would he expresse against the bold daring Atheists of this Age O! what an ignoble base degenerate uncomfortable thing is Atheisme how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature Ought not the Atheist sooner to dout of his own being than God's For if he be God who made him must needs be Thence Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician composed a Treatise That Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature and is not to be found therein but that they who acknowlege not the true Deitie must necessarily feigne to themselves some false ones as it is mentioned in his Life pag. 71. In sum Atheisme is a proposition so disnatural monstrose and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man that notwithstanding the insolence vanitie and pride of Atheists who endeavor by violence to rase out al notices of a Deitie in their Conscience yet stil they give us some evidences of their fears that there is a Deitie by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities § 2. 1. Vniversal consent for the Existence of God Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheisme having been discussed we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God First That there is a God he demonstrates from the universal consent of al Times and Nations Thus Leg. 10. pag. 887. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But now giving credit to those Traditions which together with their milke they sucked in and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurses who made it their businesse to implant these sentiments on their minds c. Wherein he shews how those that denie the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradition which they sucked in with their mothers milke and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings as hereafter Yea he makes this Hypothesis That there is a God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-evidencing first Principe which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof because Nature it self instructes us therein it being that which the most prostigate men cannot rase out of their Souls Thence Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith That it never came into Controversie among the most of Grecians that there was a God And he gives this reason for it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The knowlege or notion of Gods Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us or engraven on our Natures We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument in Plato's own dialect thus Have not al mankind in al times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deitie Doth not al the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimonie for the existence of a Deitie What made the Egyptians Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multiplied Deities but a notion engraven on their Beings fomented by universal Tradition that there was some supreme Being they owed Hommage unto It 's true their Hommage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object but doth not the act sufficiently argue that they owned a Deitie albeit not the true God Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deitie Was there ever any Nation so barbarous as not to pay Hommage to some supreme Being Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World where professed Atheisme gained place or habitation Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men that God made the World and governes the same Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run not only through al Times Ages and Nations but even through the Principes of human Nature yea in the venes and bloud of men Wel then might Plato say That men sucked it in with their mothers milke So much for inartificial Argument 2. 2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie rationally from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause Thus in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever is produced it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause for it cannot be that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause Then in what follows 〈◊〉 proves the World was made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The World was made because it is seen and touched and has a bodie But it is clear that such things are produced c. Whence he concludes that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe Plato bottomes his demonstration on these two Hypotheses 1 That the World was made 2 That it was made by some precedent Cause 1 That the World was made and not eternal was an Hypothesis generally maintained by al the Philosophers before Aristotle who asserted That the first Mater was eternal and that on a mistaken Principe That nothing could be produced out of nothing But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal because it is sensible and corporeous and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause And his argument may in his own interrogatorie mode be thus improved If the World be eternal must it not also be immutable and invariable Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal For where there are generations and corruptions there must be causes and effects which implie prioritie and posterioritie for the cause naturally precedes the effect but can there be any prioritie and posterioritie in what is eternal If the World was from al eternitie must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been and eternally not have been Must not the present way of Generation and Corruption correspond with the World's Eternitie Doth not our reason yea commun sense assure us that the Worlds present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternitie Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive that one man should beget another successively from al Eternitie Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternitie implie a flat contradiction Moreover doth not generation and corruption suppose an inequal succession of ascent and descent and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being Again if there were an infinite succession of generations and corruptions how is it possible there should be any effect or issue for can there be an end where there is no beginning Against the Eternitie of the World see more largely Derodone L'Atheisme convaincu pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World the Sun Moon c. that it could not be eternal and thence makes good his Hypothesis that it was created by God See also Sr. Charles Wolseley's Vnreasonablenesse of Atheisme Edit 3. pag. 47-64 177. 2 Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause The World made by some prime Cause is That the World was made by some precedent Cause For saith he whatever is produced is produced by some Cause We see nothing but what is produced by somewhat
