terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okamâ— first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2â— q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living
Creature seeth eateth sleepeth avoydeth knowne danger The plants grow vpright bring forth leaues and fruit in due season So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature when man moues himselfe vnto doing by the direction of true reason and the vnrestrained and free choyse of the will Naturall things doe worke by accident when the instinct of nature is suppressed or diverted The intellectuall creature workes by accident when the iudgement of reason is erronious and the choyse of the will carried by a previall over-ruling power and all these doe fall out in case where nature meets with defection The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance or the will haled by the naughtinesse of corruption and violence of temptation Lastly the secret providence of God which the Heathen called fortune makes the creature work by accident in all Cases when he workes against meanes as he did when he brought the people through the red Sea Exodus the 14. and as he doth in all miracles or when man intendeth one thing but another thing comes to passe of this we haue an example in the 45. of Genesis and 5. vers 37. 27. verse In this place they are sayd to sell Ioseph because they would be rid of him and in that Ioseph sayth God sent him into Aegypt to preserue their liues They were the efficient Cause of their owne preserving when they sold Ioseph but yet by accident through Gods secret providence that wrought contrary to their intent The Iewes likewise were the Cause of Christs glory and mans salvation when they delivered him to death but yet by accident because God himselfe did create light out of darknesse and made their evill intention serue vnto that good There be many examples wherein wee finde that the efficient cause doth worke on this manner but these are enough for this present The efficient doth worke Physically Morrally This distinction is received in all the Logick schooles and is of frequent vse in the question touching sanctification and the actuall motion of grace in mans conversion the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many other places A Physicall operation is a reall influence into the effect we haue an example of this in mans creation He formed him and that of the dust and poured life into him all these be reall influences of this kinde are the builders of the Tower of Babell they made bricke and reard a building with bricke and stone Of this sort be all workemen that labour with their hands and tooles the strength of nature doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke A morall worke is a motion offered to the vnderstanding and serues to allure and draw it on with reasons and perswasion Of this kinde bee be all such things as be obiected to the vnderstanding as namely the testimonie of God and man by commanding forbidding promising threatning perswading therefore so often as wee finde any of these attributed to God or man wee are to know that then they are efficient causes that worke morally Ramus doth call Testimonies Exhortations Commandements c. inartificiall arguments because they argue not of their owne force but by the authoritie of him that doth testifie but this is altogether vnfitly spoken for inartificiall and argument implyes a contradiction if inartificiall then no argument if an argument then artificiall for an argument is a member of Art 2. These things themselues are no arguments vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator but then they argue as properties or adjuncts and otherwayes they are never attributed to any subject In this place affirmation perswasion c. are not brought as morall causes in themselues but the causalitie is referred to him that affirmeth perswadeth c. which makes it very plaine that they belong to this place or seat of arguments God and his servants are the morall causes of mans holines when they command good and forbid ill when they promise good and threaten ill when they perswade vnto obedience and disswade from sinne thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things when by his obedience he deserved that God should bestow them vpon vs he by meriting I say is the morall cause of Gods gifts because by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them and so much shall suffice for this distinction A Physicall efficient is Principall first second Instrumentall This distinction is very ancient in the schooles and of great vse when we desire to know how mans will is wrought vpon and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace Alvarez received it from Thomas and makes vse of it disp 68. no. 5. c. where hee doth thus describe each member of it A principall efficient is that which worketh out of its owne power or forme as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 18. art 3. in cor A first principall efficient is that which worketh onely out of its owne power Thus God only worketh of whom it is sayd hee sitteth in Heaven and doth what he will He is the vniversall cause for in him we liue and mone and haue our being A second principall efficient is that which is so moved by another that it moveth it selfe by a power of its owne Of this sort is mans mind which is moved by God yet neverth lesse it worketh out of an actiue beginning remaining in it selfe Of this sort be all those sayings in the Scripture which attribute mans good workes as his conversion and the