joyned together by the said Verb is As for Example Man is a living creature or thus Man is not righteous whereof the former is called an Affirmation because the Appellation Living Creature is Positive the latter a Negative because not righteous is Privative 10. In every Proposition be it Affirmative or Negative the latter Appellation either comprehendeth the former as in this Proposition Charity is a Vertue the Name of Vertue comprehendeth the Name of Charity and many other Vertues beside and then is the Proposition said to be true or Truth For Truth and a true Proposition is all one Or else the latter Appellation comprehendeth not the former as in this Proposition Every Man is just the name of Just comprehendeth not Every Man for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men And the Proposition is said to be false or Falsity Falsity and a false Proposition being also the same Thing 11. In what manner of two Propositions whether both Affirmative or one Affirmative the other Negative is made a Syllogism I forbear to write All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions though necessary is but dry Discourse and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick which if I enter further into I ought to pursue Besides it is not needfull for there be few Men which have not so much natural Logick as thereby to discern well enough whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter be well or ill collected Only thus much I say in this Place that Making of Syllogisms is that we call Ratiocination or Reasoning 12. Now when a man reasoneth from Principles that are found indubitable by Experience all Deceptions of Sense and Aequivocation of Words avoided the Conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right Reason But when from his Conclusion a Man may by good Ratiocination derive that which is contradictory to any evident Truth whatsoever then he is said to have concluded against Reason And such a Conclusion is called Absurdity 13. As the Invention of Names hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance by calling to their Remembrance the necessary Coherence of one Conception to another so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into Errour Insomuch that whereas by the Benefit of Words and Ratiocination they exceed brute Beasts in Knowledge and the Commodities that accompany the same so they exceed them also in Errour For true and false are Things not incident to Beasts because they adhere not to Propositions and Language nor have they Ratiocination whereby to multiply one Untruth by another as Men have 14. It is the Nature almost of every Corporal Thing being often moved in one and the same Manner to receive continually a greater and greater Easiness and Aptitude to the same Motion insomuch as in Time the same becometh so habitual that to beget it there needs no more than to begin it The Passions of Man as they are the Beginning of voluntary Motions so are they the Beginning of Speech which is the Motion of the Tongue And Men desiring to shew others the Knowledge Opinions Conceptions and Passions which are in themselves and to that End having invented Language have by that Means transferred all that Discursion of their Mind mentioned in the former Chapter by the Motion of their Tongues into Discourse of Words And Ratio now is but Oratio for the most part wherein Custom hath so great a Power that the Mind suggesteth only the first Word the rest follow habitually and are not followed by the Mind as it is with Beggars when they saw their Pater noster putting together such Words and in such manner as in their Education they have learned from their Nurses from their Companies or from their Teachers having no Images or Conceptions in their Mind answering to the Words they speak and as they have learned themselves so they teach Posterity Now if we consider the Power of those Deceptions of the Sense mentioned Chap 2. Sect. 10 and also how unconstantly Names have been setled and how subject they are to Aequivocation and how diversified by Passion scarce two Men agreeing what is to be called Good and what Evil what Liberality what Prodigality what Valour what Temerity and how subject Men are to Paralogism or Fallacy in Reasoning I may in a Manner conclude that it is impossible to rectifie so many Errours of any one Man as must needs proceed from those Causes without beginning a-new from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense and instead of Books reading over orderly ones own Conceptions In which Meaning I take Noste teipsum for a Precept worthy the Reputation it hath gotten CHAP. VI 1. Of the two Kinds of Knowledge 2. Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge 3. Evidence defined 4. Science defined 5. Supposition defined 6. Opinion defined 7. Belief defined 8. Conscience defined 9. Belief in some Cases no less from Doubt than Knowledge 1. THere is a Story somewhere of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of Blindness wherewith he was born by St. Albane or other Saints at the Town of St. Albans and that the Duke of Glocester being there to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle asked the Man What Colour is this Who by answering It was Green discovered himself and was punished for a Counterfeit for though by his Sight newly received he might distinguish between Green and Red and all other Colours as well as any that should interrogate him yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green or Red or by any other Name By this we