which names doe import a restraint and confinement but is the perfection of all these so that no perfection of any thing can be denied of that which is infinite essentially to say that this infinite is not that Let us conceive a line infinite imagine such a thing This line you cannot say it is a span a foot a yard or mile long yet it contains in it all these measures without their limitation so doth an infinite being containe all beings without confinement in a more excellent and eminent manner What I have spoken concerning that which is infinite in essence or being may be applied to all other infinites in immensity in quantity what is immense must be beyond all bounds of quantity it must have no limits but contains eminently all quantities in it so must number be likewise if there be any such which I shall disprove God willing hereafter so must in respect of duration Eternity be It must comprehend all durations and its self be without beginning and end so must all Infinites in respect of quality be in regard of wisdome of mercy of power comprehend all those Acts of those qualities which are in that which is finite and themselves be without all bounds and limits Hâ—vâ—ng thus explained what is meant by infinitie let us return to that which occasioned this discourse neither man nor any thing which is not infinite saith he can have any conceipt of that which is infinite conceptionem ullam is his phrase Sect. 5. This I disprove for although a mans understanding is finite and cannot grasp or fully comprehend that which is infinite yet it can lay hold on it and apprehend though not comprehend it although it cannot inclose the whole being of that is infinite yet he can discover that it is incomprehensible and that discovery will give him some conceit of that infiniteness yea the very knowledge of finite things will yeeld him some conceit of that is infinite so he who travelleth in an enclosed Country can sever those hedges from his fancy and can conceit what that Country would be if those hedges and bounds were removed although he do not see them so removed yet he can conceive what manner of Country that would be if they were removed Men may conceive that which neither is nor ever was in the world as an empty place against which he hath disputed in his natural Philosophy although many learned are of opinion against him and therefore had a conceipt of it Men may and learned men have expressed their opinions to be of an infinite thing which is not that is of an infinite vacuity beyond the heavens which give bounds to this visible world therefore have a conceipt of that infinite which they dispute for men have had a conceit and methinks he is not far from it that this world hath had an eternal being and therefore they had a conceit of this we call Eternity which is an infinite duration men have a conceit of infinity of number and therefore somewhere in his Book of Philosophy I have forgot where he most ingeniously expresseth it that if a mans hand were as active as his head or to this purpose he might divide any quantity into infinite parts his head then is able to doe it and then he must needs have a conceit of his own work He spake therefore too much when he said no finite thing could have any conceit of that is infinite a conceit it may have but an imperfect one and so I goe on with him Sect. 6. Neque si quis ab effectu quocunque Neither saith he if a man from any effect to its immediate cause and from thence to his more remote and so continually shall ascend by a most right reasoning yet he cannot proceed to that which is Eternall but being tyred shall flag at the last and be ignorant whether he can go further or no Thus far he an ingenuous and handsome expression I confess but how true will be examined And first I hope Mr. Hobbes will not say he is the wisest man that ever was in the world or that he only found out right reasoning and yet he speaks somewhat like this now and then but howsoever because I write not onely to him but to other men and I hope he harh not gained an universal esteem of such with the generality I thus answer There was never any sort of reasoning men who denyed an Eternity for whether they held the world had a beginning or no beginning which all did and must doe those which held it had no beginning as Aristotle in my judgement held the world eternall those which held it had a beginning from Water as Thales or Ayre as Anaximenes or Fire as Heraclitus or from Atomes as Democritus by chance meeting together in the great and infinite Vacuum not to lose time in confuting all or any of these which are most absurd yet all these that held it was principiated by these meanes held likewise that that Principle was eternall so likewise Plato his Ideas and Chaos were eternall Let us from the fact consider the manner in one or two instances If with Democritus we make the world constituted by Atomes when we resolve these mixed bodies into their principles we come to their Elements then with Democritus those Elements may be resolved into their Atomes by Aristotle into their Principles matter forme and privation these Atomes according to Democritus are Eternall that matter according to Aristotle so here is an eternity found So likewise may be said of Aire Water which are by some imagined to be the Principles or Chaos and Ideas If any man can imagine any thing further that these had a beginning and were not eternall his judgement can fly to none but an eternal God So that still there is by the ratiocination of man found out something that is Eternal When he said that by the ascending from the immediate cause to the more remote a man would lose himself it was most ingenious and had a truth with it which perhaps will be farther examined hereafter if it had been applyed to efficient causes as out of what Egge this Hen was hatched and what Hen layd this egge c. But when we resolve things into their constitutive causes which make their natures that which they are then the work will be short as is shewed and the result easie man need not lose himself in the inquest What he saith that a man tyred in the search will be ignorant whether he can go further or no is not so boldly as finely affirmed by him for certainly although a man be weary in his journey yet he can discern whether he can go further or no. Sect. 7. He proceeds and I Nâ—que absurdi sequitur quicquam neither saith he would any absurdity follow whether the world be finite or infinite since whatsoever the workman should determine all those things which we now see would be seene I
