effect and if you ask me what his action is I answer it doth materia or substantiare the effect as the efficient did efficere the effect It is also passive in regard of the form but both together co-work to make the effect though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter Now this is the next thing to be inquired after we see who made it then whereof it was made both which we see in every thing and see them as they are done Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia As Kickerman saith it is proxima or remota but he may say so of every argument as well as of materia he saith man is made of the first matter then of the elements which are more remote but ex semine that is nearer alas we do not here consider priority or posteriority neither do these any more press the effect here is no Logick still but materia est causa ex qua ergo this will not fall in Logick and if you mark it presently when he comes to materia prima and to the elements he is in natural Philosophy ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logick but of the particular thing that belongs to a particular Art Hoc argumento ficto apud Ovid. 2. Metam Solis domus auro pyropo ebore argento componitur Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis Clara micante auro flammasque imitante pyropo c. Here Ramus brings an example out of Ovid which is a common School book and here a fained cause argues a fained effect ens and non ens are the subject of Logick but non ens gratia entis for so Logick looks at them first and gives entity to ens fictum and therefore Grammar and Rhetorick must follow it for they are attendants on it The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts and they are argued by their matter it had his pillars of gold for their matter and pyropus another matter of the columnes the covering or seeling of Ivory the leaves of the doors made of silver Observe how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all ergo he doth not teach them here for whether they be made of one matter or of more matters all is one ergo there is no Logick in that ergo it doth not belong to Logick Caesar 1. belli civilis Imperat militibus Caesar ut c. Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships then he distributes the ship into his parts keels ribs Carinae primum and statumina ex leui materia the rest was viminibus contextum lined within with leather so that here is distributio integri in membra and every part is argued by the material cause CHAP. VII Causae primum genus est inefficiente materia secundum sequitur VVE have heard of the efficient and of the matter and this is the conclusion of it now we come to the second which is in forma fine so that whilest he saith Causae primum genus ejusmodi est c. he tels me it was a distribution before where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis materiae for so genus is totum partibus essentiale and is never but in speciebus so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts Secundum sequitur in forma fine he doth not say Secundus est forma fine now as the efficient and matter were combined together as moving together a while without the form and end so the form and end though the form be before yet the end comes presently after and is as it were the pedissequa to the form and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing we put the end as being next to it and best expressing it So bene disserere the end of Logick is put for the form of Logick now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seen in greater matters so is it also in less for there is a co-operation of the efficient and end together first then of the form and end together also though not without the efficient and matter In forma fine for the form is before the final cause for before the form be induced or ingenerated in the matter it cannot be good for his end and the end is causa in respect of the effect not of the efficient So we say a coat hath a form before it have an end for it may be a coat and yet not fit to serve me now then as the efficient began the motion and the motion redounded out of the matter so it runs per formam finem Forma est causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latine there is but a transposition of the letters and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio because when it is made it hath the face of a thing so a thing when it hath its form it hath a face it will seem something so that the efficients esse is not facies rei nor the matters esse for they might be otherwhere ergo the efficient and matter are common causes this is a particular one which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before being more general so that when once he hath the face of a man then is he a man this word forma both in Latine and Greek is taken abusive for the outward figure of a thing it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct for figuration is not forma as we may see in water put in a round glass or in a square glass the same water having the same form will have a round figure or square figure according to the glass wherein it is now because the figure is adjoyned to the form ergo they say it is forma and in Schooles they call it forma accidentalis now the figure follows the form but it is not so essential but it may be changed and yet the water is the same because the water is variable into divers figures as we heard before in water The Schooles say that no artificial thing hath any other form ergo ask them in what predicament any artificial thing is and they will answer in quality but thus they will make Geometry to give the formes of things Figura is a quality ergo to make quality a form is very absurd again as before one and the same thing had divers figures and onely one form that makes the thing one again is the figure of a table the form of it then the table belongs to Geometry not to the Joyners Art again whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia ergo the form too or else it is in divers predicaments again figura is an accident but forma is a cause and gives essence to the thing
you shall see a composed form so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus ensula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven told us the form of it CHAP. VIII De fine Finis est causa cujus gratia res est VVE have gone through the esse of a thing we have but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes up the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that final cause that serveth to make up the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keep the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logick Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the effect by it own essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cujus gratia Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cujus gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the final cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialio◠for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent than any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it evermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodness of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slave the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or form would move ergo the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment and so of a good form yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happiness and so is not perfect Again this shews the difference between the formal cause and the end for the form may be as we see and not the end Again we know there are many things that have not their perfection but by growth and yet have all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the matter reason the form yet here is not his end namely fitness to serve God And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est homini Deus Of natural things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach unto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logick and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference between the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it never be dwelt in so for a garment to be worn is one thing and to be fit to wear another So if I go forth to speak with one and he be gone yet I obtain my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii scilicet prolisque gratia Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae c. Here Juno perswades Eolus to let his wind out and she would give him one of her Nymphs which she presseth upon him by final causes first that she may spend all her years with him and secondly that she may make him the father of a fair off-spring In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem urget c. Et certe ait contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus c. As if he should say Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio thou didst strike his side mark the variety of the phrases and so of the ends What meant thy sword what was thy mind here was the propositum What meantst thou to have done even to have killed Caesar So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing but even substantial and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form and that for this reason because it is the next argument to it and presupposeth the form so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts. As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi here bene disserere is the end and it is as if he should say Dialectica hath such a soul as that it is able to perform and execute this or that thing for which it was made So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in general why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts Answ But as every thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo if a man will do any Logicum opus he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thus we have heard the doctrine
for that is the effect it self where the form is and therfore Ramus said Distributio generis in species formas eadem est Neither of the final cause for that cannot so determine because one thing may have many ends Object So the effect may have many efficients Answ But then according to the several modi of the efficient there will be several effects but there are no modi of the final cause Efficient cùminvent author Here Inventor and Author are the two modi of the efficient The first examples be of the Inventor as Tum Cererem c Ceres is corrupted with water here is Ceres the Inventor of Corn put for Corn Cerealiáque arma Here Arma is a Metaphor Quos amisimus Cives Those Citizens which we have lost Mars pro bello Aut dulcis musti c. Or he that doth concoct the humor of sweet Muskedine with Vulcane i. e. fire and this is he that is called Tubalcain often in Scripture Sinè Cerere Libero c. Without Bread and Wine lusts wares cold And here is an Allegory for the same Trope is continued yet 't is better to use venus than Coitus but Liber and Ceres are more than the severity of the judgment seat will bear Est preterea hîc valdè usitat c. Here is Author the second modus of the efficient and this is valdè usitatum yea of much greater use than is the Inventor so Martial calleth the history of Livie Livie Metonymia materiae This is a definition it self neither needeth it more to be added to it for there is not definitio definitionis yet I may say it is quando nomen materiae traducitur admateriatum significandum Non domus fundus c. Aes aurum pro aeneis nureis nummis Aes ferrum duelli Brass and Iron are signes of War not of Peace pro armis aeneis ferreis So is silver put for silver houshold-stuffe so plate for the dishes made of plate CHAP. IV. Metonymia effecti cùm ex effect c. HE here makes the effect to answer only to the efficient and in Latin it doth so but in Hebrew sometimes it doth not as in Genesis chap. 1. vers 2. The earth was wtthout form and void and sometimes it is found so in English also in Latin as 't was called Lavinium because 't was built either from the material cause or the subject of place Now this is a common metonymy neither doth he lay down all the modi which belong unto it So spes is obscura obscura is a metaphor afterwards a metonymy i. e. incerta So is caeca pro ignorante a metaphour So pale Death knocks equally at poor mens shops and Kings turrets Death is said to be pale because it makes things so Pallentesque habitant c. Morbi efficiunt pallentes senectus a metonymy of the adj for the subject for the man that is old it is tristis because it causeth sorrow Here sometimes the efficient is put for the effect without any more adoe as in these examples that went before sometimes the adjective is given to the substantive which noteth the vis of the efficient and not the efficient it self as in this example that followeth Praecipitem iram Many modi there are of this metonymy of the effect which he omitteth as this when a man carrieth a Sword in his hand we say this man carrieth Death in his hand here is Death put for the instrumental cause so mors in olla CHAP. V. Metonym subj est c. WE have heard before the reason of the name of Metonymia and that it is distributed according to the Arguments whence it is borrowed namely to be of Arguments consentanious absolutè or modo quodam absolutè as the cause and the effect of the cause was of the efficient or matter yet of these two causes the matter is more usually put for the effect as this Chest is wood i. e. made of wood Now the reason why 't is so usual that the matter is put commonly for the effect is this because the genus doth arise from the matter and doth predicate in quid of it Cùm nomen c. That is when that Noune which properly signifieth a subj is delivered to signifie the thing adjoyned Here he saith nomen not verbum as he did in the definition of a Trope to shew that he liketh both of them indifferently and therefore useth them promiscuously Here we are to understand that this definition is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for every subject is not put to signifie his adjunct or contrà as whitnesse is not put for wall yet this is the best definition that can be given and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with his modi that follow Vt cùm ponitur Continens c. Neither is this generally true for every continens non pro quáque re contenta ponitur but is to be limited with his two modi that follow The first whereof is when the place is put for the inhabitants thereof and this is the first special modus of that modus of continens pro re contenta Invadunt urbem c. The City was not buried in sleep and Wine but the People in the City So urbs pulcherrima for cives pulcherrimi So Quòd in me carcerem effudistis They cast a Prison upon me for the Prisoners Testis est Italia Here Tully calls Italy France Sicily Spain to witnesse for the Italians French Sicilians and Spaniards and here is also allegoria Now the second special modus of that modus of continens pro re contenta is when the place is put for the things done in the place so the market is put for the Rhetorical actions done in it so by Academia where Plato taught Lycéum where Aristotle taught and Tusculane where Tully taught is meant the Learning made famous therein There is yet another speciall modus of continens pro re contenta which I marvel that he left as this Reach me the cup for the drink in the cup and Give me thy purse for the money in the purse here is continens pro re contenta and yet neither of the special modi aforegoing Ex hoc genere est illud This is not a third special modus of continens pro re contenta but a second from it and here the possessor is put for the thing possed as our neighbour Vcalegon burneth for his house Vcalegon comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non curo therefore he that dwelleth near such a carelesse neighbour had need to be careful for fear of fire This modus is very useful in prose as he is with me that is at my house Sic dicimus hominem devorari We say the man is undone or eaten up when his Goods are taken from him and this is another modus The next modus is the Captain for his Army The last is the Advocate for his Client CHAP. VI. VVE have heard the reason of
