more immediate â—â—use doth intervene between the predicate â—nd the subject as that which is rational is â—â—sible a man is rational 12. In a most perfect demonstration where â—â—e middle term is the material or formal inâ—rnal cause of the subject and efficient of the â—â—fect by emanation the major proposition 〈◊〉 immediate in respect of the cause but not â—f the subject as that which is rational is â—sible The conclusion is immediate in respect 〈◊〉 the subject but not of the cause as a â—an is risible The minor is immediate in reâ—â—ect of the cause and the subject both as a â—an is risible 13. In a most perfect demonstration wherâ— the middle term is not the internal cause of thâ— subject though both the major and conclusioâ— be immediate yet the minor is not immediate in respect of the cause This happen in every chief demonstration from the external cause as also where we proceed from one affection predemonstrated to the demonstration of another such as are all mathematical demonstrations for the most part aâ— Zab. de medio demonst c. 7. 14. The relative conditions to be observed in reference to the conclusion are three first that the premisses be the cause of the conclusion secondly that they be before thirdly that they be more known than the conclusion 15. The premisses may be said to be thâ— cause of the conclusion as the medium is thâ— cause why an affection is not only the cauâ—â— why the conclusion is known but the cauâ—â— why it is true and as the medium is before aâ— affection not in time but nature so the truâ—â— of the premisses is first in nature before thâ— truth of the conclusion Lastly as the medium is more known than an affection not bâ— a confused knowledge and in respect of us but by a distinct knowledge and accordinâ— to nature so are the premisses more knowâ— than the conclusion because we by reason 〈◊〉 the premisses receive the conclusion with full assent of mind we must needs assent to that more than to the premisses for according to Aristotle That for which another is such as it is must needs it self be more such Lib. 1. post cap. 2. 16. Premissâ—s are of two sorts Axiomes and Theses 17. An Axiome is a proposition of whose â—ruth no body can be ignorant the signification of the words being known 18. A Thesis is a proposition whose truth doth not sufficiently appear by knowing only the signification of the words but by the judgment of the senses or any other declaration and it â—s either a Definition or an Hypothesis 1. A Definition is that by which we shew what a thing is An Hypothesis is that by which we shew whether the thing be or not 20. The medium of a demonstration ought to be the next cause of the predicate and that either efficient or final and the efficient either internal or external 21. A cause may be said to be the next either absolutely or in his own kind here it is understood to be the next absolutely that it is such a cause as doth produce the effect and without which that effect cannot be For as much as there are four kinds of causes and in every kind some one the next of the four next causes there is but one that is the next absolutely 22. Moreover it is required that this next cause should be the cause of the predicate but it is necessary that it should be the cause of the subject also for the question is not whether there be a subject for this is supposed but whether there be a predicate or whether it be inherent in the subject 23. This next cause must be either the efficient or the final for when the predicate is an accident it hath neither matter not form properly so called The final cause is used in those things which are made for other such as are mediums and natural instruments actions also and habits if any such can be demonstrated The efficient cause is used in all the rest Sometimes it falls out that the next efficient cause is also the form oâ— matter of the subject and these kind of demonstrations are indeed the most excellent but do not make a different species of themselves but these things will be more clearly understood by the examples following 1. Every rational creature is capable 〈◊〉 knowledge Every man is a rational creature Therefore every man is capable of knowledge In this demonstration the medium rational is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and form of the subject 2. Every terrestial thing doth sink in water Ebene is terrestial Therefore Ebene doth sink in water Here the medium is the internal efficient cause and matter of the subject 3. Whatsoever doth consist of matter and form hath three dimensions Every body doth consist of matter and form Therefore every body hath three dimensions Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and both the form and matter of the subject 4. That which hath three dimensions will not admit of another body in the same place with it self But every body hath three dimensions Therefore c. Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and propriety of the subject 5. That which by the interposition of the earth cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams doth suffer an Eclipse of the Sun-light But the Moon the earth being interposed cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams Therefore the Moon c. Here the medium is the external efficient cause of the predicate 6. Whoso is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things ought to have his countenance lift up Man is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things Therefore c. Here the medium is the final cause of the predicate 24. Sometimes it so comes tO pass that one and the same question may be demonstrated both by the efficient and final cause so you may demonstrate that a living creature doth sleep either because the common â—ense is overcome by vapours and that the â—assage of the external senses are obstructâ—d and this is a demonstration from the â—ficient cause or that the animal spirits may be â—efreshed and strengthened and this is a demonstration from the final cause CHAP. VIII Of an Imperfect Demonstration or the Demonstration What. HAving hitherto spoken of the principal Demonstration or the Demonstration â—hy the next is the less principal or the â—emonstration What and which leaveth an â—mperfect knowledge and is twofold the â—ne is from the effect the other from a remote â—ause The first of these collecteth the cause from â—ome sensible effect for example Every thing that is risible is rational Every man is risible Therefore every man is rational Here the medium is the next effect and the predicate is the cause of the conclusion 2. The second of these demonstrations collecteth the effect from some remote cause for example That which hath not a sensitive soul doth not breath A Plant hath not a sensitive
predication in every proposition the which is not in a circle 2. In the Matter for the matter of a circle or middle term is uniform in both the demonstrations seeing it is the next cause of the major extream proving why a thing is but in regress the effect doth first demonstrate that there is a cause then after consideration had about the cause the cause doth demonstrate why there is an effect 3. In the end for in a circle the same thing is both beginning and end seeing it proceeds from a cause distinctly known to a cause distinctly known and returns from this to that but in regress the end is a distinct knowledge of the effect and the first progress is from an effect confusedly known to a cause to be confusedly known but from a cause confusedly known consideration being had we come to the distinct knowledg of the cause and from that once habituated and radicated in the understanding we return to the distinct knowledge of the effect 3. Conversion of a demonstration into a definition is when from the terms of a demonstration the definition of a proper accident is framed by transposition And the definition of a proper accident is twofold 1. Partial and that is either Nominal which consists of a Genus and a subject as an Eclipse in the defect of light in the Moon Causal which is the middle term in the most perfect demonstration shewing why there is an effect as an Eclipse is the interposition of the Earth 2. Total which being made of the nominal and the causal both doth consist of a Genus a subject and the next cause as an Eclipse is the defect of llight in the Moon by reason of the interposition of the earth A nominal definition is the conclusion of the of the demonstration A causal is the beginning A total is an intire or whole demonstration differing in nothing from it but the placing of the terms for the thing defined is the greater extreme the lesser extreme the subject and the cause the middle term CHAP. X. Of a Topical Syllogism in the General HItherto we have spoken of a demonstrative Syllogism whose matter is necessary and the end a perfect knowledge come we now to a dialectical or topical Syllogism whose matter is probable and contingent and the end opinion 2. In a dialectical or topical Syllogism we are to consider of Problemes Propositions and the invention of arguments 3. A Probleme or Question is the thing of which it is probably discoursed and the conclusion of a Syllogism already made But that this Problem may be dialectical two conditions are required 1. That it be profitable either to life and then it is called a moral Probleme as whether pleasure be good or to knowledge and then it is called a Physical or a natural probleme as whether the world be eternal or to some thing that is subservient unto these and then it is called a Logical Probleme as whether division be a Syllogism 2. That it be doubtful in which either the common people do dissent from wise men as whether riches make men happy or the common people dissent among themselves as whether usury be lawful or the wise men dissent among themselves as whether the heart be the most noble part of man 4. The parts of a Probleme are the two terms of subject and predicate As concerning the subject I give no directions because a dialectical Syllogism is not restrained to any certain subject But the Predicates according to Aristotle are four Genus Definition Accident proper and common He adjoineth difference to Genus if it be more comprehensive than the species or to definition if it be reciprocated with the species if the species chanceth to be attributed in any Probleme it is reduced to Genus 5. Dialectical Propositions ought to be certain at least probable and not Paradoxes 6. That is said to be probable which not being absolutely true doth rather seem to be true than false There are five degrees of probability for that is said to be probable which seemeth to be true either to all to most men or unto wise men and that either to all of them or to the most or to the wisest of them 7. That is said to be a Paradox which is true though contrary to the vulgar opinion 8. For the invention of arguments we are to consider common places and rules 9. A place is a sense or commmon note by whose help an argument is found 10. A Rule or Canon is a proposition containing the reason of the consequence in a dialectical Syllogism 11. Arguments are of two sorts artificial and inartificial 12. Artificial arguments are such as from the consideration of the parts of the probleme are not found but by rules of art 13. Inartificial arguments are such as are found