Situation is 8. What Duration is I. QUantity is an Attribute of a Being whereby it hath Extension of Parts II. Quantity is either Formal and Immaterial which is the extension of the Form beyond which it is not and within which it acteth or Material which is the Extension of a material Being III. Quality is whereby a being doth act as from a Cause IV. Relation is whereby one being is referred to another V. Action is whereby one being acteth upon another as through a meanes VI. Passion is whereby one being receiveth an Act from another VII Situation is whereby a being is seated in a place A Place is which doth contain a Being VIII Duration is whereby a being continueth in its Essence CHAP. XXII Of Causes 1. What a Cause is That the Dectrine of Causes belongeth to Metaphysicks 2. Wherein a Cause and Principle differ 3. What an internal Cause is What Matter is 4. What a Form is and how it is divided 5. What an external cause is I. A Cause is whereby a Being is produced It doth appertain to Metaphysicks to treat of Causes for else it would be no Science which requires the unfolding of a being by its Causes Ramus did much mistake himself in denying a place to the Doctrine of Causes in this Science and referring it altogether to Logick 'T is true that the Doctrine of Causes may conveniently be handled in Logick as Arguments by which Proofes are inferred yet as they are real and move the understanding from without they may not for Logick is conversant in Notions only and not in Realities II. A Cause differeth from a Principle or is Synonimous to it according to its various acception In Physicks it is taken for that whose presence doth constitute a Being and in that sense it is the same with an internal cause to which a Cause in its late extent is a Genus and consequently is of a larger signification A Principle sometimes denotes that whence a being hath its Essence or Production or whence it is known In this sense did Aristotle take it in the 5th Book of his Met. Chapt. 1. Whereby he did intimate a threefold Principle to wit a Principle of Constitution Generation and of Knowledge or of being known A Principle as it is received in the forementioned sense is of a larger signification then a Cause It is usually taken for a word Synonimous to a Cause In this Acception is God said to be the Principle that is the Cause of all Beings III. A Cause is either Internal or External An Internal Cause is that which doth constitute a Being by its own Presence An Internal Cause is twofold 1. Matter 2. Form Matter is an internal cause out of which a being is constituted So earth is the Matter of man because a man is constituted out of Earth Matter is remote and mediate which is out of which the nearest and immediate matter was produced or constituted or nearest and immediate out of which a being is immediately constituted For example The nearest matter of Glass is Ashes the remote is Wood which was the Matter of Ashes But this Distinction doth more properly belong to Logick IV. A Form is a Cause from which a being hath its Essence A Form is remote or nearest A remote form is from which a being consisting of remote Matter had its Form The nearest Form is from which the nearest Matter hath its Essence The remote matter is either first or second The first is out of which the first being had its Essence The Second is out of which all other beings had their essence A Form is divisible into the same kinds The first Form was from which the first being had its essence The second from which all other beings have their essence These Divisions are rather Logical then Metaphysical V. An external Cause is by whose force or vertue a being is produced The force whereby a being is produced is from without for a being hath no force of it self before it is produced therefore that force whereby a being is produced is necessarily from without This Cause is only an efficient Cause Other Divisions of Causes I do wittingly omit because some are disagreeing with the Subject of this Treatise and belong to another Part of Philosophy as to treat of the first cause belongeth to Pneumatology of final Causes to Morals Others are very suspicious CHAP. XXIII Of the Kinds of Causes 1. The Number of real Causes That a final cause is no real Cause The Causality of Matter and Form 2. The Division of an Efficient 3. That an Efficient is erroneously divided in a procreating and conservating Cause 4. That the Division of a Cause into Social and Solitary is illegal 5. That the Division of an efficient Cause into Internal and External is absurd 6. That all Forms are Material 7. That there are no assistent Forms I. THere are only three real Causes of a Being a Material Formal and Efficient Cause Wherefore a Final cause is no real Cause I prove it A real Cause is which doth really effect or produce a Being But these are only three Ergo. 2. A Final Cause doth not cause any effect concurring to the constitution of a being as each of them three forementioned do for matter causeth an effect by giving her self out of which a being may be constituted A Form doth produce an effect by giving through her presence unity distinction from all others to Matter An efficient Cause effecteth by educing a Form out of the matter and uniting it to the Matter Which three causalities are only requisite to the production of a compleat being and they constituted in actu constitute a being at the same instant If so what effect doth a final Cause then produce Certainly not any contributing to the essential constitution of a being These three being only necessary any other would be frustaneous Possibly you will object that the final Cause moveth the efficient Suppose I grant that it doth not infer that it concurs to the real and essential production of a being The causality which it exerciseth is in contributing per accidens to the constitution of a being which if only so it doth not appertain to this place neither can it be equally treated of with Causes which do act per se. II. An End moveth the efficient An efficient is either Natural or Moral Natural efficients are moved necessarily or act e necessitate Naturae Hence we say a Cause being in actu to wit a Natural Cause its effect is likewise necessarily constituted in actu It is not so with a final Cause for that may exist without producing an effect All Natural Causes move for an end per accidens in that they answer the Ordination of the Creator who hath created all things for an end which accordingly act for the same out of Necessity of Nature Moral Efficients are moved by an end Yet it is not the end which produceth the effect but the efficient it self You
adorned with that variety of Accidents it is probable that Nature hath bestowed them for Action say they and not for nought They do not only allow one power to a Substance which might suffice but a multitude yea as many as there are varieties of acts specifically differing from one another effected through a Substance This leaneth upon an Argument of theirs thus framed The Soul being indifferent to divers Acts there must be somthing superadded by which it is determined to produce certain Acts. Neither is this Opinion deficient in Authorities of Learned Philosophers Averrhoes Thomas Aq. Albertus magn Hervaeus Apollinaris and others consenting thereunto Dionysius also in his Book concerning divine Names teacheth that Celestial Spirits are divisible into their Essence Vertue or Power and Operation III. The said powers are not only affixt to the Souls Essence but are also formally and really distinct from it They are perswaded to a formal distinction because else we might justly be supposed to will when we understand and to understand when we will or to tall when we smell and so in all others They are moved to a real distinction by reason that all powers in a Substance are really distinct from its Matter and Form Weight and Lightness which are Powers inherent in the Elements whereby they encline to the Center or decline from it are not the Matter of Earth and Fire nor their forms and therefore they are really distinct from their Essence IV. These Powers are concreated with the soul and do immediately flow from her Essence An Argument whereby to prove this is set down by Thom. Aq. among his Quaest. Powers are accidentary forms or Accidents properly belonging to their Subject and concreated with it giving it also a kind of a being It is therefore necessary that they do arise as Concomitants of its Essence from that which giveth a substantial and first being to a Subject Zabarel de Facult an Lib. 1. Cap. 4. sheweth the dependance of the powers from the Soul to be as from their efficient cause from which they do immediately flow not by means of a transmutation or Physical Action which is alwaies produced by motion Others add that the Soul in respect to its faculties may be also counted a Material Cause because it containeth her faculties in her self and a final Cause the faculties being allotted to her as to their End V. Immaterial Powers are inherent in the Soul as in their agent or fountain Material Faculties as the Senses Nourishing Faculty and the like are inserted in the Matter yet so far only as it is animated Hence doth Aristotle call the latter Organical Powers from their inherence in the Organs VI. Powers are distinguisht through their Acts and Objects to which they tend and by which they are moved to act For example Any thing that is visible moveth the fight and is its proper Object which doth distinguish it from the other Senses and Powers which are moved by other Objects Thus far extends the Doctrine of Aristotle touching Powers which although consisting more in Subtilities and Appearances then Evidences and Realities notwithstanding I thought meet to expose to your view since most Modern Authors do persist in the same and thence to take occasion to examine the Contents thereof in these brief subsequent Positions By the way I must desire the Reader to remember that the distinction of Powers from their Subject is commonly treated of in the Doctrine of the Soul and solely applied to it there being not the least doubt made of it elsewhere Wherefore I have also proposed the same as appliable to the Soul but nevertheless shall make further enquiry into it so far as it doth concern all Matters in general CHAP. II. Of all the usual Acceptions of Power 1. The Etymology of Power The Synonima's of Power 2. The various Acceptions of Power 3. What a Passive Natural Power and a Supernatural Passive or Obediential Power is 4. Various Divisions of Power I. THe unfolding the name is an Introduction to the knowledge of the thing it self and therefore it will not be amiss to give you the Etymology of Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I can or have in my power So Potentia from Possum signifying the same Power in English hath its original from Pouvoir in French noting the like viz. to can or be able Power Vertue Might Strength and Faculty are Synonima's or words of one Interpretation Thus of â—ntimes we make enquiry what Vertue Strength Power or Faculty hath such or such an Herb that is what can it effect II. The Acception of the word Power is very ambiguous 1. Sometime it is understood passively for a disposition whereby a Substance is apt to receive the strength of an Agent 2. Actively for that through which a being can act 3. It s signification doth vary much according to the Subject which it doth respect as when we say a being in power that is a being which is not actually but yet may or can be So likewise a Cause in power is which doth not actually produce an effect but which can produce one Zabarel remarketh a double Acception of Power 1. Improperly it is taken for a Power which is joyned to its Act Thus we say of a man who actually walketh that he can walk 2. Properly it is attributed only to a Power which doth precede its Act Thus we say a man is a Logician when he can be one III. A Passive Power as it is capable to receive a Natural Act is called a disposition As it may receive a Supernatural Act that is an Act from a Supernatural Cause it is then named an Obediential Power The Power which was inherent in Lots Wife of receiving the Form of a Pillar of Salt was an Obediential Power IV. Again those Powers are either Natural Violent or Neutral A Natural Power is such which is agreeable to its Nature as the power in Fire of ascending is Natural to it A violent power is which is disagreeing to the Nature of its Subject as in fire there is a violent Power of moving downward A Neutral power is which is neither the one or the other but participates of both Such is the power in fire of moving circularly A Power may be understood either for a Logical power which is nothing else but a non-repugnance or for a Physical power which is the same with a Natural disposition or for a Moral Power which is nothing else but the Will Lastly in Metaphysicks it is that which is presupposed to be in an actus entitativus There is also mention made in Philosophy of an Objective Power which is not much different from a Non-repugnance or a Logical Power but expresly it is a Possibility of existing in a being which the understanding doth give it before its Existence Many more Additions of Power might be proffered as that a Power is either Created or Increated Accidental or Substantial
is Water and Ayr mixt together in such a proportion that the tenuity of the air may render the water attenuated and fluid that so it may be apt to penetrate through the depth of the Mixture for otherwise water of it self is of that thickness that it exceeds Ice or Chrystal Now this Ayr incrassated or Water attenuated doth open and expand the density of the earth makes way for the fire to enter and at last retaines the whole mixture in a coherence and compactness Of this more hereafter Again A body consists of the same Principles or Elements into which it is dissolveable but all natural bodies are dissolveable into the first Elements therefore all bodies consist of the said first Elements I shall only instance in some few examples for proof of the Minor Milk in its dissolution is changed into Curds which through their weight go down to the bottom are analogal to earth 2. Into Butter which containeth in it incrassated ayir and fire for it is also inflammable a sign of fire Lastly Into Whey which is responding to attenuated water The like is observable in Blood dividing it self into Melancholy expressing earth in its weight colour and Substance for drying it it becomes perfect Sand into Choler agreeing with fire in its motive and alterative qualities into pure blood through its gluing quality or lentor not unlike to incrassated ayr Lastly into Flegm or Phlegme resembling water Doth not the ordinary division of mans body in spirits impetum facientes humors and solid parts demonstrate its composition or constitution out of the Elements For the Spirits are nothing else but fire and ayr Humors contain most water and the solid parts most earth The Spagyrick Art proves the same by distillation through which water Spirits and Oyl the two latter being made up most of Fire and Ayr are separated from the Caput mortuum Sal fixum or earth and Subsidencies 'T is true Sal Sulphur and Mercurius are different Names but re ipsa are the Elements What is Sal but Earth Sulphur but fire and ayr Mercurius but water Hereby I have not only proved the existence of elements but also their Number nominatim atque in specie III. Give me leave to expound the Definition in the first place quantum ad nomen In the word Element is considerable its Etymology from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 capio quod element a in sese omnia capiunt mixta It s name is likewise homonymous in a large sense promiscuously convertibiliter denoting a Principle or Cause In a strict sense it is differing from both Eudemus Alexander and Thomas Aq. opiniate that through Principle Principium is only meant an agent cause through Cause a formal and final Cause through elements Matter Averrhoes and Albert. by Principles intend an efficient cause through Causes final Causes by elements Matter and Form Generally Principles are understood to be of a larger extent then Causes and Causes then elements So that Aristotle B. 5. of Metaph. Ch. 1. describes a Principle to be that from whence a thing is is made or is known by this you see that a principle is of a more large signification then either of the others but a cause is which contributeth to the being of a thing either by substituting it self for a Subject as the Matter or through actuating and giving it an essence and its consequence as the Form or by determining it to an end as the final cause IV. The distinction which I have made between them is that cause is of a larger extent then Principles are taken in Physicks but in Theology a Principle is larger then it these denoting the internal causes of a natural being as matter and form but remotely as I have already hinted Elements point out to sensible and immediate internal causes of a natural being V. A natural cause is which hath a vertue of acting naturally or which acteth according to that power which God hath conferred upon it at its first Creation So that Van Helmont saith well in his Physic. Arist. Dist. 3. Ego vero credo naturam jussum Dei quo res est id quod est agit quod agere jussa est But I believe that Nature is Gods Command through which a thing is that which it is and acteth that which it is commanded to act They are Causes to wit internal causes or principles of a being because they contribute themselves to the constitution of that being I said out of which because they are the matter of all natural beings and through which because they are also the Form of all the said beings How they are or become so you may expect to read below The elements are described and taken singly or separately ratione only or ex supposito and not realiter for they never did exist singly neither could they exist so supposing they were created in that nature in which they were because of their relative forms but confusedly in the Chaos Aristotle nameth the bodies constituted by those mixt bodies as if they were different from naturals but that was only to make good the first part of his Metaphysical Physicks and thereby to distinguish them from the others namely his proper and elementary Physicks VI. Three causes do concur to the production of a natural being whereof two are internal to wit natural matter and form the other is external namely the Efficient I prove the necessity of these three first there must be a Subject or Matter out of which a being is produced for ex nihilo nihil fit out of nothing nothing can be produced But I instance in some particulars the good wives know that for to make a Pudding they need Matter namely Flower Eggs c. to make it out of or to build a House a Mason will require Stones for his Matter c. Now when they have these materials they endeavour to make somthing of them that is to introduce a new thing shape or face into it or educe a new thing out of it which locution is more proper then the former it being the efficient doth ex intrinseco quasi formam educere and what is that but the Form And lastly Experience tels us that quod nihil fit a seipso nothing is produced from it self but from another which is the Efficient as in the building of a house you may have stones and Morter for your matter yet unless a Mason who is the Efficient place them together and introduce or rather educe the form of a House the matter will abide matter CHAP. V. Of New Philosophy and the Authours of it 1. Helmontius his Arrogance and Vainglory How and wherein he rejects the Peripatetick Philosophy His own Principles 2. The Life and Death of the said Helmontius 3. A Confutation of all his Physical Principles in particular 4. Some few Arguments against Rerè des Cartes his Principles in general I. I Thought fit to make a stop in my Discourse and before I proceed