else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
be a great deep And Psal 97.1 The Lord reigneth let the Earth rejoice Psal 97.1 2. because al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous Yet it follows v. 2. Clouds and darknesse are about him i. e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous yet much darkenesse and mysterious Providences attend it there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures albeit Righteousnesse and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne as it follows Gods Providences are always mater of our Admiration but not of our Comprehension or Imitation To measure Providence by our shallow Reason what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial It 's wel observed in the Life of Padre Paul p. 114. In the successe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired where human prudence vanisheth out of sight it being most certain that in actions there is an eternal force and a long chain of Causes so far without us that neither our knowlege or any consideration of ours can ever come near The workes of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art whereof we see the frame and operations but that which is the interne moving principe and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not So in the workes of Providence we see the Executions and Effects but O! how mysterious are the interne Reasons Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and single Essence And is there not in every worke of Providence something Divine which doth puzle the most sharpe-sighted Reason and hath more in it than the most acute Philosopher can discover And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence but because they cast their eye on some few particulars but consider not the whole frame and complexe It 's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence and is not this the genuine reason why we misjudge and mistake the parts That is not disorder in the whole which seems so in some one particular as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are wel expressed by Damascence Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must saith he admire al the workes of Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 albeit they may appear to many injust because Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible and our cogitations and actions and things future are known to it only Thence he addes towards the close of the Chapter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we must know that there are many modes of the Divine Providence which can neither be explicated by speech nor comprehended by mind § 6. The distributions of Providence From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we passe on to its various Distributions which are for the most part Modal only not Specific As 1 Providence in regard of its Object is distributed into General and Special General Providence is that which respectes althings in general Special Providence that which respectes some under a special relation to God as his people 2 Providence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Mediate and Immediate Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof of which before Immediate Providence is when God produceth Effects without the use of Means 3 Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary Ordinary Providence is when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order which was constituted at first by himself Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production Conservation or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order constituted by himself Of Miracles The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are by a Metonymie of the Effect termed Miracles A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation because the constituted order of Nature being broken the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically in a way of principal efficience produce a Miracle It 's true the Ministers of God have when called to it by him been Instruments of doing Miracles yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental they wrought al in the Name of God in a way of faith and dependence on him and for the manifestation of his Glory Wherefore our Lord Christ by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie without any moral dependence on another gave an evident Conviction and Demonstration of his being God For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience No this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deitie because every Miracle is educed out of nothing either as to the thing it self or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought In Nature and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power and yet the effect is produced that we cal a Miracle which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways 1 When there is no substrate mater at al to worke on 2 If there be a substrate mater yet when the mater is so inhabile and unapt as that it has no natural passive power or capacitie for such an effect Or 3 when there is a natural passive power and capacitie in the substrate mater yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater In al these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence And indeed the very names both Latin Greek and Hebrew import a power extraordinary and Divine To let passe the origination of the Latin which is obvious Miracles are called by the Greeks 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they are Signes of the Divine Efficience and Presence given for the succur of our Faith 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Powers as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence which is most illustrious therein 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prodigies or tremendous Signes such as not only ravish men into admiration but leave also a terror and astonishing stupor on the mind So Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders by reason of the Miracle that is wrought Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which terrefies and astonisheth Al which note that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal Providential Conservation proper to God its formal essential and specific distribution is into Conservative and
