self i. e. in the simplicity of its nature is either more good or absolutely good adhaere to a second judgement which of its self is either less good or absolutely evil but yet notwithstanding that in the object which affects and inclines the Intellect is always ipsa veri species the Apparence of Truth which it observes and is attentive to And because that species of Truth may be either real or counterfeit therefore may that which is in its own nature really true be presented under the disguise of an absolute falshood or less Truth and that which is in its own nature really false be presented likewise under the disguise of an absolute truth or less falshood and so the Intellect becoming subject to deception in the point of judicature may be allected to the prosecution of an absolute falshood or less truth while the object remains obvelated under the delusive vizard of an absolute truth or a less falshood è contra This seriously considered supports three excellent Consequences 1 that as often as the Intellect having adhaered to a true judgement Article 16. Three considerable Inferences from the praemises quits and pursues a false one so often of necessity doth something intervene which detracts the genuine or natural Apparence from the good object and imposes a counterfeit Apparence upon the evil one and by that means causes a mutation of the Intellects assent or judgement and therefore 2 that the commutation of the species or Apparence of the object is the sole immediate cause of the Commutation of the Intellects judgement and assent and therefore 3 that since the Will is obliged by that necessity formerly declared to conforme to the conduct and directions of its Guide the Intellect it is in vain therefore to hope or attempt that the Will should change its Appetition unless care be first taken that the Intellect change its judgement or that the Will should be constant to its Appetition unless we provide that the Intellect be constant to its judgement And therefore that Mind which having discovered the incomparable beauties of virtue is become enamoured on her and stands resolved to court no other Mistress but her ought to be exceeding circumspect and cautious in this particular that it submit to the allurement of no object untill it hath profoundly examined whether that species of Good therein presented be really true or only superficial and counterfeit that so it may render its self superiour to the delusion of painted Vice The admirable Des Cartes in 3. part passion artic 22. praesenting a general praeservative against all the excesses and Article 17. Cartesius his general Praeservative against the excesses of Passions exorbitancies of our passions gives us this excellent advice that having learned first to distinguish betwixt those motions or Affections which are terminated in the Soul and those which are terminated only in the Body we should when we feel our blood and spirits agitated by any affection which concernes only the body reflect upon this as a general Maxime that all things which offer themselves to the imagination do tend to no other purpose but to the deception of the Soul and to perswade the rational and judicative Faculty that those reasons inservient to the Commendation of the object of that passion are far more solid sirme and worthy our assent then really they are and on the contrary that those reasons inservient to the Improbation or disallowance of the object are far more trivial infirme and less worthy our assent then really they are That when the passion perswades to those things whose execution may admit suspension or delay we abstain from passing our verdict too hastily upon them and divert our cogitations to the serious examen of the inconveniences impendent on their pursuit and execution or at least to some other object till time and sleep shall have calmed the impetuous commotions of the blood and spirits which the seeming good of the object hath excited And that when the Passion incites to those actions whose fleet occasion gives the soul little or no time to consult and deliberate we always endevour to convert our Understanding to the perpension and our Will to the prosecution of those reasons which are conttary to those inferred and urged by that passion notwithstanding they shall at the first view appearless valid and ponderous for thereby we shall mainly refract and abate the violence of the passion Now this may be our Exemplar in ordering our advice how Article 18. General Rules praescribed by the Author how to praevent the Delusion of the Vnderstanding and dependent seduction of the will by Evil disguifed under the similitude of Good to prevent the Delusion of our Understanding and the seduction of our Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good First we ought to learn the discrimination of the goods of the Mind from those pertinent only to the Body and then when we meet with any object apparently good abstractly to examine whether that good concerns either the body alone or the mind alone or both body and mind equally or more the body then the mind or more the mind then the body If only the body we are to convert our cogitations upon the reasons which disswade more intently then upon the reasons which perswade the election of and adhaerence to it that so we may if there be any detect the Evil couched under that vernish of good and also conquer the Minds impatience which too often beares a large share in our deceptions If only the Mind in that case we are to bring it to the touchstone of the Divine Will i. e. examine whether those reasons whereby it perswades our Intellect to an Approbation and consequently our Will to an affectation and prosecution of it are correspondent to that inseparable or proper sign or mark of true Good Conformity to the Will of God or not for the very Soul or quintessence of virtue doth radically consist â—n this that man without all haesitancy murmur diffidence and reluctancy conforme his Will to the indeceptible Divine Will as being ascertained that he can will nothing more excellent in its self nor convenient to him then what God hath willed before If both body and mind equally then to abstract those reasons which insinuate the interest of Sense and insist only upon those which praefer it to the mind for if they shall be found worthy of assent we need the Authority of no other to justify our election of that object If more the body then the mind then we ought to aestimate the convenience of it by that lesser relation it holds to the mind and not by that greater it holds to the body And finally if more the mind then the body since the interest of the mind is infinitely to be praeferred to that of the body where the reasons are equall on each part t is manifest we may safely acquiesce in that judgement and embrace the object
honor of its Invention as was betwixt the two Haâ—lots about the right to the Living Child others requiring if not to the justification of the Decree it self yet at least to justify the Execution thereof the concurse of Good Works so necessarily that no man can ever attain to Glory but by the scale of Merits at least those of our Saviour and others mincing or extenuating the Elective Liberty of man into a meer and simple Libency which we have more then once specified and as often described and accordingly attempting to salve the Repugnancy thus that the Elect are therefore Free because they do their Good works Libently or Willingly and likewise that the Reprobate are also Free because they doe their Evil works Libently Hereupon to him who shall charge upon them with this Vnactive Argumentation they instantly oppose that there is very great reason why every man endowed with this Libency should most strenuously endevour the constant practise of Good rather then Evil because though He be uncertain of the Decree concerning his Election or Reprobation yet is He certain of this that no man shall ever be assumed into Glory unless he shall have done Good nor any be excluded the Celestial Eden unless He shall have done Evil. To which they add that it is the main Duty of every man to the utmost of his power to ascertain himself rather of Election by his perseverance in good then of Reprobation by a debaucht and desperate resignation of the sceptre of his Will to all the temptations of Evil that so he may praevent or mitigate that Fear and Anxiety which must otherwise uncessantly excruciate his mind during his whole life by acquiring a setled confidence that from God who is infinitely Good and Just he hath no cause to expect evil while the scope of all his endevours is to deserve well at least to obtain Mercy at his hand To conclude lest man should in the interim either Glory in himself as if He ought according to justice to be Elected for his good works sake or Complain of the rigour of the Decree of his Reprobation murmuring that it was not his fault why his name was not inscribed in the Book of life they check his Glorying with this cooling card of the Apostle O Homo quis te discernit and hush his Complaint with Tu qui es qui respondeas Deo Nunquid dicet vas Figulo quare me fecisti sic Nunquid sacere illi licet aliud vas in honorem aliud verò in contumeliam Roman chap. 9. ver 21. And if this satisfy not they here set bounds to Curiosity and lime the wings of those Eagle Wits who would soare higher then the lower region of the mysterie with that grave advice of the Canonized Doctor Quare hunc trahat Deus illum verò non trahat noli judicare si non vis errare or that modest rule of Cornelius Tacitus Sanctius reverentius visum de actis Deorum credere quà m scire But as for the Second Opinion to our first inquisition that Article 4. The Second Opinion to a great part extricated from the same Labyrinth seemes capable of extrication from the forementioned Labyrinth without much difficulty thus I am says Adrastus or the Fatist either Elect to glory or Reprobate to misery by an eternal Decree of God This we grant to be most true but with this additional qualification that Himself is Now the Cause why He was from eternity Elect or Reprobate For He is now in that very state in which God foresaw that he would be when educed into existence endowed with reason and