or by the concatenation of naturall things and the disposition of the first matter all things being so put together from eternity that one thing must needs follow another as it doth and the prima materia being so disposed that things cannot successively come to passe otherwise then they doe but must of necessity be as they are even invito deo though God would have some things to be otherwise then they are The Maniâ—heâ— held that all mens actions good or evill were determined too good actions by a good God who was the author of all good things that were created and of all good actions that came to passe in the world Evill actions by an evill God who was the primum principium mali the prime author of all evill things or actions that were extant in the world The Maintainers of the Absolute Decree do say one of these two things eyther that all actions naturall and morall good and evill and all events likewise are absolutely necessary so the Supralapsarians or that all mens ends at least are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills so the Sublapsarians And this is upon the matter all one with the former For first in vaine is our freedome in the actions and meanes if the end at which they drive be pitched and determined sith all actions are for the ends sake that it might be obtayned by them which without them could not And second the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that precede that end as if a man be fore-determined to damnation he must unavoydably sinne else he could not be damned Now in these 3 opinions we may note two things 1 The Substance and formality of them which is an unavoydablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be in this all of them agree all holding that in all things at least in all mens ends undeclinable fates and insuperable necessity do domineere And therefore Melancthon doth not sticke sundry times in his common places to call this Absolute Decree Fatum Stoicum tabulas Parcarum Stoicall fate and the Destinies tables He also chargeth the Church of Geneva the great Patron of it with a labor to bring in the Stoicks error as we may see in a certaine Epistle of Melancthons to Pencer where he hath these words (n) Melanct. in Epist ad Penâ— Scribâ—t ad me Lelius de Stoico fato usque adeo litem Genevae moveri ut quidam in caâ—cerem conjectus sit propterea quòd a Zenone differâ—et O misera tempora Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur Lelius writeth unto me that in Geneva there is such strife about the Stoicks fate that one was cast into prison because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times c. And by the Testimony of Beza too who speaking of Melancthon sayth (o) Beza in vita Calvini Philippus de his rebus ita scribere caeperat ut Genevenses quasi StoicuÌ„ fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur Philip hath so written of these things as if he meant to taxe the Geneva Divines for bringers in of Destiny 2 We may note the circumstance or the grounds of their opinions The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or the first matter The Manichees from two prima principia aeterna â—aeterâ— first principles of all things eternall and coeternall These last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God So that they diffeâ— in their grounds indeed but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better For it is better to derive this necessity of evill actions and unhappy events from an evill God or the course of nature then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good The substance of their opinions is all one the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to error Which being so for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute Reprobation be suspected because those dreames of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts and this of the Manichees was generally cryed downe by the Fathers not onely as foolish but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart or Christian Common-wealth not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it as for the substance of the error because it made all things and events to be necessary and so plucked up the roots of vertue planted vice and left no place for just rewards or punishments These are my reasons of the first sort THe Reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation now follow And first of those that fight against the upper way They are drawne ab incommodo from the great evils and inconveniences which issue from it naturally which may be referred to two maine heads 1 The dishonour of God 2 The overthrow of religion and government I. Jnconvenience It dishonoureth God For it chargeth him deeply with two things no wayes agreeable to his nature 1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell 2 Their sinnes on Earth First it chargeth him with mens Eternall torments in hell and maketh him to bee the prime principall and invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable soules the prime cause because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his owne voluntary disposition antecedent to all deserts in them and the principall and invincible cause because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable Decree and so necessary that they can no more scape it then poore Astyanax could avoid the breaking of his neck when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy Now this is a heavie charge contrary to Scripture Gods nature and sound reason 1 To Scripture which makes man the principall nay the onely cause in opposition to God of his owne ruine Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israel but in me is thy help Hos 13.9 As J live saith the Lord I will not the death of the wicked c. Turne ye turne ye why will ye dye Ezech. 33.11 He doth not afflict willingly nor greeve the children of men Lam. 3.33 To which speeches for likenesse sake I will joyne one of Prospers (p) Resp ad 12. Obj. Vincent Praedestinatio dei multis est causa standi nemim est causa labeÌ„di Gods predestination is to many the cause of standing to none of falling 2 It 's contrary to Gods nature (q) Exod. 34.6 who sets forth himselfe to be a God mercifull gracious long suffering abundant in goodnesse c. and he is acknowledged to be so by King David (r) Psal 86.5 Thou Lord art good and mercifull and of great kindnesse to all them that call upon thee And by the Prophets Joel Ionah and Micah He is gracious and mercifull Ioel. 2.13 slow to anger and of great kindnesse saith Ioel. Ionah 4.22 I know sayes Ionah that thou art a gracious
