built unlesse the Lord doe afford not onely his concurrence but his blessing to the labours of the one and to the watchfulnesse of the other But in this argument wee may expatiate without impeachment of digression from the matter or of diversion from our ayme in the following Treatise of divine providence 6. This present Treatise requires an induction sufficient to prove that every visible or sublunarie substance aswell the common matter whereof all such things are made as the severall formes which are produced out of it have an efficient cause precedent to their making or production For the seuerall formes or bodies generable which are constituted by them the induction is as cleare to every mans sense or understanding as any mathematicall induction can bee The naturalist is neither able nor disposed to except against the universalitie of it or to instance in any sublunarie bodie which hath not a true efficient cause or an agent precedent from whose efficacie its physicall or essentiall forme was either made or did result The question onely remaines about the efficiencie or production of the prime or common matter Seeing it is the mother of generation wee will not vexe the Naturalist by demanding a generative cause efficient of its beeing but that it must have some cause efficient wee shall enforce him to grant from a generall Maxime most in request with men of his profession The Maxime is That the philosophicall progresse from effects to their causes or from inferiour to superiour causes is not like Arithmeticall or geometricall progressions it cannot bee infinite Wee must at length come to one supreme cause efficient which in that it is supreame is a cause of causes but no effect and being no effect nor cause subordinate to any other Agent it can have no limit of Beeing it can admit no restraint in working Whatsoever we can conceive as possible to have limited Beeing or beginning of such Beeing must haue both frō it by it Now if the perfect workes of nature bodies sublunarie of what kind soever suppose a possibilitie physicall included in the prime and common matter before they have actuall Being if it imply no contradiction for them to have beginning of Beeing it will imply no contradiction that the prime mater it selfe or imperfect masse whereof they are made should have a beginning of its imperfect beeing That Physicall beeing which it hath doth presuppose a logicall possibilitie of beeing as it is that is no contradiction for it sometimes to be and sometimes not to haue beene This supreame cause or agent which as we suppose did reduce the logicall possibilitie of the prime matter of sublunary bodies into Act cannot be the heavens or any part of the hoast of heavē neither the sun moon nor stars For albeit the Sun be the efficient cause by which most workes of nature in this sublunarie part of the world are brought to perfection yet is it no cause at all of that imperfect masse or part of nature on which it workes Vnlesse it had some matter to worke upon it could produce no reall or solid effect by its influence light or motion how ever assisted with the influence of other stars or planets Yet must this prime matter have some cause otherwise it should be more perfect than the bodily substances which are made of it For they all stand in neede both of this prime matter as a cause in it kinde concurrent to their production and of the efficiencie of the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents to worke or fashion the materialls or Ingredients of which they are made If either this common matter of sublunary substances or the Sunne which workes upon it had no superiour cause to limit their beeing or distinguish their offices both of them should bee infinite in Beeing both infinite in operation Now if the matter were infinite in beeing the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents could have no beeing but in it or from it For if the Sunne were infinite in operation the matter it selfe could bee nothing at all no part of nature unlesse it were a worke or effect of the Sunne Infinitie in beeing excludes all possibilitie of other Beeing save in it and from it And infinitie in operation supposeth all things that are limited whether in beeing or operation to bee its workes or resultances of its illimited efficacie CHAP. 7. Shewing by reasons philosophicall that aswell the physicall matter of bodies sublunary as the celestiall bodies which worke upon it were of necessitie to have a beginning of their Beeing and Duration 1 FOr further demonstration that as well the Sunne which is the efficient generall as the prime matter which is the common mother of bodies sublunary had a beginning of beeing there can be no meane eyther more forcible or more plausible then another Maxime much imbraced and insisted upon by the great Philosopher to wit that as well the efficient as the materiall cause derive the necessitie of their causalitie from the end or finall cause unto which they are destinated The Sunne doth not runne its daily course from East to West or make its annuall progresse from North to South to get it selfe heate or for the increase of its native force or vigour by change of Climates but for the propagation of vegetables for the continuance of life and health in more perfect sublunary substances If then wee can demonstrate that those vegetables or more perfect sublunarie bodies for whose continuall propagation for the continuance of whose life and well-fare the Sunne becomes so indefatigable in its course had a true beginning of beeing that the propagation is not infinitely circular the cause will be concluded that as well the common matter whereof they are made as the Sunne it selfe which produceth them had a beginning of beeing and operation from the same supreame cause which appointed the Sunne thus to dispense its heate and influence for the reliefe and comfort of this inferiour world To prove that these sublunarie more perfect bodies as vegetables c had a beginning of beeing or propagation no Argument can be more effectuall to the Naturalist or others that will take it into serious consideration than the discussion of that probleme which Plutarch hath propounded Whether the Egg were before the Hen or the Hen before the Egg. The state of the question will be the same in all more perfect vegetables or living Creatures which usually grow from an imperfect or weake estate to a more perfect and stronger Whether the Acorne were before the Oake or the Oake before the Acorne Whether the Lyon had precedencie of nature to the Lyons whelp or the Lyons whelp unto the Lyon The induction may be for eyther part most compleate in respect of all times and of all places if with the Naturalist wee imagine the world to have beene without beginning or without ending No Naturalist can ever instance in any more perfect feathered fowle which was not first covered with a shell or contained in