assisted with sufficient Grace for the clear discernment of Good from Evil and it now depends upon the Liberty of his Will that God hath praevised him operating good or evil so that the Decree of his Election or Reprobation is subsequent or posterior to the Divine Praevision of his future good or evil Demerits To speak yet louder God therfore Elected him to Glory because He Foresaw that he would use both the Liberty of his Understanding and Will and that Supernaturall Light or Divine Grace which the Compassion of God vouchsafed for his Assistance as he ought to enable him to lead an honest and pious life and therefore Reprobated him to misery because He Foresaw that he would Abuse the Lights of Nature and Grace in constantly and impenitently doing actions point-blank repugnant to their frequent and importune Advisoes This being inferred the Fatist cannot but perceive that it lyes on his part now to doe well and with all the nerves of his Mind to Cooperate to Divine Grace that so God from eternity foreseeing that his Conformity to the dictates of his Grace may have Elected him For if he shall counterinflect his Will to the Inclinations of Divine Grace and pursue Evil those Evil works shall be very they which God from eternity having respect unto hath Damned him for the Guilt of them and impoenitence for them Nor can He elude this truth by pleading that God doth Article 5. The Fatists Subterfuge of the Infallibility of Divine Praenotion praecluded from eternity Foreknow whether He shall be Elect or Reprobate and that therefore of Necessity he shall be what he Will be since the Divine Science is uncapable of Elusion or Mutability Because though God indeed had an infallible Praecognition from Eternity whether he would be Praedestinate or Reprobate yet is that Praecognition grounded upon his own eternal Decree and that eternal Decree grounded upon his eternal Praevision of the Fatists Good or Evil life So that the actual Determination of the Will of man to the constant prosecution of Good is the Basis or first Degree in this mysterious Climax of Praedestination the Praevision thereof by God the second the respective Decree of God the third and his indeceptible Praescience the fourth and last Not that these Antecessions and Consecutions are Temporany i. e. not that the Praescience of God is posterior to his Decree and his Decree posterior to his Praevision for those 3. make but one simple and intire Act in the Divine Intellect and Will and Eternity is but one permanent Now incapable of Division because of Cessation really but Anthropopathically i. e. that narrow and remote Man when he speculates the nature of his own Free-Will and that of Divine Justice as integrally Consistent is necessitated for comprehension sake to suppose some Momenta Rationis or Priority and Posteriority in Eternity as we have singularly enunciated in the 2. Articl 4. Sect. 6. chap. praecedent Article 6. A second subterfuge of the Fatist viz. that the Subsequence of the Decree to Praenotion doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability praevented Again the Fatist can justly promise to himself no greater protection by this farther objection that if the Divine Decree be subquent to Divine Praevision therefore is it in his power to stagger the Certitude of the Decree and dissolve its rigour
great and excellent that I may be assured the same cannot be in me either Formaliter or Eminenter and therefore I cannot be the Cause of that Idea by direct and genuine inference I determine that I am not alone in the World but that there is existent in the universe some other Being which is the father of this Idea For if I finde no such Idea occur to my minde in earnest I know no argument that may make me confident of the existence of any one thing distinct from my self Now among these Ideas that I may range them into distinct Article 7. The diversity of Ideas respective to the diversity of Entities orders respective to the severall Degrees of Entities from which they result or are derived there is one which holds forth me to my self concerning which no difficulty can be started as to the concernment of the present Demonstration another which represents God others which pourtray things meerly Corporeal and Inanimate others which describe Angels others resemble Animals and finally others that shew me other men like my selfe As for those Ideas which represent Men Animals or Angels I easily understand that such may be composed and made up Article 8. The possible originals of each sort severely examined and all found to be desumable from our selves the Idea of God only excepted of other Ideas which I usually conceive of my self and other corporeall Entities and of God though there were neither Men nor Animals nor Angels in the whole World beside my self And as for those of Corporeal Entities in them I meet with nothing so great noble or excellent which seems not to have its fountain or origin in my self For when I make a deep and strict inquisition into them I discover that of those things which they comprehend there are only very few which I clearly and distinctly understand such are Magnitude or Quantity extended into its three dimensions of Longitude Latitude Profundity Figure arising from the termination of that extension Situation of parts or that position which parts variously figurated obtain and hold among themselves and Motion or the change of situation in the whole or parts composing the whole to which may be superadded Substance Duration and Number But as for other things as Light Sounds Odors Sapors Heat Cold and other tactile qualities these fall not under the comprehension of my thoughts but darkly and with as much obscurity as confusion insomuch that when I have summ'd up all I know of them it amounts to no more then this that I am even ignorant whether they be true or false i. e. whether such Ideas as I conceive of them be the Ideas of things really existent or of Non-entities For though I have faithfully observed that Falsity properly and most emphatically so called or Formal falsity can be no where found in the world but in our judgments or determinations yet is there another Material falsity in our Ideas when they represent a Non-entity for a real Entity a nothing in stead of a something Thus to exemplifie the representations which I have of Heat and Cold appear so narrow dim and confused that my most intense and acute speculations cannot acquire from them any plenary and stable satisfaction Whether cold be only a privation of Heat or Heat no more but the privation of Cold Whether both be real and positive qualities or neither and since there can be no Ideas but as of real entities in regard it is a truth apparent that cold is nothing else but a privation of heat that same Idea which exhibiâ—s cold as something real and positive may justly be reputed false and so likewise may others of the same series To such Ideas therefore it is not necessary that I assigne any other original besides my self for since they may be materially false i. e. represent nothing under the disguise of something it is declared unto me by the Light of Nature that they proceed from nothing i. e. that no other reason can be given why they are in me but only this that something is wanting to my nature which is requisite to make it absolutely perfect and compleat and if they were true yet in respect they exhibit so litle of reality that I cannot in the most abstracted contemplation clearly distinguish that litle from nothing I see no reason why they may not worthily be counted the Minervas of my own brain or the productions of my own thoughts Now as concerning those things which are clear and distinct in the Ideas of Corporeal Natures I have discovered that some of them also be derived from the Idea of my self such are Substance Duration Number c. of the same classis For when I consider a stone to be a substance or an entity constituted in a capacity of subsisting per se and at the same time consider my self also to be a substance although I conceive my self to be Res cogitans a thinking ens and look not upon my self as Res extensa a quantative or extensive but upon a stone as Res extensa and not cogitans and that therefore there must be a great dissimilitude between these two conceptions yet they seem to be reconciled and shake hands in termino substantialitatis and also when I consider that I now am and formerly have been and when I have various cogitations whose number I comprehend I then acquire the Ideas of Duration and Number which I can after transfer and apply to what other things I please But for the residue of particular things whereof the Ideas of Corporeal Natures are composed as Extension Figure Situation and Motion these have not their residence in me since I am nothing else in propriety of essence but Res cogitans formaliter and yet in relation that they are only certain Modi substantiae modificated substance and I also am a substance they seem to be comprehended in me eminenter by way of transcendency And so there remains unexamined only the Idea of God in which I am to consider whether it include any thing which cannot be derivative from my self By the name God I understand a certain substance infinite Article 9. The Idea of God here described cannot be either formally or materially false but the most clear distinct and true of all others independent omnipotent omniscient from which as well my own as all other dependent natures were derived by whose incomprehensible Wisdome Power and Goodness the universe was created according to the admirable Idea formed in his own eternall intellect and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order and exquisite harmony which in the beginning he was pleased to institute Now so divine excellent and perfect are all these Attributes that when with deep yet humble and reverentiall thoughts I contemplate them either conjunctively or distinctly I become fully informed that they are too great and noble to be derived from so mean frail and imperfect a being as my self and upon this firm foundation I erect