formally distinct from singulars p. 45. 3. Singulars are primum cognita p. 46. 4. Universals are notiora nobis ib. CHAP. XI Of the Extream Division of a Being 1. Another Division of a Being p. 48. 2. What the greatest or most universal is ib. 3. What the greater universal is ib. 4. What a less universal is ib. 5. What the least universal is ib. 6. How the fore-mentioned Members are otherwise called ib. CHAP. XII Of the Modes or Parts of a Being 1. What a Mode is Whence a Part is named a Part. Whence a Mode is termed a Mode The Scotch Proverb verified p. 49. 2. The Number and Kinds of Modes What an Essence or a whole being is p. 50. 3. That a Mode is the Summum Genus of all Beings and their Parts ib. 4. The vulgar Doctrine of Modes rejected ib. 5. That a Substance is a Mode of a Being p. 51. 6. That a Mode is an univocal Gender to a Substance and an Accident p. 52. 7. That a Substance is an Accident and all Accidents are Substances The difference between Subsistence and Substance ib. CHAP. XIII Of the Attributes of a Being 1. Why a property is so called p. 53. 2. The Difference which Authors hold between Passion and Attribute ib. 3. That Passion and Attribute as to their Names imply the same thing ib. 4. That Attributes are really the same with their Essence That all Attributes of a Being as they are united are the same with their Essence or Being p. 54. 5. That the Attributes are formally distinct from one another ib. 6. That that which we conceive beyond the Attributes of a Being is nothing ib. 7. What an Essence is ib. CHAP. XIV Of the Kinds and Number of the Attributes of a Being 1. Whence the Number of the Attributes of a Being is taken p. 55. 2. The Number of Attributes constituting a Being ib. 3. All Attributes are convertible one with the other and each of them and all of them in union with an Essence or Being ib. 4. That all the Attributes of a Being are equall in Dignity and Evidence ib. 5. That the Order of Doctrine concerning these Attributes is indifferent ib. CHAP. XV. Of Essence and Existence 1. That Essence and Existence are generally received for Principles p. 56. 2. That Essence is no Principle ib. 3. That Existence is no Principle ib. 4. That Existence is according to the opinion of the Author p 57. 5. That Existence is intentionally distinct from Essence ib. 6. That Essence is perfecter than Existence ib. 7. That Existence is formally distinct from Substance ib. CHAP. XVI Of Unity 1. That Unity superaddes nothing Positive to a Being p. 58. 2. What Unity is That Unity properly and per se implies a Positive accidently and improperly a Negative What is formally imported by Unity ib. 3. That Unity is illegally divided in unum per se and unum per accidens ib. CHAP. XVII Of Truth 1. Why Truth is called transcendent p. 59. 2. What Truth is ib. 3. An Objection against the definition of Truth That a Monster is a true being That God although he is the remote efficient Cause of a Monster neverthelesse cannot be said to be the Cause of evil p. 60. 4. Austin 's definition of Truth p. 61. 5. That Fashood is not definable How it may be described ib. CHAP. XVIII Of Goodness 1. What Goodness is The Improbation of several Definitions of Goodness p. 62. 2. The Difference between Goodness and perfection ib. 3. What evil is ib. 4. What the absolute active End of Goodness is ib. 5. That Goodness is improperly divided in Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness p. 63. 6. How Goodness is properly divided ib. 7. That the Division of Good in Honest Delectable c. doth belong to Ethicks ib. CHAP. XIX Of Distinction 1. The Authors description of Distinction That the privative sense of not being moved is a Note of Distinction whereby the understanding distinguishes a Non Ens from an Ens. That the Positive sense of being moved in another manner than another Ens moves the understanding is a Note of Distinction between one Being and another p. 63. 2. How Distinction is divided What a real Distinction is p. 64. 3. What a Modal difference is ib. 4. That the vulgar description of a real Distinction is erroneous ib. 5. That the terms of a Distinction between two or more real Beings are requisite both or more to exist p. 65. 6. That one term of Distinction although in Existence cannot be exally predicated of another not existent Oviedo and Hurtado reamined ib. 7. What a formal Distinction is à Parte actus and how otherwise called ib. 8. What a Distinctio Rationis is How otherwise called p. 67. CHAP. XX. Of Subsistence 1. What Subsistence is What it is to be through it self from it self and in it self p. 68. 2. That a Nature cannot be conservated by God without Subsistence That the Transubstantiation of Christs Body and Bloud into Bread and Wine according to the supposition of the Papists is impossible Oviedo 's Argument against this Position answered ib. 3. The kinds of Subsistences p. 69. 4. What Termination is ib. 5. What Perfection is ib. CHAP. XXI Of remaing modes of a Being 1. What Quantity is p. 70. 2. What the kinds of Quantity are ib. 3. What Quality is ib. 4. What Relation is ib. 5. What Action is ib. 6. What Paspon is ib. 7. What Situation is ib. 8. What Duration is ib. CHAP. XXII Of Causes 1. What a Cause is That the Doctrine of Causes belongeth to Metaphysicks p. 71. 2. Wherein a Cause and Principle differ ib. 3. What an internal Cause is What Matter is ib. 4. What a Form is and how it is divided p. 72. 5. What an external Cause is ib. CHAP. XXIII Of the Kinds of Causes 1. The Number of real Causes That a final Cause is no real Cause The Causality of Matter and Form p. 73. 2. The Division of an Efficient p. 74. 3. That an Efficient is erroneously divided in a procreating and conservating Cause ib. 4. That the Division of a Cause into Social and Solitary is illegal ib. 5. That the Division of an efficient Cause into Internal and External is absurd p. 75. 6. That all Forms are Material 77. 7. That there are no assistent Forms p. 78. CHAP. XXIV Of the Theorems of Causes 1. That a Cause and its Effects are co-existent p. 78. 2. That there are but three Causes of every Natural Being ib. 3. That there is but one Cause of every Being ib. 4. That all Beings are constituted by one or more Causes p. 79. 5. That all Causes are really univocal ib. 6. That all Natural Causes act necessarily ib. 7. That the Soul of a Beast acteth necessarily p. 80. 8. That all Matter hath a Form That Matter is capable of many Forms p. 81. The FIRST PART The Third Book CHAP. I. Of Powers according to the Peripateticks 1. THe Opinion of
may be applied to any of the restant Attributes as if an unity was not adjoyned to an Essence the other Attributes could not be related to it Wherefore all the Attributes of a being are equal one to the other and all together are equal to the whole which is the Essence IV. Existence is an Attribute whereby a Being is actually constituted By Existence a Being is seated beyond Generation and reduced to an Ens constitutum vel generatum so that Existence doth follow the Position of all the Attributes in union or rather is whereby the Position of all the Attributes in union is produced Wherefore Essence without existence is only a Chimaera and impossible to be V. Existence is distinct from an essence intentionaliter by the operation of the mind because it moves the understanding in a manner different from the motion of an Essence Actus Essentialis and Existence are Synonima's for they denote the same thing neither is there any distinction between them either ex parte Objecti or ex parte actus that is really or intentionally Essence is perfecter then Existence because Essence comprehends in it Existence and all the other Attributes Existence is formally distinct from Substance or Subsistence in that the latter is an Attribute constituting a being independing from another but existence denotes only a Position of all the Attributes in union This Question doth somwhat puzzle Oviedo Fol. 286. Met. Cont. 2. Where he doubts wherein existence is distinct from a Substance He is forced to Answer that the existence of a Substance is a Substance and the existence of an Accident is an Accident although a little before he admits of a formal distinction between them By this Answer it would follow that a Substance were an Accident and an Accident a Substance because they agree in uno tertio incommunicabili for existence is only communicable to a being ergo a Substance and Accident are one being CHAP. XVI Of Unity 1. That Unity superaddes nothing Positive to a Being 2. What Unity is That Unity properly and per se implies a Positive accidently and improperly a Negative What is formally imported by Unity 3. That Unity is illegally divided in unum per se and unum per accidens I. UNity doth superadd nothing Positive to a Being For Unity is essential to a being that is it constitutes part of its Essence Without which unity a being is no being Wherefore nothing can be said properly to be superadded to a being unless a being were a being without it and before it or unless it be no part of a being II. Unity is an Attribute of a being by which it is one in it self and distinct from all others To be one in it self is to be not many and to have but one Definition or one Formality A being may be divided into many notwithstanding each of them many are one still after their Division And if you proceed to an infinite Division as it were each Particle divided will be one still in it self before its Division Wherefore unity is inseparable from a Being By one in it self understand a positive unity not negative for a Negative is a Non Ens. Unity formally is not an indivision of a being in it self because indivision is accidental to it For if Division be accidental to a being Indivision must also be accidental to it Unity doth rather include or imply an Identity of Parts to the whole By unity a being is distinct from all others that is each being by its unity moveth the understanding terminatively by which terminative motion one being is distinguisht from another being By terminative understand a Positive a Negative being incognoscible III. Unity is illegally divided in unity through it self unum per se and unity by accident that is through another or unum per accidens Because all real unities are one through themselves and consequently all formal unities that is unities ex parte actus are also one through themselves You may object that a Heap of Corn a House are unities per accidens I Answer That a Heap of Corn as far as it is a heap is one through it self because it doth represent it self by an unity which representation is the ground of a formal unity or unity ex parte actus I prove it to be a formal unity because the understanding can define it Ergo it is one For whatever is definible is one Why cannot a heap of Corn represent an Object one in it self as properly as a Multitude or heap of Individual men represent an Universality Why cannot a House although it consisteth of Parts when divided from their whole namely from that House differing one from the other constitute an unity in its Object as justly as an individual man who consisteth also of Parts when divided different from one another Unity is either Numerical Specifical or Generical that is more or less universal or singular CHAP. XVII Of Truth 1. Why Truth is called transcendent 2. What Truth is 3. An Objection against the Definition of Truth That a Monster is a true Being That God although he is the remote efficient Cause of a Monster nevertheless cannot be said to be the Cause of evil 4. Austins Definition of Truth 5. That Falshood is not definible How it may be described I. TRuth here is called Transcendent from its constituting a being in its Transcendence II. Truth is an Attribute of a being whereby it appeareth to us to answer its end or to that which it was intended for To Answer its end consisteth in the Conformity of a being to the Pattern or Idea in the Divine Mind All beings are created by the all-creating God for an end and therefore are necessarily true because they must necessarily obey their end as having a necessary Cause which is Gods Ordination III. Against the Definition of Truth as it is Transcendent may be Objected That a Monster is a Being but a Monster is not answerable to its end because its end was to be perfect therefore all beings are not true that is answerable to their end To this I Answer That a Monster is a true being in that it answereth to its efficient and material Cause as in this case a Child born without a head is a perfect Natural living being but is not a perfect Humane being that is it is imperfect as to its humane body Nevertheless it is perfect as to its Natural and vegetable being which sufficeth Here a further Reply may be made that God did not only ordain beings to be perfect as to their Natural Perfection but also as to their vegetable animal and rational Perfection for his Ordination upon Herbs was that they should encrease by bringing forth Seed of the same kind that Beasts should multiply after their own kind To the clearing of this doubt we are to observe that Gods Ordination was related either to the Species or to every individual future being or to both It is most probable it was to
may demand to what Science or Art it belongeth to treat of final Causes I answer That they are treated of in Logick and Moral Philosophy but in a different manner Logick discourseth of final Causes as Notions thereby to direct the understanding in enquiring into the truth of things and Ethicks treats of them as they are dirigible to Good and Happiness III. An Efficient Cause is erroneously divided in a procreating and conservating Cause A procreating cause is by whose force a being is produced A conservating cause is by whose vertue a being is conservated in its Essence I prove that this Division is not real but objective only The dividing Members of a real division must be really distinct from one another But these are not really distinct c. Ergo. The Major is undeniable I confirm the Minor All beings are conservated by the same Causes by which they were procreated Therefore really the same I prove the Antecedence Nutritive causes are conservant causes But Nutritive causes are the same with Procreative causes Ergo. The Minor is evidenced by a Maxim Iisdem nutrimur quibus constamus We are nourished by the same causes by which we do subsist or have our Essence Wherefore Nutritive or Conservant Causes are really for by Nutriture we are conservated or a parte rei the same differing only objectively a parte actus Here you may answer that these Instances are of material causes but not of Efficients To this I reply That no cause can be a conservative cause but a Material Cause As for an Efficient cause I prove it to be no conservating cause That which conservateth a being must conservate its essence namely Matter and Form but Matter and Form are conservated only internally by apposition of that which is like to what was dissipated or which is like to themselves Wherefore an Efficient can be no conservating cause because it acteth only externally or from without A being might be conservated externally if its impairment did befal it from without that is from an external Agent which is only accidental to it An efficient then may Logically be called a conservative cause per Accidens IV. An Efficient is likewise divided in solitary and social A solitary Efficient is which produceth an effect alone or without the assistance of another cause A social cause is which produceth an effect joyntly with another As two Watermen rowing in one Boat are social causes of the moving of the Boat through the water This Division is no less illegal then the other I prove it All beings act alone and in unity as far as they are Causes and although two or more concur to the effect of a being yet they two act formally but as one and their Ratio Agendi is one Ergo formally they are but one as far as they are Causes yet in the foresaid instance as they are men they are two which duplicity is accidental to a cause The same Argument may be urged against the division of a cause in a cause perse and a cause per Accidens in univocal and equivocal in universal and particular V. An Efficient is Internal or External An Internal Efficient is which produceth an effect in it self An external Efficient is which produceth an effect in another This division is stranger then any of the rest The strangeness consisteth in this that thereby a being is capable to act upon it self and consequently upon its like Which if so what can it effect but that which was before It cannot produce a distinct being because it doth not act distinctly but identificatively This granted infers That the Soul being the internal cause of its Faculties as they affirm cannot produce any thing but what is like to it self Consequently that the Faculties are identificated with the soul and thence that a Substance is an Accident and an Accident a Substance 2. A Substance acting upon it self that is upon its sibi simile like for what is more like to a Substance then it self produceth a distinct effect and not its like which is another absurdity following the forementioned Division Iâ— will also follow hence that a substance doth act immediately through it self which is against their own Dictates To remove this last Objection they answer that a Substance may or can and doth act immediately through it self by emanation but can or doth not act by transmutation They describe an emanative action to be whereby an effect is produced immediately without the intervent of an Accident This description doth not distinguish Transmutation from Emanation for transmutation is also whereby an effect is produced without the intervent of an Accident and so transmutation may be as immediate to its Agent as emanation If there is any difference it is this in that emanation is an action not terminating or influent upon any other being but in and upon it self Transmutation is the Termination of its Influence upon another being Pray tell me why emanation may not be as properly called transmutation as not for there is no effect but which is different from its cause and changed by its cause For if it is not changed it remaines the cause still Ergo Emanation is also a Transmutation The Faculties of the Soul are said to be emanative effects Ergo they must be its understanding Faculty only for this only doth not terminate in any other being but in it self As for the other Faculties to wit vital and sensitive they are effects of the soul terminated in other beings Ergo These are no emanative Actions as they affirm them to be That which hath the most probability of being an emanative action and distinct from transmutation is the understanding faculty of the Soul Neither is this action distinct from Transmutation That which doth change the soul is an Object but the soul of it self alone doth not act or cannot act upon it self unless it be changed by an Object for were there no Object the Souls Rational Faculty would be nothing and frustraneous wherefore it is generally held that Angels when created had also notions or species which are objects concreated with their understanding Ergo emanative actions are also transmutative All matter is transient Wherefore the division of matter in transient and immanent is erroneous Transient matter is out of which a being is constituted by transmutation so bloud is the transient matter of flesh Immanent matter is out of which a being is constituted without any transmutation as Wood is the immanent matter of a Ship Here one part of the division is referred to a Natural Production the other to artificial How is this then a regular distribution since its dividing Members ought to be of one Species or kind The same Improbation may be applied against the distribution of matter in sensible and intelligible which distinctions are accidental to matter and therefore may be justly omitted for we ought to insert nothing in a Science but what doth essentialy relate to its Subject Hence Aristotles Precept is in
VVhat an alteration or accidental change is That the differences of Temperament are as many as there are Minima's of the Elements excepting four p. 119. CHAP. XIX Of the Division of Temperaments 1. VVhat an equal and unequal Temperament is That there never was but one temperament ad pondus That Adams Body was not tempered ad pondus That neither Gold nor any Celestial bodies are tempered ad pondus p. 120. 2. That all temperaments ad Justiriam are constantly in changing That there are no two bodies in the world exactly agreeing to one another in temperature p. 121. 3. The Latitude of temperaments How the corruption of one body ever proves the generation of another p. 122. 4. That there is no such unequal temperament as is vulgarly imagined That there is an equal temperament is proved against the vulgar opinion That where Forms are equal their matters must also be equal p. 123 124. 5. VVhat a Distemper is That Galen intended by an unequal temperature p. 125. 6. VVhen a man may be termed temperate That bodies are said to be intemperate ib. 126 127. 7. The combination of the second Qualities of the Elements in a temperature Their Effects p. 128. CHAP. XX. Of Alteration Coction Decoction Generation Putrefaction and Corruption 1. VVhat Coction and Putrefaction is The Difference between Putrefaction and Corruption p. 130. 2. The Authors Definition of Alteration The effects of Alteration ib. 3. The Division of Alteration p. 131. 4. That the first Qualities of the Peripateticks are not intended by the acquisition of new Qualities without Matter Wherein Alteration differs from Mixtion or Temperament ib. 5. The Definition of Coction Why a man was changed much more in his youth than when come to maturity p. 132 133. 6. The Constitution of women Which are the best and worst Constitutions in men That heat is not the sole cause of Coction p. 134 135. 7. The kinds of Coction What Maturation Elixation and Assation are p. 136. 8. VVhat Decoction is and the manner of it p. 137. 9. The definition of Putrefaction 139 10. VVhat Generation imports in a large and strict acception Whether the Seed of a Plant or Animal is essentially distinguisht from a young Plant or new born Animal That heat is not the sole efficient in Generation p. 139. 11. VVhether the innate heat is not indued with a power of converting adventitious heat into its own nature Whether the innate heat be Celestial or Elementary p. 140 141 142. 12. The Definition of Corruption Why the innate heat becomes oft more vigorous after violent Feavers Whether Life may be prolonged to an eval duration What the Catochization of a Flame is By what means many pretend to prolong life That the production of life to an eval duration is impossible Whether our Dayes be determined The ambiguity of Corruption Whether Corruption be possible in the Elements p. 143 to 149. CHAP. XXI Of Light 1. VVhat Light is The manner of the production of a Flame p. 150. 2. The properties and effects of Light p. 151. 3. That Light is an effect or consequent of a Flame Whence it happens that our Eyes strike fire when we hit our Foreheads against any hard Body That Light is not a quality of fire alone That Light is not fire rarefied That where there is Light there is not alwayes heat near to it How Virginals and Organs are made to play by themselves p. 152 153. 4. That Light is a continuous obduction of the Ayr. That Light is diffused to a far extent in an instant and how Why the whole tract of Air is not enlightned at once p. 154 155. 5. The manner of the Lights working upon the Eye-sight That sight is actuated by reception and not by emission p. 156. 6. The reason of the difference between the extent of illumination and calefaction That Light cannot be precipitated ib. 7. That Light is not the mediate cause of all the Effects produced by the Stars That Light hath only a power of acting immediately and per se upon the optick spirits How the Air happens to burst through a sudden great light That a sudden great Light may blind kill or cast a man into an Apoplexy p. 157. 8. How Light renders all Objects visible Why a peice of Money cast into a Basin filled with water appears bigger than it is The causes of apparent Colours Why a great Object appears but small to one afar off The difference between lux and lumen What a Beam is What a Splendour is That the Lights begot by the Stars and other flames are not distinguished specie How the Coelum Empyreum is said to be Lucid p. 158 159. CHAP. XXII Of Colours 1. The Authors Definition of a Colour That Light is a Colour Aristotles Definition of colour examined p. 160 161 162. 2. Scaligers Absurdities touching Colours and Light p. 163. 3. What colour Light is of and why termed a single Colour That Light doth not efficienter render an Object visible How a mixt Colour worketh upon the sight and how it is conveyed to it ib. 164. 4. The Causes of the variations of Mercury in its colour through each several preparation p. 165. 5. That Colours are formally relations only to our sight That a mixt colour is not an intentional quality That besides the relation of colours there is an absolute foundation in their original Subjects How the same fundamental colours act p. 166. 6. That there are no apparent colours but all are true p. 167. 7. The Differences of colours What colour focal fire is of The fundamental colours of mixt bodies p. 168 169 170 171. 8. What reflection of light is What refraction of colours is Aristotles Definition of colour rejected The Effects of a double reflection The Reasons of the variations of Colour in Apples held over the water and Looking-glasses The variation of Illumination by various Glasses p. 172. 9. The Division of Glasses The cause of the variation of colour in a Prism ib. 173 174. 10. The Nature of Refraction Why colours are not refracted in the Eye p. 175 176. CHAP. XXIII Of Sounds 1. The Definition of a Sound That the Collision of two solid Bodies is not alwayes necessary for to raise a Sound p. 177. 2. Whether a Sound be inherent in the Air or in the body sounding The manner of Production of a Sound p. 178. 3. Whether a Sound is propagated through the water intentionally only That a Sound may be made and heard under water p. 179. 4. That a Sound is a real pluffing up of the Air. How a Sound is propagated through the Air and how far Why a small Sound raised at one end of a Mast or Beam may be easily heard at the other end Why the Noise of the treading of a Troop of Horse may be heard at a far distance p. 180 181 182. 5. The difference between a Sound and a Light or Colour That it is possible for a man to hear with his eyes
parallel'd to any but to themselves have affected Philosophy and preferred its worth above the esteem of all others David and Solomon the greatest of Kings extolled the Pleasure and Contentment flowing from their Contemplations above them of Glory and Honour and other secular Pleasures which they enjoyed in greater measure than any before or since Ptolomy Philadelphus King of Africa having weighed Triumphs or the Glories following Conquests and Victories which in their splendor do overtop all other kinds of Glories and are reputed among the greatest of Contentments and Joyes judged them to be more troublesom than pleasing For he had observed them to have been attendants in their highest eminence to his late Predecessors Alexander the Great and Ptolomy Lagus his Father and that their Contentments and Joyes supposed to slow thence were subject to a continual Eclipse through their immoderate aspiring to greater and through every Alarum of an Enemy and through the daily News of their revolting Subjects although but lately vanquished discomposing their Spirits Wherefore he composed himself to a peace and applied his mind to the study of Philosophy which did so much cultivate his understanding and please his thoughts that he endeavoured to procure the helps of men most Renowned far and near by an universal Invitation VI. A man naked and unpolisht doth more resemble a Brute than himself What Proprieties are there in wild Beasts but which you may find in West-Indians I mean those which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Men-eaters They slay and devour one another the shadow of each of them is a terrour to the other nothing begetteth tameness in them unless it be the presence of a Male with a Female which the Instinct of Nature and not their Reason doth compel them unto Nothing different from these should we be were it not that Philosophy did rectifie and redintegrate our Understandings To this we owe our right Reasoning Morality and Knowledge of all Natural and Supernatural Beings and without that we are nothing else but Ignorance and Barbarism A Divine will hardly reach to Theologick Vertues unless he be first endowed with Morals Neither is he like to compass the Knowledge of God unless he first admireth him in his Creatures and natural beings Civilians those who really merit that name grow expert in composing Differences between others by regulating Contentions arising between their own Soul and Body A Physitian incurreth a suspition of being a Mountebank or Astrologick Impostor in case he be not more than ordinarily versed in Natural Philosophy and questionless will be frustrated in his Cures unless he be exactly skilful in knowing the proportion of Animal Mineral and Vegetable Natures to the Nature of man which is demonstratively treated of in Natural Philosophy To this doth the great Hippocrates in his Book of Elegance elegantly exhort his Auditors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore we ought to apply Wisdom to the Art of Physick and the Art of Physick again to Wisdom for a Physitian who is a Philosopher is like unto God CHAP. II. Of the Nature of Philosophy 1. Whether Philosophy can be defined 2. Various Definitions of Philosophy How Plato did define it The Definition of Damascen 3. The Authors Definition of it That the Essence of God is as sensibly apprehended as the Essence of his Creatures 4. What is implyed by Knowledge 5. The Subjectum circa quod or Object of Philosophy 6. The Subjectum Inhaesionis or Subject wherein Philosophy is inherent MAny perswade themselves that Philosophy doth not admit a Definition that requiring an Unity in the Definitum or thing Defined which is not inherent in the Nature of Philosophy but rather a Multiplicity wherefore it can only be described To the contrary all Beings have an Unity for Ens unum convertuntur a Being and One are identificated so that whatever hath no unity is no Being But they granting Philosophy to be a Being cannot deny it an Unity and if it hath an unity it is definible A Being may be materially manifold and yet formally one and of that nature is Philosophy Philosophy is a knowledge of Beings by their Causes which is the Modus considerandi or Ratio formalis of it to wit of Philosophy But this is one Beings as they are the Materia are many nevertheless their universal Form in Philosophy is but one which is to be known by their Causes II. The Definitions of Philosophy are variously propounded by several Authors who disagree more in terms and words than in the thing it self Others again who seeming to define the Essence of a thing rather describe it by its Properties and Effects some of which serving to illustrate its Nature I shall not think amiss to produce Among these that of Plato is most cried up 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosophy is a Meditation upon death This Meditation upon death is that which goeth under the notion of a Platonick Extasie which is nothing else but a qualification requisite in a Philosopher whereby he doth withdraw his thoughts from singular and material things applying them to universal and immaterial beings or whereby he inclineth his Reason to his Fancy and diverteth his Mind from his senses So that in this Rapture a Philosopher hath his eyes open and seeth not and may be environed with Noyse and hear not Another Definition the said Divine Philosopher recommends approaching somwhat nearer to its Essence Philosophy is a likeness to God in as much as it is possible for a man to be like to God God is a Pattern to man in his actions according to the greatest perfection of vertue and in speculation or knowledge of all natural and supernatural Beings the habitual imitation of which is the true Philosophy Damascen in his Dialect Chap. 3. states this following Definition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosophy is the Art of Arts and the Science of Sciences and the beginning of all Arts all which amounts to this Philosophy is a comprehension of all Arts and Sciences III. Philosophy is the knowledge of all cognoscible Beings By Knowledge understand a Habit of knowing a thing by its Definition or Essence that is by its internal and external Causes namely Matter Form and Efficient By internal Cause I intend a Principle through which a Being is constituted Some beings having only a single internal Cause as God and Angels are constituted by their Forms without Matter and for that reason are nominated Immaterial Others are constituted through a double internal Principle and from an efficient Cause as all Natural Beings Some obtain a single internal Principle and one efficient Cause as Angels God only consisteth of a single internal Principle which is his Form which is that which he is Hence God declares himself I am who I am Here may be offered an Objection That God cannot be known by the same Ratio Formalis cognoscendi as Naturals are since that these are considered in a distinct manner in their Matter and Form