indeed Reason first seeth both it self and the other Arts. Ens est quod est Now having found that ens is it is requisite that we should know what it is and I say ens est quod est If we shall look at the Grammatical notation of ens it is a participle of the present tense and therefore is as much as quod est even as legens and qui or quae legit are the same or as in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verberans or qui verberat are all one and that the very particle doth shew For if it be of the present tense it is the same with the verb of the present tense so that ens and quod est are the same Again if there be ens as we have already proved then vel est quod est vel non quod est vel quod non est at neque non quod est nec quod non est ergo quod est For when I say non quod est then I put ens fictum impossibile ergo this can no way be ens no not in our phantasie when I say quod non est then I put ens fictum impossibile and to that I give a quod but non est so that in the end I say ens est quod est that is neither ens fictum possibile or ens fictum impossibile and therefore if we will define ens fictum impossibile it is non quod est if we define ens fictum possibile it is quod non est Now if neither ens fictum possibile nor ens fictum impossibile be entia then ens est quod est And again when I deny non quod est I deny est and when I deny quod non est I deny est ergo ens est quod est Again ens and bonum are all one therefore non ens and malum are all gone therefore siens non sit then it is bonum and malum ergoens est quod est Ens est primum vel a primo If ens be it must be either first absolutely which is not from another or it must be from a first that is from another which is not from another again contradiction sheweth it for it is as if I should say ens is non aliunde or aliunde that is it is of it self or not of it self and this is contradiction But objection may be made that in the continual generation of things one thing is before another as my father begot me and another begot my father and so in infinitum ergo it is not necessary that ens should be absolutely first or from a first Answ This is nothing for am I from my father This then he was before I was and I am after him ergo here is prius and posterius therefore here cannot be eternity ergo this ens is not eternal Again is not my fathers case as well as mine to be from another and so all men till they come to ens primum Yes ergo all men are from others till we come to this first absolute being which is not from any other for then he should not be primum ergo ens est primum vel a primo Ens absolute primum est quod est seipso First if there be ens primum or a primo there must be ens primum of necessity for if there be ens primum ye grant it me if there be ens a primo ye must also grant ens primum therefore ens primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primum and maxime intelligibile therefore Atheists are here to be confuted for they may sooner doubt whether they themselves be then whether God be for if they be entia a primo they must first know him that is primum before they can know themselves for the cause is before the effect Quod est seipso it must be being either seipso or aliunde if aliunde ne primum for that from which it is is prius unto it ergo est seipso Object Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso neither any creature whatsoever for then he saith the same thing would be the cause of it self and the effect Resp It is a meer sophisme or rather an Amphibolia of the phrase For when we say God is seipso we do not mean that he hath causes but we mean privatively that he is not aliunde and est seipso and est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same it is quod est and so est seipso Ens primum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he be seipso then he is without causes that that is absolutely first must have no causes for then it is not absolutely first ergo there can be no scientia of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus Again first if he have no causes he hath no end ergo he is not made for an end ergo there can be no art of him to guide him to an end So that we find in this respect that ens primum cannot be the subject of Art Every Art is to guide the thing whereof it is an Art to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again every Art doth lay forth the causes effects subjects and the proper adjuncts of a thing for if it have no causes it can have no qualities and God hath none of these ergo he is not the subject of Art Hence again as this ens is beyond our reason so he is beyond our speech either Grammar or Rhetorick so that concerning this ens primum whatsoever we think or speak it is imperfect Now bring it to our Logick after another sort and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art Our Logick bringeth us first to a first efficient and in the resolution of any thing we go so far as in the end we find a first efficient Now this first efficient hath nothing before it ergo that is beyond our reason therefore what that is we cannot tell and therefore if we shall make him an effect to look out his causes we shall not make him first ergo he is beyond all Art Then again there is no Art but is an eternal rule in the Idea of God as a precept of that thing whereof it is an Art to guide it to its Eupraxie therefore if there should be an Art of him there must be a former ens which must have the Idea of it to shew how this ens primum was made and whereby it must be governed so that he is not the subject of our reason so that whereas I said before that ens was the subject of our reason here I recal it and say that primum ens is beyond out Logick and therefore he being beyond all art we will go them over more briefly till we come to ens a primo First then he is without efficient for he is without causes ergo he is uncreated for the first matter though it were without matter and form yet it
modo quodam is as if one should ask a definition of animal ratione Absolute ut causa effectum The causes give esse to the effect therefore without these esses the thing cannot existere ergo there are absolutely required In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses of all the causes therefore these are absolute consentanea Hence we learn that all the causes must go to the making up of the effect And again if any effect then there must be all the causes so then we see how the ones being depends necessarily upon the other ut causa effectum therefore the cause must first be looked at as if I would look at ens or any thing whatsoever therefore our Author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures Can any man see any thing throughly and not see the causes first he cannot and is there any thing to be seen in a thing before the causes there is not therefore that is alwayes first in nature and therefore first also in reason Now here are fallacians as to think an effect may be from some causes and to think the causes may be removed from the effect which is a common fallace Aristotles organon Tullies offices c. here is Aristotles and Tullies casuality still though they be dead Now we see how orderly we go to work if we had not done so we could not have come to causa all the arguing of them before as of artificiale primum absolutum consentaneum simplex are here in causa and effectum So that there are many clasp◠as it were as the cause is in artificio of the effect it is also there primitus and absolute and consentanie and simpliciter so that this discent doth very much clear truth we have our flesh bloud bones from causa then afterward we have our complements from modo quodam consentanea then we may see we are not this or that See an imperfect garment at the Taylors and you may ask what it is but let the Taylor make it up compleat with all its cuts and jagges then you may see it your self and need not ask what it is for further knowledge of it De efficiente procreante conservante CHAP. I. Causa est cujus vires est REmember the purpose of Logick is to direct man to see the wisdom of God which that reason may do well it acts doubly first by taking at simples then by laying them together that which we take with the first eye is argumentum that is any thing so farre as it hath the affection to argue first as it is in artificio rei which therefore is in an Art now it is firstly there or secondly first it is there absolute by way of consention respecting the thing wherein it is or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not those that consent are absolutely consenting or modo quodam absolute as the causes and effect that proceeds from the causes here we must begin because the first thing that cometh to mans reason is the cause so if we take the world or any part thereof let us resolve it and in the end we shall come to the first causes a first efficient c. So God is the first cause of all things and himself without all causes ergo the cause is first of all things then the first matter is first in his kind the first form in his kind and the first end in his kind So Aristotle saith God is primum intelligibile so then if we will see the wisdom of God in the creatures we shall see the cause the beginner then again Aristotle doth confess that causa is primum motus Again what is the initium of every thing but his being and that is from the causes therefore they are first again the next cause is the farthest thing we can go unto as if we work any thing now if we take causes and look into them then we make them effects not causes as if I look at the causes of a garment I find the Taylor to be the cause but if I look at his cause I make him an effect yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect c. The Greeks call causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peto because it is that which is first granted or required as the Geometricians require a petitum or as our Author should say there can be no demonstration of the first cause Est argumentum absolute consentaneum c. causa est if a cause be absolutely required for the effect then there is a cause then again Logick serves us to behold the wisdom of God and himself also through the creature now all things but God are made and are composed ergo they must have causes est absolute consentaneum because they are essential to the effect No shipwright no ship no wood no ship no form no effect no end no effect and all these together an effect contra Cujus vires est First here he tels us of a vis then he sayes it is vis essendi then vis essendi rei so that as there are four words so four things causa is here a concrete signifying the thing causing as argumentum was before signifying the thing arguing for our Logick that brings us to the first cause doth but shew him as he argueth not as he is in his being causa is the thing arguing cujus that is est res causans cujus vi this vis and vertue is of the thing but Logick looks at it as it is in the thing and then at the thing for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect it could not be a cause as wood will not make a gown so that it is here secondly required that the thing causans have vim causandi and against this word is that common fallacian of non causa pro causa as he that will lay to the charge of a childe that which a man can onely doe so when we ascribe to Nature that it cannot doe as the making of a World which is peculiar to God est Est Esse is a general term and may signifie the essence of a thing or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence as first when I say vir est secondly vir est doctus where I do not respect homo from his causes but as he hath this adjunct doctrina and the reason why est is so general is because this esse is from the causes which are most general for nothing can be said to be this or that before it be which is from the causes by this vis we must understand that power and faculty in the thing that causeth another thing as if he should say the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly for vis is here the same that affectio is in argumentum
Esse indeed is general to all the causes and existere is from them all which appears by this we say mundus est a Deo est ex nihilo est formata c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause to make the effect so we shall see in a knife there are all the four causes to be in it and the three former for the end and therefore if we will not be deceived here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause res not effectum for we have heard what res est that is the subject of Art but if we had said effectum it had bene a posteriore for we have not the effect wrought Again we are but yet in causa in general by res he meanes res efficienda not yet effecta Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa when we take that to be the cause which hath the potentia efficiendi but doth not efficere but is causa quatenus it hath an hand in that effect so that if one bring a cause that is not a cause though it have vim efficiendi yet is it not causa Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientiae This is a deduction out of the first rule following this if the thing be causae vi then this is primus locus inventionis for it is first in the cause before it be in the effect then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must look at Locus here Ramus tels us closely that the Aristotelians topick places are these arguments the first whereof is causa Fons We know the fountain is the first place where waters spring so all things spring from the causes yea subjects adjuncts c. Fons scientiae For if we know the causes then we know the effects because they arise from them and subjects c. and again that is the principal part of knowledge Scirique demum creditur c. For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing and that which may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing but knowing the causes of a thing we know it as it is the things being arising from the causes and thus knowing the thing we know it intus and in cute Here Ramus doth commorare telling us what Aristotle meant by these words And again too tels us that Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiome consisting of causa and effectum and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient matter form and end No Aristotle saith that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by the definition because that layes forth the essence of a thing but it doth not tell us all the esse ergo not all the scientia for the esses of the efficient and end do not go into a definition Vt merito dicatur a Poeta c. Here he prefers the Poets authority before Aristotle for Aristotle being more imployed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man but the Poet as a publike man foelix meaning a contemplative happiness not a practick Causa est efficiens materia aut forma finis Every cause yeelds an esse but all together make the effect now it is of two sorts efficiens materia aut forma finis for he cannot give it to us in two words but makes a distinct axiom and couples the parts with a conjunction copulative by reason whereof they have a community but where lyes it this it is I may call the two first potential causes the other two acting causes this the Schools tels us when they call materia potentia and the form actus and this is Ramus meaning as we shall see in many examples as when a Taylor sets buttons on a doublet with thread they are not done till all the causes are there so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient and matter but when it hath also a form and end Now our Author would not use potentia and actus first because they are barbarous words secondly they are improper because they cannot be called potentia and actus but potentiating and acting then again the form and end are potentia as well as efficiens and materia contra therefore he makes two couple of causes for so we see the efficient is the first mover moving quite through with the matter singly and the form and end move them inseparably together therefore they are thus distinguished efficiens est motus a quo in a line the matter ex qua and form per quem finis ad quem but because there is a scope at matter therefore there is a distinction For as the efficient and end terminate the thing so the form and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same So God made a matter and gave it a form and so an end ergo reason must see them thus The same order there is also in Gods providence so man also doth imitate God when he doth any thing orderly the first care is for a workman then a matter then a form and then an end though we may have cloth before a Taylor yet it is not a matter till it begin with the Taylor to bring an effect to pass So then the efficient is in nature before the matter and the matter before the form for the form is an adjunct to the matter and the form before the end the end being an adjunct to the form and again a thing must be formed before it can have an end The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him the second forms are adjuncts to the matter Now the first efficient is absolutely first for it hath nothing before it the first matter is not res prima nor causa prima but first for matter ergo it is from the first efficient onely ergo never hath any existency in the world but is ens incompletum so the first form is from the first efficient not of the first matter but onely in it ergo it is ens also completum hence our soules are not our forms for then our forms should be res incomplâ—tae Now the end is last and the first end is the last end it is first because it is most general last because it is not made for another end ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made so that the end as it is last as the thing is acted so it is first as it is most general for all the former causes work to effect the end As we say in Schools finis est primus in intentione posterius in executione so God made all things for his glory here his glory is first in intention of him that works by counsel but is acted last of all by all things that he made And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo melius is
