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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A01093	Atheomastix clearing foure truthes, against atheists and infidels: 1. That, there is a God. 2. That, there is but one God. 3. That, Iehouah, our God, is that one God. 4. That, the Holy Scripture is the Word of that God. All of them proued, by naturall reasons, and secular authorities; for the reducing of infidels: and, by Scriptures, and Fathers, for the confirming of Christians. By the R. Reuerend Father in God, Martin Fotherby, late Bishop of Salisbury. The contents followes, next after the preface.	Fotherby, Martin, 1549 or 50-1620.	1622 (1622)	STC 11205; ESTC S121334	470,356	378

And lofty ones depressing Abating of the prouder show And poorer sort increasing So Homer Facile est Dijs qui coelum latum habitant Et gloria illustrare mortalem hominem Et malo afficere The God of Heau'n he easily can Immortalize a mortall man with glory and with fame The same God euen as easily may Afflict a mortall man I say with sorrow and with shame And Simonides affirmeth that God hath not only the power of the thing but also the power of the Time He both can do the thing and appoint the Time O Filt penes se habet Iupiter altitonans finem Omnium quae fiunt pro arbitrio suo disponit The Ends of all in Gods sole power rest Which hee disposeth as him pleaseth best So that to conclude this discourse with Tertullians sentence I lle vices dominationum ipsis temporibus in seculo ordinat qui ante omne tempus fuit Seculum corpus temporum fecit Hee it is that ordained the interchange of dominions and Empires in their times who himselfe is more ancient then any time and who hath made an eternity of the body of time Now if Cities grow great and little neither by Fate nor Fortune but by Gods praeordination if hee limit their powers circumscribe their dominions and measure out their continuance then must there needes bee a God who performeth all these workes But the Antecedent is true as hath beene proued in this Chapter And therefore the Consequent must needes follow after CHAP. 8. God is both the Physicall and Ethicall last end of all things 2. Hee giueth vs all vertues which are the way vnto perfect Blessednesse 3. Hee implanteth in vs all good affections which are the praeuious dispositions vnto vertues 4. He giueth vnto vs the true and perfect Blessednesse 5. Nay hee himselfe is our true and perfect Blessednesse LET vs now proceede forward from the Politicks vnto the Ethicks which affoord vs many Arguments to proue There is a God and that by the confession euen of the very Heathen For as the Physicks doe inferre that there needes must be a God because there is noe moe but one Primum Efficiens but one first Efficient Cause from which all things doe proceede so the Ethicks doe inforce the same conclusion vnto vs because there is no moe but one vltimus finis but one last finall cause vnto which all things are referred Which last End as Aristotle himselfe teacheth both in his Physicks and in his Ethicks must needes be Summum bonum ipsumque adeo Optimum that is The chiefest and most soueraigne good of all things For Quanto est posterior tanto est praestantior omnis Finis Among all Ends the Latter is euermore the better And consequently the last must needs be the best And so must needs be God Or else there should something be better then God Which were vtterly absurd For hee is the best of all His title is to be Optimus And therefore as God is that Primum Efficiens by whom all things were made so is he also that Vltimus Finis for whom all things were made As the Scriptures themselues haue expresly testified The Apostle Paul telleth vs that All things were made not only of God but also for God too Of him and through him and for him are all things So that hee is not onely their Primum Efficiens that is Their first Author from whom they came but he is also their Vltimus Finis too that is Their last Ende for whom they came Both which points King Salomon confirmeth in his Prouerbs in expresse and plaine words The Lord hath made all things for himselfe yea euen the wicked for the day of euil The Lord hath made all thing therefore hee is their Efficient He hath made them for himselfe therefore he is their End Sic Deus est finis postremus vltimus in quem Omnia contendunt propter quem mundus omnis Res mundi est siquidem propter seipsum omnia fecit saith the Christian Poet. God is the End yea that last End Vnto which One all things contend For which the world and all therein Was made For he made all for Him And as God is Finis rerum condendarum that is The last Ende for which all things were created so is