lived till he was allmost a thousand It seemes the sent of Plotinus his subtilties hathe perfumed all those that have dwelt under his shadowe and therfore no merveyle if Ficinus commenting upon him savoureth herof allso He compares you say liternitie to a center and time to the points or extreamities of the line in the circumference allwaye moovinge about the Center so that if it were an eye it might viewe them all at once I doubt not but ere we depart from this chapter we shall meete with the Circumference of eternitie as well as with the center of it but not from Plotinus his text or Ficinus his Commentaries but from one that will be bolde to adde a Gemora to theyr Talmud For it is fitt the World should profite in subtilties as well as in solid points and not allwayes to stand at a stay But a woord of this by the way Though future times and future things are all knowne to God yet not by reason of any existence of theyrs in eternitie or Gods coexistence with them for the present For how dothe God at this time coexist with them which at this time have no existence at all Agayne God lookes not out of himselfe for the knowledge of any thinge now more then he did before the World was made For surely the making of the World wrought no change in him as touching the manner of his knowledge with whom there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change When you take upon you to tell us how Eternitie is indivisible to witt by conteyning all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner then can be conteyned in time it selfe I pray remember that in like manner you professed that God did conteyne all entities even the entities of brute beasts and you expoâ—nded it in this sense because forsoothe he was able to produce them And thus we easily grant God conteynes all perfections of successions in as much as he can produce them If so be succession may be coumpted a perfection wherof but erst you made doubt whether it had any being at all Yet we doubt not but God can produce them yea so farre forthe as to exceede all that is conteyned in time For as much as he could have made the duration of the World tenne times more then it is like to be I doe not affect to quarrell with Plato his witt much good doe you with it and if you please your selfe with such fancies as namely that time is a moovable image of that which is unmooveable a divisible image of that which is indivisible a successive representation of that which is without all succession a modell finite with beginning and ende of that whicâ— is infinite without beginning and ende you shall not displease me You have another sophisme or seeming contradiction to unloose or salve by these rarities of curiositie and that is how it may be verified that Petrus in aeternitate aegrotat Petrus in aeternitate non aegrotat If this were spoken of the same time you say it were contradiction but being spoken of eternitie you say it is not and yet you confesse Eternitie is more indivisible then any time Let who will thinke that you have salved this knott of seeming contradiction to my understanding you leave it as you finde it The propositions conteyning a seeming contradiction are bothe absurd For Peter cannot be sayde to be sicke in eternitie as in that which is the measure of duration eythe of himselfe or of his siknes but only in time with which time eternitie I confesse is coexistent but when not till the time that Peters sicknes dothe exist nor after it hathe ceased to exist For coexistence supposethe existence on both sides And as the existence of the creature is past present or to come so is Gods coexistence with it eyther past present or to come which hathe bothe Scripture reason to warrant it whereas your wilde conceytes are warrantable by neither 6. Materia prima is ingenerable and incorruptible not because it is no body but because it is no compound body But God is ingenerable and incorruptible because he is no body at all Therefore better it is to liken him unto the Angells who are ingenerable and incorruptible because they are Spirits All thinges generable come from matter only as touching their materiall parts not as touching their formes neyther can they be sayde so properly to spring from it as to be compounded of it But from God all things spring in the way of an efficient cause yea the matter it selfe allso and that out of nothing If matter be most unlike him in wanting the true unitie of entitie other things belike have this And if they have unitie of entitie it is to be hoped they have true entitie allso veritie being the propertie of entitie as well as unitie and consequently they may be sayde to have a true beinge which you hertofore that very often have made proper and peculiar unto God I wonder why you make the Creator and essence it selfe to be termes of equall signification wheras God is not the creator of all things by his essence but by his freewill rather Those things which necessarily belong to God are usually ascribed unto him by way of essence but not such things as contingently denominate him arisinge from the libertie and freedome of his will God you say is the incomprehensible perfection of all things doe you meane of things create only or only of things increate or of bothe You cannot meane it of things create For no create perfection is found in God Nor of increate For no imperfection at all is founde in essence increate The Earthe is not unmooveable some have conceaved it to moove naturally Vndoubtedly it may be mooved otherwise it were not Corpus naturale And Earthquakes doe manifest as much If it cannot be mooved by the force of Man yet by prayer of faith Mounteynes may be remooved and cast into the Sea yet it may be mooved questionles by the force of Angells at least by the power of God Neyther is infinite vigour of vitalitie required to an immoveable condition in the opinion of greater Clerkes then our selves as who thinke all Angells to be no way capable of locall motion Yet you talke of a mobilitie of the Deitie a prodigious phrase thoughe you thinke to charme it by calling it more then infinite and calling the motion therof a supermotion and this his mobilitie as well as his immobility formerly spoken of you make to proceede from the infinite vigour of his vitalitie Nor dothe eternitie say you receave addition from succession infinite Belike it receaves succession in your opinion though no addition therby For if it receaves no succession at all what sober man coulde expect that it should receave addition by it At lengthe you come towards that which I have a long time looked for Eternitie you say is like to a fixed center because indivisibly immutable but
acknowledged by all Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God as Aristotle and his Followers have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe And therfore unles the contrary be prooved these Philosophers confuted we have herby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this truthe by the light of reason That there is a God and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost And therfore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense but rather you extende the word limites or boundes to a greater generalitie of signification in which sense you woulde have it supposed that All thinges besides God himselfe have limite and boundes of beinge not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable but in regard that they are Entia finita which is out of question In like sort the woord being is of ambiguous signification For it may be taken eyther for beinge of essence or for beinge of existence The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby thinges are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende and that at such a time or other But the limits boundes of thinges according to their essence are such in respect wherof Entia are sayde to be finiâ—a or infinita Nowe in this latter sense your proposition hathe bene very questionable amongst the most learned Philosophers that have bene For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted but that this visible World was finite Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it is no where evident Nay he opposethe Plato the rest before him who maynteyned that the World was made so accordingly that it had a beginninge wherby it seemes that he denyinge the creation of the World denyed therwithall that the World had any efficient cause And indeede whosoever maynteynes that the world had a beginning by creation must therwithall maynteyne that eyther it was made of somethinge or of nothinge You will not say that t is a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter which matter had existence without creation For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe Therfore you must be driven to maynteyne that it is a truthe evident of it selfe that the World was made originally out of nothinge or at least that it may be immediately concluded evidently by a principle which is evident of it selfe thus Whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made the World hath boundes of beinge therfore it hath bene made and seing it was not made of any thing pre-existent therfore it was made of nothing Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceaved it to be a thing impossible that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement herof not to any naturall evidence but only unto faithe as where the Apostle saythe by faithe we believe that the World was made so that things which we see were made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not of things that doe 2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position tell us that this maxime is simply convertible thus Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge because it hathe beginninge of beinge For omnis causa principium omne causatum principiatum There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this For to say that a proposition is simply convertible is in a Logicall phrase to say that it is a good consequence which is drawne from the proposition converted to the convertent that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made But this is untrue of the proposition convertible which you speake of For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion but only an Vniversall negative a particular affirmative But I leave your wordes and take your meaninge You say it is allso true that Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge Nowe bothe this proposition is naught and the reason worse For the Sonne of God the second person in Trinity hathe cause of beinge from his Father for he is begotten of him And the H. Ghost hathe cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne For he proceedethe from them bothe Yet neyther God the Sonne nor God the holy Ghost have any limits of their beinge If you say the Persons are limited thoughe the nature of the Godhead be not I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father For of the Sonne and H. Ghost I knowe no other limitation then this that the Sonne is not the Father nor the H. Ghost Likewise the H. Ghost is neyther the Father nor the Sonne And in this sense the Father is limited as much as eyther For as the Sonne is not the Father so the Father is not the Sonne and as the H. Ghost is not the Father so the Father is not the H. Ghost You shoulde have sayde All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation have allso limits or bounds of being Or thus All thinges that have cause of beinge in time and not from everlastinge have limits and boundes of beinge Or if you woulde apply it to generation thus All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge Yet none of these is to the purpose save the first And that first proposition supposethe the creation which yet is not evident but unto faithe So then you see howe weake this proposition is Yet the reasons you bring for the proofe of it are much woorse Your first reason is this because it hathe beginninge of beinge Nowe if by limits of beinge you meane limits of existence such as is the beginninge of duration then your proofe is merely identicall But if you meane by limits of beinge limits of essence wherby a thing is sayde to be Ens sinitum the consequence is true I confesse but nothing more evident is the conclusion by this reason then it was before of it selfe For that it hathe a cause efficient which producethe it dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced then that it hathe a beginninge Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue that the effect produced is finite unles the efficient cause be finite For to say that a finite thinge coulde produce an effect infinite is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity But there is no place for this exception in case the efficient cause be infinite And I have knowne some inferre herehence that the World is infinite Otherwise say they there shoude be no effect of God
