Rom. 9. 22. with chap. 2. 4. of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering to lead them to it And * Hebr. 6. 18. that by two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie we may have a strong consolation in flying for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us He hath confirmed his promise by an Oath Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O House of Israel Gods goodness or equity makes him have a desire to the work iâ— his own hands 'T is Job 14. 15. the extream provocation and incorrigible obstinacy of sinners that makes the Prophet denounce such a fearful doom against some of them Isaiah 27. 11. For it is a people of no understanding therefore he that made them will not have mercy on them and he that formed them will shew them no favour Desolatus Doth God cast off none but such as cast off him first and dâ—spise his goodness See 2 Kings 13. 23. Samaritanus Not a man that I can find according to the Holy Scriptures * Imo divinae dereliction is eae apertissimè designatur ratio quod Deus ab hominibus peius descratur Prov. 1. 24. Theol. M. Britt â—â— 3. 4. Artic. Thes 4. vide sequent inter Act. Syn. Nat. Dord pag. 129. par 2. for so the Lord hath declar'd himself 1. In the Old Testament Prov. 1. 24. to 31. Because I have called and yeâ—r fâ—â—sâ—d I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded but ye have set at naught all my counsel and would none of my reproof I also will laugh at your calamity c. And to the same purpose Ezek. 24. 13. In thy filthiness is 〈◊〉 because I have purged thee and thou wâ—st not purged thou shalt not be purged from thy filthiness any more till I have caused my fury to rest upon theâ— 2. In the new Testament Acts 13. 26. The Apostle addresseth his Ministry unto them in these That the displeasure of God is only against the refractory and disobedient see Heb. 10. 38. 1 Cor. 10. 5. Heb. 3. 17 18 19. expressions Men and Brethren Children of the stock of Abraham and whosoever among you feareth God to you is the Word of this salvation sent And he gives them warning Ver. 40 41. Beware therefore lest that come upon you which is spoken of is the Prophets Behold ye despisers and wonder and perish and because they did despise contradict and blaspheme the Gospel and reject * Luke 7. 30. the Counsel of God against themselves therefore the Apostle took the boldness to tell them Ver 46. It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you but seeing ye put it from you and judge your selves unworhly of everlasting life â—â— we turn to the Gentiles The Talent * Talentum gratiae a Deo semel concessum nemini eripitur nisi qui prius suo vi tio illud sepelivit Matth. 25. 28. Hinc monemur â—â— Spiritum resistamus nâ— Spiritum extinguamus nâ—gratiam Dei frustra recipiamus ne deficiamus a Dâ—o Hebr. 3. 7. Theol. Britt ibid. vide is never taken away till it be first abused or at least neglected hence Hebr. 2. 3. How shell we escape if we neglect so great salvation Reprobation is therefore thus defined by the Learned and Orthodox God 's immutable Decree whereby he hath determined to leave them under wrath for their sin and unbelief and to damn them eternally who will not repent and believe in Christ This Deâ—â—â—iâ—ion is most exactly true if God reprobates such only as he damns and if he doth otherwise there is not an exact conformity betwixt his Decree and the Execution of it which is absurd and the Scriptures express it in See Mark 16. 16. John 3. 36. Acts 13. 46. Rom. 11. 20. every page but especially we may take it from the words of our Saviour Christ John 3. 18 19. He that believeth not is condemned already because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God And his is the cause of condemnation that light is come into the World and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil In which words we have not only the way but the cause also of condemnation propounded viz. unbelief and the love of darkness proceeding from a custom of evil-doing Desolatus My Friend I am afraid you forget your self in this point for you know Divines do distinguish here and make a wide difference betwixt the Decree of Reprobation and the Execution of it Although say they God doth destine whomsoever he please to hatred and destruction without any respect to any quality in them yet he is not unjust because betwixt his Eternal Decree and the Execution of it sin and infidelity are subordinated as the cause for which he justly damns them Samaritanus I remember this distinction very well but I cannot allow it for currant because it doth not free God from injustice for if the execution be therefore just because it supposeth a cause or ground for the infliction of that evil upon man which was destinated to him by the Decree the Decree therefore for the infliction of that evil is unjust because that excludes such cause or ground for if it be not lawful to inflict evil without cause neither is it lawful to will the infliction of it for the injustice we know is not first and principally in the insliction but in the will to inflict for rectitude is primò per se in itself first and chiefly in the will in the execution only by extâ—insecal denomination But 2. If there be such a diversity in the execution from the Decree this Execution is not the Execution of that Decree but something else as was intimated before Besides how is sin subordinated to that Decree and by whom Is it by Almighty God Why then whether that subordination be by a positive or privative action that sin is intended of God as a means inservient to that Execution and this will double the injustice of iâ— for what is this else but first to will
