a husbanding of these seeds and therefore these words must needs be taken in that Indefinite sense they are exprest that these are the seeds of all Religion I will consider them apart and fiâ—st the Opinion of Ghosts is a seed of Religion Sect. 2. All the Opinion of Ghosts which he expresseth in the former part of this Chapter he makes to be an Error now for Errour to be a sâ—ed of Truth was never heard of before an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit nor ill seed a good tree Errour the greater growth it hath the greater is the Errour but it never growes into Truth Again in the seventh Chapter he makes Opinion to be a very weak assurance as indeed it is although his description of it is weak in that place but the assurance that there is a God is the greatest that may be and therefore not to grow out of such a seed Thirdly consider that although there can be no assurance of God without an assurance of a Ghost or Spirit because God is exprest in Scripture to be a Spirit yet the beliefe and assurance of God cannot grow out of the Opinion of Ghosts for although the Opinion of Ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in Nature to induce it which prevailed with many Philosophers to perswade them that there were such things yet the Arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince there is a God and therefore the assurance of God may introduce and be a seed of the Opinion of Ghosts but the opinion of Ghosts which is lesse certain and lesse evident cannot introduce it He brings no manner of proof for what he speakes and in his Catalogue of those Deities which this opinion should produce Pag 55. He nameth Chaos Ocean Planets Men Women and other things which have no likeness with Ghosts or Spirits although his Daemons and some others have Now although the opinion of Spirits may perswade a Religion towards those things which were thought Spirits yet it could never invite but would crosse and oppose those Religions which were paid to corporeall things for by all men who have writ of Spirits both Christian and others Spirits are thought to have a more God like power in them then Bodies and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other Sect. 3. His second seed is ignorance of second Causes a most unhappy and unreasonable speech Ignorance the Mother of Religion Ignorance of second Causes cannot make a man acknowledge the first Rom. 1.20 S. Paul saith The Invisible things of Him that is of God from the Creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his eternal Power and Godhead This understanding of eternal Power and Godhead is the foundation and ground of Religion and this was visible although not in its self yet in the things that are made the second Causes so that not the ignorance but the knowledge of the second Causes like Iacobs ladder leads us from one to another step by step until we ascend to the highest and first Cause This he himself acknowledgeth before but as he often doth so he now forgot what he had said Ignorance of second Causes that they are second and mistaking them for first may make a man think them Gods and so turne a Religion to them but as may appear at the bottome of the preceding Page 53. he understands the Ignorance of the Causation of second Causes which without doubt is so farre from bringing in Religion that it is apt to produce Atheism and an opinion that the world is governed by chance not by Providence So that as for his first I deny it to be a Seed of Religion that is the opinion of Ghosts so for this Second the Ignorance of second Causes I affirm that is an enemy to Religion stopping the Soul from ascending up to Heaven by breaking the lowest step of that Ladder which is fixed on Earth Sect. 4. His third Seed is Devotion towards what we fear That feare Timor Reverentialis may be a seed the fomenter and cherisher of Religion yea an act of Religion I do not doubt but that that ugly sordid feare which he speaks of as appeares in the bottom of Page 52. is not to be imagined for the first feare ariseth out of the knowledge and apprehension we have of the Excellency of God but this second feare he speaks of out of Ignorance of Causes Because men know there are Causes saith he of every thing but know not those causes therefore they impute their good or evill fortune to some invisible Agent This ignorance oâ— Causes must needs be understood of second Causes for ignorance of the first Cause can never make a man worship the first nor impute the production of things to him It is true the ignorance of some Attributes as his goodness may make a Maniche think there is an ill God and the same ignorance may produce almost as ill an opinion in others that God is the Author of the evil of sin the one not apprehending his internal goodness conceives God evil in himself the other not apprehending his Goodness in operation his Benignity makes him do and produce that is ill but the ignorance of him as a first Cause can never introduce a Religion to him But then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the Causation of second Causes we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible Agent as he terms it unless it be that god Fortune which the Poet derideth Te facimus Fortuna Deum coeloque locamus And worthily for there can be nothing more contradictory then the Providence of God and the Blindness of Fortune Now when men cannot find the Chain of Causes which produce the effects they discerned and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first Cause as they cannot who discern not the second they must needs have that doubt or fear that they are acted by Fortune and all things fall alike to all without either being rewards or punishments Rods or Scourges c. And therefore is so far from introducing of Religion as it leads to Atheisme But it is not said that this fear but the Devotion to what we feare is the Seed of Religion I could have wished that among other his expositions of words he had put down what he means by Devotion but he hath not Consider then the sense of it is Voto decernere to decree a thing to another by a vow so that when one devotes a thing to another he then decrees it in a sacred manner to be his Now then Devotion to what we feare is decreeing some thing to it by way of Vow Devotion then to what we feare if that we feare be God is not a seed but a fruit and act of Religion for Religion is not only as he not vainly onely but wickedly and prophanely defines Chap. 6. page 26. Feare of
the reality of Colours other then the reflexion of light 33 III. Answered ibid. Colours reall and intentionall not the same ibid Intentional Colours not the same with Light 35 IV. Sight more then a bare reception of species 36 The conceipt of the Species not founded only upon Aristotle's Texts ibid. V. Aristotle's first reason for them 37 A second Argument from Aristotle's image in Plato's eye ibid. A third Argument from the distance between the Object and Organ of Sight 38 The species why so called ibid. An Objection answer'd ibid. CHAP. VI. I. Mr. Hobbes fallacious in his discourse about conceptions 39 II. The Philosophers first opinion concerning Echoes 40 Their second opinion concerning Echoes 41 Their third opinion concerning Echoes ibid. III. The distinction of formally and vertually applyed to their Axiom Nihil dat quod non habet 42 IV. Mr. Hobbes's absurdities touching the production of sounds ibid. V. Smell and Taste where 44 VI. What difference between the heat in the fire and that transmitted to the hand and how it prove's no nullity of an externall object ibid. The nature of first and second qualities 45 VII Heat is neither pleasure nor pain but a cause of both 46 VIII The same cause worketh different effects according to the subject or object about which it is busied 47 Some danger in asserting sensible qualities to be nothing but mere apparitions 48 IX A Universe of motion madly fancyed by Mr. Hobbes ibid. X. Colour in the Object when seen by reflexion 50 Sight when and when not deceived ibid. Sense judgeth not of colour but Reason by collection from it 5â— CHAP. VII I. Animals will move themselves after rest 54 Every thing will move towaâ—ds its proper place ibid. II. All Animals being subject to lassitude require rest 55 Inanimates by locall motion tend toward rest ibid. All things able to overcome the ill they are affected with change themselves ibid CHAP. VIII I. The distinction of Appetite into naturall and rationall their conflicts c. 57 II. Appetite and knowledge not more then man hath 58 III. What appetite and knowledge is in inferiour creatures and how excellently dispoped by providence 59 IV. God's Wisdom not Art in the natures of all he made and disposing the principles of their severall operations 60 V. All things act according to God's method with an innate appetite to accomplâ—sh his end though without knowledge how they tend to it 61 CHAP. IX I. How standing Water put in motion recovereth rest 63 II. How improperly Dreames are assimilated to it when ceasing 64 III. Imagination something more then