attributes are The other That they doe not consider that the absolute infinitie of this his eternall happinesse is an essentiall cause of goodnesse unto all others so farre as they are capable of it As for the first of these what Heathen Philosopher that acknowledged the making of the world that acknowledged a God did ever doubt of his eternall happinesse and that as infinite as any other of his attributes As touching the other doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much when he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God and did this make them as happy as they might be It is true indeed their goodnesse they conceived to be from themselves Det vitam det opes animum mihi ipse parabo And doe not you I pray concurre with them in this even in this place For although you carry it in generall termes when you say he is the cause of all goodnesse yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodnesse as when you say God is a cause of goodnesse to all that are capable of it and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are none but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse And where is any mention of Christ Iesus in all this where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this which you make sufficient to bring them unto happinesse It is true God cannot be the author of evil of sin but God forbid that we should so maintaine God to be no Author of evill as withall to deny him to be the author of good Speake plainly doe you beleeve that God is the author of faith that God it is who gives repentance that workes in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure if you beleeve this then you must beleeve that God did decree to give men faith and repentance But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed who professe that God doth decree contingency but not things contingent And who doubts but the faith of Peter and his repentance the faith of Paul and his repentance were contingents and if God did never decree them surely he was not the author of them for God doth nothing in time but what he decreed to doe before all time And in case you did truly acknowledge God to bee the cause of all goodnesse we would not quarrell with you about the terme essentiall which with what learning you deliver I professe I know not but I observe you are very liberall of your words and phrases we were never acquainted with any more then foure causes can you tell us which of them is called by any essentiall unlesse matter and forme be called essentiall because they constitute the essence of that whose matter and forme they are But I hope you will not say that God in this sense is the essentiall cause of all our goodnesse CHAP. XII Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature I doe not like this Title the disjunctive argueth that Gods goodnesse communicative as communicative is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature I know no patterne of morall goodnesse which we must imitate but that which is commended unto us in Gods Law Gods communicative goodnesse was exercised in making of the World and us Is this a fitt patterne for us to imitate As touching his providence whereby he governs the World we are called by our Saviour to imitate him in some particulars as when he suffereth his rayne to fall and Sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good But in most particulars we can not in many we may not imitate him He caused two shee beares to come out of the wood and teare 42. children that mocked Elisha we must not imitate God in the like we must still blesse them that curse us and pray for them that persecute us The sense of imbecillity and indigence in our selves even in this corrupt state of man doth only provoke us the more to shewe pitty unto others in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. Dâ—do Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco But it doth not breede it for it is manifest that men litle exercised with the Crosse or not at all may shewe more mercy then such as have beene in great misery themselves Yet these mercifull natures having tasted of misery themselvs will be the more provoked to shew compassion unto men in misery 2. And this is true not onely in the corrupt state of man but even in the state of integrity for is it not sayd of our Saviour that being tempted himselfe he knew how to succour them that are tempted It is now a dayes without question among divines that mercy and pitty as they signify passions are not in God but attributed unto him per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as are the members of our body also But the will of succouring creatures in their necessity may with propriety enough be attributed unto God for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly Father how much more is his love enlarged towards man who when they were sinners sent his Sonne to dy for them and when they lay weltring in their blood sayd unto them live And washed them with water yea washed away their blood from them and anoynted them with oyle Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery and this will and grace and favour of God is in Scripture phrase called mercy But he sheweth this mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth I wonder you should applaud that saying Nemo sponte malus which hath no colour of truth Save in respect of originall sinne traduced to Adams posterity of which originall sinne the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant And you in another sense treading the authors stepps seeme to mainteyne it not in respect of any naturall corruption that hath sowred our natures but in respect rather of the perfection of our soules and their native inclination unto good for externall things you say doe so captivate the humane soule that she cannot doe as she would but these strings being cut she followeth her native sway And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this Nemo sponte malus manifesting thereby that you acknowledge the native sway of the soule to be unto good But by the way you cast your selfe upon an erroneous assertion convictable of untruth by the very light of nature as when you say that externall things doe captivate the soule as if the object had power to the will which is a conceipte contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity And nothing indeed but a mans owne corruption is it that captivates him unto evill For let
generations as of thâ— Sonne by the Father the progresse upwardes cannot be infinite Therfore at lengthe we must ascend to thâ— first of Men as Adam who was not borne by generation of Man for then he had not bene thâ— first but otherwise and in like sort of the generations of all other thinges that they had their beginninge from some superior cause to their owne natures which supreame cause of all we accoumpt to be God But yet I thinke you are not ignorant that some Schoolemen maynteyne the world might have bene everlastinge and that by creation in which case there shoulde be an infinite progressâ— in generations unles as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeminge contradictions in Aristotle to praevent an infinite number of immortall soules hence ensuinge devisethe that thoughe the World had bene from everlastinge yet shoulde it not be necessary that there shoulde have bene an infinite number of Men deceased because saythe he God coulde have praeserved the first Man from generation propagation of his like untill some five or sixe thousand yeares agoe so you shoulde take some such course to praevent an infinite progresse in naturall generations But I meane not to put you to any such shifts For I holde creation from everlastinge to be a thing impossible and that the impossibility therof may be made evident by demonstration and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned to be of a thing merely impossible allso So that in fine this argument of yours though with litle accuratenes proposed by you is drawne from the creation which kinde of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of till another time yet in the first place you have fallen upon it ere you are aware Bradwardine writinge against the Pelagians layethe downe two suppositions as the ground of all wherof this is the second that there is no infinite progresse in entities but that in every kinde there is one supreame The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more And least he should seeme to suppose this without all proofe one argument but one he produceth to prove this And the proofe is to this effect It implyeth no contradiction to say such a one there is therfore it is necessary that such a one have beinge it is impossible there shoulde be no God If any Man deniethe the Antecedent it behooveth him to shewe wherin the contradiction dothe consist And it is very strange so strange as incredible that for the best nature to have existence it shoulde imply contadiction As for example we finde these manifest capitall degrees of perfection amongst entities corporall Some liave only beinge some have beinge life allso some have beinge life and sence some unto all these adde reason allso Nowe that nature which includes bothe being life is of greater perfection then such as have beinge without life and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist Agayne that nature which includes bothe beinge life and sense is of greater perfection then that which includes only beinge and life without sense and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist Agayne that nature which besides all these in the notion therof includes reason allso is of farre greater perfection then the former and it implyeth no contradiction for natures of such perfection to existâ— Lastly there are besides all these natures purely spirituall which we call Angells or Intelligences of farre greater perfection then natures materiall corporall it implyethe no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist as the Philosopher hathe demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all materiall concretion Why then shoulde it imply any contradiction for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist unles they are supposed to be of greatest perfection even able to make a World out of nothinge and consequently to be of a necessary beinge themselves For if possible not to be howe is it possible they shoulde atteyne to beinge Not of themselves For that which is not hathe no power to give being to it selfe Nor of any other whether of a nature superior or inferior Not of any of inferior nature For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angell neyther by generation nor by creation If by a superior this is to acknowledge that there is a nature existent superior in perfection unto Angells And if Angells had a necessary being then seinge they are of a certeyne number their number allso must be necessary Nowe if it implyeth no contradiction that God shoulde be it is most necessary that he is and must necessarily be granted that he is For being supposed to include greatest perfection if he had no being it were impossible he shoulde have beinge seing nothinge can bring it selfe from nothinge to beinge neyther can ought els produce him For if any thinge coulde then that whatsoever it were shoulde be of greater perfection then he This is the argument of Bradwardin And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before and but one of the five wayes which he takes in the proofe of this The first way more manifest as he saythe is that which is taken from the consideration of motion wher hence he concludethe that we must at lengthe ascend to one who moovethe and is not mooved that is the first moover which saythe he all understand to be God The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient For saythe he we finde even in insensible thinges an order of efficient causes one subordinate to another wherin he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progresse secondly that nothing can be the efficient cause of itselfe Hence it followeth saythe he we must ascend rest in one supreame efficient which acknowledgethe no efficient of it and that all understand to be God The third way is that which hathe bene allready prosecuted from the consideration comparison of thinges possible with thinges necessary The fourthe is from the degrees that we finde in thinges as some thinges are more or lesse true more or lesse good more or lesse noble whence he concludes that somethinge must be acknowledged to be most true most good most noble that to be the cause of truthe goodnes perfection in all others as fire is the cause of all heate And that which is the cause of all others we acknowledge to be God The first and lastis drawne from the governement of the World the consideration of the order of thinges amongst themselves whence he concludethe there is some thinge that orderethe them and that must be God This last argument is that which Raymund Sebond dothe so much dilate insist upon And wherof he is very confident like as of the successe of his undertakings in generall as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine within the space of a monthe and that without any knowledge to
prepare him so much as the knowledge of Grammar yet he shall not be proud of it neyther Vasquius further telleth us that Aegidius was of opinion that this truthe that there is a God is a truthe knowne of it selfe And albeit Thomas Aquinas denyethe it to be a truthe per se notam quoad nos Yet in it selfe he professethe that it is per se nota for as much as the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject And to my judgement it seemes allso to be so quoad nos if it be duly considâ—red pondered what we understand by God to witt the most perfect nature of all others Nowe howe is it possible that that which is more pâ—rfect then all others shoulde not have beinge And every man knowes that that which hathe beinge is more perfect then that which neyther hathe nor can have beinge such as is the nature of God if it have no beinge For according to the Proverbe a live Dogge is better then a dead Lyon In the next place you inquire wherunto you shall liken him This indeede was the second thinge you proposed to be inquired into But in what congruitie to a Philosophicall or Theological discourse I leave it to others to examine I will be content to summe up the accoumpt of what you deliver rather then to argue the unseasonablenes of such a discourse Thoughe nothing can exactly resemble him yet somâ— thinge you say can better notify howe farre he is beyond all resemblance then others But truly what you meane herby is a mystery unto me I shoulde rather thinke the incomprehensible nature of God is not to be manifested by way of resemblance drawne from inferior thinges That he is the cause of all thinges dothe better represent the nature of God then the resemblance of him to any thinge especially consideringe what cause he is to witt an â—fficient cause of all thinges and that not univocall but equivocall consequently such as comprehendes all thinges eminently but in perfection without comparison beyond them For comparison hathe place only betweene things agreeinge in kinde or in proportion But God and his creatures agree in neyther This I confesse may drawe to admiration As the Philosopher who beinge demaunded what God was required three dayes libertie to put in his answeare and at three dayes ende required three more at the ende of these three dayes more giving this reason of his reiterated demurring upon the matter because the more he gave himselfe to thâ— contemplation of the nature of God the farther he foundâ— himselfe of from comprehendinge it but wheras you adde that such admiration will more more enlarge our longinge after his presence I doe no way like eyther your collection or the phrase wherby you expresse it For as for the presence of God of the very apprehension therof we are not capable in this World but by faithe Neyther can any naturall admiration arising from naturall inquisition after the nature of God consideration of the fruiteles issue therof drawe men to a longing after that presence of God which they