effects without respect to some qualifications in them would argue injustice even by St. Austin's own confession for he saith Numquid In Eâ—chirid c. 98. iniquitas est apud Deum absit Iniquum enim videtur ut sine ull s bonorum malorumve operum meritis unum Deus eligat odiatque alterum Is there unrighteousness with God God forbid For it seems unjust that God should love one and hate another without any merits of good or evil works But grant Almighty God his liberty to love freely as no doubt he may do yet the Apostle tells us He is so just His wrath comes onely where he finds sin a sufficient cause to send it upon the children of disobedience * Ephes 5. 6. Col. 3. 6. That Their Progenitors or God upon Their account have entailed that Title with the wrath annexed upon Them * Jer. 31. 29. Ezek. 18. 2. Jon. 4. 11. and never cuts it off in a matter of this everlasting concernment ought not to be affirmed without great authority Those who are said to be children of wrath by nature Ephes 2. 3. are not said to be so by the nature they were born in but by the nature * The word nature is put for custom 1 Cor. 11. 14. they walked in which was their evil custom and course of trespasses and sins vers 1 2. 3. Grant Esau a Reprobate in his Mother's womb and what certainty can the Faithful for such without doubt was Isaac when he begot Esau have of the salvation of their dearest Babes So sad an Oracle had she met with such interpreters would have been more heavy to Rebecca than the double burthen she travell'd with But 4. There was no such word in the Oracle to Rebâ—cca Gen. 25. 23. nor any such heard of till the time of the Prophet Malachi of which I shall give a fuller account anon So that Esau in his own person is not like to be concerned in it 5. If the Oracle had spake to her in that very phrase and language it would have been capable of a milder construction than to signifie his eternal Reprobation For when the Scripture speaks of hatred it doth not always mean that which is Absolute but many times that which is Comparative which is no more than a lesse degree of love And so God may hate the Innocent that is love him lesse then another Innocent for God is not bound to love all alike and with an equal degree of love That the word hatred is frequently used in this sense you may observe as you read the Scriptures Gen. 29. 31. the Text saith The Lord saw that Leah was hated yet in the former verse 't is onely said that Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah So Luk. 14. 26. our Saviour saith If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother c. which signifies but to lovâ— them leâ—s as St. Matthew doth record it Mat. â— 10. 37. See also to this purpose Dut. 21. 15. Prov. 13. 24. Joh. 12. 25. with Matâ—h 10. 37. And iâ— can have no other sense when applied here to Esau or rather to his Posteriâ—y 6. Were it meant of Gods Decree of Reprobation I would fain understand wherein the Execution of that Decree consisted It must consist in the abandoning Esau to a state of tâ—mpoâ—al servitude a Gen. 25. 23. and his Hell must be an Earthly Wildernes b Mal. 1. 3. and his own Brother the Elect Jacob assigâ—'d him for his Torm â—tor c Gen. 27. 29. against whom he had a promise too that he should finally prevail d Gen. 27. 40. over him What gross Absurdities these are who wants a judgment to discern Yet all these are parts of the Oracle or Appendages in the process of the Affair as you will find by consulting the Sacred Text to this purpose Lastly there is no ground to conclude that Esau was a Reprobate for it doth not appear probable that in his person he fell off from God to serve Idollâ— and for that prophareness imputed to him Hebr. 12. 16. it consisted but in the divesting himself of a privilege e Gen. 25. 29 to the end annexed to his Primogeniture and what Sacrednesse soever was in Tâ—is he was supâ—lanted f chap. 27. 36. by his Brother's policy and induced to part with it in a case of extream necessity g chap. 25. 32. to save his life his Brother being so unnatural that he would relieve him upon no other tearms h vers 31 33. and Esau repented of This ill bargain too i ch 27. 36 38. Heb. 12. 17. For the Fornication associated with Profaneness by the Apostle in that place it is no part of Esau's Character but belongs to the Apostates of those times from the imitation of whose practices the Hebrews are there so earnestly disswaded As for the hatred k Gen. 27. 41. he did bear a while towards his Brother though it were kindled upon an exceeding provocation it was not implacable for such was his kindnesse to him at Their meeting that Jacob tells him l Gen. 33. 10. I have seen thy face as thoâ—gh I had seen the face of God and thou wast pleased with me He was not so happy as to please his Parents in his first Marriage his wives were distasteful to Isaac and Rebecea m Gen. 26. 