that insuperably he that produceth the act and that immediatly shall he be blameless What is this but to condemn an accessary and acquit the principal Diotrephes But there is a great difference betwixt Gods concourse unto our good and evil works to good works he concurs not only efficiently Ex parte Potentiae predetermining the very faculty to the work but also morally Ex parte Objecti in that he doth counsel command perswade and aâ—â—ure us unto the lawful object In sinful acts he does only the first and not the latter so that of our sinful actions he is the physical cause only not the moral but of our good he is as well the moral as the physical Paganus You should consider that moral motion doth not give God the honour of a true and proper cause but only of a Metaphorical for the influence it hath into the Agent is not ipsum agere the very act it self and consequently the effect doth not follow that motion If therefore God should move us no otherwise than after such a manner your Partizans do conclude that while we work God should not discriminate us but we should discriminate our selves from such as work not therefore though God concurs unto the good act by a physical predetermination and morally too but unto the evil act by a physical predetermination only yet there remains the same manner of working in respect of good and evil in that which is chiefly considerable and by it self alone attributes the true and proper nature of a cause to God and assigns him the first and perfect original of that determination that this act should rather be than not be But 2. What is this moral motion and from whence and what doth it work upon in its seduction of us to an evil work be it in the understanding or the will in the imagination or the sensitiue appetite if you allow it to be an act you must confess according to your principels that it is from God and of his product on seeing therefore that the total sum of Gods concurse unto the act of sin amounts fully to thus much in your own account That he predetermines man to produce the whole entity of it and the whole reality also of every other act prerequired unto it that besides he predetermines and applies the Divel * Imoâ—â—ne ipse quidem Diabolus quicquam potest nisi determinante Deo Proinde pro certo tenendum Dominum omnes actiones decâ—rnere atque agendo concurrere suo sancto modo cooperari quando peccatum est in fiâ—â—i c. Malcom Com. ad Act. 4. 24. Passio Christi in individuo fuit a Dâ—o praedefinita praedefinitione perfecta Ergo omnes circumstantiae quae concurrunt ad individuationem illius praedeterminatae sunt aeterno Deâ— decreto sed ad talem individuation in etiam concuâ—rit inâ—â—â—sio actus extensio ad tales personas Alvarez Disp 22. 19. Câ—tance approbante Amesio iâ— Bel. ener Tom 4. lib. 2. cap. 2. n. 12. p. 27. and every other cause de facto conâ—urring to propound the unlawful object and allure to it since he predetermines the will and directs the intention and provides the object and applies the Tempter and addresseth all other circumstances that concur to the individuation of the sinful act there seems to be no moral or physical causality wanting that God should therefore be said to produce mens evil works otherwise than he effects their good works Diotrephes But the efficiency of God though he be Author of the act of sin doth not reach the formal malice of it Paganus No more do Men nor Divels in their most importunate contrivances solicitations and actings towards the sins of others notwithstanding they communicate in the fault * Quatenus incredulit adhabâ—t rationem peccati Deus illam non efficit sed Diabolus juxta illud 2. Cor. 4. 4. Piscator Apol. Resp Amicae Collat. Oppos cap. 3. and guilt by impelling to them such acts as are inseparably attended with a moral pravity neither doth any man produce the formal malice of his own wicked act but inasmuch as he produceth the entity of that act * Aquin. 12ae q. 79. ar 2. 2. to which that malice is annexed If the resolution of your Casuist * Amesius ubi supra lately mentioned be authentick he doth indirectly cooperate and so communicate in the sin of others who is deficient in his diligence to prevent it and he is sufficiently diligent to prevent sin who doth predetermine the will to it Diotrephes Now I have freed God so fully from having any hand in sin by a Metaphorical distinction you endeavour to make him communicate therein by a moral interpretation but that one may be accounted the Author of sin he must be culpably deficient saith Dr. Twiss * Ubi supra p. 72. and thus man may beguilty saith he either by doing what he ought to omit or by omitting what he ought to do but this cannot be incident to God He could I confess saith he keep any Creature from sin â—f it pleased him but if he will not and doth not he commits not any culpable defect for he is not bound to preserve any man from sin Therefore all that can be infer'd from hence is this * R. B. Prid. ubi supra p. 13. That man doth necessarily fall into sin if God doth not uphold him not that God sins because he doth not give what he doth not owe him Paganus You grant then that God is the cause of mans fall though inculpable but your Doctors do acknowledge That to love God in such a measure as to contemn our selves in comparison of him and his service is above the power of nature A Dr. Twiss nbi supra p. 49. man mvst be endued with heavenly grace and the Spirit of God to enable him hereunto and that accordingly God created our first parents in a state of grace and endued them with the Spirit that in this capacity such a law of love might be justly impos'd upon them Now I would fain be satisfied with what equity God could withdraw * from his innocent creatures and such were our first parents before the fall * Si Deus hominem sibi obedientem a pietate deturbat bene currentem cadere facit ergo pro bonis mala retribuit injuste punit quod ut fiat impellit Quid tam perversum quid tam insanum dici aut cogitari potest Prosp Aquit ad 12. Gal. Object that supernatural and necessary assistance and yet being thus without any fault in them strip't off their abilities leave them under the obligation of that now become an impossible Commandment that they might inevitably fall and perish yet this he did as you concluded above out of your Divines Diotrephes We satisfie our selves in that God did this for a greater good and that we may have no cause to complain our Divines conclude *