like sometimes vnto God alone and other sometimes vnto man alone An instrument properly taken and so we speake of it here is that which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient of this kinde are all instruments without life as namely the tooles of a Carpenter or Smith c Thus hot water heateth another thing that is cold by the heate received from the fire To conclude the point touching the efficient cause wee are to know that the efficient Ramus alwayes worketh after one of these waies whether it works alone or with others whether it begins the worke or preserues it being alreadie made CHAP. VIII The matter Ramus is a Cause of which a thing is Matter This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily substance but it is not so taken in this place for as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor The matter as it is a matter remaineth onely in power or capacitie to receiue many formes and therefore according to it selfe hath no being nor can be obiected to our vnderstanding 1. p. q. 15. art 3. ad 3m. In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed or some intellectuall thing answerable vnto that A cause These words doe attribute an actiue power and actuall efficacy vnto the matter wherby the effect is produced Of which These words shew the nature of that efficacy and
it consisteth of things true first immediate better knowne preceding and cause of the conclusion Those are first and true which haue force to argue not from others but of themselues They ought to be true because that which is not cannot be knowne they must be first because they ought to be indemonstrable and consist of their owne proper principles we must not inquire of the principles of Science wherefore they are so but every one of them even by it selfe ought to be worthy of credit The medium must containe the causes of the conclusion seeing we know nothing vnlesse wee vnderstand the causes The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion both in nature and our knowledge therefore the principium of ad monstration is an immediate proposition viz. that hath none before it Poster lib. 1. cap. 4. 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. wherupō demonstrations are made by definitions Poster lib. 1. cap. 33. and they are the principles thereof Poster lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no wayes be proued Poster lib. 2. cap 4.5 6. 7. lib. 1. cap 9. By this whole discourse we haue rules to know what Syllogisine containes a truth simply necessary and we are sent vnto them onely whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion and such causes also as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe Wherefore for further explication hereof Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be and how they concurre In these words For as much as we doe then know when we vnderstand the causes and these be foure 1. the forme 2. the matter 3. the efficient and 4. the end Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth when one of these causes is taken and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion And by Causes is meant not onely the causes of those things that are but also of those things that haue beene or shall be hereafter Post lib. 2. cap. 11. 12. Now wee doe fully vnderstand where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme Our next labour must be to set out these scientificall Syllogismes by other properties that we may know them the more easily and certainely for that cause Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner A demonstration is Vniversall Particular Affirmatiue Negatiue Poster lib. 1. cap 24. A demonstration vniversall excells a particular and an affirmatiue is better then a negatiue cap. 24.25 This distribution followes the nature of a Syllogisme for every demonstration is a syllogisme though every syllogisme be not a demonstration Poster lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this necessary truth and the degrees of it To conclude this matter of demonstratiue science he sayth The first figure is fittest for a demonstration yea chiefly proper vnto this science and it is to be sought out onely by that Poster lib. 1. cap. 14. Some perhaps will looke that I should giue instances to open the vse of these precepts and it may seeme the more needfull because some are of opinion that no example can be given answerable to this rule I answer this conceit is very vaine for cannot any of the causes or all of them together serue to proue a sentence that is called into question or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions Without doubt they may Also it is most certaine that every proposition comprehends a necessary truth wherein the effect is argued by the causes for the effect is no more but a comprehension of all the causes and when the causes doe argue the effect the effect is resolued into the causes therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect And consequently such propositions are necessary and what they are such the conclusion must be that is lawfully inferred from them If there may be premises and conclusion answerable to this rule then no doubt there be examples of it and we may shew them if need were but I will saue that labour for this time for divers reasons 1. Aristotle hath done that alreadie Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. so as he that will may make vse of them 2. This kinde of knowledge cannot easily be discerned seeing it is very hard for vs to vnderstand those principles of a thing that are true first