in libertima dei veluntate fundari dicimus We affirme that this non-Election is founded in the most free pleasure of God And (n) Ib thes 3. heterodox Nominem post lâ—psum merâ Dei voluntate praeteritum osse that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God is numbred by the same Divines among the Heterodox positions To this purpose also speake the Ministers of the Palatinate (o) Act Syn. Iud. Palat thes 3. Causa reprobationis est liberrima ac justissima Dei voluntas The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God (p) Ib thes 4. Quod Deus nonnullos praeterit granâ praedicationis evan â—elii ejus causa est idem beneplacitum sive eadem libera vâ—luntas That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospell the cause is the same free pleasure of God (q) Iudic. Theol. Hassiac Decrevit deus quosdam in lapsu misâ—ia relinquere pro suo beneplacito God decreed to leave some in the fall of his owne good pleasure Thus the Divines of Hâ—ssen The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time (r) Deus in tempore quosdomè genere humino de relinquit in miseâ—ââ—suâ nec media ad fiâ—eÌ„ conversioneÌ„ ipsumque etiam saluâ—em obtinendam necessaria eis confert c idque pro libertiniâ suâ voluntate God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen and doth not bestow upon them meanes necessary to beleeve c. and this out of his most free pleasure This they joyntly affirme and prove it by this reason especially All men were lookt on as sinners If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate he should have reprobated or rejected all But he did not reprobate all therefore for sinne he reprobated none but for his own pleasure in which we must rest without seeking any other cause Now from these two things layd together viz. 1 That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning 2 That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity it will follow that he is the author of the reprobates sinnes 1 Because Causa causae est causa causati The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect whether it be a cause by acts negative or positive But God is the chiefe or sole cause by their doctrine of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace therefore he is by the same doctrine the true and proper cause of their sinnes 2 Because Removens prohibens c. that which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event is the cause of that event as for example he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs is the cause of the falling of that stone and he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to would uphold a house is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house But God by their opinion withholdeth from Reprobates that power which being granted them might keep them from falling into sinne therefore he becommeth a true morall cause of their sinnes (s) Terâ—ul l. 1 contr Marcion c. 22. In cujus manu est quid ne fiat ei deputatur â—m jam fit In whose power it is that a thing be not done to him it is imputed when it is done saith Tertullian It will not suffice to say that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becommeth onely an accidentall not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes For a cause is then onely accidentall in relation to the effect when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause For example digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold when that event is neither expected nor intended by the husbandman in digging But when the effect is lookt for and aymed at then the cause though it be the cause onely by withholding the impediment is not accidentall as a pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storme foreseeing that by his neglect the Ship will be drowned is not to be reputed an accidentall but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship This being so it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detayning grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne from Reprobates not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow but knowing infallably what mischiefe will follow and determining precisely that which doth follow namely their impenitency and damnation becommeth the proper and direct cause of their sinnes SEcondly it opposeth Gods Mercy God is mercifull a part it is of his title Exod. 34.6 2 Contrary to his Mercy mercifull and gracious He is mercy in the abstract 1 Joh. 4.16 God is love a Father of mercies and God of all consolations 2 Cor. 1.3 a Saviour of men 1 Tim. 4.10 And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be And therefore hath of old stiled him in her liturgy A God whose nature and property is alwayes to have mercy and to forgive Two wayes is Gods mercy spoken of in Scripture absolutely and comparatively 1 Absolutely and so it is set out in high and stately termes It is called rich mercy Eph. 2.4 great kindnesse Ionah 4.2 Abundant mercy 1 Pet. 1.2 love without height or depth length or breadth or any dimensions love passing knowledge Eph. 3.18 So great it is that Jonah could not intreat him to punish the little infant harmelesse Ninivites with temporall death for the sinnes of their guilty parents Ionah 4.11 2 Comparatively with two things it is compared 1 His owne justice 2 The love that dwelleth in the creature and is advanced above both I. With his owne Iustice it is compared and advanced above it not in its essence for all Gods excellencies are infinitely good and one is not greater then another but in its expressions and some things that have relation to it particularly in these 1 In its naturalnesse and dearenesse to God It is sayd of mercy it pleaseth him Micah 7.18 but justice is called his strange worke aliâ—num à naturâ suâ Esay 28.21 He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men Lamentat 3. 