well apprehended and to teach us what we ought to think of Treatises which are written upon this Subject After all these precautions I believe I may say that all the Passions may be referr'd to the three Primitive ones Desire Joy and Sorrow and that 't is chiefly through the different Judgments the Soul makes of Good and Evil that those which relate to one and the same Primitive Passion differ amongst themselves I may say that Hope Fear and Irresolution which keep the Mean between these two are kinds of desire that Boldness Courage Emulation c. relate more to Hope than to the other two and that Fearfulness Cowardise and Jealousie c. are kinds of Fear I may further say that Cheerfulness and Glory Favour and Acknowledgment are kinds of Joy caused by the sight of the good we discover in our selves or in those to whom we are united as Laughing and Rallery is a sort of Joy which is commonly excited in us at the sight of the Evil which happens to our Enemies Lastly disgust tediousness regret pity and indignation are kinds of sorrow caused at the sight of something which displeases us But besides these Passions and many others which I mention not and which particularly relate to some one of the Primitive Passions The number of the Passions is greater than the number of terms we express 'em by there are also many others whose emotion is almost equally compound either of Desire and Joy as Impudence Anger Revenge or of Desire and Sorrow as Shame Regret and Despight or of all three when we meet with Motives of Joy and Sorrow joined together But altho' these last Passions have not as I know of any particular Name they are nevertheless the most common because in this Life we hardly ever enjoy any Good without the mixture of some Evil and that we scarcely ever suffer any Evil without some hopes of being delivered from it and of possessing some Good And altho' Joy be quite contrary to Sorrow it nevertheless admits it and even with his Passion shares the Souls capacity of Willing as he prospect of Good and Evil divides the Souls capacity of perceiving All the Passions therefore are kinds of Desire Joy and Sorrow and the chief difference to be observed between the Passions of the same kind proceeds from the different Perceptions or different Judgments which cause or accompany them so that it is necessary to enquire into the different Judgments that we make of Good and Evil. But as our chief design here is to search after the cause of our Error we ought not so much to stop at the examining the Judgments which follow them and which the Soul makes of Objects when it is agitated by any Passion for 't is these last Judgments which are the most liable to Error Those Judgments which precede and cause the Passions are commonly false in something for they are generally upheld upon the perceptions of the Soul in as much as it considers things in relation to it self and not according as they are in themselves But those Judgments which follow the Passions are false in every respect for the Judgments which form the Passions are upheld only upon the perceptions the Soul has of Objects in relation to it self or rather in relation to its emotion In those Judgments which precede the Passions both the true and the false are joined together but when the Soul is agitated and Judges of every thing according to the inspiration of the Passion the true is dissipated and the false preserved from whence are drawn so many more false conclusions as the Passion is greater Every Passion justifies it self they continually represent to the Soul that Object which affects it after such a manner as is most proper to preserve and encrease its agitation The Judgment or Perception which causes it is fortified in proportion as the Passion encreases and the Passion encreases ini proportion as the Judgment which produces it is in its turn fortified False Judgments and Passions continually contribute to their mutual preservation So that if the Heart ceased not sometimes to supply such Spirits as are proper to maintain the traces of the Brain and the distributions of the same Spirits which are necessary to preserve the sensation and emotion of the Soul which accompanies the Passions they wou'd continually encrease and we shou'd never discover our Errors But as all our Passions depend upon the fermentation and circulation of the Blood and as the Heart cannot always furnish such Spirits as are requisite for their preservation they must necessarily cease when the Spirits diminish and the Blood cools If it is so very easie to discover the common Judgments of the Passions we ought not to neglect it There are few Subjectys more worthy the application of those who enquire into the Truth and endeavor to deliver themselves from the dominion of their Bodies and who wou'd judge of all things according to the true Idea's of them We may instruct our selves upon this Subject two different ways either by reason only or by the internal sensation that we have of our selves when we are agitated with any Passion For instance we know by our own Experience that we are inclined to judge disadvantageously of those we love not and to discover all the malignity of our hatred by that means to the Object of our Passion We may also by pure Reason discover that hating only what is Evil it is necessary for the preservation of hatred that the Mind shou'd represent its Object on the worst side for indeed it is sufficient to suppose all the Passions justify themselves and that they divert the Imagination and afterwards the Mind in such a manner as is fit to preserve their own emotion that we conclude what those Judgments are which all the Passions cause us to make Those who have a strong and lively Imagination are extreamly sensible and very subject to the Motions of the Passions may perfectly instruct themselves in these things by the sensation they have of what passes within them and even speak of them after a more agreeable manner and sometimes more instructive than those who have more Reason than Imagination For we must not think that such as best discover the Springs of Self-love that penetrate farthest and after a more sensible manner unfold the secrets of Man's heart are always the most Learned 'T is indeed often a mark that they are more lively more imaginative and sometimes more malicious than others But those who without consulting their internal Sensation only make use of their Reason to discover the Nature of their Passions and what they are capable of producing if they are not always as penetrating as others they are always more reasonable and less subject to Error for they judge of things as they are in themselves They see very near what the Passions can perform according as they suppose them more or less moved and they do not judge rashly of
fortifie its emotions that the least suspicion frightens and disturbs the Reason False Zealors think they do God service when they submit to their Passions they blindly follow the secret motions of their Hatred as proceeding from the Internal Truth and stopping with satisfaction at such sensible proofs as justifie their excess they confirm themselves in their errors with an unconquerable obstinacy As for Ignorant and Weak Persons they create to themselves ridiculous and imaginary subjects of fear and like Children who walk in the dark without a guide they imagine frightful Bugbears are disturb'd and cry out as if they were undone light re-assures them if they are ignorant but if Men have weak Minds their imagination is always disturbed The least thing which relates to that frightful Object renews the traces and course of the Spirits which causes the symtom of their fear so that 't is absolutely impossible to cure or appease them for ever But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind it continually produces such unjust and violent Judgments in it that we cannot think on 'em without horror To change the Mind possessed with these Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul and to cure it would be absolute impossible if we could set bounds to the Mercy and Power of God Those who walk in the dark rejoyce at the appearance of light but this Man cannot endure it since it hurts him because it resists his Passion His fear being in some manner voluntary because 't is produced by his hatred he loves to be affected by it since we love to be agitated by those Passions which have Evil for their Object when the Evil is imaginary or rather when we know as in Tragedies that the Evil can't hurt us The Phantoms that these form to themselves who walk in the dark vanish at the approach of light But this Man's Phantoms cannot be dissipated by the light of the truth for instead of dissipating the darkness of his Mind it only incenses his imagination so that whilst he applies himself to the Object of his Passion the light reflects and it seems to him as if these Phantoms had real Bodies since they reflect some weak rays of light which strike upon them But if we should suppose in these Persons a sufficient docility and reflection to make 'em listen to and apprehend such Reasons as are capable of dissipating their Errors yet their imagination being disordered through fear and their Hearts corrupted through hatred and false zeal these Reasons how solid soever they might be in themselves would not be able long to stop the impetuous motions of these violent Passions nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing proofs For we must observe that there are some Passions which never return again whereas there are others that are constant and durable Those which are not maintained by the sight of the Mind but only produced and fortified by the sensible view of some Object and the fermentation of the Blood continue not but commonly die immediately after they are produced But those which are attended with the contemplation of the Mind are lasting for the Principle which causes them is not subject to change like the Blood and Humours So that Hatred Fear and all the rest of the Passions which are stirr'd up or preserved by the knowledge of the Mind and not by the sensible sight of some Evil must necessarily subsist long These Passions are therefore more durable violent and unjust but not more lively and sensible as has already been shown The perception of Good and Evil which excite the Passions is produced three several ways by the Senses Imagination and the Mind The perception of Good and Evil by the Senses or Sensation of Good and Evil produces the quickest and most sensible Passions Good and Evil perceived by the Imagination only excites them after a much weaker manner and the perception of Good and Evil by the Mind purely never produces true ones because it is always attended with some motion of the Animal Spirits The Passions are given us only for the good of the Body and by that to unite us to all sensible things for although sensible things can be neither good or bad in respect to the Mind they are so however in relation to the Body to which they are united Thus the Senses discovering much better the relation that sensible Objects have to the Body than the Mind it self can They must excite much more lively Passions than a clear and evident knowledge is able to do But because all our discoveries are attended with some motion of the Spirits a clear and evident knowledge of a great Good and great Evil which is not perceived by the Senses always excites some secret Passion Yet all our clear and evident discoveries of Good and Evil are not followed by some sensible Passion which we perceive and so on the other side all our Passions are not attended with some knowledge of the Mind For if we sometimes think of Good and Evil without feeling our selves moved we often find our selves moved with some Passions without knowing what they are nay sometimes without perceiving the cause of ' em One who breaths in a good Air feels a motion of Joy without knowing from whence it proceeds or what good 't is he possesses which causes this Joy And if there is any invisible Body which mingles with the Blood and hinders its fermentation it will produce sorrow and perhaps he will attribute the cause of his sorrow to any visible thing which occurs in that moment of his Passion Of all the Passions none are more sensible or more quick and consequently less attended with the knowledge of the Mind than horrour and antipathy agreeableness and sympathy It sometimes happens that a Man sleeping under a shady Tree would of a suddain and unexpectedly be waked at the sting of a Gnat or tickling of a Leaf even as if he were bitten with a Serpent The confused Sensation of something as terrible as death frights him without perceiving that he is agitated with a most powerful and violent Passion which is an aversion of desire On the contrary a Man in some necessity by chance discovers a small good the satisfaction of which surprizes him and he applies himself to this trifle as to the greatest good imaginable without making the least reflexion upon it The like also happens in the motions of sympathy and antipathy We sometimes see a certain Person whose habit and external appearance has some secret alliance with the present disposition of our Body we are forthwith touched with a vehement inclination for him and without any reflexion are induced to love and wish him well 'T is this I know not what which agitates us since Reason has no share in it And the contrary happens in respect to those whose Air and Manners excite disgust and horrour in us They have I know not
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
and gives us Motion and Life nor is it that which covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers and which supplies us with Food and Nourishment This Philosophy teaches us with the Scripture that it is God only who gives Rain and regulates the Seasons who gives Nourishment to the Body and fills the Heart with Joy Acts 14.15 16. Ergo nihil agis ingratissimè Mortalium qui te negas Deo debere sed naturae quia nec natura sine Deo est nec Deus sine natura sed idem est utrumque nec distat Officium si quod à Seneca accipisses Annoeo te diceres debere vel Lucio Non creditorem mutares sed nomen Seneca l. 4. Of Benefits c. 8. Ego Dominus non est alter formans lucem creans tenebras faciens pacem creans malum Ego Dominus ficiens omnia haec Isa 45.7 Amos 3.6 That he only is capable of doing us good and thereby has given us a perpetual Testimony of what he is although in Ages passed he has permitted all Nations to walk in their own ways According to the Language of this Philosophy we must not say That it is Nature that fills us with Good nor that it is God and Nature together But that it is God alone speaking thus without Equivocation that we may not deceive the Simple For we must distinctly acknowledge him the onely Cause of our Happiness if we would make him the onely Object of our Love 'T is likewise an undoubted Truth That we ought to fear such Things as are able to hurt us and fear them in proportion to the Evil they can do us But this Philosophy tells us That it is God alone that can do us Evil that it is he as Isaiah says who creates Darkness as well as Light who makes peace and creates Evil and even that no Evil happens but from him according to the Prophet So that it is him alone we ought to fear We must not fear either Plague or War Famine our Enemies nor even Devils themselves but God alone We ought to fly a Sword when ready to wound us shun Fire and avoid a House that is likely to fall upon us yet must not fear these Things We may fly such Bodies as are Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil but we must fear only God as the True Cause of all Evils and Misfortunes and only hate Sin which necessarily provokes the Cause of all our Happiness to become the Cause of all our Evils And in short all the Motions of our Minds ought to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to it and the Motions of our Body may relate to those about it This is what we learn from that Philosophy which admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes But this Efficacy being supposed I cannot see but we have some reason to fear and love Bodies And that to regulate our Love according to Reason it is enough to prefer God above every Thing else the First and Universal to Second and Particular Causes Then it is not necessary to love God with all our strength Ex totâ mente ex toto corde ex tota anima ex totis viribus at the Scripture says Yet when we content our selves with preferring God to all other Beings and adore him with a Love of Esteem and Preference without continually endeavouring to honour and love him in all Things it often happens that we deceive our selves that our Charity is dissipated and lost and that we are more taken up with Sensible than the Soveraign Good For if the greatest Sinners and it may be even Idolaters were asked If they preferred not the universal to particular Causes They would not perhaps be afraid in the midst of their Debauches and Extravagancies to Answer That they failed not in so Essential a Duty and knew very well what they owed to God I confess they would deceive themselves but take away the Efficacy of Second Causes and they will have no probable pretext to Justifie their Conduct And if it be supposed they may say this for themselves when their passions blind them and they listen to the Testimony of their Senses Since I am made to be happy I neither can nor ought to forbear loving and respecting whaterver may be the Cause of my Happiness Why therefore should I not love and respect Sensible Objects since they are the True Causes of the Happiness I receive in their Enjoyment I acknowledge the Supream Being is alone worthy of our highest Adoration and I prefer him to every Thing but not seeing that he requires any Thing of me I enjoy the Goods he has given me by the means of Second Causes to which he has subjected me and I pay no Acknowledgments to him which perhaps would dishonour him As he does me no good immediately and by himself or at least without the Assistance of the Creatures it is a sign he does not require my Mind and Heart should be immediately applied to himself or at least he is willing that the Creatures should divide with him the Acknowledgments of my Heart and Mind Since he has communicated a part of his Power and Glory to the Sun has surrounded him with Brightness and Majesty Established him Supream over all his Works and 't is by the Influence of this Great Luminary that we receive all the Necessary Goods of Life Why should we not then employ a part of this Life in enjoying his Light and testifying the sense we have of his Greatness and Benefits Would it not be the utmost Ingratitude to receive the Abundance of all Things from this Excellent Creature and have no Sentiment of Gratitude for it And would it not likewise be an unaccountable blindness and stupidity to have no Motion of respect and fear for him whose absence freezes us to death and who by approaching too near us may burn up and destroy us I say it again that God is preferable to all Things that we must esteem and love him infinitely more than the Creatures but that we must also love and fear them For thereby we honour Him who made them merit his Favours and oblige him to bestow New Benefits upon us It is plain he approves of the Honour we pay his Creatures since he has communicated his Power to them and all Power merits Honour But as Honour ought to be proportioned to Power and that the Power of the Sun and all Sensible Objects is such that from them we receive all sorts of Goods it is just we should honour them with all our strength and next to God consecrate our whole Being to them Thus we naturally reason when we follow the Prejudice we have received from the Efficacy of Second Causes 't is probably after this manner that the first Authors of Idolatry reasoned Here is what he thought of it who is esteemed the most Learned of the Jews He thus begins a Treatise he
viz. Joy Desire and Sorrow For we have Joy when a Good is present or an Evil past We feel Sorrow when Good is past and Evil present and are agitated with Desire when Good and Evil are to come The Passions which regard Good are particular determinations of the motion which God gives us towards Good in general and therefore their object is real But others who have not God for the cause of their motion terminate only in nothingness CHAP. X. Of the Passions in particular the manner of explaining them in general and of discovering the Errors of which they are the cause IF we consider how compound the Passions are we shall plainly discover that their number cannot be determined and that there are many more of them than we have terms to express The Passions do not only draw their differences from the various Combinations of the three first for then there wou'd be but a few of them but their difference proceeds likewise from the different Perceptions and different Judgments which cause or accompany them The different Judgments which the Soul makes of Good and Evil cause different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently create such Sensations in the Soul as are not absolutely alike Thus they are the cause as we have observed of the difference between certain Passions whose emotions resemble each other However the emotion of the Soul being the chief thing which occurs in each of our Passions it is much better to refer them all to the three Original ones in which these emotions are very different than to treat of them confusedly and without order in relation to the different perceptions that we may have of the Good and Evil which causes them for we may have so many different perceptions of Objects in relation to time to our selves to what belongs to us in relation to Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or the choice of our Will that it is absolutely impossible to make an exact enumeration of them When the Soul perceives a Good which she may enjoy we may perhaps say she hopes for it altho' she desires it not But it is plain this Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment So that 't is the emotion which accompanies the Idea of Good the possession of which we judge to be possible which makes this Hope to be a true Passion When Hope is changed into Security 't is still the same thing it is not a Passion only because of the emotion of Joy which is then mixt with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being likely to fail of it is a Passion only because the foresight of Good agitates us In short when Hope diminishes and Despair succeeds it it is also plain that this Despair is a Passion only because of the emotion of Sorrow which is then mixt with this Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being able to happen is not a Passion except this Judgment agitates us But because the Soul never considers Good or Evil without some emotion and even without some change happen in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment which produces this Passion because we confound whatsoever passes in the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil for the words Hope Fear Rashness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Regret in short the Names we commonly give to all the other Passions are short expressions whereby we can expalain in particular whatever the Passions include By the word Passion we understand the view of the relation that any thing has with us the emotion and sensation of the Soul the shaking of the Brain and motion of the Spirits a new emotion and new sensation of the Soul and in fine a sensation of Complacency which always attends the Passions and makes them agreeable All these things we mean by it But sometimes by the Name of Passion we only understand either the Judgment that excites it or the emotion of the Soul or the motion of the Spirits and Blood or something else which attends the emotion of the Soul To abridge Idea's and their expressions is a very useful thing in the knowledge of Truth yet it is often the cause of some great Error when these Idea's are abridged through Popular Custom for we must never abridge our Idea's but when we have made them clear and distinct by a great application of Mind and not as we commonly do by the Passions and all sensible Things when once we have made them famillar by Sensations and the meer action of the Imagination which deceives the Mind There is a great deal of difference between the pure Idea's of the Mind and the sensations or emotions of the Soul The pure Idea's of the Mind are clear and distinct but difficultly made familiar whereas on the contrary the sensations and emotions of the Soul are very famillar but impossible to be discern'd clearly and distinctly Numbers extension and their Properties we clearly know but before we have made them sensible by some Characters which express them 't is difficult to present them for whatever is abstracted affects us not Sensations and the emotions of the Soul on the contrary are easily represented to the Mind altho' we only know them after a very confused and imperfect manner and all the terms which excite them strongly agitate the Soul and render it attentive From whence it happens that we often imagine we very well apprehend such Discourses as are absolutely incomprehensible and when we read certain descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we perswade our selves that we understand them perfectly because we are livelily touched with them for all the words we read agitate the Soul We have no sooner pronounced the words Shame Despair Impudence but it as soon stirs up in our Minds a certain confused Idea and obscure Sensation which strongly applies us and because this Sensation is very familiar and represented to us without any trouble or effort of the Mind we perswade our selves that it is clear and distinct Yet these words are the Names of compounded Passions and consequently the abridged expressions that vulgar Custom has made of many confused and obscure Idea's As we are obliged to make use of such terms as are approved by Custom so we must not be surprised to find obscurity and sometimes a kind of contradiction in our words And if we reflected that the sensations and emotions of the Soul which answered to the terms we make use of in the like Discourses are not perfectly the same in all Men because of their difference dispositions of Mind we shou'd not so easily condemn others when they are not of our Opinions I don't say this so much to prevent the Objections which may be made against me as to make the Nature of the Passions be