I should have given unto my self also all those perfections whereof I have the Idea in my mind and so I my self should have been God Nor am I bound to conceive that those excellencies wanting to the accomplishment of my nature can be more difficult to acquire then those graduall abilities of which I am already master for on the contrary t is manifest that it must import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being i. e. for a Cogitant something to be deduced from nothing then for me being once constituted in a Capacity to attain to the cognition of many things whereof I am now actually ignorant which can be esteemed no more but the Accidents of that substance And assuredly had I borrowed the greater my substantiality from my own stock of power I should not have denied unto my self the less those Accumulations or accidentall additions nor any other of those divine accomplishments which I understand to be included in the Idea of God why because no one of those seem more difficult to be acquired and if any were more difficult for me to aspire unto t is more then probable I should understand that difficulty if I had those Faculties of which my nature stands possessed from my own donation in respect I should find my power to be terminated in them Nor doe I evade the convictive rigor of these reasons if I adventure on this supposition that I have been ever heretofore as I now am as if the induction of this hypothesis would be that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my essence no higher then my self or seek out no other cause of my Existence for in respect that all time may be divided into innumerable parts each whereof hath no necessary dependence on the rest either precedent or subsequent from hence that I have formerly been is no valid consequence that therefore I must now be unlesse some other cause be admitted which dothfreshly create me in each of those particles or atoms of time and particularly in this instant moment i. e. doth constantly conserve me in being For manifest it must be to any that looks attentively into the nature of Duration that to the Conservation of any thing through all those several minutes in which its existence endureth is required no less then the same power and act which is necessary to the Creation of the same thing anew if it were not already existent and consequently that the act of Conservation doth not at all but in the cloudy reason of man differ from the act of Creation These things thus stated I am concerned to propose to my self this interrogation Whether there be any power inherent in my nature whereby I may be enabled to conserve my self the same in the future that I am now in the present for since I am nothing but a meer res cogitans for here I precisely regard only that part of my self which is properly and distinctly a Cogitant substance if there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence doubtless I should be conscious of it but I am convicted there is none such and therefore from this one evidence that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being for the shortest moment imaginable I judge that I am subordinate unto and dependent upon some other Entity distinct from my self But to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation in order to the exclusion of all doubts from the intended result or conclusion put the case that this Entitie to whose sufficiency I owe my Conservation pardon ò thou incomprehensible Essence thou great and sole Preserver of men pardon this supposition that modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy Supremacy is not God and that I deduce my production from my Parents or some other cause less perfect then God For determination t is an Axiome to which every Sceptick will readily condescend Tantundem ad minimum esse debere in causa quantum est in effectu there must be so much at least in the cause as is found in the effect and therefore since I am res cogitans a substance thinking and having a certain Idea of God in me what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or fountain of my being that cause also must be Ens cogitans and must possess the Idea of all those perfections which I ascribe unto God Now of that cause it may be again enquired whether it were derived from it self or from some other Cause for if from it selfe then may it bee naturally collected from what hath preceded in this disquisition that such a Cause is God For as it hath the power or act of self-existence or self-conservation so also undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections the Idea whereof it comprehends in it self i. e. all such accomplishments as I conceive to be concentred in God But if from some other cause then I repeat my question again Article 11. Oâ— from some other cause leâ—s perfect then God concerning this other cause whether that had its being from it self or from another untill I arrive successively at the first Cause or highest linke in the chain which also will be God For no melancholy can be so absurd as to dream of a progress in infinitum in the series of Causes especially since I doe not here intend that Cause only which did in time past produce me but principally that which doth conserve me in the present Nor can it be imagined that a plurality of Causes met concurred and conspired to the making up of my nature and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God from a second the Idea of another from a third the Idea of another c. so that all those perfections may indeed be found severally in the distinct and scattered peices of the Universe but no where conjoyned and amassed together in one single Essence which might be God For on the contrary the Vnity Simplicity Inseparability or Identity of all those excellencies in God is one of the chiefest of those perfections which I understand to be in him nor assuredly could the Idea of the Vnity of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfections also nor could he have effected that I should understand them conjoyned and married together by an indissoluble union unless he had also effected that I should know what they are in their distinction To expunge the last scruple and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God fair and immaculate have not my Article 12 Or from our Paâ—ents Progenitors devolved a being to my Parents and they devolved the like to me and may not this Idea of those perfections which I attribute to God be implanted radically in this my being so derived down to me by propagation without the necessary insertion of it by
majoriad minus majus thus if the smaller machine of a Hand-worm wherein the almost invisible without an engyscope or magnifying glass exiguity of the whole frame the multiplicity of organs and the variety of respective functions assigned thereunto may worthily contend concerning elegance of composure with the large captain of the watry regiments the Whale may be configured by Chance or the casual concourse of convenient particles of the First matter why may not the grosser movement of the Vniverse be also wrought by the like contingent segregation of disagreeing and convention of consimilar Atoms whose tumultuation and conslict growing from the antipathy of different magnitude and Figure made the Chaos and their working themselves into peculiar orders by the accidental conflux aud mutual coherence of Homogeneities made the forme of the World So we by counter-demonstration may argue à majori ad minus thus if Fortune had the power and skill to make the World why can she not make the more rude and facile movement of a Watch If Atoms could spontaneously range and combine themselves into the immense batlements of the World why not also into the narrower structure of a Castle If they met into the mighty bulwarks of an Island why not into the thinner and more fragil rampiers of a Fort If they could dispose themselves into wide campania's of Herbs and variegated Flowers why not into a peice of Landskip Tapestry All which require as infinitely less of Power so also of Science Should they endevour a subterfuge by replying that these are the Effects of Art and not of Nature we may prevent their evasion by rejoyning that since they allow Chance to have an interest even in the operations of Art why doe they not aswell make her the Founderess of a City as of the aedifice of a spontaneous Animal whose structure is more difficult We are not backward to confess what we lately supposed concerning the dissected and disordered parts of an Animal that if the World were but a promiscuous heap of different materials such as stones Timber Sand Lime Clay Nailes Tyles c. confusedly congested then could not our choler swell to so high a tide of indignation against the arrogance of Fortune nor should we be so well provided of arms to fight in defence of a divine contrivement But since the building of the same is by infinite transcendency more durable more distinct more symmetrical and more gorgeous in all its parts then the most elaborate and magnificent Palace since the Heart of a Pismire hath more of magisterial artifice then the Eschurial the proboscis or trunk of a Flea more industry in its delicate and sinuous perforation then all the costly Aquaeducts of Nero's Rome the Arsenal at Venice or the two Spanish Engines one for the traduction and elevation of Water at Toledo the other for the automatous coyning of money at Segovia both admired by a Person for the most part above admiration S r. Kenelme Digby since the breast or laboratory of a Bee contains more anfractuous convolutions then the Labyrinth of Daedalus and more Cellules then the famous monastery of S t. Lawrence in Spain for bravery and amplitude of architecture reputed the eighth wonder of the World and since the skull of a Louse hath more ventrieles or receptaries for the numerous swarms of Animal spirits then the spatious Amphitheatre of Rome had seats for the spectators in sine since the meanest peice of Nature throwes disparagement and contempt upon the greatest masterpeice of Art how can it be that man noble and ingenious man should fall so much lower then his incircumspect Father Adam as to confess the visible influence of Prudence in the easier and yet at the same time deny any cause but Ignorance to have been exercised in the harder to admit the managery of an Architect or knowing principle in the structure of a house and yet determine the more magnificent Creation of the Vniverse upon the blind disposal of Fortune To conclude this unworthy vindication of the injured wisdom Article 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inference and ours prevented and the invalidity os theirs though their own hypothesis were conceded in terminis declared by an adequate similitude of our Maker by leaving no possible objection unanswered let us suppose that our opponents should recurre to their old starting hole or salley port the Spontaneous motion of Atoms and urge that if the materials of a house or other artificial structure were endowed with an innate propensity to motion as the materials of the World were then might they also without the direction of any external Agent onely by reciprocal convention complication and revinction acquire setled and orderly situations and so dispose themselves into a regular Fabrick but since they are devoid of all domestick Activity the disparity betwixt the operations of chance and those of Art is so great that an argument drawn from the impossibility of a performance by one is not conclusive against the possibility of an atcheivement by the other And when we have supposed this retort let us also suppose what they would have viz. that the materials of a house were radically impregnated with a perpetual tendency to motion and that by the drift of this internal activity they should from different quarters meet together in one heap there croud compress express impell repell detrude elevate circumgyrate fix each other and at last by reciprocal combination acquiesce yet can it never be supposed by a sober imagination that the result of all this hurly burly betwixt those unequal parts and the peace ensuing upon the casual acquisition of situations proper and convenient to each would be a well ordered aedifice nay any thing half so neer allied to architecture as a ruine I conceive the wit of Balbus wound up to a very happy strain when disputing against Velleius one that blush't not to weare the infamous badge of Epicurus concerning this monstrous sigment of the worlds Projection from the dissolution of the Chaos and a fortuitous concursion of the universal matter he invented this apposite similitude Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse non intelligo cur idem non putet si innumerabiles unius viginti formae literarum vel aureae vel quales-libet aliquo conjiciantur posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennij ut deinceps legi possint â—ssici quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere Fortuna Upon which we may briefly thus descant if that congruous series of letters which is necessary to the lecture of one page line or word can never result from a careless congestion of prints but must be the setled effect of great industry and diligence in the Compositor undoubtedly with no less violence to reason can any man opinion that the innumerable parts of the World that observe a far more distinct and elegant order then the characters of any Typographer disposed into words
end for the most part best and many times only known to himself Nor is it an illegal process of our reason but the best logick as to supernaturals to conclude not only the excellencies but even the necessary being of some things meerly from hence that we cannot fully comprehend them since their very being above our capacity is argument both clear and strong enough that they are not only so as but more perfect and far greater then we understand them to be as he that sees but a small part of the sea with a Telescope at distance may safely conclude that t is exceeding large because the circumferrence thereof is by infinite degrees of magnitude wider then to be drawn into the aperture of his slender tube Sure I am at least that the Antisyllogisme or Counter-argument the understanding of man cannot discover its abstruse and mysterious plots resolve its multiplex aenigma's nor analyze its method or series of Causes subordinate and so by a retrograde chase hunt out its first and chief intention Ergo there can be no Providence is intolerable and deserves a greater dose of Ellebor then that absurdity of the blinde man who concluded there was not nor could be any such thing as light or Colours only because he could not see them When therefore we shall have run our eager contemplations to a stand in the wilderness of Providence and lost our busie thoughts in the maze of Gods secret decrees all the satisfaction our bold curiosity can return home with will be only this that all occurrences in the World are predetermined have their Causes Times and Ends punctually set down in the Ephemerides of Fate and though in the incompetent judgment of man some of them may seem the Peradventures or temerarious Hits of Chance yet are they the mature Designations of the supreme Wisdome though in the ears of man they may sound discords to the musick of particular Natures yet will they at last be found well composed Aers necessary both to sweeten and fill up the common Harmony of the Universe To instance are there not many Monsters Heteroclites Equivocal and irregular births on the earth many prodigious and new-faced Meteors in the upper and uncertain Anomalies or unseasonable Tempests in the lower division of the Aer many new Phaenomena among the fixed various encounters diviâ—ions and conspiracies among the erratick stars c. and yet doe not all these as Chrotchets and Quavers in a grave and solemn lesson on a Lute conduce to the advancement of the General Melody Doth not irregularity render order the more conspicuous and amiable and Deformity like the Negro drawn at Cleopatra's elbow serve as a foile to set off Beauty Are not the Moles on the cheeks of Nature as those on Venus skin placed there to illustrate or whiten the snow and sweeten the feature of her face Is it not exceeding gracefull in a Comoedian to temper and endear the sage and weighty scenes of Princes and Melancholy States-men with the light interludes of Pantalons Clowns and Anticks Doth not the Painter then shew the most of skill when he refracts the glaring luster of his lighter Colours with a veil of Sables and makes the beauty of his peice more visible by clouding it with a becoming shadom And without doubt every man will readily conjoyne his vote to ours that he is best able to adorn and imbellish a piece of Art who first contrived and wrought it and therefore the Perfection and Condecoration of a work doth properly and solely bolong to his hand that brought it to that height as to want only ornament nor is it his part to prescribe what 's necessary to the conciliation of gracefulness and decorament to an engine who is ignorant of the modell and holds not a perfect Idea of the Artifice thereof Now the importance of all these similes being put together who can be so ignorant in the Alphabet or rudiments of ratiocination as not at first sight to spell them into this short lesson consisting only of two orthodox Positions First that those subitaneous Accidents which the ignorance or carelesness of the vulgar doth usually refer to the blind sortilegies of Chance are truely the meer hand of God and the prudent designes of that Catholick Providence which hath numbred the sands on the Sea shoar and weighed the dust of the earth in a balance which feeds the young Ravens when they cry and while the old ones wander for meat which thundereth marvellously with his voyce and doth great things that we cannot comprehend for he saith to the snow Be thou on the earth likewise to the smal rain and to the great rain of his strength by whose breath frost is given and the breadth of the waters is straightned which turneth the bright clouds round about by his Counsels that they may doe what ever he commandeth them upon the earth who made the ordinances of heaven and hath set the dominions thereof in the earth who can binde the sweet insluences of the Pleiades and lose the bands of Orion can bring forth Mazaroth in his season and guide Arcturus with his sons c. Secondly that those Monstrosities or extraordinary and prodigious effects which the nescience of the multitude cals Irregularities Perversions and Deformities of Nature to wiser considerations prove themselves to be no wanton excursions or randome shots of her hand made without aim at any final cause but praeordained and collineated by that sure one of Divine Providence point blanck at some certain end private or publick The former being known only to himself à priori and frequently mistaken by man a posteriori the later indeed we have a liberty to conjecture to be either that he leaves the straight and chalks out this serpentine and crooked line to satisfie the World of his Prerogative that himself is the Agent and Nature but his Instrument and therefore to be turned wrenched altered and perverted at his pleasure or else that his wisdome thinks those spots requisite to enhance the beauty of the whole those private fewds and petty discords betwixt Individuals necessary not only to endear but conserve the peace of the whole Both which durable Truths are with so much piety as judgement contracted by that Emperor of the Stoicks as well as of the Romans Marcus Aurelius Antoninus of whom the smooth Herodian initio historiae gives this glorious Character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Solus imperatorum sapientiae studium non verbis aut decretorum scientia sed gravitate morum vitaeque continentia usurpavit into one short meditation in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Quae ad Deos ut auctores referuntur ea Providentiae plena esse nemo dubitat Quae Fortunae vulgò adscribuntur ne illa quidem extra Naturae leges fatalemque illum contextum complexúmque rerum quae à providentia administrantur Inde omnia sluunt adde quod necessarium est quicquid est toti universo
alteration is not only above the hopes of man whose virtuous endeavours piety and prayers must therefore prove as fruitless and ineffectual towards the Aversion as vitiosities impiety and profaneness towards the Attraction or Acceleration of any misfortune predecreed but even of God himself whom though they allow to have bin the Author of that sempiternal and irrepealable law of Destiny yet they deny him to have reserved to himself the prerogative of exemption from the obligation thereof This was the Creed of Philetas when he sayd ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mortales superat quodcunque necesse est Vi solida quia nec superos reveretur in almis Qui Coeli spatiis degunt sine luctibus aevum Of that old Poet quoted by Cicero de Fato who sayd quod fore paratum est id summum exuperat Jovem and of that renowned Captain Hector when being importuned by his wife not to hazard himself in a salley upon the Graecian trenches he conjured her fond fears into a resolved confidenco that no sword could reach his heart but that of Fate by this spell Parce precor nimio misera indulgere dolori Nam quis me Fat is invitis mittet ad Orcum Nullum equidem vitasse hominum dico ultima Fata Prithee forbeare thy needless grief and know No hand can send me to the shades below Without the Fates assent I hold it true What Fate hath destin'd no man can eschew As also of those Military men mentioned by P. Gregorius Tholosanus lib. 21. de republ cap. 8. whose minds being seasoned with the same perswasion that the manner and moment of every mans Death is appointed by the immutable law of Fate and his lot inscribed in invisible Characters on his forehead became of so hard a temper as to be wholly insensible of the threats of that terrible Giant Danger nor did they account it other then a vanity resulting from the cowardize of Ignorance to provide against the blows of War either by caution or defensive armes urging the examples of many valiant Soldiers who have bin observed to have confronted whole showers of levelled bullets shot from the neer engines of the advancing Foe without a wound and yet at last have fallen by some petite and unexpected peble thrown from the sure sling of Destiny even then when they seemed immured in the secure Cittadel of Peace and thought their triumphant Lawrels armour of proof even against thunder Occidis Argivae quem non potuere phalanges Sternere nec Priami regnorum eversor Achilles Hic tibi mortis erant metae c. Virg. 12. Aeneid But alas 't is not the Academy of the Stoicks alone that affords patronage to this Error of Absolute Fatality nor the Camp that only contends for the propagation thereof nor the politick institutions of that Secretary of Hell Mahomet in his absurd Alcoran cap. 6. that only countenance the diffusion thereof in these our days for even the Schools of Christianity in some parts have advanced the reputation thereof to so unreasonable and dangerous a height as to make it an Article of Faith if not absolutely necessary yet at least collaterally conductive to Salvation and this by Auctority of the Councel of Dort which ratified the doctrine of their Apostle Calvir concerning Absolute Predestination and enjoyned the publick Assertion thereof to most of their Divines of the last reformation I sayd the Doctrine of Calvin concerning Absolute Predestination Article 11. The Stoical Fate and the Calvinists Predestination fully defined thereby though tacitly intimating my knowledge of the no small Disparity between the Fate of the Stoicks and that propugned by many Christian Divines The one being as Chrysippus hath defined it Sempiterna indeclinabilis series rerum catena quae seipsam velvit perpetuò implicat per aeternos consequentiae ordines ex quibus connexa est A sempiternal and indeclinable series syntax or chaine of Causes whose turnings convolutions and perpetual implications are dependent on it self by those eternal orders of consequence of which it is made up and connected the other as the best of School men hath defined it Pendens à Divino Consilio series ordoque caussarum a series or successive complexion and order of Causes dependent on the Will of God From the just Collation of which two Definitions our first thoughts may collect that the Difference between the Stoical and Theological Fate may be thus stated The Former in some things excludes Divinity from that Article 12. A full and câ—â—ar discrimination of the Stoical from the Theological Fate round or Circle of Causes reserring all events as well general as particular to the meer subsequence of Naturall Actives operating upon capable Passives subordinately connected unto and so by successive influx necessarily disposing each other to the production of those particular Effects to the Causation whereof their Natural Faculties were at first determinately accommodated and in others includes Divinity within it i. e. confines his Power and Will to that rigid and infringible Law of Necessity excogitated by his Wisdom from all eternity and established by his Decrce at the inauguration of Nature to Existence The Later makes the Will of God to be the first link in the chaâ—n of Causes and so superior to the restriction of natural necessity dependent thereon The Stoick being a declared Enemy to the Arbitrary Prerogative of God adligeth the Energie of the First and Infinite Cause to the capacity of Secondary and Finite and upon consequence doth acknowledge neither the Liberty of his Will nor the Absoluteness of his Power or Omnipotency But on the Contrary the Christian look's up to heaven as the Councel-house where the Instruments opportunity place and success of every Action receive their Specification to this or that determinate purpose to the Arbitrary Resolve of God as the Definite Sentence or Injunction and on all Second Causes but as subordinate and subalternally instrumental to the punctual execution and accomplishment of the same and upon legal consequence concludes that the Divine Will is absolutely Free knowing no circumscription but that of the Divine Wisdome that the meer Fiat of that Councel is the Director and Spring in the Enginâ— of the World and that the Author of Nature hath reserved to himself the Privilege of adding unto detracting from intending remitting inverting transcending or adnulling the fundamental Constitutions of Nature and so breaking that Concatenation of Causalities or the Chain of Fate at pleasure The Heathen absurdly dream't that all effects are inevitably produced by the conspiracy and coefficiency of natural Causes respectively qualified or that all Accidents spring up from the proper tendency of their particular Efficients without the influence direction or moderation of any other Virtue besides their own native and Congenial Faculties The more intelligent Christian proves that all natural Causes doe not produce their respective Effects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex
more both of Imprudence and Inconstancy it must import to play the uncircumspect Sophister with those who as our Adversaries themselves affirme stood possessed with a full perswasion that the Term of every mans life was absolutely and without any respect to his future piety or Impiety predetermined I profess sincerely I am yet to be perswaded that any Credulity can be so pedantique and slavish as to entertain a beleif that even Man I forbear to say God can thus openly and detectibly dissimulate with any the most stupid and indiscreet person alive unless he be first resolved to expose himself to the just scorn and derision of all men and by this loose and childish jugling forfeit that reputation which he had acquired by his former grave and oraculous treaties and the just performance of all Articles to which he had subscribed 'T is one thing to admit that the Holy Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man when he is pleased to hint unto us those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ineffable Mysteries which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh and are notions reserved to entertain the Soul when enfranchized from the bonds of Corporeity such are those glances whereby he affords us a dark landskip of the New Jerusalem and allegorical description of the joyes and glories of the Eternal Life an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible Essence and three distinct Subsistences in one indivisible Existence c. and a far different nay contrary to say that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequall capacities when he promiseth those things which do not only not transcend our faculties of comprehension but are familiar to our knowledg nay such as the neerest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know And such is the quality of those Blessings which the Bounty of Providence hath by promise assured unto the Virtuous in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life and particularly that of longevous subsistence upon earth To conclude the Spirit or Form of a Promise doth consist in this that they to whom the promise is made do understand the good therein specified to be really bona fide in specie intended to be performed by him who made the promise Now if there arise any doubt whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared then doth the force and sanction together with the Dignity thereof totally vanish and become voyd Our Adversaries have rejoyned that God doth therefore promise Longevity to obsequious Children because he hath formerly decreed to qualifie their particular Constitutions with respective Durability But alas this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty nor prevents the Doubt For if his Decree concerning their Longevity be Absolute devoyd of all Suppositionality and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience no reason can discover what Force or Energy the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the Condition required Again how can that Promise 〈◊〉 way of invitation or allurement affect those who are already confirmed that what the promise imports is formerly by the positive and non-conditionate Will of God made inevitable and hath the Possibility of its Futurition determined to precise Necessity In fine the Postulation of that Condition can neither consist with the Eternal Identity of God that promises nor effectually move those to whom he makes the promise to endeavour the Consequution of that ample reward of filial obedience for his Decree concerning the Term