may understand there be two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the one is nothing else but Sense or Knowledge original as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter and Remembrance of the same the other is called Science or Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions and how Things are called and is derived from Vnderstanding Both of these Sorts are but Experience The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from without and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of Names in Language and all Experience being as I have said but Remembrance all Knowledge is Remembrance and of the former the Register we keep in Books is called History But the Registers of the latter are called the Sciences 2. There are two Things necessarily implied in this Word Knowledge the one is Truth the other Evidence for what is not Truth can never be known For let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well if the same shall afterwards appear false he is driven to Confession that it was not Knowledge but Opinion Likewise if the Truth be not evident though a Man holdeth it yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge all Truth were known which is not so 3.
Power of him that contendeth with us the Signs whereof besides those in the Countenance and other Gestures of the Body which cannot be described are Ostentation in Words and Insolency in Actions and this Passion of them whom it displeaseth is called Pride by them whom it pleaseth it is termed a just Valuation of himself This Imagination of our Power or Worth may be from an assured and certain Experience of our own Actions and then is that Glory just and well grounded and begetteth an Opinion of increasing the same by other Actions to follow in which consisteth the Appetite which we call Aspiring or Proceeding from one Degree of Power to another The same Passion may proceed not from any Conscience of our own Actions but from Fame and Trust of others whereby one may think well of himself and yet be deceived and this is false Glory and the Aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill Success Further the Fiction which is also Imagination of Actions done by our selves which never were done is Glorying but because it begetteth no Appetite nor endeavour to any further Attempt it is meerly vain and unprofitable as when a Man imagineth himself to do the Actions whereof he readeth in some Romance or to be like unto some other Man whose Acts he admireth And this is called Vain Glory and is exemplied in the Fable by the Fly sitting on the Axletree and saying to himself What a Dust do I make rise The expression of Vain Glory is that Wish which some of the School mistaking for some Appetite distinct from all the rest have called Velleity making a new Word as they made a new Passion which was not before Signs of Vain Glory in the Gesture are Imitation of others Counterfeiting and Usurping the Signs of Vertue they have not Affectation of Fashions Captation of Honour from their Dreams and other little Stories of themselves from their Country from their Names and from the like 2. The Passion contrary to Glory proceeding from Apprehension of our own Infirmity is called Humility by those by whom it is approved by the rest Dejection and Poorness which Conception may be well or ill grounded if well it produceth Fear to attempt any Thing rashly if ill it utterly cows a Man that he neither dares speak publickly nor expect good Success in any Action 3. It happeneth sometimes that he that hath a good Opinion of himself and upon good ground may nevertheless by Reason of the Frowardness which that Passion begetteth discover in himself some Defect or Infirmity the Remembrance whereof dejecteth him and this Passion is called Shame by which being cooled and checked in his Forwardness he is more wary for the Time to come This Passion as it is a Sign of Infirmity which is Dishonour so also it is a Sign of Knowledge which is Honour The Sign of it is Blushing which appeareth less in Men conscious of their own Defect because they less betray the Infirmities they acknowledge 4. Courage in a large Signification is the Absence of Fear in the Presence of any evil whatsoever but in a Strict and more common Meaning it is Contempt of Wounds and Death when they oppose a Man in the Way to his End 5. Anger or sudden Courage is nothing but the Appetite or desire of overcoming present Opposition It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an Opinion of Contempt which is confuted by the often Experience which we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate and without Sense and consequently incapable of contemning us 6. Revengefulness is that Passion which ariseth from an Expectation or Imagination of making him that hath hurt us find his own Action hurtful to himself and to acknowledge the same and this is the Height of Revenge for though it be not hard by returning Evil for Evil to make ones Adversary displeased with his own Fact yet to make him acknowledge the same is so difficult that many a Man had rather die than do it Revenge aimeth not at the Death but at the Captivity or Subjection of an Enemy which was well expressed in the Exclamation of Tiberius Caesar concerning one that to frustrate his Revenge had killed himself in Prison Hath he escaped me To kill is the aim of them that hate to rid themselves out of Fear Revenge aimeth at Triumph which over the Dead is not 7. Repentance is the Passion which proceedeth from Opinion or Knowledge that the Action they have done is out of the Way to the End they would attain the Effect whereof is to pursue that Way no longer but by the Consideration of the End to direct themselves into a better The first Motion therefore in this Passion is Grief but the Expectation or Conception of returning again into the Way is Joy and consequently the Passion of Repentance is compounded and allayed of both but the predominant is Joy else were the Whole Grief which cannot be forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End he conceiveth Good proceedeth with Appetite and Appetite is Joy as hath been said Chap. 7. Sect. 2. 