God and those things that belong to God are best and most perfect therefore he cannot admit any mutation for what is best is never changed The force of the Argument lies thus God by the necessitie of his Being has a plenitude of Essence and Perfection and therefore admits not of any augmentation or diminution for what by necessitie of Nature has a plenitude of Being and Perfection that cannot extend it self any further but must be infinite and what is infinite cannot be greater or lesser neither can any thing be taken from or added to it Hence God being by a necessitie of Nature most perfect cannot be more or lesse perfect therefore he cannot fal under any mutation either perfective or corruptive augmentative or diminutive § 2. Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection Hence follows Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection For a Being necessarily simply and immutably such must of necessitie be infinitely perfect A Creature simply and absolutely finite may be in some limited sense said to be infinite as the Soul of man is in regard of its capacitie said to be infinite because capable of an infinite object but nothing is absolutely simply and essentially infinite and perfect but God Infinitie really excludes al negation of Entitie from God and also includes that God is in pure Act whatever Ens in its most extensive universal latitude and notion doth include For an infinite Essence necessarily contains either formally or eminently whatever is or may be of perfection in al Beings either actually existent or possible But to treat more philosophically and distinctly of this Attribute we are to consider that infinite is a negative notion which includes a negation of al termes or bounds now a thing may be said to be terminated bounded or finite in reward 1 of its Essence and Perfection 2 of its Duration 3 of its Presence 4 of its Comprehensibilitie In al these regards God is said to be infinite He is infinite 1 in Essence as most perfect and independent 2 in Duration as eternal 3 in Presence as omnipresent or immense 4 as to our Comprehension in being incomprehensible We shal here treat only of Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection and of the other as distinct Attributes resulting from this Infinitude of Essence Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection may be various ways explicated and demonstrated Gods Infinitude from his Independence Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 2. c. 19. describes God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate independent immortal infinite eternal immaterial chiefest Good the immutable impassible incircumscript immense indefinible incorporeous invisible without indigence absolute most free omnipotent and infinitely potent By each of these divine Attributes the Infinitude of the Divine Essence may be demonstrated As 1. By his Independence The Infinitude of the Divine Essence consistes in a negation of al limitation and termes The termes that limit any Essence are its causes therefore that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any cause must needs be without termes and so infinite And is not the Divine Essence thus independent without al causal termes and limitation Must not God then be infinite in his Essence This Independence of the Divine Essence as to al causes and causal limitation is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie by Gods being the first and the last as Esa 41.4 I the Lord Esa 41.4 the first and with the last I am he So Chap. 44.6 I am the first and I am the last and besides me there is no God Thuse also Chap. 48.12 I am he I am the first I also am the last God is said to be the first as having no causal principe or efficient that might give limits to his Essence and the last as having no final cause or end that might give moral limits or bounds to his Wil. This Infinitude and Independence of the Divine ssence as the first Cause and last End is wel illustrated Rev. 1.8 11. 21.6 22.13 Rev. 1.8 11. 21.6 22.13 I am 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end the first and the last i.e. as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the first letter and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last of the Greek Alphabet so God is the first causal Principe or Efficient and last End or final Cause that gives termes and limits to al created Essences but receives limits and termes from none and therefore is infinite in Essence and Perfection Hence God is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-Being or Being of himself not by any positive influxe for that is impossible that any thing should give Being to it self but negatively by reason of his independence on any other Cause For God as the first has no efficient and as the last has no final Cause thence by consequence no causal termes or limitation This Independence and Infinitude of God as the first Efficient and last End is wel explicated and demonstrated by Plato in his Parmenides p. 137. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore if he the one God hath no part neither truely shal he have any beginning or end or middle for such are the parts of a thing Where he proves that God has no beginning nor end i. e. he is the first and the last from his simplicitie or not having parts And in what follows he gives us the reason of his consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the end and the principe is the terme of every thing i. e. every thing is terminated and bounded by its causal Principle or Efficient and last End therefore to speak in the language of sacred Philosophie He who is the first and the last without a first causal principe or last end to terminate his Essence must needs be infinite Thus Plato concludes in what immediately follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The one God therefore is infinite if he hath neither principe nor end This Argument which agrees with that of sacred Philosophie is most cogent for that which has no causal termes either of beginning or end but is the first causal principe and last end of althings must needs be infinite 2. Gods Infinitude from his Vnitie and Simplicitie The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection procedes from and may be demonstrated by Gods Vnitie Simplicitie and pure Actualitie Thus Plato in his Philebus pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One namely God is as many and infinite and many are as one only Plato here describes the first infinite Being under the commun Pythagorean notion of one and many as being one in regard of the simplicitie of his Essence and yet many in regard of his infinite Perfections and Ideas or Decrees So pag. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the one God is many and infinite The force of this Argument lies thus God being one simple pure Act must needs be infinite