is I think should produce an effect for saith he although it may be proved by nâ—turall Reason that God doth understand and will and so in God is an act and operation yet by no certain demonstration can it be proved that he should so understand and will that these acts should produce and unlesse Faith did teach us this we should say that these acts are his substance not operations and are onely conceived of us as operation This is his first answer to which I shall reply that although I am perswaded that that learned Jesuite had found no such thâ—ng in the Books he had read of Lully's yet I have found in those I have with me an ample proof of that proposition which he affirm's canâ—oâ— be set out by Reason which is that there is a reall act which must be a production for which first I shall cite his arbor quaestionalis de quaestionibus dignitatis Dei where the question is put utâ—um productio siâ— in Deo whether there be any production in God his Solutio is If there be no production in God then Omnes rationes all his reasons is the word but I may call them as he doth elsewhere all the formes all such things as we affirme knowingly to be in God should be idle in an infinite extension and infinite duration Give me leave Reader to explain this for it is a reigning Disease amongst great Artists that in high notions they do impose new Terms which do amaze a Reader but more pardonable in him who having run through all Arts and Sciences write's them for his own Scholars which he supposeth understand his language to explain him then as well as I can to such as are not acquainted with his Books the sense is this If in God should be no production then all his Attributes were uselesse in an infinite extension of place and an infinite duration of time I use these terms although God's immensity infinitely exceed's place his eternity all time and the reason of this may be because we conceive a most unlimited nothing beyond this world and most unconceiveable eternity when this world was not and shall not be now saith he if there should be no internall production in God there would be an infinite vacuity in which was no production and an infinite time in which there was none and then in all that vacuity and duration God were idle and produced nothing which were little less then blasphemy for a naturall man to say for he observe's that there is nothing unactive in the whole beings of nature and the more excellent any thing is the higher it growe's in action and the more noble the effects it must be so in God then unlesse we conceive something unworthily of him This I apprehend to be the summe of that Argument but he turne 's me to the Dignities and Flowers of his Arbor Divinalis for the Dignities I find reckoned God's goodness and greatness which we call his immensity his eternity c. new saith he all these have their effects his Goodnesse produceth that which is good his immensity that which is such his eternity the like c. in all his other Dignities and all these being essentialâ—y in God yea God as he speak's often there is necessity that either eternally he must produce somewhat or be idle Thus I think I have made good this proposition against Vasques his first answer that there must be some effect produced but he hath another answer Sest 7. Againe saith he his reason to prove that there is an act of production in God is because he is bonificativum bonificare bonificabile that is making good and the act to make good and the thing made good this saith he is frivolous for saith he this act is not that which Faith teacheth to be the production of a person and a rationall operation but it is a certaine act not of an efficient or producing cause but of a formall cause as we say whiteness make's a thing white By his leave first I find he hath reade more in Lully his Arguments then he set down or else he could not have urged this now for proofe of that which he said before he left unproved Secondly the proposition to be proved was not that there was a production of a person for that was the conclusion before to be proved and this that there was a reall production was the medium from whence that will follow for if there be an eternall production it must be another essence or an other person the first is impossible therefore the second must be and then lastly I answer that bonification as making good is not onely taken for a forme but an efficient Cause which may be thus proved first from God's goodnesse and the infinite excellency of it now goodnesse in its own nature is communicative in morality a good rich man give 's more then a poor good man a good wise man communicate's his wisdome c. In nature it is an excellence of fire not onely that it is warm in it selfe but that it communicate's this warmth to other things of the Sun not onely that it is light but that it doth enlighten of any thing that it is good and that it doth communicate that goodnesse so then see if Nature doe not teach us that if God be an infinite Good he must communicate and produce an infinite good thus may we discourse from his infinite power if good and powerfull both then why should he not produce some infinite effect that is infinitely good for else his power should be without an act proportionable let no man talk of this world this was made in time and there would have been an infinite duration without it or that he might make other works before it they must be all in time besides that they are finite things which doe not cannot extend themselves to the expression of such an infinite excellencie and then let me urge from that other medium aequiparantiae before spoken of powers are known by their act and by their object all the world acknowledgeth God to have an infinite power where is the infinite act the infinite production and then conceiving that this infinite goodnesse and power are eternall this production must needs be such if at all because else there would be a duration in which this power were not produced into act in which this goodnesse produced no good Thus far I think I have vindicated Lully and the conclusion out of invincible reason that there is a plurality of persons it must needs be that God eternally produced some infinitely good effâ—ct which because it cannoâ— be another essentiall God must be another person If you would have thiâ— discourse drawn into a perfect Syllogisme take it thus That which is infinite in power goodnesse immensity eternity perfection must produce such an effect eternally But God is infinite in power c. Therefore God must produce an effect