and of the same kinde as Aristotle doth admonish Poster lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem c. 3. By a mans owne practice and obseruation he shall finde them and their vse in naturall things and in them onely for in matters divine and spirituall such arguments can haue no place In them we vnderstand by faith not by sence and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof not the nature or causes of the things themselues I say a man may finde them by practice because by sence we get memory by the remembring the doing of the same thing often we get experience by our many times remembring our experience is one amongst all these that we doe remember there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied aboue many that which is one and the same amongst the rest becomes a principium of science if it belong vnto a thing that is Thus much we learne from Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 19. Exsensu c. The medium of a demonstration whereby wee know that a thing is consists in some of these that follow 1. Of the causes but not the first or immediate 2. Of things mediate and no cause but such as are reciprocated or mutually referred to each other 3. Of a demonstration that shewes what a thing is 4. Of things that are not reciprocated yet it is better knowne and yet no cause 5. Of a superior science as Geometry is to the Opticks and Arithmoticke to musicke 6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed vnder another as Surgery is vnto Geometry To know that a wound is healed sooner or later belongs to the Surgeon but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter belongs to Geometry 7. In a demonstration that sheweth what a thing is sometimes also the medium is placed without the extreames as when we say why doth not the wall breath Wee answer because it is not a living creature and these Syllogismes are alwayes made in the second figure after this sort whatsoeuer doth breath is a living creature But a wall is not a living creature Therefore a wall doth not breath Poster lib. 1. cap. 13. Thus farre goe Aristotles precepts to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth and the degrees thereof If any expect examples of these last I answer they may be given because we may haue examples of the former as I haue alreadie proved They may be given with more ease then the former because the things contained in them are neerer to our vnderstanding but I will saue that labour least I make my discourse ouer long and the Reader too idle We
the maner how the matter doth concurre vnto the effect and importeth the thing that so receiues the forme that it resteth and remaineth in it This we see in an house wherin the timber stone c. are framed and fashioned together and made fit for habitation so doth a peece of timber receiue the picture made vpon it by a carver A thing is By thing is meant the effect produced by Is is meant essentially so as the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree or notion Wee conceiue the timber c. Of a house to be a part of it but we know that there is an other part therof more principall before that namely the forme fashion thereof A thing signifies an individuall effect so as the office of the matter is to bring the effect vnto asingular or individuall being thus all Philosophers doe conceiue of it The matter is the principium of individuation saith Thomas 1. p. q. 86. art 3. in cor And againe the essence is restrained vnto one individuall thing by the matter 1. p. q. 7. art 3. in cor We haue an instance of this in every singular creature Peter is a singular man by his body every plant is singular by the stem that groweth vp for they inioy all other things in common with therest of their kinds The soule of Peter hath the same rationalitie with all other mens soules no singular tree differs from other trees in vegititie Sanctitie makes men christians Peters sanctitie makes Peter a christian because the holy Ghost dwels in his mortall body This argument brings the subiect to which it is attributed vnto our cleere vnderstanding and it is of singular vse to make vs know the nature and distinction of particular beings Yea of absolute necessitie for that I may vse the words and reason of Aristotle Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text 11 It is not possible to know vntill wee come vnto indiuidualls It is impossible to know vntill we ataine vnto those things which doe not admit division for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our vnderstandings We haue a pregnant example of it in the 1. Cor. 15.39 c. Where the Apostle doth describe and destinguish diuers kinds of singular bodies and saith some be celestiall as the Sunne Moone and stars Other some be terrestriall and those be spirituall as mans body that is raysed other some be naturall viz the flesh of men beasts and birds and from hence he deliuers the nature and difference of glory that these particular beings doe inioy Likewise the holy Ghost Reuel 21 18. c. Makes vs know what the new Ierusalem is by the matter thereof The examples of this kinde are very frequent and well knowne to every man therefore I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the materiall cause CHAP. IX Of the formall Cause A forme is a Cause Ramus by which a thing is that which it is Forme As I sayd of the matter so must I say of the forme If it be considered in it selfe abstracted from all matter and individualitie it is a certaine thing common vnto many so Thomas truly sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor 2. Vnder the name forme sometimes is comprehended a figure which consisteth in the termination of a quantitie This also I haue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. ad 2m. But wee take not this word at this time in either of these sences By forme then wee here vnderstand the intrinsicall part of the compounded effect so sayth Suarez meta disp 10. sect 1. no. 7. that is Received of the matter informing the same Thus saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor A forme saith Thomas is Generall A forme saith Thomas is Speciall A speciall forme is that which informs the subiect but it selfe is not informed by any other forme of the same nature as one colour is not informed by another colour 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 1m. Forme in this place is taken in the second sence not in the first Wee haue an example of this in the rationalitie of man and vigiditie of plants both of them are formes and distinct beings not receiving any thing from other formes of their kinde Is a Cause That is it hath actuall exercised force to inferre the effect By which These words doe shew that the force of the forme is not receptiue nor retentiue nor restrictiue as the force of the matter is but it is actiue for as Aristotle saith Meta. lib. 9. cap. 6. text 17. The forme is an act that is an actuall determinate and actiue being the Reader may see this matter fully opened by Gillius col 467. A thing is By these words the essence of every individuall effect is attributed to the formall cause every thing that doth actually exist saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 2. in cor hath some forme and againe every being is caused by the forme thereof 1. p. q. 51. art 4. in cor That which These words doe attribute the whole effect vnto the forme and this is agreed vpon by the learned in all ages Each thing is that which it is by its forme thus Thomas thinketh 1. p. q 5. art 5. ad 3m. in cor The whole compound is the effect of the forme in the iudgement of Okam 1. dist 32. q. 1. 2. lit C. And this sentence agrees well with the nature of the thing for the matter doth finite and contract the amplitude of the forme and thereby it becomes the determinate forme of this or that individuall effect The forme on the other side doth perfit and determine the matter and bring it from power to act by giuing an essence thereunto in so much that by the forme the essence is termined vnto some speciall kinde And thus much wee receiue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. et 3 in cor q. 14. art 2. ad 1m. This argument is of necessary vse to instruct our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect to which it is attributed for how can we know a thing more cleerely and certainely then when wee finde the intrinsicall primary and proper nature and being thereof It is all one saith Aristotle 2. post cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing and to know the cause of its nature Wee haue examples of this kinde of Cause in the word of God and the nature of the Creature when God would shew vs what sinne is he doth set it out by the forme thereof Sinne sayth the Apostle Iohn 1. Epist chap. 3. v. 4. Is a varying from the Law The Apostle Paul when he would set out what the righteousnesse of faith is he doth describe it in his Epistle to the Romans ch 4. v. 6.7.8 by forgiuenesse of sinnes The holy Ghost doth yeeld vs many of these examples but these shall suffice In man we haue a full representation of every part of this Argument Wee
themselues for thus he writeth Those are called denominates which haue the appellation of a name from some other but so as they differ in case as from Grammar man is called a Grammarian from strength he is called Strong Categor Cap. 1. These are the same arguments with the former for Grammarian imports the skill of Grammar and is an accident because it may be and not be in man It is a formall qualitie seeing it doth constitute and denominate a man a Grammarian Grammar is an abstract and signifies nothing Logically being no more but a comprehension of precepts If we referre it to man it is the same with Grammarian namely the same precepts literally and habitually Distribution is when the whole is divided into parts Ramus Distribution is called the dividing of the whole The gathering of the parts together to make vp the whole is called Induction When we say a man hath two parts soule and bodie Living Creatures are reasonable and vnreasonable then we make a distribution and Aristotle doth acknowledge these distributions Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1. but in a different sence Although it is very probable that a distribution doth formally consist in an axiome and therefore it belongs to the second part of Logicke yet I will not now insist thereupon because the arguments predicated in a distribution are meerely the Causes themselues and we cannot finde a compounded effect more cleerely resolved into its Causes then in a distribution In the first example of distribution before going we find the matter informed arguing the whole effect constituted by that matter In the second we haue the specificall forme informing each severall kinde and arguing that whole effect which comprehendeth both kindes The Reader shall finde this answer fully explicated and proved Chap. 38. c. in the matter of a distribution Aristotle doth acknowledge a division belongs to Logicke Prior. cap. 31. but he makes it a Syllogisme because â—omething is alway concluded therfrom though a weake one because it preâ—umes