effects without respect to some qualifications in them would argue injustice even by St. Austin's own confession for he saith Numquid In Eâ—chirid c. 98. iniquitas est apud Deum absit Iniquum enim videtur ut sine ull s bonorum malorumve operum meritis unum Deus eligat odiatque alterum Is there unrighteousness with God God forbid For it seems unjust that God should love one and hate another without any merits of good or evil works But grant Almighty God his liberty to love freely as no doubt he may do yet the Apostle tells us He is so just His wrath comes onely where he finds sin a sufficient cause to send it upon the children of disobedience * Ephes 5. 6. Col. 3. 6. That Their Progenitors or God upon Their account have entailed that Title with the wrath annexed upon Them * Jer. 31. 29. Ezek. 18. 2. Jon. 4. 11. and never cuts it off in a matter of this everlasting concernment ought not to be affirmed without great authority Those who are said to be children of wrath by nature Ephes 2. 3. are not said to be so by the nature they were born in but by the nature * The word nature is put for custom 1 Cor. 11. 14. they walked in which was their evil custom and course of trespasses and sins vers 1 2. 3. Grant Esau a Reprobate in his Mother's womb and what certainty can the Faithful for such without doubt was Isaac when he begot Esau have of the salvation of their dearest Babes So sad an Oracle had she met with such interpreters would have been more heavy to Rebecca than the double burthen she travell'd with But 4. There was no such word in the Oracle to Rebâ—cca Gen. 25. 23. nor any such heard of till the time of the Prophet Malachi of which I shall give a fuller account anon So that Esau in his own person is not like to be concerned in it 5. If the Oracle had spake to her in that very phrase and language it would have been capable of a milder construction than to signifie his eternal Reprobation For when the Scripture speaks of hatred it doth not always mean that which is Absolute but many times that which is Comparative which is no more than a lesse degree of love And so God may hate the Innocent that is love him lesse then another Innocent for God is not bound to love all alike and with an equal degree of love That the word hatred is frequently used in this sense you may observe as you read the Scriptures Gen. 29. 31. the Text saith The Lord saw that Leah was hated yet in the former verse 't is onely said that Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah So Luk. 14. 26. our Saviour saith If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother c. which signifies but to lovâ— them leâ—s as St. Matthew doth record it Mat. â— 10. 37. See also to this purpose Dut. 21. 15. Prov. 13. 24. Joh. 12. 25. with Matâ—h 10. 37. And iâ— can have no other sense when applied here to Esau or rather to his Posteriâ—y 6. Were it meant of Gods Decree of Reprobation I would fain understand wherein the Execution of that Decree consisted It must consist in the abandoning Esau to a state of tâ—mpoâ—al servitude a Gen. 25. 23. and his Hell must be an Earthly Wildernes b Mal. 1. 3. and his own Brother the Elect Jacob assigâ—'d him for his Torm â—tor c Gen. 27. 29. against whom he had a promise too that he should finally prevail d Gen. 27. 40. over him What gross Absurdities these are who wants a judgment to discern Yet all these are parts of the Oracle or Appendages in the process of the Affair as you will find by consulting the Sacred Text to this purpose Lastly there is no ground to conclude that Esau was a Reprobate for it doth not appear probable that in his person he fell off from God to serve Idollâ— and for that prophareness imputed to him Hebr. 12. 16. it consisted but in the divesting himself of a privilege e Gen. 25. 29 to the end annexed to his Primogeniture and what Sacrednesse soever was in Tâ—is he was supâ—lanted f chap. 27. 36. by his Brother's policy and induced to part with it in a case of extream necessity g chap. 25. 32. to save his life his Brother being so unnatural that he would relieve him upon no other tearms h vers 31 33. and Esau repented of This ill bargain too i ch 27. 36 38. Heb. 12. 17. For the Fornication associated with Profaneness by the Apostle in that place it is no part of Esau's Character but belongs to the Apostates of those times from the imitation of whose practices the Hebrews are there so earnestly disswaded As for the hatred k Gen. 27. 41. he did bear a while towards his Brother though it were kindled upon an exceeding provocation it was not implacable for such was his kindnesse to him at Their meeting that Jacob tells him l Gen. 33. 10. I have seen thy face as thoâ—gh I had seen the face of God and thou wast pleased with me He was not so happy as to please his Parents in his first Marriage his wives were distasteful to Isaac and Rebecea m Gen. 26. 35. but upon what account is not so easie to determine If we say with Diodati and others that it was for their Idolatries this was no more than that guilt that stain'd the practice and education of Jacob's Wives also as the sacred Story doth record it n Gen. 31. 19. 30 32. Josh 24. 2. However if herein he were guilty of some undutifulnesse too his Parents yet that the Elect and after their Regeneration to may fall into as foul and fouler sins than that amounts to and likewise continue in them God knows how long we have the opinion of a person of some note o Mr. Baxter See his Disputations of Right to the Sacraments pag. 327 c. amongst us And besides that he intended the displeasure of his Parents in those Matches is not probable that he endeavour'd their satisfaction afterwards an undeniable instance of his repentance is evident from Gen. 28. 8 9. where we read that when he saw the daughters of Canaan pleased not his father by his forbidding Jacob to match himself amongst them then went Esau unto Ishmael Abrahams son who was as near related to Isaac as Laban was unto Rebecca and took his daughter to be his wife and this was done without doubt to comply with the temper and desires of his Parents Who then dares condemn Esau for a Reprobate Though Pâ—reus exercise this intolerable severity Mâ—llrus durst not Oâ—colampadius durst not Dr. Prideaâ—x durst not Ex Genesi ve isimiles conjecturae sumi possunt quae ostendunt Esavum non ita reâ—ectum esse à Deo ut 〈◊〉 damnatus
one kind * Dato quod voluntas sit causa actionis liberae addam si placet totalis in suo genere ergone Deus ejusdem actionis non est causa in suo genere Mr. Hickman in Br. Refut Tilcâ—i ad â—inem yet man is the cause of the same action in another kind God preserves his Creatures in their nature and properties he moves them also and applies them to act or work agreeably to their nature He affords them his concourse and so concurs with them and so immediatly influenceth the action of the Creature with his action that one and the same action is said to proceed from the first and second cause iâ—asmuch as unum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one production or work derives its existence from them both in which work if there be any thing inordinate it is from the action not as it is the Creaâ—ors but as it is the Creatures Thus the Belgick professors Ibid. Thes 13. Paganus If God as the first Cause and Author of Nature to conserve that order and manner of working instituted in second causes at their first Creation doth afford his general concourse * Deus enim â—t Author naturae tenetur se voluntati creaâ—â— paratum praebere ad concurrendum ad opposita ut ipsa uti possit sua naturali libertate Hence they say Actus pravus quatenâ—â— Ens est 〈◊〉 Deo non ut induâ—enâ—e ad illuâ— sed ut non subtrahente suum necessarium concursum volâ—ntati quae dum ad illum se determinat abutitur sua libertate influxu divino in actu primo ad opposita sibi â—blato Et id 〈◊〉 magis proprie dicitur Dâ—us congerâ— voluntati in talem actum causando quaâ— voluntas dicatur coagere Deo Vid. Greg. in 2. d. 34. 