true of the last end of all things which is God for he is as we may say finis communissimus ergo optimus Efficiens est causa a qua res est We have heard of causa and of his kinds and that they are disjoyned by which means there is made two couple of causes the two first working joyntly even as the other do Efficiens materia here is a second distribution and here the efficient is first for it is first eujus vi res est again by the rule of method it is first in nature because it giveth light to that which followeth and that the efficient moves first we see it in every thing he layes hold on the matter which in respect of the efficient is moved and by a natural appetite moves and runs to make an effect of it self and doth effect the effect as well as the effiâ—â—ent and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect but the mover or efficient is before the thing moved and before the effect also Efficiens Efficiens quasi exfaciens moving quite through for besides his first moving as being the first cause he moveth also together with the matter form and end and his working with the rest is the cause of his name Est Every cause is required to the effect efficiens est causa ergo again first there must needs be a mover to move the matter before there can be a table wrought this appears plainly by the creation of the world and because every thing is an effect therefore the efficient is the first cause for take any thing and you shall see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same so look into the world and every part thereof and you shall see Gods finger in every thing without which they could not be so that efficiens est causa and because an effect cannot be without its esse ergo it is of the esse of it a qua from whom it is as if he should say it is terminus a quo c. so as the world began with God so in every thing in nature the beginning of motion is first from the next cause so that efficiens est causa a qua telling us that this is the first being the effect hath Res. Here res is general as before to all the Arts and it is the subject of the general Arts. Ramus doth not here break the rule of method not defining what res is Again if he had said a qua est we should have had reference to res again if he had named effectum it had been a posteriore not having learned what effectum est Res est this is general to every cause ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general but that he may not be so obscure he borroweth some thing that went before for else the perfect definition had been efficiens est a qua Now this teacheth us to look first at the efficient in every thing for Logick tels us not onely of an esse in general but of four several esses from which existere doth arise as efficiens est causa a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia why doth he not say causa est cujus vi res sit because something may be a cause and yet is not but if it do causare then it is a cause So if I say will do a thing and yet do it not yet am I an efficient for est doth here commend to us the adsignification of time but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move so soon it is an efficient though the effect be not till the matter form and end be there Cujus et si vera genera c. Here Ramus doth commorari telling us that those many species which the Aristotelians make are not species but modi efficientis because more of them may be in one and the same efficient as one man may be causa precreans and conservans sola and cum aliis per se per accidens because they may be in the same efficient Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing but are divers modi of the same thing Here Ramus will find no species of efficiens neither are there any of the other three for the matter that is lowest ergo it hath nothing under it but examples and so is the efficient ergo he needed not say Cujus etsi vera genera c. for how could rhat appear to him that is not we know the effect is single ergo as the single matter form and end make that so the thing efficient makes it neither hath it any species Vbertas tamen per magna c. There is great and plentiful use of the efficient and as it is first of all so is it most general of all for matter cannot be a matter till the efficient move it and so of all other arguments now these make cause the efficient to be commended or discommended and according to these modi is the effect more or less argued as if a child kill his father it is parricide so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone he is more to be commended than if he had done it cum aliis aut contra Again if a thing be done well natura it is better than if it had been done necessitate and more commendable when a thing is done by counsel than fortuna now because these modi doe urge and press the effect more or less ergo there is reason in them and therefore they belong to Logick modi that is adjuncts not making these effects species but onely distinguished by accidents that fallacian non causa pro causa is general to causa and it is also particular to efficiens making that causa efficiens which is not as the Hereticks in Divinity were deceived which said that the Angels did make the world Primo quod procreat qut tueatur These are first because they are more general than the rest and also they are more in use for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to the other modi so we respect God as causa procreans and tueans before we respect him alone then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse and the preserving cause is the Keeper of the thing in his esse Now in reason he that is the procreating cause should also be the preserving cause as God is not onely causa procreans of the World but also causa conservans and so should parents as they procreant children so should they in like sort preserve them The procreant cause is first because things must needs have a being before they can be preserved now they are distinguished because when a thing is procreated it is not preserved aut contra and the modi are joyned with the cause not with the effect because they are first in the
Physitians call it causa evidens and meat and drink is causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a disease 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that cause that worketh externally the Physitians call it causa continens but here is no distinction of cause neither have these quatenus causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any force to argue the effect but onely quatenus efficiens whereas we hear in every special modus of Ramus that they did press the effect strongly as didst thou kill thy father or didst thou it alone c. so also in causa per se and per accidens there is great difference in arguing a conclusion if he did it natura there is no rebuking of that for it was from his nature if he sinned by counsel the punishment is so much the greater if he did it well consilio he deserves the more praise Fortuna indeed is such a cause as it is not a cause by Ramus definition for fortune is but Gods providence unknown now if there be any other respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis Now we come to materia that as we have heard had a community with the efficient which community was to move with it a great while before the form and end come so soon as the efficient moves presently the matter moves but the form and end move not a good while after Now because this difference which causeth the distribution of causa appears in greater things ergo it is also in less things but our Logick tels us that the efficient must go before the matter and how agreeable doth our Logick go to Gods work in the creatures if we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes and make them effects and look at their causes for so when we look at their causes we make them effects so that absurd is that definition of causa to be either going before or concomitans to the effect at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him ergo he was not made ergo he ever was ergo all other things once were not for they were made ergo they now being were from the first ergo the first matter was not eternal as Aristotle dreamed but indeed he would cross Plato in what he could yet one may confute him by his own rules for he grants there is a primus motor ergo he is movens but not moved for then he should have some thing to move him and so not be first ergo it is easie to make Aristotle beleive he is immoveable because he is first ergo he must move others onely for he is infinite ergo without limits of place ergo in every place ergo nusquam inclusus or exclusus ergo unmoveable Now the first matter is first in his kind namely the first matter but not the first thing and we may conclude from this that the first efficient was before the first matter for if both were first neither were first for if the one should say he were first the other would say nay I am as forward as thee and so there would be none absolutely first and again one is before two ergo he that is absolutely first can be but one Materia For his name as efficiens was extrafaciens moving all the rest and not moved of them but as it were pater so materia is quasi mater out of which the thing springs as out of a mother so that we may see the name to be given a simili but yet with very good reason as the child is not a patre but of the mother so the effect is from the efficient but springs out of the matter Now that there is such a matter thus it may appear there is nothing composed but its essence and it self a distinct for to make essentia and ens to be the same is peculiar to God Again whatsoever is finite that may be limited in his essence now God onely is infinite and every other thing finite ergo may be defined ergo it self and its essence are distinct ergo it must have a matter Again if every thing have not essence as they speak of Angels why are not they finite ergo they may be defined ergo their essence and themselves are distinct again if they have not a matter what have they nothing but an efficient and an end then they should be imperfect and be either the first matter or the first form again if they have a form and no matter then this form must be another thing from them and how is that possible for if the form and they be all one then the cause and effect will be the same But Logick is a general Art and because every thing hath a matter ergo materia belongs hither and the first matter had not a matter for then it should not have been first but was incomplete Materia est For it gives esse and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing so the matter much more for not onely its esse but its nature and self couches in the effect and makes a bulk and if the vis of the efficient were essential because there could be no essefication of the effect without it much more must the matter be essential for if we take away the matter we take away both the force and the thing it self Now we must understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logick and as argumentum was concretum and also causa so when I say materia I mean a thing that was made of a matter Ex qua That is out of which it is raised it is the mother of every thing as we often speak of the earth because every thing indeed is made of the four elements but more especially nourished of the earth Now the matter doth not onely by his vertue cause the effect but is interessed in it and the effect riseth out of it as if it were a child springing out of the mother onely it goes further in that its essence goes to the making up of the effect now though the essence be from â—atter and form yet the ens it self is from all the causes Res est That effect as we shall hear hereafter for in this doctrine of causa effectum is the aliquid which we must call res till we come to it Est Every cause gives an esse to the effect and this esse is the bulk of it and from whence ariseth the greatness or littleness of the effect by the form now it is a great question in Schools whether the matter doth any thing indeed in respect of the efficient it is patiens but in respect of the effect it doth causare and so doth agere For if it be an effect in respect of every cause then every cause is after a sort the efficient of that