that which hath no beginning of beeing cannot have its beeing for any other sake besides it owne Nor can we truely say that it is for its owne sake And this Authors reason for this assertion is most judiciously acute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praeter causam enim est cujus cansa non est so the Latin translator The Authors full meaning is That which hath no efficient cause to give its beginning of beeing can have no finall cause of its beeing or rather no cause at all whether finall formall or material But is it selfe the cause of causes the prime efficient by which all things are what they are and the last end or finall cause for which they are CHAP. 8. Discussing the second generall proposed Whether the making something of nothing rightly argue a power Omnipotent 1 THe discussion of the second generall Principle might well have had its admission into Divinity denyed had not some Schoole Divines by disputing whether there can be any instrumentall cause of Creation given it a colourable pretence for intruding it selfe Their meaning may in more civill language be thus exprest Whether the power of creating may by omnipotency be delegated to any agent not omnipotent That Omnipotency it self cannot be delegated all agree Now if the production of spirituall grace in the heart of man be a true and proper effect of creative power they who teach that the Sacraments of the Gospel do conferre grace ex opere operato that is by their proper efficacy are ingaged to make proofe that the power of creation may be delegated by the Almighty Father either to the consecrated Sacramentary Elements or to the Priest which consecrates them But leaving the discussion of this Question in the explication of whose termes or meaning the favourers or maintainers of it do not agree 〈◊〉 proper place 〈◊〉 our present question is Whether ability to create substances visible or invisible doth necessarily inferre it to be Omnipotent Spirituall grace all grant is no substance But here againe the Schoolemen have troubled themselves and their Readers with a question if not more curious yet as unnecessary as the former as whether this visible world or at least some part of it might not have beene created immediately by Angels as by Gods instrumets The Question perhaps might be more pertinent and more distinct were it framed thus Whether to make any visible or invisible substance of nothing or without any matter pretedent which should remaine as an ingredient in the substance made do rightly infer the immediate maker to be Omnipotent That any cause efficient of substance which hath beene created or hereafter may be created could be enabled to create or make any other substance without any entity praexistent whereof it should be made is an hypothesis or supposall which hath no other ground either in Philosophy or Divinity besides the vncertaine grounds from which some have attempted to prove that creation is a prerogative of the one Omnipotent which cannot be delegated to any other This truth some labour to prove from this Maxime Inter 〈◊〉 non ens infinita distantia est Betweene something betweene any thing which truly is and meere nothing there is an infinite distance or disparity Now this breach of disparity or distance infinite which they conceive between something nothing caÌ„not be fully made up save only by power truly infâ—nite whence it may seeme concluded that it is impossible for any thing to be made of nothing save onely by power in it selfe Omnipotent or absolutely infinite The conclusion it selfe or the last proposition in the inference I verily beleeve to be most true but the meane to inferre it or manner of inferring it is not so certaine as the conclusion is sound The Argument is bâ—t calculatory And this kind of argument is deceitfull unlesse the degrees of proportion whether between the disparity oâ— congâ—â—ity of termes compared bee determinate and certaine The degrees of disparity betweene something and nothing cannot be more in number or more infinite than are the entitive degrees of any created substance And these are not actually or absolutely infinite nor can the disparity betwixt something and nothing betwixt nothing and the most excellent eventure that is be so great or so absolutely infinite as is the disparity betwixt the most excellent creature that is or can be and the one Omnipotent Creator who alone is absolutely infinite 2 But be it onely supposed no way granted that the power of making some visible substance out of nothing might be delegated to some Creature the exercise of this power thus delegated would not inferre the Exerciser of it but only the Author to be Omnipotent For to be Omnipotent includes as much as to be able to do all things which imply no contradiction as much as to make all things that can be conceived as logically possible out of nothing because all sorts or kinds of being numerable or comprehensible are eminently contained in the incomprehensible Essence of which the attribute of Omnipotency is a chiefe prerogative It is not then all one to be enabled to make some thing suppose a gnat or flye out of nothing and to be able to