decaying sense ibid. IV. Memory no decaying sense the act of Sensation being wholly past 65 His illustration from the Sun 's light obscuring that of the Stars incongruous 66 V Extent of time doth not alwayes weaken the imagination 67 VI VII Imagination and Memory not one and the same thing 68 VIII What Memory it is that maketh Experience 69 CHAP. X. I. There have been Prognostick Dreams and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts 71 II. Solomon's opinion of Dreams dâ—fferent from Mr. Hobbes's 72 III. His reasons invalid drawn from the differences of Dreams 73 Old men's dreams constitutional dreams phantastick dreams ibid. Whence coherent and incoherent dreams 74 CHAP. XI I. Sensitive creatures become acquainted with words and signs by custom or the suggestions of appetite not by understanding 75 II. The specifick souls and signal differences distinguishing them each from other 76 Their sagacity 77 CHAP. XII I. Religion defined 79 Why reckoned among the duties of Justice 80 II. The seed of Religion in Man onely because rational ibid. III. But Mr. Hobbes's reasons of no force to prove it ibid. IV. His opinion of the feigned Gods invisible Agents Ghosts c. 81 Invisible Agents what ibid. Mr. Hobbes stick 's an absurd opinion of man's soul undeservedly upon Idolaters 82 V. His discourse of Spirits and Ghosts c. too perplexed 83 CHAP. XIII I. Mr. Hobbes sow's ambiguous seeds to produce false and true Religion 85 II. The opinion of Ghosts could not introduce the assurance that There is a God ibid. III. Ignorance of second causes apter to produce Atheism then Religion 86 IV. Devotion to what we fear rather a fruit then seed of Religion 87 V. A taking things casual for Prognosticks no seed of the false Religions 8â— There have been Sibylls that prophesied of our Saviour 90 CHAP. XIV I. The sole immediate seed of Religion an innate principle 91 II. To be proved from the chain of Causes 92 An eternity of the World with an infinity of causations why not to be admitted ibid. III. Somewhat of God though infinite may be known 94 IV. And that from Phantasms 95 V. The conceit of finite and infinite explained 96 What conceit may be had of infinite 98 VI. An Eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions 99 VII Mr. Hobbes's indifference be the world finite or infinite 101 VIII His contradiction touching the first mover ibid. The first mover proved immoveable ibid. IX Mr. Hobbes's Paralogism by which he would charge the absurdity of one infinite exceeding another 102 X. His disputing ex non concessis 103 No infinity at all of numbers 104 Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration ibid. XI And yet God the Creatour of it may and must be 105 No before or after in Eternity and yet how these terms are applicable to God's duration or co-existence not to his simple or absolute existence 106 XII Our double conceit of God's eternity to which no computation of time is applicable 108 XIII The doctrine of Eternity most agreeable to H. Scripture 109 XIV No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing instant 111 XV. The difference of nunc stans and tunc sâ—ans as applied to Eternity 113 XVI Eternity co-exist's with no infinite number of dayes 115 XVII God so manifest in the creatures as all ignorance is inexcusaâ—le ibid. The Bishop's character of Mr. Hobbes 117 And censure of his Dispute here touching the eternity of the world ibid. And of the apology he is likely to make out of such principles at the last day 118 His Lordship 's seasonable and salutary advice to him 119 Mr. Hobbes pretend's to be content with the doctrine of holy Scripture the fame of Miracles Country-custome and Laws yet wrangle's against all ibid. CHAP. XV. I. Mr. Hobbes contradict's himself as touching the seeds of Religion 121 Which are more then onely an opinion of a Deity ibid. II. Mr. Hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the Schoolmen 122 How far the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature ibid. III. What may be supposed Mr. Hobbes mean's by a Formed Religion 123 How he imposeth upon his Reader ibid. Formed Religion not founded upon his phantastick Faith 124 The Jewish and Christian principally to be examined ibid. CHAP. XVI I. No probability of idolatry before the Floud 125 II. The
should think to perswade a man not onely against his own eyes but all the eyes in the world and all the reason too but his owne Well I conceive this is enough for these two Propositions That colour is not the Apparition of that motion and that colour is a reall thing in this object These two passed Propositions are such wherein I have disputed with Master Hobbes no man that I ever read of opposing my conclusions but himself Sect. 3. In the next I find various opinions among Scholars which if he would have studied although not for truth but to maintain his own opinion onely although against truth which I doubt he unluckily affects he might have found much more probable reasons for what he affirms then any produced by him The conclusion defended by him and denyed by me is That colour and light are the same thing this he demonstrates thus towards the later end of the 8. num where before Their difference being onely this that when the light cometh directly from the fountain to the eye or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies and such as have not inward particular motion internal to alter it we call it light but when it cometh to the eye by reflâ—ction from uneven rough and course bodies or such as are affected with internal motion of their own to alter it then we call it colour colour and light differing onely in this that the one is pure the other perturbed light Although to deny is answer sufficient enough for all is said there being no proof but as if he were another Moses he delivers his Philosophy as authentique coming from his mouth without any arguments although against the opinions of the whole world yet I will in little lay open some weaknesses in these expressions First think what he meanes by inward particular motion internal to alter light certainly unlesse he meanes the causes of colour which must be against himself I know not what it can be and then inward motion internall which should have power to alter light which is external to that body was an uneven and course kind of expression if it express any thing but the weaknesse of the whole appeares to any man that hath eyes for whereas he saith when it cometh to the eye by reflection from uneven rough and course bodies or such c. there we call it colour speaking of light I say let it come from the most even most clean and polite bodies that can be imagined that Nature or Art have made as Brasse Silver Gold yea heaven it self we call it colour as one Star is red another more white and therefore this Gentleman is either mistaken or would deceive in the usage of speech His conclusion it self may be thus overthrown Sect. 4. That which exists when there is no light that cannot be the same thing with light But colour exists where there is no light ergo colour is not the same with light The major is evident because the same cannot be and not be at the same time which would be true if at the same time colour and light being the same colour should be and light not The minor will be proved thus Colours are in the dark where light is not that will be proved because at night when light leaves our Horizon yet the colours remaine the same they were before and that is proved because when light although another light is brought to them yet they are and they apppear the same they were before Now we have an Axiom in nature and to be over-master'd and check'd by nothing but divine power à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus there is no recalling a word that is spoke no making that not done which is once done not making that up individually and compleatly the same which is destroyed no restoring a forme and being once lost now this being the same it was and appearing so at the coming of the second light which it was at the manifestation of the first it is evident that the light did not give this colour its being but onely the manifestation of its being and this colour was something besides light which was made appear by light I know not what can be answered to this any further Again I can dispute thus That which opposeth light cannot be the same with light but some colours oppose light Ergo The major appeares because nothing opposeth it self the minor is thus illustrated because black opposeth light for light hath an affinity with white and black with darknesse so that such Stars which have not something to vary their representation to us appear white and so do candles and these white things amongst us have something of light in them and great affinity to it and therefore are better discerned with a weak and evening light then darker Clouds are So likewise black hath an affinity with darknesse which is the total privation of light insomuch as a shadow which is a partiall privation of light in a particular place is black