the existence of which is incurrent into our Senses Wherefore the Essences of these we may perfectly apprehend On the other side God is not known to us unless indistinctly and by his Attributes not by his Essentials My Answer to this is That our Knowledge of God is no less distinct evident and sensible I term it sensible because according to the Dogmatical Institutions of Aristotle the Root and Evidence of our Knowledge is and sloweth from our Senses than of Naturals and to speak truth we neither understand certainly the Essence of God nor of his Creatures only their Existences and other Accidents and Modes under which the Peripateticks imagine the Essentials of a Being to be latent So that only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth appear unto us Whence my Inference is that the Ratio Formalis of knowing immaterial and material Beings is the same whereby we know the Essences of both in an equal manner We doubt no less of the Being of God than of the Being of his Creatures because as we know these to have a Being and Essence by their sensible operations and effects For Omne quod est est propter operationem All which is or hath a being is or hath it for an Operation so we are also certain of the being and Essence of God by his Operation and Effects upon our Senses We know that a material Substance consisteth of Matter because we apprehend a trinal dimension of parts in it which is an Accident concomitant to Matter or rather Matter it self We are also sensible of a Form inhering in that Matter through its Qualities and distinct moving We gather from Experience that Nihil fit a seipso no material Essence receiveth a Being from it self but from an Efficient By which three Causes a Natural Being is generated and from them derives its Definition In like manner do our Senses declare to us that God's Nature is immaterial For we cannot perceive a trinal dimension of Parts in him only that he consisteth of a pute single and formal Being because we cannot but perceive his formal and spiritual Operations and Effects upon all material Beings Wherefore the Knowledge of God proveth no less evident to us and in the same degree and manner of Perfection then of Elementary and Created Substances IV. Knowledge in the forementioned Definition doth equally imply a Practick and Theoretick Knowledge the ground of which Division is founded upon the Matter and not the Form of Philosophy so that according to the same sense the understanding is called either Practick or Theoretick not formally as if the Understanding were twofold in man but because it apprehendeth an object according to its double Representation of being Practical or Theoretical V. Subjectum circa quod or Object of Philosophy are all Beings comprehending real and objective Beings Essences and their Modes which latter are not specifically distinct from the former but identificared and considered here as real notwithstanding partaking of a Modal Distinction wherefore it makes no Formal Distinction in this universal Knowledge In the like manner are the Phaenomena appearances in Astronomy supposed and taken for real and move the understanding as distinctly as if they were real Beings strictly so termed otherwise they could not be referred to a Science VI. The Subjectum inhaesionis or Subject wherein Philosophy is inherent is the Understanding The Understanding is either Divine Angelical Humane or Diabolical In God Philosophy is Archetypick in Angels and Men Ectypick in Devils neither they apprehending and discerning all things depravately and erroneously CHAP. III. Of Philosophers 1. What a Philosopher is Four Properties necessary in a Philosopher That nothing is more hateful and noysom than a man but half Learned 2. The first Universities The Rise and Number of Sects sprung from these Universities The Fame of Socrates 3. What Meanes Philosophers made use of to procure themselves a Repute and Fame I. A Philosopher or a Wise man is a great Artist and all-knowing He is an Artist in that he can direct all his Actions to a good and true end and All-knowing since there is nothing existent but which he may know definitely Wherefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is well derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 clear because a Philosopher understandeth all things clearly which condition makes up one of the three Proprieties of a Philosopher which are 1. To know all things 2. To have a capacity of teaching all which he knoweth 3. To teach and divulge his Knowledge liberally not for Loan which is mercenary and not suiting with the Dignity of a Philosopher and freely Scire tuum nihil est nisite scire hoc sciat alter Alas thy Knowledge is scarce worth a Pin If thou keep secret what thou hast within Hence slow these trite Sayings Libere Philosophandum Amicus Socrates Amicus Plato sed magis Amica Veritas Non est jurandum in verba Magistri We are to deliver Philosophy freely that is with a Socratick Liberty or without adhering strictly to Authorities of Wise men since that all men are subject to Errours and the contrary of many of their Assertions are found to be true we have cause enough to doubt of all which they have commended to our Studies and not to be tied as if by Oath and Slavery to believe our Masters words in every Tittle an Abuse equal to Popery enjoyning all men upon danger of their Soules perdition not to question the least Sillable of the Dictates of their Priests It is no less Errour to reject all which wise men have Published their Works testifying their immense Parts and Abilities So that our securest course is to walk in the middle Path and close with the Body of Philosophers in this Saying Socrates is my good Friend Plato is my good Friend but the Truth is my best Friend To which this doth also allude Plato is ancient but the Truth is more ancient To these three I will add a fourth Philosophandum est sed paucis We are to prove our selves Philosophers in short or in few words This was one of the Famous Precepts of Ennius whereby he reproved those disturbers of Learning who through the abundance of their futil Arguments aery words and tedious Probo tibi's might have raised anger in Socrates himself which disposition to nugation and pratling you cannot miss of in a man who is but half Learned who generally hath depravate Conceptions of most things which he meets withal Such are they who strive to defend and propagate most absurd and pseudodox Tenents many of which do secretly contain Atheism As Assertions of the Pre-existence of Souls Multiplicity of worlds the Souls being extraduce and infinite others which necessarily are Concomitants of these before-mentioned In a word Homine semidocto quid iniquius what is there more detestable and hateful than a man but half Learned Which Apothegm may be justly transferred to a Physitian Medico semiperito quid
both particularly to man for whose sake the same extended also to other creatures We are likewise to remember man in his twofold state to wit of Integrity and Deficience Gods Ordination then upon man was that he and all other Animals and Vegetables for his sake should encrease after their own kind during mans Integrity This Ordination upon Gods Creatures is answered and effected by Powers and Dispositions created by him in them According to which Powers all Creatures acted All the Actions of man did therefore depend from his Powers to wit his Propagation from his Generative Power which again was subjected to his Phansie and that to his will and understanding Wherefore as long as his will and understanding did will and understand nothing but what was perfect his Phansie could receive no other Impression but of Perfections which could not cause any Errour in the Generative power and therefore had man abided in his entire state he nor any other Creatures could have generated Monsters Man having through his deficience corrupted his Faculties no wonder if their Acts are also corrupted and their effects corrupted and corruptible Hence then it is beyond scruple that Gods Ordination did immediately relate to the Powers of all Creatures and herein are all beings true and answerable to their end and therefore perfect You may urge an Inconvenience to follow this Solution because thereby God seems to be the original cause of Monsters or evil for if God had conferred perfect powers upon man man could not have changed them of himself wherefore God must be supposed to alter them dispositions and faculties I Answer That God was not the original cause of this alteration but man himself through his sin which therefore was the first impulsive cause 'T is certain that God was the efficient cause of this Alteration of Powers yet Gods Act was not evil therein but good and perfect because his Justice did require it for this change upon man was his punishment If so none can or will attribute the evil following a punishment of a Malefactor to him that punisheth or to the punishment it self but to the Malefactor whose Default and Crime was the cause of that evil which befel him after his punishment IV. Austin in the 5th Chap. 2 Book of his Soliloquies states the Description of Truth Truth is that which it is and in the same Chapter openeth his meaning Truth is that which is so in it self as it appeareth to him that perceiveth it if he will and can perceive it Hence do Hurtad Disp. 7. Met. Sect. 1. and Soar Disp. 7 Sect. 5. infer the Nature of Truth to consist in a cognoscibility of a being to the understanding of that which it is This Opinion as it is obscure so it is expos'd to doubts if not to falshood The truth of a man doth not consist in my knowing a man to be a man and that he is no other thing but a man for that is a quidditative Concept of a man namely to know him to be a man but to know a man to be that which he was intended for is the concept of his truth Wherefore Soar in the same Chapter doth well recal himself in asserting that truth is relative to created and increated Knowledge Truth doth not superadd extrinsecally ex parte actus any denomination really distinct from a being since it is concurrent to the constituting of the nature of a being for take away truth and you take away the essence of a being V. Falshood is defined by most Philosophers to be that which appears to be that which it is not It is strange that falshood which is not in rerum natura should be defined It is not in rerum natura because all beings are true If it can be defined it is a being For nothing is definible unless it is a being had it been described by a Negative then indeterminatively we might have perceived it as thus Falshood is which doth not appear to be that which it is or which it was intended for I say indeterminatively because we know a falsum falshood to be a falshood because it doth not determinate our Concept through its truth so that this is a privative or accidental knowledge CHAP. XVIII Of Goodness 1. What Goodness is The Improbation of several Definitions of Goodness 2. The Difference between Goodness and Perfection 3. What Evil is 4. What the absolute active End of Goodness is 5. That Goodness is improperly divided in Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness 6. How Goodness is properly divided 7. That the Division of Good in Honest Delectable c. doth belong to Ethicks I. GOodness is an Attribute of a Being whereby it is for an end Many Philosophers do omit the Definition of Goodness because they can find no distinction between Truth and Goodness Others define it to be a convenience of a being with the Appetite which is erroneous for Goodness is in a being that is a partial being without the Appetite 2. Goodness is absolute a Convenience is relative Timpl. Chap. 9. of his Metaph. 2 Book defines Goodness to be an act of Good as far as it is good or is a Quality from which a being is denominated Good This is Idem per Idem and Obscurum per Obscurius II. Goodness is formally distinct from Perfection because a being according to what it is good only is not perfect Wherefore Goodness is erroneously defined by some to be a Perfection III. Evil Malum is that which doth not appear to us to be for any End IV. The Absolute active End of Goodness is to constitute that which it is The Passive is to be constitured that which it is V. Goodness is improperly divided into Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness because Good is that which is essential of it self to a being and therefore cannot be accidental as it is opposite to Essential It may be an Essential part because it concurs with the rest of the Attributes to the constitution of the Essence of a Being VI. Goodness is divisible according to the divisibility of a being which is either Natural Animal or Humane VII The Division of Goodness into Honest Delectable and Profitable or Useful doth not appertain to this Doctrine but is referred to Ethicks CHAP. XIX Of Distinction 1. The Authors Description of Distinction That the privative sense of not being moved is a Note of Distinction whereby the understanding distinguishes a Non Ens from an Ens. That the Positive sense of being moved in another manner than another Ens moves the understanding is a Note of Distinction between one Being and another 2. How Distinction is divided What a real Distinction is 3. What a Modal Difference is 4. That the vulgar Description of a real Distinction is Erroneous 5. That the terms of a Distinction between two or more real beings are requisite both or more to exist 6. That one term of Distinction although in existence cannot be really predicated of another not
1 B. of the Parts of Liv. Creat C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we ought to divide a being by them parts which are contained in its essence and not by its Accidents The division of Matter in Metaphysical and Physical may be rejected upon the same ground These divisions as they are objective appertain to Logick where only second notions are treated of and are very useful to the directing of Reason VI. Forms are divisible in material and immaterial If material is understood to be that which doth inhere in matter which is its most frequent and ordinary acception for most Philosophers take it in that sense then all worldly beings are material what being is there but which doth inhere in Matter You may say mans soul. The soul of man according to this acception is material But if you take immaterial for that which can or doth exist out of matter then there are immaterial forms Neither can this be naturally for a Natural Form is which giveth an actual specification and numerication to matter If so how can a form give an actual Specification and numerication to matter when it is not united to it I prove that the Form giveth an actual specification and numerication to matter Forma dat esse i. e. Specif Numer non posse esse materiae A Form giveth a being not a power of being to Matter For matter hath the power of being from it self and not from the Form This is true for most Peripateticks hold that Potentia is essential to matter The Soul of man when once freed from its tye to the body ceases to be a Form but therefore doth not cease to continue a being So that I conclude there are immaterial beings but no immaterial Forms It is ridiculous to doubt whether the Soul of man when separated hath an Appetite or Inclination to its Body or to that matter which it did once informate because the soul in its separated estate is a compleat and perfect being and doth not need a Body neither is the Soul a Form in that state Wherefore should it then have an Appetite to its Body Such an Appetite would be in vain You may answer that it wanteth a Subject to inhere or subsist in I grant it and therefore it subsisteth in God VII A Form is improperly divided in an assistent and informating Form because one being is satisfied with one Form for had it two forms it would be a double being 2. That which they intend by an assistent form is coincident with an Efficient Cause CHAP. XXIV Of the Theorems of Causes 1. That a Cause and its Effects are co-existent 2. That there are but three Causes of every Natural Being 3. That there is but one Cause of every Being 4. That all Beings are constituted by one or more Causes 5. That all Causes are really univocal 6. That all Natural Causes act necessarily 7. That the Soul of a Beast acteth necessarily 8. That all Matter hath a Form That Matter is capable of many Forms I. A Cause and its Effect are existent at one and the same time This Theorem is received among most Philosophers who render it thus Posita Causa ponitur Effectus The Cause being stated that is reduced into action its Effect is also stated or produced The Reason depends upon their relation one to the other to whose Relata it is proper to exist at one and the same time according to that trite Maxim Relata mutuo sese ponunt tollunt Relations do constitute and abolish one another II. There are three Causes of every Natural Being whereof one reduced to Action supposeth the others also to