make as many things as now are extant in the world or much better than these are out of meere nothing It is a maxime evident by light of reason that no Doner can really give more than he hath to give suppose he were willing enabled and authorized to give himselfe to give its whole nature with the appurtenances to any other Creature already extant or in possibility to bee created It being then supposed that an Angell by some speciall delegation from the incomprehensible Essence or power Omnipotent might be enabled to make something of nothing it were not possible that he should make any nature or essence more excellent than himselfe Yet it is possible that there might be some more excellent created substance than this Angell yea of necessity there should be a possibilitie of his being more excellent in his kind than now he is However for him to give for him to bestow a more excellent being upon that which is not than for the present he himselfe hath is no way possible Suppose then hee might entirely alienate from himselfe or bequeath the best being which for the present he hath upon some possibility of being or advance some numerable not being to his own estate by his utter annihilation this could not argue him to be Omnipotent because there be many other effects possible which are not in his power to produce albeit he could resume that which he had given unto another and bestow it againe where he pleased Lastly seeing the prime Essence who alone is absolutely infinite did not make all things out of nothing by a necessity of nature but because it was his will so to make them no creature by any delegated power imaginable could possibly make any one thing or more things out of nothing
the seat of Chance or Fortune in our way and to declare what is meant by these termes and whether such events as we say fall out by Fortune or Chance have any alliance with necessity In this discussion I hope wee shall arive at that point whereat the favourers of absolute necessity and the favourers of other opinions concerning Fate and Fortune more fluctuant will bee content to cast anchor Fortune saith Plutarch is a part of Chance as free-will or choise is of contingency Every casuall event is contingent but every contingent effect is not casuall or a chance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quasi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The very name of Chance in Greek saith Aristotle implies as much as to be to no end or purpose yet this etymology under correction was no part of the Ancients meaning which gave the Greek name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to such events as we terme casuall unlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 frustra be referred onely as perhaps Aristotle intended to the efficient cause After a manner of speech not much unlike to this the Schoolemen say that is gratis dictum as wee would say freely spoken not for which a man takes no fee but for which he hath no just ground or reason And that in phrase of Scripture is said to bee done gratis or frustra which is done without just motives or provocation not that which is done or attempted to no end or purpose Oderunt me frustra and Oderunt me gratis They hated me without a cause or They hated me vainly are in some translations equivalent The word in the originall answers to both In analogy to this kinde of speech those events were said to fall out by chance or to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in the opinion of such as gave this name had no efficient cause or at least none discernable but were supposed to move themselves or to take possession of such short beeing as they had without the assignement of any superiour power or of any constant or setled cause intruding themselves into the course of nature like unbidden guests sometimes as unwelcome as frost in summer sometimes as welcome as warme weather to such as want fire in winter 5 Fortune hath her authority placed onely in reasonable actions or deliberations yet not in all these but onely in such events as fall out either so farre beyond or contrary to mens intentions that they may be rather wondred at then expected If husbandmen should digge their Vineyards with purpose to finde Gold the fruitefull vintage thereon following though no part of their intentions could not so properly bâ—e ascribed to Fortune as if a husbandman intending onely to dig his Vineyard in hope of a plentifull vintage should finde store of Gold 6 The meaning of Plato of Aristotle and Plutarch may bee better perceived by fit instance then by large scholastique commentaries upon their severall definitions of Fortune Valerius Maximus and to my remembrance Plutarch hath a memorable storie of one Iason Phereus that was cured of an impostume in a fray or Duell The blow of an enemy was the cause of this mans health but by a rare and unusuall accident quite contrary to his intention that gave it and altogether beyond his expectation that received it His purpose was only to maintaine his reputation or revenge his wrongs either to wound or to be wounded without any hope or thought of curing his disease the danger wherof was not fully discovered til it was past But a more perfect Idaea or exemplarie forme of fortune good or bad then any historian relates the greeke Epigrammatist hath pictured for our contemplation The matter of the Epigram was in English thus A silly poore wretch being deprived of all meanes to live resolves to deprive himselfe of breath but whilest he sought a place convenient for acting this desperate purpose finding store of gold which another had hid he returned home againe leaving his halter in the place which was worse taken by him that hid the gold then meant by him that left it for he hanged himselfe in it for griefe of his losse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A poore wretch finding gold for ioy left 's halter in its steed Which he that left the gold for griefe did make his fatall threed To finde Gold was no part of that poore mans