intentionally black as I shall discourse hereafter It is true that neither black nor any colour can be seen without light no more can a shadow but dark and black colours and shadowes do oppose light which is a kind of white when in reality it is in its own subject as the Sun or Star or Candle This certainly joyned to what went before may serve for my last Proposition But because there are other Opposers of this conclusion besides himself now I am in I will speak something to their arguments CHAP. V. The reality of colour vindicated by intentional colours and species Sect. 1. THe first and chiefest I find is because colours without light are visible only Potentia only indeed visible but reduced into act and seen by being enlightned so that then by this light they are reduced into act and therefore light is their form For answer to this argument we must know that the being and nature of things consists not in their second acts as they are called which are their operations but in their first acts which give them their abilities to work and they are distinguished by their abilities to operate when time and other opportunities and accommodations are offered not by their operations themselves Thus vegetative creatures are distinguished from things inanimate not by their operations of growth or generation for then they should not be vegetable creatures in Winter but by their abilities to grow or generate when their season is offered and as their abilities distinguish them from others so amongst themselves their several species natures or kinds are distinguished by their abilities to produce several sorts of things by those operations not by the operations themselves so it is in all things the abilities to sense not the act of sensation make an Animal the abilitie to discourse not the act makes the man for else a beast should not be a beast when he
of it do you think he would believe him But by this Doctrine he hath one evasion which I know not what to say to that is when I shall charge him with it he can reply it was onely an apparition of such an opinion or discourse but no such discourse I can prove it no other way but that these eyes of mine shewed it me in a book under his name called Humane Nature or another called Leviathan Sect. 9. But this being only a negative conclusion he proceeds further to a positive thus The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused Surely there was never heard or read so much nonsense and yet it tastes not of folly but a kind of madnesse or else he thinks the world is mad to receive such incredible fancies without colour of reason Is all without us nothing but motion Is the standing still of the earth nothing but motion Is the thing that moves nothing but motion motion moves somwhat that is not motion if so what doth it move whatsoever moves moves something and if that were motion the question goes on infinitely unless we find somthing to be moved which is not motion substances bodies c. are not motion rest is not motion much less are they these motions by which these seemings are caused I discern a stone hard cold heavy by sense are these things yea the stone it self for so they term the things that really involves it nothing but those motions by which they appeare These things confute themselves and yet I may go further many of these representations apparitions seemings are without motion in the object the house standing still unmoved sends forth its image to my eye without motion for all motion is but of six kinds generation and corruption about substances augmentation and diminution about quantities alteration about qualities lation or local motion about place he can find none of these in this house neither in its substance quantitie quality place but the motion is in mine eye no such thing neither mine eye is changed none of these wayes only an image brought to it which is undiscernable by any sense but it self neither is the power of the soul moved which then proceeds to discern the object for it is the same power it was before without any real alteration or change for it hath the same abilities it had neither more nor lesse but it is true there is an internal immament act which results out of that power without any motion or if it may in an improper and forced way be halled into the notion of motion in some unused acceptation yet this must be an internal motion within its self none of those things he speaks of a motion Much of this is needlesse that which sufficeth to shew the weaknesse of his reasoning is to shew that there are hundreds of things discerned by us which are not motions and that is most apparent He proceeds And this is the great deception of sense which also is by sense to be corrected If it were true that this were a deception I should think it a great one yea the most universal deception that ever was in the world but how it shall be corrected by sense that were worth the observing He hath shewed it thus For as sense telleth me when I see directly the colour seemeth to be in the object so also sense telleth me when I see by reflexion that colour is not in the object Sect. 10. First of all observe that if this were true yet being but a particular instance he cannot deduce that generall conclusion out of it concerning all sights much lesse concerning all other senses then observe upon a direct sight he puts onely a seeming to be in the object but upon a reflex peremptorily that it is not in the object when certainly a direct sight shews its object more clearly then any reflex But now to his instance why doth a reflex shew it not to be in the object he sets not down but perhaps he may say in a glass the image may seeme to be in the glasse and not in the object I say the image that which represents the object is there and I have known a Robin Red-breast fighting with his own shadow in a glasse To this I answer that the sight judgeth of colours and therein is not deceived when the distance is not too great nor the organ or medium ill disposed for that is its proper object over which it hath power to judg but in such things as are a common object to it and other senses it is easily mistaken of which kind are figures greatnesse or littleness distance of place and many the like Thus it mistakes the distance of the Moone from the earth the bigness of the stars but then besides these common objects there are other which are objectum per accidens as Logicians an object not out of its own nature affecting that act or faculty in its self but by reason of some other thing to which it is annext or happens to be joyned so we may say we see Socrates or Plato when we see them not but their colour and that colour of theirs is the onely thing by which they are discerned by sight Now there are mighty mistakes in our senses concerning these so when we see one man's cloaths worne by another we think him at the first to be the man whose cloaths he weares so when we see that man to have a red who had a pale face we think him not the same man My opinion of this mistake is because although the vision of the colour is an act of sight yet the applying that colour to the person seemes to be an act of reason a work out of the reach of pure sense This by the way of explication to make all plain that the Reader may the fuller apprehend my answer to this objection punctually then I answer first that there is no such judgment of sense as to say that colour is not in the object for although sense perhaps can onely discern the colour in the glass yet sense meddles not with that question whether the same colour can be in two subjects much less whether this be a real colour in the glasse or whether an intentional or whether it be in the glass or not but if it do meddle with this last yet in that speech which sayes it is in the glasse sense meddles beyond its sphere it judgeth in a cause which belongs not to its Judicature that may be disputed by reason between him and me and sense may give in evidence concerning what it knows circumstantially conducing to the truth but cannot judg of it it is not its proper object so then to say sense sees it in a glass therefore there is no colour in the object is vaine to reason which can discerne that every accident follows its subject remove the glass from the