Inclination to Sociatle Ib. Consociation constitutes a Politic Bodie or Societie 163 Al Consociation by some Law 164 Perfect Politie requires Amitie and Fraternitie 165. Religion the Principal Ligament of Politic Societie 166. The Ends of Politie 1 Gods Glorie 169 2 To render men Virtuose 170. 3 The Good of the whole 171. 4 Mutual Assistences 172. A Politic Bodie or Citie what Ib. Legislation its Origine 176. The Necessitie of Laws 177. Al Laws Originally from God 178. The Qualification of human Legislators 179. Al Laws from the Multitude Ib. Al Laws for public Good 181. Virtue a principal End of Laws 182. The Qualities of good Laws 183. The Law of Equitie its use 184. Conservators of Laws 185. A Law its Equitie and Constitution 186. Three kinds of Politic Administration Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie 187. Monarchie mixed with Democratie 190. Mixed Politie its use Ib. Moderate Empire best 191. Tyrannie Empire its Origine c. 192. The Evils of Tyrannie 193. Civil Magistrates 1. Their End 194. 2. Their Qualifications 1 Wisdome both Natural and Acquired 195. Knowlege of human Laws and Factes 196. Knowlege of Divine Laws 197. 2 Virtue both Natural and Moral 198. 3 A Public Spirit free from Self-interest Ib. A Magistrates Diet and Richesses 199. 4 His Education and Examen Ib. Scriptural Qualifications 200. A Magistrates Facultie and Authoritie Ib. 1 Divine 2 Human. 201. Magistrates Conservators of Laws 202. The Magistrates Exerclce of his Office 1 With Justice without Briberie 204. 2 With Temperance 205. 3 Moderation 4 Clemence 5 Fidelitie 206. The Effects of Polities Good and Bad 207. Things destructive to Republies 1 Atheisme Ib. 2 Lururie and Idlenesse 208. 3 Prosperitie and Povertie Ib. 4 Divisions 5 Injustice 209. BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie c. CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic in General ARistotle's Metaphysics 210. Metaphysic Sapience what 211. Metaphysic a Natural Sapience 212. Contemplation its proper Act. 213. Contemplation of God best 214. CHAP. II. Of Atheisme and the Existence of a Deitie THe Origine of Atheisme 215. Atheisme 1 From Polytheisme 216. 2 From Vain Philosophie and Policie 217. 3 From Mans Carnal Mind and Pride 218. Three sorts of Atheisme 220. The Monstrose Nature and Pestiferous Influences of Atheisme 221. The Punishment of Atheisme 222. The Existence of God demonstrated 1 From Vniversal consent 223. 2 From the Subordination of second Causes to a First 224. The World made by a Prime Cause 225. 3 From a Prime Motor 228. 4 From the Order of the Vniverse 230. 5 From the Connate Idea of God in the Soul 231. 6 From Practic Arguments 232. 1 From Conscience its Notions and Exercices 233. 2 From the sense of Religion 234. 3 From the Politic World 235. 4 From the Atheistes Cavils and Enmitie 236. CHAP. III. Of God his Names Nature Attributes Unitie and Simplicitie GODs Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being 237. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah 239. Jehovah the proper Name of God 240. The explication of Jehovah and Jah 241. Ehjeh Elohim El Shaddai Adonai 242. Elion Zebaoth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 243. The Divine Essence and Attributes Ib. God not Capable of a Definition 244. Gods Essence Absolute and Independent 245. 1. The Divine Unitie demonstrated 249. 2. The Simplicitie of God Explicated 251. The Simplicitie of God demonstrated 254. CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie Infinitude Eternitie Immensitie and Incomprehensibilitie 3. THe Immutabilitie of God 257. God Immutable 1 In his Essence 259. 2 In his Immanent Acts. 260. 3 In regard of his Word 263. Gods Immutabilitie demonstrated Ib. 4. Gods Infinitude demonstrated 266. 1 By his Independence 267. 2 From his Vnitie and Simplicitie 268. 3 From his Transcendence 269. 4 From the Idea of Perfection 271. 5 From the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God 273. 6 From Gods Infinite Power 274. 5. Gods Eternitie explicated 1 By Scripture 275. 2 By Plato's Philosophemes 276. The Eternitie of God demonstrated 277. What Eternitie is 279. 1 Eternitie not mesurable by time Ib. 2 Eternitie without beginning or end 281. 3 Eternitie most Simple and Vniforme 282. 4 How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time 283. 5 Eternitie a fixed Instant 284. 6 Eternitie the same with the Divine Essence 286. 6. Gods Immensitie and Omnipresence 288. The Explication and Demonstration thereof 1 From the Infinitude of the Divine Essence 290. 2 From Gods Simplicitie Ib. 3 From his Infinite Power and Operations 291. 7. Gods Incomprehensibilitie 292. It s Demonstration by 6 Arguments 294. How far we may apprehend God 296. Against Poetic figments of God Ib. Against Curiositie in our Inquiries after God 297. The least Notices of God of great moment 299. Al Notices of God by Divine Revelation Ib. The Grades or Ascents of Knowing God 1 Natural 300. 1 By way of Causalite 301. 2 By way of Eminence 302. 3 By way of Rematiom 303. 2 Supernatural 1 By Christ Ib. 2 By the Scriptures c. 304. CHAP. V. Of Gods Life Knowlege Wil and Power THe Life of God 305. Life in its generie Notion 306. The Life of God 1 most Spirituose 307. 2 Most Actuose 308. 3 Most Self-moving 309. 4 Life it self 310. 5 Eternal Life 311. 6 The first cause of Life Ib. Gods Science and 〈◊〉 most Perfect 312. The Object of Gods knowlege 313. 1 The Divine Essence Ib. 2 Althings cognoscible 114. The Object of Gods Owniscience 1 Complexe Intelligibles 315. 2 Incomplexe Intelligibles 316. 3 The Human soul 317. God knows althings by his Essence 318. How the Divine Ideas represent althings 321. Gods Science 1 most Simple 322. 2 Intuitive not discursive 323. 3 Immutable and Necessary 325. 4 Most Certain 327. 5 Absolute and Independent Ib. 6 Eternal 329. 7 Infinitely perfect Essentially Intensively Extensively 330. Gods Simple Intelligence 331. Gods Science of Vision 332. God knows things future by his Wil. Ib. Against Scientia Media 334. The Wil of God 336. 1 The Object of the Divine Wil. 337. 2 The Divine Wil one pure Act. 338. 3 The Divine Wil Independent 339. God Independent Physically and Morally 340. 4 The Divine Wil Immutable 343. 5 Gods Wil Absolute not Conditionate 344. 6 Gods Wil Antecedent not Consequent 347. 7 The Divine Wil most perfect 348. 1 Intensively 2 Extensively 349. 3 Effectively 350. 8 The Divine Wil most Free 351. What Indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God 352. 9 Gods Wil Irresistible 353. Gods Wil distributed 1 Into Decretive or Preceptive 355. 2 Into Secret or Reveled 356. 3 Into Complacential Providential and Beneplacite 357. Gods Power Ib. Gods Power his Essence 358. Gods Ordinate Power the same with his Wil. 359. The Object of Gods Power every thing possible 360. What things are Impossible 361. Divine Power Omnipotence 363. CHAP. VI. Of Gods Justice Veracitie and Sanctitie Also of the Trinitie THe Justice of God 365. Gods Absolute Justice as to the afflicting the Innocent and acquitting the Nocent 367. How far Gods Punitive Justice