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum or that which is most convenient i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature Hence 3 This Conformitie is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie and Symphonie Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mediocritie of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. § 30. and Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 4. Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing namely that it be done wel How the Forme of Good consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wel doing and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's better to a little wel than much il Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wâ—l doing the forme and measure of good So Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian who doth what is Grammatic Grammatically i.e. according to Rules of Grammar But yet he addes by way of caution That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves without regard to the perfection of the Artificer but the perfection of Virtue requires that the subject be so and so qualified And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is a righteous and temperate man not that doth those things but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them i.e. rightcously and soberly Hence that vulgar Effate That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie Tit. 2.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 soberly and righteously and piously This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions where the mater is indifferent because such have no goodnesse at al but what is from the Adverb So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right manner of being done and herein according to some the Forme of its goodnesse doth consiste even in the manner of it and any defect herein wil render the action evil according to those scholastic Maximes The forme gives being and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good So in the Canon Law they tel us That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former and must be resolved thereinto For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or bene factum wel done when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals but the least privation thereof is sin But How far Circumstances formalise moral Good to descend to particulars an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done when it is not only good for the mater but also clothed with al those Circumstances which necessarily attend its moral goodnesse The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act making it good or evil sometimes they only make it better or worse But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue saith he consistes in the wel doing of things for we may fear trust desire hate despise be angrie pitie rejoice and grieve 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not duely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly to be moved with these affections when and in what things and towards whom and for what end and in that manner as we ought this is the golden mean and that which is best wherein Virtue consistes Whence also Aristotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art 5. pag. 160. assures us That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But sins may be committed some when that is done that ought not others when not as it ought others because not at that time when it ought or the like Thence art 10. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater and when and in that manner as reason or the Law of Nature dictates Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good not only a right mater but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 7. Art 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act which toucheth it extrinsecally And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues For a Theologue considers human Acts as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration which they receive from due circumstances whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue What these circumstances are he addes Art 3. In human Acts Who did it By what aides or instruments What Why How When and Abour what he did it are to be inquired into Some explain these Circumstances thus 1 Quis who must not be taken for the efficient cause but for his condition and qualitie as a private person or public c. 2 Quid what must not be understood of the mater or object but of the qualitie thereof 3 Neither must Quomodo how be taken for the forme or manner but whether it be done openly or secretly c. Greg. Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. strongly assertes and proves That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good By an Act morally good I understand saith he no other according to the Doctors than an Act conforme to right Reason objective i.e. the Divine Law according to al circumstances requisite to this that the Act be truly virtuose When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason or the Law according to al due circumstances it is vitiose and morally evil This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions 1. Conclus That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance is truly virtuose This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance it is not as it ought to be therefore it is evil Due circumstances are communly said to be such things as are required to this that