of their life doth and shall forever stand firm and immote whether the Condition be performed or not The last Testimony they have essayed to extort from us is the Article 8. The sixth Testimony cleared from 4. Exceptions Instance of Ezekiah and this by a Fourfold Cavillation 1 By this Excuse Singulare aliquod Exemplum non evertere regulam that one single denormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law or one swallow makes no summer This Exception I confess might have had some colour or slender pretext of Validity had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it by asserting that the immutable law of Destiny was equally extended to all and every individual person from Adam down to us For most certain it is that God never limited his free Omnipotence by any fixt law or bound up his own hands with the same setled Constitutions whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Creatures it being the Prerogative of his Nature to know no Impossibility but to be able to act either above or against the statutes of his Deputy whensoever and upon what subject and to what end soever he pleases But I have no warrant to beleive that among the Propugnators of Fate any one hath deviated inro so remote an Alogie as to opinion that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urne but that the Decrees concerning the Destinies of some particular persons are not so definitive precise and immoveable as those of all others in generall 2 By this Response that under the seeming Absoluteness of the Prophets Sentence Morieris Thou shalt dye there lay concealed a tacite Hypothesis which was this Nisi seria poenitudine te ad Deum convertas unless by serious and profound repentance thou shalt mortify the old man of sin and apply thy self wholly to the Mercies of God Against this mistaken plea our defence shall be that it wants the principal inducement to beleif and so can afford no satisfaction at all For besides this that it quadrates neither to their First Exception nor their Thesis concerning the Immobility of Destiny what Logick can tolerate the induction of an Hypothetical upon a Categorical Proposition or more expresly how can any Condition be comprehended under that message which by a definitive and peremptory decree and such as carried no respect to the performance or non-performance of any condition whatever tels the K. in down right terms that the date of his life was now expired and that the severe Publican Death stood ready at the door of his chamber within some few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature Subordinata non pugnant is an Axiome I well know and am ready to receive a challenge from any singularity that dares question the universality of its truth but that a condiiional Decree can be subordinate to an Absolute I am bold to deny nor need I goe far for an Argument to prove the impossibility thereof the very Antithesis of those notions Absolute and Conditional sufficiently declaring as much To take the just dimensions of this Cloud every Condition is moveable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Uncertainty as being suspended upon an uncertain and mutable Cause viz. the Arbitrary Election of mans Free will insomuch that the Event thereof cannot be known
nonnaturals and the restauration of the same when impaired by any distemper by rational and approved medicaments and shall therefore enjoy health and attain to longaevity On the Contrary I foreknow that he shall lead a disorderly and luxurious course of life accelerate the dissolution of his temperament by the immoderate praemature or unseasonable use of Wine Woemen Passions c. and when assaulted by any disease chronique or acute shall either omit to consult learned judicious and experienced Physitians or disobey their pharmaceutical or diaetetical praescripts drinke wine in a Fever cold water in a Critical sweat salt sharp acid or corroding liquors in a Dysentery eate Astringents in obstructions frigid crude and dyspeptical fruits in an imbecillity of the stomach c. and shall therefore ruine his health and drop into the grave before hee 's ripe Now take which Praescience you please and either hath for its object the praecise Term of Peter or Johns life as a thing to come and fully and punctually presupposeth the same but so that together with that fixt Term it comprehends also all the order and manner of its Futurition or all the antecedent and conspiring causes amongst which the principal and most energetical is the right use or abuse of his own Free will in whose power it was to move that Term either forwards or backwards i. e. either to adduce or produce it So far therefore is this Praevision of God from excluding the necessity of Medical Remedies as the Defendants of Fate would impose according to that of Solon in Stobaeus Fato quaecunque manet sors Non hanc avertet victima sed nec aves Nec qui Paeonias aegris mortalibus herbas Saepe erraturam ferre laborat opem That it totally includes nay presupposeth it so necessarily that if we take away from man the Liberty of his Will and the opportunity of using either prophylactical or therapeutical means in order to the prolongation of his life we must also submove the Certainty of Gods Praescience since that determineth nothing but only praesupposeth all things nor doth God by a decree subsequent to that Prescience praeordain that this or that individual man shall recover of such or such a disease unless by virtue of such or such appropriate remedies which the Physician shall in the opportunity praescribe Nor is it a more justifiable plea at the bar of reason to argue thus if the Term of mans life be certainly and precisely foreknown to God then must it together with the order and manner of its Futurition be sixt and immutable then to argue thus if God hath a certain and precise cognition of any thing already past as of the Creation of the world therefore could that thing have come to pass no otherwise nor at any other time then it did therefore was the world created by God non liberé sed necessariò not by an Arbitrary but Necessary and restrained activity For as Science having for its object a thing Praeterite doth infer no necessity upon that thing praeterite that it should have bin so and no otherwise effected so doth Praescience having for its object a thing Future infer no necessity upon its futurition each being an Immanent Action in God extra rem or having no compulsive influence at all upon that particular thing or its Causes and Futurum esse imports no other thing but an object of Praescience nor Praeteritum esse any thing but an object of Science or Memorie Science is the perfection of the Subject or thing knowing not of the obiect or thing known much less the destruction of the thing known For necessary it is to perfect Science that it agree in all points with the nature of its object But wholly Antarctical to this is that Praescience which is grounded upon Divine Praedestination whereby not only the Term of every individuals life together with the whole order and manner of its Futurition is praefixt but also all those Causes whose refractary or counter-activity might in any respect hinder the precise accompletion of that prefixt Term are praevented or praedetermined to invalidity lest the Praescience become uncertain or dubious whether that Praedetermination dispose per modum Causae Efficientis by a certain Physical and really effective action or impression upon the will of man enforcing it to the election of such a course of life as may conduce to his punctual pervention to that praestitute Term or per modum Causae Desicientis by nonconcurrent but only permissive influence by some called Permissio simplex Simple Permission by others Permissio essicax efficacious permission since that rule amongst Philosophers Causa Desiciens in necessariis reducitur ad Efficientem doth warrant the Indifferency For this Decretory Praescience though it agree with the precedent simple Praescience in this that it hath for its object rem futuram includeth in its circle the whole order and manner of its Futurition and presupposeth both the end and respective means fully and absolutely yet it clearly and irreconcilably differs from it in this that the precedent Prescience presupposeth the liberty of mans Will and the use thereof not only incoacted and without irrefragable impuls but absolutely free and arbitrary but this wholly destroys the arbitrary monarchy of the Will by importing that the influence of the Decree not only inclineth by soft and gentle flexure or perswasion but by an irresistible violence forceth it upon the election and pursuit of those means which in a direct and natural line lead to the accomplishment thereof and this lest the Certitude or Infallibility of the Divine Praescience be infirmed and staggered To discriminate this Later from that Former Praescience yet Article 5. A third illustration of the same Difference by conceiving the Divine Decrees in the same subordinate scries which the Fatists have imagined morefully and so insinuate the result of the Distinction by the most intelligible and concise way of argumentation it will be necessaty for us to conceive the Decrees of God in the same method of subordination wherein they who found the infallibility of his Praevision upon the necessity of his Praedestination and Praedetermination have bin by the obscurity of the Subject compelled to range their thoughts in the declarement of their opinion The first Decree of God runs thus I will that Peter live till the expiration of the natural or temperamental lease of his life conceive it to be till his glass hath run 50. 60. 70. or 80. year but that John wither before hee 's ripe and fall in the June of his age conceive it to be in the 20. 30. or 40. year from his birth The Second thus I will praeserve Peter from this or that sickness defend him from this or that knock of misfortune conserve him in or restore him from this or that dangerous disease lest he expire before the praestitute Term of his life but for John he shall be invaded by such or such a mortal disease receive such
