But then we are never the nearer to satisfaction The Question still returns Is Prodence in opposition to common Right such a Gift So that all this while we are but where we were The Dr. gives a Reason For I suppose it is as agreeable to the Sovereignty Wisdom and Justice of God to give a Kingdom to a Violent Vsurper as to suffer a Wicked Impious and Tyrannical Prince to ascend the Throne with a Legal Title which says he God often does Now here are two things to be observ'd 1. God may give a Kingdom to an Usurper if he please as well as he did to Jehu but then when he hath given it him such Gift extinguishes his Usurpation and he justly and honestly possesses it and whatever wickedness he might be guilty of before it is none to wear that Crown which God gives him So that indeed in such a Case God is not a Party to their wickedness but the Reason is not because God permits wickedness with a farther design or because he over-rules it to accomplish his own wise ends but because it is not Wickedness and Injustice 2. What the Dr. brings for a Parallel confutes him God may permit an Impious and Tyrannical Prince to ascend the Throne and he may likewise permit him to ravage and depopulate with a farther design to over-rule them to accomplish his own holy and just purposes But then this does not give God's Authority to his Impious and Tyrannical Acts. And I would fain see a good reason why God's having a farther design in permitting wickedness and over-ruling it gives his Authority to Vsurpation any more than it does to Tyranny And the truth is the Drs. account here furnisheth us with admirable measures of Justice and Righteousness and let us translate this Doctrine to other matters of Providence besides Government and see then how it looks and this we may do by the Drs. allowance for he tells us it is an argument not only against God's making Kings but against Providence in general And therefore I suppose no man will deny but God may give the goods of this world to whom he please he may take them from one and give them to another without injustice the only dispute can be about God's bringing this to pass by the wickedness of men and what hurt is there in this if God can over-rule the violence and rapine of men as to do that in pursuit of their own lusts which God for wise and holy reasons thinks fit to have done suppose a wicked and cunning man spurr'd on by covetousness whom God may permit by fraud and violence to wrong and oppress all his neighbors I ask any man which most becomes the Divine Wisdom to suffer such men when they please to spoil their neighbors only to gratifie their own lusts or to give them success when he sees fit to chastize and punish such persons in their goods or estates I am sure this much more becomes the Wisdom and Justice of Providence than a bare permission of such violence without any farther design And if God may permit such wickedness without being a party to it much more may he over-rule it for wise ends and make them the Executioners of his Justice in punishing wicked people And then why may not God give them those Goods or Estates which he hath taken away by them For I suppose it is as agreeable to the Sovereignty Wisdom and Justice of God to give such Goods or Estates to a violent Robber or Oppressor as to suffer a Legal Proprietor to riot and revel to spend them upon his Lusts and Vices or to make them Instruments of Injury and Injustice And is not this pure Doctrine and admirably suited for the advancement of Righteousness And it is notwithstanding the true state of the Drs. Arguments here for such reasonings extend equally to all Cases of Providence to the Case of private property as well as to that of Crowns and Scepters And the whole Scheme is as applicable to one Case as well as the other The Dr. tells me upon another occasion P. 51. which I here return him he may if he please call this giving account of Providence but I doubt every body else will give it some other name and I hope he himself upon second thoughts will be asham'd of it The Dr. repeats my charge against his interpretation again That it justifies an unreasonable and wicked doctrine Vindic. p. 61. by making the Acts or permissions of Providence a Rule for practice against Right and Justice and says as for Right and Justice it has been consider'd already let us now consider how far the Providence of God may be the Rule for practice It is indeed saith he an impious Doctrine to justifie every action and every cause which has success God many times prospers very evil designs when he can serve any good end by them and therefore to measure the good or evil of things by external success to conclude that it is God's Cause which the Providence of God prospers confounds the differences of Good and Evil and destroys all the standing Rules of Right and Justice Now the Drs. Hypothesis is this very same impious Doctrine For of two Persons claiming the Government who is and who is not King who hath and who hath not a Right to Allegiance That the obligation of an Oath made to the Person of the Governor ceases tho his Person and his Legal Right be still in being That 't is necessary and a duty to take an Oath contradictory to that to another Person all this is purely to be determin'd by Providence without any manner of other Right or Title and contrary to a plain and known Rule acknowledg'd by the Dr. himself and by all the world And if this be not to make external success the measure of Good and Evil and to conclude that to be God's Cause which is prosper'd by Providence I wish the Dr. would tell me what is And if he please likewise to favour me with the Solution of this Question Whether Usurpation be God's Cause if it be whether the Dr. hath any other proof of it besides external success and the Providence of God prospering it if it be not God's Cause what can justifie our swearing to abett support and maintain it So that either the Dr. must maintain this Impious Doctrine that God's Cause is to be measured by Success and Providence or another as impious that we are bound in Conscience to do the utmost to maintain that which is not God's Cause But saith he yet it is so far from being an impious Doctrine that it is a necessary duty to conform our selves to the Divine Providence and to discharge those duties and obligations which the Providence of God lays on us according to the nature and intention of the Providence Now if by the nature and intention of Providence the Dr. means that God by such a Providence intends to lay such duties on us it