Power invisible feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publikely allowed but it is the worship due to God and this worship is when it is as it ought to be accompanied and attended with reverential feare and awe of that Infinite Excellency and this makes us devote our selves in all holy waies to his service but if these things we feare be lesse then God although we may devote our selves or any thing is ours to them it is not Religion nor in any way doth it introduce Religion So that if the thing we feare have in it the estimation of Divine Excellency Devotion to it is an Act of Religion not a Seed if it have not that estimation it is an act of some Reverence or other habit but no way a Seed of Religion for a Seed precedes the fruit and introduceth it which this doth not Sect. 5. His fourth and last Seed is taking things casual for Prognostiques In all these according to his scornfull derision rather then definition of Religion he makes â—he Seeds of it nothing but Errour and Folly no wonder that the Tree should be so weak and rotten when the very Seeds are corrupted This Seed he applies Page 56. only to the Religion of the Gentiles although in general with the rest it was uttered of all Religion and so exprest as I have shewed Indeed if he should speak it of the true Religion it were most impiously wicked and would imply that the very Prophecies in the old and new Testament which were a true and reall Seed of Religion were but casual things and not fore-seen by God and revealed to his Prophets But I wil take him in the best sense that he can be taken that the taking things casual for Prognostiques were a seed of those false Religions and then I say first for the Oracles men did not therefore beleeve that there were Gods and so worship them because of their oraculous sentences but because of their beliefe that these were Gods they were confident that they spake truth and so expounded them according to the event whatsoever it was For the Sibyls I might say the like if they were such as the other and although he imagined these but feigned whose Copies we have yet that there were such is evident in Story and that they prophecied such things as could be applyed to none but our Saviour which were not to be interpreted Casual events but Prognostiques real and although the beliefe in them for a great while was a fruit of Religion for because men believed they were Prophetesses and inspired by God therefore they beleeved what they said yet afterwards as it haps in Trees so did it with their Prophesies that which was the fruit of one was the seed of another so these Prophesies which were a fruit of Religion before were a seed of Religion in planting the Christian Church and often made use of by the Fathers an Argument against the Idolatrous world to perswade them to Christianity but it was not as he speakes a taking Casual things for Prognostiques For the other things he there reckons up I guess them for the most part unhappy illusions and the fruit of Superstition not the seeds of Religion or else mistakes of second Causes which in no sense conduce to Religion as Horoscopy Presages and the like CHAP. XIV What the seed of Religion Concerning the chaine of causes What of God to be known Of finite and infinite The first mover The sound doctrine of Eternity c. Sect. 1. CErtainly the sole immediate seed of Religion is the assurance that there is a God of an infinite excellency governing all the world for therefore men perform Religion to him but that which propagates this naturally is first without doubt an innate principle born in and with a man which naturally every man hath as soon as he hath reason and there never was Nation or society of men found in the world which denied it It is true there may be now and then by the suggestions of the Devill a man found that with malicious reason hath laboured to diswade this Principle but that is not material There are Errours and Monsters in the morall part of man as well as in his natural This Gentleman who hath by nature the sight of Colours and ability to discern them yet hath studied reasons to make men beleeve he sees none There is nothing so abhorring to Reason that malicious Reason doth not oppose but such a truth as this Quod ubique semper et ab omnibus hath been held cannot be other then natural and whereas he can shew one man breaking this rule I can shew him a hundred that have no use of reason at all and a thousand that have lost it so that as such a man as he is a rarer sight then those so he may well be reckoned amongst the worst of fooles and mad-men and therefore the Psalmist Psal. 14.1 saith The fool hath said in his heart there is no God and he himself in this Chapter pag. 58. affirmes That an opinion of a Diety and Powers invisible and supernatural can never be abolished out of humane nature but that new Religions may be made to spring out of them So that this Seed is so naturally and firmly rooted in mans heart that it cannot be extirpated by any thing that doth not likewise with it extirpate reason Sect. 2. But because although this is natural yet some men by the wickednesse of malicious reason have endeavoured to wither it therefore other Children of Nature have endeavoured to cherish this root by watering it with the strength of invincible reasons drawne from the chaine of Causes which suppose a seed or a tree first and that first to be created not generated for if generated then it requires a preceding tree or seed and then that was not first and so in all the effects in the world But these men pretend an Eternity in the world and so in the propagation and causation of Natural things that there may be an infinity of these causations from one to another which is almost impossible to be conceived for then there should be an Infinite number of Causes which cannot be for then Robert who is now born should have no more Paternities or Precedings in causes then Adam had for if there should be an infinite Number of Causes preceding Adam then there can be no addition to it for what can receive addition is not Infinite it hath a bound to it and then all the Causations from Adam to Robert are nothing for if you should imagine in these five or six Thousand yeares there may have been so many hundred generations more then were before I can answer no the other was infinite for should you fill this sheet with Ciphers and head them with the figure of one I can make all these Ciphers nines and the figure of one Nine and make nine Millions of such sheets and yet all this
these things life or death are such some men have thought this temporall life a misery clothed with these circumstances they possesse it with like a rotten house which when the winds and raine drives in is worse then the open fields like a Prison it were better have no house then that such is the body to the soul and therefore men may and have often wished to be delivered out of it and death to some men is as desired as a freedome from a Gaole This Gentleman talkes up and downe in these books not only like a natural man but like the worst of them and the wickedest for wise men among them have written much in contempt of these sensual temporal things in which he placeth the only aime and happiness of man Sect. 4. Certainly even in Nature the life of man is not the principal thing of man's happinesse and then not of mans intention and care for Life is a thing which a man enjoyes in common with Beasts and Trees and therefore if man's happinesse should be in that he were no better yea much worse then they whose excellency consists in a relation to man to live only is to be a Beast a Plant only but to live vertuously and reasonably to glorifie that God who gave him those abilities by which his life is happy that is the end of man and of mans life which he is to leave then when he cannot enjoy it upon these conditions and to a Christian man as to the best of Philosophers who had thoughts and assurance of Eternity this life hath been reputed of little value and to die no misery because it is but the passage to a better and more spirituall life although perhaps there may be some difficulties in opening the gate yet it is not to be compared with the happiness it admits into nay it hath been of such esteem amongst men of honour alwaies that they would choose to die vertuously rather then live dishonourably Instances would be numerous out of the Roman story so that it is impossible in that absolute sense without limitation in which he speaks it to be true that this is the whole right of Nature as his Leviathan or his chiefe or principal as his Corpus politicum to preserve this life or to avoid this enemy death which for multitudes may and for not a few reasons ought to be despised These phrases which he useth Sect. 5. From whom we expect the lesse of power he meane's Death and the greatest of bodily paines in the loosing must be censured next and first of the first By death we doe not loose all power yea without doubt like a man out of prison he is more active and able then he was within so is the soul when it is broke out of this gaole or dunghill its natural corruptible body nor can he say that he meant bodily power for then he would not have left out that word Bodily in this which he joyned with Paine in his following sentence men without question who have hopes of that better life hereafter do not expect the losse of all power by this death but rather the increase of it and therefore suppose he should say he meant bodily power which indeed must needs be lost by death yet who is troubled to loose a bag of Silver when in its room shall be left a bag of Gold to loose bodily power and gaine spirituall It was said of our Druids in England who taught the Immortality of the soule Ignavi est rediturae parcere vitae it was a poor dull thing to spare that life which would returne again but then if they