consectary that makes a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be a rule of Art for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and is a first property in his kind though there be more of them together now it is here proton and agrees to the parts afterwards as risus first agrees to homo and to Richard William and John c. It is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it agrees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that all real distinction is from the form and here is the doctrine of differentia with other Logicians it is nothing but a property and is here ideoque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur so that that which is differentia constitutiva in regard of the effect is differentia divisiva as it makes it differ from other things Et forma simul cum reipsa ingeneratur Again here is another property he saith forma simul c. here are two things adjoyned to forma as properties the first is that forma ingeneratur the second is that simul cum reipsa ingeneratur For the first there is much question how the forms come to things the Philosophers say it is an heavenly nature and comes by influence of the Sun Moon and Stars as if it were a quinta essentia from the elements and must be extrinsice Now these influences they know not what they are if they be qualities of the Sun Moon and Stars then they cannot be forms for the forms give essence ergo is no quality if they be not qualities then they are substances what substance are they If they be of their substance then they are corruptible shall it be from their matter then it should be celestial for they are not made of the elements neither can matter make a form and again it cannot be of their matter for then they should be diminished neither can it be of their forms alone for one thing cannot make a third distinct from it ergo it is not from them but the Sun Moon and Stars send down fire which makes a mistion with the other elements and so from their forms ariseth the forms of mists for so mistio is alteratorum unio ergo it is made one and it is evident that the forms of the four elements are all operative that is their qualities are in every thing But they hold as it were a meeting of many Stars together at the conception of things but as for their work it is not so to be respected for we see Esau and Jacob born at the same time and yet of divers manners Ingeneratur Some are of opinion that the form is in the thing before the thing be but now it is educted and brought out true it is it was before in the parts but they were not membra so that after that sort it was before cum reipsa how can this be whereas the end comes between the form and the effect Answ This is a propriety and every propriety is an adjunct to the thing and the adjunct is after the subject so that this comes after the form Cum re As if he should tell us the form lies in the matter after an hidden manner but this property is before the end ingenerari is another thing then the form ergo forma is before it but it is together with the thing We have made an entrance into the formal cause and have heard how that it is after the efficient and the matter again whereas every cause gave an esse the form did that and more too the efficient gave a bare being the matter gave a being and part of his essence and the form gives his whole essence and make it that which it is and that reason of that makes it differ from all other things and this the common Logicians did consider when they made differentia to be divisiva or constitutiva Now here was their mistaking that they called it differentia which doth not arise from the essence of it but from this property that forma simul cum reipso ingeneratur The Theory of the form is hardest of all humane learning for it cannot be seen with our senses but onely by the effects of it we come to grope at it because it is principium agens of every thing strengthened by the matter but the contemplation of that belongs to natural Philosophy and thus we may seek the formes of things When I know that membrum is essentiale toti and that the matter and form constitute the effect it must needs be that so many portions of matter so many portions there are of forma ergo the Schools are deceived which think the form may not be divided for it may because it is portionated from the members The organical parts of a thing are made of simular parts and the simular parts are made of the elements both for matter and form the elements of the first forms now if you ask me further what they are I can onely say they are the works of the first efficient incomplete in themselves so that if you will penitus introspicere this is the way and look what element is most predominant in the mist so much more the neerer you shall come to see the form ingenerated if we speak of the forms of the elements they were extrinsice and were ingâ—nerated in the matter again if we shall speak of the soul of man this is extrinsice infused but the forms of other things are within and are educed out of the matter but there is nothing new in this for the matter is so too Ingeneratur True thus farre as the form is not made but by composition of the elements when the forms are not made but in nature there is that misture or in Art that composition that there is a new form as in a stone by the misture is made one form arising from the forms of the four elements by their action and passion So in artificial things the form is a compound form made of the forms of the parts and because that thing is now that which it was not ergo this form must needs be that now which it was not ergo ingeneratum and the whole work of the efficient whilst he doth dolare or hew a thing is nothing but his preparing of it together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing Forma is diversly ingenerated if it be by composition then it is composed if it be of simples then it is made by shaving or cutting it Now whilst he saith simul at once it may seem by this that the form and effect are together he means not together in nature for the form must be before the effect because it constitutes the effect and the constituter is before the thing constituted therefore how are they simul he means forma simul ingenerat thus I suppose two go together and yet one of them goeth before the other here is a priority and simul too he that is before goeth
first the other followeth yet both move together and as two hands laid together do move together and yet one before the other so is it with the formal cause and effect the formal cause moves and the effect also but the effect follows it in every step and the final cause follows the form as the shadow follows the body and the effect comes last again this is a property ergo an adjunct ergo is after the subject for the form is an effect before it be a subject so that the efficient doth as it were make the form and the effect still follows as we may see in artificial things so that so far forth as the form is ingenerated so farre forth the effect is accomplished Anima rationalis est forma hominis c. Here our Author doth commorari and stay upon the doctrine of forma for it is so deep and subtil as that it can hardly be perceived This example is not true because anima rationalis may subsist from the body now as there can be no matter without a form so there can be no form without a matter therefore this example will not serve his turn yet he brings that he could get many in Schools have stumbled at this and have gone about to mend it but indeed they have marred it Some say ratio belongs to Angels ergo it is not the proper form of homo and therefore they have added mortale and say homo is animal rationale mortale Now if they joyn mortale to ratio it is not mortalis Again animal ratione mortale doth detract from man unless we speak of his body Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis That is not so for the Angels though they be animae and so have not animam rationalem yet they have rationem again doth not the body of man distinguish him from other thing so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A mans soul in a bird will not make it a man Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis quadrangulis sua forma est He brings such examples as he could find and those whereof greatest question might be made it hath been a question among Logicians that this forma is peculiar to substances not accidents and hence have made a distinction of forma to be substantialis or accidentalis but they are deceived for Logick is a general Art and every thing that is made hath causes ergo may be defined ergo hath matter and form for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition in Grammar Rhetorick and Arithmetick or in any other Arts that have accidents for their subjects ergo accidents behold a form as well as an efficient ergo he saith in Geometry take a triangle it consists of three lines with three angles which by their unition in their angles make up one form as well as one matter Phisicarum rerum coeli terrae arborum piscium sua forma est He doth commorari here long for two causes first in respect the form is deep and needs illustration Secondly to confute other Logicians that say accidents have no forms unde praecipua rerum ut natura est c. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est then it is praecipua rerum natura Nature proper is res nata that is that springeth principiis that is matter and form so that the whole nature consisteth of them and this is the proper signification of it afterward it comes to signifie the principia themselves hence is materia and forma called natuâ—ae so that in natural Philosophy when you read of nature they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma then again by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject it signifieth the qualities natural in things all this shews forma to be praecipua rei natura Praecipua first because it makes the thing to be id quod est so doth not the matter again forma why it is principium actus from whence the qualities principally arise for as the Philosophers teach though not truly in every point materia is principium passionis forma actionis and actio is better than passio ergo the form more excellent than the matter but both matter and form do agere for they are causa yet the forms begin and the matter is but the sustentation of it and the forms act is the stronger by the matter not onely as it acts internally but when it acts upon external things by resistance by the way Now as it hath chief interest in esseficating the effect so it is praecipua rei natura so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio si possit inveniri Si possist inveniri He saith it neither can be found out nor that it cannot be found out Si possit inveniri sure it is findable I prove it thus it is lyable to Logick if it be objected to the eye then the eye may see it it may but hardly be found because it doth not descry it self to the outward senses by qualities as bodies do again the form in nature is so subtil that we can hardly find it but see as it were the shadow of it ergo divers have thought the forms of things to be divine Some have gone so farre as to think them to be influences but subtile it is indeed and harder to find out then either the efficient or matter ergo we commonly call that the matter which contains the form too because it is rather seen as it hath a material cause than as it hath a formal Vt in artificiofis rebus facilius occurrit That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can trace his wisdom as we may see in the elements ergo no man can make a thing in nature man may further nature but he cannot make any thing again the parts are so fine in the mixture of things as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit Why because artificial things are the works of men and one man may trace another though every man cannot Caesar 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici c. As for example in artificial things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to find out the form but we use to point at it by the matter and by the position of it There stood great beams all along two foot asunder put into the earth the distances between them were stuffed with great stones when these were so fastned then there was a new order begun where they laid the beams against those stones that were laid before and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams but what hath he told us now why saith he I am a French-man and I will tell you the form of a French wall where if you do but look at the forms of every part and of them
of the causes CHAP. IX De effectis Effectum est quod e causis existit siveigitur gignatur sive c. NOw we come to see a thing made up it is worth the consideration to see how we begin at the farthest thing and at the first There are four esses distinct which we must look at distinctly and orderly if we â—ill see things aâ—ight First the efficients then the matters c. now then let us see effectum Effectum for the name it seems to be nominated onely from the efficient for it comes of efficior which comes oâ— efficio whence efficiens comes and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum formatum or finitum yet he rather names it of the efficient but we are to understand that it hath reference to all the causes even materiatum formatum finitum Object Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects as there are of causes Answ Because no one cause alone can make an effect for it is existent from them all the causes are distinct in nature and their forces are their own ergo their doctrine must be distinct but because essectum must be made of the composition of the four esses ergo it can be but one so that I cannot say effectum efficientis effectum materiae effectum formae or effectum finis ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump as it is in nature Now because it hath all the esses of the causes ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and worketh generally quite through with every other cause matter form and end should have the effect denominated from it so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient Est All things are effects but God alone ergo effectum est therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing so the effect which is a quinta essentia arising from them Quod. He means argumentum absolute consentancum now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect but how is the effect absolutely a-agreeing to them yes for if the effect be from them it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it self to be from them and we see in nature that if an effect be then all the causes are contra again that we may see it plainly if we take away the efficient the effect will be imperfect so put the effect and we put the matter and form substantially and the esses of the other so take away the effect and you take away them Now if the efficient be rotten yet it is an effect as this Logick is Ramus his effect though he be dead and rotten for here we respect not time but the esse Again he puts efficiens generally a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia and here effectum quod the reason why he used quod so often is because he would tell us that Logick is general to every thing Existit Esse is of any one cause existere is a compound of them all not that existere hath respect of time and place as some teach true it is time and place attend every thing when it doth existere but they are not of the esse of the thing but are onely complemental est is a causa qualibet existere ex omnibus subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis Existere comes of ex and sto now it doth stand upon its feet and doth estare out from all the causes being a fift thing from them Ecausis Here e is as much as a ex per and gratia ecausis that is ab efficiente ex materi per formam gratia finis Causis not causa and therefore it is that all four causes must absolutely concurre or else the thing cannot existere as the first matter did not ergo if Angels do existere they must have all the causes so the soules of men after they be out of the body they cannot per se existere without they have all the causes for if any one cause be wanting they will be incomplete Sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum because the common Aristotelians referre the doctrine of motus not to Logick but to natural Philosophy but Ramus teacheth it here in Logick in the doctrine of effectum sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur c whether it be made or corrupted sive modo quodam moveatur quidlibet that is whether it be augmented or diminished c. generatio and corruptio are substantial motus augmentatio and diminutio quantitatis alteratio and loci mutatio qualitatis and all these are effects then again whereas the Aristotelians teach that distruens causa is not causa Ramus teacheth that it is for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both ergo both of them are motus of his act to the opus ergo causa distruens is a motus and a cause as well as opus destructum is an effect and privations though they be privations in respect of their habits yet they are effects in respect of their causes ergo they are causes both alike they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin whereas he spoiles the Image of God in him ergo whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done it would be his effect at least the corruption of nothing Now the effect is double motus and res motu facta every thing is made motu God onely is sine motu and doth not move when he works for else he should not be primus movens but motus but if we resolve all things it must needs bring us in the end to that which is immoveable for so Aristotle found out most things by motus now again there are those that sever motus and res motu facta as the Aristotelians which makes Ramus to commorari they say somethings rest motu onely without a res motu facta but that is not so for there is nothing that God hath made which doth movere but there is a res motu facta of that motus they conceit that some Arts motion hath no opus post se relictum as when one playes on the Virginals they say there is nothing left behind Answ What care I for that Logick looks not to that but as there is playing so there is something playd which is res motu facta and as there is writing so there is something written These namely motus and res motu facta are never distinct asunder one without another but onely in that the one is not the other Hujus loci sunt laudes vituperationes As if Ramus should say if you would commend