35. but upon what account is not so easie to determine If we say with Diodati and others that it was for their Idolatries this was no more than that guilt that stain'd the practice and education of Jacob's Wives also as the sacred Story doth record it n Gen. 31. 19. 30 32. Josh 24. 2. However if herein he were guilty of some undutifulnesse too his Parents yet that the Elect and after their Regeneration to may fall into as foul and fouler sins than that amounts to and likewise continue in them God knows how long we have the opinion of a person of some note o Mr. Baxter See his Disputations of Right to the Sacraments pag. 327 c. amongst us And besides that he intended the displeasure of his Parents in those Matches is not probable that he endeavour'd their satisfaction afterwards an undeniable instance of his repentance is evident from Gen. 28. 8 9. where we read that when he saw the daughters of Canaan pleased not his father by his forbidding Jacob to match himself amongst them then went Esau unto Ishmael Abrahams son who was as near related to Isaac as Laban was unto Rebecca and took his daughter to be his wife and this was done without doubt to comply with the temper and desires of his Parents Who then dares condemn Esau for a Reprobate Though Pâ—reus exercise this intolerable severity Mâ—llrus durst not Oâ—colampadius durst not Dr. Prideaâ—x durst not Ex Genesi ve isimiles conjecturae sumi possunt quae ostendunt Esavum non ita reâ—ectum esse à Deo ut 〈◊〉 damnatus
decreed that I shall or I shall not use the means to escape it So that all the Absurdities that dog the Stoâ—câ—l dream of fatal necessity at the heels are inseparable attendants of this Opinion For I may not onely say If I shall die of the Infection I shall if I shall not die I shall not and therefore I need not use means to avoid it But also if I must use means I must if I must not I must not Seeing Gods decree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means as to obtain or lose the end For if their opinion be true all things whatsoever end or means of little or great moment come to passe necessarily and unavoidably by reason of Gods eternal Decree Here they have two Evasions The first is this A beit say they God hath most certainly determined what shall or what shall not be done concerning us Evasio 1. yet his Decree is hid from us and we must use lawful and ordinary means for the obtaining of such and such good Ends keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealâ—d to us See the vanity of this shift our Opposites teach that whatsoever God hath decreed shall be dâ—ne and whatsoever is omitted Confutatio shall be undone If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means it is impossible for us to use them iâ— he hath decreed that we should it is impossible that we should omit them And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say that although God in his secret will hath determined that we should not do such a thing yet we are to do it seeing his decree though it be sâ—cret yet it will have its effect and it is absolutely impossible we should do that which God hath determined we shall not do Howsoever say our Opposites our opinion is far from Stoicism for the Stoâ—cks thought that all things came inevitably to pass by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of natural Evasion 2. causes but we teach that all events are irresistably necessary by reason of Gods everlasting dâ—crees and His Omnipotency daily executing them This reason is so poor a one and yet so much made on by some worthy men that I am more troubled to wonder at it Confutation than to confute it yet that I may satisfie it distinctly I will divide the opinion of the Stoâ—cks into two particular Tenets 1. They hold that all things come to pass inevitably 2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes Our Opposites stifly maintain the former of these Tenets Now let the Reader observe that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error follow the first part of their opinion though sequestred from the second For if all things come to pass unavoidably what need I care what I do yea if I shall care I shall care whether I will or no and a thousand the like horrid conceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day that all things are done unavoidably and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Maranatha It s too apparent therefore that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence both of Stoicism and Turcism Again if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion we shall perceive that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced but that it will be compleat Stoicism The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events its true but what did they think to be the connexion of causes doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature which they supposed to be a Deity It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws but whatsoever they meant by the Fates its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta Parcarum Leges c. Yea the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree as Edictum from