oppâ—est with the Negotiations of the day will busie its self about them in the Night as is most apparent so that I remember that the first Latine verses which I made were made in my sleep my thoughts having run upon nothing else in the day busied themselves about them in the night and you shall observe that a dog used to hunting barks in his sleep with the like earnestness and useth actions of that nature so that all natural dreams spring not from the inward parts Sect. 3. But in his 3. Chap. of Humane Nature he offers at some reasons to prove his conclusion and they are delivered at numb 3. under the name of a Sign thus The signes by which this appeareth to be so are the differences of dreams old men commonly dream oftner and have their dreams more painful then the young proceeding from the different accidents of mans body Thus he I conceive this Instance mistaken God be praised I have lived to the age of an old man and I find it other because I think my thoughts are more composed and by practice have made my passions less violent and trouble my self wâ—â— h lesse eagerness of businesse but he saith only Old men commonly and then I say this may be a sign but not a certain one yea in natural things very weak for the course of Nature is constant and is a sign that that proposition of his which is universally proposed is not universally true That many times natural Dreams may arise from such inward causes may be granted because they co-operate with the businesse or thoughts or passions to which that man is inclined but most oft they fail when it is otherwise What he further disputes there to shew that such and such Constitutions do produce alike effects in the dreams of those persons I deny not so it be not universally affirmed for we read of some men who never dreamed but in the same Numb pag. 23. he proceeds to another sign thus Another sign that Dreams are caused by the Actions of the inward parts is the disorder and casual consequence of one conception or image to another I grant the conclusion that may be deduced hence that is that some Dreams may arise hence but deny the universality for fancy not guided by reason but taking things as by chance they offer themselves out of that book of the memory may be as confused and disorderly as any disturbance that comes from the inward parts yea that confusion can hardly be conceived to come from the inward parts for suppose the predominant humor be Melancholy or choler these can suggest only such fancies when on a sudden we may observe that Dreams alter their conditions and sometimes in an instant change from one fancy to another which that constant condition of the humor cannot promote his instance which he immediately gives is not perswasive thus For when we are waking the antecedent thought or conception introduceth and is cause of the consequent as the water follows a mans finger upon a dry and level Table but in Dreams there is commonly no coherence This Example seems to me most incongruous to this purpose for the understanding of man waking and his fancy are imployed and set at work by his will which often interrupts and crosseth the Chaine of Consequences and imployes the Reason sometimes to seek out new reasons other fingers to draw water to its end sometimes commands that finger to stop in the midst of its progress and so the finger imployed other where is not followed by the water but in a Dream if it arise from such a Physical cause as many times it doth a man may conceive rather why things as they are linked together in the Memory should follow one another when one is moved or raised up because there is no Superiour Power to controul that Consequence CHAP. XI Sensitive creatures not intelligent Their specifick differences Their Sagacity Sect. 1 WEll that we may part with a Gingle the rest of his Fancies of dreams and his dreams of Fancies I let pass for the present guessing that what is material in that Discourse will conveniently be met with hereafter and now skip to the latter end of the Chap. 2. pag. 8. where he defines understanding to be that imagination which is raised in every creature by word or voluntary signes I should have let this passe with the rest but that I am unwilling to betray that noble faculty of mans soul his Understanding by which he is sever'd from and exalted above all other sublunary creatures to that sordid condition of being onely a sensual quality That we may the better apprehend this we will first observe that these words and other such signs which are apprehended by things meerly sensual although the signs are voluntary such as are imposed by any sign-maker yet they are perceived to have such signification by those Beasts or Dogs and the like not in a rational or intellectual manner but a natural for custome meerly which is another nature and doth the same way facilitate any thing to us as Nature doth is the onely cause of their apprehension of these and this custome works onely by these two Principles of a love to that which is profitable for them and a detestation of that is hurtful which is nothing but that natural appetite before spoken of for when any of these find that by coming at such a word he is rewarded by disobeying such a menace he provokes his own punishment he by custom being sensible of this doth accordingly Nor do any of those words signifie any more to thar Beast but his pleasure or pain he understands not any simple term what it signifies but only these two things and from these Principles they do not only listen to the words but speak them as Parrots without any understanding more then their belly and by that you may have Corvos Poetas Now here is no understanding in these Acts but almost like a Tree which if you use to keep bent it will grow such so these being used to the reward or punishment upon such words do apprehend them such and naturally follow or avoid them But because there are some acts in these beasts which have a nearer affinity with Reason then these he specifies although I have already written somewhat to this purpose I will for the further satisfaction of the Reader enlarge my self a little and so pass on to other things Sect. 2. As it is with man who is one kind or species of Animals that he hath besides that general nature of a sensitive soul another soul which distinguisheth him from other Animals so likewise it is with the other species or kinds of Animals they must have some particular soul or degree of a sensitive soul which may distinguish them from man and one from each other as the Canine or doggish soul distinguisheth a dog from a lion a beare a cat a man