away the entity of the thing affirmed Vni but we shall hear afterward that contraria negantia are nothing in themselves Answ They are something gratia entis and our reason gives something to it and apprehends it as some thing in respect of the contrary and here we may see the force of our reason that can make of nothing something Now something is made of nothing divers wayes first by our reason secondly by our fancie or by the hallusination of the eye Logick makes onely two kinds of nothings the contradicent and the privant Homo is a contrary to brutum but to Leo and equus he is a disparate because 〈◊〉 is opposed to equus in the same nature that he is opposed to Leo. Contraria sunt affirmantia vel negantia This distribution of contraries runs on as the former did for as the least dissention began first so we still proceed to the greater now by affirmantia and negantia he means things positive or privative for there is either a thing opposed to a thing or a thing opposed to nothing and the fight between something and nothing is stronger than the former for when one thing fights with another thing then let them fight as long as they will or can yet they leave something behind them but the other leaves nothing at all so that contraries are where both are things in nature or where the one is nothing and are called negantia of the later part as the other are called of both parts affirmantio Affirmantia as if he should say they are things in nature or things positive as a Father a child c. Affirmantia quorum utrumque affirmat c. He doth not say affirmatur but affirmat because he would willingly describe them from their act for he would deliver the nature of the arguments ut relata adversa There is likewise among these a difference of contrariety for there are some affirmantia that may be reconciled and â—â—â—e to agree there be some also that will 〈…〉 â—gree but perpetuo adversantur The 〈◊〉 if you set them face to face will be 〈…〉 â—riends but set them back to back and 〈…〉 be foes but set them adversa how you 〈◊〉 and they will be foes so then relates have not so strong a fight betwixt them as adversa Now they are called relates by reason of a certain reference they have one to another continually yea indeed they are by reason of their reference for the causes of the one relate are in his correlate for the cause of the fathers relation is not in him but he receives his whole relative being from the correlate so that in Divinity we know there is nothing added to the Godhead by giving to it the persons mutually Sunt contra here is one to one for though a father have many children yet the relation is but one namely betwixt father-hood and son-hood and though many stand on the one side yet there is but one relation so in the high mystery of the Trinity there is a double relation first between the Father and the Son secondly between the Father and the Son on the one side and the holy Ghost on the other side So when I say Aristotle est discipulus Platonis these are relates yet when I say Aristotle est discipulus this is subjectum and adjunctum so cousen and cousen are relates if we respect the relative quality and not the men Now that term of relates is used confusedly as we say he is his father meaning his procreant cause quorum alterum constat Quorum alterum constat e mutua c. Constare is to stand together of causes e mutua alterius affectione so that these relates have not their causes from the thing in whom they are but from their correlates as when I define a husband to be him that hath a wife or a wife to be her that hath a husband these are definitions e relatis and so e causis But what causes do relates contain all the causes both efficient matter form and end E mutua e is a sign of the effect quod e causis existit so that this is their nature Atque inde nominande sunt relata They are called relates in regard of the reference they have one to another so that we may here see what relates are and how they belong hither they that think all arguments are relates why they are so as the cause and effect c. but so I cannot call them species of argumentum consentaneum for here they are examples ergo lowest of all Again if I say argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale and so go on thinking that all these are genera to causa and effectum I deceive my self as they are relates but if all arguments should be relates as the arguments are taught in Logick then all the examples of all arguments should be relates as God and the world but when I make them relates I analyse Logick even as I make the definition of Dialectica an example of definitio so that as I say if relation were a common affection to all arguments all examples also should be relates which they are not again if causa and effectum were relates then they must be together for relates must be simul natura ergo this is fallacia accidentis they thought the words of Art as they call them were relates ergo the doctrine of relates must go generally with all arguments We know again that the causes efficient matter form and end and the effect are distinct things and do not constare e mutua alterius affectione ergo are not relates again causa est cujus vi res est and the effect quod e causis existit Now each relate contains the efficient matter form and end of his fellow ergo if they should be taught generally then in the efficient alone in the matter alone in the form alone and in the end alone there should be all the causes Some would have relates taught as consentanie arguments because they do agree it is true but they do disagree also and if they should be taught in consentanies their dissentio also should be taught there or else they should make a double doctrine of one thing and this kind of teaching had been a posteriore again where should they have been taught they are mutual causes ergo not causa and effectum but both causes and effects again the doctrine of causa efficiens materia forma and finis are distinct here they are confounded together in one Now the Aristotelians have a predicament of relates and have also their series but their gradus of them will not stand for relates have no species but are lowest save onely examples and they go clean out and say relates are of this nature or that nature as if they should say relates whose species are in this Art or in that Art As in Oeconomie in a family they are free or bound free
efficient as essential for actio is before passio so that here mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi As we are saved by faith alone here is efficiens sola Our Author brings in an example of Ovids the 4. remedii and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity But first Logick being a general Art it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and general Writers as out of Poets and Historians which the Gentiles and Turks may receive these being more generally known to the world than are the Scriptures and again Divinity is the most special Art of all And so Ramns findeth fault but justly with Aristotle for fetching his examples out of Geometry which is too obscure for it is a fallace to fetch examples to prove any thing if the examples be not as well or better known to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selves As they say in Geometry A is not B c. for so they say in Geometry angulus A and angulus B. c. Now Logick is a general Art ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry c. which belongs to Rhetorick a general Art the example is this first proper otia are proper and conserving causes of love then tropical causa est procreans cibus the cherisher Otia si tollas c. Thus â—e reasons otia are the causes of love for take them away and love is gone hence it appeares they were of the essence of love so that because causa is of the essence of the effect ergo put idleness and you must put love aut contra for the essence will be wanting and we have a rule sublata causa tollitur effectum and it is general to all causes for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall have here as posita causa ponitur effectum yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre many other rules they have all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa now it holds contingently in every cause for if we put one cause we put all the causes and so it holds in the special causes that posita causa ponitur effectum contra as take away otium from Egistus and you take away love so that sublata causa a tertio tollitur effectum so in judgement it is also true as give otium to Egistus and you may give him love which argues from the efficient Sic pater mater procreant nutrix tuetur Before he shewed us an example out of an Author he wils us to look for the use of them out of Authors The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks the matter of the second to History Logick is a general Art ergo his examples are best out of Poetry and Oratory wherein the use of all Art is Now the aliquid before is love which we should have heard of against which Ovid makes a medicine In this example Dido is the aliquid for here the aliquid is the causa Dardanus had two sons Assaracus and Anchises and of him came Aeneas now here she takes away the true causes and sayes Caucasus begot thee so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans and Hyrcanae tigres are preserving causes but this is false for here is non causa pro causa Object But doth he well to bring fallaces Answ Yes out of Poets for here non ens or ens fictum hath the nature of ens in it neither are all fables lyes but by continued allegories they teach us notable truths now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners because he forsook her Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis c. He makes examples of his own and there is genesis teaching us that though genesis be before analysis yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis Again our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes and whereunto any other example may be brought as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident in the second he makes a substantial effect to be from substantial causes naturally but fainedly in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordinarily in artificial things and here we may see who first shot the arrow before we can see where it lights or through what it flew or whence CHAP. IV. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit aut cum aliis VVE are still in the efficient the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing is the efficient and the modi of it rhe most general modi was procreans and conservans before now we come to the second modi sola aut cum aliis which are more general than per se and per accidens in use but not so generall as the first Secundo sola c. this is next ergo next after the first sola that is where this modus efficiendi is considered and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this modus sola for so we are to consider always when any efficient is brought to argue any thing see which modus is brought with it as in the example before the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans and with the modus of conservans as you would take away love take away idleness for it is the procreant and conserving cause of love Now as God is the procreant and conserving cause of all things so he is causa sola first ergo that is before causa â—um aliis afterward he is causa cum aliis working together with the creatures and we finding this in the first efficient we may also find it in the first in the second and in every one because all things are simulacra of the first Now these belong to Logick for there is reason in them and any thing deserveth more or less praise or dispraise as he doth good or evil sola aut cum aliis Earumque omnium saepe alia principalis alia adjuvans ministra That is earum omnium quae cum aliis efficiunt saepe alia principalis alia adjuvans ministra for so saepe here is part of the axiom and thus often it fals out that one among the rest in doing of things is principal and as we say ring-leader to the rest though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows So that as the Lord did at the first work all things alone and then with others so likewise do the creatures in nature and here again as the Lord is principal when he worketh with others so also when creatures work together one for the most part is principal Alia adjuvans ministra That is as it were a minister and an instrument Here we are to understand there
which worketh an effect but non sua facultate but is moved by some other thing and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua facultate but not sua facultate if we respect the effect as fire drieth a cloth by removing the moisture and so leaves the cloath dry which drought is in the cloth Vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum Here we see a necessity in invention which is all one with coaction By fortuna we are to understand the special providence of God or ignorance of the next cause for ignorance of the providence of God in all things and of the next cause hath caused that men say what fortune had I when they are crossed in play or such like Now necessity answereth to nature cum efficiens cogitur so that this necessity here is a coaction and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur cogitur when as the work of it per se is rather of some other thing now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se and in another respect causa per accidens for they are but modi vi externa ad effectum so that it doth it not natura or consilio Object Why saith he effectum rather than res Answ All comes to one for he means res neither doth he define effectum here Here he means violence not that vis in causa this vis doth not work the effect but works upon the cause and is that facultas whereof he spake before Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio At mihi quidem ait Orator si proprium verum nomen c. Before he said he was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate and hither belongs fatum in Schools Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter c. Our Author before did tell us of fortuna in the ablative case here he puts it in the nominative because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another doth per accidens the arguing we ascribe it to fortune and say fortune did it so that our Author would have us consider first that it was fortune did it secondly that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it Per accidens That is working externa facultate now whereas he saith he doth it per accidens he meanes fortune as it is commonly taken when we make her blind not seeing what she doth for hence it doth arise when we doe not a thing by counsel but â—ab nab as they say that causeth us to make fortune blind Quando aliquid accidit That is happeneth for here it is principal the improvidence as