37. q 1. ar 3 ad 8. ad opposita that his Creature may have power and liberty to do good or evil and suffer the will of man to determine its self freely to the evil act and then fore-seeing it so determined upon supposition of his concourse doth yield his simultaneous influence to the production of that evil act then it is possible to conceive how a man may avoid sin notwithstanding that Divine influx for in this case man doth abuse his own liberty and the Divine concurse offer'd to him ad opposita and so doth freely determine himself unto the sin when he might do otherwise and God should co-operate with the created will as the Author of nature according to the exigence thereof rather than the will co-operate with God as its first determiner Diotrephes That opinion doth cast fetters * R. B. P. ubi supra p. 27. Hoc unum asserimus hunc concursum quicunque tandem is est male statim subordinatum aut posteriorem influxâ—â— voluntatis in actum suum quia cum Deus non â—sset causa pâ—ima omnium entium sed secunda deinde quia voluntas in primo motus sui initio non dependeret a Deo sed contra Deus a primo initio mortuuâ—â— voluntatis Râ—sp A. Wallaei ad Censur Coâ—vini pag. 103. upon the Divine Liberty and Providence for if mans will doth freely determine itself before the Divine Determination then it would follow that the power and providence of God can dispose nothing till the assent of the created will be expected and first had with which it may concur as a partial cause to produce the effect and so God should not be the first but the second cause of this act and the will should not so much depend upon him as he depend upon the first motion of the will Paganus If God preserves to his rational Creature its natural propriety and manner of working I suppose he doth ordinarily allow it the liberte of a self-determination And I understand not how this should be any derogation to Gods Power or Providence for the Creature still acts not only under the general concourse of his Providence but also under the special egressions of it and God can and doth as it seemeth good to him put in an immediate and extraordinary finger of power to over-rule and order the actions of it the Creature therefore is not exempted from the conduct of his Providence by this means as you pretend Diotrephes We look upon all created beings as so many emanations from the first cause upon which they depend in Ibid. page 2â— esse operari in their being and working as the Rayes depend upon the Sun neither is the intellectual Creature in the actions of free-will exempted from this order * Synops Pur. Tâ—col ubi supra Thes 10. for it is necessary that every Creature and every action of it and every mode and perfection of every action of it be reduced unto God as unto the first most perfect and therefore most effectual cause We conclude therefore That * Mr. Bagshaw Pract. Dâ—sc pag. 3. Our wills are tyed up so close to the will of God that like lesser wâ—eâ—ls they move only as that great mover doth guide them Paganus Methinks this Doctrine should be very apt to tempt men to believe that God doth very much promote and assist them in their most prodigiously sinful courses Diotrephes The Acts of Gods Omnipotency are carefully to be distinguished from his Legislative Acts by these last God alwayes forbids sin but by those former he secretly incites * Deus homines ad suas pravas actiones incitâ—t seduct traâ—it jubâ—t indurat deceptiones immittit quae pâ—ccâ—ta gravia sunt efficit Mart. in Judic 3. 9. men unto it either by moving their wills tongues and members unto sin or else by not moving them to the contrary virtue but withdrawing his grace and necessary assistance whence it comes to pass that they cannot but sin Paganus This makes God the Author of the sinful act and consequently the cause of all sin in the world Diotrephes Though it sounds ill to weak and tender ears yet Mr. Calvin * Instit lib. 1. Cap. 18. Sect. 3. mihi p. 128. hath openly avouched it Satis apertè ostendi saith he Deum vocari corâ—m omnium Authorem quae iâ—ti câ—nsores volunt otioso tantùm ejus permissu contingere I have cleaâ—ly shâ—wed that God is called the Author of all those sins which these censurers would have come to pass only by his idle permission But that we may clear God of all imputation We are taught to distinguish when we speak of sin betwixt the act and the malice Dr. Twiss ubi supra page 73. or betwixt the act which is sinful called by some the materialty and the sinfulness thereof which is called the formality God is the cause of the former but only the permitter of the latter Paganus This permission then by which you endeavour to free God from the imputation of being the Authour and Cause of sin must not be an action by which God makes us to operate but only
to follow Gods example in disposing of his own But God as his own most gracious * Micah 7. 18. nature abhors it so his Law forbids all such intolerable cruelty And as a good man regards the life of his Bâ—â—st * Prov. 12. 10. Jonah 4. 11. so doth our good God too But unto men he is a faithful Creatour 1 Pet. 4. 19. Who will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the Truth 1 Tim. 2. 4. Not willing that any should perish but that all should come to Repentance the end and means too Salvation and Repentance And extendeth the riches * Rom. 9. 22. with chap. 2. 4. of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering to lead them to it And * Hebr. 6. 18. that by two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie we may have a strong consolation in flying for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us He hath confirmed his promise by an Oath Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O House of Israel Gods goodness or equity makes him have a desire to the work iâ— his own hands 'T is Job 14. 15. the extream provocation and incorrigible obstinacy of sinners that makes the Prophet denounce such a fearful doom against some of them Isaiah 27. 11. For it is a people of no understanding therefore he that made them will not have mercy on them and he that formed them will shew them no favour Desolatus Doth God cast off none but such as cast off him first and dâ—spise his goodness See 2 Kings 13. 23. Samaritanus Not a man that I can find according to the Holy Scriptures * Imo divinae dereliction is eae apertissimè designatur ratio quod Deus ab hominibus peius descratur Prov. 1. 24. Theol. M. Britt â—â— 3. 4. Artic. Thes 4. vide sequent inter Act. Syn. Nat. Dord pag. 129. par 2. for so the Lord hath declar'd himself 1. In the Old Testament Prov. 1. 24. to 31. Because I have called and yeâ—r fâ—â—sâ—d I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded but ye have set at naught all my counsel and would none of my reproof I also will laugh at your calamity c. And to the same purpose Ezek. 24. 13. In thy filthiness is 〈◊〉 because I have purged thee and thou wâ—st not purged thou shalt not be purged from thy filthiness any more till I have caused my fury to rest upon theâ— 2. In the new Testament Acts 13. 26. The Apostle addresseth his Ministry unto them in these That the displeasure of God is only against the refractory and disobedient see Heb. 10. 38. 1 Cor. 10. 5. Heb. 3. 17 18 19. expressions Men and Brethren Children of the stock of Abraham and whosoever among you feareth God to you is the Word of this salvation sent And he gives them warning Ver. 40 41. Beware therefore lest that come upon you which is spoken of is the Prophets Behold ye despisers and wonder and perish and because they did despise contradict and blaspheme the Gospel and reject * Luke 7. 