Edicere so Fatum from Fari Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod Deus de unoquoquâ— fatur saith Minutius Well then to apply Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together one necessarily following in the neck of another Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree Do they not defend compleat Stoicism What part of Stoicism do they disclaim Do they not maintain inevitable necessity Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this connexion Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point unless we will give them leave to grant the prezmises and deny the conclusion I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities as accounting those to be Deities which are not whose decrees they made the causes of all things but they were the common errors of Paganism and are beside the point in hand And truly these set aside I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks I have prosecuted this Argument more copiously because it includeth many others I mean all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with against the error of the Stoicks and they are many for I think verily there are few opinions which have a greaâ—er retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences than this of the unavoidable necessity of events Some of them may make one laugh and some of them may make one tremble I omit the former because they are obvious to every mans conceit and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter Of the last sort I will specific one in a second Argument That opinion which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin is gross and erroneous that I may say no worse but so I Arg. 2. speak it with horror doth the Opinion of our Opposites I know they are renowned Christians and as they abhor Stoical errors so they hold this damnable doctrine which is worse than ever any Heretick held which transformeth God into a Devil to be most accursed yet so the case standeth that as the See this Argument confirmed in the Answer to the 4th Objection error of fatal necessity so this of the cause of sin fatally followeth their opinion which I prove thus They teach That nothing is done in the world nor can be done but what God hath decreed to be done Now it 's too certain that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are
sins therefore according to this opinion God is the principal cause of sins Devils and Men are but His Instruments The usual Answer is That God is the cause of all the actions Evasio that are sinful but not of the sirfulness of the actions of all our works but not of our obliquities and imperfections As one that rides upon a halting Jade is the cause of his motion and yet not of his halting It s a hard case when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from sinning Might I here without wandring discourse Confutatio of the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way but I will keep my self as much to the purpose as I can and so answer it thus or rather confute it That which is a principal cause of any action is a cause of those events which accompany that action necessarily This Rule is most certainly true Therefore if God by His decrees do force Concomitants us to those actions which cannot be done without sin God Himself I am afraid to rehearse it must needs be guilty of sin For example If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit seeing the eating of the fruit which he had forbidden must needs be with a gross obliquity I do not see how this distinction will justifie God for Adam sinned because he ate the fruit that was forbidden but they say God decreed that he should eat the fruit which was forbidden necessarily and unavoidably The conclusion is too blasphemous to be often repeated The Reader may see how well that common distinction holdeth water yea if this nicety were sound man himself might prove that he committed no murder though he stabbed the dead party to the heart for at his arraignment he might tell the Judge that he did indeed thrust his dagger into his heart but it was not that which took away his life but the extinction of his natural heat and vital spirits Who seeth not the wild frenzie of him who should make this Apology yet this is all our Adversaries say for God They say His decree was the cause that Adam took the fruit and put it into his mouth and ate that which he had commanded he should not eat Yet they say He was not the cause of the transgression of the commandment The example of the halting Jade is a meer impertinency for suppose it were as it is not appliable to us who halt naturally yet Adam before this action was sound and therefore God necessitating him to such an inconveniency dealt with him as if one should drive a lusty Nag into rough passages where he must needs break his leggs Neither is it as I said appliable unto us the lame posterity of Adam for he who rideth an horse that was lame before although he be not a cause of the impotency which he findeth in the horse already yet in urging him to motion he is now a cause of the actual imperfection in the motion and so perhaps a cause of encreasing the impotency for the future though he were not the cause of his