what it ought to proue He doth acknowledge induction also Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. lib. 1. cap. 12. Prior lib. 2. cap. 23. and by an induction hee vnderstands a collection of all the singulars to make the totall therefore he doth acknowledge it in the present sence but according to him it is one species kinde or forme of disputing little differing from a Syllogisme for thus he sayth of it A Syllogisme is for Logicians an Induction for the multitude Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. Secondly It is an instrument more apt to perswade more open better knowne to sence and is common amongst the multitude but a Syllogisme hath greater force to vrge and is more effectuall against them that are apt to gaine say Top. lib. 1. cap. 12. Therefore according to him division and induction belong to the second part of Logicke not to the first and consequently a distribution must be referred thither also for both division and induction are comprehended or implyed in a distribution according to Ramus A definition is Ramus when wee declare what a thing is Therefore a perfect definition is nothing else but a generall marke or badge of the causes which make the essence or nature of the thing I haue a little to say touching this fourth seate for I haue done enough in the last to satisfie this for what appertaines to that may be applyed to this Aristotle doth acknowledge definitions and that in the present sence too but giues them a place in the second part as wee shall see cap. 35. c. The arguments disposed in a definition belong to the first part of Logicke because as Thomas sayth 1. dist 25. q. 1. art 1. ad 2m. a definition according to the intent thereof doth lâ—aâ— to the knowledge of the thing definea and this is the case with all axiomes whatsoeuer The predicate in a definition belongs to the seat of causes even in the iudgement of Ramus himselfe for the predicate doth set out what the subiect or thing defined is and nothing can doe that but the causes therefore a definition deserues no other place in Logicke but the seat of the causes Vpon these premises we may wel conclude these foure seats of arguments in question are superfluous because Art hath given them place alreadie in the precepts fore going therefore wee must not seeke it here The second part of Logicke comes in the next ranke THE SECOND PART CHAP. XXIX Of disposition or iudgment Either to wee haue handled the first part of Logicke called Invention Ramus Wee come now to the second termed Iudgement Iudgement is a part of Logicke teaching the maner of disposing arguments that we may iudge well for every thing is to be iudged according to certaine rules of disposition Hence this part of Logicke is called both Iudgement and disposition the same thing being signified by both termes THE substance of all this matter is already set down in the second chapter and repeated heere for the benefit of the Reader There is no great difficultie in the parts nor difference in the whole from Aristotle I haue shewed the consent of both Authors in the place aleadged and I will now giue my opinion of the sence of every thing that seemes not cleere enough Iudgement Disposition These words are vsed for the same thing and that fitly for they are the same thing variously considered the second intends the first and the first proceeds from the second The second is the fountaine the first is the streame and they make one continued thing The first is the supreame the second the subordinate end and meanes vnto the supreame in that respect they vary and not otherwise Apart Logicke hath parts even by it selfe for the precepts thereof are of distinct natures as members in the whole and therefore we must so conceive of them The precepts that are contained vnder this name make a second part for the disposing of things doth suppose that the things themselues haue a being already Disposing These words and the rest that follow doe containe the whole shot or generall summe that ariseth from all the precepts belonging to this part of Logicke and it signifieth a ioyning together of distinct things in an orderly frame Arguments viz. Those single or incomplexed termes whereof wee spake in the former part Iudge Iudgement is an act of the vnderstanding whereby we determine in our selues that this or that is true or false This word sets out the end of those precepts which belong to this part of Logicke namely the thing they are fit for and the profit we receiue by them Well That is not doubtfully but even as the things are in themselues and this is the perfection of Iudgement This first and vniversall precept may fitly be expressed in these terms 1. Some precepts of Logicke doe teach vs to dispose arguments fitly that thereby wee might iudge of truth and falshood cleerely and certainely 2. These precepts make vp a second part