8. Hope is Expectation of Good to come as Fear is the Expectation of Evil But when there be Causes some that make us expect Good and some that make us expect Evil alternately working in our Mind if the Causes that make us expect Good be greater than those that make us expect Evil the whole Passion is Hope if contrarily the Whole is Fear Absolute Privation of hope is Despair a degree whereof is Diffidence 9. Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for Good so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust is manifest from this that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold 10. Pity is Imagination or Fiction of future Calamity to our selves proceeding from the Sense of another Mans Calamity But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same the Compassion is greater because then there appeareth more Probability that the same may happen to us for the Evil that happeneth to an innocent Man may happen to every Man But when we see a Man suffer for great Crimes which we cannot easily think will fall upon our selves the Pity is the less And therefore Men are apt to pity those whom they love for whom they love they think worthy of Good and therefore not worthy of Calamity Thence it is also that Men pity the Vices of some Persons at the first Sight only out of Love to their Aspect The Contrary of Pity is Hardness of Heart proceeding either from Slowness of Imagination or some extreme great Opinion of their own Exemption from the like Calamity or from hatred of
Humane Nature OR The Fundamental Elements OF POLICY BEING A Discovery of the Faculties Acts and Passions of the SOUL of MAN From their Original causes According to such Philosophical Principles As are not commonly known or asserted The Third Edition Augmented and much corrected by the Authors own hand By Tho. Hobbs of Malmsbury LONDON Printed for Matthew Gilliflower Henry Rogers and Tho. Fox Booksellers in Westminster-Hall MDCLXXXIV To the Right Honourable WILLIAM EARL OF NEW-CASTLE Governour to the Prince his Highness One of His Majesties Most Honourable Privy Council My most Honoured Lord FRom the principal parts of Nature Reason and Passion have proceeded two kinds of Learning Mathematical and Dogmatical the former is free from Controversie and Dispute because it consisteth in comparing Figure and Motion only in which things Truth and the Interest of Men oppose not each other but in the other there is nothing undisputable because it compareth Men and medleth with their Right and Profit in which as oft as Reason is against a Man so oft will a Man be against Reason And from hence it cometh that they who have written of Justice and Policy in General do all invade each other and themselves with Contradictions To reduce this Doctrine to the Rules and Infallibility of Reason there is no way but first put such Principles down for a Foundation as Passion not mistrusting may not seek to displace and afterwards to build thereon the Truth of Cases in the Law of Nature which hitherto have been built in the Air by degrees till the whole have been inexpugnable Now my Lord the Principles fit for such a Foundation are those which heretofore I have acquainted your Lordship withal in private Discourse and which by your Command I have here put into a Method To examine Cases thereby between Soveraign and Soveraign or between Soveraign and Subject I leave to them that shall find Leasure and Encouragement thereto For my part I present this to your Lordship for the true and only Foundation of such Science For the Stile it is therefore the worse because whilest I was writing I consulted more with Logick than with Rhetorick But for the Doctrine it is not slightly proved and the Conclusions thereof of such Nature as for want of them Government and Peace have been nothing else to this day but mutual Fears And it would be an incomparable benefit to Commonwealth that every one held the Opinion concerning Law and Policy here delivered The ambition therefore of this Book in seeking by your Lordships countenance to insinuate it self with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth is to be excused For my self I desire no greater honour than I enjoy already in your Lordship's favour unless it be that you would be pleased in Continuance thereof to give me more Exercise in your commands which as I am bound by your many great Favours I shall obey being My most honoured Lord Your most humble and most obliged Servant THO. HOBBS May 9. 