30. the Counsel of God against themselves therefore the Apostle took the boldness to tell them Ver 46. It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you but seeing ye put it from you and judge your selves unworhly of everlasting life â—â— we turn to the Gentiles The Talent * Talentum gratiae a Deo semel concessum nemini eripitur nisi qui prius suo vi tio illud sepelivit Matth. 25. 28. Hinc monemur â—â— Spiritum resistamus nâ— Spiritum extinguamus nâ—gratiam Dei frustra recipiamus ne deficiamus a Dâ—o Hebr. 3. 7. Theol. Britt ibid. vide is never taken away till it be first abused or at least neglected hence Hebr. 2. 3. How shell we escape if we neglect so great salvation Reprobation is therefore thus defined by the Learned and Orthodox God 's immutable Decree whereby he hath determined to leave them under wrath for their sin and unbelief and to damn them eternally who will not repent and believe in Christ This Deâ—â—â—iâ—ion is most exactly true if God reprobates such only as he damns and if he doth otherwise there is not an exact conformity betwixt his Decree and the Execution of it which is absurd and the Scriptures express it in See Mark 16. 16. John 3. 36. Acts 13. 46. Rom. 11. 20. every page but especially we may take it from the words of our Saviour Christ John 3. 18 19. He that believeth not is condemned already because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God And his is the cause of condemnation that light is come into the World and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil In which words we have not only the way but the cause also of condemnation propounded viz. unbelief and the love of darkness proceeding from a custom of evil-doing Desolatus My Friend I am afraid you forget your self in this point for you know Divines do distinguish here and make a wide difference betwixt the Decree of Reprobation and the Execution of it Although say they God doth destine whomsoever he please to hatred and destruction without any respect to any quality in them yet he is not unjust because betwixt his Eternal Decree and the Execution of it sin and infidelity are subordinated as the cause for which he justly damns them Samaritanus I remember this distinction very well but I cannot allow it for currant because it doth not free God from injustice for if the execution be therefore just because it supposeth a cause or ground for the infliction of that evil upon man which was destinated to him by the Decree the Decree therefore for the infliction of that evil is unjust because that excludes such cause or ground for if it be not lawful to inflict evil without cause neither is it lawful to will the infliction of it for the injustice we know is not first and principally in the insliction but in the will to inflict for rectitude is primò per se in itself first and chiefly in the will in the execution only by extâ—insecal denomination But 2. If there be such a diversity in the execution from the Decree this Execution is not the Execution of that Decree but something else as was intimated before Besides how is sin subordinated to that Decree and by whom Is it by Almighty God Why then whether that subordination be by a positive or privative action that sin is intended of God as a means inservient to that Execution and this will double the injustice of iâ— for what is this else but first to will
little after he relates that the President advised those who were to undertake this That they should have an eye to the inclination of the Synod and beware as much as might be that they toucht not there where any man was sore Whatsoever the pretence is saith Mr. Hales the mentioning of these Books before the determination of the Synod be formally set down must needs be very unseasonable It will make the world to think they came resolved what to do which though perchance they did yet it is no wisdom to confess it Letter of Feb. 7. 1619. pag. 78 79. I will add but one testimony more which is this of Mr. Belcanqual in his Letters to the Lord Embâ—ssador of Febr. 23. Sess 89. Febr. 22. saith he There were read 57 pages of the R. monstrants Book which concerned their opinion of Reprobation in which they did lay open the harsh opinions of many of our men which unless the Synod do condemn as well as the opinion of the Remonstrants I see not how they can give the world satisfaction touching their indifferency Of Mr. Bâ—ll Letters pag. 12. But the British Divines c. who urged it very vehementâ—y could not so much as get this opinion rejected Nemâ—nâ—m posse plus b nifacere quamfacit Nor this Deum movere hominum linguas ad blasphâ—mandum pag. 39 40. This leads me to my Second Observation viz. That the Provincials were a passionate and factious if not a malitious Party 2. For evidence hereof 1 Consider the temper of some of them and how they flew out into passion beyond all measure especially when any thing was spoken that seem'd to favour the cause of the Remonstrants Upon this accounâ— grew that great animosity of Goma us against Martinius mentioned in Mr. Hales his Letters of Jan. 15 25 1618. pag. 72. and more fully discovered in Mr. Belâ—anquâ—l ' Letters of Febr. 18. pag. 8. where he tells the Lord Embassador In truth I must needs say that some of the Proviâ—câ—aâ—s doâ—use Martinius very uncivilly and all the â—orrâ—iâ—n Dâ—vâ—nes do begin to take it evill at their hands They use him wâ—â—h so much discourtesie as I will assure your Loâ—dship he hath been very near leaving of the Synod and his Colleagues were half purposed to go with him What a blow this would give to the credit of the Synod any man may easily perceive the Pâ—oviâ—cials in this take not the right course Though one be against the Râ—monstrâ—nts in all the five Articles in Sâ—bstaâ—ce yet if hâ—â—ffer from them but in manner of â—â—eakiâ—g they hold him as not sound And in his next Letters of Fâ—â—r 23. pag. 9 10 11. he relates of a plot laid ex composito for â—isgraâ—ing of these Bremenses and how the Brâ—tâ—â—â— Divines drew the indignation of those Provincials upon themselves by interposing though it was doâ—e by the Lord Bishop of Landaff with gravity ond sweetness to â—llay their contentions Insomuch that in his Letters of March 25. pag. 23. he tells the Lord Embassador That Sibrandus and Gomarus keep their fits of madness by course the last fit before this came to Gomarus his turn and this day Sibrandus flew out but with such raving and fierceness of countenance such unheard bitternesse against our Colledge as I desire no other revenge on him than the very speaking of the words which saith he a little after if they had come from a wise mans lips had been above the strength of patience If these men flew out thus passionatly against some of their own Party for their gentleness and moderation which was the onely provocation of their choler what temper may we expect to find them in in their proceedings towards their Adversaries This we may collect from Mr. Belcanqual's Letters of Febr. 13. misplaced amongst Mr. Hales's pag. 60 61. where he reports the matter thus For the Provincials for any thing I can see they are so far set against the Remonstrants I wish not