hee also Finis rerum expetendarum The last End for which all things are desired Whom haue I in Heauen but thee saith the Prophet Dauid and there is none vpon Earth that I desire in comparison of thee So that God is not onely the naturall ende of all his Creatures but also the morall ende of all mens actions and affections And this also may be conclud●d by the reason afore-framed For Aristotle affirmeth in the fore-alledged place that Si finis est quispiam rerum agendarum quem propter seipsum caetera autem propter hunc volumus constat hunc talem Finem summum esse Bonum ipsumque optimum If there be any such ende of all humane actions which we onely desire in respect of it selfe and other things but with reference vnto it it is apparent that such an ende must be that which we call the supreme and chiefest good Now that must needs be God vnlesse something which is not God should be better then God vnlesse some other thing should be Summum Bonum and God himselfe be but Inferius Bonum But that God himselfe and nothing else is both the last ende of all humane actions and that chiefest good which is aymed at in all of them it is generally taught in the Schooles of all the Heathen Who deliuer vnto vs these foure speciall Doctrines as the principalls of their Morals Yea and that with as great and as vniforme a consent as in any other of their doctrines can readily be found First that Vertue which is the way vnto Felicitie is giuen vs of God Secondly that good Affections which are praeparatiues vnto Vertue are also giuen by him Thirdly that Felicitie which is the salarie and reward of Vertue is giuen vs of God And Fourthly That God himselfe is our onely true Felicitie 2 For the first of which positions and the first branch of it it is a thing which is agreed vpon among the very Heathen that the ende of the Ethicks and Morall Philosophie is to bring men by vertue vnto the true Felicitie Felicitie is the ende of all mens actions and desires but Vertue is the way whereby men come vnto that ende As Tullie exemplifieth in the person of Hercules Abijt ad Deos Hercules sed nunquàm abijsset nisi quùm inter Homines esset eam sibiviam munivisset Hercules is gone vnto the gods but hee neuer had come there if he had not made his way whilest hee liued here Hee had neuer come to Heauen if hee had not by his vertue paued himselfe a Causey thither whilest he liued among men And therefore Seneca

nearest causes themselues Nulla res potest aliquid facere sine Deo Et nulla res potest aliquid sacere nisi Deus per se immediatè faciat illud idem imò immediatiùs quolibet alio faciente And thus the very titles which Authors haue giuen vnto the first cause doe necessarily imply that it must needs be God But yet diuers of them goe further and collect the very same by way of Argument Damascen proueth that the first cause of things must needs be God by this Sorites Quae mutabilia sunt etiam creata sunt Quae autem creata sunt dubium non est quìna quopiam creata sunt Conditorem porrò increatum esse necesse est Nam si ipse quoque creatus est a quopiam quoque creatus est ldque tantisper locum habebit quòad ad aliquid minimè creatum pervenerimu● Increatus est ergò summus ille opifex atque immutabilis Hoc autem quid aliud esse qu●at quàm Deus Whatsoeuer things are mutable as are all that be sensible they must needs haue beene created Whatsoeuer is created is created of some Creator That Creator himselfe must needs be vncreated Or if he also be created hee must be created by something And this holdes on so long vntill wee come at last vnto something vncreated Therefore that great work-man that is the maker of all things must needs himselfe be both vncreated and immutable Now what can that be else but onely God himselfe This is Damascenes reason whereby hee doth conclude that the first cause of all things can be nothing else but God Trismegistus in like sort doth presse the very same Argument in matter fully agreeing though in words somewhat differing Quae sensu percipiuntur facta sunt omnia Genita non a seipsis sed fiunt ab altero Est ergò aliquis factor istorum atque is ingenitus vt genitis sit antiquio● Those things that are subiect vnto sense haue all of them beene made Those things that are made haue not beene made of themselues but of something else And therefore they must needes haue had some maker And hee must needs be vnmade because hee is more ancient then any thing that is made He there proceedeth further disputing much both of the Power and Wisdome and Goodnesse of this First cause and Creator and of his Dominion ouer euery creature being much sollicitous by what name he should call him whether by the name of