of the Mind from God and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it like the Body since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy Thus to be acquainted with Truth to know things that are the most agreeable or consonant to the Rules of Virtue is to know God himself The Mind is as it were placed between God and the Body Good and Evil between what instructs and blinds it regulates and disorders it what can make it perfect and happy and what can make it imperfect and miserable When it discovers any Truth or sees things as they are in themselves it sees them in the Idea's of God that is by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them For as I have before intimated the Mind of Man does not in it self include the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of considering 'T is not the Universal Being and therefore does not see in it self such things as are distinct from it by consulting it self it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing it self for 't is neither its own Perfection nor Light it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to and possesses God in some manner But we cannot only say that the Mind which is acquainted with Truth does in some manner know God who includes it but we may likewise add That in part it knows things as God himself knows them for the Mind knows their true Relations and God knows them also the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them God sees them likewise by the same means For in short God neither sees nor imagines but perceives in himself as he is the Intellectual World the Material and Sensible one which he has created It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination Sensations and Phantoms only represent false Relations to the Mind and whoever discovers the Truth can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which God himself sees it for this Material and Sensible World is not intelligible of it self The Mind then sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly thô it sees them but imperfectly and in that respect very differently from what God sees them So that when the Mind discovers the Truth it is not only united to God but possesses and beholds him and in one sense sees the Truth as God himself does Likewise when our Love is regulated by Virtue we love God for when we love according to these Rules the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him and is neither diverted by Free-will nor changed into Self-love The Mind then does only with the greatest freedom follow this impression that God gives it and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him since he only acts for himself It is evident that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue we love God But 't is not only to love God 't is also to love as God does who only loves himself and his Works because they relate to his Perfections and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections And indeed 't is the same love whereby God loves himself and whatever he has created To love according to the Rules of Virtue is to love God only and to love God in every thing is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness In short 't is to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself for 't is that love by which God loves himself and whatever relates to him which animates us when we love as we ought to do And therefore we then love as God loves It is then evident that the knowledge of Truth and regulated love of Virtue produces all our Perfections since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God and even lead us to the enjoyment of him as much as we are capable in this life And on the contrary the blindness of our Minds and irregularity of our Inclinations are the cause of all our imperfections being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body as I have before proved in shewing that we never discover the Truth nor love the true Good when we follow the impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions Tho' these things are so evident yet Men who ardently desire to perfect their Being take very little pains to encrease their union with God but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explain'd The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it it makes him more perfect and at the same time more happy Yet it does not always happen so I confess 't is impossible that the Mind shou'd actually possess any good and not be actually more perfect but it may actually enjoy a good without being made more happy by it Those who are best acquainted with the Truth and have the greatest love for the most amiable good are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder yet are they not always actually more happy It is the same thing in respect to Evil it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect it does not always make them more unhappy or at least it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter and Vice sweet and agreeable so that 't is chiefly through Faith and Hope that good Men are truly happy whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights It ought not to be thus 't is true but so it is Sin having caused this disorder as I have shew'd in the preceding Chapter and 't is this disorder that is the chief cause not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds Our Imagination is by this disorder perswaded that the Body may be the good of the Mind for Pleasure as I have many times intimated is the Character or Sensible Mark of Good and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments are those which we imagine we receive from the Body Wherefore without much reflexion we judge that Bodies may be and even truly are our Good And 't is so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to resist the Proofs of Sensation that we never so much as think of it We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes That the Mind cannot immediately or of it self
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
is accompanied with a greater number of Accessory Ideas or that the Good or Evil are more Circumstantiated in respect to us If we remember what has been said of the connexion of Ideas and that in all great Passions the Animal Spirits being extreamly agitated stir up in the Brain all the Traces which have any relation with the Object which affects us we shall find that there are an infinite number of different Passions which have no particular name and which we can no way explain but must confess they are inexplicable If the Original Passions which compose the rest were not capable of more or less we should have no difficulty in determining the number of all the Passions but the number of those Passions which are produced by the complication of others must necessarily be infinite because the same Passion having infinite degrees it may by joining it self with others be infinitely complicated So that perhaps two Men were never moved by the same Passion if by the same Passion we understand the collecting together of all equal Motions and like Sensations which at the presence of any Object is stirred up in us But as the more or less do not alter the Species so we may say that the number of Passions is not infinite because the Circumstances which accompany the Good or Evil may be limited But let us explain our Passions in particular When we see any thing the first time or when we have many time seen it attended with certain Circumstances we are surprized and admire at it if we afterwards see it appear in another manner Thus a new Idea or a new Connexion of old Ideas begets in us an imperfect Passion which is the first of all and which I name Admiration I call this Passion imperfect because it is neither excited by the Idea nor Sensation of Good The Brain being then shaken in certain places which never were before affected or after a manner that is perfectly new the Soul is sensibly touched with it and consequently strongly applies it self to whatever it finds new in that object for the same reason as a simple tickling at the Soles of the Feet excites a most lively and moving Sensation in the Soul rather through the novelty than the force of the impression There is yet other Reasons for the Souls applying it self to Novelties but I have explained them where I spoke of Natural Inclinations We here consider the Soul in relation to the Body and according to this relation 't is the emotion of the Spirits which is the Natural Cause of its application to new things In Admiration strictly taken we consider things only as they are in themselves or according to their appearances and not as they relate to us or as they are good or bad And therefore the Spirits diffuse not themselves through the Muscles to give a proper disposition to the Body to pursue good or avoid evil nor agitate the Nerves which goes to the Heart and to the rest of the Bowels to hasten or delay the fermentation and motion of the Blood as it happens in the rest of the Passions All the Spirits go towards the Brain there to trace a lively and distinct image of the surprizing object that the Soul may consider and know it again But the rest of the Body continues in the same posture and as if it were immoveable For there being no emotion in the Soul there is also no motion in the Body If what we admire appears great the admiration is always followed with Esteem and sometimes with Veneration But on the contrary it is always accompanied with Contempt and sometimes Disdain when it appears little The Idea of Greatness produces a great motion of Spirits in the Brain and the trace that represents it is preserved a long time A great motion of Spirits likewise excites the Idea of Greatness in the Soul and strongly fixes the Mind on the consideration of this Idea But the Idea of Littleness creates in the Brain but an inconsiderable motion of the Spirits and the trace which represents it does not continue long Also when the Spirits are but little moved they cause in the Soul an Idea of Meanness and stays the Mind but a very little in the consideration of this Idea These things deserve to be well observed When we consider our selves or any thing which is united to us our Admiration is always attended with some Passion which moves us But this agitation is only in the Soul and in the Spirits which go to the Heart because there being no good that it makes us seek after nor evil that it makes us shun the Spirits are not dispersed through the Muscles to dispose the Body to any action The thoughts of the perfection of our Being or of any thing belonging to it naturally produces Pride the esteem of our Selves contempt of others Joy and some other Passions The prospect of Grandeur produces Haughtiness that of Power Generosity or Boldness and the sight of any other advantagious quality naturally produces some other Passion which will be always a kind of Pride On the contrary the foresight of some Imperfection of our Being or of any thing which belongs to it will naturally produce Humility contempt of our selves respect for others sorrow and some other Passions The prospect of Poverty creates meanness of Spirit that of weakness Timerousness and thus the sight of any disadvantageous quality naturally produces a Passion which will be a kind of Humility But this Humility as well as that Pride is properly neither a Virtue nor a Vice They are both of 'em only Passions or involuntary Motions which are nevertheless very useful to civil Society and even absolutely necessary in some occurrences for the preservation of the Life or Goods of those who are actuacted by them It is necessary for instance to be humble and timerous and even outwardly to testifie the disposition of our Minds by a respectful and modest Air when we are in the presence of a Person of Quality or of a proud and powerful Man For 't is commonly advantagious for the Good of the Body that the imagination should submit at the sight of sensible Grandeur and that it should give it external Marks of its Humility and inward Veneration But this is Naturally and Mechanically performed without the Will 's having any share in it and often even notwithstanding all its Resistance Even Bruits themselves have need of it as Dogs to prevail with those they live with have their Machine composed after such a manner that they assume such an Air as they ought to have in relation to those about 'em as is absolutely necessary for their preservation And if Birds or any other Animals have not a fit disposition of Body to give 'em this Air 't is because they have no occasion to asswage those the effects of whose Anger they can avoid by flight and without whose help they can preserve their lives It cannot be too much considered