their persons as well as their opinions that I am afraid they will not like well of our Moderation For the Dâ—smission of the Remonstrants since your Lordship is pleased to take notice of it I hope I may without offence say that it was such as certainly did the Synod much wrong On Friday when they seemed to yield then the Exteri Theoâ—ogi could not be heard for the continuing of them in the Synod Nay the trick which was put upon them was a little too palpable For the Delegates had their Decree of Dismission written before they came into the Synod yet our voices were asked hoping it should have been answerable to their Decree but finding it was otherwise without so much as laying their heads together for consultation they published a Decree which they brought written with them into the Synod This was resented so ill by some of the Foreign Divines that when according to the custom repetition was made of the Act for the Remonstrants Dismission Lud. Crosius of Breme which perhaps began their indignation against these Divines signified That he perceived that Mr. Praeses in that business had been paulo commotior and had let slip verba quaeda ac rba which might well have been spared that in so great an act as that was a little more advice and consideration might have been used The Synod ought to have been consulted with and a Form of Dismission conceived and approved of by all which should in the name of the Synod have been pronounced and Registred whereas now the Synod stands indicted of all that unnecessary roughness which then was practised It had stood better with the honour of the Synod to have held a more peaâ—eable and passionless order Mr. Hales his Letters of Jan. 6 16 pag. 64 65. See also pag. 70. and the Letters of Jan. 12 22 And this will not onely lead our way to it but also clear our Third Observation viz. That this Factious Provincial Party 3. swayed matters in this Synod as themselves listed That they were able to do so is evident because they made up two parts of three and so could out-vote the rest at their pleasure and that they did so appears not onely by what is alledged already but also by Mr. Hales his Letters of Jan. 6 16 pag. 64 65. where he saith The forreigners think themselves a little indirectly dealt withal in that it being proposed to the whole Synod to passe their judgment concerning the behaviour of the Remonstrants the Provincials were not at all required to speak and by these means the envy of the whole business was derived upon the Forreigners Whereas on the contrary when the like question was proposed formerly and the Forreigners had spoken very favourably in the Remonstrants behalf the Provincials struck in and established a rigid Sentence against the Forreigners liking So that there is little regard given to the judgment of the Forreigners except they speak as the Provincials would have them This will lead us to our
decreed that I shall or I shall not use the means to escape it So that all the Absurdities that dog the Stoâ—câ—l dream of fatal necessity at the heels are inseparable attendants of this Opinion For I may not onely say If I shall die of the Infection I shall if I shall not die I shall not and therefore I need not use means to avoid it But also if I must use means I must if I must not I must not Seeing Gods decree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means as to obtain or lose the end For if their opinion be true all things whatsoever end or means of little or great moment come to passe necessarily and unavoidably by reason of Gods eternal Decree Here they have two Evasions The first is this A beit say they God hath most certainly determined what shall or what shall not be done concerning us Evasio 1. yet his Decree is hid from us and we must use lawful and ordinary means for the obtaining of such and such good Ends keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealâ—d to us See the vanity of this shift our Opposites teach that whatsoever God hath decreed shall be dâ—ne and whatsoever is omitted Confutatio shall be undone If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means it is impossible for us to use them iâ— he hath decreed that we should it is impossible that we should omit them And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say that although God in his secret will hath determined that we should not do such a thing yet we are to do it seeing his decree though it be sâ—cret yet it will have its effect and it is absolutely impossible we should do that which God hath determined we shall not do Howsoever say our Opposites our opinion is far from Stoicism for the Stoâ—cks thought that all things came inevitably to pass by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of natural Evasion 2. causes but we teach that all events are irresistably necessary by reason of Gods everlasting dâ—crees and His Omnipotency daily executing them This reason is so poor a one and yet so much made on by some worthy men that I am more troubled to wonder at it Confutation than to confute it yet that I may satisfie it distinctly I will divide the opinion of the Stoâ—cks into two particular Tenets 1. They hold that all things come to pass inevitably 2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes Our Opposites stifly maintain the former of these Tenets Now let the Reader observe that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error follow the first part of their opinion though sequestred from the second For if all things come to pass unavoidably what need I care what I do yea if I shall care I shall care whether I will or no and a thousand the like horrid conceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day that all things are done unavoidably and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Maranatha It s too apparent therefore that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence both of Stoicism and Turcism Again if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion we shall perceive that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced but that it will be compleat Stoicism The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events its true but what did they think to be the connexion of causes doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature which they supposed to be a Deity It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws but whatsoever they meant by the Fates its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta Parcarum Leges c. Yea the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree as Edictum from Edicere so Fatum from Fari Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod Deus de unoquoquâ— fatur saith Minutius Well then to apply Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together one necessarily following in the neck of another Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree Do they not defend compleat Stoicism What part of Stoicism do they disclaim Do they not maintain inevitable necessity Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this connexion Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point unless we will give them leave to grant the prezmises and deny the conclusion I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities as accounting those to be Deities