without any help of art and these are nothing but testimonies 14. Several men do reckon the order of these heads or places severally Aristotle reduceth all heads to the four predicates mentioned before some for the more plainness and distinction reckon up twenty and five and this number some contract to thirteen others to ten and perhaps they may without any inconvenience be reduced unto seven 1. The Cause and the Effect 2. The subject and the Accident 3. Dissentany and Comparison 4. Conjugates and Notation 5. The whole and its parts 6. Genus and Species 7. Definition and Division In every of these places I will in the proposed order shew you the Canons to be observed and the restrictions of them CHAP. XI Of the Topicks from the Cause and the Effect THere are four kinds of Causes efficient material formal and final there are several sub-divisions of them but these following are the most convenient to our purpose as 1. Into total as Gold is the cause of money the Sun of the day and partial as timber in the cause of a house nature of learning 2. Into a cause actually as a builder is the cause â—f an house and a cause potentially as an â—rchitect may build an house 3. Into a reâ—ote cause as a feast may be the cause of â—â—ckness and the next cause as crudity in â—he stomach is the cause of sickness 4. Into 〈◊〉 cause simply and by it self as the Sun is â—he cause of light and a cause by accident as â—he Sun of blindness The Canons or Rules of this Topick are â—hese 1. The cause being granted the effect cannot be denied and if the cause be taken away the effect is taken away also as if the Sun shine it must be day if the Sun doth not â—hine it is not day the former part of this Canon hath four limitations 1. In a remote cause as he that drinks wine is not alwaies made drunk 2. In a cause that is obstructed in its operation as heavy things do not alwaies descend because they may be hindered by some thing that holds them up 3. In a cause by accident as he that diggeth in
it by some other Synonymous word more generally known 5. A real Definition is that which sheweth what the thing is and this is twofold perfect imperfect 6. A real a perfect Definition is that which doth explain the thing by essential attributes whether they be such as constitute the thing and then it is a Definition of the substantial form which doth most exactly explain the nature of its species as a man is a rational living creature Or such as do partly constitute the thing and partly produce the same necessarily and then it is a Definition of the accidents and this is threefold 1. Formal which consists of the Genus and the subject of the accident for the subject of the accident is as it were the form as Thunder is a noise in the clouds 2. Causal which doth demonstrate the nature of the thing defined and it is the next cause of the accident either efficient or final 3. Both formal and causal which sheweth the Genus subject and cause of the thing defined as if an Eclipse of the Moon be thus defined it is a privation of light in the Moon by the interposition of the earth The Genus is privation the difference or form is the subject viz. the Moon and the efficient cause is the interposition of the earth 7. A real but imperfect definition otherwise called a description is that which explains the nature of the thing by certain accidental attributes it doth consist of a Genus or something which doth supply the place of a Genus and of proper and common accidents which supply the place of the difference as a man is a living creature that is risible hath two feet And because our knowledge begins from the accidents therefore this kind of description is most in use with all The Canons or Rules are 1. In every science you are to begin with the definition of the name thereof 2. A description may be sutable as well to the substantial as the accidental part of any thing 3. A Species only is defined by a formal definition 4. An accident only is defined by a causal definition or by a formal and a causal both 5. A definition consisting of the form and cause both doth differ from a Demonstration in the disposition of the terms only 6. Every descriptive definition whether formal or formal and causal both is an oration CHAP. II. Of Division DIvision is the resolving of the whole into parts And this is either of some ambiguous word into its several significations or of the whole into its parts 2. Now the whole is either simple or aggregate 3. Division of the whole simply and properly so called is threefold 1. Vniversal into its subjective parts or of the General into the specials as to divide animal into man and beast 2. Essential which resolves the whole into essential parts and this is either of a species into its Genus and difference or of some spefical nature into its matter and form as a â—an into soul and body 3. Integral which resolveth the whole inâ—o integral parts and this is the division of some individual either into its sensible or material parts 4. Division of the aggregated whole into â—s parts and by accident is four fold 1. When the subject may be divided by its accidents as men are learned or unlearned 2. When an accident may be divided by â—ts subjects as Feavers are in the spirits or in the humours or in the solid parts 3. When an accident may be divided by â—ccidents as good is either profitable honest â—r pleasant 5. When things may be divided by their â—bjects as sight by colours hearing by â—ound 6. When causes may be divided by their â—ffects and the contrary as Heavenly heat â—s from the Sun and Elementary from fire The Canons or Rules are these 1. An ambiguous word must be explained before it can define