a husbanding of these seeds and therefore these words must needs be taken in that Indefinite sense they are exprest that these are the seeds of all Religion I will consider them apart and fiâ—st the Opinion of Ghosts is a seed of Religion Sect. 2. All the Opinion of Ghosts which he expresseth in the former part of this Chapter he makes to be an Error now for Errour to be a sâ—ed of Truth was never heard of before an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit nor ill seed a good tree Errour the greater growth it hath the greater is the Errour but it never growes into Truth Again in the seventh Chapter he makes Opinion to be a very weak assurance as indeed it is although his description of it is weak in that place but the assurance that there is a God is the greatest that may be and therefore not to grow out of such a seed Thirdly consider that although there can be no assurance of God without an assurance of a Ghost or Spirit because God is exprest in Scripture to be a Spirit yet the beliefe and assurance of God cannot grow out of the Opinion of Ghosts for although the Opinion of Ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in Nature to induce it which prevailed with many Philosophers to perswade them that there were such things yet the Arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince there is a God and therefore the assurance of God may introduce and be a seed of the Opinion of Ghosts but the opinion of Ghosts which is lesse certain and lesse evident cannot introduce it He brings no manner of proof for what he speakes and in his Catalogue of those Deities which this opinion should produce Pag 55. He nameth Chaos Ocean Planets Men Women and other things which have no likeness with Ghosts or Spirits although his Daemons and some others have Now although the opinion of Spirits may perswade a Religion towards those things which were thought Spirits yet it could never invite but would crosse and oppose those Religions which were paid to corporeall things for by all men who have writ of Spirits both Christian and others Spirits are thought to have a more God like power in them then Bodies and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other Sect. 3. His second seed is ignorance of second Causes a most unhappy and unreasonable speech Ignorance the Mother of Religion Ignorance of second Causes cannot make a man acknowledge the first Rom. 1.20 S. Paul saith The Invisible things of Him that is of God from the Creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his eternal Power and Godhead This understanding of eternal Power and Godhead is the foundation and ground of Religion and this was visible although not in its self yet in the things that are made the second Causes so that not the ignorance but the knowledge of the second Causes like Iacobs ladder leads us from one to another step by step until we ascend to the highest and first Cause This he himself acknowledgeth before but as he often doth so he now forgot what he had said Ignorance of second Causes that they are second and mistaking them for first may make a man think them Gods and so turne a Religion to them but as may appear at the bottome of the preceding Page 53. he understands the Ignorance of the Causation of second Causes which without doubt is so farre from bringing in Religion that it is apt to produce Atheism and an opinion that the world is governed by chance not by Providence So that as for his first I deny it to be a Seed of Religion that is the opinion of Ghosts so for this Second the Ignorance of second Causes I affirm that is an enemy to Religion stopping the Soul from ascending up to Heaven by breaking the lowest step of that Ladder which is fixed on Earth Sect. 4. His third Seed is Devotion towards what we fear That feare Timor Reverentialis may be a seed the fomenter and cherisher of Religion yea an act of Religion I do not doubt but that that ugly sordid feare which he speaks of as appeares in the bottom of Page 52. is not to be imagined for the first feare ariseth out of the knowledge and apprehension we have of the Excellency of God but this second feare he speaks of out of Ignorance of Causes Because men know there are Causes saith he of every thing but know not those causes therefore they impute their good or evill fortune to some invisible Agent This ignorance oâ— Causes must needs be understood of second Causes for ignorance of the first Cause can never make a man worship the first nor impute the production of things to him It is true the ignorance of some Attributes as his goodness may make a Maniche think there is an ill God and the same ignorance may produce almost as ill an opinion in others that God is the Author of the evil of sin the one not apprehending his internal goodness conceives God evil in himself the other not apprehending his Goodness in operation his Benignity makes him do and produce that is ill but the ignorance of him as a first Cause can never introduce a Religion to him But then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the Causation of second Causes we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible Agent as he terms it unless it be that god Fortune which the Poet derideth Te facimus Fortuna Deum coeloque locamus And worthily for there can be nothing more contradictory then the Providence of God and the Blindness of Fortune Now when men cannot find the Chain of Causes which produce the effects they discerned and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first Cause as they cannot who discern not the second they must needs have that doubt or fear that they are acted by Fortune and all things fall alike to all without either being rewards or punishments Rods or Scourges c. And therefore is so far from introducing of Religion as it leads to Atheisme But it is not said that this fear but the Devotion to what we feare is the Seed of Religion I could have wished that among other his expositions of words he had put down what he means by Devotion but he hath not Consider then the sense of it is Voto decernere to decree a thing to another by a vow so that when one devotes a thing to another he then decrees it in a sacred manner to be his Now then Devotion to what we feare is decreeing some thing to it by way of Vow Devotion then to what we feare if that we feare be God is not a seed but a fruit and act of Religion for Religion is not only as he not vainly onely but wickedly and prophanely defines Chap. 6. page 26. Feare of