had pryed into and could have considered the glorious immortall existence which men shall have hereafter for the mortall and contemptible being here it might have been said that it were not only a dul but a beastly thing for a man so much to affect the sensual pleasures of this fleshly life as to be unwilling for the losse of them to gaine Spirituall perfections we cannot then say that we expect to loose by death all our power and if we do leave bodily powers we are not loosers but gainers by it Sect. 6. His next phrase is That by death we expect in the losing these Powers the greatest bodily paine This Gentleman I guesse hath only looked upon Death in those horrid vizards and disguises which fearfull men masque it with he hath not been so often in the house of mourning as I have and there made this observation that Death is not so horrid as many men conceit it nor the paines so great that Death is not so fearful is apparent not only in experience of those Martyrs who have dyed for the glory of CHRIST and so by their blessed sufferings for him have had an assurance that they shall reigne with him but even in those who with heroick spirits have confronted Death in politique concernments yea sought it which shewed that there is not a necessity of nature to preserve Life or that they expected the greatest paine in the losing it I could fill divers sheets with instances both ancient and moderne these I let passe lest they kick me in the teeth whilest I follow them in the Chase for the former consider how many wicked men have killed themselves for feare of worse paines alive so Sardanapalus so Cleopatra so Nero multitudes esteeming the paines of Death deliverance from the pains of unhappie life and themselves made choice of death upon such Conditions but take one instance where men were not concerned in the benefit of death themselves but took it in relation to others good we may read in the life of Otho or rather in his death that when after his losse in that great and fatal battell betwixt his forces and those of Vitellius he being retreated and discontented his Souldiers flocked to him beseeching him to head them again and regaine the losse of that day promising how that they were all ready to dye in that cause with and for him if there should be necessity and to give him assurance of what they said one of the most obscure and meanest sort of Souldiers drew his sword and killing himself told him know O Caesar that we are all provided thus to die for thee this man had no end for himself but onely to encourage Otho either for his Countries good or his owne to engage againe yet go on and we shall find that Otho unmoved with this or any thing else killed himself likewise and his souldiers carrying him to his funeral Pile many more slew themselves there to dye with him so that as love of his Country or Otho's imagined vertues provoked the first so a bare love to his person inflamed the rest to dye with him now certainly there could not be a necessity of Nature in these men to expect the greatest pains in death nor indeed can I think there is such paine Old men weare out questionless
right is equally granted to Man over those creatures there specified but none to any man over another Therefore all right that any man hath to doe any thing to another must either be by nature as Parents in regard of whose origination of their Children's lives and educaâ—â—â—â— of them they have naturally a right to governe and 〈◊〉 any things concerning them or else it must be by 〈◊〉 Covenant concession or yielding expressed or 〈◊〉 of one to the other but in the original Charter 〈◊〉 is not any grant or priviledge given to one over 〈◊〉 and therefore barbarous acts of inhumanity 〈◊〉 it is to be supposed that no man would yield 〈◊〉 should act upon him no man can have right to 〈◊〉 Upon these Considerations his proposition must 〈◊〉 perish when he saith every man hath right to any 〈◊〉 but he seemes to prove it thus For seeing all 〈◊〉 he willeth must therefore be good to him in his owne â—â—dgement because he willeth them and may tend to his preâ—â—â—vation some way or other or he may judge so and we have â—ade him judge thereof Sect. 8. If he had said I have â—ade him judge thereof the force of the Argument would quickly have been shatâ—ered because his authority is weake to constitute a Judge in so weighty affaires but when he said we I wonder who he meanes I am sure I was none of them nor doe I remember to have read any other but himself of that mind That every man must be judge of his own Cause I know every man will judge and act according to his judgement who is an honest and vertuous man but to be a Judge Authoritativè which that phrase we have made him judge thereof doth imply is that which no man saith but himself how he is a Judge I have shewed before by what right to judge by the law of Nature not by his making him his will hath not right with it to act any thing because he willeth it but because it is regulated by the lawes of nature and acts according to those rules therfore only he hath right to doe what he doth by them and therefore his Conclusion which he saith follow 's out of his premises is vain which is that all things may be rightly done by him Sect. 3. He goe's on with another for saith he for this cause it is rightly said Natura dedit omnia omnibus that nature hath given all things to all men the truth of this must next be examined Nature may be said to have given all things to all men those things before expressed in Gods charter at mans Creation but nature hath not given men right over one another which is mainly importuned by him in both these Treatises and must be understood in the latitude of that universall terme all things for unless other men all things cannot be given to him now that other men are not given to each other will appeare out of this that then God should not be offended with those acts which were done one to another where is no positive law for where there is no positive law of God's or man's prohibiting them only the law of nature is of force to restraine mens actions and to give right to every thing and without doubt God can be displeased with nothing that is right well then let us cast our eyes upon the 19. Chap. of Genesis we shall find there the Sodomites attempting a most wicked and unjust act upon two strangers way-faring men as they thought because the assault was so universal by the old and young of the City it is reasonable to think there was no positive law against that sin for men universally would not confront a positive law and againe if there had been any positive law it is probable Lot would have urged it to them but there being none and these men by the height of their lust which is one of Mr. Hobbes his titles having smothered the light of nature pursued the design and had the wrath of God falling on them by Fire why was God so angry Mr. Hobbes would have told him there is no positive law forbidding it and thou hast given all things to all men by Nature and it is lawfull for any man to doe any thing to any man Let us ascend higher and consider in the 4. of Genesis that Cain kills Abel in the 9 vers God questions Cain about him Where is thy brother Abel His answer was somwhat like Mr. Hobbes's I know not am I my brothers keeper and yet this was but like him it was very short of Mr. Hobbes's his impiety he only pleaded that he was not accomptable for him he was not to be charged with his condition be it what it will Mr. Hobbes he would have told God thou hast given him to me and I had right to doe what I would with him by thy Commission this villain wan thy favour from me and now I have taken him away by that naturall right which thou hast given me Mr. Hobbes he would have out-Cained Cain himself in his justification of these horrid acts by his Principles but because God whose anger is never but most just did express himself so severely against him could not be just unlesse these Sodomites and Cain had transgressed some Law which could be none but the law of Nature it must needs shew that these men had no right to doe what they would with any thing that is with other persons but had their right confined in many acts by the law of natuâ—e againe if every man had right over every other person then those men have mutually right over one anâ—â—her and the same persons in the same cause in respect of the same persons should be both superiours and infeâ—â—ours which is a contradiction and impossible to be I let this passe therefore without further trouble and come to examine how Nature hath given all those other things the Earth the Fowles the beasts to all men Sect. 4. To understand this we must have recourse to the Charter before mentioned in the first of Genesis as likewise Psal. 115.16 The earth hath he given to the Children of men which gift was made by the law of nature at the first Creation for else we find no other Grant unless some men may think it a new Patent which was made to Noah and his sons Gen. 9. Which yet upon examination will appeare no other but a renewing of the former Charter which being given to man in his integrity he might justly suspect to be lost by his sinne God therefore in this replanting the world repeats the former priviledges almost word for word after the Flood and therefore if it were a gift of God by nature at the first or with nature in the Creation it is now either a positive law or else a renewing of the former Charter Let us now examine it and begin with Noah for whâ—tsoever the other Charter to