any thing 2. Vnless the ambiguity be explained in the beginning the errour will be afterward the greater 3. In the simple dividing of the whole tâ—â— members dividing should be equal to and agreâ— with the whole 4. The members dividing should be disjoineâ— from one another 5. Division doth consist of as few members or parts as the nature of the whole will bear 6. In any Division the whole must be of a larger extent than any one of the parts CHAP. III. Of a Syllogism A Syllogism is an oration in which some things being taken for granted something else not granted before is proved or inferred from them and this is twofold perfect or imperfect 2. A perfect Syllogism is an argumentation in which from two premises disposed rightly and according to rule some conclusion doth necessarily follow as every man is an animal every thing that hath reason is a man therefore every rational thing is an animal 3. A perfect Syllogism is twofold Categoriâ—l and Hypothetical 4. A Categorical Syllogism is that in â—ich all the propositions are categorical and â—â—is is also twofold Common and Expositoâ— 5. A common categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a common name 〈◊〉 every sound may be heard every voice is a found therefore every voice may be heard 6. An Expository Categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a singular â—â—me as Sorates is learned Socrates is an Athenian therefore some Athenian is learnâ—â— 7. An Hypothetical Syllogism is that in â—hich one or more of the propositions are Hypoâ—â—etical as if Socrates be a man he is an aâ—imal but Socrates is a man therefore he 〈◊〉 an animal 8. To make a common Categorical Sylloâ—sm two things are required matter and â—rm 9. The matter of a Syllogism is either remote or next 10. The remote matter of a Syllogism is â—hat matter of which it is remotely made â—s the three terms in every proposition callâ—d the major extreme the minor extreme and the middle term or argument 11. The major extreme is that which is in the major proposition and in the conclusion but never in the minor 12. The minor extreme is that which is in the minor proposition and in the conclusion but never in the major 13. The middle term or argument is that which is in the major and minor propositions but never in the conclusion 14. The next or immediate matter of a Syllogism is that of which the Syllogism is immediately made as the three propositions of which the first is called the major the second the minor and the third the conclusion 15. The form of a Syllogism is the right disposing of the matter both next and remote and this comprehendeth two things figure and mode 16. A figure is that which shews how the middle term may be fitly placed which may be done three waies or by three figures 17. The first figure maketh that which is the subject in the major proposition to be the predicate in the minor 18. The Second figure maketh that which is the predicate in the major proposition to
is demonstrated are made first by joyning the cause with the effect and then by joyning the cause with the subject In all these two things are to be considered the precognitions which precede the demonstration and the conditions which are to be observed in the demonstration it self 11. The Precognitions are two 1. That the thing is 2. what it is 12. In these precognitions the things which are evident and obvious unto all are so in the understanding only but the things which are not so evident but that they may be unknown are expressed in the very beginning of sciences 13. And if being delivered the learner doth presently believe them they are properly called fuppositions but if the learner either doubt of them or be of another opinion they are called postulata or things to which an assent is requested 14. The first of these precognitions viz. the Quod sit That the thing is includeth two things 1. That the thing sougt hath a being or a true existence and this answereth to the Question Is there such a thing 2. That the thing sought is the true predicate in a subject 15. The other of these precognitions namely the Quid sit What it is doth also include two things 1. The name or what the signification of the name is 2. The nature of the thing that is called by that name so that from these two precognitions four questions do arise of which two are simple and two compounded 16. The simple questions are those which do equally agree to accidents and to substances The first is made concerning the essence or existence by asking An sit whether it be or not The second maketh inquiry concerning the nature of it and asketh Quid sit What it is 17. The compounded questions cheifly agree with accidents the first asketh whether the predicate be in the subject as whether man be risible The other asketh why the predicate is in the subject as why is man risible 18. Of these four questions the third hath such reference to the fourth as the first hath to the second for then in simple terms when we know they have being we ask what the things are and in propositions when we know they have a being we inquire why they are 19. After these precognitions and questions the three praecognita are next to be considered namely the subject affection and cause 20. The subject is a simple term or less extream in the demonstration concerning which some accident is demonstrated by its next cause as a man concerning whom we must both know that he is and what he is First that he is or otherwise we seek the knowledg of him in vain for there is no knowledge of a thing that is not and then we must also know what he is not only in respect of his name but also of his nature for that must be the medium of the