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
proper only to things sensible and created which fal under the duration and succession of Time 2 That thence they cannot properly be attributed to God who is an Eternal Essence without beginning or succession 3 That HE IS is only properly ascribed to God according to sacred Philosophie Exod. 3.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Esa 43.13 I am he So the Inscription on the Delphic Temple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THOV ART Al which illustrations of Gods permanent Eternitie are included in the Name Jehovah as before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus also the Eternitie of God is lively explicated and illustrated by Plato in his Parmenides p. 140. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But what doth the one God seem to have elder or younger or the same Age that so he may be The same pag. 141. Therefore the one God is neither younger nor elder nor of the same age either in regard of himself or any other thing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore the one God if such can never be in time For that which is in time is it no necessarily elder than it self And is not that which is elder always elder in regard of some junior Therefore that which is always elder than it self must be always younger than it self which is a contradiction He designe is to prove that God being always the same is not senior or junior in regard of himself or any thing else for then he should be always senior and yet always junior in regard of himself Which Argument is indeed demonstrative and cogent Then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If therefore the one God no way participate of time truely he was not ever made or hath been neither is he now made neither shal he ever be made or be He here proves the Eternitie of the one God from his Independence of which more hereafter But the more fully to demonstrate and explicate the mind of Plato and sacred Philosophie touching the Eternitie of God The Eternitle of God demonstrated we shal endeavor 1 to demonstate that God is eternal and then 20 to explicae what this Eternitie of God importes First that God is eternal may be various ways demonstrated As 1 from the Infinitude of the Divine Essence The mode of existence always follows the mode of essence because existence according to the confession of the Scholes addes nothing to essence but Actualitie neither is it indeed really distinct from essence Now duration is nothing else but continued existence whence it necessarily follows that if Gods Essence be infinite his Existence and Duration must be also infinite The Divine Essence necessarily existes of it self and therefore is always in act never in power to be whence it must necessarily be eternal That which is absolutely infinite as to essence can have no principe of its essence and therefore it must be absolutely eternal as to Duration What is infinite cannot give Being to it self for then it should be before and after it self the cause and thing cause independent and dependent in one and the same regard Neither can what is infinite receive Being from another for that other must be finite or infinite it cannot be finite because it is impossible that a finite Principe should give an infinite Being neither can that other be infinite because this would lead us into the labyrinth of a progresse into infinite Hence we may conclude with Plato that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an eternal Essence 2 We may demonstrate the Eternitie of God from his Independence Thus Plato in his Parmenides pag. 141. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The one God doth not participate of Essence i. e. is not Ens by participation as he explicates himself therefore he is eternal So in his I hadrus pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A Principe has no origine for althings arise from a Principe but the first Principe ariseth from nothing neither were it a first Principe if it were originated by some other And if it hath no beginning it can have no end The Argument lies thus That which is independent as to any first Cause or Principe must needs be absolutely eternal Now that God dependes not on any precedent Cause or Principe has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes 3 Gods Eternitie may be demonstrated from his Immobilitie and Immutabilitie Thus Plato Tim. pag. 37. What is always and immutably the same is not elder or younger c. as before Whatever begins or ceaseth to be must sal under motion and mutation for what has beginning hath Being after not-being and whatever has end hath not-being after Being and this in a way of succession and motion But now the immutable God admits not such a succession of Not-being and Being We may not say that ever he was not or that ever he shal not be he never began to be neither shal he ever cease to be but is always the same immutable indivisible Essence Thus Plato in his Philebus pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He determines that the one God is not of those things that have beginning and end And he gives the reason of his Hypothesis namely because it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always one and the same immutable Being which receives not generation nor destruction but is one Firmitie and Constance ie The one God having a Firmitude Constance and Immutabilitie of Being cannot be obnoxious to the Laws of Mutation Generation or Corruption but must be eternal Thus Plato in his Timaeus pag. 27 c. proves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the first Being who is always the same can have neither beginning nor end Thus Plutarch on Gods Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 emgraven on Apollo's Temple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore that which truely is one and the same is eternal without beginning or end 4 The Eternitie of God may be demonstrated from his Perfection The most perfect Being can never begin to be because that which gives Being is more perfect than that which receives the Being conferred Again the most perfect Being must necessarily have the most perfect mode of Duration which is eternal Lastly the most perfect Being cannot depend on any other for any degree of perfection and therefore it cannot begin to be Having demonstrated the Eternitie of God What Eternitie is we now procede to explicate the same so far as sacred Philosophie gives us light and evidence For indeed without divine light it is impossible for mortal man who is confined by Time to contemplate immortal Eternitie Have not many great errors had either origine from proud mens confining the Eternitie of God to the Laws of Time This is incomparably wel expressed by great Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 2. c. 52. These things saith he of Eternitie I have more copiosely discussed because I repute it the most difficult thing for temporal man who is always accustomed to measure things by the differences and laws of