in respect of Eternity will be not so much as one unite to all this and six or seaven hundred thousand were nothing being added because whatsoever you adde to Roberts number of Fathers I can adde a thousand times as many to Adams and therefore Nature that abhors impossibilities abhors likewise infinites of Numbers and by consequence of Causations eternally for a man to say this Eternity is à parte ante and not à parte post is a contradiction for although there may be some imagination of a thing which having a beginning may have no end but exist eternally because it may be created with eternal Principles and the Number infinite is not presently existing nor ever shall be for whensoever you reckon you shall have a finite time to reckon from although it were ten thousand Millions of yeares hence or whensoever yet there can be nothing without a beginning eternal à parte ante but must needs have eternal Principles which no time can corrupt for if time could corrupt it as suppose ten thousand yeares or a thousand times so many fix any time it had been corrupted before this or else it was not eternal à parte ante And then to the second part such a person he hath actually an Infinite number of Causes which cannot be and therefore these things must be created in some certaine time These and many more arguments out of Metaphysiques as that which the Philosophers call Essential Subordination of Causes as likewise many others are such as of which I may say that they render the Proposition There is a God evidently to be discerned by the Creatures but as Aegidius Romanus excellently speaks Sapientibus this evidence is perceiveable only by wise men from the disquisition whereof they are not to be scared by the infinity of Gods essence because inaccessible to a finite Inquirer as he plainly asserts it in his Element of Philosophy c. whither I will make a transition to inlarge this discourse and cleare what I have writ from somewhat I find there opposite to my purpose Sect. 3. In his said book of Philosophy de Corpore Cap. 26. Pag. 236. having proposed divers questions about the World he concludes at the bottome of that pag. and the beginning of the next Et haec omnia ab eo qui Philosophiam complecti profiteretur universam determinanda essent si quantum quaerit tantum sciri potest est autem infiniti scientia finito quaesitori inaccessibilis Thus far he And not without reason no finite understanding can grasp that which is infinite yet although we cannot perfectly know that which is Infinite we may know many things of it Mr. Hobbes himself I dare say doth not know the essence of the Sun yet there is not the meanest person which follows the Plough but knowes there is a Sun and many effects of the Sun that he doth send forth light and heat by which the poor man is comforted Mr. Hobbes his Argument Therefore because finite things cannot know God as he is we must know nothing of him is weake He proceeds Sect. 4. Whatsoever we men know we have learned from our Phantasm but there is no Phantasm of that which is either Infinite in magnitude or time Neque enim homo saith he neiiher man nor any thing that is not infinite can have any conceipt of that which is infinite He said true in affirming that what we know we have learned from our Phantasm so although the soul of man have many things in it which have no being in the world as Chimera's Utopia's Leviathans and our Phantasmes are properly of things in the world yet those things which are in the understanding and not in the world are learned from those Phantasmes which are of things in the world as thus That man who cannot behold the Sun in his own glory and lustre yet seeing him behinde a thin Cloud can learn from thence that the Sun who shines so glorious vailed and hid from eyes by such a dark body would have a strange high degree of resplendent lustre if we could see him as he is So we learn from Phantasmes apparent as the Apostle speaks from visible things to collect many apprehensions of that which is of its self invisible and not to be perceived and having reduced one Conclusion may collect from thence many more and men desirous to know God as he who desires knowledge doth will make such collections The Prophet David there in a most heavenly invective calls them not onely fools but beastly people who do not so collect Psal. 94.8 Understand ye brutish among the People and ye fools when will ye be wise Mark they were foolish and brutish because they did not make such Collections He that planted the Ear shall he not hear and he that formed the Eye shall he not see Thus from one truth men may and ought to enlarge their talent to another and learn as Mr. Hobbes expresseth from Phantasmes But I like not so well what Mr. Hobbes adds that there is no Phantasme of that whch is Infinite nor what he further expresseth Neither man nor any thing that is not Infinite can have any conceipt of that which is Infinite To understand which I shall take a little pains to explain the conceipt of Finite and Infinite Sect. 5. Finite is the same to have bounds or limits beyond which it cannot passe Infinite is that which hath no bounds nor limits and although concerning these terms in the first sounding a man would think that Infinite should express a meere negation as finite an affirmation yet upon judgment of these things expressed by these termes we shall find the cleane contrary for by finite we understand non ultra as much as hitherto and no farther but by Infinite we apprehend such a vastness to which we can alwaies say ultra that there is further there is somewhat beyond and there must be something more And out of this regard finite things must have a cause of their finite nature because whatsoever is bounded is bounded by somewhat but infinite can have no cause because unbounded or limited These bounds or limits we may consider in three things in the essence of things in their quantities and in their qualities In their Essence and so we consider all finite things to be this and no other as a Tree is a tree and not a Beast or Bird nor another tree the being of it is bounded and limited by that difference which constituted it either in its specifical or particular being and whatsoever is the Cause of that being is that which limits that thing and makes it thus finite in being But that which is infinite in essence hath no bounds no limits of that being it is all essence without limitation and in a most eminent manner comprehends all being without any negation It is true it is not finite and therefore it is not a Man a horse a dog a tree all