beasts doe differ in their proper being and Gods destination for the one is made to perish finally the other to rise againe These Creatures doe differ also in their life or liuelines the life of beasts is no more but as breath that doth vanish at their dissolution Mans life is more for his soule is life being a living continuing and spirituall substance and no doubt but that spirituall substance is informed by a liuelihood differing therefrom though our vnderstandings cannot but ghesse at it 1. because wee finde a secret motion of mans vnderstanding and will in his soule differing from the spirituall substance thereof 2. Because mans soule liues when it is parted from the body It may be some will obiect on this sort If the species containes no more then is in the Genus then the specificall difference is also contained in the Genus but this last is not true therefore the first is vntrue also I answer I grant the assumption vpon Aristotles authoritie and proofe alledged before in the poynt of the Genus But I deny the consequence because it doth suppose that the specificall difference is a reall being constituting the species but that is vtterly vntrue If that were so then it is a cause different from the matter forme and end But the last is not true and this I take as granted therefore the first is vntrue also and consequently the argument is so too that is founded therevpon The specificall difference is a rationall entitie and no more namely our vnderstandings doe apprehend this kinde to differ from another when they are both layd together Now this apprehension is a veritie no fiction for it hath a foundation in the thing namely the specificall forme our vnderstanding doth thus argue This hath one kinde of forme that hath another therefore this doth specifically differ from that And thus the specificall difference doth flow from the forme it is not the specificall forme it selfe Hitherto wee haue shewed what arguments are disposed in this kinde of Distribution and the manner how they are disposed now I will declare that it containes a necessary truth and I may easily doe that for it fully agrees with the rules of necessary truth set downe Chap. 34. as will appeare by laying them herevnto 1. The parts doe belong to the whole even to all of it and at all times there is no animalitie more then is comprehended in the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable We cannot conceiue a time wherein the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable are not liuing Creatures and therefore the first Rule agrees with this Distribution 2. The Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable are living Creatures even by themselues and their owne nature there is no third thing that comes betweene their nature and the nature of a living creature that makes the one belong to the other but they are so living creatures by themselues that the one is essentiall to the other therefore this Distribution agrees with the second Rule 3. The Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable even in that thing wherin they are they are living creatures so also even in that nature wherein their being doth consist vniversally they are living Creatures yea and this their nature wherein they are they are the first thing in living creatures we cannot conceiue any thing in the essence of the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable that exceeds the essence of a living Creature Neither can we imagine in any signe or moment of reason that there is any thing in the essence of a living Creature which hath the prioritie or is before the essence of the creature reasonable and vnreasonable I say before either in nature or time but in the first moment wherein you conceiue a living Creature to be you conceiue a creature either reasonable or vnreasonable Wherevpon animalitie and these creatures are conuertible All living creatures conceived as making one totall summe is no larger in number then the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable and contrariwise So also we may say If a Creature reasonable or vnreasonable then a living Creature If a living Creature then reasonable or vnreasonable And consequently all the lawes of necessary truth agree vnto this Distribution If any desire to know when a Distribution of this kinde is false let him lay it to these rules and by them he shall know If it agrees not with these rules but comes short in any part then it is false And the more it disagrees from them the lesse truth there is in it Here I will end the distribution of the Genus into the species CHAP. XL. Of the distribution of the whole into the members IN this Chapter we must see what a Distribution of the Integrall into the members is The integrall is distributed into the members when the comprehensiue whole is parted betweene the things comprehended therein I must say of this precept as I did of the last The doctrine and practice of Aristotle and Ramus doth patronize it therefore we may take it for a precept of art though they haue it not in so many words the opening thereof will say it came from them In this Distribution 1. The whole is an individuall 2. That whole is severed into peeces as the timber is by the saw or wedges 3. The parts haue different and individuall natures 4. The whole is made by their meeting together therefore this second kinde of Distribution differs really from the former This one example will make the sence plaine and easie A man hath two parts Soule Bodie This proposition is a simple axiome for one thing is attributed to another I say one because both members viz. soule and body be one in reference to man though they be distinct in themselues 1. Man is the whole divided to wit an individuall man 2. This whole is shared one peice to the bodie another to the soule 3. The body and soule haue distinct individuall natures the one corporeall the other spirituall 4. The meeting of these two parts together doth make man as he is an individuall whole the soule in forming the body and the body being informed by the soule This shall suffice to shew what arguments be in this distribution and the manner how they are framed together This kinde of distribution containes a necessary truth because the lawes of necessary truth agree to it 1. Soule and body are affirmed of all men severally and at all times without exception 2. Bodie and soule are referred vnto a singular man by themselues and their owne essence not by the force of any third 3. The soule and body in what respect they are and in the very essence as they are they are affirmed of a singular man I say affirmed both vniversally according to the totall nature of themselues and according to the essence of a singular man So as the essence of a singular man and the essence of soule and bodie are of equall extent the one is as large and no lesse large then the other so also this