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that we may determine that those things we see were not made of things apparent or were made of those things that appear not i. e. al the visible things of time were made according to the invisible Ideas of Eternitie there is nothing extant in this inferior sensible world but what had its Idea in the superior intelligible world of Divine Ideas Thus Plato in his Timaus pag. 28. treating of the Origine of the Universe saith God in the framing thereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had an eye on the eternal Exemplar or Idea which as a seal impressed its similitude on althings made Whence that commun Saying among the Platonistes Plato Ideas vocar ex quibus omnia quaecunque videmus fiunt ad quas cuncta formantur Grosseteste This Vniverse is but the imitamen of the Divine Mind That by Plato's Ideas we are to understand the divine Decrees as the Exemplars of althings future Robert Grosseteste that great Impugnator of the Papal Tyrannie in his acute Tractate de Libero Arbitrio which is to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. proves out of Augustin super Gen. Augustin saith Plato cals Ideas those by which althings we see are made and according to which althings are formed these are immortal immutable invariable Hear what an Idea is according to Plato An Idea is of those things that are necessary it is an eternal Exemplar such infinite Exemplars the natures of things of Men of Trees of Fishes c. have according to which whatever ought to be made is expressed These Exemplars of althings God hath in himself and thereby contains in his mind the numbers and modes of althings that are to be made or done He is sul of these figures or formes which Plato cals Ideas immortal invariable infatigable These Ideas in the Divine Mind Plato in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. discourseth more fully of and the sum of al his Philosophemes about them is this That these Ideas are most simple immaterial eternal infinite and immutable c. as we have more fully explicated and demonstrated Court Gent. P. 2. c. 9. § 4. Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect 5. § 3. l. 3. c. 2. sect 1. § 2. c. 4. sect 1. § 9. Thus we see how God contemplates and knows althings in the glasse of his own Divine Essence and Ideas How the divine Ideas represent the Creatures not as if the divine Ideas were to be considered as a formal concept but only as objective whence they are properly stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Exemplar which alwayes importes an objective concept according to which this or that is framed Thus also Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 19. pag. 225. Things understood by God move the Divine Intellect not properly but only metaphorically or objectively because the Ideas and similitudes thereof are in God i. e. his Divine Essence which most distinctly representes al Inteligibles And because God hath al these Ideas and similitudes from himself only and not from the things understood which are posterior he is not said to be moved by them to understand but very metaphorically and lesse properly Things future are according to their proper existence present unto God yet not simply but in some respect only namely in the Divine Wil and Prescience So Aquinas assures us That the Essence of God as understood by God is the Idea of things The Essence of God albeit it doth not formally contain things create by a formal convenience and similitude yet it doth contain them according to their formal representation The very Essence of God is the objective Exemplar of understanding himself as also of understanding the Creatures The Divine Essence representes althings according to their proper reasons which reasons of things in God are the very creatrix Essence which is the exemplary representation of al Essences as the sufficience of God is of al things possible and the Wil of althings future The divine Essence which representes althings as an Exemplar directes the operation of God in producing the Exemplates or things formed according thereunto For there is something in God that correspondes to al the perfections of Creatures not as if there were a formal similitude between the Idea and Ideate but there is something formally existing in God that representes al the perfections of Creatures Thus al the Creatures are in the Divine Mind representatively albeit they are not as to their own formal essences really the same therewith Some over and above this Representation make these divine Ideas to be also energetic and operative causes of things but this must be understood 1 either as they are conjunct with the divine Wil which is the prime Efficient of althings or 2 not of a proper efficience but only exemplary For an Idea in the mind of an Artificer albeit it worke not as a proper efficient cause yet it doth worke as an exemplary cause which is reduced to the efficient Thus the divine Ideas may be said to operate as they are the grand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exemplar according to which the divine Wisdome directes it self in the production conservation and disposition of althings These Ideas as was hinted are either of things merely possible and so they are represented by the divine Sufficience or Essence nakedly considered and belong to the simple Intelligence of God or else they are of things future and so they are represented by the divine Wil which is the Efficient of althings future For look as an Artificer has an Idea of his worke so God contemplates in his own Wil the original Exemplar of althings future as Plato Timeus pag. 28. One and the same knowlege of God receives diverse denominations according to the various state of the things known For if the things known be only possible then God contemplates them in his divine Essence but if they are future present or past then he contemplates them in the determination and decree of his Wil. Hence God by means of these his divine Ideas the original universal and perfect Exemplars of althings has the most perfect comprehension of althings whether possible or future past or present complexe or simple necessary or contingent absolute or conditionate The mode of Gods Science in the general being thus explicated Particular Characters of Gods Science we hence may draw several particular essential and proper characters thereof 1. Most simple As 1. hence it follows That the Divine Science is but one simple Act without the least shadow of composition or division Gods Science having one and the same Idea with his Essence it thence necessarily follows that in God the Intellect intelligible Species Object understood and Act of Intellection be one and the same The divine Essence is a spiritual light most intelligible and most intelligent of it self and althings else in the most simple manner Hence Plato makes his divine