what men may know the businesse of mens lives take them so up that he is a wise man who know's any thing in any one Art many things we know quòd sunt yet we know not the things nor the manner of them in the Mathematiques there is such a thing as quadratura circuli but the worke of it is not found out there is a certaine number of the starres but men doe not know it there is a certaine influence but the most cunning Astrologer is deceived in hâ—s prognostiques this might be endlesse but did any one man know all these did he know all the contrivance of Policies were he expert in all Mechanicks in naturall knowleâ—ge in Morall in any of which never man was perfect yet his soule would not be full with all this nor his appetite of knowledge for he must needs desire when he knowe's all these to know the cause of all which is God as in Trismegistus his Poemander when he asked this Philosophick and knowing man what he dâ—sired he answered I desire to know things and their causes the knowledge of any thing without their causes is not satisfactory to a mans soule and although men are proud of little Sciences yet satisfied they cannot be without the knowledge of God and his causation of things the world cannot fill the vastnesse of man's soule or desire they can and doe think of other worlds and of him who is the cause of all and desire to know him I speak not of the baser sort of men who live little otherwise then beasts and then whom beasts are more happy but of them who live like men excelling beasts by these divine faculties of reason and will these cannot choose but desire to know God for knowledge is of Truth God is the fountaine of all truth from whence it came yea Truth its self and therefore that Understanding which is carried to Truth cannot be at rest untill it come to know him againe God is infinite nothing can fill the understanding but what is infinite Let a Mathematician make the greatest number he can another yea himself in his understanding can make a greater the Understanding of man can grasp and containe any finite thing and therefore is greater Let him imagine a world as great a line as long as he can yet the understanding of another yea his own at a second act can enlarge that and make it greater so that whatsoever is finite cannot fill a man's Soule but onely what is infinite and therefore onely God who is infinite can be satisfactory to man's understanding What I say for the Understanding I say likewise for the Will what is lesse then infinite cannot satisfy it I speak not of these beastly sensual affections they may be surfeited upon yea the very enjoying them make's men loath them but of his humane Will his intellectual nothing can satisfy that but what is infinitely good let us look upon riches and things of that nature although they are thirsted after most eagerly by man's â—easonable Will no beast covet's Wealth yet the Soule of man is never satisfied with them but they prove like fuell to the fire the more a man hath the more he desire's they who have so much as their riches is a burden to them are faine to lay the load upon other mens Shoulders their Servants to manage for them yet these men desire more he who is in meane estate require's little additions to content him when he hath gotten that he hath larger desires when a Kingdome another a world and then grieve's he can have no more I never read the desiâ—e of riches satisfied in any man but him in the Parable who cryed Soule take thine ease for thou hast Treasures layd up for many ages such flâ—shes and little inconsiderable ejâ—culations of Content men sometimes have upon the enjoyment of worldly wealth but had that man beene asked a little after would you have another Baâ—ne full of Corne he would have been of another mind and have said let me have that and thaâ— and a thousand more and had he all the wealth in the world unlesse this should be secured to him that neither rust nor Moth shall corrupt it nor Theeves breake through and steale it yea that that great Thiefe death shall not take him from it his Will cannot be contented which yet was never granted to men in this world I will not stay upon this riches are not things absolutely good but relatively onely as they are referred to other things they are onely bona vtilia profitable goods and that word profit intimate's some other things that they are profitable for and therefore they who desire riches desire some other thing for which these riches are desired and therefore they cannot satisfie that man's desire who covet's them but he must goe further in one word to conclude this discourse goodnesse happinesse absolute is the object of man's will there is nothing good but God all other things are partiall goods they have some good but they lacke more then they have and where there is a deficiency that is not absolutely good therefore not any thing not all things can satisfie man's will but he onely for still there will be a further desire in the Covetous soule of man untill they have him who is all good Now then if the Understanding can be filled with nothing but God if the Will can be satisfied with nothing but him it is most reasonable that there should be some such Condition where these two highest powers which are given under the Sunne should be satisfied Sect. 12. I will next enquire whether this satisfaction can be in this life if not sure there must be such a thing hereafter and for this it is fiâ—st evident that man hath some knowledge of God in this life he can by examining causes find that there must be a first yea he can from thence affirme that he must be free from all imperfections incorporeall immense and the like because Corporiety Mensurability finitenesse argue imperfection Thus have men Philosophiz'd by reason but the understanding is not filled with this as you may observe a Country-man when he see 's another write walke speake and the like he can tell you these are the effects of some excellent principles in that man who doth them ask him what it is he can with all the world tell you it is his Soule but ask what that Soule is he is at a stand he knowe's nothing of it such are our thoughts of God from whose works of his we know there is a cause which bringe's these mighty things to passe which we call God but what that God is who doth them we are at a losse by all the reason man can find out for as a dog can apprehend his master's kindnesse to him or his anger yet cannot know the excellency of his Master's Wisdome power c. because he is in a lower rank of things then man is
prosecution of it and to none other Sect. 11. And in this St. John giveth the Son of God no new name but such as men knew him by long before Saint John's time The Philosophers in all ages when their Soules soared so high as to contemplate the essence of God his creation and government of the world they said he had a Son or mind which proceeded from him like Light from the Sun that is a simile they are frequent in and they termed that Son his word and they say that that Word made the world and gave Life and being to all things thus Trismegistus in the first Chapter of his Poemander and Section 4. according to the edition of Flussus he saw in his rapture an indefinite Light then in the fifth Section he enquired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what comes out of the light the answear was made The holy word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the holy word then in the sixth Section when Trismegistus had begg'd an expression of this vision I saith Poemander I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intellectus mens I a Spirit I translate it or as is commonly amongst those Philosophers the Supreme Spirit of God I that Spirit thy God am that light and presently after that bright or resplendent Word which thou didst see come out is the Son of God I could shew much more to this purpose out of him but this is enough to shew that this which St. John deliver's here when he calle's the Son of God the word internall is according to the language of this Philosopher if there could be any farther doubt let any man read that whole Chapter he shall find his expressions extremely full the same may be found up and down in Plato the Sibylls Zoroaster and many more which I need not name because the observations out of them are made by many and as well as this acknowledged by Socinus as I shall shew presently Sect. 12. But this one thing more may be worth the marking that not onely those Philosophers which writ before St. Iohn had these expressions but those who lived after him as Plotinus Porphyrius Iamblicus Proclus but Amelius