the assumption and the rest taken away in the Conclusion BY assuming is vnderstood a bare repeating and taking away is a contradicting in the same sort as hath beene before set downe In this second kinde of disjunct Syllogisme there are three properties First The proposition is whoâ—y affirmatiue Secondly One single terme onely of the opposition is repeated in the assumption Thirdly The other part is contradicted in the conclusion therfore this forme doth really differ from the former That concludes affirmatiues and no negatiues this concludes negatiues and no affirmatiues Gal. Cap 3 ver 2.3 doth yeeld vs an argument of this kinde Yee received the spirit either by the Law or the Gospell But yee received it by the Gospell Therefore yee received it not by the Law This disputation doth suppose two things first They had the spirit Secondly one of these two the law or the Gospell gaue it them not both together Those two things being granted the argument cannot be denyed If either of them might be denied the argument may not be granted The assumption doth barely repeate the second terme opposed and the conclusion doth contradict the first I will adde this second instance This action is either supernaturally good or supernaturally evill or naturally good or naturally evill But it is supernaturally good Therefore it is neither supernaturally evill nor naturally good nor naturally evill Here we finde first divers termes opposed in the proposition one against many and many against one Secondly They are all affirmatiue Thirdly The first terme is barely repeated in the assumption Fourthly The other three are contradicted in the conclusion Fiftly A supposition that every action hath one of these properties and no more but one of them The reason why one opposite terme onely is assumed and the rest contradicted is because but one opposite can be in the subject at once and the presence of that doth inforce the absence of the rest We may bring these into simple Syllogismes after this sort That act which is supernaturally good is not supernaturally evill nor naturally good nor naturally evill But this act is supernaturally good Therefore it is neither supernaturally evill nor naturally good nor naturally evill I doubt not but this will suffice to shew the truth and vse of this precept It is needles for me to set forth what truth is contained in these Syllogismes for if we take them as disjunctiue then they containe truth no otherwise then as disiunctiue axioms doe If we take them as simple then they must be referred vnto simple Syllogismes therefore in the precepts of them we shall know what truth is contained in these I might also alledge the reason why Ramus doth prosecute all the precepts of Compound Syllogismes and thereby justifie him And for what cause Aristotle did but name them not prosecute them and so justifie him also but I thinke I haue done that sufficiently in the matter of Compound Axiomes Cap. 42. they and these draw in one and the same line therefore I referre the Reader vnto that place Repetitions are but lost labour Now we are come to an end of all the precepts of Logicke so as there is no more required to make a Logician then what hath beene sayd alreadie But that seemes not enough to Ramus for he brings another member of this art and calls it Methode but I omit the same of purpose for divers reasons 1. No precepts of Logicke can teach it because even according to him Method is no more but the orderly placing of sentences together But the precepts of Logicke cannot teach that it being no more but the generall nature of art as wee haue alreadie found Cap. 1. I say of art simply abstracted from all particulars and not applyed to Rhetorick Logicke or any other as we do when we say Rhetoricke is an art c. 2. If any precepts of Logicke haue power to teach the orderly framing of sentences together then they must be either some that are past or some that are yet to come if we must haue recourse to these then their Authors and places must be named But that is impossible If the precedent precepts do teach it then we haue done enough alreadie and can doe no more except wee will repeat the same things againe 3. If we define and distribute according to the precepts of a definition and distribution Cap. 34. c. We cannot place definitions and distributions nor any other sentences that depend vpoÌ„ them vnduly and out of order for then the most generall will come first and the most speciall will come last and this is all the Method Ramus required 4. He alledges Aristotles authoritie for method but altogether without cause for he alledgeth no place nor words and I am sure he cannot Aristotle calls all the precepts of Logicke a Method whereby wee come to know how to discusse Top. lib. 1. cap. 2. lib 8. cap. 12. prior lib. 1. cap. 31. therfore he did neuer meane to make Method one member of his Art distinct from the rest seeing therefore we haue nothing to say touching Method I must here put an end to the whole Worke. FINIS