of our Understanding is mutable because dependent on externe objects and Mediums but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable and therefore the measure of al Truth as Aquinas wel notes This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God saith he by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings and al particles of time as they are most truely in himself for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant according to the manner of our human infirmitie but he understandes althings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Wil which represences althings uniformely and invariably As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens which should see by extramission and actively as God seeth it would then always see uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round and the same part now in the East and anon in the South and then in the West Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time with their distinct vicissitudes and successions without the least variation or succession because he sees althings not passively by species and impressions received from the things themselves but actively in his own Essence and Wil the active Principe of al. We poor mortals by reason of our infirmitie cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time always fluent and succeding each other and therefore we take the present instant which of al time is most actual and best known to us and make it the measure of past present and future time whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable but God who knows althings in his own Eternitie is not liable to such succession and mutation his Science being a pure necessary Act must needs be immutable and invariable albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods knowlege the primary object is the divine Essence which is immutable and therefore the divine Science such also Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known then it would be mutable as they are but not otherwise God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential wherefore 1 he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of 2 He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows 3 He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows 4 He cannot begin to know what he before knew not or not to know what before he knew because nothing begins to be future This immutabilitie of the divine Science as to things future arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil and not from any thing in the object is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates That the Causes Origines and Reasons of althings future though in themselves never so instable are most stable immutable necessary yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil whence also the Divine Science is most certain necessary and immutable This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future as before That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary so Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 39. pag. 130 140. Hence 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible 4. Divine Science most certain Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive and be deceived or to be ignorant of supreme Beings much lesse God The Science of God being necessary ad immutable it cannot but be most certain and infallible To know things certainly is to know them in their causes now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings he thence knows them perfectly Gods Science is as certain as the future events for where there is a determinate effect there must be a determinate cause and where the cause is determinate there the science also may be determinate The knowlege of things future in God is as certain as the knowlege of things present for every future compared to God the first Cause and his Science is necessary and necessarily future albeit as compared to the second causes some effects may be contingent or contingently future The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect namely the divine Essence it cannot but be most certain and infallible if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science how much more in divine Science which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light and most simple intuition contemplating every Being and Truth as it is in it self in the glasse of the divine Essence The divine Intellect sees althings as existent in themselves by the infinite light of the divine Essence and therefore most certainly and infallibly as Esa 40.13 14. Hence 5. The Dâ—â—â—â—e Science is absolute and independent not conditionate and dependent on any create Object Thus Plato 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-subsistent and independent as to al externe objects and condition For otherwise saith he God should not have a certain knowlege of and soverain dominion over human affaires It 's impossible that any effect should be or be understood as future in any case but dependently on its efficient cause Now what is the first and universal Essicient of al effects but the Decree of the divine Wil on which every effect dependes more than on its proxime cause Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects placed in such circumstances For al futures whether absolute or conditionate are known by God not from the determination of second causes but from the determinatin of the divine Wil which is the first Cause For whence springs the futurition of things but from the determination of the divine Wil And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the second CAuse And if so may we not then hence conclude that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the existence of or any conditions that belong to future objects If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent must not the divine Science which is identified therewith be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object can it be any other than conjectural Where any science dependes on its
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the progenie of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