1640. IN Libellum praestantissimi THO. HOBBII Veri verè Philosophi de Naturâ Hominis QVae magna Coeli moenia tractae Maris Terraeque fines siquid aut ultra est capit Mens ipsa tandem capitur Omnia hactenus Quae nôsse potuit nota jam primùm est Sibi Accede Lector disce quis demùm sies Tranquilinam jecoris agnoscas tui Quî propiùs haeret nil tibi nil tam procul Non hic Scholarum frivola aut cassi logâ Quales per annos fortè plus septem legit Ut folle pleno prodeat Rixae Artifex Vanasque merces futili linguâ crepet Sed sancta Rerum pondera sensus graves Quales parari decuit ipsa cùm fuit Pingenda Ratio vindici suo adstitit Panduntur omnes Machinae gyri tuae Animaeque Vectes Trochleae Cunei Rotae Quâ concitetur arte quo sufflamine Sistatur illa rursus constet sibi Nec si Fenestram pectori humano suam Aptâsset ipse Momus inspiceret magis Hîc cerno levia Affectuum vestigia Gracilesque Sensûs lineas video quibus Vehantur alis blanduli Cupidines Quibusque stimulis urgeâ—nt Irâ— graves Hîc Dolores Voluptates suos Produnt recessus ipse nec Timor latet Has nôrit artes quisquis in foro velit Animorum habenas flectere populos cupit Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi Hîc Archimedes publicus figat podem Siquando regna machinis politicis Vrgere satagit feras gentes ciet Imisque motum sedibus mundum quatit Facile domabit cuncta qui Menti imperat Consultor audax Promethei potens Facinoris Anime quis tibi dedit Deus Haec intueri saeculis longè abdita Oculosque luce tinxit ambrosiâ tuos Tu mentis omnis at Tuae nulla est capax Hâc laude Solus fruere Divinum est opus Animam Creare proximum huic Ostendere RAD. BATHURST A. M. Col. Trin. Oxon. Humane Nature OR THE Fundamental Elements OF POLICY THE true and perspicuous Explication of the Elements of Laws Natural and Politick which is my present Scope dependeth upon the Knowledge of what is Humane Nature what is Body Politick and what it is we call a Law concerning which Points as the Writings of Men from Antiquity down wards have still increased so also have the Doubts and Controversies concerning the same And seeing that true Knowledge begetteth not Doubt nor Controversie but Knowledge it is manifest from the present Controversies That they which have heretofore written thereof have not well understood their own Subject 2. Harm I can do none though I err no less than they for I shall leave Men but as they are in Doubt and Dispute but intending not to take any Principle upon Trust but only to put Men in Mind of what they know already or may know by their own Experience I hope to erre the less and when I do it must proceed from too hasty Concluding which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid 3. On the other side if Reasoning aright win not Consent which may very easily happen from them that being confident of their own Knowledg weigh not what is said the Fault is not mine but theirs for as it is my Part to shew my Reasons so it is theirs to bring Attention 4. Mans Nature is the Summ of his natural Faculties and Powers as the Faculties of Nutrition Motion Generation Sense Reason c. These Powers we do unanimously call Natural and are contained in the Definition of Man under these words Animal and Rational 5. According to the two principal Parts of Man I divide his Faculties into two sorts Faculties of the Body and Faculties of the Mind 6. Since the minute and distinct Anatomy of the Powers of the Body is nothing necessary to the present Purpose I will only summ them up in these Three Heads Power Nutritive Power Motive and Power Generative 7.
What Truth is hath been defined in the precedent Chapter What Evidence is I now set down and it is the Concomitance of a Mans Conception with the Words that signifie such Conception in the Act of Ratiocination for when a Man reasoneth with his Lips only to which the Mind suggesteth only the Beginning and followeth not the Words of his Mouth with the Conceptions of his Mind out of Custom of so speaking though he begin his Ratiocination with True Propositions and proceed with certain Syllogisms and thereby make always true Conclusions yet are not his Conclusions evident to him for Want of the Concomitance of Conception with his Words for if the Words alone were sufficient a Parrot might be taught as well to know Truth as to speak it Evidence is to Truth as the Sap to the Tree which so far as it creepeth along with Body and Branches keepeth them alive where it forsaketh them they die for this Evidence which is Meaning with our Words is the Life of Truth 4. Knowledge therefore which we call Science I define to be Evidence of Truth from some Beginning or Principle of Sense for the Truth of a Proposition is never evident until we conceive the Meaning of the Words or Terms whereof it consisteth which are always Conceptions of the Mind Nor can we remember those Conceptions without the Thing that produced the same by our Senses The first Principle of Knowledge is that we have such and such Conceptions the second that we have thus and thus named the Things whereof they are Conceptions the third is that we have joyned those Names in such Manner as to make true Propositions the fourth and last is that we have joyned those Propositions in such Manner as they be concluding and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known And of these two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the former is Experience of Fact and the later of Evidence of Truth as the former if it be great is called Prudence so the latter if it be much hath usually been called both by Ancient and Modern Writers Sapience or Wisdom and of this latter Man only is capable of the former brute Beasts also participate 5. A Proposition is said to be supposed when being not evident it is nevertheless admitted for a Time to the End that joyning to it other Propositions we may conclude something and to proceed from Conclusion to Conclusion for a Trial whether the same will lead us into any absurd or impossible