instructes us The least notice of God of great moment That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us So in his Critieas pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he illustrates this Hypothesis thus When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods c. we thinke it sufficient if they give us but any darke representation of them neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a censorious eye on their worke but rest abundantly satisfied in what representation they give us But when they come to draw our own picture or the picture of any that belong to us we more severely animadvert and censure them if they erre in the least point The same is to be observed in the explication of these things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When we discourse of things celestial and divine we thinke our selves abundantly satisfied if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human we are wont to use greater diligence Wherefore if those things which we are now about to discourse of be not so exactly as their dignitie requires represented by us you 'l pardon us An excellent preface to a discourse of things divine touching God which Plato is here entering on Hence 4. Al notices of God by Divine Revelation Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God than his own revelation and illumination shal afford to us So in his Timaeus pag. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It must be remembred both by me that speak and by you who are Judges of my discourses that we have but human Nature and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things touching God c. we may not inquire farther about them That by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation I thinke wil appear evident to any that considers the use of this phrase in Plato Indeed in our contemplations and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to procede further than divine Revelation and Illumination shal conduct us Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God the humble ignorance of which argues more solid knowlege than curiose and vain speculations thereof These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God not only to follow God learning but also to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself so we may not search into what God has kept secret for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude so the later too much pride and curiositie It was a great Saying of Augustin We may safely follow Scripture which as an indulgent mother goes softly that she may not go beyond our infirmitie A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science Al natural reason and investigation about God ought to follow not precede faith Hence 5. The Gradation of our ascent to God Plato informes us That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees by which he descendes to us either in his workes or words Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509 c. he informes us That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majestie of the chiefest Good as it is in its inaccessible splendor yet we may ascend thereto by certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gra es or degrees which Grades of Ascent must be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Descent unto us that so we may by a certain Analogie and similitude ascend up to the knowlege of God so far as it is possible for man Yet he gives us this needful caution That we must speake soberly of these so great Mysteries and take heed that we ascribe not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious birth to the Parent of the Vniverse The grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either natural or supernatural 1. Natural Grades of knowing God The natural Grades or Degrees whereby God descendes down to us and we ascend up to him are al the Effects Products and Workes of God with al their Virtues Efficaces Orders Varieties and al manner of Perfections So Plato Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Causalitie he saith Al natural Causes and Effects are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Workes Artifices and Children of God the great Parent of the Vniverse whereby we may ascend up to the knowlege of God This is more natively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophie Rom. 1.19 20. as Rom. 1.19 20. where he saith the visible workes of God as so many ascents lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God specially his eternal power and Godhead That there is a natural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident albeit the Socinians to serve their Hypothesis denie it This natural knowlege of God is either insite or acquisite So Dion Prusaeensis said that our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persuasion of God was either innate or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite Our insite and innate knowlege of God consistes in those commun notices of God both speculative and practic which are impressed on the Conscience Our acquisite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the workes of God This acquisite knowlege may according to the distribution of that spurious Dionysius who was indeed a great Platonist cap. 2. de Myst Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways by way of Causalitie by way of Eminence by way of Negation 1 By way of Causalitie when by the Effects of God 1. By way of Causalitie which are either little Images or at least Vestigia Footsteps of God we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God the original Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature impresse and ressemblance of its Cause as you frequently see the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child Thus Plato Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface that it was impossible to comprehend yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majestie in himself he tels us That he would inquire after him in his off-spring or effects and then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but take heed lest I should against my wil give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent He speakes in the language of Aratus cited by Paul Act. 17.28 we are al his off-spring Act. 17.28 and applies this notion to al lower goods which he makes to be the off-spring or issue of the chiefest Good and therefore by them we ascend up to the