into the same Errors because they fill their Minds with a great number of such Truths as have more lustre than power and are fitter to dissipate and divide their Minds than to fortifie it against Temptation whereas unlearned and ignorant Persons are faithful in their Duty because they make some great and serious Truth familiar to them which fortifies and upholds them in all Occurrences CHAP. IX of Love and Aversion and of their principal kinds LOve and Aversion are the first Passions which succeed Admiration We do not long consider an object without discovering the Relations it has to us or to something that we Love The object that we Love and to which consequently we are united by Love being almost always present to us as well as that which we actually admire our Mind without any pain or great reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations they have to each other and to us or else it is naturally advertized of 'em by the preventing Sensations of Pleasure and Complacency And then the motion of Love we have for our selves and the object that we Love extends it self unto that we admire if the relation that it immediately has with us or with any thing we are united to appears advantagious to us either by Knowledge or Sensation Now this new motion of the Soul or rather motion of the Soul newly determined being joined to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this new motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Love But if we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the union or relation of the object we admire is disadvantageous to us or to any thing we are united to Then the motion of Love that we have for our selves and for what is united to us is limited in us or carried towards it and follows not the sight of the Mind nor employs it self on the object of our Admiration But as the motion towards good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints in the Soul carries us towards what we know and feel to be so because what is intelligible and sensible is good in it self We may say that the resistance which the Soul makes against this natural motion that draws it away is a kind of voluntary motion which terminates in Nothingness Now this voluntary motion of the Soul being joyned to that of the Spirits and Blood That we may not be mistaken in respect to what I here call voluntary Motion it is requisite to read the first explanation upon the first Chapter and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Aversion This Passion is absolutely contrary to Love yet is never without Love It is wholly contrary because this separates I should only perplex the thought if I spoke whatever related to it to satisfie some difficult Persons and that unites The former has Nothingness for its object and the latter always some Being whereby 't is excited Aversion refists natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas Love yields to it and makes it victorious But it is never separated from Love for if evil which is its object is taken for a privation of good to fly evil is to fly the privation of good that is to incline towards good and so that to hate the privation of good is to love good it self But if evil is taken for Pain and the aversion of Pain is not an aversion of the privation of Pleasure since Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure it is not therefore the privation of it but the aversion of Pain being the aversion to some inward Misery we should not have this aversion if we had not love Indeed evil may be taken for whatever causes Pain in us or deprives us of good and then aversion depends upon the love of our selves or of something to which we wish to be united Love and Hatred are then the two Mother Passions and opposite to each other but Love is the first chief and most Universal Being also since the Fall so far removed and separated from good as we are and looking upon our own being as the chief part of every thing we are united to we may in one Sense say that the motion of Love which we have to all things is only a consequence of Self-Love We love Honours because they raise us above others Riches because they defend and preserve us Our Relations Prince and Country because we are interested in their preservation The motion of love that we have for our selves extends to every thing that relates to us and to whatever we are united For 't is even this motion which unites and diffuses if I may so say our Being into those which encompass us in proportion as we discover by Reason or discern by Sensation that 't is advantageous to be united to them So that we must not think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the cause and rule of all other Loves but that most Loves are only kinds of Self-Love For when we say a Man loves a new object we must not think that a new motion of love is produced in this Man But rather that knowing that this object has some relation or union with him he loves himself in that object and by a motion of Love as old as himself For indeed without Grace there is only Self-Love in the Heart of Man For the love of Truth Justice and even of God himself and every other Love that has been in us from the first Inftitution of Nature is ever since the fall the Sacrifice of self-love We doubt not nevertheless but the most wicked and barbarous Men as Idolaters and even Atheists themselves are united to God by a Natural Love and of which consequently Self Love is not the cause By Love they are united to Truth Justice and Virtue They praise and esteem good Men and 't is not because they are Men that they love them but because they see good qualities in them which they cannot avoid loving since they cannot hinder themselves from admiring and judging them aimable Thus we love something else besides our selves but Self-Love is always predominant over all other loves Men abandon Truth and Justice for triffling Interests and if by their natural Powers they hazard their Lives and Fortunes to defend oppressed innocency or any other occasion They are induced by little else than Vanity and to make themselves considerable by the apparent possession of some Virtue which all the world reverences They love Virtue and Justice but never when 't is against themselves They may love them when they agree but never when they are opposite to their Interest for they can never without Grace gain the least conquest over Self-Love There are also many other natural
God only because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil For they cannot hate Good considered as such So that 't is by the same motion of love that God imprints on them to Good that they Hate him Now they judge that God is not Good because they make not that use as they ought of their liberty Not being convinced by an undoubted evidence that God is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently Hate him We must distinguish two things in Hatred the Sensation of the Soul and motion of the Will The Sensation cannot be bad For 't is a modification of the Soul which Morally speaking has neither Good nor Ill in it For the motion it is not ill neither since it is not distinct from that of Love For external Evil being only a privation of Good it is evident that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to incline towards Good So that whatever there is of real and positive in the Hatred even of God hath nothing bad in it And the Sinner cannot hate God but by making an abominable abuse of the action that God continually gives him to induce him to love himself God causes whatever we have that is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence This Explanation relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence As the difficulties that are raised about Concupiscence have much relation to those things I have explained it will be proper for me here to show that God is not the Author of Concupiscence altho' he performs all things in us and 't is only he who produces even sensible Pleasures in us It seems undoubted to me that we ought to grant for the Reasons I have given in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that following the Natural Laws of the union of the Soul and Body Man even before Sin was carried by a foresight of Pleasure to the use of sensible Goods and that every time that certain traces were formed in the chief part of his Brain certain thoughts were produced in his Mind Now these Laws were very just for the Reasons brought in the same Chapter This supposed as before the Fall all things were perfectly well regulated so Man had necessarily a power over his Body that he cou'd hinder the formation of these traces when he wou'd for order requires that the Mind shou'd govern the Body Now this power of Mans Mind over his Body consisted strictly in that according to his desires and different applicacations he could stop the communication of the Motions which were produced in his Body by those Objects that were about him over which his Will had not an immediate and direct power as it had over his own Body I dont see how we can conceive that after any other manner he coud hinder the traces from being formed in his Brain Thus the Will of God or general Law of Nature which is the true cause of the communication of Motion wou'd on certain occasions depend upon Adams Will for God had this respect for him that he produced not new Motions in his Body if he consented not to them or at least in the chief part of it to which the Soul is immediately united Such was the Institution of Nature before Sin Order requires it so and consequently he whose Will is ever conformable to Order Now this Will continuing always the same the Sin of the first Man has overturn'd the Order of Nature because the first Man having Sinned Order woud not permit him absolutely to rule over any thing In the Objection of the 7th Article of the Explanation of the 7th Cap. of the 2d l. I explain what I speak here in general of the loss that Man sustain'd as to the power he had over his Body It is not just that the Sinner shoud suspend the communication of Motions that the Will of God shou'd be accommodated to his and that in favour of him there shoud be exceptions in the Law of Nature So that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends upon his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions in consequence of his most Just Law who united both parts of which he is composed Thus formal Concupiscence as well as formal Sin is nothing real It is in Man only the loss of that power he had of suspending the communication of Motions on certain occasions We must not admit in God a positive Will of producing it This loss that Man has sustained is not a Natural consequence of the Will of God which is ever conformable to order and always the same 't is a consequence of Sin which has made Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence and Justice So that we must say that God is not the cause of Concupiscence but only Sin Yet whatever is real and positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence is performed by God Aug. against the two Epistles of the Pel. l. 1. cap. 15 c. for God effects whatever is done but that is no Evil 'T is by the General Law of Nature 't is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce certain Motions in the Body of Man and that these Motions excite certain Sensations in the Soul useful for the preservation of the Body or propagation of the Species who dares then say that these things are not good in themselves I know very well that we say Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures we say it but do we know it Can we think that Sin which is nothing shou'd actually produce something Can we conceive nothing to be a Cause However we say it but it may be the reason is because we will not take pains enough to think seriously upon what we say or else it is because we will begin an Explication which is contrary to what we have heard persons say who it may be spoke with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Understanding Sin is the cause of Concupiscence but it is not the cause of Pleasure as Free-will is the cause of Sin without being the cause of the Natural Motion of the Soul The pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its motion or love and there is nothing good that God does not The rebellion of the Body and malignity of Pleasure proceeds from Sin as the inclination of the Soul to or its acquiescence in a particular good comes from the Sinner But these are only privations and nothings that the Creature is capable of All Pleasure is good and even in some manner makes him happy that enjoys it at least whilest he enjoys it But we may say that Pleasure is Evil because instead of raising the Mind to him that causes it it happens through the errour of our Mind and corruption of our Heart that it