Conclusion which if it do then we know such Supposition to have been false 6. But if running thorow many Conclusions we come to none that are absurd then we think the Proposition probable likewise we think probable whatsoever Proposition we admit for Truth by Errour of Reasoning or from trusting to other Men And all such Propositions as are admitted by Trust or errour we are not said to know but think them to be true and the Admittance of them is called Opinion 7. And particularly when the Opinion is admitted out of Trust to other Men they are said to believe it and their Admittance of it is called Belief and sometimes Faith 8. It is either Science or Opinion which we commonly mean by the Word Conscience for Men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their Conscience which they never do when they think it doubtful and therefore they know or think they know it to be true But Men when they say Things upon their Conscience are not therefore presumed certainly to know the Truth of what they say It remaineth then that that Word is used by them that have an Opinion not only of the Truth of the Thing but also of their Knowledge of it to which the Truth of the Proposition is consequent Conscience I therefore define to be Opinion of Evidence 9. Belief which is the admitting of Propositions upon Trust in many Cases is no less free from Doubt than perfect and manifest Knowledge for as there is nothing whereof there is not some Cause so when there is Doubt there must be some Cause thereof conceived Now there be many Things which we receive from Report of others of which it is impossible to imagine any Cause of Doubt for what can be opposed against the Consent of all Men in Things they can know and have no Cause to report otherwise than they are such as is great Part of our Histories unless a Man would say that all the World had conspired to deceive him And thus much of Sense Imagination Discursion Ratiocination and Knowledge which are the Acts of our Power cognitive or conceptive That Power of the Mind which we call motive differeth from the Power motive of the Body for the Power motive of the Body is that by which it moveth other Bodies and we call Strength but the Power motive of the Mind is that by which the Mind giveth animal Motion to that Body wherein it existeth the Acts hereof are our Affections and Passions of which I am to speak in general CHAP. VII Of Delight Pain Love Hatred Appetite Aversion Fear Good Evil Pulchritude Turpitude End Fruition Profitable Vse Vain Felicity Good and Evil mixt Sensual Delight and Pain Joy and Grief IN the eighth Section of the second Chapter is shewed that Conceptions and Apparitions are nothing really but Motion in some internal Substance of the Head which Motion not stopping there but proceeding to the Heart of Necessity must there either help or hinder the Motion which is called Vital when it helpeth it is called Delight Contentment or Pleasure which is nothing really but Motion about the Heart as Conception is nothing but Motion in the Head and the Objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful or by some Name equivalent The Latines have Jucundum à juvando from helping and the same Delight with Reference to the Object is called Love but when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion then it is called Pain and in Relation to that which causeth it Hatred which the Latines express sometimes by Odium and sometimes by Taedium 2. This Motion in which consisteth Pleasure or Pain is also a Solicitation or Provocation either to draw near to the Thing that pleaseth or to retire from the Thing that displeaseth and this Solicitation is the Endeavour or internal Beginning of animal Motion which when the Object delighteth is called Appetite when it displeaseth it is called Aversion in Respect of the Displeasure present but in Respect of the Displeasure expected Fear So that Pleasure Love and Appetite which is also called Desire are divers Names for divers Considerations of the same Thing 3. Every Man for his own Part calleth that which pleaseth and is delightful to himself Good and that Evil which displeaseth him insomuch that while every Man differeth from other in Constitution they differ also from one another concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil Nor is there any such Thing as Absolute
an Expression of such Height of vain Glory as reading of Romance may produce in pusillanimous Men Also Rage and Madness of Love are but great Indignations of them in whose Brains is predominant Contempt from their Enemies or their Mistresses And the Pride taken in Form and Behaviour hath made divers Men run mad and to be so accounted under the Name of Fantastick 10. And as these are the Examples of Extremities so also are there Examples too many of the Degrees which may therefore be well accounted Follies as it is a Degree of the first for a Man without certain Evidence to think himself to be inspired or to have any other Effect of Gods holy Spirit than other godly Men have Of the second for a Man continually to speak his mind in a Cento of other Mens Greek or Latine Sentences Of the third much of the present Gallantry in Love and Duel Of Rage a Degree is Malice and of Fantastick Madness Affection 11. As the former Examples exhibit to us Madness and the Degrees thereof proceeding from the Excess of Self-Opinion so also there be other Examples of Madness and the Degrees thereof proceeding from too much vain Fear and Dejection as in those melancholy Men that have imagined