demonstration and we must know the medium at least confusedly before we can infer the conclusion The precognition of the things existence is called the Hypothesis of its nature the Definition 21. Passion is a proper Accident which is demonstrated of the subject by the proper cause it is always the greater extream which is predicated in the conclusion as Risibility the which is necessary to be foreknown in respect of the name what it is though not in respect of its nature and that it be considered how it is inherent for seeing it supplies the place of the subject it is in some sort called a substance Arist lib. 1. post cap. 27. but it is not foreknown That it is for that is the thing inquired after and which we are to find by demonstration 22. A Cause is that by which the passion or affection is demonstrated of its subject and is always the Major proposition of the demonstration as Every rational animal is risible that being known the conclusion is vertually known also as being vertually conteined in it but yet it is not actually known till the Minor be assumed which being known the Conclusion though after in nature yet is known at the same time also What the cause is cannot be foreknown because it is a compounded proposition and what a thing is is only of uncompounded but it ought to be known That it is or hath a true existence or else the Conclusion cannot be inferred from it CHAP. VII Of the Conditions to be observed in a perfect Demonstration A Demonstration is to be considered either in the respect of the matter or in respect of the form 2. In respect of the matter one kind of Demonstration sheweth why the predicate is inherent in the subject and that 1. By an immediate intrinsecal cause and this is either the before demonstrated matter or form or affection of the subject 2. By an immediate extrinsecal cause and this is either final or efficient by some transient action 3. Another kind of Demonstration in respect of the matter sheweth that the predicate is inherent in the subject and that either by the effect or by some remote cause 4. A Demonstration in respect of the form is to be considered 1. In quantity and so it is universal or particular 2. In quality and so it is affirmative or negative 3. In the manner of the proof and so it is either an ostensive demonstration or a demonstration reducing to some impossible thing 5. In the first of these kinds of demonstration called the demonstration Cur sit why a thing is the conditions to be observed do partly belong to the question partly to the cause or medium of the demonstration and partly to the premisses 6. Every question doth not admit of the first and most perfect kind of demonstration called why a thing is but such a question only as is true and hath a certain and immutable cause of its own truth 7. The conditions to be observed in the premisses of a demonstration are absolute or relative 8. Those are said to be absolute conditions which are suitable to the premisses considered absolutely and in themselves and those are said to be relative conditions which are suitable to the premisses in reference to the conclusion 9. The absolute conditions are two the first is that the propositions be necessarily true and reciprocal The second is that they be immediate or first 10. Demonstrative propositions must be true for that which is false cannot be known â—nd they must be necessarily so for from â—ropositions not necessarily true no necessary â—nclusion can be inferred unless by chance or â—ccident and they must be necessarily true in the â—ighest degree that is they must be reciproâ—l For they contein the next cause of the â—â—edicate which is such as that it is reciprocaâ—d with its effect 11. A proposition is said to be immediate â—o waies 1. In respect of the subject â—hen there is no more immediate subject beâ—ween the predicate and the subject as a â—an is rational a man is risible 2. In reâ—ect of the cause when no
the earth doth not alwaies find gold 4. In a cause not sufficient of it self as he is not alwaies learned that is industrious nor that ground alwaies fertil that is well tilled because to both these more is required The latter part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In a cause by accident as he that doth not dig into the earth may find a treasure 2. In a cause that may but is not as a building may stand though the Architect be dead 3. As oft as the effect may be produced by diverse causes as Socrateâ— may die though he doth not drink poyson 2. The effect being granted the cause is also granted and the effect being taken away the cause is taken away also The first part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a treasure may be found though the earth be not digged 2. In an effect that doth remain after the cause as the house may remain though the builder be dead 3. In an effect that may be produced by diverse causes as a man may die though not by poyson The latter part hath also three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a man may dig in the earth and not find a treasure 2. In an effect which was but is not as a building may be destroyed though the builder be living 3. In an effect produced by a free agent as there may be a Physician although he doth not cure any disease 3. Such as the cause is such is the effect and the contrary as if the tree be good the fruit will be good and the contrary both parts of this Canon have two limitations 1. In aequivocal causes and effects as the draught may be beautiful though the painter be deformed 2. In a material cause for some thing that is extrinsecal as ice is not fluid because water is so 4. That for which any thing is such