who lived after him about two hundred years more or less observe's this concordance of St. Iohn with them it is true he call's him a Barbarian as the pride of the Grecians did all that were not Grecians but that by the Barbarian he mean't St. Iohn is evident because he set's down the words of this Text I treat of and some following verses and approve's the Consent of that Barbarian well then this being a language of learned men before St. Iohn to call the Son of God the Word of God in respect of his Divine nature and it being observed by Philosophers who had no by-end but onely the apprehension of this Evangelist I see no reason why we should be forced to give it a violent sense not used by any and most unconsisting as will appear by the examination of every word with the rest Sect. 13. This consent of these Philosophers Socinus foresaw and therefore pag. 37. of this Treatise he handle's this Sentence The word was made flâ—sh he saith Si ea non addâ—dâ—sset If he had not added these words the word was made flâ—sh some man might and that by right have fallen into that errour c. that he should think that word of which Iohn write's to be another thing or sometimes to have been another thing from the man Iesus and perhaps endowed with Platonical Philosophy when he should see him here called God and in the beginning to be wiâ—h God this is pag. 38. to make the world c. he should presently believe that our Evangelist was conformable to Plato who hath writ of God some things out of which this opinion of the Trinity did flow and presently after he saith that other Philosophers had it from Trismegistus and acknowledgeth Iamblichus so that he yield's that some before and some after St. Iohn understood this phrase of St. Iohn's according to our exposition but I think that he can shew me no writer before or after unless Photinians and themselves which are the same that expounded this Text of the humanity of Christ what concern's that verse which Socinus apply's that discourse to I shall meet with in its proper place but what concern's me now I cannot but think it reasonable that when so many learned Authors had philosophized with such learned discourses concerning God his Word and Spirit under that language and notion I cannot but imagine it most congruous to reason that those divine Speculations of theirs so far as true should be countenanced by one Evangelist one infallible Writer of Divine Truths that every man might hear God speaking to him in his own language Sect. 14. I am sure the first fathers almost all because they had to do with philosophical men made use of those conveniencies they had with Scripture and so did Saint Paul and I may say of our Evangelist that he did frequently make use of their language and expressions never bâ—ulking them but chusing them before other where they were fit for his purpose and especially Plato I could instance in very many of this kind which any man who is acquainted with these Authors know's but I will select two or three which have not as I know of been used to such purpose and the first shall be out of Plato's Epistle to Hermias Erastus and Coriscus these three in that Epistle he invite's to have a kindness and friendship one with another and to avoid all differences he adviseth to establish a kind of Covenant and Law one with another and confirm that even by an oath in which Oath they should call God to witness who is the Captain of all things present and future and the Lord who is father of that Captain and cause whom saith he if we truly philosophize we shall know clearly all of us so far as the nature of a happy soul can attain unto in this speech we see he clearly set's down the Son of God to be the cause and governour of all things as in an hundred well-nigh other places then he saith such as are vertuous shall see him clearly as a happy soul can do what is this but which holy Job who was before him too said I know that my Redeemer liveth and that in my flâ—sh I shall see God Job 19.25 26. and the same that St. John relate's our Saviour to express in his prayer this is life eternal that they might know thee the onely true God and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent John 17.3 life eternal that is the felicity Plato speak's of it is true Plato could not say Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent because in his humanity our Saviour was not yet seen in the world but Plato spake of him according to his Divinity that felicity consisted in the clear vision of him and I may truly say I was extremely
activitatis beyond the reach of that naturall arm to come at but if it shall please God to enlarge the bounds of that Nature or draw the other neerer to it it may then do that naturally which before without that enlargement it could not doe as we see that fire cannot with its heat warme a thing which is far off yet bring that body neeâ—er to the fire or let the fire be made more intense it can then doe it so can God make a Creatureâ—s understanding more intense and active and if he please make that sun whose glorious light in its self we cannot behold have such gentle Clouds interposed as may make us see him behind them which in its self nakedly without those Cloudes we could not so may God make himself discernable by such expressions as were fit for him and kindly to us it is a mighty fault in the great wits frequently that they will limit God's abilities to their own apprehensions and because they cannot conceive how therefore they will say he cannot doe it and because naturall men in this Condition cannot apprehend this therefore God cannot make such a man and so this Author whilest he labour's to shew how divine excellencies transcend our capacities he himselfe confine's God's infinite power to his owne fancy But I say I have almost all against my undertaking and therefore before I go I will smooth the way by disputing that question de possibilitate rei whether it be possible to be proved or no. Sect. 2. To understand which give me leave to preface somethings necessary to be preconceived first we must know that there is a God that this God is of an infinite excellency infinitely true good immense eternal c. all which have a great consent among Divines that they may be proved by reason Secondly Consider with me that there is a great difference betwixt these two the man pretended able to prove this by naturall reason who never heard nor apprehended it by faith and him who hath assented to it first by faith for the former hath no reason to enquire or with industring to search because those things of God onely concern him by which he is ruled as his omnisciency his justice his providence and the like but these internal excellencies which are onely in God and onely work as one principle in the outward works concerning the Creation or Government of the world these he hath no occasion further to busie his Soul about but then when they are revealed by faith a contemplative Soul ambitiously strive's how he may climb up to them by reason These permitted I shall undertake the Question Sect. 3. The first opposer I meet with is that great Father of the School Aquinas himself who indeed hath spoken as fully as any of his followers his discourse is in prima parte Quest. 32 Art primo in corpore I answer saith he It must be said that it is impossible by naturall reason to come to the knowledge of the Trinity of the divine persons for it is proved before which is Quest. 12. Art 12. in corpore that man by naturall reason cannot attaine to the knowledge of God by the Creatures but the Creature induce's to the knowledge of God as effects induce to the knowledge of the cause that therefore onely can be known of God which is necessary to be affirmed of him as he is the beginning and cause of the creatures but the creative vertue of God is common to the whole Trinity therefore it appertaine's to the unity of the essence not to the Trinity of the persons Thus farre he and this is the first of his Arguments I will answer them by degrees one by one for perspicuity sake To this first I shall answer that although the greatest part of knowledge is either drawn from the cause to the effect or from the effect to the Cause and the first onely can be applyed to God who hath no cause and whose effects some way or other all things are as from that one infinite being God yet Raymund Lully whom I most honour in this case hath thought of other wayes of arguing of as great force and convincing a man's understanding as these to wit demonstratio per aequiparantiam by the proportion and equality of things and per similitudimem by their likenesse that by equiparance or equivalence he conceiveth to be when by one or two of an equall excellencie an other quality is proved to be as excellent as thus because God is infinitely excellent therefore he is infinitely knowing infinitely good againe this argument from equivalence may be brought from the power to the acts thus the act is proportioned to he power where is an infinite power there is an infinite act where a finite power there but