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
God An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would nor forced to do what he would not a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent unless it has at least equal power How then is it possible that a poor infirme impotent Creature should resist the Divine Wil Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing being not to be hindred or frustrated any manner of way For who knows not that it altogether follows if God can do any thing and wil do it he doth it c. But of this more when we come to the Causalitie of God C 7. § 4. Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil Gods Wil 1. Decernent or preceptive we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Wil as has been demonstrated we may distribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehensions 1. into Decernent or Decretive and Legislative or Preceptive Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is usually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti and his Legislative Preceptive Wil Voluntas Signi This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophie for God is oft said in Scripture to wil things that are never offected as the salvation of Reprobates or the like which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Wil but may very wel of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this distinction we are to consider 1 That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly said to be his Wil but his voluntas signi or preceptive Wil is only equivocally or analogically and figuratively such Gods decretive Wil is the Divine essence decreeing althings and so properly and univocally stiled his Wil but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil 1 Metaphorically as Princes signifie their interne wil by their externe commands which are thence termed their Wil. 2 Metonymically as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleasure Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the wil of God as Sanderson De Obligat Conscient p. 132. Davenant against Hoard p. 392. and Ruiz prove Hence 2 Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are disparate or diverse but not opposite The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other but the wil decreeing and the wil commanding do not oppose each other because they are not ad idem the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law or the measure of his operation and permission but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law or the Rule of our operation and offices The Decree of God determines what he wil do or not do the Precept what we ought to do or not to do Gods Decernent Wil or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of al his actings towards the Creature but his Reveled Wil is the sole Rule Reason and Measure of al the Creatures actings towards him 3 The Decretive Wil of God is ever Absolute efficacious and particular but the preceptive wil of God is sometimes absolute sometimes conditionate sometimes universal sometimes particular sometimes efficacious and sometimes not 4 Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent called in Scripture his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good pleasure which is the measure of his own Affects and Effects But Gods preceptive wil is externe and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects but only of our Dutie 2. Gods secret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29 Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled which is much the same with the precedent mentioned Deut. 29.29 The secret things belong unto the Lord our God but things which are reveled unto us i. e. Gods secret Wil is the measure of his operation but his reveled wil of ours So Prov. 25.2 It 's the Glorie of God to concele a thing Gods wil is stiled secret 1 as the things he wils are unknown to us 2 as the causes and reasons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us 3 as it is as it were the Law Rule or measure of his Divine operations Gods reveled wil is so termed because it is his pleasure reveled either in his Word or Workes every act of Gods Providence shews somewhat of his Wil as wel as his Word 1 Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promissive or preceptive Reveled promisses are the measure of Gods Benefices towards us Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God 2 Gods reveled providential Wil is either directive or afflictive There is a conformitie which the rational Creature owes to each of these reveled wils of God To the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due to the promissive reveled wil there is an obedience of faith due to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission Resignation and Dependence due Lastly this reveled wil of God is never opposite to albeit it be oft diverse from his secret wil and the reason is because they are not about the same object Gods secret wil regards the events of things his reveled wil the duty of man either active or passive 3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Wil into Complacential Gods Wil Complacential Providential and Beneplacite Providential and Beneplacite 1 Gods Complacential Wil is his simple complacence in al the good Actions Habits and Events of men yea it extendes not only to moral but to natural goods as Gen. 1.31 There is a perpetual necessary volition in God which taketh pleasure in al good whether create or increate Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good This they cal Gods Love of simple complacence of which see Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 6. § 2. p. 38. and Disp 19. p. 214. 2 Gods Providential Wil is that whereby he is said to wil and intend an end when he in his providence either graciose or commun affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it As where God sends his Gospel he may be said really to intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent albeit they are not al saved because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same were they but really embraced and improved In this regard Davenant and others affirme that Christs death is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an universal remedie applicable to al and that God by his Voluntas Providentiae as Aquinas stiles it intended it as such This intention or wil of God