lameness yet he is of his limping at that time Let the horse stand still and see whether he will halt or no. Marry if the horse go of himself then the Rider is no cause of his halting and so we may say that all our haltings are from our selves without any instigation from God I know our Opposites have another shift teaching that God useth to punish one sin by making us to commit another so that although we sin He doth but punish Albeit I do not believe this to be true as 't is commonly expounded yet I abstain at this time from a farther examination of it because it weakens not my Argument about Adam for his sin was the first that ever he committed and the original of all that ever followed and therefore if Gods decree were the cause that he ate the forbidden fruit as our Adversaries teach its apparent whom they make the Author of all sin These two Arguments well scanned are sufficient to make any not fore-stalled with pre-conceits to be afraid of that opinion which believeth all things to come to pass necessarily by reason of Gods irresistable decree and therefore they shall suffice for the confutation of it Moreover seeing it is clogged with such monstrous consequences me-thinks out opinion should be far more amiable which giveth no countenance to such hideous mis-shapen errors as it will appear by the process of this disputation Now I proceed to the confirmation of our opinion concerning the contingency of some events in respect of God by two Arguments more The first is this That God hath decreed that all his creatures ordinarily and for the most part should work according to their Arg. 1. several kinds and endowments by which he in the Creation distinguished them For illustration they may be ranked into three several forms In the lowest stand the meer natural Agents inanimate and sensless creatures to these God hath given certain instincts and 1. inclinations by which they are determinately swayed to these or these certain effects and operations unless they are out wardly hindered for heavy bodies cannot chuse but descend fire cannot chuse but burn c. In the second stand the Sensitive creatures four-footed beasts 2. fouls and fishes to these God hath given sense and knowledge to discern what is good for their nature and what is bad and amongst diverse goods to prefer that which is best He hath given them also a free appetite or a kind of sensitive will by which they may either â—reâ—ly prosecute or avoid such objects as they like or mislike not determinately tyed to this or that certain operation as the other were A stone cannot choose but descend but a beast may as well go up hill as down c. In the upper Forme are Men reasonable Creatures whom God hath made more volunâ—ary than the other by giving them 3. greater freedom of choice and presenting unto their more elevated knowledge a great variety of objects Now then without doubt God distinguished thus his creatures in abilities and faculties that they might operate in their several kinds that the natural agents might work naturally the voluntary voluntarily as that eloquent French-man Du Vain hath well explained this point The truth of all this no man will deny explicitely Well then let them hearken to the consequences of this truth so common both in Logick and Metaphysicks among those who handle of natural and voluntary causes If God hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily by his creatures then also hath he decreed that many things should be done contingently in respect of him but the first is granted truth therefore the second should be The connexion I prove thus All things are done contingently in respect of God which for ought he hath decreed might with as much
Now then God leaving to His creatures free liberty to work or not to work after this or that manner so that for any necessity imposed upon their actions by Him whatsoever they omit was as possible to be done as what they did And yet from all eternity fore-knowing whatsoever his creatures would do or not do his fore-knowledge must needs be infinite and most admirable Infinite I say not in respect of the number of objects for so as I said before no knowledge can be infinite but in respect of the omnipotent and boundless manner of actual comprehending those things with an infallible fore-sight which in respect of God were contingent their not being being as possible as their being And indeed this fore-sight of future contingents is the true character and Royal prerogative of Divine knowledge and Ergo in the 41 of Esay God upbraideth the Pagan Deities with this priviledge peculiar to Himself though juglingly pretended by them in their lying Oracles vers 21. The Lord biddeth them produce Gnatzumotheken the strongest Arguments by which they could prove themselves Gods and in the next verse he particularizeth and thrice bids them tell if they can what shall happen in the times to come It s worth the observing how that there was never any sort of Diviners Artificial I speak not of Devils Witches Gypsies and such palpable Impostors that undertook to fore-tell future contingents for if you prove those things which Astrologers and Physiognomers undertake to foretell to be meer contingent in respect of the Horoscope