abases it towards sensible Objects which seem to cause it It is Evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently deserve to be punish'd rather than rewarded to oblige God in pursuance of his Primitive Will to recompence us with agreeable Sensations In a word for I will not repeat here what I have already said it is Evil because God now forbids it since it alienates the Mind from him for whom it was made and preserv'd for that which God ordain'd to preserve the Righteous Man in his Innocence now establishes the Wicked Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely ordain'd as the easiest and most obvious expedient to teach Man without diverting his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the Bodies about him these Sensations I say at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fix him on Objects incapable of acting and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he occasionally enjoys from them THE SECOND EXPLANATION OF THE First Chapter of the First Book Where I say That the Will cannot differently determine the Impession it has towards good but by Commanding the Understanding to represent some particular Object to it WE must not imagine that the Will commands the Understanding otherwise than by its desire and motions for the Will has no other Action Neither must we believe that the Understanding obeys the Will in producing in it self the Ideas of those things which the Soul desires For the Understanding does not Act It only receives the Light or the Ideas of Objects by the necessary union it has with him who includes all Beings after an intelligible manner as we have explained it in the Third Book See the Explanation of the 6th Chapter of the 2d Part of the 3d Book This then is the whole Mystery Man participates of the Soveraign Reason and Truth discovers it self to him proportionally as he applies himself to it and prays it The desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer which is always granted for it is a Natural Law that the Ideas should be so much the more present to the Mind as the Will desires them with the more fervency Thus provided the Capacity we have of thinking or our Understanding be not filled with the Confus'd Sensations we receive by means of what passes in our Body we never desire to think on any Object but the Idea of the said Object is immediately present to us and as experience it self teaches us the said Idea is the more present and clear according as our desire is stronger and that the confused Sensations we receive by the Body are weaker and less sensible as I have already observ'd in the preceding Remark Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to present some particular Object to it I only meant that the Soul which would consider that Object with attention draws near unto it by its desire because this desire pursuant to the efficacious Will of God which is the inviolable Law of Nature is the cause of the presence and clearness of the Idea which represents that Object I could not express my self otherwise nor explain my self as I do now since I had not as yet proved that God alone is the Author of our Ideas and that our particular Wills are the Occasional Causes of it I spoke according to the common Opinion and I have often been forced so to do because all things cannot be said at one and the same time Readers must have Equity and trust for some time in order to be satisfied for none but Geometricians can always pay in ready Coin AN EXPLANATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER Where I say That it is no Wonder we have no Evidence of the Mysteries of Faith since we have not so much as Ideas of them VVHen I say that we have no Ideas of the Mysteries of Faith Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur De Trinitate B. 7. Ch. 4. Cum quoeritur quid tres Magnâ prorsus inopiâ humanum laborat eloquium Dictum est tamen tres Personae non ut illud diceretur sed non taceretur In the same place B. 5. Ch. 9. it is visible by what precedes and what follows that I speak of the clear Ideas which produce Light and Evidence and by which we have a Comprehension of the Object if I may so speak I grant for Instance that a Peasant could never believe that the Son of God was made Man or that there are Three Persons in the Godhead unless he had some Idea of the union of the Word with our Humanity and some notion of Person But if those Ideas were clear we might by applying our selves to them perfectly apprehend those Mysteries and explain them to others they would no longer be ineffable Mysteries The Word Person according to St. Augustin has been spoken of the Father of the Son and of the Holy Ghost not so much clearly to explain what they are as not to be silent upon a Mystery which we are oblig'd to speak of I say here that we have no Ideas of our Misteries as I have said elsewhere that we have no Ideas of our Soul because the Idea we have of our Soul is not clear no more than that of our Mysteries Thus this Word Idea is Equivocal I have sometimes taken it for whatever represents to the Mind any Object whether clearly or confusedly I have taken it yet more generally for whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind But I have also taken it for that which represents things to the Mind in so clear a manner that a Man may discover at first fight whether such or such Modifications belong to them Therefore I said sometimes that we had an Idea of the Soul and sometimes I have denied it It is difficult and often tiresom and disagreeable to keep too rigorous an exactness in our Expressions since it is sufficient to make our selves understood When an Author only contradicts himself in the Mind of those who Criticise upon him and who are desirous he should contradict himself he needs not much value it and if he should undertake by a tedious Explanation to solve whatever the malice or ignorance of some Persons might urge against him he would not only make an ill Book but moreover the Readers would be displeased at his Answers to his Objections that would be contrary to a certain Equity which all Men pretend to For Men hate to be suspected either of Malice or Ignorance and commonly Men are not allowed to answer weak and malicious Objections until they are actually made whereby the Readers are secured against the reproach which such Answers seem to charge those with who exact them AN EXPLANATION OF These Words of the First Chapter This being granted we must say that Adam was not induced to the Love of God
easily when it has a Spherical Figure than when it has a Cubical one But the Figure of a Body is different from its Motion and it may be Spherical and stand still It is true Spirits are not like Bodies they can feel no Pleasure without being in Motion because God who only makes and preserves them for himself moves them continually towards Good But this does not prove that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion for two things though different may always meet together Finally I answer That though Pleasure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul that which the first Man felt in the use of the Goods of the Body did not incline him to love those Bodies Pleasure inclines the Soul towards the Object which occasions it I grant it But it is not the Fruit which we eat with Pleasure which occasions that Pleasure in us Bodies cannot act in the Soul and make it in any measure happy God only can do that 'T is through Error we fancy that Bodies have that in them which we feel by their means Adam was not so stupid before his Fall as to imagine that Bodies occasion'd his Pleasure Therefore the Motion which accompanied his Pleasures did not move him towards Bodies If Pleasure contributed towards the Fall of the first Man it was not by causing that in him which it now causes in us It is only the taking up or dividing the Capacity he had to think it blotted or diminished in his Mind the Presence of his real Good or of his Duty Objection against the Sixth Article WHat likelihood is there that the immutable Will of God should have depended on the Will of Man and that in favour of Adam Exceptions should have been made in the general Law of the Communication of Motions Answer At least it is not evident that there can be no such Exceptions But it is plain that immutable Order requires that the Body should be subject to the Mind and it were contradictory to believe that God neither loves nor wills Order In the Explanation which relates to the Nature of Ideas I shall explain more particularly what Order is and why God loves it necessarily For God necessarily loves his Son Therefore it was was necessary before the fall of the first Man that Exceptions should be made in his Favour in the general Law of the Communication of Motions This perhaps may seem abstruse but here is something that is more sensible Man though a Sinner has the Power to move and stop his Arm whenever he pleases Therefore according to the different Volitions of Man the Animal Spirits are determin'd to produce or stop some Motions in his Body which certainly cannot be done by the general Law of the Communication of Motions Thus the Will of God being still at this very time subject to ours why might it not have been subject to Adam's If for the advantage of the Body and for the sake of Civil Society God stops the Communication of Motions in Sinners why should he not have stopt it in favour of a Just Man for the Good of his Soul and for the Preservation of the Union and Society he had with him for God had only made Man for himself As God will have no Society with Sinners he has taken from them after the Fall the power they had to leave as it were the Body to unite themselves to him But he has left them the Power to stop or change the Communication of Motions in reference to the preservation of Life and Civil Society because he was unwilling to destroy his own Work having even before he had form'd it designed according to St. Paul to restore it and reform it in Jesus Christ Objection against the Seventh Article MAN still conveys his Body at this time where he will he moves as he pleases all the parts of it the motion of which is necessary for the prosecution and avoiding of sensible Good and Evils And consequently he stops or changes every moment the Natural Communication of Motions not only in things of small Consequence but also in things which are of no use for Life or Civil Society and even in Crimes which ruine Society shorten Life and dishonour God in all respects God Wills Order I grant it But does Order require that the Laws of Motion should be violated for Evil and remain inviolable on the account of Good Why should not Man have the Power to stop the Motions which sensible Objects produce in his Body since those Motions hinder him from doing good from drawing near to God again and from returning to his Duty and still have the Power to do so much evil with his Tongue his Arm and with the other parts of the Body the Motions of which depend upon his Will Answer To answer this Objection we must consider that Man having sinn'd was to return to his Original Nothingness For being no longer in order nor in a possibility to return to it he ought to cease to exist God loves nothing but Order See the 5th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation a Sinner is not in Order Therefore God does not love him Sinners then cannot subsist since Creatures only subsist because God will have them to be and God will not have them to be unless he loves them Neither can a Sinner restore himself to Order because he cannot justifie himself and whatever he can suffer cannot attone for his Offence Therefore he ought to be reduced to nothing again But whereas it is unreasonable to think that God should make a Work to annihilate it or to put it yet into a worse condition it is evident that God would not have made Man nor permitted his fall which he had foreseen had he not had in view his Sons Incarnation in whom all things subsist and by whom the Universe receives a Beauty Perfection and Greatness worthy the Wisdom and Power of its Author We may then consider that Man after his Sin is without a Restorer but under expectation of one If we consider him without a Restorer we see clearly that he can have no Society with God that he cannot have the least power in himself to draw near unto God again that God must needs repulse and use him ill when he pretends to leave the Body to unite himself to him That is to say that Man after Sin must lose the power of freeing himself from sensible Impressions and Motions of Concupiscence Moreover he ought to be annihilated for the reasons abovesaid But he expects a Restorer and if we consider him under that expectation it is plain he must subsist together with his Posterity out of which the said Restorer is to come and therefore it is necessary that Man after his fall should still retain the power of moving diversly all those parts of his Body whose motions may be useful towards his preservation It is true Men continually abuse that Power they have