knowe not Bothe the knowledge of the presence of God and a longinge desire after it I take to be a woorke of speciall grace and not any woorke of nature upon the power wherof I finde you doaâ—e too much in all your writings Painters you say can more exactly expresse the outward lineaments of thinges then we their natures Painters expressions are in colours our expressions are not so but rather in woordes And what a wilde comparison is it to compare thinges so heterogeneall in exactnes But though the expression of the one fayle in exactnes in comparison of the other yet the delight taken therin you say needes not And thus you plot to make the love of God a woorke of nature wherunto the naturall conceptions of him though nothing exact by meanes of the creature may leade us These conceptions of yours are in my judgement as farre from truthe as from pietie The frequent ebbes flowings of Euripus may cast a Philosopher into admiration not comprehending the reason of it yet bringe him nothing the more in love with it Angells are of very glorious natures in a manner quite out of the reach of our reason bothe touching their being in place their motion their understandinge the communicatinge of their thoughts exercising of their power yet all this bringeth us never a whit the more in love with them Impressions of love are wrought only by the apprehension of goodnes in the object which alone makes thinges amiable as a beautifull picture affecteth the sense with pleasure and delight But nowe I finde that from the impression of love you slip I knowe not howe to the impression of truthe this I confesse delightethe some mindes of purer metall as Aristotle speakes of the delight that a Man takes in the demonstration wherby it is prooved that the Diameter in a squate hathe no common dimension with the sides of it or that a triangle hathe three angles equall to two right Especially if the conclusion be rare long sought after but not founde as the squaring of a circle receaved as knowable in Aristotles dayes thoughe not knowne till of late as Pancirolla writes Salmuly in his commentaries upon him about 30. yeares before that time Yet some speculations may be as vayne as curious as to proove that two Men in the World there are that have iust so many hayres on their head one as another But to make a rayne bowe in the ayre by ocular demonstration proove the truthe of that which reason concludes namely that as often as a raynbowe appeares in the cloudes though it seeme but one yet indeede there are as many as there are Men that beholde it because it discoverethe a secret of nature very curious and nothing vayne For it is the glory of God to hide a thinge and it is the glory of a Kinge to finde it out And seeinge God hathe set the World in Mans heart thoughe a Man cannot finde out the woorke that God hath wrought from the beginninge to the ende yet it is good to be doinge to discover as much as we can especially such as have a calling herunto But to proceede you put your Reader in hope of great matters by your perfourmances namely to have a sight of some scattered rayes of a glorious light which Saints have in blessednes and to this purpose to elevate us to a certeyne Horizon whose edges and skirts shall discover this Thus you phrasify the matter gloriously prosecute your allegory in allusion to the brightnes that appeares in our Horizon after the Sunne set But surely that Sunne did never yet rise upon us and when it dothe surely it shall never sett And I much doubt least the glory of your phrases proove to be all the glory we are like to be acquainted with before we part Hence you proceede to a
certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole and for avoydance of all vacuity I see no reason for that other assertion of yours that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall but rather is limited in them What thinke you of the soules of men doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter Materia prima was accoumpted in our Vniversitie to have dimensiones in determinatas and that it receaved the determination therof from formes but by the operation of Agents in their severall generations I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God who is the God of nature as well as of grace But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature as the World hathe dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof is such a question wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe our acknowledgement of the Creation 4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge can have no limits or boundes of beinge This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge the same hathe no beginninge of beinge But if it proceede of limits of essence or of qualitie or of quantitie it requires helpe of reason to make it good For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge denyed as it seemes that it had any cause of beinge and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie and qualitie For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible as Aristotle by name By your distinction followinge of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof which yet hathe bene the cheife if not only limit which hitherto you have mentioned Agayne why shoulde you make but two wayes confoundinge the limits of quantitie with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie with limits of qualitie which yet are both accidentall But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge therfore he hathe no limits of beinge Nowe I pray apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge Is he without limits in number why then belike he is numberles Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature and in persons can be but three must needes be three Is he without limits in quantitio and so infinite therin But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all Is he without limits in qualities not materiall for such are not incident to him but spirituall so infinite therin Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes why but consider in God there are no degrees no qualities at all As touching perfections created therof indeede we have severall kindes but none such are to be found in God Only because God is able to produce them therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God thoughe not formally But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute as of spirituall For God can produce all alike Therfore all are eminently alike in God Of thinges visible the most perfect you say are but perfect in some one kinde It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created But you may not say that God is perfect in all such kindes but rather in none of them For that were to be perfect in imperfections Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes and he is the Author of them producinge them out of nothing They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall maynteyne it to have bene so by necessitie of nature And all such would peremtorily deny that it was possible for the World not to have bene and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary then to suppose it Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not seing they are not capable of life And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule which is not incident to Angells much lesse to Heavens which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist Neyther dothe Seneca in the place by you alleaged speake of Angells in my judgment but rather of the Species of thinges generable particulars thoughe subject to corruption beinge inabled for generation and therby for perpetuation of their kindes and consequently for the mayntenance of the World and that for ever It is well knowne that the Platonickes thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made to have had any beginninge Of the same opinion were the Stoicks Their common voyce was De nihilo nihil in nihiluâ— nil posse reverti accordingly they might well conceave that God might be hindered in his operation by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers I conceave to be just Yet by your leave I doe not thinke that any creature capable of immortalitie in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men can be made immortall by nature Yet I doubt not but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be For it is apparant that God hathe many such as namely the Angels and soules of men Yet still their natures are annihilable in respect of the power of God Neyther can I believe that to be immortall in Senecaes language was to be without beginninge For I doe not finde but that the Stoicks together with Plato conceaved that the World had a beginninge But in this respect he calleth them eternall I shoulde thinke because the World together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned subject to corruption and generation in particulars should have no ende and that by the Providence of God We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary but God But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge of absolute necessitie For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge all Philosophers helde impossible and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge and of absolute necessity wherof the World was to be made that seemed impossible unto Aristotle and that upon good reason The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument and not avouched only by bare contestation That which followethe
neyther universally true nor at all to any purpose you insist liberally in your followinge discourse You should proove that whatsoever hath limits of extension the same allso hath beginninge of duration which yet I deny not to be a truthe and demonstrable but of the demonstration herof your discourse hathe fayled hitherunto When you argue thus It is as possible to put a newe fashion upon nothing as for any thing that is to take limits or set forme of being from nothinge You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it For they that maynteyne the World had no beginninge doe allso maynteyne that it tooke no beginninge of the limits therof And as they doe not say the World tooke his beginninge from nothinge so neyther doe they say that the World tooke the beginninge of his limits or tooke his limits or forme from nothinge Nowe you by this forme of your dispute doe instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World thus If God made the World out of nothing then he put a newe fashion upon nothinge But it is impossible that any newe fashion shoulde be put upon nothinge therfore it is impossible that God shoulde make the World out of nothinge Nowe in this Syllogisme the minor is most true For not any thinge can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion as the forme therof But the consequence of the major is most untrue For when we say that God made the World out of nothinge our meaninge is not that nothing was the matter wherof the World was made but only that it was the terminus a quo not materia ex qua As much as to say God made the World wheras nothing went before neyther had God any matter wheron to woorke when he made the World And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginninge doe therwithall deny that the World tooke eyther being or limits from any thinge You turne their negative into an affirmative so to corrupt their opinion in steade of confutinge it They thought it needed not any thinge to give it beinge or bounds of beinge least they shoulde be driven to affirme that somethinge coulde be made out of nothinge wheras they had rather maynteyne that the world ever had existence by necessitie of nature Neyther did they maynteyne that the world tooke limits or beinge from it selfe any more then from any other which you devise and impute unto them in steade of convictinge their Tenet of errour by force of argument in the way of naturall reason which you undertake And therfore havinge so weakely disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited you doe therby betray the weakenes of your proofe of Gods illimited condition from the everlastingnes therof 6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived in the point of creation you proceede magnificently to suppose that the conceyte of beinge without limits is essentially included in the conceyte of beinge without cause precedent which if it were true then were it a truthe per se notae and consequently the creation of the world evident of it selfe even to common reason seinge it is supposed to have limits And agayne your discourse is so fashioned as if Philosophers maynteyned that the world tooke beginninge of it selfe which is untrue and indeede a thinge evidently impossible namely that any thinge shoulde take beginninge of it selfe And indeede if a thinge coulde give beinge to it selfe it might give what it lusted to it selfe if so be it had a lust which the Elements and Heavens have not Yet those Aristotle maynteyned to have bene from everlastinge not that they gave beginninge to themselves but that they tooke no beginninge from any thinge The reason wherof was because they coulde not conceave howe any thinge coulde be made out of nothinge a thing contrary to all naturall experience upon which kinde of ground your selfe but erst builded your discourse when you sayde thinges caused as induction manifestethe are allwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes Yet notwithstandinge upon this fiction of a thing able to give beinge to it selfe you dilate at large I grant that upon this fiction nothinge coulde restrayne it from takinge all bodily perfection possible to it selfe in case it had power to give beinge to it selfe But never any Philosopher maynteyned that it had power to give beinge to it selfe For they that maynteyned a Chaos precedinge the production of the world maynteyned that out of this Chaos God produced all thinges and not that the Chaos or ought els gave being to itselfe And Aristotle that denyed such an eternall Chaos maynteyned the world had no beginninge was farre from maynteyninge that the world gave beinge to it selfe Secondly I answeare that thoughe it shoulde thus receave all bodily perfection possible yet this shoulde not be infinite and without limits as you woulde have your Reader to suspect without proofe and indeede unles this be imagined t is nothing no the purpose The reason why in this case it shoulde not be infinite is this because all bodily perfection possible is but finite as they conceaved and therin conceaved nothing amisse So of quantitie or qualitie the impossibilitie of eyther to be without measure in bodies whose perfection is only finite is a sufficient hinderance from takinge eyther quantity or qualitie without measure In like sort let Vacuitie as you speake be left free to give it selfe full and perfect act let it take all possible perfection yet since all possible perfection of bodies is supposed to be only finite it will not followe that the perfection taken shall be without limits which yet you must proove otherwise your discourse is of no force to proove that whatsoever hathe nâ— cause of bringe distinct from itselfe is without limits Allthoughe the Philosophers that maynteyned the world or matter therof preexistent to be without beginninge driven herunto because they conceaved not how it was possible that any thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge yet did they never maynteyne that the one or the other gave being to it selfe Yet this fiction you pinne upon their sleeve to supply the weaknes of your discourse Much lesse coulde it enter into any sober mans conceyte that they gave power to a Vacuitie to give it selfe ful and perfect act seinge Vacuitie is starke nothinge which the Chaos was not but a materiall thinge thoughe merely passive and nothinge active But as for vacuitie that is neyther active nor passive as being starke nothinge And yet to this you adde a further solecisme in this your fiction as when you suppose this vacuitie to have power to assume eyther bodily substances or spirituall which the Chaos had not no not so much as in capacitie being wholy materiall wheras spirituall substances are immateriall And yet I confesse as you give unto that which is nothinge power to assume which it list eyther bodily or spirituall substances it may well be sayde that nothing hathe power indifferently