is much more such it self as the air being hot by reason of fire doth argue that fire is much hotter than air This rule faileth 1. Where both are not such as wine which maketh a man drunk is not it self more drunk because drunkenness cannot be said to be in wine 2. Where it doth not receive more and less as a father is not more a man than a son although he be the cause why the son is a man for humanity doth not receive more and less 3. In a cause not sufficient of it self as a Master which maketh his schollar learned is not alwaies more learned than his schollar for by his ingenuity and industry it sometimes so comes to pass that the schollar is more learned than the master 5. The cause is in nature before the effect as reason before risibility and this never faileth for a final cause in which it only seems to fail although it be in act and execution after the effect yet it is before it in the intention of the agent for which only reason it is the cause CHAP. XII Of the Topicks from the Subject and the Accident WE do not here take the subject for substance in which the accident is inherent or accident for that which doth precisely and adequately adhere to the substance but subject is here taken for all that to which any thing not belonging to its essence is attributed An accident is here taken for every such attribute as number is the subject of equality that is it is an accident of an accident An accident may be divided many ways and so may a subject for an accident is 1. either proper or common 2. Separable or inseparable 3. Inherent or internal and adherent or external 4. And chiefly it is either accidental as weariness doth accompany a feaver a pale Moon rain and all prognosticating signs Concomitant as an Eclipse of the Full-Moon and consequent as a day to the twilight signs and circumstances do also belong to this Topick The Canons or Rules are five 1. The subject being granted the proper accident is also granted and being taken away the proper accident is taken away also and the contrary as if he be a man he is risible and the contrary and if he be not a man he is not risible nor the contrary This rule never faileth by reason of the reciprocation of the subject and the proper accident 2. The subject being granted the common accident is also granted but not the contrary as if it be snow it is white but if it be white it is not therefore snow The first part of â—his rule faileth in separable accidents as if â—t be water it is not therefore cold And the â—atter part faileth 1. In a proper accident â—he first way as if there be knowledge there â—s a man 2. In an individual accident as â—f there be this whiteness there is snow because an accident doth not change its subâ—ect 3. A common accident being taken away â—he subject is taken away but not the contraâ—y as if it be not white it is not snow but yet there may be white though there be no snow The first part faileth in a separable accident the latter in a proper accident the first way and in an individual accident and subject as in the former rule 4. The thing being granted the circumstance of time and place is granted and the circumstance being taken away the thing is taken away as if Milo did kill Clodius then Milo was living and present if he was neither living nor present he did not kill him This rule never faileth in any requisite circumstance necessarily 5. The antecedent concomitant consequent being granted the consequent concomitant and antecedent for every exigence is also granted to wit a concomitant in being an antecedent in being or that hath been a consequent in being or that will be and being taken away the other is taken away also as if there be an Eclipse there is a full Moon if there be a birth there was a conception if there be a twilight the Sun will rise This rule faileth 1. In a thing not cohering necessarily as he which is a Philosopher must not of necessity be therefore poor and if there be a Comet it doth not follow there must be war 2. In things cohering necessarily if there be not a mutual necessity for though it be true that if there be an Eclipse there is a Full Moon yet it doth not follow that if there be a Full Moon there must always be an Eclipse yet these things not necessary are of great force to beget belief especially if many of them shall be joined together in one Hence Astrologers Physiognomers and Orators do highly value this Topick in questions of fact especially CHAP. XIII Of the Topicks from Dissentany and Comparison DIssentanies are either Opposites or Disparates as a Horse and a Bull. There are four kinds of Opposites of which Book I. Chap. 13. Comparisons are either in respect of quality as like and unlike or in respect of quantity or also of
true or probable but is indeed deceitful And the Antients did call those Sophisters which endeavoured to obtain Glory by disputation and that by five waies or means especially by forcing the respondent 1. To Redargution which is the denial of something that was before granted or the concession of something that was before denied When the respondent is forced to contradict himself 2. To something that is false as when he admits of something that is apparently known to be so 3. To something contrary to common sense as when he admits of some proposition that is contrary to the common received opinion 4. To some Soloecisme as when he admits of some thing contrary to the rules of Grammar or 5. And lastly to some trivial and vain thing as when there is a vain and useless repetition of the same thing These fallacious waies of arguing Aristotle hath well referred to these two heads to Fallacies in words or in things Of Fallacies in words he