which are not whose decrees they made the causes of all things but they were the common errors of Paganism and are beside the point in hand And truly these set aside I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks I have prosecuted this Argument more copiously because it includeth many others I mean all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with against the error of the Stoicks and they are many for I think verily there are few opinions which have a greaâ—er retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences than this of the unavoidable necessity of events Some of them may make one laugh and some of them may make one tremble I omit the former because they are obvious to every mans conceit and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter Of the last sort I will specific one in a second Argument That opinion which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin is gross and erroneous that I may say no worse but so I Arg. 2. speak it with horror doth the Opinion of our Opposites I know they are renowned Christians and as they abhor Stoical errors so they hold this damnable doctrine which is worse than ever any Heretick held which transformeth God into a Devil to be most accursed yet so the case standeth that as the See this Argument confirmed in the Answer to the 4th Objection error of fatal necessity so this of the cause of sin fatally followeth their opinion which I prove thus They teach That nothing is done in the world nor can be done but what God hath decreed to be done Now it 's too certain that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are
Now then God leaving to His creatures free liberty to work or not to work after this or that manner so that for any necessity imposed upon their actions by Him whatsoever they omit was as possible to be done as what they did And yet from all eternity fore-knowing whatsoever his creatures would do or not do his fore-knowledge must needs be infinite and most admirable Infinite I say not in respect of the number of objects for so as I said before no knowledge can be infinite but in respect of the omnipotent and boundless manner of actual comprehending those things with an infallible fore-sight which in respect of God were contingent their not being being as possible as their being And indeed this fore-sight of future contingents is the true character and Royal prerogative of Divine knowledge and Ergo in the 41 of Esay God upbraideth the Pagan Deities with this priviledge peculiar to Himself though juglingly pretended by them in their lying Oracles vers 21. The Lord biddeth them produce Gnatzumotheken the strongest Arguments by which they could prove themselves Gods and in the next verse he particularizeth and thrice bids them tell if they can what shall happen in the times to come It s worth the observing how that there was never any sort of Diviners Artificial I speak not of Devils Witches Gypsies and such palpable Impostors that undertook to fore-tell future contingents for if you prove those things which Astrologers and Physiognomers undertake to foretell to be meer contingent in respect of the Horoscope or Complexion and no way to depend on them as natural causes you have proved their Arts to be but Impostures How much then do our Opposites dishonor God in this case making the great miracle of his foresight of future contingents to be as much as nothing seeing they say that albeit they are contingent in respect of us yet they are necessary in respect of Him When any man hath answered any of these four Arguments then will I change my opinion In the mean time I proceed to the vindicating of it from such exceptions and objections as our enemies in this case make against it The dissipating of those mists wherewith they endeavour to obscure this opinion will not onely clear the truth of it for belief but also the sense of it for understanding First they say That while we avoid their Stoicism as we term Objâ—ct 1. it we fall into flat Epicurism for while we make so many things in the world to fall out according to the inconstant bent of voluntary Agents we Deifie Chance and make Fortune a goddess we do in effect deny Gods providence which they say makes all things come to pass according to a most wise and constant method I will be as forward as any man to Anathematize him whosoever he be who holdeth any thing to fall out fortuito in respect Answ of God I will make it most evident that our opinion makes no Chance in respect of God and most sweetly illustrates Gods Providence First There is a vast difference between Contingency and Casuality Contingency is an equal possibility of being or not being 〈◊〉 Casuality is the coming to pass of an event eximproviso beside the fore-thought as I may say of the thing Now it is our assertion that many things fall out contingently in respect of God because he imposed no necessity upon their being but left them to the pleasure of the inferior causes that they might as well not have been as been But we say withall that nothing falleth out accidentally or casuâ—llâ— in respect of God because nothing cometh to pass without his most certain and unerring foresight he knowing from all eternity what his creatures would do though he left it to their pleasure to do what they list In events there is a great difference between Contingency and Casuality of events in respect of men for most things we do we do contingently we being not bound by any inevitable necessity to do them yet as long as we do them upon certain persuasive reasons for certain ends we do them not by chance The same events yet are not after the same manner contingent in respect of God as they are in respect of us for He out of the Prerogative of His Deity fore-knoweth them but we by reason of our mortality cannot have infallible foresight of them and what foresight we have is in a very little distance And indeed if this point be punctually canvased we shall perceive that in that same proportion we have any knowledge of them they are not contingent but necessary for every thing so far forth as it is in existence or in near preparation for it is necessary Contingency is the middle point between necessity and impossibility of being and therefore so much as any thing inclineth to existence it is necessary The want or neglect of the distinction between contingency and casualty hath been a great cause of the error we confute for our Opposites still taking fortuâ—to and contingenter ☞ for Synonyma because they would have nothing casual in respect of God therefore they would have every thing necessary not discerning the middle path which we walk in between Epicurism and Stoicism Concerning Gods Providence we teach that although according to that ordinary course which we call nature which he 2. hath prescribed for the operation of his creatures in the decree of Creation many things fall out according to the free choice of voluntary Agents no way by Him necessitated yet God is still busie with a double providence The first is universal by this whatsoever natural Agents do contingently He fore-seâ—th most clearly and ordereth it most wisely according to His glory the preservation of the Vniverse and good of His creatures The second is particular by this He puts in oft-times a miraculous finger into such contâ—ngent business as respects his Church and oft-times so worketh the heart of the voluntary Agent that sometimes he doth that which if he had been left alone to himself he would not have done and sometimes is secretly diverted from the doing of that which otherwise he would most willingly and in all likelihood could most easily have done And here our Opposites may please to observe how our opinion is so far from denying particular Providence that it onely maintaineth a Providence properly termed Particular for that particular Providence which our Opposites so much talk of if it be well looked into will appear to be in no better sense particular than the Roman Church is universal They say That there is not any numerical act performed by any creature without an eternal decree from God this they call particular providence Alas this is the general which concerneth all the actions performed by all things or at least one mixt of general and particular As for example Because it raineth to day God so ordering that it should is it any sense to say This rain was by the