will not meddle with what concernes not my present business but remit the madness of the worlds infinity in magnitude as not pertinent to my purpose and apply my self to that which is in his following words about Eternity Sect. 8. Preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum Moreover saith he although out of this that nothing can move it self may be right enough inferred that there is some first moving thing which shall be Eternall yet that cannot be inferred thence which men doe use to inferre to wit an eternal immoveable but contrariwise an eternall thing moved for as it is true that nothing is moved of its self so it is true likewise that nothing is moved but from a thing moved He is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning this contradicts wâ—at went before for if from that conclusion which he holds true nothing can move its self may be deduced a first mover which is Eternall it necessarily follows that men ascending from effects to immediate causes thence to others may arrive at that which is eternall which was denyed not six lines before and hath been confuted by me Againe observe that that inference which he censures must be true and his inference false For if there be a first mover and every thing moved is moved by another then that which moves must it self be unmoved for if it move then that was not the first mover but rather that other thing which moved that he said was the first moveable for a first can have nothing before it but that moveable according to his Philosophy must have another moved thing which moves it And for the two Propositions out of which he draws his inference he saith they are alike true I that they are a like false that which saith nothing moves its self For the nature of every thing as Aristotle defines it is the Principle of motion and rest of each natural body that is the natural motion and rest and therefore moves every natural body naturally And therefore the other Proposition is like false which saith that every thing which is moved is moved by something which is moved it self which can be affirmed of none but violent motions they are forced by something without but neither natural nor animal motions And this Philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends the Schoolemen who disavow Aristotle in that Argument I will leave his discourse in the middle which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the World and close with him again towards the latter end of 237. Pag. where he endeavours to answer an Argument somwhat like that which I urge but how weakly let the Reader judge The Argument it self is not so strong as mine and shall together be both examined Sect. 9. He begins thus Quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet Who saith he will praise a man after this manner demonstrating if the world be Eternal then the number of dayes or any other measure of time infinite hath preceded the birth of Abraham but the nativity of Abraham preceded the nativity of Isaac therefore one infinite or one eternity should be greater then another which is absurd thus farre he Consider first the affinity this Argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be inserted his Argument is drawne from the number of Dayes mine of paternity which overthrows one of his Answers at the first view as will appear in its place But that whâ—ch he seems to apply his strength against is that Axiom one Infinite cannot be greater then another This is used concerning infinite in number the reason of this is because whatsoever is infinite is boundlesse it cannot be out-gone but its self out-goes every thing of its kind now what is greater then another containes that and exceeds it so foure exceeds three and therefore gives it bounds a hundred and every number is bounded it is not 100. and one it is bounded in its self and therefore every number hath its internal bounds and if it be exceeded it hath external bounds Minimum quod non as his friends the Schooles speak so well as maximum quod sic it hath the least terme of that it cannot extend to as the greatest it can exist in Sect. 10. Well let us consider his answer Similis demonstratio est It is a like Demonstration saith he as if he from thence that there is an infinite number of equall numbers therefore he should conclude that that there were so many equal numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal together taken I find a mighty errour run through his whole work which doth not become a Mathematician is evident in this Answer that he disputes Ex non concessis his Answer is drawn from a supposal that there is an infinite number of equal numbers which is false there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers for suppose the world made of Atomes with Democritus although they are called Infinite because mans eye cannot discern them nor his wit apprehend them yet they being bodies that have dimensions must have a finite nature and therefore a certain number of them must goe to the constituting another bigger body suppose a Million to make a barly corne what number you will yet it is a number and that number may be reckoned by unities every one for a Million and so every million of Millions may afterwards be reckoned by unities as one may goe for a Million or Millions and a million of sheets or papers may be filled by these or more greater numbers may be united yet they are and will be a certain number of them and the things of this world are made in number by GOD Almighty aswell as measure and weight as the Son of Sirak Wisdom 11.20 Well then there is no infinite number he answers from an impossible supposal but now hence doth he inferre If I should grant there were an infinite number of equall numbers then that should be equal to all numbers even equall and unequall yes it must for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equall to infinite twoes threes twenties hundreds for 〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds if it had not infinite twenties infinite Millions indeed infinite infinites it had some bounds it is not infinite whatsoever by any reckonings even by myriads can be bounded is not infinite can be exceeded therefore it is absurd to say the world was infinite in duration for if we conceive it infinite as I argue there must be as many paternities of Adam as of Robert and all that number of paternities betwixt Adam and Robert are no addition A drop in the Sea is an addition because the Sea is bounded and finite but if it were infinite there could be no addition to it The greatest number that is may have addition because it is