to assume eyther or both of them This I propose by way of an universall negative not by way of a particular affirmative as you doe making the terme nothing to be the subject in your propositions and not an universall signe only Yet all thus assumed as you speake shoulde be but finite because all possible perfection besides the nature of God it selfe is but finite Therfore I say it shoulde be but finite if any thinge at all which caution I doe put in because upon due accoumpt it will be founde that the summe of all this in a good sense will proove to be no more then just nothinge For suppose nothing dothe assume bodily substances agayne suppose nothinge dothe assume spirituall substances put this together and adde nothing to nothing and see whether the totall will proove to be any jot more then just nothing You proceede further and tell us that while we imagine it without cause of existence or beginninge no reason imaginable coulde confine it to any set place of residence or extension why rather in the center then circumference or eyther rather then bothe In this you seeme to have reference to that which immediately went before and that was a vacuitie And in very truthe upon this supposition where nowe the center is nothing was where nowe the circumference is nothing was and in all the bodies betweene nothinge was For you suppose a vacuitie of all and nothing to be where now there is some thinge Yet this nothing by your leave must be confined in reference to the places where bodies were before or after And the places where bodies were before being the same by your supposition with the places which nowe are must needes be finite For undoubtedly the space of this whole world betweene the center and circumference yea including bothe is but finite But foortwith you relapse to the former iniquitie of your supposition and in steede of havinge a being without beginninge which was indeede the opinion of some great Philosophers concerninge the world or concerning preexistent matter wherof the world was made driven herunto upon supposition as of a thinge impossible that nothinge coulde be made out of nothinge wherin all agreed thoughe otherwise of different opinions nor different only but contrariant allso I say from this true state of their opinion you relapse to the worlds taking of beginninge to it selfe which is rather to maynteyne that it had a beginninge thoughe of it selfe then that it had none at all yet this alone was affirmed by them and not the other Of which other namely of takinge beginning to it selfe imagination only you say is the true cause And therin you say true but this cause is to be understood of your imagination not theirs For they imagined no such taking of beginning to it selfe eyther in the world it selfe or in the preexistent matter therof Yet upon this you founde a newe imagination of extendinge forsoothe its existence bothe wayes and drawing a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes to witt where it beginnes in your imagination not in theirs for they imagined no such thing And indeede he that imaginethe white to be blacke I see no reason why he may not proceede further and imagine black to be white and adde unto this a third to witt that white is neyther white nor blacke and blacke is neyther blacke nor white Of circular motions I have read but of circular durations I have neyther read nor heard till nowe well let us understande it of duration in circular motions But if you please imagine time to be circular like the motions of your orbes and in course of time to returne at lengthe to the beginninge of it For what els to make of the instant where it beginnes I knowe not It seemes by this discourse that you have seene the gigge and if your braynes have not runne round I assure you mine have all most in followinge you At lengthe you come to a more sober supposition and expression as when you relate their opinion thus that the world hathe a true present beinge without any cause precedent This I confesse is suitable to their opinion whome you impugne who were driven herunto as I sayde because they coulde not comprehende howe any thinge coulde be made of nothinge But when you adde without a superior guide to appoynt it a set course you something swerve from the right All maynteyned the world coulde not be made out of nothinge But all of them did not deny that it had a guide to direct it The Platonickes and Stoicks acknowledged a divine understandinge to have made the world but out of a prejacent matter which they conceaved to be eternall and to acknowledge no maker Nowe as they acknowledged a maker so they acknowledged a Governour thoughe sometimes hindered in his course by the stubbornes of the refractary matter which acknowledged no maker Aristotle maynteynes allso a first moover therfore he acknowledged a guide allso But wheras he acknowledged him to be a necessary Agent as I conceave it was in effect as much as if he had acknowledged no Governour But all agreed that the duration eyther of the world or of the prejacent matter was everlasting for the time past and that the world shoulde be everlasting for the time to come To this Plato yeilded And so conteyned all duration imaginable bothe wayes namely both for the time past and for the time to come but with this difference that for the time past it was actually infinite only the duration for the time to come not actuall but in such sort infinite as it shoulde never have an ende Now this consideration openeth a fayre way to a discovery of the impossibilitie of this conceyte of theirs concerninge the eternitie of the world or the eternitie of time and that by very evident reason thoughe I deny not but men have and may sett their witts on woorke in quashinge the evidence therof in their zeale I thinke to defend the honour of Aristotle For if the world were everlastinge Paulus Venetus thoughe zealous to defend the possibilitie herof yet acknowledgethe it woulde followe that the part is equall to the whole nay greater then the whole and that in so evident a manner that he hathe no other way to answere it then by professinge that this maxime Totum est majus sua parte is of force only in materia finita not in materia infinita which in effect is as much as to say The world may be everlasting I will maynteyne it but I forbid any man to dispute against it For I purpose to deny all maximes that are made use of in disputing against it and will be bolde to say that they all have force only in materia finita and not in materia infinita And because seing I have excepted against weake courses of argumentation in defense of the creation it may be expected I shoulde substitute stronger arguments in the place of them I will not spare
to the purpose partly as questionable as ever where it is to the purpose For that that which is infinite in essence must be one and not many I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes that have any learning in them allthough a man may fayle in the demonstration of it as here you doe For to be infinite in essence is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall For such as such differ not in essence And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie then infinity of essence in my judgement But be it not only without question but allso supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours yet is it nothing to the present question For the question in present is not whether there may be two Gods but only whether in the one nature of God there be not thinges different to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power and both these different from his goodnes that is in a word whether there be not any accident in God And yet unto this question you are arrived but in a very indecent and incongruous manner For wheras before you had undertaken to proove that all thinges were in God accordinge to ideall perfections by all thinges understandinge substances cheifly as of Angells and men and beasts of all sorts And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe that all things thus being in God are not in him by way of pluralitie but drawne to unitie and accordingly should herby proove that the essence of an Angell and the essence of a man yea and the essence of a beast and of every base thing is so in God as one with him and one with every thinge You shift of from this and in the place therof only mention how Gods life and wisedome and power and goodnes are all one in God And this you proove only from this that God is illimited which is as sory a consequence as that wherby you prooved his illimited condition to witt from this that he is independent and receaved not his being from any thinge Which consequence of yours is so farre from naturall evidence that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde who maynteyned eyther the World or the first matter not to speake of Intelligences to be independent of any efficient cause and without all makinge yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe that eyther of them should be infinite No lesse inconsequent is that which followeth allso as when you say Whersoever it can be truly sayde this is one and that another or this is and is not that each hath distinct limits I say this is untrue For suppose a body were infinite In this case bothe lengthe and bredthe and thicknes were infinite yet lengthe were only lengthe and not bredthe yet never a whit the lesse infinite Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe though breadthe be not thicknes nor infinity in breadthe any hinderance to infinity in lengthe thoughe lengthe be not breadthe In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisedome though his wisedome be not his power Nor the infinitie of his goodnes any prejudice to the infinitie of his power and wisedome thoughe his power and wisedome and goodnes were different in themselves But to come nearer what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie The Father is the Father and neyther is he the Sonne nor the Holy Ghost will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite The Sonne is the Sonne but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost will you therfore say he is not infinite The Holy Ghost is the Holy Ghost but neyther the Father nor the Sonne will you hence inferre that he hathe limits and is not infinite And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen but even by our divines allso that the Sonne is produced of the Father per modum intellectus Is he not the wisedome of the Father and what difference betweene the wisedome of God and the understanding of himselfe And doe they not allso confesse that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe per modum voluntatis And as we say Gods understanding is not his will though it be no different thing from his will and Gods will is not his understandinge thoughe it be no different thinge from his understandinge so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons thoughe we are not able to comprehended the mystery herof It is true our understanding is such as that oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari imaginatio non transcendit continuum Yet notwithstandinge we atteyne by discourse to the acknowledgment of thinges immateriall as of our soules yea and of Angells yea and of the God both of men Angells yet not by materiall thinges as by the pictures of them as you phrasify it but rather as in the effects wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hathe inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them And we commonly say that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments wherby you proove it as allso the soundnes of those consequences which you make from it And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faithe in believinge of God what Gods word teachethe us then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause then justify it We believe that God is one and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him but only of Persons And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of vis unita fortior which you speake of doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity as to deny the Trinity And touchinge the attributes of God as neyther distinct from the essence of God nor from themselves we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske we looke for substance of sound proofes and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him as man dothe for man to gratify him You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power above all conceyte of infinite power of Gods wisedome above all conceyte of infinite wisedome of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite
that the greater force ariseth from the contraction of parts Now hath God any parts to be thus contracted and united that so his vigour might be greater what base comparisons are these to represent the infinite power of God by them Then you roule in your woonted Rhetorick to amplifie the vehemency of his motive power in that it cannot be exprest by a motion that should beare levill from the Sunnesetting in the west to the Moone riseing in the East which is a very faire marke I confesse for the case put is in plenilunio when the Moone is att full Then to cast the fixed starres downe to the center belike you meane one after another otherwise there would be no roome for them in the center and hoyse the earth up to the Heavens within the twinkling of an eye or to send both in a moment beyond the extreamities of this visible world into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued would not straine his power motive Yet all this you confesse to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something that is to take not your words but rather your good meaning to create out of nothing Wherby nothing doth not become something but something hath a being which before it had not But here you power out many wilde conceits besides this first as when you say Essence swallowes up infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant I had thought rather this had bene the property of eternity not of essence You might as well say essence swallowes up all places into an indivisible unitie or point Then how may eternitie be sayde to swallow up that which it doth not contayne neyther formally for certeynly there is no formall succession in eternitie nor eminently For to conteyne eminently is to be able to produce succession but it is not Gods eternitie that denominates him able to produce time or the existence of thinges in time but his power So neyther his essence nor his eternitie swallowes up motion for the same reason But as for the swallowing up of motion into a vigorous rest to witt by mooving the eighth spheare round in a moment Of the nakednesse and absurditie that is shamefull nakâ—dnesse of such an assertion we have discoursed enough Againe is it not enough for you to maynteyne motion in vacuo but you must needes affirme that this visible world issued from the vacuum which now we imagine without the extreamities of it where now the world is was a vacuum before the world was but yet the world issued not from it neyther in the kinde of a materiall cause nor in the kind of a formall cause nor in the kind of an efficient cause much lesse did it issue from that vacuum which you terme without the extreamites of this world Then againe I know no measure of perfection derived unto the creature from Gods immensitie but only from the counsayle of his will by his immensitie he fills all places but distributes not the measure of perfections therby When you call Nothinge the mother of Gods creatures tell mee I pray did you affect poeticall witt or Metaphysicall truth I had thought Nothing had not afforded so much as the matter of any thinge as the Mother doth the matter at least of the childe It is true we were not any thing before God made us And as sure I am that this which we call nothinge did not contribute any thinge to the creation of men The basenes of mans originall is a common place of another nature Now your text is the Infinity of Gods power but you may squander from it as you please Whatsoever implyes not contradiction the production therof is within the compasse of Gods power and whatsoever God can do he can doe with ease His head aked not in the makeing of the World neyther doth it ake in providing for and preserving all things But to talke of the possibilitie of more worlds hand over head under colour of gratifying God in the amplification of his power I leave unto them that are not satisfied with the demonstration of his infinite power in this Yet as touching Gods omnipotency for the strengthening of our faith we are promised somethinge hereafter as if all hitherto tended to the strengthening of our imagination by comparing it first to the susteÌ„tative force of a center which is a matter of nothing and then to the force of gunpowder which undoubtedly is a matter of something Whether we are like to meete with a more wise discourse concerning Gods infinite Wisedome if others know yet I know not CHAP. VIII Of the Infinitie of divine Wisedome That it is as impossible for ought to fall out without Gods knowledge as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence 1. IN the first Section there is nothing that I mislike we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power unles he were infinite in Wisedome allso And that power ungoverned by Wisedome would bring forth very enormous effects But if a duble portion of witt matched with halfe the strength would effecte more then a triple portion of strength with halfe so much witt surely where the power is equall the Wisedome insinitly unequall there the effects cannot be the like Yet you have bene bold to affirme in another treatise of yours not yet extant I confesse that If a man had the same infinite power that God hath he might well thinke he coulde dispose thus of thinges as God hath disposed by the Wisedome which man allready hath And you give this reason for in thinges wee can lay any necessitie upon wee can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seeke As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or penne of any man For we manifestly perceave that the difference of artificiall operations in the World doth not arise from the difference of mens powers but merely from the difference of theire skill and Wisedome in severall trades 2. You doe not well to confounde power with strength for strength is only power naturall but there is a civill power goeth beyond that And there is no question to be made but Wisedome is to be preferred before the strength of the body by how much the qualities of the minde are to be preferred before the qualities of the body But where civill power is supreame that ruleth over the wisest Counsaylers No question God is as infinite in Wisedome as in power But I take it to be very absurd to say that Gods wisedome is greater then his power For is it possible that God by his wisedome can thinke of any course fitt to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect and seing you confesse his power to be infinite as well as his wisdome what should move you to maynteine the one to be greater then the other I can not devise Princes have guides to governe them which yet are not therfore greater theÌ„ they but inferior by farre
passe from him or by him as they doe from us That which you take to be most true I take to be most false in the sense wherin you deliver it For like as they passe from us by ceasing to coexist with us so they passe also from God as ceasing to coexist with him And as they come upon us by beginning anew to coexist with us so they come upon God also as beginning anew to coexist with him The conforming of space of time with space of place doth abuse your understanding and cast you into errour ere you are aware though you will not be perswaded of it In space of place it is true things both comming towards us yet doe not come towards God and passing by us and from us yet doe not passe by God or from God The reason whereof is because God doth coexist with all places and filleth all but man doth not And no marveile For all places doe actually exist and God existing too they are truly sayd to coexist together But as for all the parts of time they doe not exist together and therefore consequently cannot bee said to coexist with God neither God at once to coexist with them But as they doe exist by succession one after another so is God said to coexist with them not by reason of any succession in God but onely in the creature and as wee lose our coexistence with creatures that cease to be so doth God For coexistence is an externall denomination attributed unto God from the existence of the creatures In which sence he is said to be He that was and is and is to come to wit in respect of his coexistence which was with things that are past and which is with things that are present and which shall bee with things that are to come to wâ—t when they are come But besides this succession in man of coexistence with other creatures there is also a succession in man which is not in God For he groweth or diminisheth in the quantity of his body he is changed and altered to and fro in the qualities both of body and soule In body sometimes hot sometimes cold sometime faire sometimes foule In soule he hath for a while a growth in knowledge afterward hee 〈◊〉 and decayeth in knowledge As for the duration of his essence that is without succession as the Angels are And to continue the same as God doth is not to gaine ought but to keep that which he hath God is alwayes so are Angels since the time they have beene The manner of Gods duration is indivisible such also is reputed the duration of Angels whom Schoolemen acknowledge not to be measured by time but by Aevum as touching their substance onely as touching their thoughts whereof there may be a succession they have invented a discreet time to be the measure thereof God loseth no existence by antiquity man neither loseth nor gets existence by continuance For how should the continuation of existence be the losing of it and how can hee get that which he hath already Accidents are gotten and lost I confesse nothing so in God Thus your fancies cast about to gaine some confirmation of your former erroneous conceit of Gods coexistence with all parts of time but nothing serves your turne If by continuance alone we did gaine any thing which before we had not God himselfe should gaine something which before he had not For without doubt hee hath continuance Times passing you say exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration without inlarging it Times comming incessantlie flowe from it without diminution of it No doubt you please your selfe in these expressions To me they are worse then Empedocles his Androprora were to Aristotle There is no canting like unto this The waters that run into the Sea are a part of the Sea thence they came and thither they returne as Salomon telleth us And therefore no marvell if the Sea neither is diminished by their egresse nor by their regresse enlarged No creatures duration is a part of Gods duration as the rivers are part of the sea And how doth our duration flow from Gods but as an efficient cause and that equivocall that is wholly different but water doth not come from the Sea as from an efficient much lesse equivocall but as a part from the whole Neither indeed doth our duration proceed from Gods duration but from his will For our duration is our existence continued and this from the will of God For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Thus we can devise how our duration comes from God though farre different from the flowing of the water from the Sea but how our durations doe exonerate themselves into God or into his duration it surpasseth the sphere of my imagination to devise I doe not thinke Paracelsus was ever able to interprete this Yet some say he heard the devill reade a lecture through a grate in the Vniversity of Toledo Yet you have not done traversing your ground Times future you say are said to come upon us or to meet us because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things whilest they are future Your figure Catachresis when will it be at an end when we talke of reaching we suppose the thing to have existence whereat we reach but time future as yet exists not Yet you thinke God doth reach it by coexistence with it Yet I marke of late you forbeare thâ—s phrase Is it not because it doth manifestly discover the errour of your conceit For to coexist with things future doth imply that things future coexist and consequently exist and so they are present and not future The very Angells are not of so long standing to day as they shall be to morrow This I confesse is something but I would gladlie know what inference you make herehence Angells have had a beginning God hath not if God had a beginning as Angells have had every day he should be of longer duration then he was the former yet without any change and consequently without succession But will you inferre herehence therfore God hath coexistence with things future A consequence of no coulour of probability and the consequent in it selfe implying manifest contradiction as before I have shewed Till future things exist we have no coexistence with them nor God neither For if God did coexist with them they should coexist with God consequently exist and so cease to be future and forthwith become present Yet you labour to prove the contrary and so you may and sweate too and be never a whit the nearer to that you seeke for God is every way before time you say that is not onely before it as we accompt he is before that which is to come and so are we also but he was before all Worlds but after it and behind it also For that which we accompt after or behind time you call before it that so with the better grace you