one at least of the Church of England on his side but such a one it seems was not to be found and therefore he gives us two Forreigners both learned men indeed but against one there is just exception and the other is not for him Mr. Calvin for any thing I know may be of the Drs. opinion and any man that considers the turbulent State of Geneva at that time and the Revolution there will be able to give a Reason for it and I think there is no great Question but as he suited his Church Discipline so he did his Doctrines about Government to the circumstances of that State And his Doctrine of a power reserved to inferior Magistrates Calv. Inst l. 4. c. ult to restrain and coerce Kings is another instance of it And the one hath just as much Authority as the other And to say no more the Judgment of Mr. Calvin in point of Government hath always been exploded by the Church of England and it is a great evidence the Dr. is very much streightned for Authors when no body but Mr. Calvin can be found to concur with him He might if he had pleas'd have nam'd Dr. Goodwin and it would have done as well But as for Grotius the Dr. interpâ—ets him as he does the Scripture Grotius does say indeed Grot. in Rom. 13.1 That God rules and changes Governments not only by his common Providence by which he leaves many things in their natural order but with Wisdom suited to the advantage or the punishment of the Subjects c. And what then therefore he believ'd the Apostle meant usurped as well as legal Powers or that it is the Law of God that every person possessing himself of the Throne by Providence is a King of God's making and ought to be own'd as such I wonder how he will draw this out of Grotius's words And Grotius himself plainly asserts the contrary De jure belli pacis l. 1. c. 4. Restat ut de invasâ—re Imperii videamus non postquam longa possessâ—ne aut pacto jus nactus est sed quamdiu durat injuste possidendi causa quidem dum possidet actus imperii quot exercet vim latere possunt obligandi non ex ipsius jure quod nullum est sed ex eo quod emnino probabile sit cum qui jus imperandi habet c. Nec minus licebit invasorem imperii interfâ—ere si diserta auctoritas accedat ejus qui jus verum imperandi habet and that when he speaks to the Question ex professo He tells us that an Usurper not after he hath acquired a Right by long possession or agreement but so long as the Reason of his unjust possession remains While he is in possession the acts of Government which he exercises may oblige but not from any Right derived from him which is none but from the presumptive consent of the Right Heir and then puts the Question Whether it be lawful to depose or to kill such an Usurper and in some cases affirms it and among those this is one If it be with the Authority of him whose the Right is whether that Right be in a King Senate or the People And to these saith he we are to reckon the Tutors and Guardians of young Princes as Jehoiada was to Joash when he deposed Athaliah And it is yet more remarkable what he adds Besides these cases I do not think it lawful for a private person to depose or kill an Usurper And for what reason not one single word of the Doctor 's Hypothesis nor any thing like it of his havinâ— God's Authority or being God's providential King but truly from the old beaten reason the presumptive consent of the true King It may so be saith he that he who has Right to the Government had rather leave the Usurper in possessiâ—n than give occasion to dangerous and bloody troubles c. And again likewise speaking of Contracts personal and real the latter of which he says are Leagues and Contracts made with Princes which bind their Successors and People as well as themselves and then adds A League made with a King remains in force altho he or his Successor be driven from his Kingdom by his Subjects and his reason is For the right of the Government is with him tho he hath lost the possession Sane cum Rege initum fâ—edus manet etiamsi rex idem aut successor regno sâ—â—â—itis sit pulsus Jus enâ—m regni pours ipsiâ—m manet utâ—â—â—que posse sâ—mâ—m amiserit contra si alieni regni invasâ—r volente vero rege aut oppr ssâ—r c. beâ—lo impeâ—atur nihil en siet contra foedus c. ibid. lib. 2. cap. 16. And on the contrary if an Usurper or an Oppressor of a free People before he hath a sufficient consent of them be invaded by War the true K. consenting this is no breach of the League because they have only possession but they have no Right And this is the meaning of that which F. Quintius said to Nabis Livy lib. 34. We made no friendship and society with you but with Pelops the just and lawful King of the Lacedemonians And here by the way we have not only the sense of Grotius but a very good Argument likewise for if in real Contracts made with a King as sustaining the person of a supreme Governour if these bound to his person out or Possession and not to the Usurper in Possession it is plain the Prince out of Possession is the King and the Usurper is none for the Contract or League was made with him as King of such a Country and if he ceases to be King the binding power of the Contract ceases as to him for as the Dr. phraseth it the Man is in being but the King is gone and the Contract goes away with it and being real and not personal passes to him that is King But now if such a Contract does not pass to the Usurper nay if it be no breach of it to fight with and to invade him and if it remains with the dispossessed â—rince then he is the King of that Country and the Usurper that possesses his Throne is not And Grotiâ—s says The Qualities in Leagues of Kings and their Successors and the like properly signifie Right and the Cause of an Usurper is odious This Argument will reach a great way and any man may improve it to deâ—ect the fallacy both of the Doctor 's and of some other Arguments But it may be sufficient here to observe that tho the Dr. ciâ—es Grotius and seems to triumph in it yet that he is not for him but directly against him What follâ—ws is extraordinary What saith the Dr. thinâ—s he of Bishop Overal's Conversation were there no learned men in it and yet they 〈◊〉 this Doctrine before John Goodwin was thought of What kind of Argument does the Dr. call this This is the thing in controversie and the Dr.