reckons five Ambiguity Amphibolie Composition Division and Figure of a word Of Fallacies in things he names seven Accident Of a thing spoken after a sort to a thing spoken simply Ignorance of the argument A false or wrong Cause Consequent Begging of the question and An asking of many questions CHAP. XX. Of Fallacies in Words ALL Fallacies in words arise from some Multiplicity that is in them and the multiplicity that is in words is either Actual Potential or Phantastick 1. Actual when a word without variation hath many meanings as in Aequivocation and Amphibolie 2. Potential when a word being altered in the pronunciation hath many meanings as in Composition Division and Accent 3. Phantastick when a word doth really and indeed signifie but one and yet doth seem to signifie many things as in the figure of a word A Fallacy of Aequivocation or Homonymie is when some simple word is diversly taken in the several propositions of the same Syllogism and this may be three waies 1. When one word is applied to several things for example Every Dog doth bark The Dog star is a Dog Therefore the Dog star doth bark 2. When a word properly signifying but one thing is by Analogy or Metaphor applied to another as if one would prove that water hath feet because it runs or the meadow a mouth because it smiles 3. When there is some ambiguity in respect of the accidents of the parts of speech according to Grammar as if one would prove that he which is sitting doth stand because he did rise In these Fallacies there are four terms and may be resolved by shewing the several significations of the ambiguous word A Fallacy of Amphibolie is when some sentence is doubtful by reason of the construction and this may be three waies 1. The construction of the words being the same but under a diverse habitude as if one would prove this to be Aristotle's book because he made it 2. By changing the order of the construction as thus That which one doth see is true But you saw Thomas drunk Therefore it is true that Thomas was drunk 3. When a sentence hath both a proper and a Metaphorical sense as thus They which laugh have mouths The Meadows do laugh Therefore the Meadows have mouths And to this belong all proverbial speeches and may be resolved by shewing the ambiguity of the sentence A Fallacy of composition is when such words are joined together which should be disjoined and the contrary unto this is a Fallacy of division when such words are severed which ought to be joined together both of these may happen four waies 1. When the dictum in a modal proposition may be put for its whole self or for a part of its self as for example It is possible for him that is sitting to run the which proposition is false if taken together for while he doth sit he cannot actually run but being disjoined it is true for he that doth now sit at another time may run 2. In Hypothetical propositions whose parts are joined by some conjunction copulative or disjunctive as two and three are even and odd but five are two and three therefore five are even and odd 3. When some word in a sentence may be joined to diverse things as for example He that may now be truly said to be born is born in this hour But a man that is threescore years old may now be truly said to be born Therefore a man that is threescore years old is born in this hour 4. When two things are taken severally in the premisses and conjunctly in the conclusion and the contrary as thus This dog is a father And this dog is yours Therefore this dog is your Father In these there are four terms and are resolved by separating the divided sense from that which is compounded and shewing which of them is true and genuine and which not A Fallacy in Accent is when one and the same word or sentence doth signifie diverse things by reason of the different accent or manner of pronunciation and this may be four waies 1. By making a wrong pronunciation a long syllable for a short or the contrary 2. By the diverse writing without a diphthong or aspiration as thus They that could pronounce Shibboleth were safe from the Gileadites but the Ephramites could pronounce Shibboleth therefore they were safe 3. When one word is made of two or two of one 4. By changing the manner of the pronunciation as thus He that saith well done doth acknowledge the action to be good But he that derides another doth say well done Therefore he that derides another doth acknowlede the action to be good In these also there are four terms and they are solved by shewing the reason of the diverse accent or writing A Fallacy of the figure of a word is when for some similitude and likeness of words that doth seem to agree to one thing which is proper to another But these Fallacies have the least shew of probability and therefore are but rarely used and are many of them solved by saying that the words are indeed like by reason of some accidents as sound or termination but not in substance sense or signification CHAP. XXI Of Fallacies 〈◊〉 Things FAllacies in things are seven 1. A Fallacy of accident when that which agreeth to one of the terms in a Syllogism only by accident is attributed unto another as if it were essential This happeneth 1. When we argue from the accident to the subject and the contrary for example That which causeth drunkenness is to be removed But wine is the cause of drunkenness Therefore wine must be taken away 2. When the Genus of the supposition is changed the material into the formal the simple into personal and the contray as thus An animal is a Genus a man is an animal therefore a man is a Genus 3. When we argue from the Superiour to the Inferiour and the contrary as if we would prove that rationality is