themselves brittle as Glass or have had some other like Imagination and Degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causless Fears which we commonly observe in melancholy Persons CHAP. XI 1. HItherto of the Knowledge of Things natural and of the Passions that arise naturally from them Now forasmuch as we give Names not only to Things natural but also to supernatural and by all Names we ought to have some Meaning and Conception It followeth in the next Place to consider what Thoughts and Imaginations of the Mind we have when we take into our Mouths the most blessed Name of GOD and the Names of those Vertues we attribute unto him as also what Image cometh into the Mind at hearing the Name of Spirit or the Name of Angel good or bad 2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is incomprehensible it followeth that we can have no Conception or Image of the Deity and consequently all his Attributes signifie our Inability and Defect of Power to conceive any Thing concerning his Nature and not any Conception of the same excepting only this That there is a God For the Effects we acknowledge naturally do include a Power of their producing before they were produced and that Power presupposeth something existent that hath such Power And the Thing so existing with Power to produce if it were not Eternal must needs have been produced by somewhat before it and that again by something else before that till we come to an Eternal that is to say the first Power of all Powers and first Cause of all Causes And this is it which all Men conceive by the Name of GOD implying Eternity Incomprehensibility and Omnipotency And thus all that will consider may know that God is though not what he is even a Man that is born blind though it be not possible for him to have any Imagination what Kind of thing Fire is yet he cannot but know that somewhat there is that Men call Fire because it warmeth him 2. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty Seeing Hearing Speaking Knowing Loving and the like by which Names we understand something in Men to whom we attribute them we understand nothing by them in the Nature of God For as it is well reasoned Shall not the God that made the Eye see and the Ear hear So it is also if we say Shall God which made the Eye not see without the Eye or that made the Ear not hear without the Ear or that made the Brain not know without the Brain or that made the Heart not love without the Heart The Attributes therefore given unto the Deity are such as signifie either our Incapacity or our Reverence Our Incapacity when we say Incomprehensible and Infinite our Reverence when we give him those Names which amongst us are the Names of those Things we most magnifie and commend as Omnipotent Omniscient Just Merciful c. And when God Almighty giveth those Names to himself in the Scriptures it is but {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} that is to say by descending to our Manner of speaking without which we are not capable of understanding him 4. By the Name of Spirit we understand a Body natural but of such Subtilty that it worketh not upon the Senses but that filleth up the Place which the Image of a visible Body might fill up Our Conception therefore of Spirit consisteth of Figure without Colour and in Figure is understood Dimension and consequently to conceive a Spirit is to conceive something that hath Dimension But Spirits supernatural commonly signifie some Substance without Dimension which two Words do flatly contradict one another and therefore when we attribute the Name of Spirit unto God we attribute it not as the Name of any Thing we conceive no more than we ascribe unto him Sense and Understanding but as a Signification of our Reverence we desire to abstract from him all corporal Grosness 5. Concerning other Things which some Men call Spirits incorporeal and some corporeal it is not possible by natural Means only to come to Knowledge of so much as that there are such Things We that are Christians acknowledge that there be Angels good and evil and that there are Spirits and that the Soul of Man is a Spirit and that those Spirits are immortal but to know it that is to say to have natural Evidence of the same it is impossible For all Evidence is Conception as it is said Chap. 6. Sect. 3. and all Conception is Imagination and proceedeth from Sense Chap. 3. Sect. 1. And Spirits we suppose to be those Substances which work not upon the Sense and therefore not conceptible But though the Scripture acknowledge Spirits yet doth it no where say that they are incorporeal meaning thereby without Dimension and Quality Nor I think is that Word Incorporeal at all in the Bible but it is said of the Spirit that it abideth in Men sometimes that it dwelleth in them sometimes that it cometh on them that it descendeth and goeth and cometh and that Spirits are Angels that is to say Messengers all which Words do imply Locality and Locality is Dimension and whatsoever hath Dimension is Body be it never so subtil To me therefore it seemeth that the Scripture favoureth them more who hold Angels and Spirits corporeal than them that hold the contrary And it is a plain Contradiction in natural Discourse to say of the Soul of Man that it is tota in toto tota in qualibet Parte Corporis grounded neither upon Reason nor Revelation but proceeding from the Ignorance of what those Things are which are called Spectra Images that appear in the dark to Children and such as have strong Fears and other strange Imaginations as hath been said Chap.