God or of Maker or of Father or of all these three together And hee resolueth his owne doubt that hee may worthily be called Deus propter potentiam Factor propter actum and Pater propter bonum A God for his power a Creator for his worke and a Father for his goodnesse This is that Heathen mans discourse vpon the first cause And Seneca hee bringeth in another Argument vnto the same effect which though in the passage it be somewhat different yet in the conclusion it fully agreeth with it For he reckoneth vp fiue differing causes of the world Id ex quo Id a quo Id in quo Id ad quod Id propter quod that is The Matter the Efficient the Forme the Exemplar and the End But the power of all these he ascribes vnto the Efficient making it in effect the onely true cause and all the rest to be rather as instruments vnto it then Concauses with it Quae nunc retuli non sunt multae singulae Causae sed ex vna pendent ex ea quae facit It is onely the Efficient whereupon they all depend The Efficient is that which praepareth the Matter imposeth the Forme conceiueth the Patterne and propoundeth the End And this Efficient of the world he expresly affirmeth to be nothing else but God Faciens hic Deus est And thus they doe not onely insinuate The first Cause to bee God but also by Argument they indeauour to proue it Yea and diuers of them in expresse termes affirme it which is our third head Seneca whom I last named shall bee the first of them Hee saith expresly of God that Ille est prima omnium Causa ex qua caeterae pendent God is the first and cheifest Cause of all things whereupon they all do hang. And againe in another place Quaerimus quae sit Causa Ratio faciens id est Deus Do we inquire what is the Cause Euen the Reasonable Spirit that maketh it And that Reason or Spirit is God The second is Trismegistus whom I named next before him who saith that that Efficient which is more ancient then any Effect is nothing else but God Efficiens Effectum vnita quidem sunt inuicem sic tamen vt vnum praecedat alterum verò sequatur Praecedens sanè Deus Essiciens sequens verò id quod est effectum The Cause and his effect are alwayes vnited yet so that the one of them goeth before and the other followeth after The Cause which goeth before is nothing else but God the thing which followeth after is the Effect of that Cause Yea and in another place he defineth God to be nothing else but onely a generall Cause of all things Deus profectò mens non est at verò vt sit mens Causa est nec spiritus sed causa qua spiritus extat nec lumen sed causa qua lumen existit God is not vnderstanding but the cause of Vnderstanding It is the inspiration of the Almighty that giueth vnderstanding God is not a spirit but the Cause of all spirits The Father of Spirits God is not a light but the Cause of all light The Father of Lights So that in his verdict this first and chiefest Cause is nothing else but God Whom in another place he calleth Bonum efficiens Bonafaciens omnia That good Efficient Cause which bringeth forth all good Effects The third of them is Aristotle whom I named before them both who expresly affirmeth that Deus est rebus omnibus Causa Principium that God is vnto all things both a Beginner and a Cause Yea and in another place hee affirmeth that he is causa quae continet omnia making him not onely the first and cheifest Cause but also the generall cause of all thing The fourth is Pythagoras who calleth God directly causam efficientem formantem Both the Efficient the Forming cause The fifth is Macrobius who writeth thus of God That Deus qui prima causa est vocatur vnus omnium quae sunt quaeque videntur esse princeps origo est God who is both called the first cause and is so indeed he is both the Ruler and Maker of all things Vnto which fiue fore-named I will onely adde a sixt And that is Pindarus who directly affirmeth that God is the Efficient and Author of all things Omni rei Deum Authorem superponere oportet Wee

you take away the beginning of his being And therefore in another place hee peremptorily pronounceth That nothing can be made without his Cause Illud exploratum habeto Nihil fieri posse sine Causa Which Palingenius also expressly affirmeth sine Causa Esse potest nihil aut fieri Without a Cause nor being nor ought can haue beginning And thereupon Tully derideth it for a grosse and a palpable absurdity and a paradox against the very grounds of Philosophy to affirme that there can any thing without a Cause of it be either made or done Nihil turpius Physico quàm fieri sine Causa quicquam dicere There can be no fouler error in a naturall Philosopher then to affirme this That any thing can be done or made without a