it were he neither sees himself a cause neither doth he see who is the cause and therefore he saith accidit not efficit for he saith I did it not so again ask him who did it and â—e will say I know not so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus Praeter scopium efficientis Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel which evermore hath a scope whereat it levels now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum it is fortuna we say Now things in nature may have a scope which is beyond their nature and then it is fortuna so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have said praeter scopum fortunae if it be causa fortuna or praeter scopum naturae if it be causa natura Sic Pheraeo Jasoni profuit hostis c. here his enemy going about to kill him healed him In hoc genere causarnm imprudentia connumerari solet Imprudentia is one modus of fortune as here Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est c. I unawares have seen that which hath done me harm Then Ovid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her self and here Ovid reasons a simile as Acteon was torn in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares so am I banished for seeing that I would Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est c. He means Augustus So if a man go forth and a tile fall from an house and break his head this is causa fortuna it is natura as it break his head being harder than his head and fortuna as it hit him and consilio it breaks his head if it be flung for it hath a scope true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh Hinc sumitur deprecatio c. For our Author said before accidit therefore we are causes ergo it ought to be pardoned deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna so they will say he is a proper man but hath no luck Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit c. Here Ramus doth commorari in the name lest he should be mistaken it is an unchristian word it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsel but as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by fortune Many other modi there are among other Logicians all which may be brought hither as causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either causa necessitate or efficiens in genere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is causa per se if he shall say anger did it then there is a trope in it as when I say he writes I mean his pen writes if I say he writes with his pen then I make him causa cum aliis if I say he writes he is efficiens Now for the order of causes one efficient may be cause of another efficient c. and so causa causae be causa causati but this will fail as when I look at a child and commend him from his grandfather not respecting the mean causes there is not causa causae but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio c. Hactenus de efficiente and this we must alwayes look at first in artificio rei moreover observe here in every thing the manner of working for so God is said to do some thing necessitate as when we say he doth that he would not though he would it in another sense and fortuna as mans fall was praeter scâ—pum Legis CHAP. VI. De Materia Materia est causa ex qua res est VVE have heard of the efficient cause and his manner of moving in that work of his now these are essential to Logick because in the very manner there lyeth the force of the argument and whatsoever hath reason belongeth to Logick many distinctions there are among the Logicians all which may be brought to these that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally the
c. that is when special causes may be given to one common effect for as integrum though it be singular yet is it totum because it is made of the portions of the matter and form of the members so here the effects are made of their genus Now he sayes distributio ex effectis because it ariseth ex effectis for there are the causes distributing and the parts distributed so that here we may see why these arguments are rightly called orta quando partes sunt effecta so as the whole doth symbolice contain the causes so the parts do symbolice contain the effect as if he should say effecta we heard of in the first invention but effecta here sunt partes this is the second invention God as he made all things so hath he ranged and ordered them one under another so that in this definition this is all the parts are the effects and the cause is the whole Marriners are general causes but they have special effects for some climbe the shroud some run up and down some pump c. here are the effects of the efficient cause so we may distribute from the matter as of wood is made a wooden chest or table or stool c. so from the form as we may from the genus but this alwayes consider in general that the parts be part of the whole and that they be homogenie parts for if we shall divide a whole into parts and particles there will be no distribution as if a mans body be anatomized because the particles will agree with the parts Distributio generis in species hic excellit He doth here hasten to genus as being the principal thing in this place and it is as if he should say that distribution which we usually hear of and which we have so often in Schools of genus and species they are but modi of a distribution ex effectis and it is true and whilst the common Logâ—cians see not this they know not the truth of them nor their original and this makes them to begin with genus and species in their Logick so they know them not in their cause but onely in their second nature Hic excellit As if he should say this is the chiefest modus in this distribution Genus Genus signifieth firstly a stock or kinred now because all the species come from one root as a family cometh from one stock ergo it is called genus or as the parents are causes of their children so is genus cause of the species so the Hiraclides are they that come of Hiracles Species This signifieth in the original the countenance of a thing nâ—w we come to see nothing but singulars ergo individua and species infimae are properly species it comes of an old verb specio or spicio species it is that which is looked on excellit that is of principal use and this is the reason thereof the Lord hath ranged all things under his own general but this kind of ranging is more general than the rest and the genus giving essence to the species it draweth the species with it wheresoever it goeth hence it is that wheresoever the genus of any thing is taught there a so must the species be taught and this was the father of predicaments so that there is nothing but is under a genus but genus generalissimum Genus est totum partibus essentiale Totum est quod continet partes for the parts we heard were holden together in the whole for before whilst the members did contribute every one a portion of matter and form they made up the whole now genus is totum but contrary to integrum for there the integrum had his whole matter and form from the members but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter and in a common form Totum essentiale By this we are to understand that which gives essence that is matter and form so that integrum did contain all that the members had but the genus doth not contain all that the species have so that though all the essence of the genus be in the species yet the whole essence of the species is not in the genus when I say totum essentiale I say two things first that genus is a totum secondly that there is nothing in the genus but is also in the species Object But how can it be said that genus gives essence to the species whereas they have more in them than the genus Answ To contain is to hold together now because the species agree in one common matter and a common form as in uno puncto ergo genus doth contain them so that reciprocation here is to be understood so far forth as by their hypostatical union the specius are made one in their genus hence it is that whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the genus must agree with the species therefore if any in distributing shall make any part as large as the genus as Logicians distribute genus into perfectum and imperfectum they make species totum and not genus so ens is substantia or accidens will not come into any Art for the parts are consentanies inter se being subjectum and adjunctum Partibus Pars est quae continetur non in toto sed a toto tâ—tâ—m est quod continet as being the common punctum wherein the parts meet together he saith also partibus non parti Species est pars generis Pars we heard before generis so that as membrum was pars integri not generis so species est pars generis not integri so that they which divide parts into integral or simular understand not Logick for a part simular is nothing but species which is pars generis as a pan of water a drop of water is genus species a bone and a part of a bone is also genus and species now they call it simular because they have the same denomination Why so genus doth predicare re et nomine as they say pars generis here observe that species hath reference onely to genus and so genus to species even as causa is effecti causa and subjectum adjuncti subjectum for they are relates ergo can repeat no other thing but one another So again genus is totum not speciei but specierum ergo when we give a double face to him we make him like Janus with a double fore-head for they make the same species to be species to two things species therefore is generis species as one son is but son of one father Now this is their trouble that they cannot distribute a species into individua because say they individua do but differre numero what is that Differre numero is properly to reckon up or make an induction of the individua to make up the species again when we distribute that species into all his individua there is a distribution for there is a totum and
though it be true that there was but one Tongue from the beginning of the World till the destruction of Babel yet in Gods decree all the rest are eternal and so is the rule of Speech and they were in the eternal notion of God Again their words do vary continually therefore they were not eternal for if one that died 500 years ago were now alive and should speak we could not understand him Answ Though it be true that words by reason of many sounds do daily change yet the rule is eternal though they be not spoken from eternal yet the variety of Speech doth not change the rule of Grammer as in reason this axiome homo est animal was true before homo was and will be for ever So in Grammer is the rule eternal as likewise is the rule of generation and corruption eternal and ever true and the same though men daily be generated and corrupted so is Grammers rule external though c. and 't is because God would shew his mighty power and wisdom that there are as many several Grammers as there are several ages and more too and there is nothing more wonderful under heaven then to consider the great variety oâ—â—â—ands and colours and complexions of things which all are from their contrary forms Ars. In Latin some think the word comes from artus a sâ—new others of arx a tower ab arcendo and both wâ—ll well agree to our purpose for artus a sinew we know the strength of those things that have sinews liâ—th in them yet they are stronger then the bones for the bones by reason of their hardness will break wâ—ereas sinews will rather give back and bend and are more tough So the rules of art are most strong anâ— sinewy If we derive the word from arx a tower it my be very well so for as there is both great streâ—gth and much beauty both in the matter and form so the rules of Grammer are most strong and make a most sweet harmony Generalis Because though it be not everywhere as Logick is yet it may be now Logick is everywhere because every thing was made for man therefore he must have an eye to see every thing for otherwise he could not use them aright But Grammer because when I see a thing by Logick I may keep it to my self therefore it is general only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 secundùm quid therefore it is taught after Logick Again wheresoever there is Grammer there is also Logick where there is Logick there is not alwayes Grammer for Logick may be only in mente therefore it is more general Orationis This general art of Speech is twofold both Grammer and Rhetorick but the difference is this that Grammer carrieth the matter in a budget neither too big nor too little like one of these Irishmen with Breeches without pockets Rhetorica carrieth it in a fine bag full of laces yet not altogether full for there are more words then matter therefore both Grammer Rhetorick and Poetry are all equally general for subject but not for use For Grammers use is before the use of them and may be without them even as a garment may be without a lace or jag But here by the way because these are general Arts therefore they have no proper subject but their use may be everywhere and therefore Keckerman whilst he maketh Rhetorick a special art telleth me he never knew the right distribution of the arts for it is the art of Speech and that may be every-where therefore Rhetorick is general and may be used in any thing therefore Tropes upon due consideration may be used in any art Now if it be demanded whether it be better to use Grammer or Rhetorick in teaching of Children I Answ Grammer is better 1. Because it is more general than Rhetorick 2. Because it keeps us more close to the matter which is a very good thing in teaching yet not withstanding sometime Rhetorick is better because it delivers the proper word together with some sweetness for Tropes do arise from some arguments in Logick so that we cannot condemne Rhetorick neither is it possible we should alwayes use Grammer seeing there be many more things then proper names for God making all things and Man being to name them and had not names sufficient for them therefore for want of words gave the same name to divers things by Tropes and therefore Talaeus saith necessitas tropum genuit Yet at the beginning one thing had but one name but afterwards the same word came to signifie many things as we see in Hebrew where one word signifieth twenty things and but one properly and Grammatically and all the rest Tropically And I find that words are used improperly these wayes First in respect of the Trope Secondly when we deliver the same things in divers languages there they use divers phrases which must be compared together as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is good in Greek in Latin it is to make Children which is not usual Now if you will know whether is better bring them to Logick and there see which phrase is more special that is to be prefer'd to make it general to the efficient cause in general to beget or procreate Children is proper to the first modus of the efficient therefore it is the better phrase So vaccas agere in English is to drive Kine though they say in some parts do the Kine into the field And there is another kind of Trope which is caused by reason of the phrase therefore one that teacheth young Scholars must have a special care That first his Scholar knwo the nature of the thing and then the name of it which stands by this rule vâ—x est nota quâ unumquodque vocatur and by this means we shall teach them first what every word signifieth in propriety and then the thing as it is named in other tongues and then the phrase and then compare one phrase with another and thus by the way we shall estimate which phrase in every language standeth with best reason As that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in English to beget Children where to beget is peculiar to nature and belongeth to those things which have only a vegetative life and therefore our English phrase is better So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to put to the hand and in Latin is agreed to put to the foot or to go to which is more general therefore the Greek phrase is better So in English we say to go to and to go in hand with which phrase neither the Greeks nor the Latins have It is a Metaphor fetched from the motion of the hand which is the chief organ of motion is as much as I should say put our hands to this is more special so that bring them to Logick and â—here you shall be able to judge which phrase in every language is best and so consequently which Tongue is best And this way I can prove our English
best except the Hebrew For those that invented the Greek Tongue were great Scholars and were very good Rhetoricians and so made their Speech more eloquent whereas our inventors of English were not so Bene Is here an adverb joyned to the verb to shew his signification and is not another word from loqui and the reason of it is this a man may loqui but not bene loqui as bonus vinum was as good as their Wine but not good Grammer as a man may dispute sophistically or ignorantly and so break the rule of Logick so likewise he may malè loqui and break the rule of Grammer Again since the Fall of man as there is a bona and a mala ratio so there is a bene and malè loqui and Grammer gives not precepts of that malè loqui which was attracted by sin but only of that bene loqui which is a Creature of God Object But many have thought that this bene is nothing but that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the definition of art in general and therefore should not be repeated in every special art Answ But they are to know since the Fall as we said before there is a bene and malè loqui and art gives precept only to the bene loqui and therefore bene must be added for distinction sake Again they confess themselves That bene in the definition of ars is the same that expeditè and that is an habit in man whereas this bene is essential unto Grammer as it is an art Again here bene is joyned with the form not with the genus and therefore is another genus which is more special over and above that which was before for so we are to understand that the species contain more in them than the genus doth Now for those who to avoid bene will put more words into the definition let them know that into how many words they divide the form into so many parts they cut it which ought not to be because the form is but one Argument Now it is a great question among many Scholars which language was the first and that was indeed the Hebrew Goropius would have the Dutch to be the first and he argueth for it subtily and hath many notations of words as fast backwards is staf because when we have a staff we stand fast so litera is of let and er which signifieth to wander because when we write we let our Pen wander about Benè loquendi Here because the form is not easily found out and when it is found out we have not one word to express it in therefore we are to imagine the form to be included in this Gerund in di for because we have not a word to deliver the form in hence we are fain to take the next argument to forma which is finis and include it in that and we are to know that in very deed every precept is a member of that Art whereof it is a precept so that every precept hath a certain vigour or life or soul as it were which soul taken up from all the precept is the form of the Art And again howsoever it may be objected that Grammer is not in every thing for many things have no names and so is not a general Art yet the work of Grammer is in every thing So also though man only can speak yet Grammers work is general and so we are to understand it to answer in proportion to Logick for as I see every thing with my eye of reason so it is requisite that after I have received it I should carry every thing to another and that I must do by Grammer and Grammer hath a double reference one in regard of him that speaks and another in regard of the thing he speaks of or the matter in hand i e. We that here are to look out at the thing he speaks and his meaning and in very deed ens à primo is Gods creature and hath every Art in it so that though Grammer that is speech is proper to man yet Grammers work is in every thing the reason is this Every thing in nature is distinct and I apprehend them so with my Logick and they being so must needs have distinct names otherwise I cannot carry them to others distinctly and as they are So that Grammer is general 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so Adam by seeing into the nature of every Creature could see their names though we cannot do it so he named the fire Esh because of the noise it makes in green wood so water maiim which signifieth quid that is the essence for so Thales thought that every thing was made of water and in the second verse of the first Chapter of Genesis it is said The Spirit of God moved upon the waters where water is put for the first matter so we call it in Latin aqua quasi à quâ the efficient cause so he called darkness lajil which signifieth rest because it is the time of rest So God called the day jam because of the jumbling noise that is made in it so the earth erets from rashat tero to ware and there is no name but it hath a reason of it and that Logick tels me when it handled notatio for ens à primo hath that in it which is in every general Art Loquendi Loqui and dicere signifie the same thing but come to be distinguished thus because that Rhetorick to which dicere doth belong was seen most especially in pleading before Judges hence they gave it that name dicere which cometh of dico and dico cometh of the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth the decision of a Controversie and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bifariam or as some say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 divido which may well be because in pleading of controversies they divide their speeches Loquendi not Ars Scribendi for if they take it for the Orthographie of a word it is accidental neither are the letters the same in every tongue therefore not the same writing of them Again the letters may be changed though not well for the Hebrew letters are given with great reason and the other are taken from them if they take writing as general as speaking it is the same with Grammer now the cause of it was this Man receiveth into his understanding the notions of things these notions are expressed and made known from him to another man by words now because man was not to live alwayes neither by reason of the distance of place could speak unto every one hence was the necessity of writing Bene. For a man may loqui and yet not bene loqui i. e. according to bona locutio whereof Grammer gives precepts but he that speaks according to the rule of Grammer whether he know he doth so or no it is no matter he doth bene loqui i. e. he speaketh such a speech as is pure according to the custome of
down the procreant and conservant cause of a Trope and for necessity though Grammer be as large as Logick yea as large as our thoughts yet at the first it was not yea they used to say The heart cannot comprehend her own thoughts and again because things at the first were so many that they could not readily give the proper name of every thing hence arose Tropes afterwards these Tropes were sweet and pleasant and therefore they would let them go no more Nam ut vest is frigoris c. Man at first needed not cloathes but now by reason of sin the temper of his body and external cold together cause cold he needeth cloaths which he useth not only for heat but also for ornament So for Tropes though necessity brought them in yet decency doth hold them Delectat autem ideo c. Because it is witty to let pass those things which are before our feet Secondly Because our cogitation is refreshed by them for variety delighteth as there is in Tropes and even as if we see Speech in his holy-day garment Haec igitur prima sunt These are the first sauses and remedies to make Speech look red and white Sedtamen verecund c. Here is a propriety a Trope must be bashâ—ul and shamefac't not brought in by another or come in rushing perforce but gentle and led by the hand or I pray you ceme in Now to all kinf of Tropes there be certain general affections and those are either in one word alone or in the continuance of more words together Those which are in one word alone are either such as are too hard and harsh or too bold and proud such as are pull'd in by the ears and are more sausy now these are general affections of Tropes and the reason of them is this We have heard what a Trope is namely where a word is changed from his natural signification into another now because that for want of words we cannot readily give a fit word that is tropical therefore we are forc'd to bring them in more harshly sometimes and more proudly now that which is more harsh is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abusio tropi which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abutor that is a word which is abused more unkindly or a word hardly entertain'd 't is called of the Grammarians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tunc ego c. If I might only hope for this grief here is an harsh Trope for Spes is expectatio boni and metus or timâ—r expectatio mali so that here is either a synechdochy or a catachrestical Ironie Now for Hyperbole that hath no affinity with catachrésis for an hyperboly is very usual and commendable neither is there any harshnesse in it but it is a little too proud but catachrésis is harsh and not used but of Poets only not of Oratours at least very seldom Gladium vagina c. This is also harsh for we rather say Vagina gladio vacua than gladius est vagina vacuus Vacuum here is a metaphour h. e. exutum Hyperbole est audacia tropi Of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be carried above and this affection signifieth that for which it was fetch 't very kindly but proudly and so as it doth inhaunch and encrease the matter to very good purpose and this affection is very commenadble and usual especially in Scripture Meiosis diminutio which is contrary to hyperbole is nothing else but a synechdochy of the species for the genus The Second affection of Tropes in the continuance of more words is called Allegoria which is continuatio troporum yet those Tropes must be of the same kind of Tropes as they must be all of them either metonymies metaphors ironyes or synechdochyes not one a metonymy another an irony and another a metaphor and another a synecdochy it hath his notation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sedin Allegoria tenendum That is In an Allegory look from what thing we first fetch our Allegory with the same thing must we end As if I begin with a ship I must end with a ship for if I begin with a ship and end with a plow inconsequentia foedissima fuerit So also we see in the Gospel how the Allegory of Dives and Lazarus is continued how they were there feasted and afterward how they were to feast in another place where Dives had such a dry feast as he desired but the tip of his finger to cool him withal but how Lazarus was taken into a joyful feast yea even into Abraham's bosom where we may see even by this rule what is meant in this place by Abraham's bosome namely that Lazarus sitteth in Heaven next unto Abraham So is the Allegory continued from the thing he doth fetch it And this rule is of great use in Scripture for the understanding of the Spirit of God in many places which otherwise might seem dark Now for him that gave his fellow a box on the eare which felled him and yet said nisi tetigi what affection is this it is a kind of hyperboly of his own commendation as if he could do more with a touch then others with a great stroke CHAP. III. Troporum genera duo sunt Primum est metonymia ironia THis distribution of the kinds of Tropes is in respect of the things whence they are borrowed and those from the Arguments of invention The second distribution is from simple arguments Metonymia est tropus causae ad effect subj ad adjunct vel contrà Here is definitio ex distributione as if he should say is absolutè vel modo quodam consentaneorum which is shewed by the induction of the species But because not every cause is put Tropically for every effect nor è contrà neither every subj for every adj nor è contrà therefore he chuseth rather to keep himself closely by these species then to speak generally Metonymia Of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a change of the name which is true of every Trope but because use hath received we content our selves with it knowing what is meant by it or if ye will make it a synecdochy of the genus for the species And this trope is first for that the arguments whence they are borrowed are first and the reason why the cause is put for the effect is because it gives esse to the effect so the reason why the effect is put for the cause is because it hath its esse from the cause So why the subj is put for the adjunct because the adjunct in esse is in the subj et contrà so that this Trope is of consentany Arguments Metonymia causae est efficieintis aut materiae Here also is a definition of the metonymy of the cause ex distributionne There is not any Trope of the other causes neither form nor end not of the form
this Art of Rhetorick namely that 't is to sweeten speech with otherwise being inartificial it is of little force in the hearers eares For whereas every thing coming to mind doth first come to the outward senses then to the inward senses and hence to the understanding so to the affections and last of all to the Will Rhetorick comes to the understanding yet presently before it can examine it the affections lay hold of it and so tickle the Will that it may approve it and hence it came to be abused 1. with sophistry to the understanding 2. for tickling of the Will We have heard also that it hath two parts namely for that Speech is so either writing or uttering of it hence is the double consideration of speech the first whereof is called elocutio which may be in writing alone without pronunciation but pronunciation cannot be without elocution hence it followeth that these are several parts And secondly Elocutio is before Pronunciatio now elocutio is either in one word alone adorning etymology or in more words together adorning Syntax that which is in one word alone is called tropus and the reason of the sweetnesse of a Trope is because it doth not only give a splendour but besides that it carrieth us to another Argument from whence it was drawn for every Trope signifieth two things to the hearer First A kind of sweetnesse with the thing it delivereth and secondly the argument whence it was drawn Therefore though at the first necessity found it out yet afterwards variety did so delight that it would not cast them off Now these Tropes are not of any words as we will but of consentanies with consentanies dissent with dissent c. and therefore the distribution of the doctrine of Tropes must run along according as the arguments are distributed yet we have not fit words to distribute them withal for if we should have said that a Trope is either simple or comparate then we should have left out those Tropes which do arise from orta argumenta as synecdoche integri membri generis speciei Again not every simple argument is put for every simple one neither every comp for every comp so that in this distribution there would have been a double errour therefore he contents himself with the special words Metonym and Ironia commending unto us a totum which we are to imagine by these specials as they have a community one with another which is in regard of the arguments from whence they arise 1. For a metonymy of the cause that is either of the efficient or of the matter The reason of these two Tropes is because these two causes in constituting the effect are precedent a good while before either forme or end Now here first the efficient is put for the effect for that often times giveth names to the effect and this metonymy hath two modi the first when the Inventour is put for the thing invented the second when the Authour is put for the thing effected so we call Ramus his Logick Ramus and the reason hereof is this because at the first we had not readily a name for it for the thing being new we could not hastily give it a name but gave the Author's name till we had a better for it So for the matter we call Money silver because at the first we had not readily a better name Now there are no Tropes of the formal and final causes and the reason is because they were so confused with the effect that at the first we cannot readily sever them both because forma simul ingenita cum effecto and secondly because these two causes do work so near to the effect a good while after either efficient or matter 2. A metonymy of the effect is when the efficient is signified by his effects here he seemeth to make the effect only to answer to the efficient but it doth answer also to the matter at least though not in Latin yet in Hebrew and English Luz was called Bethel before it was Bethel Now this metonymy of the effect hath two modi The first when the effect is given to the efficient adjectively the second when given to the efficient not adjectively but abstractively as he said Death was in the Pot because Colliquintida was in it Now as the cause is put for the effect contrà so the subj for the adj contrà 3. In the metonymy of the subject the modi are either contin pro re contenta as locus pro incolis ad res locatas or possessor pro re possessâ or Dux pro exercitu or Advocatus pro Cliente 4. Now followeth the metonymy of the Adjunct Cùm ex adj res subj signifie That is when the name of an adjunct is given to the subj whereof 't is an adjunct So we use to say Saving your Honour If it please your Worship Honour and Worship being put for the subjects thereof for because the term of the cause effect subject and adj did not at the first come readily to our hand therefore we were fain to put cause for effect subj for adj aut contrà So the names of Vertues and Vices are put for vertuous and vitious men as Lecher for a lecherous man Covetousness for a covetous man c. and this is the first modus of this metonymy The second modus is when the signe is put for the thing signed as pubes for inventus for pubes is properly the budding of the beard when he beginneth to be adolescens The third modus is when the adjunct of time is put for the subject as time for the unmannerly Citizens in that time so aspera saecula for the People that were then asperi so is togae for Peace and here cedant arma togae conced c. are two Hyperboly's CHAP. VII Ironia est Tropus à contrar ad contr SO that this Trope is only from those Arguments of contraries and not of disparates because they are too many This definition is too general for Relates are not so put one for another because they are of more use in their agreeing affection than in their disagreeing but only is special to adversa contradicentia and privantia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cavillator a wrangler simulator making that to be which is not dissimulator making thâ—t not be which is illusor a mocker irrisor a derider this is the proper name of this Trope and the use of it chiefly is ad jocandum Now here because there is so little reason that one contrary should be put for another therefore 't is hardly perceived yet is to be distinguished either by word or gesture or by both Heus bone vir So Meaning malè adversa Curasti probè That is Non curasti contradicentia So integritas tua i. e. your uprightnesse your shame-fac't-nesse your good done deeds and so for the adversa The modi here are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
but spiritual quantity which is nothing but their subtile quantity and because they have quantity hence they must be under some figure and they have their place and that is one Passionis Actionis By vertue of the forme there ariseth actio by vertue of the matter passio Yet they arise from them both but more especially from the one than the other for every thing is effectum ergo it hath causes ergo these causes do agere ergo the effect doth pati so that every nature doth pati And again every nature hath principia from whence cometh actio Hence are these most general yet passio before because it cometh more principally from the matter as also because every thing doth pati in its very generation before it be perfect And the materiale doth pati and the formale agere yet the materiale doth agere also so Aristotle saith materia doth appetere formam ut foemina virum Crassities Tenuitas Crassities comes from the contraction of the matter as tenuitas from the extension of the form in the matter and one and the same thing may be crassum and tenue and as there is a certain limitatio of every thing by reason of its principia so there is a certain limitation in regard of extension and contraction in them Tenuitas vocatur subtilitas Subtilitas we call slenderness subtilitas is the forme spinning of the matter by the forme crassities contra So take a Portion of the first matter and put the forme of fire upon it and it will spin it finer than the forme of air will do and so the rest So that the act of the form on the matter extending it causeth subtility crassities is contrà Again every thing hath porositie in it and so it rents and t is requisite there should be porosity in every Element for that there must be apposition of elements and that there must be as in the earth that it may bring forth fruit And that which Kickerman calls impurity in the elements is nothing but this apposition of them And for the doctrine of the three Regions of the Air it comes in the Meteors as not being so distinguished as t is an Element but as the Meteors be in it Gravitas Levitas Gravitas and Levitas do arise from the continual act of the forme for where there is a great deal of forme and little matter there is most levity So in the highest Heavens because the principia were together and there is much acting of the forme hence is it most light and hath the highest place And gravity is a privation as it were of levity as opacity is of light And so the same matter may be more light by the action of the forme not more grave And so the first matter was most grave because it was without forme and as it was every thing imperfectly so 't was in loco and was quantum imperfectly though limits of place and quantity be so far as matter and form reach and 't was without forme ergo imperfect And for so many legions of Spirits in a mans body we are to imagine them to have distinct places so when we pull a thing we would have it in two places ergo it rents And acts are either internal when the forme extends the matter and hence is subtilitas and crassities and this is the true arising of subtilitas some say it ariseth from heat and rarity but there may be subtility where these are not as in the highest Heavens and this is plain in the Elements which have one common matter and yet by their forms they are more or less extended neither is heat the cause of extension for the earth will be more extended if the forme of Water be in it Again when the form extends the matter beyond its reach till it rent this is rarity Gravitas is from more matter and less forme levitas contrà The external act is of the matter and forme Raritas and Densitas Rarity is the extension of the matter by the forme that it rents and becomes porose and so is every thing for if Angels can extend themselves then t is from their rarity and density and ergo from porosity and so for Adam and the patriarchs and the rest they being in the highest Heavens there must needs be cessio corporum and there must be no vacuum ergo there is a caelestis aura that doth cedere Scaliger saith when the air is extended t is porosus and yet he cannot tell what 't is that is in the pores of it for if it were air then it should still be one continued body with it but all the Elements are together by apposition so that there are other elements in it And raritas and densitas are not qualities saith Aristotle but the distance of the parts and as it were a kind of ratio And these may be of the same thing as the air may be more rare and more dense And these are internal acts The external act the power of action and passion For where there is much potentia actionis there must be much potentia passionis and so antipathy where if there be much action then there must be patientis fuga or else it perisheth Now where there is much action and affection to his like as is cause effect subject or adjunct this is Sympathy Multiplex discontinuum unum mundum efficit ordine et hinc ascensus descensus Multiplex discontinuum unum mundum efficit contiguitate hinc nullum datur vacuum The world consisteth of many parts which are not continua but contigua yet we may call the world one as he that made it is one scilicet in method or order not in continued quantity And by reason that all things are one by method hence there can be no vacuum First because there would be a crypsis of this method again vacuum is non ens but only ens à primo is part of the world ergo not non ens for nothing cannot be a part of something Nature is manifold but 't is made one by method as every rule of Logick are divers in themselves but make but one act by method so nature being manifold in it self is made one by method And here are a great many Controversies answered as That the world is not one by continuity but method we know is the wisdom of God according to which God created and governs things ergo the things do appetere their place as God hath placed them hence 't is that things ascend and descend Some say 't is for their own preservation which indeed is the final cause but the efficient cause is method And as a Painter when he paints a thing should make a deformity if he should set things out of order so nature if things should not be rightly placed so that there be no crypsis of method And here comes in the world which is multiplex and discontinua natura here also by reason of this
method there comes to be contiguity of every thing so that there cannot be vacuum for then the world should not be one and so we should make two worlds and make nothing something And though Gods wisdom Power and other Attributes be and in God yet he would have them appear instar omnium and to be sufficient for all things and so he made them many to shew the variety of this wisdom Now again as they are many in themselves yet they must be but one to shew that the variety of this wisdom is but one in him And they are in one method and so make one world So we say in Logick and 't is sometimes true That the cause and the effect be like and so is God and the world So the world is but one and is round as being the most capacious figure of all now 't is one not in continuity for then it should but have one quantity and so one forme but as before in contiguity as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. an heap but an orderly heap and so is but one in method And hence every thing desireth its place and order by the rule of method which commands that naturâ prior must praecedere ergo the outmost things must first be made and ergo they must have more forme than matter that they may ascend and so by order from the highest nature goeth down to the lowest And for those Philosophers which make Nature to be God I doubt it and methinks 't is like their opinion which made the God-head the form of every thing But we must not wrong God but acknowledge the principia to be causes of things and give them their effects for they say in that such qualities such a thing 't is from God But as a man doth write with pen so God hath made a creature which worketh of it self even as the Pen writeth but is governed by God even as the pen by the writer So that natures work is when the two causes do work according to Gods Logicum artificium and Nature is the cause of natural effects and is to be distinguished from God So that here we see the disposition and order of every thing So when I see a Tree bring forth fruit I conclude there is Logick and yet neither tree nor fruit hath reason ergo there is one greater that hath reason which methinks were sufficient to convert any Atheist And from this order of things comes contiguity for there must be no vacuum as before since that would be a breach of method So we see Water and Earth will go up even into the element of Fire for the preservation of the unity of this world And if there should be a vacuum it must needs be something or nothing then in the world or out of the world if out of the world then it were not all things if in the world then a part of the world then as before in ens it should be ens if in the world and not ens then the world must be two And from method 't is that the Load-stone desireth to stand North and South and so doth every thing yea naturally not guided by counsel desire natale solum And when we do transplant trees 't is a monster and against nature and so that one woman should nurse an other womans child And one woman may have three children though she have but two dugs so that she have milk for them And from sympathy it is that the iron goeth to the load-stone for 't is his food ergo his preserving cause and the stone may act through a Table For descensus What is the reason that fire cometh down Common Philosophers ascribe it to plate which belongeth to subjectum but 't is place which is order and belongeth to method and that is the next cause though the final cause be as before ne detur vacuum So when I cast a stone that it flies 't is propria forma the reason why it flies from me is that it doth pati and ergo doth flie his enemy The common Philosophers ascribe it to the air which in very deed doth hinder it as themselves shall confess for cast a stone upward and when it falleth down again what is the reason it moveth faster when 't is near the center than when t is farther off but because when t is near the center there is less resistance of the air than there was above So what is the reason we take force to strike with an Ax and that goes farther than if we set it upon a thing and lay great weight on it because the wood can resist the Ax well enough Now we lift up our hands because all the vital spirits in the legs and other parts of the body come to inable that part which acteth most and the higher it goeth the more forciblly it cometh for that it is more able to resist the air as also there is a double motion natural and violent and it will come down more easily because it is a natural motion not upward so well because t is violent unto it So a thing that hangs down that part moveth most which is farthest from the center for that it suffereth violence So what 's the reason that put salt Beef into the Sea and it will be fresh but put fresh in and it will be salt because t is the nature of salt to constringe and that 's the reason salt Beef occupieth less place than fresh doth now its pores being filled with salt the salt water cannot get in but only the fine water pierceth in and so takes away the salt but if it be fresh the pores be so open that the salt water entreth in and so it becometh salt Materiale est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in naturâ primum substratum and this is fons passionis Formale est essentia in naturâ prîmum superstratum as before and this is fons actionis And from these principia many things in nature may be made manifest As from hence things natural have finitness of essence which belongeth to every nature and thence limits of quantity as the Angels have and thence they are alwayes under some figure thence also have they limits of place and so Zanchius saith an Angel is in his own place Again if every natural thing have these principia then t is principiatum ergo tis in tempore and had a beginning hence nature must have an efficient ergo not eternal and this efficient only can turn the constant nature into nothing but they are not resolvable per se because they are proxima to nothing in their kind otherwise if nature should resolve them it could work a miracle which is above nature for nature found them created and must so leave them for creatio and annihilatio are not effects of nature but above it Hence the soul of man could not be created by nature for then either of something or nothing not of nothing