a finite act now by these wayes I apprehend that a man may prove the Trinity although not by the effects of God in the Creature as effects Sect. 4. His second Argument is that to prove the Trinity by reason were derogatory from faith which is of things invisible as it is Heb. 11. now saith he if these things were proveable by reason they were not unseene that is of naturall understandings To this I answer that from the same inconvenience the infinite creating power and act of creating were not proveable by reason which is an article of our faith and although we could not prove it yet we must believe it which both he and his followers agree to grant Secondly I answer that although these things of faith are unseen by mere naturall men without all faith yet when a man hath faith then that light of faith may shew him this or that thing of them and his Reason may afterwards likewise discern it for you may conceive a weight too heavy for a weak man to lift yet when a stronger assist's him he can doe it with him which before he could not without him or as you may see a weake-sighted man by the help of his Spectacles reade's those words which else he could not have read without them yet having clearly read them with Spectacles can after by his weaker sight reade them without because the sense is in his head so a man who by his own weake sight of his own reason cannot lift such a burthen as the Trinity yet having the assistance of a stronger his faith he can then lift up his Arme of Reason to beare it likewise so he that was forced to use spectacles assistants to his Reason whereby he might apprehend this Mystery yet having the sense of it in his head by that can afterwards read it by reason so though these holy Mysteries are invisiâ—le to mere naturall men yet when made apparent by faith they may afterwards be discerned likewise by Reason Another argument is that it is unprofitable to faith for saith he when men use reasons that are not convincing they fall into the scorne of incredulous men who
is that makes Experience There have been prognostick dreams and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts Solomons opinion of dreams different from Mr. Hobbes's His reasons invalide Old mens dreams Constitutional dreams Phantastick dreams Whence coherent and incoherent dreams Sensitive creatures become acquainted with words and signs by custom or the suggestions of appetite not by understanding 〈◊〉 specifick souls signal differences distinguishing them each from other Their Sagacity Religion defined Why reckoned among the duties of justice The seed of Reâ—igion in man onely because rational Mr. Hobbes's reasons invalid and his discourse impertinent His opinion of the feigned God invisible Agents Ghosts c. Invisible Agents what Mr. Hobbes sticks an absurd opinion of mans soul undeservedly upon Idolaters His discourse of Spirits and Ghosts c. too perplexed Mr. Hobbes sowes ambiguous seeds to produce false and true Religion The opinion of Ghosts could not introduce the assurance that there is a God Ignorance of second causes apter to produce Atheisme then Religion Devotion to what we fear rather a fruit then seed of Religion A taking things casual for Prognostiquâ—s no seed of the taâ—â—e Religions There have been Sibyls that prophesied of our Saviour The sole immediate seed of Religion an innate principle To be prov'd from the chain of causes An eternity of the world with an infinity of causations why not to be admitted A transition to Mr. Hobbes's Element of Philosophy c. Somewhat of God though infinite may be known And that from Phantasms The conceit of fiâ—ite and infinite explain'd What conceit may be had of infinite An Eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions Mr. Hobbes's indiffâ—rence be the world finite or infinite His contradâ—ction of himself by inadvertence The first mover prov'd immoveable Mr Hobbâ—s's paralogisme His disputing ex non concessis No infinity at all of numbers Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration And yet God the Creatour may and must No before or after in Eternity and yet how these terms are applicable to Gods duration or coexistencâ— not to his simple or absolute existence Our double conceipt of Gods eternity to which no computation of time is applicable The doctrine of eternity most agreeable to H. Scripture No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing instant The difference of nunc stans and tunc stans as applied to Eternity Eternity coexâ—sts with no infinite number of dayes God so manifest in the Creatures as all ignorance is inexcusable Mr. Hobbes contradict's himself as touching the seeds of Religion Which are more then only an opinion of a Deity c. Mr. Hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the Schoolemen How farre the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature What may be supposed Mr. Hobbes mean's by a Formed Religion How he imposeth upon his Reader Formed Religion not founded upon his phantastike Faith The Jewish and Christian principally to be examined No probâ—liâ—y of Idolatry before the floud 1. Argument Answ. Invocation taken for the whole worship of God Practis'd by Adam Abel Seth c. Or for some peculiar additional Devotion A like instance in Confession The Church Service Gloria Patri That peculiar devotion introduced in Enos's time 2. Argument Answ. The punishmâ—nt disproportionate to sin in this world Of what sort were their sins who perished in the Floud Revelation not reason did dictate the first Religion The difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of a Religion Which prevaiâ—eth according to the congruity it hath to the will of God Whatsoever mens opinion be of the Person that introduceth it How this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a God Why the promised discourse of the Iewish and Christian Religion is omitted Mr. Hobbes abstruse in making out his conclusion of suspected Governours and their Religion Christian Religion depends not upon the integrity and sufficiency of Church Governours Religion formed by divine revelations may oâ—lâ—ge to a beleeâ—e of seeming contradictions The singular excellency of Faith to be as well against as above Reason Mr. Hobbes's subtiltie in his citation and praetermission of examples Which though pertinent are dangerous to weak capacities Mr. Hobbes's scandalous description of man The equality of men by nature not universal The estate in which Adam and Evâ—h were made That wherein others Memory Experience and Prudence distinguished Mr Hobbes confuse â—f not contradictâ—â—y to himself in arguing Men universally no such opiniatours of their own prudence as Mr. Hobbes pretendeth Equality of hopes does not render men enemies Nor of desires as appeares by the agreement between Abraham and Lot Nor self-conservation much lesse delectation How and by what Hopes and Feares work upon us Not Ahab's but Jezabels malice destroyed Naboth Obj. Ans. The title of Occupancy sacred c. Reason secureth men from feares Who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury Which is generally restrain'd by the thought of Gods punitive justice How Reason or Armes decide the controversy before occupancy Three sorts of men although without a common humane power to awe them not in the condition called Warre How a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutual â—â—iendship Ob. Repl. Ans. Time being no essential constitutes no war His instance in foul weather to illustrate erroneous A disposition to war before any act of hostility makes no war His impropriety of speech Men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive War An universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented Nor is it proved by Mr. Hobbes's instances What in the passions makâ—â— Sinnes which are not such in themelves The several constitutions in the objects of our passions what and whence Affected ignorance of the law a sin Every man borne under a Law maker and a Law The Americans have Kings and justice exeeuted amongst them Private families not at war with the Kings and Nations among whom they live The concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust The exorbitances of a Civil Warre prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature The mutual jealousies of Soveraigns render them not like Gladiatours in a direct posture of war Conscience dictate's to men what is right and wrong what law and common power they must submit to Militarie Vaâ—our and Prudence degenerated into Force and fraud lose the nature and deserve not the name of the the two Cardinal vertues in war Justice and Injustice no faculties but habits and may be in a military person Nations have propriety in Dominions Persons in their wives And estates Thâ—ir title to which may be various That of Occupancy most evident The right of Nature extends farther then to the preservation of life Several acceptions of Necessity and the different effects of it accordingly Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law Necessity of nature makes not every particular