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the progenie of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
Rector of althings Thus we may applie Eccles 8.4 Where the word of a King is there is power or Domination and who can say to him what doest thou i. e. by how much the more Soverain any person is by so much the greater is his Domination God being King of Kings and Lord of Lords must necessarily be most Absolute in Power and Domination This is oft inculcated by Plato and carries with it its own Evidence For 1 althings receiving their Being Perfection Virtue and Operation from God it cannot be but that he should have an Absolute Dominion and Soverain Empire over them 2 Althings tend to God as their last end therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end it 's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end Thus Aquinas 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good it 's necessary that the Gubernation of the world be best But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one c. 3 God is infinitely wise to order althings and potent to bring them to their ends therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato Leg. 10. p. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who is most wise both can and wil take care of his own Creatures c. 4 The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of althings For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made Whatever flows from God as the first Cause must returne to him as the last end 5 This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation to see that althings reach the end for which they were made For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made unlesse they be directed and governed by the same power which made them It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the worke he made to the end for which it was made And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of althings Hence 2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things The last end of Divine Gubernation What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to some last end And what is the last end of althings but the Glorie of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag 903. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us persuade this young man that he who by his providence takes the care of the whole that he may conserve and adorne it with necessary virtue doth wisely dispose and order althings to this end the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into al parts of the Vniverse according to their nature Whereby he explicates to us how God doth order and dispose althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie This he more fully lays open in what follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But thou knowest not that al generation of singulars is for this that the life of the whole may be blessed his Essence is not for thy sake but thou wert made for his sake For every Physician and every skilful Artificer makes al for the sake of the whole aspiring after the commun utilitie Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part but the part for the sake of the whole But thou art ful of indignation because thou canst not see how that which is best may accord with the commun good and thy proper interest Here are several things remarquable for explication and demonstration that the Glorie of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation 1 He saith Al singulars are for this that the life of the whole may be blessed Why may we not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the whole understand God That Plato sometimes understandes God by this notion specially in his Timaeus pag. 90. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contemplations of the whole c. I could easily persuade my self 2 But grant that we must understand this of the Vniverse strictly taken yet it must at last be resolved into God for is not the Universe and althings else for Gods sake not God for the sake of the Universe 3 Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer who workes al for the sake of the whole and is not the Divine Bonitie and Glorie that great Vniversitie or whole into which al lower ends must be melted 4 Plato blames his young Atheist and in him the most of men for preferring their private good before the good of the whole which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God That althings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation for the Glorie of God is manifest 1 From the prime motion and causalitie of God For God being the prime Motor of althings and moved by nothing it thence necessarily follows that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himself as the last end The order of ends necessarily answers the order of Agents the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of althings 2 From Gods Dominion over althings Every Agent has power to use his own workes for the end he made them and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands Has he not then power to use them for his own Glorie 3 From the perfection which althings acquire by subserving the Glorie of God By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie by so much the more perfect it is and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine Bonitie by how much the more subservient it is to the Glorie of God It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius The supreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itself which al desire as their last end and by which they al subsist as their most perfect end Hence 3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and reduceth althings to their last end is most fixed The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed Esa 40.26 immobile and perfect This according to sacred Philosophie is wel expressed Esa 40.26 Lift up your eyes on high and behold who hath created these things that bringeth out their host by number he calleth them al by name by the greatnesse of his might for that he is strong in power not one faileth Observe here 1 he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God 2 He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation 3 He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things specially the Celestial bodies by bringing out their host by number O! what an accurate order do al the Celestial bodies observe in their motions Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by