neither vicious nor virtuous Now where was ever such a disposition to be found Not in man before his fall For hee was created good and holy and inclined onely to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God Some will say then how could he sinne I answer his sinne was the actuating of his naturall indifferency to the doing of any naturall thing As to eate an Apple or not eate it or to eate this or that a thing meerelie indifferent had not God forbidded it and in this case restrayned his libertie which prohibition of Gods he hearkening too much to the tentations of Satan by the ministery of Eve who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit without any dammage discernable and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed Since the fall of Adam a vitious inclination hath possessed all which even in the regenerate continueth in part though a supernaturall vertuous or religious inclination hath possessed them whereby it comes to passe that both carnall things are pleasing to them as they are flesh and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit Still the naturall liberty continueth in all to doe any naturall thing whether commanded or forbidden of God For even in the regenerate there is a power to doe any naturall thing though God hath forbidden it and too great a propension to the doing of it and that because God hath forbidden it in respect of the flesh And in the unregenerate a power also to doe any naturall thing which God hath commanded and an affectation to doe it also because God hath commanded it but in the way of hypocrisie to further their owne carnall ends and courses yet have they no religious inclination to honour God How freedome to evill is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedome I doe not yet understand First what meane you by the creatures freedome Do you meane it of his freedome to good or freedome to evill or such freedome as is neither to good nor evill I thinke your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good Secondly what meane you by the change of this freedome of the creature If you speake of the creatures freedome unto good how is it changed or into what is it changed here is nothing to answer but by saying that his freedome unto good is changed into a freedome unto evill Which if it bee your meaning it was verie absurd to say that his freedome to evill did spring from his change into freedome unto evill For thus the selfe same thing shall bee both before and after it selfe Yet you say not I confesse that this freedome to evill springs from the mutation of the creatures freedome but from the mutability that is from the possibility of change But that is as absurd For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change but rather from the agent that changeth Why did you not say plainly it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator I see a reason of this First because freedome to evill doth rather goe before disobedience then follow after it Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency whence came it The truth is not freedome to doe evill but bondage unto sinn proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker And this is a state of great imperfection indeed or rather of great misery as whereby all mankinde are borne children of wrath and such as deserve to be made the generation of Gods curse And are you pleased to mince it thus calling it onely a freedome to doe evill whereas if yet we are onely free to doe evill it must needs follow that wee are free also not to doe it yea and free also to doe good which freedom is now adaies found in none but those whom the Sonne hath freed according to that of our Saviour If the Sonne hath made you free then are you free indeed But let us proceed with you It was I doubt not the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy But hence it followeth not that this mutability was necessarily prerequired For how can that be said to bee necessarily which depended meerely upon the free will and pleasure of God without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God upon supposition whereof this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily pre-required before their happinesse Now what kinne this is to the immutability of God or to the reconciling thereof to his freedome let the Reader judge As also of the sobriety of that which followeth God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable essentially free and immutably happy because infinitely good Then followes the order of immutability and freedome that the ground of this this the perfection of that Yet many creatures are free without any such growne as immutability and where the one is wanting the other cannot be the perfection thereof And if we speake of immutabilitie in respect of second causes is it not in the power of God to make the heavens the Sunne Moone and Starres immutabl◠which notwithstanding should not be any free agents And undoubtedly the immutability of Gods will rather supposeth the freedome thereof then is presupposed by it But these are matters of no great moment that which followeth is of more though you doe but touche and away like the dogge at the River Nilus who feares the Crocodile and it may be herein you feare some bug-beare also Freedome it selfe you say were no absolute perfection unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse Gods freedom then you will have wedded unto goodnesse In what sence is this delivered I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth it is impossible it should be otherwise then good For it is impossible that God should transgresse As who hath no superior to give lawes to him but rather his will gives lawes to all yet in giving lawes to others he gives none to himselfe And if his will were a law unto himselfe it were impossible he should transgresse it in doing ought For as much as whatsoever he doth he doth according to the counsayle of his owne will But you I doubt have some other sence which I will labour to start out if I can You signify his freedome must be wedded to goodnes When a man is wedded to his wife he is restrayned from all others and must keep himselfe only unto her So belike amongst diverse things whereunto Gods power doth extend his freedome must not extend to all but be confined to that which is good As if there were some rules of good and evill prescribed unto God and he were confined to the one and restrayned from the other This is Arminius his language upon which occasion I have bene bold to encounter their 〈◊〉 in two digressions who maintayne that there is a
was found to call this into question amongst Christians All Naturalists acknowledge this difference betweene naturall agents and voluntary agents and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from Gods inward decree and outward operation accordâ—ng to this decree But what if you have a further ayme then this and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves onely to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth that so in the meane time his intention may overslâ—p the observation of foule things broached by you in a few words For consider I pray would you have your reader swallow sucha goageon as this that God is at this time free to decree this Why doe you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another and how contradictious is this to your owne often profession of Gods everlasting decrees and also to your present doctrine of Gods immutabilitie For if he be now free to decree this or that then may some decree of God begin to be which before was not and consequently there shall bee a change in God For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not And if Gods decrees be everlasting and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees then is God free to change Perhaps you will say Gods liberty is eternall for otherwise I know not to what purpose you discourse here of Gods eternall liberty I answer God is still and ever shall be free but in respect of what In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that Gods eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to bee made by him or no is a thing utterly impossible God alone cannot doe this as Philosophers were wont to say to make that which is done to be undone it being a thing implying manifest contradiction Againe the libertie of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures whether Angels or men which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will as either to will this or to will that but no such libertie is to be found in God It was and is impossible there should bee any other act in God then there is because God is a simple act and that act is his very essence and as his essence cannot nor could not bee otherwise then it is so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is Gods liberty is only to different objects not to different acts though you passe over this without any distinction Againe in the sentence going before you told us God was free to exercise his power and to communicate his goodnesse which is most true but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree this is nothing answerable to the former For to decree is no exercâ—se of his power nor communication of his goodnesse For if it were then seeing his decrees have beene free from everlasting from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power and communication of his goodnesse Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting Your next sentence is as wilde as the former or rather more not to speake of the coherence of them For it seemes you have no more care of that then as if you were dictating proverbs That the course of mans life or the finall doome awarded to every man though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses should be immutable because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more colour of truth then to say the omnipotent creator must needes be blacke because he made the crowes and Ebony black c. And this comparison you enlarge with multiplicity of instances as the course of your stile is to exuberate in matters of no moment You might as well have sayed that there is no colour of truth why God that made a crowe should be a crowe or that made the swanne should be a swanne And indeed there is no colour of truth in this For indeed a painter makes a fayre picture but it no way followeth herehence that he should be a fayre picture or so much as fayre And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot yet no colour of truth that he should be therefore a chamber pott or that because a Chimny-sweeper makes a clean chimny therfore himselfe should be a cleane chimny Never was any knowne to be so absurde as to devise any such inferences Like as I think never any before your selfe was knowne to affirme that there was as litle colour of truth in collecting that things decreed by God should be immutable because his decree is immutable For I pray what proportion doe you find in these the efficient cause that is aequivocall is not of the same nature with the effect produced therefore the thing decreed is not immutable by reason of the immutability of the decree whereby it is decreed Let every Reader judge whether there be so much likenesse betweene these as betweene a foxe and a Fearne-bush Yet you give no reason but the bare proportion it selfe to beare it out Now the former inference which you denye is drawne from the cause to the effect the later inference which you denye is drawne from the effect to the cause Yet these inferences you make proportionable If you would make them suitable after some such manner as this it should proceed God makes crowes black herhence it followeth not that God himselfe is black so God decreed to damne Iudaâ— herehence it followeth noâ— and what I pray I am ashamed tâ— follow the proportion of your inference least so I should utter that which in modestie is not fit or thus God makes Iudas his damnation immutable herhence it followeth not that God is immutable or to helpe you with a proportioned case fitter for your turne God makes Iudas his damnation mutable herehence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable This I say better serves your turne but this is not the inference whereupon you passe your denyall but rather quite cam as we say Gods decree is immutable herhence it followeth not that Iudas his damnation though foreset by God is immutable Yet as for that inference proposed which I sayd was more fitter for your turne who ever sayd that God decreed Iudas his damnation to be mutable or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable Who ever sayd that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul or of any one of Gods elect to be mutable And indeed it were very absurd to say so For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect after they have obtayned it or the damnation
warnes Timothy to cary himself gently towards them that are without waiting the time when God will give them repentance that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill by whom they were led captive to doe his will By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illation when you say Wheresoever God hath laid the one to wit naturall being it is to all that rightly consider his wisedome truth and goodnesse and assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other Why the truth of God is directly against it professing that he hath mercy on whom he will and heardeneth whom he will and that the same word of God is a savour of life unto life to them that are saved hee doth not say to them that are carefull to prepare themselves and a savour of death unto death unto them that perish and a good savour unto God in both he doth not say to them that do not prepare themselves And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation for they believed as there the Apostle professeth as much as to say the word preached was a savour of life unto life unto them and wot you the reason hereof Why surely because they were ordained to salvation like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that God added to the Church day by day such as should be saved You might with as much modesty professe that in as much as God hath made every man It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to give every man repentance before he drops out of the world Gods gifts are without repentance it is true of the gifts of sanctification but it is as true that God repented that he made man That the current of Gods joyfull benificence can admit no intermission is most untrue for he dispenseth it freely so he continueth it as freely For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his owne will that is nullo necessitatis obsequio as Ambrose expoundeth it Nay it doth admit intermission in this world In the world to come indeed it shall admit no intermission in this it doth both in respect of blessings temporall and in respect of motions spirituall For as touching blessings temporall God sheweth the back sometimes and not the face Ier. 18. 