this The Dr. says that to reconcile it to our Author's Hypothesis the removed King must signifie an Vsurper and the King set up a Rightful and Legal King Now if the Dr. can make this out from my Hypothesis I will give him the Cause He tells me He doubts not but our Author would be asham'd to say this And he is in the right I should be asham'd to say that and a great many other things too but it seems he is not asham'd to charge that upon my Hypothesis which is a direct contradiction to it My Hypothesis as he repeats it and disputes against it is that an Vsurper is no King and therefore the Removing a King cannot according to that Hypothesis signifie the Removing an Usurper but of a Rightful King i. e. a true King not a pretended one but then I think it follows that the setting up of Kings must signifie the setting up of true Kings likewise and not Usurpers who are not Kings And this I do insist upon and it is not a strife about words and let the Dr. prove if he can that an Vsurper is a King either in the sense of Scripture or in any good Author or by the general consent of mankind And if he cannot then for him to interpret what the Scripture says of Kings in favor of Usurpers is purely arbitrary and he may as well apply the Directions and Precepts of Scripture concerning Husbands to him that commits a Rape For an Usurper is no more a King than a Ravisher is a Husband And here is the plain state of the Case The Scripture asserts and if the Scripture had been silent the Doctrine of Providence sufficiently evidences that God removes Kings and sets up Kings And this proves that what Kings are remov'd they are remov'd by God and what Kings are set up they are set up by God But this does not prove that those are Kings which are not Kings or that Vsurpers are within the intention of those words or that every Providential Dispossession is God's unmaking a King or every Providential Possession of the Throne is God's making a King for this was manifestly otherwise in the Case of David and Absalom Joash and Athaliah and if the Dr. please in the Case of King Charles the Second and Cromwell And â—his Answer the Dr. had before if he would but have minded it However when Persons have Possession of the Throne Postscript p. 12. who have a Legal Title either by Descent or other Acquisition and who are Kings by the consent of all mankind it is plain that God sets them up And it cannot necessarily be concluded that any more is meant by God's setting up Kings and if it cannot necessarily be concluded then there is not from thence any sufficient warrant to call every Vsurper God's King and to pay Duties to them accordingly But saith he this is evidently the Prophet's meaning to attribute all the Changes and Revolutions of Government not to Chance or Fate but to the Divine Providence Well this is true enough whether the Prophet meant it or no. The Dr. adds That whenever we see one King removed and another set up whoever they be they are removed and set up by God And this is true enough as the words lye but in the Drs. sense it is manifestly false for the people saw David remov'd and it was by God also but God by that Removal did not give away his Kingdom they saw Absolom set up too and this also in a sense was by God but God by that setting up did not make him a King and give him the Kingdom But saith he who God ruleth in the Kingdom of men and giveth it to whomsoever he will Does whomsoever signifie those only who have a Legal Right Does giving suppose an antecedent right in him to whom it is given Does giving it to whomsoever he will signifie giving it only to those whom the Laws give it Do we use to say a man may give his Estate to whom he will when his Estate is entail'd and he cannot alienate it from the Right Heir we should think this a very absurd way of speaking among men and yet thus our Author must expound God's giving a Kingdom to whomsoever he will to signifie his giving the Kingdom to the Right Heir Now here are as many Sophisms as there are lines and first of all I do readily acknowledge that whomsoever does not signifie those only who have a Legal Right but the fallacy is evident for God gives all the World as well as Crowns to whomsoever he will But for all that no body hath a right to private Estates but by the Laws of the Land And it would be a fine Plea in Westminster-Hall to argue upon God's Donation by Providence Another man hath a Legal Title but God gives the World to whomsoever he will and tho he hath no Legal Title what then Does whomsoever signifie those only who have a Legal Title Thus likewise giving in the notion of it does not suppose an antecedent Right but with respect to God's giving and a Right by Humane Laws it does for God gives Property to them who have such a Right and he does not give it them who have no such Right tho they may possess it by fraud and injustice But here the fallacy lys in dividing what ought not to be divided for what is given by just Laws God gives and the antecedent Right is the Gift of God and what God gives by Laws which he hath made a Rule is not to be defeated by Providence which he hath not made a Rule He asks again Does giving to whomsoever he will signifie giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it I answer no it does not signifie so neither does it signifie Possession only But