Cause And it is a very foule error indeed For to say that any thing is made without a Cause is to say it hath a being and yet no power of being For Causa is defined to be cuius vi res est A Cause is a power whereby euery thing hath his being And as Plato affirmeth directly to that purpose Causa est qu●● principaliter rem facit So that for the truth of this first position that euery thing in Nature hath a Cause of his being you see it to be cleerly put out of al question by the consenting testimonies of many learned men Yea the most of them no way ingaged in our Religion but following only the light and guidance of Reason 2 And therefore let vs now proceede vnto the second That nothing in nature can be the Cause of it selfe Which is a position as euidently true as that Nothing can be the Maker of it selfe For as a Christian Philosopher hath very well collected Quod facit est actu quod fit non est actu Non magis igitur potest aliquid facere seipsum quàm simul esse non esse That which maketh any thing must needes be actually in being that which is but in making hath as yet no actuall being And therefore it is as impossible for any thing to make it selfe as it is at the same time to haue both being and no being For if it be impossible as Aquinas affirmeth Vt aliquid sit simul actu potentia secundùm idem then it is much more impossible Vt aliquid sit simul actu non actu or that Aliquid simul actu sit actu non sit A necessary disconuenience where any thing is allowed to bee cause of it selfe And therefore Trismegistus sets it downe for a peremptory position that Nihil quod est genitum a se genitum est Yea and Gregory Nyssen directly subscribeth vnto him Nullam rem sui ip sius principium causam esse That nothing can be the beginning or cause of it selfe Yea and Palingenius genius also expressely confirmes it nil se gignit nil provenit a se Nilque sui causa esse potest Ther 's nothing that it selfe begets or from it selfe proceedes Ther 's nothing of it selfe is cause nor ought that causelesse breeds The Reasons wherefore nothing can be the cause of it selfe be principally two The first because euery cause is a seuerall thing in nature from his owne effect The Cause and his Effect are so by nature seuered that they cannot bee confounded For Causa cuius est Causa aliud est saith Aristotle The Cause is one thing and that whereof it is a cause is another And so likewise Palingenius in the fore-alledged place causa necesse est Vt suo ab effectu distet diuersaque res sit Needes must the cause be differing And from th' effect a diuers thing Yea and Plato likewise expressely confirmeth it not resting in the bare position but forming it into a very strong reason Aliud est causa Neque enìm causa ipsius causae causa esse potest Causam enìm efficientem esse constat Ab effeciente verò effictum fit non efficiens Aliud autem est efficiens aliud effectum Non ergò caus● ipsius causa est sed eius quod ab ipsa efficitur The cause is of one nature and that which is of the cause is of another For the cause is not the cause of a cause but of an effect because the cause is an efficient and an efficient bringeth not forth another efficient but onely an Effect Now an effect is alwayes a thing different from his efficient Therefore a cause is not a cause of a cause but of an effect which is made by that cause This is the first reason why nothing can be the cause of it selfe because then it should differ from it selfe and should not be the same thing with it selfe The second Reason is because the cause is alwayes before his effect Causam causato dicimus esse priùs The cause before the caused we do euer asseuere to be Efficiens effectum vnita quidem sunt invicem saith Trismegistus sic tamen vt vnum praecedat alterum verò sequatur The efficient and effect are vnited together by a mutuall dependance one vpon another and yet is the one of them before the other For as Zacharias Mytilenensis obserueth Oportet effectorem antiquiorem esse effectu opificijs Opificem siquidem id quod fit secundum est ab co quod efficit The Efficient is more ancient then his owne effect and the Workeman then his worke For whatsoeuer thing is made must needes bee posteriour vnto his Maker So likewise Palingenius Causa suo effectu prior est Authòrque opere ipso The cause doth alwayes his effect fore-goe Before the Worke the Workeman is we know Yea and so Aristotle himselfe Effector opificium praecurrere debet Nihil autem scipso prius antiquius est The Workeman must needes bee more ancient then his Worke. But nothing can be more ancient then it selfe And therefore nothing can be the worke of it selfe and consequently nothing the cause of it