Jesus Christ or the Word of God of his Divinity does not yet so throughly darken the Mind as to hide from it this Truth that God Wills Order Thus whether the Wills of God make Order or suppose it we clearly see when we examine our selves that the God whom we worship cannot do that which evidently appears contrary to Order So that Order willing our Time or duration of Being should be for him who preserves us that all the Motion of our Heart should continually tend towards him who continually impresses it upon us that all the Powers of our Soul should only labour for him by vertue of whom they act God cannot dispense with the Commandment which he gave us by Moses in the Law and which he repeated by his Son in the Gospel Mark 12.30 Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind and with all thy strength But because Order wills that every righteous Person should be happy and every Sinner unhappy that every Action conformable to Order and every Motion of love towards God be recompenced and on the contrary it is evident that every one who will be happy must continually tend towards God and with horrour reject every thing that would stop his Course or diminish his Motion towards his True Good 'T is not necessary that for this he consult a Spiritual Guide for when God speaks Men should be silent and when we are absolutely certain that our Senses and Passions have no part in the Answers which we hear inwardly we must alwayes hearken respectively to these Answers and submit to them Would we know whether we should go to a Ball or a Play Whether we may in Conscience spend a great part of the day at Gaming or unprofitable Entertainments Whether certain Businesses Studies Employments are conformable to our Obligations Let us enter into our Selves let us silence our Passions and Senses and see the Light of God if we can for his sake do such an Action Let us interrogate him who is the Way the Truth and the Life to know if the Way we follow does not lead to Death and whether God being essentially Just and necessarily obliged to punish every Thing that is contrary to Order and to recompence every Thing that is conformable thereto we have reason to believe we go to encrease or assure our felicity by the Action we are about If it be our Love to God that carries us to the Ball let us go thither if we should play to gain Heaven let us play Day and Night if we have in sight the Glory of God in our Employ let us encrease it let us do all Things with Joy for our Recompence will be great in Heaven But if after having carefully examined our Essential Obligations we discover clearly That neither our Being nor duration are of us that we do an Injustice which God cannot but punish when we endeavour to spend our Time in vain If our Master and Lord Jesus Christ who has purchased us by his Blood reproaches our Infidelity and Ingratitude after a very clear and intelligible manner for living after the Flesh and the World for leading a Soft and Voluptuous Life and for following Opinion and Custom let us obey his voice and not harden our Hearts let us not seek for Guides that soften these Reproaches embolden us against these Menaces and who obscure this Light with agreeable Clouds which hurt and penetrate our very Soul When the blind lead the blind they both fall into the ditch sayes the Gospel but if the Blind Man who suffers himself to be lead fall with him that leads him if God does hot excuse him will he excuse him who sees clearly and yet suffers himself to be lead by the Blind because this Blind Person leads him agreeably and entertains him in the way according to his inclinations These voluntary Blind ought to know that God who never deceives does sometimes permit these Seducers to punish corrupted Hearts who seek Seducers that Blindness is a punishment of Sin although 't is often the Cause thereof and that 't is just that he who would not hearken to Eternal Wisdom which only speaks to him for his good should leave him at length to be corrupted by Men who deceive so much the more dangerously as they flatter him more agreeably It is true 't is difficult to enter into ones self to silence ones Senses and Passions and to discern whether 't is God or our Body who speaks to us for we often take the Proofs of Sensation for evident Reasons and then 't is necessary to consult Guides but 't is not alwayes necessary to consult them For we see our Duty on many occasions with the utmost evidence and certainty and then it is even dangerous to consult them if it be not done with an entire Sincerity and a Spirit of Humility and Obedience for these Dispositions oblige God not to permit us to be deceived or at least in no very dangerous manner When 't is necessary to consult a Guide we must choose one who understands Religion who reverences the Gospel and who knows Man We must take care that the Converse of the World has not corrupted him that Friendship has not made him too Complaisant so that he may either fear or hope any thing from us We must choose one among a thousand sayes St. Theresia who as she relates of her self had like to have been lost by the defect of an ignorant Guide The World is full of Deceivers I say Religious Deceivers as well as others Those who love us seduce us through Complaisance those who are below us flatter us through Respect or Fear those who are above us consider not our Necessities either through Contempt or Negligence Besides all Men counsel us according to the relation we give them of what passes in us and we are never wanting to flatter our selves for we insensibly cover our Sore when we are ashamed of it We often deceive those who direct us that we may deceive our selves for we suppose our selves safe when we follow them They guide us whither we have a mind to go and we endeavour to perswade our selves in spight of our Light and the secret reproaches of our Reason that 't is our Obedience which determines us We deceive our selves and God permits it but we never deceive him who examines our Hearts and though we shut our Ears as much as we can against the voice of inward Truth we sufficiently feel by the reproaches of this soveraign Truth which leaves us to our selves that it inlightens our darkness and discovers all the subtleties of self-love 'T is therefore evident that we must consult our Reason for the Health of our Soul as our Senses for that of our Body and when Reason answers not clearly we must necessarily have recourse to Guides as we would to Physicians when our Senses fail us but this must be done with discretion for Guides
Pain would not differ from Hatred Now it is evident that Pain is different from Hatred since Pain often subsists without Hatred A Man for instance who is hurt without observing it suffers a real and cutting Pain but is free from Hatred for he does not so much as know the Cause of his Pain or Object of his Hatred or rather the Cause of his Pain not being worthy of Hatred it cannot excite it in him Thus he hates not this Cause of his Pain although his Pain inclines him to or disposes him to hate it It is true this Man hates his Pain for Pain deserves Hatred but the hatred of Pain is not Pain but only supposes it The hatred of Pain is not worthy of Hatred as Pain On the contrary 't is very agreeable for we please our selves in hating Pain as we are displeased in suffering it Pain therefore is not Hatred nor is Pleasure which is opposite to Pain Love which is opposite to Hatred Consequently the Pleasure which precedes Reason is not the same thing as Love And I likewise prove that the Joy or Pleasure which follows Reason is also distinct from Love As Joy and Sorrow are directly opposite If Joy was the same thing as Love Sorrow would not differ from Hatred But it is plain that Sorrow is different from Hatred for Sorrow sometimes subsists without Hatred For instance A Man finds himself by chance deprived of such things as he has need of This is enough to cause Sorrow but it cannot excite Hatred in him either because he knows not the Cause which deprived him of these necessaries or else that this Cause not being worthy of his Hatred it could not stir it up in him It is true this Man hates the privation or the good that he loves but it is plain that this kind of Hatred is properly Love For he hates the privation of good only because he loves the good And since to fly the privation of good is to incline towards good it is evident that the motion of this Mans Hatred differs not from that of his Love Thus his Hatred if he 's possest of any not being contrary to his Love and Sorrow being always opposite to Joy it is plain that his Sorrow is not his Hatred consequently Joy differs from Love In fine it is manifest when we are sorrowful 't is because of the presence of something we hate or rather the absence of something we love Thus Sorrow supposes Hatred or rather Love but is very different from both these things I very well know St. Austin affirms that Pain is an a version which the Soul conceives because the Body is not disposed after such a manner as it wishes and that he often confounds Delectation with Charity Pleasure with Joy Pain with Sorrow Pleasure and Joy with Love Pain and Sorrow with Aversion or Hatred But 't is very probable that this Holy Doctor spoke all this according to the general Language amongst the common sort of Men who confound the greatest part of those things which pass within them at the same time Or it may be he had not examined these things after a very exact and Philosophical manner However I believe I may and ought to say that it appear'd requisite to me exactly to distinguish these things if we would clearly and without equivocation explain many Questions which St. Austin has treated on For even those who have contrary Opinions amongst themselves have been accustomed to maintain them from the Authority of this great Man because of the different Sense his Expressions may be taken in which is not alwayes exact enough to reconcile such Persons who perhaps have more mind to dispute than agree A N EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book Concerning the Efficacy attributed to Second Causes EVer since the Fall the Mind of Man is continually imployed upon External Objects he even forgets himself and him who penetrates and inlightens him and suffers himself after such a manner to be seduced by his own and the Bodies about him that he expects in them to find his Perfection and Happiness He who alone is capable of acting in it now hides himself from our Eyes nor are his Operations performed after a sensible manner and although he produces and preserves all Beings the Mind which eagerly seeks the Cause of all things finds much difficulty to discover him although it meets with him every moment Some Philosophers have chose rather to imagine a Nature and certain Faculties as the Causes of those Effects we call Natural than to give God all the Honour which is due to his Power And although they have no Proof nor so much as a clear Idea of this Nature and these Faculties as I hope I have shown they choose rather to speak without knowing what they say and to respect a Power purely imaginary than to make any endeavour to discover the hand of him who performs whatever is done in all things I cannot forbear believing that one of the most deplorable consequences of Original Sin is our having no more gust nor sensation for God or that we perceive him not or meet him but with a kind of horrour and fright We ought to acknowledge God in all things be sensible of his Strength and Power in all Natural Effects admire his Wisdom in the marvellous Order of the Creatures and in a word adore fear and love only him in all his Works But there is now a secret opposition between Man and God Man finding himself a Sinner hides himself flyes the Light is apprehensive of meeting God and chooses rather to imagine in the Bodies which are about him a Power or blind Nature which he can make familiar to himself than to meet there the terrible Power of a Holy and Just God who knows and performs all things I confess there are many persons who by a different Principle than that of the Heathen Philosophers pursue their Opinion about Nature and Second Causes But I hope we shall discover by the consequence of this Discourse that they are of this Opinion only through a received prejudice which it is almost impossible to deliver themselves from without the assistance that may be drawn from the Principles of a Philosophy which has not alwayes been sufficiently known For it is probably this which has hindered them from declaring in favour of an Opinion which I have thought my Duty to maintain There are many Reasons which keep me from ascribing to Second or Natural Causes a strength power or efficacy to produce any thing whatever but the chief is because I cannot even conceive this Opinion What endeavours soever I make to comprehend it I cannot find in my self an Idea which represents to me what this Strength or Power can be which they attribute to Creatures And I believe that I should not make a rash Judgment if I affirm that those who maintain that Creatures have in themselves this Strength and Power