Divine Gubernation Doth not every one keep its ranke and slation performe its office and move most regularly according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it Thence it follows And calleth them al by name i. e. has an accurate knowlege of and command over al as a wise General that can cal al his Souldiers by name whose beck and nod every one obeys Such is the admirable Dexteritie and Domination of Divine Gubernation But whence springs al this that follows By the greatnesse of his might The magnitude of Divine Power is the cause of his admirable fixed Gubernation because he is omnipotent therefore it is impossible that he should fail in his Gubernation Thus it follows For that he is strong in power not one faileth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 faileth or is deprived i. e. of that fixed order and station which Divine Gubernation has allotted to it there is not one that detractes its office but al subserve the Divine order Thus Plato in his Phado p. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is the eternal Mind that disposeth althings in the best order and is the cause of al And thus I determined with my self if it be so that this gubernative dispositive Mind doth thus dispose althings then althings are placed in that station and ranke where they may be most rightly constituted The Stoics also as Laertius in Zeno assures us held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence which disposeth althings in the best manner This gubernative Providence as it includes a fixed order and series of causes and effects they called Fate which they made to be a connexe series of things or reason whereby the world was governed So Chrysippus said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of althings mutually following each other from al eternitie by an immutable and inviolable complication Whereby indeed they seem to understand no other than the series and order of Divine Gubernation decreed by God from al eternitie So Stobaeus in his Physics explicates their mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The reason of those things which are governed in the world by Providence And that this was the original import of the Stoic Fate we are assured by Seneca Minutins Faelix Lud. Vives and others Thus Robert Grosseteste that great Philosopher as wel as Divine in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie We must know saith he that Fate may be taken for Providence according to Boetius Lib. Consol Philos 4. who saith that Fate is the same with Providence yet they may admit different considerations because Providence is that Divine Reason in the Soverain of althings which disposeth althings but Fate is the disposition inherent in things mobile by which Providence knits them together in their proper orders In what follows he proves out of Cicero Boetius and others that Fate is really the same with Providence of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. § 5. Hence 4. None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernation Prop. No second cause can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation And the reason is evident because this Gubernation of God intrinsecally includes not only a prudent provision of the best means but an efficacious execution of them so as they shal infallibly reach their end It 's true wicked men oft do substract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of Gods preceptive Gubernation but yet they cannot totally withdraw themselves from the order of Gods providential Gubernation whiles they violate the moral and sacred order of Divine precepts do they not fal into the penal order of Divine punishments Yea oft do not those very means which they use to violate the Divine order Gen. 11.4 promove the same Thus Gen. 11.4 And they said Go to let us build us a citie and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven and let us make us a name lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth You see their designe in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God or to secure themselves against a dispersion and scattering and yet lo the wise Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel v. 8. which they intended as a means to prevent their dispersion the cause thereof as v. 8. So the Lord scattered them abroad c. And yet out of this very dispersion which they feared and felt Divine Gubernation brought another sacred order even for the peopling the whole Earth Thus the most unnatural confusions are ordered by Divine Gubernation the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may seem to obstruct or pul it down whiles men endeavor to escape one order of Divine Gubernation they fal into another 5. The Order of Gods Gubernation a Law Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation whereby althings are appointed and reduced to their end has the force and efficace of a Law Thence Plato termes this Order of Divine Gubernation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Adrastie i. e. Gods fixed Order So Pindar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Regal Law of althings i. e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has constituted for the Gubernation of althings This Law whereby Divine Gubernation orders and disposeth things as it refers to things inanimate and Brutes comprehendes in it al those Natural Instinctes Instigations Inclinations and Propensions whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and usages Do not things Natural which are not invested with rational notices or spontaneitie certainly observe some Laws and Dictates of Nature which you may assoon banish them from their Natures as divest them of Are not the several kinds of their Operations constantly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end albeit they know not what they do nor why Doth not the silly Bird curiosely frame its neast and the simple Bee its cel always after the same forme and figure and so in al other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes what a fixed Order is there agreable to the Law of their Beings And whence comes al this but from the infinite Wisdome and Gubernation of the Divine Mind who conductes things most irrational in the most intelligent prudent manner to their ends May we not then conclude that the Natural Generations and Operations of althings procede from that Universal Law engraven on their Beings whereby they are by the wise Conduct of Divine Gubernation directed to their respective Ends In sum this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation consistes 1 In the Natural Principes of things 2 In their Natural Inclinations 3 In al Natural Instinctes and Impulses of Nature 4 In their Obediential Capacities or Powers whereby they are ready to receive any
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man