selfe For as Aquinas from this place very truely collecteth Impossibile est vt aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius quia sic esset prius seipso It is meerely impossible that any thing should be the cause of it selfe For then it should bee before it selfe Yea and Aristotle againe presseth the same Reason yea and backeth it with another not inferior that if any thing were the cause of it selfe it should not onely be before it selfe but it should also bee superior vnto it selfe For the cause is superior vnto his effect Whereupon he there inferreth that Nequaquam conuenit quòd aliquid nuncupetur vel sit causa sui vt falsum est quòd aliquid Prius quà prius sit posterius seipso superans quatenus tale sit superatum It is vtterly absurd that any thing should bee called or be the cause of it owne selfe as it is false that any

diuers kindes of grieuous sicknesses vnto many And fourthly that euen Physitians themselues doe finde in many sicknesses that they be diuine punishments For the first of which foure Heads What is the true Originall cause of sicknesse S. Chrysostome telleth vs that it is the part of euery good Physition inquirere semper in morborum radic●m tque ita pervenire ad ipsum mali fontem to s●arch into the roote of diseases and sicknesses and so to proceede vnto the fountaine of those euils And S. Basil hee telleth vs that it is the part of a discreet and wise patient not to leaue this inquisition only to the Physition but he himselfe also to search into a the causes of his owne diseases that so he may the better attaine to know their remedies Nos plagas a Deo suscipientes qui benè prudenter vitam nostram moderatur principio quidem inquiramus cognitionem rationis ob quam nos flagellet Whensoeuer we are scourged and chastised by God who guideth our whole life by his wisedome and goodnesse we ought first to search carefully for what cause hee so correcteth vs. For the cause being once found the Remedie is halfe found and the cure in a manner alreadie halfe performed Medici causa morbi invent● curationem esse inventam putan● Physi●ians hauing once found out the cause of a disease they thinke they haue found the cure Now for the true cause of diseases and Sicknesses though it greatly haue puzelled both the greatest Philosophers and the learnedst Physitions to finde out what it is some assigning them vnto the excesse or defect of the primary Qualities of Heate Cold Moyst Drye some vnto the impuritie and corruption of our meates some vnto the infection of vnwholesome and putrid ayres and to diuers such other Materiall causes wherein they be greatly diuided amongst themselues Yet is there a full agreement both of Heathens and Christians that God is the first Efficient cause of them and that Sinne is the true Impulsiu● cause which inforceth him to send them This the Prophet Dauid expresly declareth when he called Sicknesse The Rebuke of God and affirmeth that For sinne hee inflicts it vpon man When thou with rebukes doest chasten man for Sinne thou makest his beautie to consume away This also the Apostle Paul expresly declareth when he telleth vs that By one man Sinne entred into the world and Death by Sinne. And againe in another place where hee telleth the Corinthians that for their Abuses in receiuing the Sacrament they were stroken by God with diuers kinds of punishments some of them with Sicknesse some of them with Weakenesse and some of them with Death Yea and this our Sauiour Christ himselfe expresly declareth when hee biddeth the sick-man whom hee had lately cured to goe and sinne no more lest a worse thing come vnto him Thereby plainely declaring that his Sinne was both the cause of his former Sicknesse and would bee also of his future if he sinned any more And that Sinne is indeed the true cause of diseases wee may see it plainely verified in all these memorable Sicknesses that are recorded vnto vs in the Holy Scriptures The Botches wherewith the Egyptians wery smitten was for their rebellion against God and their oppression of his People The Leprosie wherewith the Prophetesse Miriam was smitten was for being so enuious against the Prophet Moses The Pestilence wherewith the Israelites were smitten was for their adulterie with the Daughters of Moab and for their idolatrie with their prophane god The Emerods wherewith the Philistins were smitten was for their Impietie in detayning the Arke of God And so generally in all the rest There is almost in no place any mention of any greiuous and exemplary Sicknesse but there is in the same place some mention of that Sinne for whose punishment it was sent In which forenamed instances we may obserue these two