to fight against himself but because he designed to make use of this shocking of Bodies as an occasion to establish the general Law of the communication of Motions by which he foresaw he might produce an infinite number of admirable Effects For I am perswaded that these two Natural Laws which are the most simple of all Viz. That all Motion inclines to put it self in a right Line And That in the time of concurrence Motions are communicated in proportion to the magnitude of the Bodies which are shockt are sufficient to produce the World as we see it at this day I mean the Heavens the Stars the Planets Comets Earth and Water Air and Fire In a word the Elements and all inorganized or inanimate Bodies For organized Bodies depend upon many other Natural Laws which are wholly unknown to us It may be also that animate Bodies are not formed like others by a certain number of Natural Laws For 't is very probable they were all formed at the Creation of the World and that by time they only received that growth which was necessary to make them visible to our eyes Let it be how it will 't is certain they receive this growth from the general Laws of Nature according to which all other Bodies are formed upon which account their growth is not alwayes regular I say then that God by the first Natural Law positively will'd and consequently produced the Collision of Bodies and that he afterwards made use of it as an occasion to establish the second Natural Law which regulates the communication of Motions and that thus the actual shock is a Natural or Occasional Cause of the actual communication of Motions If we consider this well it will be visibly discovered that nothing could be better ordered But supposing God had not ordained it thus and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to hit each other as if there were a void to receive them First Bodies would not then have been subject to this continual vicissitude which causes the Beauty of the Universe for the generation of certain Bodies is only produced by the corruption of some others and 't is the contrariety of their Motions which produces their variety Nor Secondly Would God then act by the most simple wayes For that Bodies ready to shock each other might continue their Motion without striking it would be necessary that they should variously describe an infinite number of Curve-Lines and consequently we must admit different Wills in God to determine their Motions Lastly If there was no uniformity in the action of Natural Bodies and if their Motion was not performed in a right Line there would be no certain Principle for us to Reason upon in Natural Philosophy nor to guide us in many Actions of our Lives 'T is no disorder for Lyons to eat Wolves Wolves Sheep and Sheep the Grass which God has taken so much care of that he has given it all things necessary for its own preservation and also a Seed to preserve its Kind Yet this proves Second Causes no more than the Plurality of Causes or contrary Principles of Good and Evil which the Manichees invented to give a Reason for these Effects But 't is a certain Mark of the Wisdom Greatness and Magnificence of God for he does nothing unbecoming an Infinite Wisdom and performs all things with such a Munificence as sufficiently shows his Power and Greatness Whatever is destroy'd is again repair'd by the same Law which destroy'd it so great is the Wisdom Power and Fruitfulness of this Law God does not prevent the destruction of Beings by a New Will not only because the first is sufficient to repair them but chiefly because his Wills are much more valuable than the reparation of these Beings They are of much more value than all they produce And if God made this visible World although in it self unworthy of the action whereby it was produced 't was for ends unknown to Philosophers and to Honour himself in JESVS CHRIST with such an Honour as the Creatures are uncapable of giving him When a House by its fall crushes a good Man to death a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another or when one Body is forced to give way by the shock it receives at the meeting of another But God multiplies not his Wills to redress such disorders real or apparent as are necessary consequences of Natural Laws He ought neither to correct nor change these Laws although they should sometimes produce Monsters He must not confound the order and simplicity of his wayes He ought to neglect inconsiderable things I mean he should not have particular Wills to produce Effects of no value or unworthy the action of him who produces them God works Miracles only when the Order he always follows requires it and this Order wills that he should act by the most simple wayes and that there should be no exceptions in his Wills but when 't is absolutely necessary to his designs or on certain occasions which are wholly unknown to us For although we are all united to the Order or Wisdom of God we know not all the Rules of it We see in it what we ought to do but comprehend not by it what God ought to Will nor must we be too solicitous about it We have a great instance of what I have been saying in the damnation of an infinite number of persons that God has permitted to perish in times of Ignorance God is infinitely good loves all his works would have all Men be saved and come to this knowledge of the Truth for he has Created them to injoy him And yet the greatest number are damn'd They live and dye in blindness and will continue in it to all Eternity And does not this proceed from Gods acting by the most simple wayes and from his following Order We have shown that according to Order God ought not by preingaging Pleasures to have prevented the Will of the First Man although his Fall caused the disorder of Nature See the Explanation of the fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method It was requisite that all Men should descend from one not only because this is the most simple way but for Reasons too Theological and abstracted to be here explained See also the First Explanation of the Fifth Chapter In fine We ought to believe that this is conformable to the Order which God follows and the Wisdom he alwayes consults in the intention and execution of his designs The Sin of the first Man has produced an infinite number of Evils 't is true but certainly Order required that God should permit it and that he should place Man in an estate wherein he was capable of sinning God is willing to repair his work but rarely gives those victorious Graces which conquers the Malice of the greatest Sinners He often gives Graces that are useless to the Conversion of those who receive them although in respect to them he foresees
places in Scripture where God is only said to act Ego sum Dominus sayes Isaiah faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram chap. 44.24 NVLLVS mecum A Mother animated with the Spirit of God sayes to her Children that it was not she who formed them Nescio qualiter in utero meo aparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI Mac. 7.22 23. sed Mundi Creator c. She does not say with Aristotle and the Peripatetic Schools that 't was she and the Sun who gave them birth but the Creator of the Vniverse Now this Opinion that 't is God only who works and forms Children in the Womb is neither conformable to Prejudices or the common Notions Therefore according to the Principle I have before established these passages must be explain'd literally But on the contrary the Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes being conformable to the common Notion and impression of the Senses Sol homo generant hominem Arist Phys ausc l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon this Text. although we should find such passages as expresly tell us that Second Causes act of themselves alone they would be of no force when compared with these Concourse therefore is not sufficient to reconcile the different passages of the Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascribed to God But although the immediate concourse of God with Second Causes should be proper to reconcile these different Texts I know not whether it ought to be admitted after all For the Sacred Books were not made for the Divines of these times but for the Jews So that if the Jews were not formerly sufficiently inlightened or subtle enough to imagine such a concourse as is admitted in our School-Divinity and to reconcile a thing that the most able Divines have had much trouble to explain it follows methinks that the Holy Scripture which attributed to God and to him only the production and preservation of all things would have thrown them into Error and that the Holy Penmen of these Books would have spoke to Men not only in an unknown but deceitful Language For by telling them that God does all things they would only have intended that God gives his concourse to all things and 't is probable the Jews never so much as thought of this concourse those amongst them that were not great Philosophers believing that God did all things and not that he concurred to all But that we may make a more certain Judgment about this Concourse it would be very proper carefully to explain the different Hypotheses of the Schools about it For besides the impenetrable obscurities which are common to all Opinions that we can explain or maintain only upon rambling and indeterminate terms there are upon this matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would not be very difficult to discover the cause of them But I will not ingage in a discussion which will be too tiresom both for my self and the greatest part of those who will read this Book I rather choose on the contrary to endeavour to show that my Opinions may in some respect be reconciled to the greatest number of the School Divines although I must not dissemble but confess their Language appears very equivocal and confused to me I will explain my self I believe as I have already said elsewhere that Bodies for instance have no power to move themselves and that their Moving Power is only the action of God Or to avoid a term which signifies nothing distinct their Moving Power is only the Will of God alwayes necessarily efficacious which successively preserves them in different places For I don't believe that God creates certain Beings to make them the Moving Power of Bodies Not only because I have no Idea of this kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies but also since these Beings would themselves have need of some others to move them and so on ad infinitum For none but God is truly immovable and sole Mover together Which being supposed when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it acts by the Concourse of God and that this Concourse is not distinct from its own action For a Body moves another which it meets only by its Action or Moving Power which at the bottom is nothing but the Will of God that successively preserves this Body in many places The transferring of a Body not being its Action or Moving Power but the effect of its Moving Power Most Divines likewise say That the Action of Second Causes differs not from the Action whereby God concurs with them For although they understand it variously they suppose that God acts in the Greatures in the same Action with the Creatures And they are it seems obliged to speak thus For if the Creatures acted by an Action which God did not produce in them their Action considered as such would as it appears to me be independant Now they believed as they ought that the Creatures depended immediately upon God not only as to their Being but also as to their Operation So in respect to Free Causes I believe that God continually gave the Mind an impression towards Good in general and that he also determined this impression towards particular Goods by the Ideas or Sensations he has given us as I have shewn in the First Explanation And 't is the same Thing with what the Divines believe when they say That God moves and prevents our Wills So that the power which puts our Minds in motion is the Will of God which animates and inclines us towards Good For God created not Beings to make them the Moving power of Minds for the same Reason that he did not create any to make them the Moving power of Bodies The Wills of God being Efficacious of themselves it is enough for him to Will a Thing to have it done And it is useless unnecessarily to multiply Beings Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions likewise proceeds from the Action of God in us as is clear from the First Explanation Now we neither Act or produce any Thing but by our Wills I mean by the impression of the Will of God which is our Moving power For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than as they proceed from God even as Bodies put in motion impell not others but in as much as they have a Moving power which transfer them and this Moving power is only the Will of God which creates or successively preserves them in different places Then we Act only by the Concourse of God and our Action considered as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from that of God's And is as most Divines say the very same Action Eadem numero Actio Now all the Changes which happen in the World See Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate c. 1. have no other Natural Cause than the Motion of Bodies and