this I can tell him it signifies every jot as much so in Kingdoms and Governments as it does in private Possessions and Estates And the Proposition in Scripture is as universal that God gives every thing all the Profits Honors c. in the World to whomsoever he will or if it was not in Scripture it is a Doctrine plain enough and every man that owns Providence must own it And it is a pure consequence that every man who is unjustly possessed of an Estate hath a Divine Right to it tho not a Legal one because forsooth giving it to whomsoever he will does not signifie giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it It is in vain here for the Dr. to answer as he does often in his Vindication Vindic. p. 58. That those matters are refer'd to the Redress of publick Laws but these God reserves to his own cognizance and disposal For the Question here is about the importance and signification of these Expressions And here his Questions turn upon him Does whomsoever signifie those only who are redress'd by Publick Laws Does giving signifie only a Sentence of a Judg or the Verdict of a Jury
conceives a Good Thing without presently being guilty of Schism and the Seven Deadly Sins So that to disswade men from the Oath especially when not asked is that which he means by Faction or else his Paragraph is inconsistent with it self And as to Faction in this kind I tell him again that never is a very long time And a man that makes such a bold assertion had need be sure of his own memory before he charges other mens inventions Well! But the Doctor is now for owning that he was Henry and Zealâ—us against taking the Oath And are not these pure Characters of Zeal never to make it our business to disswade men by all fair ways from what we are Zealous against and never to perswade them to what we are Zealâ—us for I woâ—der what he means by Zeal it is indeed opposed to Faction but it is opposed likewise to Coldness and Indifferency And which is yet more remarkable he says in the same Preface that he wished he could have done taken the Oaths as others did This is an extraordinary instance of Zeal to be Zealous against what we think an Ill Thing and at the same time wish we could do it He says he thought it an Ill Thing and a few Line after tells us he wished he could take it This is such a Zeal as never was heard of Does Zeal against a thing use to shew it self in wishes and desires towards it This is an Argument of great insincerity but very little Zeal so that whatever the Dr. may speak of his Zeal and Warmth to stop an Objection which could not otherwise be avoided it is plain enough that he took all care to represent it as little as possible and he hath given such a cold and languid account of his management while he was engaged against the Oath That any man that is not blind or prejudic'd may plainly see that his whâ—le design was to râ—present himself as low and indifferent as he was able and by palliating and diminishing methods to recommend himself to one Cause by pretending such a flatness and unconcernment as would make wise men suspect he was not very sincere in the other He adds Whereas tho there had been a material perjury a different opinion may excuse from formal perjury Vindic. p. 80. for no man is formally perjur'd who does not know it I shall not explain this by instances for if our Author is for writing Secret Histories I am not so at present This is dark and mysterie and so it must remain 'till the Doctor explains it He seems to insinuate that he knows some body or other who have taken an Oath against their Consciences and it mâ—y be so for any thing I know Both he and the Author of the Letter to him are very angry and plevish with me for charging them with Rebellion and Perjury Vindic. p. 72. altho there is not the least word of it in my Book and the Doctor knows what construction the World has always made Lett. p. 32. when men are careful and solicitous to obviate an accusation which was never made against them As for his Parting and Conclusion I have only this to observe That the Doctor hath the modestest way of ending his Books that ever I saw His Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity and his Doctrine of Self-consciousness he ends thus I am pretty confident he will never be able to reason to any purpose in this Cause again Altho he hath given his Adversary the greatest Advantage and instead of vindicating hath mightily prejudic'd that Article of the Christian Faith by clogging it with New Notions and which in a settled State of the Church would hardly have escap'd Ecclesiastical Censure His Case of Allegiance concludes with hoping he may satisfie them those not of his mind that he hath something to say for himself a Meiosis very great considerable unanswerable And he ends his Vindication with telling me if I will promise to examine his Arguments well before I answer he shall expect to hear no more from me And yet a man would be apt to imagine that false Reasonings Artificial Shifts and Distinctions plain and downright Contradictions in the Premises were an unequal foundation to support so much Triumph and Glory in the Conclusion However the Doctor finds he is mistaken he hath heard from me again But whether I have examin'd his Arguments well I shall leave to the Reader 's Judgment and to the Doctor 's Examination FINIS