be reduced to action The Proof of this is demonstrated by the same Axiom by which the next forementioned was inferred III. There is but one Cause of all Beings A Cause here is taken in a strict sense for that which produceth an effect essentially and really distinct from it self In this Acception is an efficient the only cause of all Beings Matter and Form are no Causes according to this Interpretation but Principles because they do not constitute an effect essentially different from themselves A Cause sometime is taken in a strict sense for that which produceth an Effect different from it self modally and so there are two to wit Matter and Form Lastly A cause as it signifieth in a middle signification participating of each acception comprehends a triplicity of causes viz. An Efficient Matter and Form IV. All beings are constituted by one or more Causes God is of himself and not from any other as from an efficient cause and consisteth of one pure formal cause By formal Cause understand an immaterial being Angels are constituted by two Causes namely by an Efficient and a Form All other Beings are constituted by more V. All Causes are univocal This is to be understood of Efficients only Whatever Effect a Cause produceth it is like to its Form and is formal only For it cannot generate matter that being created Wherefore it cannot produce any thing else but what like to it self and consequently produceth alwaies the same effect whereas an equivocal cause should produce different effects You may demand why it hapneth that many effects are different as we observe in the Sun which by its heat doth produce Vegetables and Animals which are different I answer that the Difference doth result from the diversity of the Matter upon which it acteth and not from the causality that being ever one and the same The diversity of Effects is accidental to the Efficient and therefore not to be allowed of in Sciences VI. All Natural Causes act Necessarily Hence derives this Maxim Natura nunquam errat Nature doth never erre because she acts necessarily Against this Maxim may be objected that Nature erreth in generating a Monster This is no Errour of Nature It might rather be imputed an Errour if when it should produce a Monster it doth not That which acts after the same manner at all times doth not erre But Nature doth act in the same manner at all times Ergo she doth never erre I prove the Minor If she acts differently at any time it is in a Monster But she doth not act differently in a Monster as in the example forenamed of a Dog without Legs she doth through the Efficient cause educe a form out of the matter which she extendeth according to the extent of the subjected matter the matter therefore being deficient in quantity it is accidental to Nature if thereby a being is not brought to the likeness of its Species The Soul of man may be considered either 1. As a Natural Cause and so it acteth also necessarily in giving a Being and Life to the Body For as long as it abideth in the body it cannot but give Life to its Parts 2. As it is above a Natural Cause in that it hath a power of acting voluntarily without the Necessity or Impulse of Nature VII The Soul of a Beast doth act
acts through a Power as one of its Parts for as I proved a Power is a Mode of a Substance or one of its Parts and therefore it is to be counted as if it acted through it self immediately because the Act of the Part is attributed to the whole So they say a Horse runs because he runs by meanes of some of his Parts namely his Legs nevertheless it is attributed to the whole thing But take it how you will that which a Substance doth effect through one or more of its Parts is effected immediately through it self because its Part or Parts are it self Wherefore if a Substance acted through its power as a being really distinct from it self these Inconveniences would necessarily ensue 1. That a being should exist without an Operation for if a Substance did not act through it self but only through its superadded power then it self must exist without an Operation which thwarts that Maxim Omne quodest est propter Operationem 2. Substances would be censured less noble then their Accidents for that which acteth is more noble then that which acteth not 3. An Accident then would be supposed to be the Efficient of a Substance which contradicts another Maxim Qualis Causa talis Effectus Such as the Cause is such is its Effect 4. It supposeth that a Substance should be generated for an Accident and not an Accident for a Substance for since that all beings are for an Operation it remaines that its Operation can be nothing else but to be a Subject to an Accident 5. Accidents are said to be superadded to a Substance Ergo according to their Philosophy its power was also superadded The antecedence and consequence are false I prove the falsity of the Antecedence which supposes that a Substance is a Substance without Accidents and therefore they say that Accidents are superadded I shew the contrary granting their Supposition that Accidents are superadded there must necessarily be accidents to wit powers allowed to Substances before the superaddition of other Accidents is possible For accidents cannot be superadded unless a substance had a power of receiving those Accidents but that power is an accident ergo a substance is not imaginable without an accident Hence it is that Aristotle was forced to grant a coeval power to his Materia prima Or lastly thus If a Substance acted through its power ergo that Power must be either an Efficient or instrumental Cause or a Causa sine qua non of its acts It is irrational to state it an Efficient because then a Power produces a Nobler thing then it self and an Effect different from it in Specie It cannot be appropriated to an Instrumental because it doth not differ really and specifically from the principal Cause besides an Instrumental cause is moved from its principal but a substance as they say doth not move Suppose I grant it to be a Causa sine qua non then it cannot be capable of producing an univocal Effect V. A Peripatetick power is a Non Ens Physicum for it hath neither Matter or Form and therefore cannot act physically Hence it is shifted off to an Ens Metaphysicum and so they say it hath an Actus Entitativus a plain Contradiction What can a Potentia be an Actus Aristotle teaches that a Power doth alwaies precede its act which I prove to be false The Elements acted at the same moment when they were created Fire was actually light Earth weighty c. Possibly you reply that their Power was obediential to God that is improper for there could be no obediential or any other Entitative Power without a Substance or a Subject wherein it should in here A substance doth act so far as it hath a power of acting By Power understand an actual virtue or an internal and modal Principle of a Being or Essence from which its acts do flow This Principle is a derived and congenited disposition and limitation of a being to action or is a being termined and disposed to act such and such acts for otherwise it would be indifferent to all acts This limitation causes every being to act within its own Sphere beyond which it cannot naturally excur to act any acts dissentaneous and improportionate to its Nature The forementioned disposition is the same which in Physicks is nominated the Form and Activity of a being and is nothing else but a certain Temperament and proportionated mixture of the Elements in a Substance the predominance of which doth dispose the body constituted by their Congress to determinated acts But of this more at large in my Physicks VI. All Powers are really identificated with their Subject A Power as I shewed before is that whereby a Substance is disposed and determined to certain acts and is nothing but the Form exalted to a certain degree I shall make it plain by this Example of Wine or Brandy either having a power of heating the body as the Sectarists of Ceres and Bacchus witness by drinking small Beer after a Debâ—uch That which effects their heat is the fiery parts predominating over the others which predominance is the power disposed to that certain act Is then fire predominating through its Access of Parts over the other constituting Elements really distinct from it self because it is greater 2. The power of moving a Leg or Arm is inherent in the Spirits disposed and determined to motion Are these Spirits when they do not move for then they are counted a power of motion really distinct from themselves when they do move You may object If Substances act through themselves then alterative Medicines are exhibited in vain A Mistake For although I assert that a Substance acts through it self I do not deny but that it alterates moves locally or produceth all other acts immediately through it self VII Powers are distinguisht from their Subject modally and by operation of the Mind A power may be taken in a double sense either in the concrete or abstract 1. If in the concrete then it is no longer to be called a Power of a being but a powerful being it proving impossible to apprehend the one without the other unless with intention to make a Chimara of it for if you consider them apart to wit a Being and Powerful each by themselves you must needs imagine an Accident denoting extrinsecally and from its first Imposition an actual qualification of its Subject not to denote an actual qualification and consequently that a concrete accident is not concrete Powerful is not powerful and that a being is not it self 2. In perceiving powerful separated from its being you do apprehend power in the Abstract which I grant to be possible but not powerful in the concrete which is repugnant so that in considering Powerful in the Abstract you do absurdly confound it with Power in the Abstract VIII Power conceived in the Abstract is taken for an universal Entity abstracted by the Operation of the Mind from its Singulars and in this acception it
Whether a man hath a free-will or a remnant of theologick good in him whereby he may procure God's extraordinary assistance through himself or whether God doth stirre up that spark of Good being moved through his own mercy and not by what can proceed from man for many hold that man hath no spark of Good remaining in him and consequently cannot be thence supposed to have a free-will to beg God's extraordinary assistance but it is God who doth out of his singular goodnesse free-will and pleasure towards singular men cast and infuse a measure of theologick good in them through which they are made capable of having accesse to God and of praying to him and this they say Scripture implies by a new creation regeneration conversion or the becoming of a new man No doubt but this latter tenent is erroneous and absurd First They affirm That man hath no spark of theologick good remaining in him This is false as hath been proved already and shall be demonstrated more at large elsewhere Secondly Hereby they imply that man doth alwayes act evil and consequently acteth evil necessarily without a free-will And wherein doth he then differ from a Beast Thirdly Should God cast his mercy or goodnesse upon that which is altogether evil it followeth that God should love that which is altogether evil but that is repugnant to God's nature that being most good doth necessarily reject that from it which is most evil Fourthly Should God stirre up that spark of Good in man it proveth that that Good is of no efficacy and for no purpose which is repugnant to common reason concluding that all things which are are for to operate and for an end and are not in vain Therefore this spark of Good doth and can operate for an end to save it self and glorifie God especially being accompanied with God's ordinary concurrence it is directly as by a guide led to God's extraordinary concurrence and assistance So then if there be a spark of theologick Good remaining in man as without doubt there is it is of the same Nature with that which was in the first man before his fall who having a free-will to good and evil infers that this spark must necessarily retain the same free-will to good and evil but in an improportionable manner since that man's will is much more habituated to evil which doth much dead that weak remnant of good in him It is certain God doth equally impart his mercy and goodnesse to natural men because they are of an equal state Then again I object If so then all men would become theologically Good which is erroneous Wherefore I say God is no more good or mercifull to one natural man than to another and consequently there must be somewhat in men whereby one doth move God to mercy before another and what is that but that spark of Good Notwithstanding this inference holds good only ordinarily and doth not infer but that God extraordinarily may be pleased out of his free-will and pleasure to conferre bounties and mercies upon those to whom he will be bountifull and mercifull XVI 5. It is a simple Question to demand Whether the will is free at that instant when it acteth which is as much as if you enquired Whether the act of the will were free Certainly there can be no freedom allotted to the act or effect of an efficient for that followeth necessarily Posita causa ponitur effectus The cause being stated the effect is also stated By the act of the will I mean the consent of the will or the last execution of it which is named Actus imperatus But if the Question be understood De actu eliciendo then no doubt but the will is free at the same instant when it acteth for when would it be free else were it not when it acteth This Query may be apprehended thus Whether the will is free that is Whether it doth not act necessarily è suppositione Necessitas è suppositione is through which the will cannot act otherwise than it acteth when it doth act According to this supposition it doth act necessarily Nam impossibile est idem simul esse non esse For it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at the same instant Neverthelesse this doth not clip any whit from the freedom of man's will for freedom of the will is properly in actum eliciendo and in actum imperando but not in actu elicito vel imperato that is before the act is consented unto for the will before she consenteth to any act can determinate it freely to either opposite In short the will is free in its faculty but its acts are necessary CHAP. X. Of Free-will from Scripture 1. Objections from Scripture against man's free-will 2. An Answer to the said Objections 3. Objections proving that moral good is evil 4. The first Objection answered 5. The second Objection removed 6. Some other Texts produced against free-will in man 7. The first Text reconciled 8. The second Objection removed 9. Arguments deduced from faith An answer to the said Arguments 10. The first Argument drawn from Scripture to prove man's free-will to good and evil 11. A second Argument proving the same 12. A third Argument 13. Many other Texts inferring the same 14. Texts proving a remnant of good in man 15. Texts proving that a natural man cannot do a theologick good act through himself and being only assisted with the ordinary concurss of God 16. Scriptures inferring that a supernatural man hath no free-will to direct contraries that is to do theologick good and evil An answer to some Texts produced by Bellarmin 17. Scripture proofs concluding that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man and adheres to his free-will 18. Whether man's actions performed with God's extraordinary assistance are to be taken for the actions of God or of man 19. A reconciliation of the ninth to the Romans The unfolding of Predestination or of God's eternal Decree I. THe precedent Dispute touching Free-will is not so much held among natural men as between them who conceive themselves to be gifted As for the first I have already endeavoured to satisfie them And as for these last they alledging sacred Texts for their opinions plead with more force than the former Wherefore it will not be amisse to examine their Arguments and afterwards to produce such others as most orthodox Divines do urge for the proof of their tenents The first Scripture which they seem to produce against us is that in the Prov. 16. 9. A mans heart deviseth his way but the Lord directeth his steps And in Chap. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the Rivers of water he turneth it whither soever he will And in the next fore-going Chapter vers 24. Mans goings are of the Lord how can a man then understand his own way Jer. 10. 23. O Lord I know that the way of man is not in himself it