hopes whom despaire of like meanes to live by had made desirous of death the other had as little minde to dispatch himselfe when he came to visit the supposed stay and comfort of his life wherein his soule had solaced her selfe with the foole in the Gospell CHAP. 21. Of the proper subject and nature of Fate 1 THE most usefull issue which these or the like cases afford is this whether the event specified in them bee meerely casuall contingent or in some sort necessarie One and the same determination will as well befit the like quaestion concerning such events as are properly tearmed Fatall whose proper subject nature and definition we are more particularly to inquire after The first quaere which few meddle withall would bee this Whether fatall events participate more of contingencie then of necessitie But setting aside all comparison it sufficeth us that they truely participate of both but in different degrees or measures according to the diversitie of times Contingencie is alwayes as necessarily praesupposed to the production of events fatall as necessitie is included in them And as the proper forme or essence of Fates consists not in every sort of necessitie but in some peculiar branch thereof so neither is every Contingent subject a fit matter for receiving that forme or branch of necessitie wherein the nature of Fate consists and which giues denomination and being to events fatall I have heard many unthrifts upon the loosing of a faire game at Tables curse the Dice or cry vengeance upon ill luck but I never heard any Gamester frame such inditements either in verse or prose against Fates as were usuall amongst the heathens whose language in other cases is with our unthrifts most familiar Such pettie adventures as Cardes and Dice are as met all too base to be instampt with the inscription of Fate whose proper subject in publike affaires is matter either of tragedie or of triumph in private matter either of extraordinarie and unusuall prosperitie or of calamitie Most of Gods creatures are the subject of contingency mankind onely or humane societie is the the proper sphaere without whose circumference neither fortune or fatall events doe wander Yet is not every part of man subject to fate though man according to every part bee subject to that contingencie which is praesupposed to Fates Iustin Martyr though a professed enemy to Stoicall Fates and a most valiant champion a chiefe leader to all the rest which have defended the Christian truth against that sect being most potent in the infancie of Christianitie was not so nice as either to
it hath Now limits of being are essentiall properties of that essence or being wherin they are found And distinct bounds or limits are included in the distinct forme of being which every thing hath from its cause Actuall essence or existence it selfe is distributed to every thing that hath cause of being as it were sealed up in its proper forme or kind of being It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing as for any thing that is to take limits or set forme of being from nothing That which hath nothing to give it being can have nothing to give it limits or bounds of being And as no entity can take its being or beginning of being from it selfe so neither can it take bounds or limits from it selfe but must have them from some other The prime essence or first cause of all things that are as it hath no precedent cause of existence nor can it be cause of existence to it self so neither can it have any cause of limits without it selfe nor can it be any cause of limits to it selfe It remaines then that it must bee an essence illimited and thus to be without bounds or limits is the formall effect or consequence of being it selfe or of that which truly is without any cause precedent to give it being or make it what it is 6 So essentially is the conceipt of being without bounds or limits included in our conceipt of being without cause precedent that if we should by way of supposition give any imaginary entity leave to take beginning or possession of being from it selfe without the warrant of any cause precedent to appoint or measure it out some distinct portion or forme of being thus much being once by imagination granted wee could not by any imagination possible debarre this entity from absolute necessity of being for ever after whatsoever it listed to be or from being all things rather than any one thing Of the Heathens many did hold an uncreated Chaos praeexistent to the frame of this Vniverse and Philosophers to this day maintaine an ingenerable matter which actually is not any body but indifferent to be made every body Let us but suppose First the one or other of them to be as Homogeneall in it selfe as the ayre or water Secondly to be able to actuate or Proteus-like to transforme it selfe into a better state than now it hath without the helpe of any agent or efficient and then as it could have no cause so can there bee no reason given to restraine it from taking all bodily perfection possible to it selfe And if it bee true which some teach that this prime matter hath neither proper quantity nor quality what should hinder it to take both without measure supposing it might bee its one carver of those endowments Or imagine there were such a vacuity where the world now is as we Christians beleeve there was before it was made and onely one of Democritus casuall Atoms or some meere possibility or appetite of the matter left free venire in vacuum to give it selfe full and perfect act without curbe or restraint of any superiour power or sharer to cry halfe mine with it or make claime to the nature of any actuall entity lost it being supposed to be able to take any one nature upon it what should either hinder or further it to assume the nature of earth rather than of water or of these two rather than of any other Element or of any simple bodies rather than of mixt or compounded substances or of bodily substances rather than spirituall or of all these rather than of their metaphysicall eminences and perfections Or whilst we imagine it without cause of existence or beginning no reason imaginable could confine it to any set place of residence or extension no cause could bee alledged why it should take possession of the center rather than of the circumference of this Vniverse as now it stands or of both these rather than of the whole sphere or of the whole sphere rather than of all extensive space imaginable Only the very supposition of taking beginning though without cause doth put a limit to its duration because this kinde of beginning being but imaginary depends upon our imagination as upon its true cause And yet even thus considered me thinks it should extend its existence both waies and draw a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes Or not imagining the beginning let us imagine it only to have true present being without any cause precedent to push it forward or superiour guide to appoint it a set course and it is not within the compasse of imagination why the duration of it should not reach as farre the one way as the other as farre beyond all imagination of time past as of time to come why it should not comprehend all duration imaginable by way of present possession or supereminent permanency without admission of any deflux division or succession for continuation of its existence 7 If it bee objected that any thing may follow from supposition or imagination of impossibilities the reply is easie The objection is either false or true in a sense which no way impeacheth but rather approves that kinde of arguing True it is there is almost nothing in nature so impossible as it may not be the possible consequent of some impossibility supposed or granted but of every particular impossibility supposed or imagined the possible consequences are not infinite neither such nor so many as we list to make them they are determinate by nature Now we cannot conceive it to be in nature more impossible for a meere logical possibility really and truely to take beginning of actuall being onely from it selfe then it is for that which is supposed imagined thus to take beginning to be restrained either to any determinat kind or part of being or to bee confined to any set place or residence Or if any mislike these imaginarie models let him now he hath givē us leave to make them and vouchsafed to looke upon them utterly cancell or deface them The everlasting edifice to whose erection they are destinated is this Such as we cannot cōceive that not to be which we conceive to take beginning of being from it selfe without any cause precedent such of necessity must we conceive and beleeve him to bee indeed who neither tooke beginning from himselfe nor had it given by any but is the beginning of being the sole maker of all things that bee being himselfe without beginning without dependance o◠any cause without subordination to any guide to appoint his kinde to limit his place or prescribe his time of being He is in all these and whatsoever branch or portion of being imaginable truely and really infinite the quintessence or excellency of all perfections whether numericall or specifical incident to al sorts or degrees of Beings numerable CHAP. 1. Of infinity in Beeing or of absolute infinitie and the right definition of it by the ancient
import terminum a quo the terme onely of the Action not any matter or subject and yet the tearme thus imported can bee no positive Entitie but a meere negation of any positive Entitie precedent To make the heauens and earth of nothing is in reall value no more then to make them not of any matter or Entitie praeexistent whether visible or invisible on which their Maker did exercise his efficient power or efficacie but to give them such beeing as they then first began to have that is a corporeall beeing or existence by the meere efficacie or vertue of his word As suppose the Sunne should in a moment be suffered to transmit his light into a close vault of stone we might truely say this heavenly bodie did make light of darknesse tanquam ex termino in that it made light to be there where was no light at all before but meere darkenesse And thus to make light out of darknesse doth no way argue that it turned darknesse into light or that darknesse did remaine as an ingredient in the light made After this manner did the Amightie make the heaven and earth of nothing that is he made the corporeall masse or substance out of which all things visible were made where no limited substance whether visible or invisible was before and by the same efficiencie by which this masse was made he made place or spatiousnesse quantitative which had no beeing at all before he did not turne indivisibilitie into spatiousnes or meere vacuitie into fulnes fulnes and spatiousnesse were the resultance of that masse which was first made without any Entitie or ingredient praeexistent To make something of nothing in this sense implies no contradiction there is no impossibilitie that the heaven and earth should be thus made but this will not suffice to refute the Atheist or infidell For many things are possible which are not probable and many things probable which are not necessary The next question then is what necessitie there is in the infallible rules of nature and reason that the Heavens the earth should be made of nothing Against the probabilitie onely of Moses his historie of the first creation the Atheist will yet oppose this generall induction That all bodily substances that begin to be what before they were not that all things which we see made are alwayes made by some efficient cause not out of meere nothing but of some imperfect being praexistent To examine then the general rule pretended to amount from this generall induction s or what truth there is in that philosophicall maxime ex nihilo nihil fit is the next point CHAP. 5. By what manner of induction or enumeration of particulars universall rules or Maximes must bee framed and supported That no induction can bee brought to proove the Naturalists Maxime Of nothing nothing can be made 1 TO frame a generall rule or principle in any facultie Art or science there is no other meanes possible besides induction or a sufficient enumeration of particular experiments to support it The particulars from which this sufficiencie must amount may be in some subjects fewer in others more How many soeuer the particular instances or alleaged experiments be the number of thē will not suffice to support an universall rule unlesse they erect our understandings to a cleare view of the same reason not onely in all the particulars instanced in but in all that can be brought of the same kind Vnlesse there bee a cleare resultance of the same reason in all the induction failes and the rule which is grounded on it must needes fall For this cause universall rules are easily framed in the Mathematiques or in other Arts whose subjects are more abstract or not charged with multiplicitie of considerations or ingredients from whose least variation whether by addition or subtraction whether by further commixture or dissolution the cause or reason of truth so varies that the rule which constantly holds in a great many like particulars will not hold in all because they are not absolutely or every way alike Hee which seriously observes the manner how right angles are framed will without difficultie yeeld his assent unto this universall rule That all right angles are equall because hee sees there is one and the same reason of absolute equalitie in al that can be imagined And this negative rule will by the same inspection win our assent without more adoe that if any two angles be unequall the one of them at least can be no right angle The consideration likewise of a few particulars will suffice to make up these universall never-failing rules 1. First that the greater any circle is the greater alwayes will the angle of the semicircle be 2. The second that the angle of the least semicircle which can be imagined is greater then the most capacious acute-angle that can be made by the concurrence of two right lines And yet it will as clearly appeare from the inspection of the same particulars from which the former rules do amount that the angle of the greatest semicircle imaginable cannot possibly be so capacious as every right angle is The consideration of the former rules specially of the first and third will clearly manifest that the quantitie contained in these angles how little soever they be is divisible into infinite indeterminate parts or divisible into such parts without possible end or limitation of division But albeit the difference of quantitie between a right angle and the angle of a semicircle bee potentially infinite or infinitely divisible according to parts or portions in determinate yet will it not hence follow that the one angle is as great againe as the other according to the scale of any distinct or determinate quantitie or expressible portions And this observation in Mathematicall quantitie would quickly checke or discover the weaknesse of many calculatory Arguments or inductions oft-times used by great Divines in matters morall or civill As for example that every sinne deserveth punishment infinite because every sinne is an offence committed against an infinite Being or Majestie And the greater or more soveraigne the Majestie is which wee offend the greater alwayes will the offence be and meritorious of greater punishment Yet all this onely proves an infinitie of indeterminate degrees in every offence against the divine Majestie by which it exceedes all offences of the same kinde committed onely against man it no way inferres an infinite excesse or ods of actuall determinate punishment or ill deserts For this reason wee have derived the just award of everlasting supernaturall paines unto temporarie and transeunt bodily or naturall pleasures from the contempt of Gods infinite goodnesse which destinates no creatures unto everlasting death but such as he had made capable of everlasting joyes nor were any of them infallibly destinated unto everlasting death untill they had by voluntary transgression or continuance in despising of the riches of his goodnesse made themselves uncapable of the blisse to which hee had
rule which all the former inductions can afford is this There can bee no reall effect whether artificiall naturall or supernaturall without an efficient Nothing which now is not or sometimes was not could possibly bee made without some agent or maker betweene every naturall Agent and its patient betweene every Artificer and his worke there alwayes results a mutuall relation of efficient and effect But this rule will not abide the turning Betweene every efficient and its proper effect there alwayes results a mutuall relation of agent and patient if by this terme patient wee understand a matter or subject praeexistent to the exercise of the agents efficiencie 4 The usuall division of Agents into artificiall naturall and supernaturall supposeth a three-fold diversitie in their objects betwixt which there is this proportion As nature alwayes affordeth art a compleat naturall subject to worke upon so the supernaturall agent or supreme efficient exhibits that imperfect substance or matter unto nature which shee brings unto perfection Nature doth so unto Art as it is done to her by a benefactor supernaturall Vnto this observation upon the former division wee can adde no more nor can any more be required besides a just proofe that there is an agent supernaturall which sometimes had no matter at all to worke upon but made even Nature her selfe and the passive capacitie or subject whereon shee workes of no worke or matter praeexistent The matter it selfe and nature it selfe are the immediate effects of his active force or efficiencie Now to beate the Naturalist at his owne weapon wee are to make proofe of this assertion by full induction and strength of reason grounded upon experiments in every subject wherein the Naturalist can instance First it is universally true of all the workes as well of Nature as of Art which now are perfect