17. And as touching spirituall motions and consolations what moved the Lord to cry out upon the crosse My God my God why hast thou forsaken me but the intermission of these It is true sorrow to us hath no other originall then our own sinne yet no sinne in Christ could be found to bee the originall of his sorrow And though the woman by reason of sinne hath ever since conceived in sorrow yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow notwithstanding that they are incapable of sinne And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures is meerly according to the good pleasure of his will And though all sorrow proceeds from sinne in the way of a meritorious cause yet all sorrow proceeds from God in the way of an efficient cause Hee is the great Iudge that inflicteth sorrow on some as well as hee causeth joy to others 9. The comparison is most absurd For illumination proceeds from the Sunne as from a naturall cause working by necessity of nature but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought or send forth any influence is more Atheisticall then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith they were sowne in their first creation for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall as well as the Angels of light And all the influence that God sends forth you say is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse whence it followeth that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in the verie Devils And seeing Gods concurrence to the actions of men and Angels is a part of that influence that proceeds from God and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits without hope of recovery in concurring to this assurance God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in them Besides this with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinfull actions this your selfe have often acknowledged and this concourse of his is a part of his influence and no influence you say can proceed from him but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith their natures were sowne in their creation Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinfull actions doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in reprobate men and Angels also Now proceed we along with you God you say doth inspire all that are conformable to his will with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them This is a bone very well worth the picking I am perswaded many a sweet morsell will be found about it You doe not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will but as many as are conformable to his will hee inspires with other good desires whence I pray then comes conformity to his will if not from the inspiration of God doe you make conformity to Gods will to bee the inspiration of the flesh For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world or of the devill Yet S. Paul saith that it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed not by any necessary emanation as light issueth from the Sunne but according to his owne good pleasure Againe this very desire of doing others good is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will why not also with another And so why may we not runne over all parts of conformity to the will of God and finde as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God as the cause of them The mystery of your meaning in this the next sentence serves as a key to open when you say that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodnesse or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestiall influence become creators of their owne woe and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish So then Gods influence is to all like as the light of the Sunne onely the difference ariseth herehence that some resist it others yeeld unto it As good Arminianisme and Pelagianisme as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himselfe So then it is not God that ex nolentibus volentes facit but mans free will And in spight of St. Paul it shall be volentis currentis and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speake of can be no other then
their miseries are so unknowne unto us Yet as conceiving your selfe to have beene somewhat free inâ—venting somewhat which alas is but a vaine ostentation of some momentous matter which hath no moment at all in it you demand whether God may yet inspire these castawayes with mischievous thoughts seeing their mischievous thoughts worke for our good A very vaine objection as if the devill and his Angels had need of any prompting unto villany or as if prompting unto villany were fit to bee called inspiration which is never used but either in the way of prophecy or in the way of some gracious suggestion Yet as touching any thought or action of Satan your selfe dare not deny Gods concourse to the substance of the action and as for the manner of concourse we are willing to undergoe with you or any man else that breathes any scholasticall discourse or inquisition hereupon as whether the will of the creature determines the will of his Creator or whether the will of the Creator determines the will of the creature rather As touching the evill it selfe whether from our opinion can be inferred any more then this that Gods will is it shall come to passe by his permission and whether we cannot shew better reason for this our tenet then you or any man else for the contrary As for the intending of the creatures woe and miserie as occasions or meanes of Gods glory what sober man can doubt but that God is the efficient cause of their woe and miserie as it signifies the misery of punishment and in inflicting punishment on transgressors undoubtedly hee doth advance the glory of his justice yea and the glory of his Saints also who may see in others sufferings what might have beene their portion if God had shewed no more grace unto them then unto others and hereupon have cause to be so much the more ravished with the contemplation of Gods goodnesse toward them As for the miserie of sinne be the sinne as great as the crucifying of Christ God determined it should be done Act. 4. be it as great as the Kings giving their kingdome to the beast little lesse then the giving of their kingdomes to the devill yet God it is that hath put into their hearts to doe his will even in this also and even this undoubtedly shall redound to the glory of God and the good of his elect For both heresies must be that they which are approved may bee manifested and God raiseth tyrants up to exercise the patience of his children yea their own sinnes redound to the profit of Gods elect Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestamque cadere peccatum But hereupon to make use of that maxime Gods will is the rule of goodnesse is most absurd for the rule of goodnesse is Gods will of commandement but the will of God that signifieth his determination to have this or that come to passe is farre different neither I hope will you make question in case God willeth any thing to come to passe whether God doth well in willing it though that which hee willeth or determineth bee the crucifying of Christ Iesus As for the will of commandement that is onely the will of God touching what is our duty to doe or to leave undone and accordingly called voluntas approbans for certainly he approves obedience unto his will in whatsoever he injoyneth us yet this wide leape hath cast your meditations upon this point to enquire forsooth whether Gods will bee the rule of goodnesse But as you have entred upon it without distinction of will and will so you carrie your selfe therein with miserable confusion CHAP. XIII In what sense or how Gods infinite will is said to bee the rule of goodnesse THe question was never before that I know proposed in this manner viz. of Gods infinite wil but only of Gods will The Heathens painted Iustice as an assistant of Iupiter Anaxarchus to comfort Alexander cast downe with conscience of his foule fact inmurthering his deare friend Clitus deviseth an interpretation of this pageant sutable and serviceable to the consolation of Alexander and that was this Iupiters actions must alwaies be esteemed just So saith the great Monarchs who are Gods on earth their actions must bee accounted just Anaxarchus is censured by Arrian and justly for his grosse flattery in the application of this unto Kings on earth who it is well knowne may degenerate into tyrants But I hope you will not dislike this interpretation as applied unto God you will not make question I trow whether God be righteous in all his waies and holy in all his workes much lesse deny it although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne allowed Samson to sacrifice himselfe the Israelites to rob the Egyptians though he send an evill spirit betweene Abimelech and the men of Shechem though hee put a lying spirit in the mouthes of all Ahabs Prophets to seduce the King and to perswade him to goe up against Ramoth Gilead that he may fall there though he sends to Pharaoh a commandement to let Israel goe yet tels Moses hee will harden Pharaohs heart that he shall not let Israel goe though that worke of the rending of the ten Tribes from the two comprehending the defection of people from their lawfull King he by open protestation takes unto himselfe as his own work like as touching the defiling of Davids concubines he telleth David to his face that he would doe this openly saying I will take thy wives from thee and give them to thy neighbour and he shall lye with them in the sight of the Sunne 2. Your comparison of Gods power with his goodnesse I doe not much mislike onely your comparing of him with Monarchs in goodnesse is not so fit for alas what prerogative have they of goodnesse above other men They are to bee borne withall though they are not so good as others because they are exposed to greater temptations then others and the greater is the temptation the lesse is the sinne No great commendation to exceed Sardanapalus or Heliogabalus in goodnesse yet wee know there is a great deale of difference betweene the goodnesse of God and the goodnesse of man in the course thereof for mans goodnesse in the exercise thereof is subordinate to a law and they are bound to exercise it towards all Gods goodnesse is of no such condition nothing could binde him to the making of the world or to the making of any creature at all They being made hee exerciseth his goodnes towards whom he will for though in the course of his naturall providence he causeth his Sun to shine and his raine to fall both upon the just and unjust yet as touching the dispensation of his chiefest blessings his spirituall blessings in heavenly things he hath mercy on whom he will yea and whom he will he hardeneth also And though ordinarily all are partakers of his temporall blessings yet sometimes he puts a great difference even in the
of nature with the deitie For what conformity can there be betweene the nature of a creature and the nature of his Creator But Saint Peter telleth us we are made pertakers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have observed some to have rendred this passage thus We are made partakers of a godly nature and the godlinesse of our nature undoubtedly consists in obeying the will of God according to that of the Apostle This is the will of God even your sanctification And what godlinesse can be greater then for a man to obey the will of his Creator and that is the will of Gods commandement though it may fall out to be contrary to Gods purpose For wee are bound to pray for the life of our parents and princes though it maybe God will not have either the one or the other to live And God commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac he arose early about this businesse though it appeared afterwards that Gods purpose was Isaac should not be sacrificed But let it be that we are partakers of the divine nature in this sense I nothing doubt but that it proceedeth in respect of the holy Spirit wherewith God hath endued us and which he hath given us to dwell in us and whereby God the Father and God the Sonne are said to dwell in us But let us proceed inwashing away this painting which makes errour appeare with a face of truth We are bound by the law of God to forgive our enemies and to pray for them even to the last as our Saviour did and Steven did But is God bound to forgive his enemies and that alwaies as we are we know he may and doth sometimes forbeare long according to the pleasure of his will but If once he whet his glittering sword and his hand take hold of judgement he will execute vengeance on his enemies and make his arrows drunke with bloud Againe Magistrates must not suffer a witch to live being once discovered God knows them when man doth not yet suffers them to live as long as he thinkes good and sometimes very long Wee are bound to have mercy on all according to our power God hath mercy on whom he will and hardeneth whom he will Lastly wee may not suffer any man to sinne if it lie in our power to hinder it But God suffereth all manner of all abominations to be committed before his eies and in all these hee carrieth himselfe without blemish to his holinesse Nos cerâ—è saith Austine si cos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittemus rei tum ipsis erimus Quam verò innumerabilia ille permittit sieri ante oculos suos quae utique si voluisset nullaratione permitteret tamen justus bonus est quod praebendo patientiam dat locum paenitentiae nolens aliquem perire That wee are bound to conforme to Gods revealed will the Scripture teacheth us Secret things belong to the Lord our God but the things revealed are for us and our children to doe them But that therefore we must be conformable to his will that wee may be conformable to his nature the Scripture teacheth not and therefore give us leave to take this superfoetation of yours to be but a revelation of flesh and bloud In the book of Iudges wee read that Manoah enquired after the name of the Angell that appeared unto him whom good Divines upon pregnant circumstances doe collect to have beene the Lord but he answereth Why askest thou after my name which is secret God verily dwelleth in the darke cloud and though sometimes againe it is said that he dwelleth in the light yet forth with it is added that this is such a light that no man can approach unto As groundlesse is your following dictate that without conformitie to his nature we cannot participate of his holinesse it being the imodiate consequent of his nature And what I pray will you make gods of us or shall our glorification in the kingdome of heaven be a deification as it must be if it be a participation of the divine happinesse But this is an usuall libertie of discourse which you take to your selfe I hope you will not say that formall glory which God hath provided for us shall be a glory increated though in the way of an efficient cause it shall proceede from the increated glory of God but created rather And all created glory I hope bee it never so great is no part of Gods happinesse which is you say an immediate consequent unto his nature wherin notwithstanding I doubt much you speake as Peter sometimes did when he spake he knew not what as namely in distinguishing Gods happines from his nature as an immediate consequent thereof You doubt of Lactantius his consequence as neither certaine nor authentique as if it might be authentique though not certaine in your opinion Yet you embrace the same consequence applied to another matter that serves your turne and you swallow it with great facility it never stickes by the way like a Burre in your throat as if consequences were but ceremonies and you the master of them But you put a difference Lactantius his inference is sometimes doubtfull you say but out of all question yours if we may take your word is not But you take too great liberty to your selfe to put things at your pleasure out of question We should have a mad Church and a mad world if you had power to put out of question what you list But let us consider your inference God doth bid us unfainedly blesse our persecuoors therefore he doth unfainedly tender his blessings to such as persecute him in his members This then belike is that conformity to Gods nature which we must aspire unto But by your leave I finde no conformity herein For first wee are bid to blesse our persecutors not to tender our blessings unto them upon condition they will admit them but you doe not say God doth blesse his persecutors you onely say hee doth tender his blessings unto them Againe God biddeth us blesse them that persecute us you doe not say that God doth blesse or tender his blessings to them that persecute him but to them that persecute others to wit his members Thirdly and chiefly God bids us to blesse all our persecutors for hee exhorts us to be mercifull unto all as you confesse in the next words but you dare not say that God doth blesse or tender his blessings unto all but here you lispe and speake indefinitely saying God doth tender his blessings to them that persecute him in his members and that Hee she weth kindnesse to them that are most unkinde Indeed he doth so to some but not unto all but unto whom he will for so himselfe professeth unto Moses I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion And I pray consider