and demonstration of the officacitie of Divine Concurse we are to consider that there is a twofold Concurse of God one moral the other efficacious which some terme physic Concurse because it workes according to the manner of physic Efficients For a physic Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect but a moral Cause as dictinguished from physic is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect yet he doth so far morally concur as that the effect is imputed to him as it 's wel determined by Suarez Metaph. Disput 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent but only objectively and remotely by Commands Arguments Incentives Motives and such like moral influences which is only a metaphoric indirect remote improper and inefficacious kind of efficience But now a physic Cause is that which alone deserves and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it self the name of an efficient Cause because it doth by a proper real direct and efficacious influxe or causalitie reach its effect God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concurse in and for the production of moral good He commandes propones arguments invites persuades what is good as also efficaciously workes the same in those he intendes to do good to But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concurse concur thereto and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them This being premissed we procede to demonstrate the efficacitie of Gods Concurse 1 From its soverain nature and omnipotent manner of working specially in supernatural gratiose effects The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infusion Conservation Promotion and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches who stile this efficacious medicinal Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne or supernatural vocation and motion they terme it sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the operant and cooperant Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Energie Aide and Assistence of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ineffable Virtue of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the assistent Power It 's termed also by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne and Divine impulse or inclination also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of protection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Spring of Energie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it self perfect and sufficiently operative Chrysostome termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insuperable Assistence But none among the Greek Theologues seems more lively to describe it than Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. de Adorat Tom. 1. where he assertes That men are turned from sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only by words injected into the Soul i. e. according to the Pelagian persuasion by moral suasion only but that God puts forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an energetic efficacious Aide whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand Clemens Alexandr l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Inspiration of God also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the subtile and spirituale instructive force of Divine words And Athanas contr Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power communicated from God Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of God hath overcome Whence the Greek Theologues termed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence And Chrysostome saith expressely that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God 2 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil. We have before § 3. demonstrated that the Divine Concurse supposeth not any transient influxe form God but only the act of the Divine Wil which being omnipotent it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is also omnipotent and most efficacious Whence it is worthy our notice that the Concurse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word as Gen. 1.3 c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil Hence in sacred Philosophie the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie both Word and Thing denoting to us that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things whatever God speakes and sayes shal be done is done and whatever is done is but the effect of his Word or Wil every Word and Wil of God which regardes the event and issues of things is omnipotent and operative 3 From the Determination of the second cause by the first Gods Concurse is not only moral by propounding objects and persuading thereto but really operative and productive of things Now in al cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate the first and second cause cannot be coordinate but the later must be subordinate to the former and if subordinate to then it must be determined by the first Cause It 's certain that either the second cause determines the first or the first the second and is it not more likely that the first cause should determine the second than that the second should determine the first to act Can we imagine that the concurse of the first cause is in the power of the second Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God and the condition of a Creature to determine that the causalitie of the second cause is subordinate unto and therefore determinable by the concurse of the first cause This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes See Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez de Auxil l. 3. Disp 18-21 l. 4. Disput 32. Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. 7. Gods Concurse connatural Lastly Gods concurse albeit it be most potent and efficacious yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial there is not more of force than Divine suavitie mixed therewith So Psal 110.3 Psal 110.3 Thy people shal be willing in the day of thy power Willing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willingnesses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib signifies 1 Free ready chearful spontaneous 2 Metonymically a free gift or oblation 3 Princes who ought to be free-spirited generose liberal as Luke 22.25 4 The word is here used in the abstract which carries a great emphase for abstractes speak essences 5 It is here also in the Genitive case plural of thy willingnesses which the Hebrews use as expressive of a superlative degree So that the meaning is thy people shal be in the most superlative degree free ready willing as Noble and Free-borne Princes to offer up themselves a Free-wil-offering gift or oblation unto thee Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the interne philtrum or charme by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace which is
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause