Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	efficient_a	end_n	final_a	2,172	5	9.9792	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A03590	Of the lavves of ecclesiasticall politie eight bookes. By Richard Hooker.; Ecclesiastical polity. Books 1-4	Hooker, Richard, 1553 or 4-1600.; Spenser, John, 1559-1614.	1604 (1604)	STC 13713; ESTC S120914	286,221	214

thēselues receiue externally some perfection frō other things as hath bene shewed In so much as there is in the whole world no one thing great or small but either in respect of knowledge or of vse it may vnto out perfectiō adde somewhat And whatsoeuer such perfection there is which our nature may acquire the same we properly terme our good our soueraign good or blessednes that wherin the highest degree of all our perfectiō consisteth that which being once attained vnto there cā rest nothing further to be desired therfore with it our soules are fully cōtent satisfied in that they haue they reioyce thirst for no more wherfore of goo● things desired some are such that for themselues we couet them not but only because they serue as instruments vnto that for which we are to seeke of this sorte are riches an other kind there is which although we desire for it selfe as health vertue knowledge neuerthelesse they are not the last marke whereat we aime but haue their further end whereunto they are referred so as in them we are not satisfied as hauing attained the vtmost we may but our desires doe still proceede These things are linked and as it were chained one to another we labour to eate and we eate to liue and we liue to do good the good which we do is as seede sowne with reference vnto a future haruest But we must come at the length to some pause For if euery thing were to bee desired for some other without any stint there could be no certaine end proposed vnto our actions we should go on we know not whether yea whatsoeuer we do were in vaine or rather nothing at all were possible to be done For as to take away the first efficient of our being were ●o annihilate vtterly our persons so we cannot remoue the last finall cause of our working but we shall cause whatsoeuer we worke to cease Therfore some thing there must be desired for it selfe simply and for no other That is simply for it selfe desirable vnto the nature wherof it is opposite repugnant to be desired with relation vnto any other The oxe and the asse desire their food neither propose they vnto themselues any end wherfore so that of them this is desired for it selfe but why By reason of their imperfection which cannot otherwise desire it whereas that which is desired simply for it selfe the excellencie thereof is such as permitteth it not in any sort to be referred to a further end Now that which man doth desire with reference to a further end the same he desireth in such measure as is vnto that end conuenient but what he coueteth as good in it selfe towardes that his desire is euer infinite So that vnlesse the last good of all which is desired altogether for it selfe be also infinite we doe euill in making it our end euen as they who placed their felicitie in wealth or honour or pleasure or any thing here attained because in desiring any thing as our finall perfection which is not so we do amisse Nothing may be infinitly desired but that good which in deed is infinite For the better the more desirable that therefore most desirable wherin there is infinitie of goodnes so that if any thing desirable may be infinit that must needes be the highest of all things that are desired No good is infinite but onely God therefore he our felicitie and blisse Moreouer desire tendeth vnto vnion with that it desireth If then in him we be blessed it is by force of participation coniunction with him Againe it is not the possession of any good thing can make them happie which haue it vnlesse they inioy the thing wherewith they are possessed Then are we happie therfore when fully we enioy God as an obiect wherein the powers of our soules are satisfied euen with euerlasting delight so that although we be mē yet by being vnto God vnited we liue as it were the life of God Happines therfore is that estate wherby we attaine so far as possibly may be attained the ful possession of that which simply for it selfe is to be desired and containeth in it after an eminent sorte the contentation of our desires the highest degree of all our perfection Of such perfection capable we are not in this life For while we are in the world subiect we are vnto sundry imperfections griefe of body defectes of minde yea the best thinges we doe are painefull and the exercise of them grieuous being continued without intermission so as in those very actions whereby we are especially perfected in this life wee are not able to persist forced we are with very wearines that often to interrupt thē which tediousnes cannot fall into those operations that are in the state of blisse when our vnion with God is complete Complete vnion with him must be according vnto euery power and facultie of our mindes apt to receiue so glorious an obiect Capable we are of God both by vnderstanding and will by vnderstanding as hee is that soueraigne truth which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all wisdom by will as he is that sea of goodnesse whereof who so tasteth shall thirst no more As the wil doth now worke vpon that obiect by desire which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet vnobtained so likewise vpon the same hereafter receiued it shall worke also by loue Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis saith Saint Augustine The longing disposition of them that thirst is chaunged into the sweete affection of them that taste and are replenished Whereas wee now loue the thing that is good but good especially in respect of benefit vnto vs we shall then loue the thing that is good only or principally for the goodnes of beauty in it self The soule being in this sorte as it is actiue perfected by loue of that infinite good shall as it is receptiue be also perfected with those supernaturall passions of ioy peace delight All this endlesse and euerlasting Which perpe●uitie in regard whereof our blessednes is termed a crowne which withereth not doth neither depend vpon the nature of the thing it selfe nor proceede from any naturall necessitie that our soules should so exercise themselues for euer in beholding and louing God but from the wil of God which doth both freely perfect our nature in so high a degree continue it so perfected Vnder man no creature in the world is capable of felicitie and blisse first because their chiefest perfection consisteth in that which is best for thē but not in that which is simply best as ours doth secondly because whatsoeuer externall perfection they tende vnto it is not better then themselues as ours is How iust occasiō haue we therfore euen in this respect with the Prophet to admire the goodnes of God Lorde what is man that thou shouldest exalt him aboue the workes of thy hands so farre as to