or Complexion and no way to depend on them as natural causes you have proved their Arts to be but Impostures How much then do our Opposites dishonor God in this case making the great miracle of his foresight of future contingents to be as much as nothing seeing they say that albeit they are contingent in respect of us yet they are necessary in respect of Him When any man hath answered any of these four Arguments then will I change my opinion In the mean time I proceed to the vindicating of it from such exceptions and objections as our enemies in this case make against it The dissipating of those mists wherewith they endeavour to obscure this opinion will not onely clear the truth of it for belief but also the sense of it for understanding First they say That while we avoid their Stoicism as we term Objâ—ct 1. it we fall into flat Epicurism for while we make so many things in the world to fall out according to the inconstant bent of voluntary Agents we Deifie Chance and make Fortune a goddess we do in effect deny Gods providence which they say makes all things come to pass according to a most wise and constant method I will be as forward as any man to Anathematize him whosoever he be who holdeth any thing to fall out fortuito in respect Answ of God I will make it most evident that our opinion makes no Chance in respect of God and most sweetly illustrates Gods Providence First There is a vast difference between Contingency and Casuality Contingency is an equal possibility of being or not being 〈◊〉 Casuality is the coming to pass of an event eximproviso beside the fore-thought as I may say of the thing Now it is our assertion that many things fall out contingently in respect of God because he imposed no necessity upon their being but left them to the pleasure of the inferior causes that they might as well not have been as been But we say withall that nothing falleth out accidentally or casuâ—llâ— in respect of God because nothing cometh to pass without his most certain and unerring foresight he knowing from all eternity what his creatures would do though he left it to their pleasure to do what they list In events there is a great difference between Contingency and Casuality of events in respect of men for most things we do we do contingently we being not bound by any inevitable necessity to do them yet as long as we do them upon certain persuasive reasons for certain ends we do them not by chance The same events yet are not after the same manner contingent in respect of God as they are in respect of us for He out of the Prerogative of His Deity fore-knoweth them but we by reason of our mortality cannot have infallible foresight of them and what foresight we have is in a very little distance And indeed if this point be punctually canvased we shall perceive that in that same proportion we have any knowledge of them they are not contingent but necessary for every thing so far forth as it is in existence or in near preparation for it is necessary Contingency is the middle point between necessity and impossibility of being and therefore so much as any thing inclineth to existence it is necessary The want or neglect of the distinction between contingency and casualty hath been a great cause of the error we confute for our Opposites still taking fortuâ—to and contingenter ☞ for Synonyma because they would have nothing casual in respect of God therefore they would have every thing necessary not discerning the middle path which we walk in between Epicurism and Stoicism Concerning Gods Providence we teach that although according to that ordinary course which we call nature which he 2. hath prescribed for the operation of his creatures in the decree of Creation many things fall out according to the free choice of voluntary Agents no way by Him necessitated yet God is still busie with a double providence The first is universal by this whatsoever natural Agents do contingently He fore-seâ—th most clearly and ordereth it most wisely according to His glory the preservation of the Vniverse and good of His creatures The second is particular by this He puts in oft-times a miraculous finger into such contâ—ngent business as respects his Church and oft-times so worketh the heart of the voluntary Agent that sometimes he doth that which if he had been left alone to himself he would not have done and sometimes is secretly diverted from the doing of that which otherwise he would most willingly and in all likelihood could most easily have done And here our Opposites may please to observe how our opinion is so far from denying particular Providence that it onely maintaineth a Providence properly termed Particular for that particular Providence which our Opposites so much talk of if it be well looked into will appear to be in no better sense particular than the Roman Church is universal They say That there is not any numerical act performed by any creature without an eternal decree from God this they call particular providence Alas this is the general which concerneth all the actions performed by all things or at least one mixt of general and particular As for example Because it raineth to day God so ordering that it should is it any sense to say This rain was by the