wrote about Idolatry In the Days of Enos Men fell into strange Delusions R. Moses Maimonides and the Wise Men of that Time perfectly lost their Sense and Reason Enos himself was in the Number of those deceived Persons These were their Errours Since God said they has created the Stars and the Heavens to govern the World has placed them on high surrounded them with brightness and glory and employes them to exexecute his Orders it is just that we should honour them and pay reverence and homage to them 'T is the Will of our God that we should honour those whom he has raised and exalted in Glory even as a Prince requires we should honour his Ministers in his presence because the Honour we give to them redounds to himself After they had once received this Notion they began to build Temples in honour of the Stars to offer Sacrifices and Praises to them and even prostrate themselves before them thinking thereby to gain the favour of him who created them And this was the original of Idolatry It is so Natural and Just to have Sentiments of Acknowledgment in proportion to the Benefits we receive See Vossius l. 2. de Idolatria that almost all the World have adored the Sun Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii nullam belluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent consecraverant Cic. l. 1. de Natura Deorum because they all thought he was the cause of the Happiness they injoyed And if the Egyptians have adored not only the Sun the Moon and the River Nilus because its overflowings caused the fruitfulness of their Country but also the vilest Animals 't was as Cicero relates because of some benefit they received from them So that as we cannot and indeed ought not to banish out of Mens Minds the inclination they Naturally have for the true Causes of their Happiness it is evident that there is at least some danger in maintaining the Efficacy of Second Causes although we joyn thereto the necessity of an immediate concourse which has I know not what of incomprehensible in it and which comes in as an after-game to justifie our Prejudices and Aristotles Philosophy But there is no danger in speaking only what we know and atributing Power and Efficacy to God alone since we see nothing but his Wills which have an absolute necessary and indispensable connection with Natural Effects I confess that Men are now knowing enough to avoid the gross Errors of the Heathens and Idolaters But I am not afraid to say that our Mind is disposed or rather that our Heart is often inclined like that of the Heathens and that there will alwayes be some kind of Idolatry in the World until the day that Jesus Christ shall again deliver up his Kingdom to God his Father having first destroyed all Empire Power and Dominion that God may be all in all Quorum Deus venter est Phil. 13.9 Omnis fornicator aut immundus aut avarus quod est idolorum servitus Eph. 5.5 In spiritu veritate oportet adorare John 4.24 For is it not a kind of Idolatry to make a God of our Belly as St. Paul speaks Is it not to idolize the God of Riches continually to labour after Worldly Possessions Is this to render to God the Worship due to him to adore him in Spirit and Truth to have our Hearts filled with some sensible Beauty and our Minds dazled with the brightness of some imaginary Grandeur Men believing they receive from the Bodies which are about them the Pleasures they injoy by their use they unite themselves to them with all the Powers of their Soul And thus the principal of their disorder proceeds from the sensible conviction they have of the Efficacy of Second Causes 'T is Reason only that tells them there is none but God acts in them But besides that Reason speaks so low that they can scarcely hear it and the Senses which oppose it cry so loud that it stupifies them they are still confirmed in their Prejudices by Arguments which are so much the more dangerous as they bear external Characters and sensible Marks of Truth The Philosophers and chiefly the Christian Philophers ought continually to oppose Prejudices or the Judgments of the Senses and especially such dangerous ones as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes And yet I know not from what Principle there are some Persons whom I extreamly honour and that with reason who endeavour to confirm this Prejudice and even to make this Doctrine pass for superstitious and extravagant which is so holy pure and solid and maintains that God alone is the true cause of every thing They will not have us love and fear God in all things but love and fear all things in relation to God We ought say they to love the Creatures because they are good to love and respect our Father render honour to our Prince and Superiour since God commands it I don't deny it but I deny that we must love the Creatures as our goods although they be good or perfect in themselves I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters For we must neither serve our Master obey our Father or Prince with any other design but to serve God and obey him This is what St. Paul sayes who became all things to all Men and complyed in all things for the Salvation of those to whom he Preached Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore tremore in simplicitate cordis vestri SICVT CHRISTO Non ad oculum servientes quasi omnibus placentes sed ut servi Christi facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo cum bona voluntate servientes SICVT DOMINI ET NON HOMINIBVS And in another Epistle Non ad oculum servientes quasi hominibus placentes sed in simplicitate cordis DEVM TIMENTES Quodcumque facitis ex animo operamini SICVT DOMINO ET NON HOMINIBVS We must therefore obey our Father serve our Prince and render honour to our Superiours AS VNTO GOD AND NOT VNTO MAN Sicut Domini non Hominibus This is clear and can never have any bad consequences Superiours would alwayes be more honoured and better served But I believe I may say that a Master who would be honoured and served as having in himself another Power than that of God must be a Devil and that those who served him under that Notion would be Idolaters for I can't but believe that all Honour and Love that tend not towards God are kinds of Idolatry SOLI DEO HONOR ET GLORIA AN EXPLANATION Of what I have said in the Fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method and elsewhere That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most Simple Wayes IT seems to some Persons to be too rash a Conjecture or an abusing of indeterminate and general Terms to say That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most simple wayes in
is Just and Wise that He loves not Disorder that Nature is Corrupted that the Soul of Man is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed 't is not a Substance distinct from their Bodies Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may represent him as criminal and all Mankind besides because they believe that Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if from his own way of Arguing we should accuse him of Impiety because he maintains Opinions from whence we deduce That God is not Just Wise Powerful Sentiments which overthrow Religion which oppose Original Sin which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should treat him as unjust and cruel for making innocent Souls suffer and even Annihilating them for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner they are innocent 'T is only to nourish his Body that he kills Bodies and Annihilates their Souls which are of more value than bodies Again If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal this Cruelty however unjust it is might perhaps be pardonable but how many Substances wholly innocent does he Annihilate only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies where the Inhabitants build * Linsch ch 37. Hospitals for Beasts where the Philosophers and many of the best Sort of Men are so charitable even in respect to Flies that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways in which they pass would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body nor distinct from it and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice whereof these People would accuse him if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom This Example might be sufficient to show That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles even when they disavow these Consequences But be it as it will I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn than these of Monsieur de la Ville The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous if they treated Monsieur de la Ville and other persons who are not of their Opinion as Impious and Heretical 'T is only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith and the Church has not obliged us and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles will not oblige us to believe That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies that they know not their Masters that they neither Fear Desire nor suffer any thing Because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths The Second Proof Almost all Men are perswaded that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us That Nourishments act in us and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life and that all Sensible Objects have a Vertue which is proper to them by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power and to fear him only 'T is a Common Notion according to which all Men act That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain to make us Happy or Unhappy This is a supposed Principle we ought therefore to love and fear them This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners It is evident by Reason and the first of Gods Commandments that all the Motions of our Soul whether Love or Fear Desire or Joy should tend towards God and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that would devour us But we ought to love and fear God only All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone We ought to love him with all our Power This is an indispensible Law We can neither love nor fear what is below us without being disordered and corrupted To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to do them honour To love Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the Heat of the Sun as if it were the true Cause thereof nay even to love ones Father Protectour Friend as if they were capable of doing as good this is to give them that honour which is due to God only We must not love any one in this sense 'T is permitted and we ought to love our Neighbour by wishing or procuring for him as a Natural or Occasional Cause whatever may conduce to his Happiness but not otherwise We must love our Brethren not as capable of doing us good but as of enjoying with us the true Good These Truths appear evident to me but Men strangely obscure them when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers pretend that Creatures can do nothing if God did not concur to their Action and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause We ought neither to fear nor love them but God only on whom all things depend This Explication shows Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville that 't is a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining at the expence of Religion Aristotles Opinions and the Prejudices of their Senses if by examining their Heart I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching Mens Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality by the Consequences