rashnes God was not ignorant that the Priests and Iudges whose sentence in matters of controuersie 〈◊〉 ordained should stand both might and oftentimes would be deceiued in their iudgement Howbeit better it was in the eye of his vnderstanding that sometime an erroneous sentence definitiue should preuaile till the same authoritie perceiuing such ouersight might afterwardes correct or reuerse it then that strifes should haue respit to growe and not come speedily vnto some end Neither wish we that men should do any thing which in their hearts they are perswaded they ought not to doe but this perswasion ought we say to be fully setled in their harts that in litigious and controuersed causes of such qualitie the will of God is to haue them to do whatsoeuer the sentence of iudiciall and finall decision shall determine yea though it seeme in their priuate opiniō to swarue vtterly from that which is right as no doubt many times the sentence amongst the Iewes did seeme vnto one part or other contending and yet in this case God did then allow them to doe that which in their priuate iudgement it seemed yea and perhaps truly seemed that the lawe did disallow For if God be not the author of confusion but of peace then can he not be the author of our refusall but of our contentment to stand vnto some definitiue sentence without which almost impossible it is that eyther wee should auoyd confusion or euer hope to attaine peace To small purpose had the Councell of Ierusalem bene assembled if once their determination being set downe men might afterwards haue defended their former opinions When therefore they had giuen their definitiue sentence all controuersie was at an ende Things were disputed before they came to be determined men afterwardes were not to dispute any longer but to obey The sentence of iudgement finished their strife which their disputes before iudgement could not doe This was ground sufficient for any reasonable mans conscience to build the dutie of obedience vpon whatsoeuer his owne opinion were as touching the matter before in question So full of wilfulnes and selfeliking is our nature that without some definitiue sentence which being giuen may stand and a necessitie of silence on both sides afterward imposed small hope there is that strifes thus far prosecuted will in short time quietly end Now it were in vaine to aske you whether ye could be content that the sentence of any Court already erected should bee so farre authorized as that among the Iewes established by God himselfe for the determining of all controuersies That man which wil do presumptuously not harkning vnto the Priest that standeth before the Lord to minister there nor vnto the Iudge let him dye Ye haue giuen vs already to vnderstand what your opiniō is in part concerning her sacred Maiesties Court of high Commission the nature whereof is the same with that amongst the Iewes albeit the power be not so great The other way happily may like you better because Maister Beza in his last booke saue one written about these matters professeth himselfe to be now weary of such combats and encounters whether by word or writing in as much as he findeth that controuersies therby are made but braules therfore wisheth that in some common lawfull assembly of Churches all these strifes may at once be decided Shall there be then in the meane while no doings Yes There are the waightier matters of the lawe iudgement and mercie and fidelitie These things we ought to do and these things while we contend about lesse we leaue vndone Happier are they whom the Lord when he commeth shall finde doing in these things then disputing about Doctors Elders Deacons Or if there be no remedie but somewhat needs ye must do which may tend to the setting forward of your discipline do that which wise men who thinke some Statute of the realme more fit to be repealed then to stand in force are accustomed to do before they come to Parliament where the place of enacting is that is to say spend the time in reexamining more duly your cause and in more throughly considering of that which ye labour to ouerthrow As for the orders which are established sith equitie and reason the law of nature God and man do all fauour that which is in being till orderly iudgement of decision be giuen against it it is but iustice to exact of you and peruersnes in you it should be to denie thereunto your willing obedience Not that I iudge it a thing allowable for men to obserue those lawes which in their hearts they are stedfastly perswaded to be against the law of God but your perswasion in this case ye are all bound for the time to suspend and in otherwise doing ye offend against God by troubling his church without any iust or necessary cause Be it that there are some reasons inducing you to think hardly of our lawes Are those reasons demonstratiue are they necessary or but meere probabilities only An argument necessary demonstratiue is such as being proposed vnto any m● vnderstood the mind cannot choose but inwardly assent Any one such reason dischargeth J graunt the conscience and setteth it at full libertie For the publike approbatiō giuen by the body this whole Church vnto those things which are established doth make it but probable that they are good And therefore vnto a necessary proofe that they are not good it must be giue place But if the skilfullest amongst you can shew that all the bookes ye haue hitherto written be able to afford any one argument of this nature let the instance be giuen As for probabilities what thing was there euer set downe so agreeable with so●●●d reason but some probable shewe against it might be made Is it meete that when publikely things are receiued and haue taken place generall obedience thereunto should cease to bee exacted in case this or that priuate person led with some probable conceipt shoulde make open protestation I Peter or Iohn disallow them and pronounce them nought In which case your answere will be that concerning the lawes of our Church they are not onely condemned in the opinion of a priuate man but of thousands yea and euen of those amongst which d●uers are in publique charge and authoritie As though when publique consent of the whole hath established anything euery mans iudgement being thereunto compared were not priuate howsoeuer his calling be to some kind of publique charge So that of peace and quietnes there is not any way possible vnlesse the probable voice of euery intier societie or body politique ouerrule all priuate of like nature in the same body Which thing effectually proueth that God being author of peace and not of confusion in the Church must needs be author of those mens peaceable resolutions who concerning these thinges haue determined with themselues to thinke and do as the Church they are of decreeth till they see necessary cause enforcing