particular providence of God unlesse we espied extraordinary matter in it We therefore call that universal providence whereby God directeth whatsoever His creatures do according to their natural propensions for the preservation and good of the Universe We term that particular or speciall providence whereby God interposing his extraordinary power amongst the contingent affairs of Common-wealths or private men sometimes by sensible miracles and prodigies sometimes by His secret omnipotency sensible onely in the Event manifesteth His Mercy or Justice to His own Glory or good of His Church This is properly termed special providence and in this sense it is taken by La Vosino the Italian in his Tract De particulari Providentiâ and by those who have wrote of that subject Well then I will now specifie my faith concerning Gods Providence First it is very probable that petty trivial matters such as are indifferent not onely in respect of themâ—elves but also of their consequences fall ouâ— altogether contingently without any necessitating decree These matters of lesser moment are of three sorts 1. The toys and trifling vanities of voluntary Agents such as the Italians term Badalucii or Ballocametti What a company of idle gestures and sporting tricks use we every day which doubtless for ought God hath decreed we might have as easily omitted 2. The petty consequences of the main actions of natural Agents for example though the main drift and scope of the operations of the Elements and Meteors be according to the method eternally prescribed them by God yet some particular events accompanying their operations some circumstances questionless were not prefixed by a particular decree as now and then it hapneth to rain when the Sun shineth I cannot believe that there 's any special decree concerning this Hear I would have the Reader observe how these events are not so properly called contingent as those other are for they were swayed by no decree either general or special from the middle point between necessity and impossibility of being But these though they are contingent in respect of a particular decree and may as well not be as be for ought God hath precisely determined concerning them yet in respect of the general method prefixed to natural Agents they do necessarily come to pass because their main office cannot be performed without these circumstances and consequences The last sort are mixed of the two former and include all such evenâ—s as result from the contingent concourse of natural 3. and voluntary Agents as when the wind bloweth off ones hat c. to say that God particularly decreed such trifles I think it injurious to the Majesty of His Determinations But here by trifles I mean such matters as I said before which are indiffâ—rent not onely in respect of themselves but also of their consequences I believe that things of greatest moment are done necessarily by the immediate power of God either by swaying men 2ly from their own proper inclinations or by supernatural means quite crossing their enterprises So we read in the Scripture and Church-stories how God hath sometimes quite changed the hearts of men for some great purpose concerning his Church and glory I believe that the middle sort of events in the world such as are neither trivial nor yet extraordinary the ordinary serious 3ly matters which concern Religion Common-wealths the temporal and spiritual good of private men the preservation from confusion c. Of these I say my belief is that though ordinarily men and unreasonable Agents do things contingently yet God doth so manage this contingency daily and hourly interposing His power according to His Mercy or Justice that very few matters of consequence are meerly contingent For example Because I see Marriage for the most part to be either a great curse or a great blessing * This may so happen upon the post-fact I am so far perswaded of the truth of the common saying that I think that Marriages for the most part are made in heaven * Sure Davids was not a Sam. 11. 27. before they are on earth Let a man diligently peruse any story and he shall find many things done ordinarily according to the natural bent of particular persons and so contingently in respect of God and yet let him joyn all things done by all the Actors in the story together let him accurately observe how one thing followeth upon another he shall find that still at the last there will be something from the singer of God manifesting the glory either of His Mercy or Justice If we read the History of the Reformation begun by Luther and other Divines of Germany we shall perceive many things done by the natural humors of men by the guidance of Divine wisdom made admirable furtherances of the Reformation The like may be said of Henry the 8th his Marriage which set most Universities in Christendâ—m a Disputing and the dissolution of Abbers The like indeed may be observed in any History especially if it concern Religion or a Christian Common-wealth for I conceive that Gods Providence is more or less remarkable in a place proportionable to the profession of Religion Let a man but diligently observe the prime passages of his own times let him mark how the chief Actors in them do all things according to their particular bents and private humors yet let him note the upshot he shall perceive that there was some secret guide which directed all to God's glory though men do what they liâ—t according to their own pleasure The best Demonstration of this most usefull and delightfull truth every man might best make to himself if he would but seriously and circumspectly consider the whole course of his own life and mark how whatsoever he hat done out of the absolute freedom of his choice his actions have been turned and winded now and then contrary to his intent now and then beyond it now and then beside it sometimes to his grief sometimes to his comfort always to be examples of Gods Mercy or His Justice he will easily perceive how excellently the Divine Providence worketh upon Contingencies If men would be basied upon such contemplations they would not shuffle away so many good hours with those waking dreams of fantastick solitary discoursings which Charron and others have wisely taxed Here the Reader may see how I suppose some things necessary some things contingent some things mixt by reason of divers circumstances of both kinds by no means undertaking precisely to determine how many things are done contingently or how many necessarily c. Now as we have formerly shewed how our opinion doth most exactly Blazon the Divinity of Gods infinite knowledge by which He simply knoweth all things so also it doth most clearly set forth the honor of His active wisdom by which he governeth all things for to order all things in an harmonious concord to good whatsoever the confused distracted discord of choices in inferior causes produce is a more glorious and superlative