to be in our Saviour a manhood which he called Jesus begotten by Joseph on Mary and something above a manhood which he called Christ which not untill he was thirty yeares old came into him at his baptisme that Jesus suffered as he speake's a little after but Christ did not being spirituall Thus you see â—renaeus his expression concerning Cerinthus where you may observe that he allowe's our Saviour no being before he was borne of Mary as he terme's her for although he grant's him an additionall after his baptisme by the descending down of Christ unto him yet that person had no being before and that additionall was long after his birth of the blessed Virgin and it is not expressed that he thought that Christ which came into Jesus had any being before that coming down And Tertullian adversus haereticos Num. 312. affirme's of Cerinthus that he say'd Christ was onely a man without Divinity to which that of Irenaeus well enough agree's I quote Tertullian now in Pamelius his edition 1617. So that there it seem's that Cerinthus concerning our Saviour's Divinity had the same opinion with Socinus Well to goe on with the story of Cerinthus he was a man of a most turbulent Spirit Epiphanius saith he was the man that raised the charge against St. Peter at Jerusalem for communicating with the Gentiles Acts 11. in the Case of Cornelius as likewise that he raised the tumult against St. Paul about Circumcision with a whole leafe of such schismaticall practices of his for they say he was a Jew by his Father and so stood still for the priviledges of their Nation and the observation of their Rites upon this ground the loving Spirit of St. John justly abhorred him and therefore as Irenaeus in his third Book and third Chapter there are some who have heard Polycarpus report c. which Polycarpus was constituted Bishop of Smyrna by St. John as Irenaeus Eusebius and all agree and that Angell of the Church of Smyrna which St. John writ to Apocalyps 2.8 he say'd Irenaeus who himselfe had seene Polycarpus reported that St. John goeing to wash himselfe in the Bath at Ephesus saw Cerinthus and presently hasted out againe unwashed saying that he might feare the Bath would fall where was that enemy of the Truth Cerinthus so that here you see two things that the Opinion of Cerinthus was much the same with that of the Socinians that this Cerinthus was abhorred by St. John not as a man but as an enemy to truth so that St. John hating his opinions might be reasonably thought to provide against them and all this evident out of that most ancient Author which Socinus himselfe quote's now let us see de facto what was done The same Author Irenaeus in his eleventh Chapter of his third Book somewhat before the midle of that Chapter affirme's in expresse termes that St. John was willing by his declaring the Gospell to take away the errour of Cerinthus then which we could have nothing more cleare a most Authentique Author affirming it upon most just and reasonable grounds Socinus then say'd too much when he affirmed that it was farre from all reason that Saint John should write against Ebion and Cerinthus here we see the contrary as much as it is possible for story to give but he dispute's againe against it page 7. Deinde versimile non est c. Moreover it is not likely that John would passe over so great a matter so slightly with silence but that he would name the haeretiques or at the least their haeresy either secretly or openly and detest it which since he hath not done why did he not somewhere clearely say that Christ was by nature God and Man or that he existed before he was born of Mary why did he affect to be so obscure and sparing in a thing of so great moment the ignorance whereof bring 's eternall destruction c. thus farre he I will not undertake to understand all the Apostle's reasons but am confident he had abundance of reason for all he did but will answer all he sayth first that the Scripture seldome set's down the haeretiques or haeresyes against which it write's although sometimes it doth Secondly to that he saith the Apostle doth not clearly witnesse that Christ was by nature God and Man or existed before he was born of Mary I shall shew him that he hath in as cleare termes as possibly could be although not in the same and I am confident that had he expressed this Mystery in those very words he set's down he and his Companions would have cavilled at them that those Termes are used otherwise in some places that there was some Copy or other without one of them or all that they did relate to something before or behind and not to Christ which are their usuall evasions but it is a vanity of them to teach the Apostle how he should expresse himselfe he hath done it abundantly and as clearly as those words would doe as we shall see shortly Sect. 2. But he urgeth farther that St. John give 's this and no other reason towards the end of his Gospell John 20.31 Cur Jesu signa I translate it why he writ the Miracles of Jesus or as others would have it his whole history then that we should believe that Jesus is Christ the Sonne of God and believing that we should have life eternall I will not trouble his lection which is very erroneous but let the Reader observe that although St. John say that this was the cause why those things which he writ were written yet he useth not that phrase put upon him by Socinus this non aliam and no other but suppose he had this will serve our designe for all we labour for is to prove that our Saviour is the Sonne of God it is true these troublesome men have brought distinctions of the Sonne into naturall and adopted and the like but that he is such a Sonne as believing of which we may have eternall life can be conceived nothing lesse then that he must be the naturall Sonne of the same nature with his Father all other beliefe I doubt will fall short of that excellency and therefore Beza most genuinely according to the Originall which prepose's an Article both to Christ and the Sonne reade's it thus That ye should believe that Jesus is that Christ that Sonne of God which Emphasis doth exceedingly much elevate the Conceipt of him shewing him to be an extraordinary Christ and an extraordinary not merely an adopted Sonne which all his Servants are here bound to believe so that it seeme's St. John writ this Gospell to shew that our Saviour was in some eminent and peculiar way the Sonne of God that which he adde's that believing in him we might have eternall life is an absolute avoyding a strong Argument to prove his Godhead for although I think by life here is meant eternall life yet in the Originall there