and sometimes were not so that they did not make themselves but had respectively their severall makers or efficient causes which brought them unto that perfect estate and condition which now they have The most perfect works of nature cannot put themselves into a perfect artificiall forme without the help of some Artificer Stones doe not naturally grow into Statues nor trees into the pictures or Images of men or birds Brasse and Copper with other metalls conceived in the bowells of the earth doe not either by themselves or by the help of naturall causes which produce them cast or mould themselves into Guns or Bullets The Earth and Water doe not worke themselves into the live-substance of plants or vegetables but are first wrought and as it were kneaded together by the heate of the Sunne first altered then incorporated into the substance of such trees by the vegetative faculty which is actually resident and praeexistent in the trees or plants which are nourished by them There is no sublunarie substance which did not take beginning either entirely and together or piece-meale and successively The elementall bodies of the ayre and water were not totally the same a thousand yeares agoe that now they are both continue the same they were by equivalencie of succeeding parts or daily addition by new generation Now successive generation supposeth an end or destruction of that that was a beginning of that which succeedes in its place and the beginning of every thing supposeth a beginner or cause efficient to give it being The race or continuation of more perfect sublunary substances as of vegetables and moving creatures remaines the same not by equivalency of succeeding parts but by a totall production of distinct individualls And every distinct individuall tree or liuing creature hath its immediate and proper efficient as well as its materiall cause nothing can give it selfe a distinct numericall being 5 What is the reason then why the workes of nature which are perfected in their kinde by their proper efficients as trees come to full growth cannot transforme themselves into bodies artificiall without the worke of the Artificer What is the reason why the imperfect masse wherein the seeds of nature are contained cannot grow up into a perfect or compleate body naturall without the efficiencie of some other in the same kinde already compleate Fortes creantur fortibus Nature makes nothing perfect but by the help of some Agent formerly made perfect Doth the perfection of bodies artificiall by an indispensable Law of necessitie require a perfect worke of nature praeexistent to the operation of Art and doth this perfect worke of nature bee it brasse wood or stone by a like indispensable Law of necessitie require an imperfect masse or matter praeexistent to the naturall Agents or efficients which mould or kneade it into its perfect or specificall forme And shall not this imperfect masse with all its severall Elements or ingredients that can be required to the perfection of any naturall body more necessarily require some precedent efficient cause of its imperfect being or existence This cannot be conceived for if these imperfect substances whereof any naturall body is made could eyther give beginning of being to themselves or have it from no cause efficient they should bee in this respect much more perfect than the more perfect workes of nature in that they eyther make themselves or have no maker Vpon this principle of nature or from this impossibilitie in nature That any visible work whether naturall or artificiall should either give it selfe being or have its being from no cause precedent did Tully rightly argue that as a man comming into an house wherein were no live creatures saue Rats and Mice could not conceive that either the house did make it selfe or had no other maker besides these Rats and Mice which were found in it So neither can it be imagined that this visible spheare wherein the workes of Art and Nature are daily seene and doe daily begin to be and expire could either make it selfe or have beeing of it selfe without beginning without a Maker super-artificiall or an efficient supernaturall Every part of this Vniverse considered alone is a worke of nature but the exquisite harmony betweene them is a worke more then Artificiall All that nature can adde to art or art to nature is but a shadow of that great Artificers skill which composed the severall workes of nature into so excellent a forme and tuneth their discording qualities into such exact harmony The induction of Tully is more briefly but more pithily and expressely gathered by our Apostle Heb. 3. ver 4. Euery house is builded by some man but hee that built all things is God But if every house bee built by some man how is God said to build all things shall every builder of an house be a God No but whatsoever man doth build God doth likewise build For except the Lord doth build the house they labour in vaine that are builders of it Psalm 127. 1. Better it were to bee idle or to doe nothing then either to be laborious in building houses or watchfull in guarding Cities strongly
besides those which the Omnipotent was willing should be so made nor these any better either for substance or qualitie than his will was they should be Nor could any creature be enabled by his will out of nothing to make any thing which was not eminently contained in the nature of that creature to whom this power of creating is supposed to be by his will delegated For albeit some efficient or productive causes bring forth effects for substance or qualitie more excellent then themselves yet this they never doe this they cannot doe unlesse they worke upon some advantage which the subject or matter whereon they worke doth afford them But this advantage cannot be supposed in the production of any substance out of no subject or matter praexistent All the excellency which any effect or substance so produced can have must be intirely derived from its efficient And that can be no greater excellency or perfection than the efficient it selfe hath not altogether so great because it must be eminently contained in the perfection of its efficient if so be the efficient have any perfection or being left after the production of such an effect So that every efficient cause which is or can be supposed as an instrumentall cause of creation or as enabled to produce something out of nothing is thus farre limited that it can produce no effect more excellent that it selfe and being thus limited in it selfe and by dependance on an higher cause as well in its being as in its operation it cannot be conceived to bee Omnipotent For that includes as much as to be illimited in operation or which is all one to bee the operative power of the incomprehensible Essence or of Being infinite 3 But though to be able to make something out of nothing be not formally aequipollent to the attribute of Omnipotency yet can it not hence be concluded that any agent besides the one Omnipotent is either able or can be enabled to produce the least substance that is the least portion or matter ingredient to any bodily substance out of meer nothing To lay the first foundation or beginning of being of any finite substance is the sole effect of being it selfe and therefore of that which is truly infinite in operation Whatsoever is finite or limited can have no other kind of being than borrowed or participated And this kinde of being must bee immediately derived without intervention of any instrumentall cause from being not participated or borrowed but from increated and authentique being To create is to give actuall being or existance without the help or furtherance of any Contributer or Confounder Now if this power of creating could possibly bee delegated to any created substance it were possible for that which is created by it to have its being extra infinitum esse that is it should not be immediately and intirely contained in the infinite and incomprehensible Essence or Being For in this very supposall That one created substance might by power delegated from Omnipotency create another it is necessarily implied that the substance created should have its being intirely or part of its being immediately from the other which by power delegated is supposed to create it And having such being as it hath either intirely or in part immediately from the other it could not be immediately and intirely contained in the first cause of all things And if the least substance possible could have its Being not immediately and intirely from the first cause or supreame Efficient he could not bee actually and absolutely infinite in Being or Omnipotent in working For that onely is absolutely infinite or infinite in Being in which all things possible are immediately contained without whose incomprehensible Being nothing can have existence without whose immediate operation nothing can begin to be or exist These agitatiōs discussions may notifie unto us the strength soundness of that treble rule or fundamentall principle layd by others and before touched by us First it is peculiar unto Art to turne bodies already formed and perfected by nature into another fashion It is the property of nature and of naturall and finite Agents to worke the unfashioned or confused matter into some determinate forme or set kinde of being It is the prerogative of the Omnipotent Maker to afford naturall Agents the intire matter and stuffe whereon they worke and to bestow on them such being as they have whether that be materiall or immateriall celestiall or sublunary spirituall or bodily and to bestow i◠intirely without the helpe of any Co-efficient without the contribution of any stuffe or matter of any reallitie praeexistent SECTION II. Of Divine Providence in generall and how contingency and necessity in things created are subject unto it CHAP. 9. Of the perpetuall dependance which all things created have on the Almighty Creator both for their beeing and their operations 1 BVt will it suffice us to beleeve that as Art hath its proper subject made or fitted by Nature or as more perfect substances praesuppose an imperfect state in Nature so this imperfect state of nature or the subject on which naturall efficients do work was made of nothing without any coagency of Nature or Art by the sole power of the Almighty Father To beleeve all this is but the first part of our beleefe of this Article of Creation For better apprehending the intire object of our beleefe in this point we are to observe the difference betwixt the dependance which Art hath on nature or which workes artificiall have on the Artificer or which more perfect naturall substances have on the imperfect substances whereof they are made or on their naturall efficients and the dependance which both naturall Agents Patients which efficient causes as wel artificiall as naturall with their severall matters or subjects have on the Almighty Creator and Maker of all things First then nature or causes naturall after they have finished their proper works and fitted them for Art to worke upon do not cooperate with the Artificer in fashioning them to his ends or purpose The Artificer againe after he hath finished his worke doth not continually support preserve or apply it to those uses unto which it serves but leaves this unto their care for whose convenience it was made The Clocke-maker doth not tye himselfe to keep all the Clocks which he makes nor doth he which undertakes to keepe them binde himselfe to watch their motions perpetually or to observe them as curiously as Physitians doe their sicke Patients Againe the most perfect works of nature as vegetables and living things depend upon their causes whether materiall or efficient for the most part onely in fieri not in facto whilest they are in making or in perfecting not after they be made and perfected The Lyonesse doth not perpetually nourish her whelps with her owne substance nor doth the Raven continually provide for her young ones or any other creatures more kinde than they perpetually support or direct their brood in