free-will might be allowed and yet not be repugnant to Gods fore-knowledge for thought he doth God fore-know our actions then man must act necessarily and consequently infers the truth of Fate but since he could not grant a Fate over men because he saw they acted contingently therefore he did impiously rob God of his fore-knowledge Hence saith Austin de Civ D. Lib. 5. cap. 9. Atque it a dum vult facere liberos fecit sacrilegos and so since he endeavoureth to make men free-willers he makes them commit sacriledge As for this doubt it is little touched upon by Christians who certainly know that God fore-knoweth contingent things as contingent and to fall out contingently Necessary things as necessary and to fall out necessarily Psalm 33. 14. 1 Sam. 10. 9 26. Prov. 21. 1. Exod. 12. 13. Prov. 16. 33. Matth. 10. This subject is very well treated of by Anselmus in his Book of God's fore-knowledge and predestination This by the way And now I return to prove that God's Predestination is in no wise coactive upon the will of man for then the will of man would be a not willing Voluntas esset noluntas God is most just in predestinating man through Election and of his grace and mercy to salvation Eph 1. 5 6. and in predestinating others through reprobation and of his justice to damnation 2 Cor. 13. 5. Because his predestination is founded upon his fore-knowledge God therefore fore-knowing the evil wherein man is enhardened doth predestinate him to damnation This I prove God damneth man of his justice and God's justice hath a particular respect to man's evil actions Wherefore it is of God's justice and for man's sinne or evil actions that he is damned That God's justice hath a particular respect to judge and punish man with damnation for his sins the Scripture doth evidently testifie Luc. 12. 47 48. Aud that servant which knew his Lords will and prepared not himself neither did according to his will shall be beaten with many stripes Ergo Man is punished for not doing the Lord's will and not because he was predestinated without God's fore-knowledge of his evil and unbelief Matth. 11. 21. Mat. 25. 41 42. Here Christ pronounceth the sentence of everlasting damnation against the wicked because they had not done his will in feeding the hungry and cloathing the naked Gen. 2. 17. Deut. 7. 26. Exod. 32. 33. So then if God doth damn man onely for his trespasses and sinnes he doth also for the same reason predestinate him to damnation Again Were God's predestination the sole and first moving cause of mans reprobation then Adam could have had no free-will of remaining in the state of innocency or of deflecting to the state of sinne but must necessarily and coactively have deflected to the state of depravation because God had predestinate him to it This assertion is impious Ergo God's predestination is not the first moving cause of man's reprobation What should God predestinate man to damnation without fore-knowing his guilt or without being thereunto moved through the fore-knowledge of his sinne then these Texts would be written to no purpose Hos. 6. 6. Ephes. 4. 22 23 24 c. John 3. 16 17 18. John 3. 36. Rom. 9. 22 23. Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O house of Israel Wherefore it is not of God's purpose to damn any unlesse being moved to it of his justice through their unbelief Likewise the Scripture doth reveal that predestination to life eternal is of God's grace and justice being thereunto moved by the saith of the righteous Mat. 9. 22. Rom. 4. 20 21. Ephes. 3. 12. Mat. 9. 2. Gal. 2. 20. Ephes. 2. 8 9. First Summarily I say that God's Will Decree and Predestination is the efficient cause of Reprobation and Election his grace mercy and justice are the moving causes Man's unbelief and belief are the objects of this motion in which or upon which and by which the fore-mentioned moving causes are moved which objects God fore-knowing determinates mans salvation or damnation from all eternity Wherefore we may observe that in many places of Scripture where predestination is held forth that God's fore-knowledge of mans belief or unbelief doth precede Rom. 8. 29. For whom he did fore-know he also predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son What can be more evident Secondly Faith or good works for saith it self is the best of works and the fountain of all good works are the means whereby we are saved yet it is not faith or good works which dâ— meritoriously or efficiently save us but God is the efficient cause of our salvation Rom. 4. 6. So likewise unbelief which is the worst of works and the original of all evil works and sins or Atheismis the means through which we are damned yet it is not that which is the principal moving cause of our damnation but God's justice which doth reject and predestinate man to damnation Rom. â— 8. Thirdly God's will is either absolute whereby he can will all things and this is concomitant to Gods absolute power whereby he can do all things although they never are effected for if he can do them he hath also a power of willing them although he doth not will all them things which he can will or his ordained will whereby he willeth that which he doth will This ordained will is unchangeable hence God is said to have loved because he loved that is when God willeth to love he cannot but love because he willeth it and therefore his will is unchangeable God's ordained will is that man shall be saved through his belief and therefore cannot but save a believer because his will endureth for ever and is unchangeable Wherefore I said in the first Assertion That man's belief moved God's mercy because God hath willed it through his ordained will otherwise were it not for this what could man's belief avail in meriting salvation for at the best we are but unprofitable servants Luc. 17. 10. and so man's unbelief moveth God's justice to damne him because God willeth justice Wherfore I conceive that belief and unbelief are remote moving causes as from us by which we move God's mercy and justice And that God's mercy and justice are moving causes as from himself Fourthly Man hath then a power of disposing and preparing himself partially to and for the admission of God's extraordinary concurss and to a conversion from the state of sinne to the state of grace for to what effect or end would all the reachings of Ministers serve All their exhortations their labour and pains would be to no purpose 1. They strive to bend men into a care for their salvation by working that carnal security out of them according to that of Acts 2. 37. 16. 33. 2. They lay the Law
are causes of the constitution of others All things saith he are idle empty and dead without a vital principle Judge his absurdity What are all idle empty and dead things without a life but a materia prima Aristotelica For he himself affirms that there are but two principles Matter and a vital Principle yea those very words idle empty and dead square with these of Arist. Materia prima est nec quid nec quale nec quantum He allots only two causes Matter and her internal efficient to the generation of a being First as I have proved it is impossible for this internal efficient to be reduced in actum unless an extrinsick efficient be it the Sun or some other particular efficient excite it by contributing some of its own virtue to it Secondly Would not all Philosophers deride him for saying an intrinsick efficient since that all have consented to term an efficient extrinsick in contradistinction to intrinsick or internal which is ever a part of the being constituted by it whereas an efficient is named extrinsick because it doth not constitute a part of that being to whose production it was concurring Thirdly Wherein is his Archeus or internal efficient different from a form which he doth so much detest Is not this Archeus an effect also of its preceding cause Doth he not affirm that this internal efficient giveth life to its matter and what is a form but which giveth life or a being distinction and specification to its matter Here again he saith that Matter is a Co-agent and before he stated that she was idle and dead certainly idle and dead things do not use to act or to be agents or co-agents That matter is not a subject he asserts and before and afterwards he granted that she contained the Archeus What is a subject but that which doth contain a thing Here again he addes a Note of distinction to his Archeus which is to be per quod and is not this also an inseparable Attribute of a Form Dist. 23. Here again he delivers a new Foolosophy in stating water to be the sole material Principle although below he adjoynes earth to it the ferment to be the remote efficient and the semen to be the immediate efficient so then now there are three Principles yea four Water Earth and a double Archeus whereas before there were but two Besides here he vaunts out with a threefold matter a materia prima which is a co-agent with the fermentum or first Archeus a materia media a subject of the semen or second Archeus and a materia ultima quickned through life it self So now he is got beyond the number of the Peripateticks three distinct matters and three internal efficients make up just six Principles Surely the old man was climed up into one of his Raptures Well let us go on in making disquisition upon the 24 h. Dist. The Ferment is a created formal being Just now there were no forms and now the ferment or the prime Archeus is metamorphosed into a form Where was his Memory It is not a Substance or Accident saith he but neither in the manner of Light Fire c. How neither a Substance or Accident neither Spirit or Body neither quid quale or quantum Ergo it is nothing but a merum figmentum If it be in the manner of light or fire it is in the manner of a quality or substance Now I think I may let him run on in telling out his Tale. IV. Cartesius a great Proficient in the Mathematicks laboured much to reduce all Philosophical conclusions to demonstrations depending from certain Hypotheses but wherein they excelled the ordinary or Peripatetick ones either in truth certainty or evidence I have hitherto not yet learned If they may be comprehended within the limits of Demonstrations they must be a posteriori concluding only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of things or their effects by improper and affinged Causes so that the causes remaining still under a cloud we cannot be satisfied in any such Science 'T is true did those forementioned suppositions appear to us as Phaenomena appearances like unto others in Astronomy there might thence some ground be afforded but they being mera figmenta and entiae rationis must necessarily prove very sandy for to build real truths thereon Neither do his suppositions cohere in all places he admitting many supposita non supponenda yea contradicentia to their number Besides to frame think or imagine that God like unto a Potter turning his Wheel round with a staffe and grinding the Clay thereon into many pieces figures and whirles should grind the materia prima into several pieces whirles figures and shapes is no small absurdity especially when Scripture doth so positively teach us the contrary Would a mans mind be carried forth to such Chimaera's furer and evidenter Principles might be proposed by the means of Numbers But tell me what satisfaction can any one expect from such Conclusions as long as their Premises are not granted but thought figments and falsities For it is not the effects we enquire into but into their real and adequate causes Doth he make any thing more plain or doth he thereby escape all falsities Certainly no for many of those Assertions that are thence deduced do manifestly partake of falsities and Errours as 1. That the nature of a body doth not consist in weight hardness colour or the like but alone in extension 2. He speakes a word or two only of rarefaction and condensation and so away I conceive the rest did surpass his Mathematical demonstrations 3. That a corporeal substance when it is distinguisht from its quantity is confusedly conceived as if it were incorporeal 4. He disproves a vacuum by an idem per idem thus there is no vacuum because the extension of all bodies is equal to their internal and external places The question is the same still viz. Whether all external places are filled up with extensions of internal places of bodies 5. He denies real Atomes 6. That motion taken properly is only to be referred to the contiguous bodies of that which is moved neither is it to be referred but to those contiguous bodies which seem to lie still A fundamental errour 7. That matter is infinite or divisible into infinite parts 8. That the world is of an indefinite quantity 9. That the second matter of Heaven and Earth is one and the same 10. That all matter is really single and obtaineth its diversity of Forms from local motion 11. That in one body innumerable motions are possible 12. That the Moon and the other Planets borrow their Light from the Sun 13. That the Earth is in nothing different from a Planet and consequently that the other Planets are inhabitable 14. That the Moon is illuminated by the Earth 15. He assumes most of the erroneous Opinions of Copernicus 16. That all the parts of the earth are light 17. That Water is convertible into Ayr. Neither are his Definitions
necessarily be so for water strictly so named had it been heaved up it would have been against its first nature and been moved violently which is improbable since that nullum violentum est perpetuum no violent motion is lasting The nature of air certifieth us that it must be it which moved above the waters under it Lastly The waters above the waters strictly so termed are called the Firmament from its firmness because they are as a deep frame or a strong wall about the waters underneath for to keep them together in a counterpoise from falling to an insinitum but it is ai◠that is above the waters and is a Firmament to them ergo the ayr must be comprehended under the Notion of waters Or thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Hebrew is by the Rabbi's and Hebrews expounded an Expansion or thing expanded for its Root is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to attenuate if so then by the waters above must be implied ayr whose nature it is to be expanded as I shewed before So whether you take the word according to the interpretation of the Septuagints 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Firmament or of the Rabbi's Expansion there can be nothing else intended by it but ayr I say then as by waters a duplicity of Elements is implied so by the Heavens ayr and fire are implied I prove it Light is fire flaming but the light was drawn from the Chaos if from the Chaos ergo not from the earth for by earth there is only meant earth single but from the Heaven which imports a conjunction of Elements viz. of Ayr and Fire Secondly Is light being a flaming fire drawn from the Heaven ergo there was fire latent in it So let this serve to answer Van Helmont his Objection who denieth fire to be an Element because its name is not set down in the first Chap. of Gen. neither is ayr mentioned among the Elements in so many Letters yet it is comprehended among them 'T is true Fowl are called Fowl of the ayr but what of that this doth not infer that ayr is an Element because Fowl are named Fowl of the Ayr. Secondly Earth and Water are there expressed in so many letters ergo the Chaos was made up of all the four Elements III. The Elements in the Chaos underwent an exact mixture because each being a stem and perfection to the other they required it for had they been unequally mixt then that part which had not been sufficiently counterpoysed by its opposite Element would have fallen from the whole Hence it followeth that they must have been of an equal extent and degree in their first vertue or quality and not only so but also in their quantity that is they consisted all of an equal number of minima's that so each minimum of every Element might be fitted sustained and perfectionated by three single minimum's of each of the other Elements Now was there but one minimum of any of the Elements in excess above the other it would overbalance the whole Chaos and so make a discord which is not to be conceived But here may be objected That the earth in comparison with the heavens beares little more proportion to their circumference then a point I confess that the air and fire exceed the earth and water in many degrees but again as will be apparent below there is never a Star which you see yea and many more then you see but containes a great proportion of earth and water in its body the immense to our thinking Region of the air and fire are furnished with no small proportion of water and earth so that numeratis numerandis the earth and water are not wanting of a minimum less then are contained either in the fire or ayr IV. The efficient of this greatest and universal body is the greatest and universal cause the Almighty God I prove it The action through which this vast mole was produced is infinite for that action which takes its procession ab infinito ad terminum finitum sive a non ente ad ens from an infinite to a finite term or from nothing to somthing is to be counted infinite but an infinite action requireth an infinite agent therefore none but God who is in all respects infinite is to be acknowledged the sole cause and agent of this great and miracuious effect It was a Golden saying upon this matter of Chrysippus the Stoick If there is any thing that doth effect that which man although he is indued with a reason cannot that certainly is greater mightier and wiser then man but he cannot make the Heavens Wherefore that which doth make them excels man in Art Counsel and Prudence And what saith Hermes in his Pimand The Maker made the universal world through his Word and not with his Hands Anaxagoras concluded the divine mind to be the distinguisher of the universe It was the Saying of Orpheus That there was but one born through himself and that all other things were created by him And Sophocles There is but one true God who made Heaven and the large earth Aristotle Lib. 2. De Gen. Cor. c. 10. f. 59. asserts God to be the Creator of this Universe And Lib. 12. Metaph. c. 8. He attests God to be the First Cause of all other Causes This action is in the holy texts called Creation Gen. 1. 1. Mark 10. 6. Psal. 89. 12. Mal. 2. 10. Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not alwaies intended for one and the same signification sometimes it implying the Creation of the world as in the Scriptures next forementioned other whiles it is restricted to Mankind Mark 16. 15. Mat. 28. 19. Luke 24. 47. In other places it is applied to all created beings Mark 13. 19. Gen. 14. 22. Job 38. 8. Prov. 20. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To create is imported by divers other Expressions 1. By 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To Form Gen. 2. 7. Esay 43. 7. 2. By 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To make Gen. 1. 31. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He hath establisht Psal. 89. 12. Psal. 104. 5. Mat. 13. 35. Heb. 6. 1. 1 Pet. 1. 20. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To stretch or expand Psal. 10. 2. Es. 42. 5. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To prepare or dispose Prov. 8. 27. Psal. 74. 16. V. Creation is a production of a being out of and from nothing Tho. gives us this Definition in Sent. 2. Dist. 1. Quest. 1. Art 2. Creation is an emanation of an universal Being out of nothing By an universal being he intends a being as it comprehends all material and immaterial beings So that this is rather a definition of the creation of the material and immaterial world then a definition of the Formality of Creation 2. His Definition is defective and erroneous for he adds only out of nothing This is not enough it being possible for a thing to emanate out of nothing and yet not be created the immaterial operations of Angels and
be possible in the Elements I. IN the precedent Chapter I have spoke at large concerning Temperaments in general and their Divisions to which ought to be annext the distinctions of Intemperatures An Intemperature moves either to an equal temperament and generation of a mixt body or from a temperature to corruption and dissolution of a mixt body The former motion is called Coction the latter Putrefaction the end of the former is an equal and durable temperament and the generation of a mixt body the end or rather terminus ad quem of the latter is a most unequal temperature that is when a mixt body returnes to its first elements now when its several ingredients are dissolved into their several elements then they become most unequal because every element in its own region superates the peregrine elements in three fourths and yet there remains a temperature because a fourth part of the alien elements is united to each of them and corruption of a mixt body The difference then between Putrefaction and Corruption is that the one is a motion to dissolution and the other is an entire dissolution it self The same difference is observable between Coction and the generation of a mixt body Alteration is a Genus to them all for Coction and putrefaction are Alterations in a lower degree but Generation and Corruption are alterations in the highest degree II. Alteration is a motion of the Elements through which they move unto into through and from one another in a mixt body The motion unto one another I have formerly called their mutual embracement the manner of which you have read before They move from one another accidentally and secondarily after they have embraced one another so close that the contiguous Elements break through the continuous ones I say Alteration is a motion the same is attested by Galen in his 7 Tom. of his works fol. 14. 4. By motion understand a local motion for the Elements change their places in alteration and therefore a local motion So that Alteration is a Species of local motion Through this local motion the Elements do divide and penetrate one another which Division through local motion doth fully comprehend the nature of Alteration Abra de Raconis in Disput. de Corp. mixt sect secund asserts that Alteration doth not terminate into qualities of the first Spec. to wit Habit and Disposition because neither of them are acquired by motion 2. He states That Alteration doth not extend to natural faculties and powers because these are produced in an instant 3. There is no Alteration concurrent to the production of figure and form because these emanate from Matter To the contrary Alteration constitutes Habits and Dispositions Natural Faculties Form and Figure because all these are produced by the forms of the Elements acting through Alteration upon one another But to Answer to his Reason I deny the first for habits and dispositions are acquired through motion 2. I dislike his second Reason also for they are produced in many Instants 3. Figure and Form are in or out of Matter but not from Matter III. Alteration is either successive or instantaneous It is called successive because it is made up by many instantaneous alterations like as successive time is said to be successive because it is constituted out of many instantaneous times following one another and nevertheless an instant is no less properly time then successive time for time is nothing else but the measure of one motion by another Even so is an instantaneous alteration no less an alteration then a successive alteration because a successive alteration is made up by many instantaneous ones An Alteration is called instantaneous because it happens in the least time which is called an Instant Or an instantaneous alteration is the least alteration whereby one Element altereth that is divides the other in one minimum Now since the beginning of action is from a minim or the least substance the action it self must be also the least which among the Elements specifieth an instantaneous alteration Alteration is to be termed continuous when a continuous Element altereth a contiguous one and contiguous when a contiguous Element altereth a continuous one IV. Fr. Eustach in Tract de Elem. Quest. 11. makes a query how the Elementary contrary qualities are intended and remitted through a successive alteration 1. He states it for a truth that Heat Cold c. do acquire new qualities in their Subject 2. That these new Qualities are entitative perfections whereby heat moysture c. are intended 3. The doubt is now how this entitative perfection is possible to any of these forementioned qualities his Opinion is that it is through addition of new degrees of heat cold c. to the former degrees of the same quality which are procreated out of the same Subject 1. I deny that the forementioned qualities do acquire any other quality but what they are mixe water with wine and the mixture will have something of the qualities of water and something of the wine but no new quality that should be neither 2. I reject his second Position as false 3. It is erroneous that other degrees should be superadded out of the subject for if they are superadded they are superadded either from the foregoing quality or an extrinsick efficient they cannot be superadded through themselves for then a thing would be supposed to generate it self which is absurd because a seipso nihil fit nothing is made by it self They cannot be superadded by another unless it be by the same qualities by reason the cause must be of the same nature which the effect is of qualis causatalis effectus if by the same qualities then the same again would generate it self ergo they cannot be superadded or if superadded from without it is no new quality but agreeing with that which is intended Alteration is different from Mistion or a Temperament in general because it is an action which disposes and prepares the Elements their Forms for mistion and temperature The union of the Elements and Forms thus altered or disposed is a mistion and temperament Wherefore Aristotle defines the nature of Mistion very well Mistion is the union of Miscibles alterated Authors usually divide alteration in perfective and corruptive which are equivalent to Coction and Putrefaction V. Coction is an alteration tending to a temperament ad justitiam Suppose at the first confusion of the Elements in order to a mixtion and temperament the fire and ayr to be unequally mixt with the others about the remote parts but to be equally mixt with the central parts Now Coction is nothing else but the promotion of the light Elements which are yet latent about the Center to an equal mixture secundum partes sed non secundum totum with the heavy ones and although at present they are not so equally mixt yet through alteration that is by dividing or embracing one another the earth dividing the fire the water the ayr the
makes all bodies therein contained shew greater Besides water containing much air in her body suffereth also an obtension of that whereby bodies must necessarily appear bigger then they are The reason why a piece of Money in a Bason with water appears bigger then it is is because the water through impregnation with peregrine air proper thickness and continuity doth reflect and admit much obtended air or light which being altered by the colour of the money doth appear much bigger then if seen through thin air alone Light is diminisht because the air is condensed so that whatever doth condense the air must diminish its light and obduction Whatever body light appulses against it is thereby darkned because the body which it strikes against condenses the air According to this degree of condensation the light is gradually diminisht and darkned if it be terminated in a most dense earthy body then it appears black if against a body that hath less earth or density it appears brown that is to say at the point of reflection against an Object and so gradually in all other This change being wrought upon the terminating obtension by an objected body it is repercussed to a certain distance namely as far as the repercutient action of that object can reach which is as far as until the Air doth recover its proper station If we are far off from an Object it appears less then it is because its action doth diminish gradually like unto the streams of water which about the center of action are greater but the more remote they are the less they grow A Flame is called a Light Lux because it begets light The light begot in the Air is called Lumen an Illumination Wherefore these lights are not really distinguisht but ratione Neither is a flame to be called a light unless when it doth obduct the Air neither is the Air to be termed a light or illumination unless when it is obducted by a flame Radius a Beam is a diducted line of a flame tending directly from the Center to the Circumference A Splendor is the intention of light by a reflection or refraction upon a thick continuous smooth body The Lights begot by the Stars and other flames are not distinguisht specie because they depend upon the same causes namely upon Fire and Air. Their difference consists in consistency purity bigness c. The Coelum Empyreum or Heavens of the Angels are said to be lucid which may be understood tropically or properly If properly possibly it hath a vertue of obducting the air like unto a flame If tropically lucid is equipollent to glorious The Bodies of the risen Saints shall appear glorious and splendid possibly because they shall be more ayry and fiery that is flammy CHAP. XXII Of Colours 1. The Authors Definition of a Colour That Light is a Colour Aristotles Definition of colour examined 2. Scaligers Absurdities touching Colours and Light 3. What colour Light is of and why termed a single Colour That Light doth not efficienter render an Object visible How a mixt Colour worketh upon the sight and how it is conveyed to it 4. The Causes of the variations of Mercury in its colour through each several preparation 5. That Colours are formally relations only to our sight That a mixt colour is not an intentional quality That besides the relation of colours there is an absolute foundation in their original Subjects How the same fundamental colours act 6. That there are no apparent colours but all are true 7. The Differences of colours What colour focal fire is of The fundamental colours of mixt bodies 8. What reflection of light is What refraction of colours is Aristotles Definition of colour rejected The Effects of a double reflection The Reasons of the variations of Colour in Apples held over the water and Looking-glasses The variation of Illumination by various Glasses 9. The Division of Glasses The cause of the variation of colour in a Prism 10. The Nature of Refraction Why colours are not refracted in the Eye I. COlour is a Mode or Quality of a mixt being through which it moves the sight if so then certainly Light is a Colour For 1. It proceeds from a mixt body 2. It moves the sight primarly immediately and per se. I prove it We do distinguish light from darkness and a light body from a dark one by our sight ergo it moves the sight Probably you may deny my Definition of colour wherefore I shall for your further satisfaction compare it with that of Aristotle and prove it to be consentaneous to it differing only in Precision ours being less universal and nearer to sense then his Lumen which is equipollent to colour est actus perspicui quatenus perspicui Light or rather Illumination is the act of a perspicuous body quatenus perspicui is redundant By actus is implied an actuation or motion 2. By perspicuous is intended a body that is capable of receiving or rather of reflecting light And is not the sight capable of receiving or reflecting light and of being actuated by it Or if you will take colour for a quality following the temperament and mistion of the Elements the difference is not great this being a Definition of colour as it is considered in it-self a priori the other described a posteriori relatively and accidentally for it is per accidens to it to move the sight I cannot but reflect at Scaligers boldness who pretending to exceed Cardan in subtility so as he seemed to reprehend and correct him in every Distinction but with more absurdity then he supposed Cardan to be less subtil and particularly about Colours and light Exercit. CCCXXV d. 2. Here he infers a real and formal difference between an Accident and its Subject the contrary hath so plainly been demonstrated 2. That an Accident is constituted out of a Power and Act. The falsity of which is detected in my Disp. of Pow. These Assertions are not exempted from Absurdities 1. An Accident and a Substance being really and formally different and owing their production to one substantial efficient it follows that a Substance produceth effects differing from it self in specie 2. That a Substance is an efficient of a Power and Act. Power and Act being two positive contraries one substancial efficient is inferred to be an efficient secundum idem ad idem of two positive contraries for a power according to Aristotle is not a privation for then it were a non ens reale but a positive 3. Neither is Power or Substance the true matter of colour Not the power for that is like to the matter not the substance that being the sole whole substance Wherefore if neither power or substance be the true matter it cannot be any real thing because whatever is real consists of Matter and Form Wherefore saith he we should say that it hath a substance for its subject wherein it is inherent but in it self it hath a power and act out
rendred of a very unequal temperature where the extraneous Elements uniting together do raise a hollowness in the earth and infinuate into one anothers substance or body to which the coldness of the earth is very much conducing thereby gathering or coagmenting the said Elements together and impelling them into one anothers body and then closing them firmly all which it performs through its coldness Through coldness understand its compressing weighty minima's Wherefore do not still abide in your obstinate conceit that it is the Sun which is the efficient cause of Minerals and Stones For that is absurd I prove it That which is the main efficient of Stones and Metals must be a contracting condensing and indurating substance but the Sun is no contracting condensing or indurating substance Ergo the Sun cannot be the efficient of Stones and Metals The Major is undeniable I confirm the Minor by proving the contrary namely that the Sun doth mollifie because its flame is soft and all heat is soft for softning is nothing else but to dispose a body to bend easily into its self if pressed from without But earth rarefied by fire doth easily bend into it self if pressed from without Ergo The Minor is evident because whatever is throughly hot fiery is soft as we see in red-hot Iron in alive flesh and all Vegetables So that by how much the more heat a body hath by so much the softer it is provided quod caetera sint paria Further What heat is there under the Earth I confess there is more and less coldness under it but no predominating heat What heat can there be in Greenland especially under the earth and yet it is certain that many rocks and stones are generated there They may as well say that fire is the efficient cause of all those Islands of Ice Again so much as a substance consisteth of coldness and earth by so much it participates of hardness or by how much the less heat a body consisteth of so much the lesse hardnesse it partakes of The matter of a stone in the kidneys or in the bladder was sofe when it fluctuated within the vessals but being detained in the kidneys its heat is diminished either through the intense heat of the Kidneys which doth dissipate and attract the lesser heat from the matter retained in the cavity of the kidneys through which ecess of heat the terrestrial and thick waterish parts are coagulated and are closed together through the depressing coldness of the intrinsick earth and water The same matter being retained in kidneys of a cold temperament doth immediately through that degree of coldness coagulate and grow hard The stone in the bladder is generally harder than the stone in the kidneys because the one is of a far colder that is less hot temperament than the other That in the kidneys is more friable whereas the stone in the bladder is affected with a continuous firm thick waterish hardness This I can witness by a stone being taken from a Patient by section which that most learned and expert Physitian Dr. George Bate shewed me six or seven years ago This stone was perduced to that hardness that I am confident an ordinary smart stroak of a hammer could scarce break it Yet when it was within the bladder it was far distant from such a hardness for a piece of the Catheter was unawares run into the body of the stone and broke in it which was afterwards taken out with it but after it had been exposed a little while to the air it grew immediately to that hardness What could be the cause of this but the hotter parts of the stone exhaling into the air whereby the cold parts fell closer and thereby arrived to a greater hardness The errour of Fernelius is obvious in that he stated the intense heat of the kidneys to be the cause of a Lithiasis for it happens as freqently in kidneys of a cold temperament neither is it an insita renum arenosa calculosaque dispositio a parentibus contracta hereditary fixt fabulous and calculous disposition as the same Author conceives which doth consist in a degree of temperament of the solid parts of the kidneys for stones have been generated in kidneys of all kinds of temperaments neither can it be said to be hereditary for many a man hath been troubled with the stone whose Issue never was so much as disposed to it and on the other side many a man hath been miserably tormented with the stone or Duelech as Paracelsus terms it whose Parents never discerned the least symptom of a stone within their bodies Nevertheless as I said before the temperature of the kidneys adds much to the accelerating of a Lithiasis It is then certain that the greatest cause of lapidation or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is internal depending upon the predominance of earth or coldness over the other Elements in a mixture The Focus or Uterus as Van Helmont terms it that is the place where a stone or gravel is generated must be a close hollow place wherefore nothing can arrive to this close hollow place unless it be liquid for a thick or course body will be intercepted before it can reach thither This liquid matter being now lodged within this cavity the hot parts do exhale because now through the hollowness of the place they have got liberty to dislate and free themselves from the heavy terrestrial and thick aqueous parts whereas before when they were kept close together through channels and lodges shutting close upon them the hot parts were firmly contained within and bound up This is necessarily and certainly demonstrative and infers that where ever close hollownesses are groved and that liquid matter containing terrestrial and aqueous parts in it may reach to them there certainly stones and metals can and may be generated By vertue of this position I shall prove and shew by and by that stones and metals may be generated in most hollow parts of the body of man But to persue my discourse The hot parts being now freed from the terrestrial parts and inhering in subtil ayry serosiries do with more ease and force procure their passage through this close and hollow prison than they made their way thither leaving the terrestrial and aqueous parts behind them for a Ransom which by degrees are coagulated more and more according to the expulsion of the fiery and ayry parts Understand also the reasons of the qualification of the Focus or womb of stones and Metals 1. It must be hollow the reason of this is set down already 2. It must be close for were it not close but open the terrestrial and aqueous matter could not be detained there but would have as free a passage as the thin parts Besides closeness conduceth to keep out extrinsick heat which otherwise would again dissolve and mollifie the work wherefore the hardest stones and metals are found some degrees below the Surface of the earth and I dare confidently assert that if metals
waters of the Fountain Campeius are bitter and flowing into the river Hipanis in Pontus infects it with the same taste There are other fountains between the Nile and the red Sea that agree with the former in taste likewise those of Silicia near Corycius The pit waters of Galniceus are acerbous The salt taste of waters is unknown to none since the Ocean is pregnant enough with it Some inland Lakes and Fountains are of the same taste viz. Three in Sicilia the Concanican Agrigentinian Lakes and another near Gela. There is another called Myrtuntius of the same relish between Leucades and the Ambracian Gulph The Taus in Phrygia Thopetis in Babylonia Asphaltites in Judaea Sputa in Media Atropacia Mantianus in Armenia one in Cyprus near Citium another between Laodicea and Apamia two in Bactria another near the Lake Moeotis and that of Yaogan Forrien besides many more are all of a saltish taste Touching Fountains there is one in Narbone exceeding the Sea in saltness There are six more of the same taste near the Adriatick gulph where it bends towards Aquileia besides several other salt pits in Italy Illyris Cappadocia c. II. Waters vary no less in their sent Some stinking as the Lake between Laodicea and Apamia the Fountain among the Phalisci another near Leuca in Calabria and those rivulets near the Lake Asphaltites c. Others give a sweet sent as the Fountain of Cabara in Mesopotamia The Pit Methone in Peloponesus smells like a Salve III. Next let me make address to the causes of these qualities A sharp taste is derived from those acute and Vitriolate particles immixt in the water A sweet taste is produced in water through an exact aerial mixtion or percoction with it The waters of Paphlagonia afford a vinous taste through the admixture of tartareous exhalations or such as are like to the mixture of Tartar of wine Bitterness flows from adust terrestrial particles admixt to waters Aluminous exhalations dispersed through water render it acerbous The saltness of the Sea and other Inland waters is communicated to them from the admixture of saltish particles exhaling out of the mud Touching the generation of salt and its mixtion I have inserted my opinion above I shall here only have a word or two with those that state the Sun the efficient cause of the said saltish particles broyling and aduring those exhalations contained with the body of the waters whence they assert the superficial parts of the Sea to be more saltish than the lower parts of it because the Suns heat is more vigorous there If the broyling Sun be the efficient whence is it then that some Lakes and Fountains are very salt where the Sun doth not cast its aduring beams 2. It is very improbable that so vast a number of saltish partiticles should be generated in the torrid Zone where the Sun doth only broyle as to infect the waters within the polars that are so remote thence How then is it that the waters prove as saltish there where the cold is as potent as the heat elsewhere as in Greenland Or absurdly supposing the Sea to be so far communicative of its savour why doth it not obtain a power of changing those sweet waters which it is constrained to harbour within it self As those which Columbus relates to have found in the American Sea near to the road of the Drakes head Moreover he attests to have sailed through fresh water a hundred and four Leagues far in the North Sea Pliny lib. 2. c. 103. affirms the same viz. to have discovered fresh water near Aradus in the Mediterranean and others by the Chaledonian Islands And in lib. 6. c. 17. he reports that Alexander Magnus had drank a draught of Sea water that was fresh and that Pompey when he was employed against Mithridates should have tasted of the same 3. The Ocean being alwaies in such an agitation cannot be a fit matrix to concrease or unite such mixtures 4. The broyling Sun doth rather render salt waters fresh as hath been experienced among Seamen by exposing pails of Sea water upon the deck to the torrid Sun under the Line which after a while standing do become much fresher An open heat doubtless sooner dissolves a mixture than it generates one for boyl Sea-water long upon the fire and it will grow fresh or distill it and you will find the same effect Beyond all scruple these saltish particles must be united into such mixtures out of earth proportioned to the other Elements in a close place or matrix yet not so close as to concrease them into a fixed subterraneous body or mineral whose coldness doth adact impact and bind the said Elements into an union and mixture which through defect of an entire closeness do soon exhale or transpire In a word the saltness of the Sea is generated within its mud whose closeness impacts and coagulates the exhalations of the earth into salin particles whence they are soon disturbed through the motion of the Sea and the attracting heat of the Sun Hence it is that old mud clay and such like bodies prove generally saltish so that the Sun adds little excepting in the stirring up of the said exhalations And touching the foregoing instance of the waters greater saltness atop than below it is fictitious for the Sea is much fuller of salt below than above because of its weight Nevertheless the Sea doth taste more saltish atop than below because the subtiller parts of the Salt are attracted or forced by the heat of the Sun towards the top which meeting there are apt to strike the tongue more piercing than otherwaies But whence these fresh waters do burst up into the Sea is worth our inquiry To resolve you you must know that the earth in many places under water is raised up into hills or shallows analogal to them whose earth atop lying very close doth hinder the water above it from passing especially in the Northern Climate where the Sea is somewhat thicker than under the Line but is nevertheless bursted through propulsion of the waters underneath which evacuated into the body of the Sea do cause that extent of fresh water without suffering themselves to be infected with the Saltness of the Sea because the Sea-water is so thick and closs that it excepts the fresh water from making an irruption into its continuity Hence it is that the River of the Amazons besides many others although irrupting into the Sea many Leagues far yet is maintained impolluted and fresh But why those salin particles should be generated near to those fresh springs and not close about them may seem strange It is because one ground is muddy and disposed to generate salt the other about the said spring is sandy dry as it were and close and not at all masht through as mud is The Sea-water deposeth its saltness in being percolated through the earth suffering the subtiller parts alone of the waters to pass but keeping back the grosser and
the way VI. Before I go on any further I will prove that such a vast measure of fiery winds blows down from each of the Polar Regions for six months together It is certain That a great proportion of fiery clouds is cast from the middle or Equinoctial of the fiery Heavens towards the Poles because there they are the strongest as appears by their strong and swift motion measuring more way by far there than about the Polars wherefore the greatest part of those fiery clouds must necessarily be detruded towards the Polars as being the weaker parts of the heavens and therefore the apter for their reception These clouds being obtruded thither in great quantities are compressed by the force of the Superiour heavens whereby the condensed fiery minims break forth in great showers which blowing constantly for six months do alwaies blow the Sun from them towards the opposite side 2. If clouds of the air are most detruded towards their Polars and blow thence constantly for a long season as Mariners tell us they do Ergo the same must happen in the fiery Region since the efficient causes and materials are corresponding 3. The fiery Region pressing strongly about the middle parts must needs cast up most air towards the Polars 4. Before there can be an eruption of these fiery clouds there must a certain abundance or proportion be collected through whose over possession and exceeding swelling they may sooner give way to burst out and then being opened they continue their fiery winds for six months and by that time they are quite evacuated In the mean time the other Polar side is a filling and is just grown swell'd enough for to burst out against the other is exhausted Here may be objected That whilst one Pole is evacuating it should attract all the matter from the other Pole because it gives way whereas the other cannot I answer That those fiery clouds through their giving way are still daily somewhat supplied by the continual casting up of the heavens for otherwise their ventilation could hardly be so lasting but however that is sooner evacuated than the clouds can be shut up again so that the ventilation lasteth untill all its contained matter is expelled 2. It is impossible that the air should be attracted from the opposite side since the greatest force of the middle parts of the inferionr Region is between which screweth the matter up equally towards each Pole VII The Suns deficient motion that is when he is accidentally moved through the succession of the Constellations of the Zodiack if compared to himself is observed to be regular that is in comparing one tropical or deficient course with another both do agree in the measure of space being over-runned in an equal time viz. of 360 Solar daies and in an equal Velocity moving in the same swiftness through the same Constellations in one year that he doth in another But if the particular motions of one defective or tropical course be referred to others of the same annual motion we shall find that the Sun is more potently withheld under the Meridional Signs than under the Septentrional ones That is moves swifter through the Austral Mediety in the Winter consuming but 178 daies 21 hours and 12 minut in that peragration and flower through the Boreal Signs in the Summer spending 186 daies 8 hours 12 minutes computing with the Vulgar 365 daies 5 hours 49 min. 16 sec. in the year so that the difference is 7 daies and 11 hours 2. The Sun appears sometimes at some seasons of the year higher then at others that is sometimes nearer to us and other times farther from us or otherwise the Sun is at the highest and farthest in the Summer in the month of June being then in Cancer and at the lowest or nearest in the moneth of December being then in Capricorn VIII The greatest declination of the Sun hath formerly in the daies of Hipparchus Ptolomy been observed to be of 23 deg 52 mi. which according to Copernicus his observation is reduced to 30 min. by others since to 28. The cause is evident and is to be imputed to the Suns or rather the fiery Regions gaining upon the inferiour Elements namely the water gains upon the earth and diducts her mole the air gains upon them both and insufflates their bodies and lastly the fire gains upon the air through which means it must necessarily incline nearer to the Center of the Earth which approximation must cause a diminution of the Suns declination For instance suppose the Sun in Hipparchus his time to have been at the height of o being then in his greatest declination from the Equinoctial a b if then since through the fiery Regions having gained upon the other Elements the Sun is descended from o to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being there nearer to the Center of the Earth his greatest declination in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must needs be less to ε than it is from o to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 IX Hence we may easily collect the duration of the World thus If the fiery Region hath gained from the time or years of Ptolomy to Copernicus so many minutes of the other Elements in how many years will the fire gain the restant minutes This being found out by the rule of proportion will resolve us when the World shall be returned again into a confusion or Chaos so that you may observe as at the beginning of the world the weighty Elements did gradually expell and at last over-power the light ones so the light ones do now gradually gain upon the weighty ones and at last will again over-power them and so you have a description of the long year consisting of 20 thousand Solar Circuits gaining near a degree every 68 years but towards the latter end will prevail much more because the nearer they incline the more forcibly they will make way And so you see all things are like to return to what they were viz. The immortal souls of men to God and the Universe in o the same Chaos which as I said formerly will abide a Chaos to all Eternity unless God do divide it again into a new World and raise new Bodies for the Souls that have of long been in being At the latter end of this descent you shall have Christ descending in the greatest Triumph Glory and Splendor appearing in a body brighter than the Sun Here must needs happen a very great noise and thunder when the Elements do with the greatest force clash against one another which cannot but then strike the greatest amazement and anguish into the Ears of the Wicked This Doctrine may prove a plain Paraphrase upon those mysteries mentioned in the Revelation of St. John For instance Chap. 9. v. 1 2. where a Star is described to fall down from heaven namely the Sun opening the bottomless pit and raising a smoak viz through his burning and consuming rayes c. No wonder if mens fancies are so strongly missed in