in the incomparable Commentary of Gassendus as a motion which once conceded doth totally infringe the indispensable rigor of Fate and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man This Plutarch taught us in two perspicuous texts 1 when He sayth de Anim. Solert that the motion of the Declination of Atoms in the Human Soul was subtilly invented by Epicurus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that Fortune might be brought on the theatre of the world there to act her part and the Arbitrary power of man might not be abrogated 2 when He declares de Stoic repub that the same Epicurus sese in omnem partem versare ingeniúmque contendere in id incumbendo ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium ac pravitatem esse inculpabilem non patiatur rack't all the nerves of his wit to find out a way for the protection of mans Free will and so that evil might not praetend to inculpability Now though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader out of the direct tract of our praesent Theme into a wide Digression concerning Epicurus his whole Romance of the Declination of Atoms in the Soul especially having lately remitted him to Gassendus his accomplisht Comment thereupon yet can we not impede his progress along the streight line of method here to arrest him while we informe him briefly How he accommodated that fiction to the vindication of mans Liberty from the inexorable Coaction of Fate We conceive that Epicurus having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals but principally in Man viz. Natural Violent and Voluntary took it for granted that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from Atoms the Principium à quo of all motion and hereupon concluded that the spring of all Natural motion was the primary motion congenial or inhaerent to Atoms viz. that whiâ—h physiology calls the motion of Gravity whereby an Atom is praecipitated ad lineam rectam to a perpendicular that the spring of all Violent motion was the motion of Reflexion or that which ariseth from occursation arietation or repercussion of one Atom by another whereby the Atom reflected is carried ad lineam obliquam and lastly that the spring of all Voluntary motion was the motion of Declination to which no region is determined nor time praefixt But might not Democritus and other Defendants of Absolute Necessity natural have excepted against this as insufficient to Article 5. An Exception in the name of Democritus against Epicurus Inference the protection of mans Evasory Freedome by returning that because this motion of Declination is no less Natural for it is derived from no other principle but Atoms themselves then that of Gravity therefore doth it still remain that All things are effected by Fate as well when Epicurus his Hypothesis is conceded as before Insomuch as all things which were to come to pass by reason of those various motions of Arietation Repuls Declination c. by an eternal series and kind of subalternate Concatenation are consequent one upon the heels of another and particularly that event of Cognition and Appetition to which mans Liberty appertains and so are brought to pass by an equal Necessity For that the Mind of man may display or execute that Liberty Elective whereby it affects and prosecutes any object conceive it to be an Apple necessary it is that the Image or Species of that Apple be first emitted from it and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight invade percell and commove the Mind to know or apprehend it Necessary to the Apple before it can transfuse its visible Species to the eye that it be put in some place convenient for adspect by him who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere Necessary that the Tree which bore that apple be first generated by a seed and nourished by the moisture of the earth concocted by the heat of the Sun Necessary that that Seed be derived from a former apple and that from a former tree planted in this or that determinate place at this or that determinate time and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world when both the Earth and all its Vegetable seeds had their origination from the Concursions and Complexions of Atoms which could not being agitated by the impulse of their own inhaerent Faculty Motive but convene and coalesce and acquiesce in those Figures those situations at that time Again if the Soul or Mind be also a Contexture of orbicular Atoms those Atoms must have bin contained in the Sperm of the Parents must have consluxed thither from certain meats and drinks as also from the Aer and beams of the Sun those me at s must have bin such and no other and so subalternately successive from eternity the Event will be found to come to pass by the same Adamantine Necessity whatever of the Causes lateral or concurrent which must run up to an account beyond all Logarithms you shall please to begin at Because from Eternity Causes have so cohaered to Causes that the last causes could not but concurr which being deduced into act the Mind could not but know and knowing affect or desire that particular object viz. the Apple And what is here said of Causes the same in all points is to be understood also of Atoms which constitute those causes and from whose congenial motions the Causes derive those their Motions by which they attain to be Causes To this Exception that we may compose some Response such Article 6. The justification thereof by a Respons conforme to the Physiology of Epicurus as may seem Consentaneous to the Doctrine of Epicurus and to contain somewhat of Probability at least we must usurp the liberty to assume that such is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul or Mind its Declinant Atoms can break that Rigidity arising from other Atoms and so make its nature Flexile to any part in which Flexility the root of Liberty doth consist And therefore the mind being allected by the Species of any object is indeed carried towards that object but so that if another object shall instantly occurr whose Attraction is aequivalent it may again be invited by and carried towards that object also so that deflecting from the first it may become aequilibrated or indifferent to either part which doubtless is to be Free or Arbitrary And that the Mind being thus constituted Flexile and Indifferent doth at length determine it self rather to one then the other part this ariseth from hence that the impression of one Species is more violent then of the other and consequently that the Election succeeds upon the Apprehension of that object whose species appears either positively good or comparatively more good Finally that the Mind when it electeth or willeth any object is as it were the principal Machine or main Spring by whose motions all the Faculties and the members destinate to execution are excited and carried thither whither the Mind tendeth and
to the virtues of their Causes shall come to be effected manifest it is that that particular Event whose Ambiguity is determined to Certainty of Futurition and is actually brought to pass is Fatal or Necessary i. e. could not but come to pass For otherwise the Gods must be confest subject to Mendacity One of the two therefore must be granted viz. that all things come to pass Necessarily as they are foreknown and Praedicted by the Gods and so that the word Contingens is excluded as importing no Reality but a meer Chimaera or that the Affairs or Occurrences of man are neither praecognite nor procured by the Gods the Impossibility of which assertion doth also fully exclude all Contingency To the Solution of this Difficulty t is well known the Divines Article 5. The full solution of the same by virtue of the Divâ—â—s Discrimination of Necessity into Absolute and Hypothetical have most judiciously accommodated their Distinction of Necessity into Absolute and Suppositional For instance that 2. and 3. make 5. or that yesterday is praeterlapsed is Absolutely Necessary but that I should to morrow take a journey into the Country or write a Consult for such or such a Patient is not absolutely Necessary yet if I suppose that I shall travel or write then there ariseth a Necessity of my travelling or wâ—iting ex Suppositione from that my Supposition Now in respect t is manifest from this Distinction that the Necessity Absolute of any Action doth destroy the Liberty of the Agent but the Suppositional doth not for though I journy or write according to my Supposition yet was it possible to me to have done neither thereupon doe they most excellently reason thus that Peters Abnegation was foreseen and praedicted by God as an Event to come of Necessity not Absolute but Suppositional by which nothing was detracted from Peters Liberty of not denying For as now in the praesent if He be interrogated concerning his Master he is intirely Free or to avouch or disavow his knowledge of him so also will He be in the Future when He shall be interrogated Wherefore as if He now determine himself rather to deny then affirme and according to that determination actually deny He doth that Freely notwithstanding from the moment he denied his denial is Necessary insomuch as it is supposed that he hath actually denied so also in the Future when He shall determine himself rather to deny then affirme and according to that determination shall actually deny shall his denial be Free or Arbitrary however it cannot but be granted Necessary that He hath denyed because he hath already actually denied Nor is it paradoxical or difficult to affirme that this Suppositional Necessity and Peters Liberty are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discordant or Inconsistent in any respect because the Necessity is subsequent not antecedent to the Determination of his Liberty and because it doth not consist so much in Re vel Actione in the Thing or Action it self as in Temporis Circumstantia the Circumstance of Time when ' tiâ— done Since when we say t is Necessary that Peter hath denyed that Necessity is not understood to have bin any thing Antecedently in him which compelled him to deny but that it is radicated now in Time it self which as it is really past and cannot be not past so the Action done in that past time however it was done cannot be not done And hence it is evident though no man can justly assert that t