that he had cursed them already And equally and indifferently as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient and therefore calls heaven and earth to witnesse that hee hath set before them life and death blessing and cursing So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God as the Author of them like as life and blessing and both are in due proportion to the behaviour of man as it is found either in the way of obedience or in the way of disobedience And in this respect perhaps you may say that man is the cause of cursing not God To this I answer 1. By the same reason man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing and not God 2. If in this respect cursing be to be derived from sin it is onely in the way of a meritorious cause so doth not fruit proceed from trees but onely in the way of an efficient cause God and none but God can be the Author as of happinesse so of misery as of eternall life so also of everlasting death And as none is truly blessed but whom God blesseth so none is truly accursed but whom God curseth Yet no man I thinke that hath his wits in his head will say that this cursing proceedeth from Gods love but rather from his hatred Gods love towards the creature is essentiall his love to the creature is not so no more then to be a creator is of Gods essence And love is no more of Gods essence as a Creator then hatred is of Gods essence as a revenger And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alledged belong to God onely as a Iudge to execute the one by way of reward and the other by way of punishment Albeit there is another course of Gods blessing and of his cursing though you love not to distinguish but to consound rather as all that maintaine bad causes love darknesse rather then light I come to the second point wherein you insist In that he is the Author of being he is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are And this is very true for God saw all that he had made and lo it was very good And as it is very true so it is nothing at all to the purpose For when we enquire whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one wee presuppose their beings in their severall times and generations And secondly we speake of a love proper to mankinde which consisteth not in giving them their being for God hath given being unto Angels even unto Devils as well as unto men and as to men so to all inferiour creatures be they never so noysome and offensive unto man And it is a strange course of yours to magnifie the love of God to man in giving him being which is found in the basest creature that breathes or breathes not I have heard a story of a great Prince when one of the prime subjects of the land being taken in a foule act of insurrection and yeelding upon condition to bee brought to speake with that Prince presuming of ancient favour whereof hee had tasted in great measure and which upon his presence might haply revive he found nothing answerable but imperious taâ—ts rather and dismission in this manner Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad Yet you magnifie the love of God to mankinde in as comfortable manner when you say that hoe hath given us being which wee well know God hath given to lyons rigers and beasts of prey yea to snakes and adders to frogges and toads and fiery serpents Herehence you proceed to the third point and do inferre That because he hath made us therefore hee loveth us for He hateth nothing that he hath made as saith the wise man and to give the greater credit to the authority alledged by you you use an introduction of strange state for you say The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived that He hateth nothing that he hath made But to what purpose tends all this pompe Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all and can neither deceive nor be deceived May not fooles speake of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived as well as wise men and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this If the author of that sentence had beene such a one as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived then indeed the sentence had beene of greatest authority and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Iew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull take the author of it for such a one as could neither deceive nor be deceived If you did this were very foule play and no better then a trick of conicatching Yet we except not against the sentence but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours taken from the same ground above two hundred yeares ago You shall finde it in Aquinas his summes where his first objection is this Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit sed Deus omnem hominem diligit secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt nihil odisti eorum quae secisti Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat It seemes that God reprobates no man For no man reprobates him whom hee loveth But God loves every man according to that Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are and hatest nothing that thou hast made Therefore God reprobateth no man And the answer hee makes unto this objection followeth in this manner Adprimum dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diliget etiam omnes creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare To the first is to be answered that God loves all men yea and all creatures for as much as he willeth some good to them all but yet he willeth not every good to all There-fore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good which is life everlasting he is said to hate them or to reprobate them And you might have beene pleased to take notice not onely of that wise man though as wise as Philo who speakes herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived but of that wise God who is wiser then men and Angels and can neither deceive nor be deceived and affirmeth openly that He hath loved Iacob and hated Esau as also of the Apostle Saint Paul who by the infallible direction of Gods Spirit applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne
as for others Againe if sinne hath made them hatefull is there not sinne enough in the world in Iewes Turkes and Infidels to make them hatefull Wherefore though in case they were in the same state wherein God made them then they should not be hatefull to God and thereupon be thought fit matter of prayers yet seeing they are in the state of sinne and consequently hatefull to God for the same cause in just proportion of reason they are no fit matter for our praiers Though a full measure onely of enmitie against God exempt men from Gods love yet will you denie that such a full measure is found in many throughout the world and will not this be sufficient to forbid our praiers for all and everie one Sure I am if there be anie in the world that sin a sinne unto death we may not pray for such an one 3. From the authorized devotions in our Church you proceed to the Catechisme and aske what can be more cleare then that as God the Father doth love all mankinde without exception so the Sonne of God did redeeme all mankinde not onely some of all sorts but all mankinde universally taken And I thinke indeed that the one is as cleare as the other Throughout the Scriptures shew me one passage wherein the love of God is expressed to Reprobates If the Sonne of God did redeeme all and everie one then all and everie one have redemption in Christ through his bloud and consequently the forgivenesse of their sinnes For in Scripture phrase remission of sinnes is that redemption which we have in Christ so is reconciliation also all one with forgivenesse of sinnes Sure I am Christ professeth Iohn 17. 9. that he would not pray for the world but for those whom his heavenly Father had given him and for those that should beleeve through their word And for their sakes did he sanctifie himselfe for whom he prayed and to what did he sanctifie himselfe but unto his death and passion by the consent of as many Fathers as Maldonate had seene as the Iesuit himselfe professeth on that 17. of Iohn and he had seene very many as there hee signifieth namely Chrysostome Cyril Austine Theodorus Mopsuestenus and Heracleotes Leontius Beda Theophilact Enthymius Rupertus But to proceed out of our Catechisme you alledge that God the Father made us and all the world now the Church our mother hath taught us that God hateth nothing that hee hath made The booke of Wisedome saith so indeed but because of the little authority that booke hath in matter of faith from God our Father therefore you charge us with the authority of the Church our Mother Now you are not ignorant I suppose whence the Church our mother taketh this which hath its course amongst Papists as well as amongst us And you know of what authority Aquinas is amongst Papists and what interpretation he makes of this place though received to bee canonicall Scripture amongst them I have already shewed out of his Summes God saith he loves all things in as much as he willeth unto them some good or other but in as much as he willeth not a certaine good to some to wit eternall life he is said to hate them and reprobate them And indeed God saveth both man and beast as the Psalmist speaketh and so he may bee said to love them all and so the Apostle acknowledgeth him to bee the Saviour of all men but especially of them that beleeve And to professe ingenuously what I thinke I see no cause of controversie hereabouts if so be the question be rightly stated For when we say Christ died for mankinde our meaning is that Christ died for the benefit of mankinde Now let this benefit bee distinguished and considered apart and forth with contentious hereabouts will cease For if this benefit be considered as the remission of sinnes and the salvation of our soules these being benefits obtainable onely upon the condition of faith and repentance As on the one side no man will affirme that Christ died to this end namely to procure forgivenesse of sinne and salvation to all and every one whether they beleeve or no so on the other side none will deny but that he dyed to this end that salvation and remission of sinne should redound to all and every one in case they should beleeve and repent For this depends upon the sufficiency of that price which Christ paid to God his Father for the redemption of the world But there be other benefits which Christ merited for us also even the very grace of faith and of repentance For all Gods promises are Yea and Amen in Christ and amongst these promises one is the circumcision of the heart the healing of our waies of our rebellions These promises doe include the grace of faith and of repentance Now consider ingenuously did Christ die to this end that the grace of faith and repentance should bee bestowed absolutely or conditionally Not conditionally for before the grace of faith and repentance and regeneration comes there is nothing to bee found in man but workes of nature Now it is meere Pelagianisme to affirme that God bestoweth grace on man upon the performing of a worke of nature And the Apostle clearely professeth that God doth not call us according to our works Therefore it remaines that albeit remission of sinnes and salvation are conferred unto us conditionally to wit upon the condition of faith and repentance yet the grace of faith and repentance cannot be so conferred and consequently they must be conferred absolutely If then Christ died for the purchasing of faith and repentance to all and every one absolutely it would follow herehence that all and every one should beleeve and repent But this being found to bee a notorious untruth it followeth that Christ died for the purchasing of these graces onely unto some and who can those bee other then the elect of God Accordingly as our Saviour professeth that for those who were Gods and whom he had given unto Christ or should in time to come give unto him the rest excluded for those he sanctified himselfe that is offered himselfe upon the Crosse which interpretation of Christs sanctifying of himselfe Maldonate professeth was received by all the Fathers whom he had seene Now to goe along with you Secondly we are taught you say by the same Catechisme to beleeve in God who hath redeemed us and all mankinde What I pray is this more then to say He hath redeemed us and all men Is all mankinde more then all men and in the straining of this phrase we have tried your strength and the issue of all was to prove but this that God willeth not the death of any but the life of all whom of men and Infidels he hath made Christians By the way I observe an incongruity Of Infidels wee are made Christians as whereby we cease any longer to bee Infidels but I hope of men we are