he would rather have used renovation regeneration making new then absolute making againe it is evident that St. John in this beginning of his Gospell describe's the nature of Christ according to his Divinity when he was in the beginning where he was with God what he was in himselfe he was God in his effects he made all things then he come's to the preparation of the Gospell by John Baptist and his Gospell by its selfe to his incarnation he was made flesh this I put down to shew the Reader that to us who observe this method in the Evangelist that conceipt of the Gospell that these words should relate to it can have no sense and againe I say let the Reader observe the places commonly cited by them to this purpose that this phrase must be understood according to the subject matter he shall find that there is something obvious in them to shew a Reader that they have such an intention those places are these Matth. 17.11 Mark 13.23 John 4.25 and 14 26. and 19 28. and some other which are needlesse to put down and would be tedious too but in all of them there will appeare somewhat inviting a man to that understanding but in this nothing and let the Reader consider what an uncouth exposition this is by which I can put the Contrary to every proposition and by their glosse it will be more true then the Text as thus The word was not God the Word did not make all things for when the beginning was he was not by them nor thousands of yeares after with God he was not otherwise then every thing in the World was with him in his presence and knowledge and that long after the beginning contrary to the Text and he was so farre from making all things that indeed by them he made nothing but instituted some Lawes and Covenants onely now what a horrid way is this of expounding Scripture onely because they are resolved against our Saviour's eternall Divinity let us go on Sect. 6. And without him was nothing made that was made I believe that before their glosses had come to this Text a man could not possibly have put down more distinct Words was Heaven or Earth or any thing else then what is comprised in all if not then it was not made without him he made it who made all things yea but say they this must be understood of all the things of the Gospell I aske were other things made if they were then they were made by him and without him nothing was made that was made I know they will returne to their former answear and say it must be understood of the subjecta materia which was the Gospell that none of those things that were made were made without him but let a man consider whether it be reasonable to refer this all things to such a business which is treated of two or three verses after or rather to those things which immediately follow that is the things that are made they have an exception likewise against this Word by all things were made by him that signifye's an Instrument say they and by this Christ should be onely here an Instrumentall Cause by which God wrought these things so Smalcius in refutatione libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ cap. 11. pag. 68. in my edition 1614. it is true he grant's that this Word by is often used for a principal cause as is most evident as we say that this house was built by this man not by his Axe or Hammer no not by his Servants yea all things are said to be made by God but he saye's they who urge this Argument must prove that it is never used otherwise I say that is not necessary in Logick it will be enough if he can prove that it cannot be used otherwise in this place and that I hope to do first against those who allow our Saviour to make all these things concerning the Gospell he was the Author of them and he must not be understood as an Instrument in respect of the sense that they give to by here which make's him to be barely an instrumentall Cause then next taking all things as we do and surely it must be so if we understand that this Word is an Instrument in the making the world the Heaven and Earth he must be long before he was born of the Virgin even before these things themselves were made which although it will not be of force against the Arrians yet is against them so that let this phrase all things be understood which way ye will as they or we yet this Word by cannot be accommodated to their exposition for a bare instrumentall Cause There is another slight objection that the Father is not made by him nor the holy Spirit but the Text answer's this when it saith without him was nothing made that was made but let the Reader observe the same Contrariety to the Text here that was before there was more a hundred times made without him then by him and if where the full and clear sense of a Text will go one way it be lawful to expound it otherwise because some Word or Words are otherwhere applyed to another meaning it is impossible to prove any thing by words for the liberty of language doth allow it and the expressions of all Authors make use of it to apply the same Words to diverse occasions and if this licence should be granted to Expositors there is no refuge but tradition which deliver's the sense not the words and by that a man may know how and in what sense such language was understood either in the Apostolical or next adjacent times for it is reasonable to think that they had with the words the sense likewise delivered Thus I write because as appeare's these men do use such violence to these Scriptures as is unreasonable and without any consent to their own intent as I have shewed Sect. 7. It followe's In him was life here in these words I find little Opposition Smalcâ—us handle's them not as not materiall Socinus saith this word life must be understood of Life eternall I will not deny that life eternall may be mean't and principally mean't here but I am confident likewise that all the life of every thing in the world may truly be said to be in him in the word as in the fountaine from whence it came and is still preserved equally as the other but for Life eternall it may be said in him besides that way as in a fountaine to be in him likewise as the mâ—ritorious cause yea as in the object for in the knowledge of him will consist much of our eternall happinesse hereafter I will proceed and this Life was the light of men that is if we understand it of the naturall Life this Life which originally and preservingly is in the word is that light which enlightneth the understanding in reasonable