was Necessary to Peter to deny because according to that assertion there must be understood some Antecedent Cause by which he was coated to deny yet justified it may be that Now t is Necessary that he hath denyed because the Action being once done and so impossible to be not done all the Necessity falls upon the Praeterition of the Time Now in respect that God is Omniscient He cannot but Foresee that Peter will deny yet that Divine Praenotion of Peters Abnegation is subsequent to the Divine Praevision of Peters Free Determination and therefore God Foresees that Peter will deny only because He Foresees that Peter abusing his Liberty will freely determine himself to a denial And hence comes it to be embraced amongst the most judicious School-men as a truth indisputable That Peter will deny not because God hath praevised and praedicted that he will deny but that because Peter will deny when he shall be examined therefore and for no other reason doth God Foresee and Foretell that he will deny For uti Scientia praeteritam rem pro objecto habens nullam rei praeteritae ut ita non alitèr fieret necessitatem infert ita Praescientia rem suturam pro suo objecto habens rei futurae sive Futuritioni nullam potest inferre necessitatem utraque enim est extra rem in Deo actio Immanens that as Science having for its object a thing Praeterite doth induce no necessity thereupon that it should have bin so and no otherwise so also doth Praescience having for its object a thing Future inferr no necessity upon its Futerition that it shall so and no otherwise come to pass for both Science and Praecience are distinct from and alien to their Objects and Actions Immanent in God i. e. not at all effluxed to the object to the destruction or alteration of its Nature this we say is a Verity which demonstrateth it self and which we have more praecisely insisted upon in the 4. Articl 4. Sect. of our discourse of the Mobility of the term of mans lifè And that all Cognition is a thing really distinct from and extraneous to its Object and that a thing comes to be actually what it is not from the Cognition thereof by an Idea in all points consimilar but from it self or its Efficient Cause needs no other probation but the conviction of this instance that Snow is white not because t is known to be white but contrary that it is known to be white because really it is so To speak a profound truth plainly in few words herein consists the Disparity between Divine and Human Cognition viz. that Human can be extended only to Praesent and Praeterite but Divine doth extend it self with equal Certitude to Future Contingents also Now insomuch as Praeterite Contingents were sometimes Future and in the same condition with those which are yet Future and again those which are yet Future may be understood to be praeterite in time to come and in the same condition with those which are already Praeterite manifest it is that as neither Divine nor Human Cognition is the Cause why Contingents already Praeterite are praeterite but è contrà they are known as Praeterite because really they are so in like manner that those which are Future are not therefore Future because God holds an exact praenotion of them as Future but è contrà because they really are Future therefore doth God hold an exact praenotion of their Futurition And upon
this Basis was it that many Schooolmen erected that Axiom Praevisionem Dei nihil influere in humanas actiones that the Praevision of God hath no influence coactive upon the actions of man Now what hath bin argued for the Praevision and Praenotion of God is also to be extended to his Praediction especially because t is uncontrovertible that Praediction is posterior or subsequent to the Praenotion of any Contingent yet in the womb of Futurity since what is not exactly foreknown can never be certainly foretold For which respect shall any urge upon us that the Divine Praenotion and Praediction cannot be Fallacious we shall most willingly concede their position as most indubitate because nothing can be prognosticate by God as Future which is not really Future but when it shall be thence inferred that if Peter had once the absolute power in his own hands to have not denyed and rightly using that arbitrary power had actually not denyed in that case the praenotion and praediction of his denyal by God had proved Fallacious we must reject the Illation as illegal and absurd because had not Peters denyall bin realy Future God had neither praevised nor praedicted the same For it is the Reality of its Futurition that supports the Certitude of the Praediction of any future Contingent And therefore in case Peter had bin not to deny God had as certainly praedicted that He would not deny since so the Supposition had bin quite contrary viz. that Peter rightly using his Liberty of Election would determine it not to a Negation but Affirmation Whereupon we may safely conclude 1 that Peters Abnegation was Future and 2 that God both praevised and praedicted the same upon no other Necessity but only this that Peter when it should be in his own power to determine himself to either part would then actually determine himself rather to Disclaim and Abjure then own and avow his Master Thus the Divines And thus the Philosophers Non quia Dii definitò norunt Article 6. The Solution of the same by the Philosophers proving that the dâ—finite Praenotion of future Contingents is no Cause of their definite Contingency but è contrà the definity of their Futurition the câ—use of their dâ—finite â—â—anotion Contingentia ideo illa eventura sunt Neque enim quia Dii norunt ideo necessariò eveniunt sed quia cum naturae sint anâ—ipitis aut talem aut talem exhibebunt exitum norunt Dii necessariò qualem seu utrum obtinebunt adeo ut Contingens ex sua quidem natura indefinitum sit sed respectu tamen notitiae Deorum definitum Quinetiam constat nostra quoque notitia Contingens definitò cognosci cum viz. propriè Contingens deinceps non sit sed necessariò consequitur antegressas cur fiat Causas Saith Ammonius in lib. de interpret The whole importance whereof is this That the definite praenotion of Contingents by God is in no relation the cause of their definite Contingency but their being of themselves definitely Future or their Ambiguity being to be determined to Definity of Futurition is the Cause of their praenotion by God For though a Contingent be Indefinite in respect to its own nature i. e. it is equally determinable by the Liberty of its Causes to either of two contrary Events yet in respect to the Praenotion of God it is Definite because God hath an infallible praenotion to which of two contrary Events its Causes will determine it All which may be confirmed à Minori from the Praenotion of Man experience assuring that Physicians frequently prognosticate and praedict the death of their deplored Patients even to an hour Not that their Prognosticks have any influence upon the Disease to determine it to Mortal when yet t is Dubious but that the determination of the disease from Dubious to definitely Mortal by its causes is the ground of their Prognostick Here lest we be misconceived to confound Divine and Human Article 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Praenotion Praecognition we advertise that the Praenotion of God is Infallible because à Priori i. e. He foreknows Contingents while they are yet only in Possibility and in the womb of their Causes nor to him who demands Why or How God foreknows Events while they are yet in the Dark or Nothing of Futurity can any other response be given but this that He is Omniscient i. e. God but the Praenotion or rather Praesagitition of man is Fallacious because desumed à Posteriori from Effects educed extra Causas into actual Existence Which vast Disparity may be most adaequately Exemplified Article 8. The same exemplified thus God certainly Foreknows that Peter shall fall sick and die of such or such a disease viz. a Pestilent Fever How because He foreknows that those Causes which in respect to the Ambiguity or Indifferency of their event may or may not generate an intense putrefaction and malignity in the humors of Peters body shall lose that their Possibility and determine themselves to the actual production of that particular malignant or pestilential inquinament in his blood which constituteth the essence of that disease and that the disease so generated will be so violent and inoppugnable by the force of Nature that the Temperament of Peters body being too weak to sustain such a disproportionate Encounter will thereby be dissolved and so Death shall inevitably succeed But the Physician can only conjecture that Peter may fall sick of such a malignant Fever why because He discovers that Peters praevious Intemperance hath prepared the continent Cause or Fewell for a putrid Fever and that the access of Malignity either by Contagion communicated or from an intense Corruption of humors internally kindled may according to the Aptitude of its nature seise upon that praepared fewell and Ferment it into a pestilential Fever but Definitely He doth not know that Peter shall fall sick of such a pestilential disease in regard it transcends the maximes of his Art and the Capacity of his limited Reason to foreknow whether the Possibility of such an Effect from such Causes shall be determined to Necessity Nor can He praedict that Peter being invaded with that disease shall certainly perish thereby untill the Dubiosity of the Fever be actually determined to Lethality for then from Symptoms that signify the total Succumbency or yeelding of Nature to the victorious fury of the disease he may with good warrant and honour praesage the imminent death of Peter ¶ SECT IV. THe other Capital Difficulty being erected upon a certain circumventing Socraticisme or Interrogatory Sophisme Article 1. The Second Capital Difficulty erected upon a sophism called Ignava Ratio as it respecteth both Theology and Philosophy most adaequately denominated by Cicero de Fato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ignava Ratio an unactive Argumentation because praevailing upon the mind it stupefies the same to a perpetual Restiveness or Supinity by charging even the Thoughts of every man upon the