things First that not onely the pestilence and leprosie and such like grieuous and infectious Sicknesses which are called Morbi Sontici that is mischeiuous diseases are the scourges and strokes of God but also all other inferior diseases as Emerods Botches and such like smaller annoyances as euen hee himselfe professeth in another place Secondly that those diseases are sent by God vnto men to correct and chasten them for their sinne Neither is this the testimony of the Holy Scripture onely but also of the Heathens euen in their owne Histories Wherein wee may obserue that whensoeuer there befell them the publike calamity of any generall sicknesse they still imputed it vnto their sinnes prouoking the anger of some or other of their gods As may be manifestly shewed by manifold instances Herodotus ascribeth that greiuous sicknesse which was sent vpon the Scythians to their sacrilege in sacking the Temple of Venus Pausanias ascribeth that deuouring sicknesse which was sent among the Iones vnto the profane lust of Menalippus and Comaetho And that generall abortion which happened among the Caphyens wiues onely vnto the cruelty of their bloody husbands in stoning for a ●leight cause certaine young and wanton Children The hand of diuine Iustice inflicting their punishment in the very same subiect wherein they had offended Their crueltie exercised vpon other mens Children being iustly punished by the death of their owne in a most equall retaliation The same Author ascribeth the dropsie and lousie-sicknesse of Cassander vnto his crueltie and infidelitie vnto Alexander his Maister And Herodotus againe reporteth of the Persians that they generally held that whosoeuer was smitten with the leprous infection hee was surely a profane person and had doubtles committed some great and grieuous sinne against their god the Sunne though they knew not what it was And therefore they banished them out of all their Cities collecting from the sicknesse the stroke of Gods Iustice euen in an vnknowne Cause And this which we haue seene in the Histories of the Greekes wee may see yet more plainely in the Histories of the Romanes For Plutarch ascribeth that destroying plague which happened among them in the time of Romulus vnto the trechery which was practised in the murther of Tatius And Liuy ascribeth another such like plague which followed the condemnation of Manlius Capitolinus vnto that iniustice which was vsed in his death And thus haue euen the Heathen bene taught in the very Schoole of Nature without going any further that the true cause indeede of all sicknesse and diseases are onely mens sinnes prouoking Gods Iustice to take vengeance of their wickednesse As Dauid plainely confesseth in one of the Psalmes There is nothing sound in my flesh becouse of thine anger neither is there rest in my bones because of my sinne 2 Which Lesson may yet a great deale more perfectly bee learned in the holy Schoole of God For there hee himselfe threatneth and that in many places that

must acknowledge God to be the Author of all things The Greeke word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And thus as you see the yeelding of a first Cause which wee must yeeld of necessity doth forcibly draw vs on to the yeelding of a Deitie CHAP. 4. That these sensible and second motions direct vs vnto a first 2. That a first motion doth necessarily imply a first Mouer 3. That this first Mouer is the cause of all the motions in the World 4. And that therefore this first Mouer is nothing else but God I Haue already dispatched the first of those two physical considerations which I purposely selected to declare There is a God taken from the first Cause and Causer of all naturall things I am now come to the second which is taken from the first Motion and Moouer of all moueable things Wherein I may bee the shorter because this Argument runneth almost in the same tract which was traced by the former But it is an Argument so much insisted on both by Philosophers and Diuines that I know not any other that is either vrged oftener or inforced further And therefore for the better vnderstanding of our order in proceeding I will contriue this Argument into this gradation Fir●●●hat second motions direct vs by necessitie vnto a first Secondly that this First Motion doth leade vs yet further vnto a first Mouer Thirdly that this first Mouer is the onely cause of all those seuerall Motions that are found in all things And fourthly that therefore this first Mouer can be nothing else but God For the first of those foure Steppes That these second and inferior Motions do leade vs by degrees vnto one first and supreme Motion Plato proueth by this