act of wisdom than first to decree how all things shall be done according to certain platforms and to see them effected according to them Yea this conceit though it be Stoicism in it self yet it openeth a greater overture to Epicurism than ours for Ep curus and his fellows believed there were gods but they imagin'd that they incumbred not themselves with the ordering of sublunary matters but suffered matters here below to go for the most part according to the natural and eternal customs Even so if according to the opposite Tenet God hath ab aeterno prefixed an irresistible tenor and method agreeable to which all things should for ever necessarily come to passe God might ab aeterno also from the same instant He made His Decrees let all things alone according to Epicurus his conceit * For our Opposites say Quae Deus decrevit sponte flunnt seeing all things must come orderly to pass by vertue of His Decree though he slept all the while But our Doctrine they say contradicteth the Scriptures our Saviour telleth the Apostles that the hairs of their head were Object 3. numbred that not so much as a contemptible Sparrow falleth without his Father Therefore the pettiest matters in the world are determined by God Himself I remember the Marginal Note indeed in the Protestant Italian Bible upon Matth. 10. 29. upon these words Yet not one of them falleth to the ground without your Father saith thus Che nou'intra venga it decreto ela volenta sua c. i. e. But so that His decree and will came between But this gloss is impertinent The meaning of the place is this Not one of them falleth without Gods privity and permission The scope of our Saviour was to comfort and encourage his Disciples whom he was now sending abroad into the world as sheep among wolves to this purpose he tells them that the hairs of their headwere numbred c. the number of them was known to God without whose permission they could not lose one of them That not so much as a Sparrow falleth without their Fathâ—r c. i. e. without the knowledge and permission of Him who was their loving Father And therefore he bids them not to be afraid seeing if such trifles could not be without Gods permission doubtless God who was their more special observer would not suffer men to meddle with them more than should be for His glory and their good So that it cannot without absurdity be hence concluded that God hath made any speciall decree concerning Sparrows for as St. Paul saith Doth God take care for Oxen so say I Doth God take care for Sparrows Here it is worth the observation that the Arguments for the most part which our Opposites produce for the necessity of all events and their kind of particular providence are such which as one saith Aut nihil concludunt aut nimium conclude either not so much or more than they would have them being much like the garments which were made for the Moon either too big or too little for their conclusions for either they are drawn from particular examples and prove nothing at all as when Calvin proveth that there ariseth no wind without a special decree from God because he caused the South-wind to bring the Israelites Quails and sent the tempest which caused Jonas to be cast into the Sea or else they are deduced out of such reasons and Scriptures which as they handle them prove God to be the Author of sin and so a great deal more than they are willing they should But our opinion may seem to patronize the proud error concerning Object 3. Free-will for if God doth not Necessitate our Actions but leave them to our inclinations so that it is in our power to work or not work we have freedom of will to do or not to do whatsoever we do contingently These words which we do contingently are well put in for we say many things are done contingently in respect of God yet Solution many we say are done by Gods special determination But 't is most certainly true that good duties properly so called to which we are tied pro hoc statu are never performed without choice and freedom Which therefore amongst other priviledges of Christs purchasing are restored under the spiritual Jubilee of the Gospâ—l and instated on us by the holy Ghost as one special part of our Redemption Iâ— the Son make you free then are you free indeed And Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty In answer then to the Objection I say That for our natural actions as eating walking c. I believe that ordinarily we perform them freely and contingently in respect of God Likewise I doubt not but as the antient Heathens Aristides Socrates Cato Fabritius so many now a days perform many things civilly and morally good being left alone * I do not reject the opinion of restâ—ingent grace if it be well expounded to their contingent educations and complexions But for matter of grace and salvation I confess to the glory of God that in us being dead in sins and trespasses dwelleth no good That we cannot so much as think much less do any good unless the holy Ghost giveth us the power both to will and to do it Adam before his fall * The opposite Tenet alloweth not Adam Free will in his innocency as I could easily prove and is partly affirmed already by the third Argument was equally poised between perseverance and defection but he falling by the freedom of his choice lost those perfections which made him free so that if his posterity do anything truly good it is from God not from themselves whatsoever bad they do it is from themselves not from God Here it may be noted that we may do many things contingently in respect of God which yet we do not freely but necessarily in respect of ourselves as our sins are contingent in respect of Him because he never imposed any necessity of sinning upon us yet they are necessary in respect of our selves seeing we being left to our selves cannot but sin So many things which are contingent in respect of our nature may be in some sort necessary in respect of our persons as those things which our complexions or customs and habits necessitate us to But this is an impertinency They say moreover that our opinion contradicteth both Scripture and Philosophy Objâ—ct 4. 1. For Scripture it is said Act. 14. that in him we live move and have our being by which words we are taught that all our motions of what kind soever either natural or moral vital or rational are not onely guided but also caused by God Himself 2. Both in Logick and Metaphysicks there are divers Rules consonant to this Scripture as Causa causae est etiam causa causati causa secunda non agit nisi meta à prim c. Therefore man doth no kind of thing but God