reason Quandò aliud ab alio movetur illúdque rursum semper ab alio eritnè in talibus aliquid quod primò mouetur At quomodò id cùm ab aliquo moveatur eorum quae moventur primum erit Certè impossibile id est Sed quandò aliquid seipsum mouens aliud quoque mouebit illúdque aliud sic deinceps plurima movebuntur an aliud totius motus principium erit quàm mutatio eius quod seipsum mouet When as one thing is moued by another and that still by another and so in infinitum can there then be any thing that hath a first motion no surely there cannot For how can that be the first moouing of all other which it selfe is moued by another This is a thing vnpossible But if wee grant that there is something which is moued onely by it selfe and not by any other thing if that moue another thìng and that another and so there bee many things moued in their order then the first beginning of all those motions so moued by others can be nothing else but onely the Impulsion of that one first Mouer which mooueth of himselfe Out of which discourse of Plato wee may gather these two Aphorismes First that if there should be in those motions which are moued by another an infinite progresse there could none of them be first Secondly that we must needs come in the end vnto some such thing as is moued onely of it selfe and not of any other thing And thirdly that this on● thing which thus mooueth of it selfe is the true cause of motion vnto euery other thing Aristotle in like manner though in many other points dissenting from his Maister yet in this point of Motion he consenteth fully with him yea presseth the same reason almost in the same forme Omne quod mouetur ab aliquo moueri necesse est Et aut ab eo quod mouetur ab alio aut ab eo quod non mouetur ab alio Si ab eo mouetur quod ab alio motu cietur mouens aliquod esse primum quod ab alio non mouetur necesse est Fieri enìm non potest vt in infinitum proficiscatur id quod mouet atque mouetur ab alio Quippe cùm infinitorum nihil sit primum Whatsoeuer thing is mooued must needes be mooued of something and that thing which moueth it must needes it selfe be moued either of another or not of another If it be mooued by such a thing as is mooued of another we must come by necessity vnto a first moouer which is not mooued by any other For it is vnpossible to goe still on for euer in those things that are moued by another Because in those things that are infinite there can none of them be first And therefore where there is granted to be any first thing there cannot be held to be an infinite proceeding Yea and againe a little after Fieri non potest vt id quo motus affertur moveat absque eo quod movet a seipso It cannot be that that which is moued by another should be moued but by that which is moued by it selfe And hee giueth these examples Baculus mouet lapidem mouetur a manu quae ab homine mouetur The Staffe moues the stone the hand moues the staffe the man moues the hand and the man is moued in some sort of himselfe For as the Romane Orator affirmeth Quod animal est motu mouetur interiore suo Euery liuing thing is moued by an internal motion of his owne So that the summe of those two fore-named Reasons which I haue aboue set downe in their Authors owne words is in effect thus much That Whatsoeuer thing is moued must needs be moued by something and that thing must either be moued by it selfe or by some other thing By it selfe can no inferior or second thing be moued but alwayes by some former and superior For as it subsisteth not by it selfe but by another so moueth it also not it selfe but by another Motum enìm suum non sibi debet sed Authori saith Hilarie It oweth all his motion not vnto his owne power but to his Author and first Mouer So that no inferior thing is moued of it selfe but onely by the power of the supreme and first Mouer Now if all these sensible and inferior things be moued of some other as wee plainly see they are then may we by them ascend as by steppes and degrees from the lower to the higher vntill we come at last vnto that first Mouer For in those things that are moued by another wee cannot proceede in infinitum but must at last stay in one which is the Mouer of all the other and yet it selfe is moued by none other but hath both his motion and his being of himselfe And therefore must needs be God This is the whole summe a●d effect of that Argument Whereby this first point is euidently cleered That the contemplation of these secondarie motions doe leade vs by necessitie vnto a first Yea and as Aquinas very wittily obserueth as well in Motions as in causes There can be no Second if there be no First no inferior if there be no superior no posterior if