33. 2 In the frequent exercise of it selfe He is said to be slow of anger but abundant in goodnesse Exod. 34.6 mercies are bestowed every day judgements inflicted but now and then sparingly and after a long time of forbearance when there is no remedy 2 Chron. 36.15 All the day long have J stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people Esay 65.2 That is I have been patient a long time and in that time I have not been idle but imployed in exhorting promising and shewing mercy that so I might
of the action 2 The formall part which is the evill or obliquity of it God is the Author of the action it selfe but not of the obliquity and evill that cleaveth to it as he that causeth a lame horse to goe is the cause of his going but not of his lame going And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Author of sinne Answ 1 1 All sinnes receive not this distinction because of many sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull as of the eating of the forbidden fruit and Sauls sparing of Agag and the fat beastâ— of the Amalekites 2 It is not true that they make the decree of God onely of actions and not of their aberrations for they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull and not as bare actions For actions deserve damnation not as actions but as transgressions of Gods law 3 To the Simile I say that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knocke him on the head and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him is undoubtedly the cause of his halting and so if God determine to cast men into Hell and then to bring them into a state of sinne that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the author as well of their sinnes as of those actions to which they doe inseparably adhere and that out of Gods intention to destroy them The will is determined to an Object two wayes Distinct 3. 1 By Compulsion against the bent and inclination of it 2 By necessity according to the naturall desire and liking of it Gods Predestination say they determineth the will to sinne this last way but not the first it forceth no man to doe that which he would not but carryeth him towards that which he would when men sinne it is true they cannot choose and it is as true they will not choose It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that Gods decree is the cause of mens sinnes but their owne wicked wils Answ 1 1 The Ancients made no distinction between these two words necessity and compulsion but used them in this argument promiscuously and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne lest they should grant him hereby to be the Author of sinne as I have touched before and shall intimate againe afterward Nor did the Schoolemen put any difference betweene them as may appeare by the testimony of Mr. Calvin Calv. Instit i. 2. c. 2 Sect â—â— who speaking of the Schoole-distinction of the willes threefold liberty from Necessity from Sinne from Mâ—ery sayth This distinction I could willingly receive but that it confoundeth necessity with coaction 2 That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne as that which forceth it because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed which otherwise might be avoyded and therefore if the divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne it is as truly the cause of the sinne as if it did enforce it 3 That which necessitateth the will to sinne is more truely the cause of the sinne then the will is because it over-ruleth the will and beareth all the stroke taketh from it its true liberty by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disposer of its own acts and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power which is under the insuperable check and controll of no Lord but it selfe It over-ruleth I say and maketh it become but a servile instrument irresistibly subject to superiour command and determination and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes as proceed from the will so determined then the will is For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one a principall over-ruling cause the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principal then is the effect in all reasoÌ„ to be imputed to the principall which by the force of its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a meere servant in the production of it We shall finde it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent It is not ye that speak sayth CHRIST but the spirit of my father that speaketh in you Math. 10.20 J laboured more abundantly then they all yet not J but the grace of God which was in me 1. Cor. 15.10 And I live yet not J but CHRIST liveth in me sayth S. Paul Gal. 2.20 In these and many other places the effect or worke spoken of is taken from the instrument and given to the principall Agent Which being so though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne and willeth the sinne which it doth yet seeing what the will doth it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe the sinne committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the inferior as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause 4 That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only that is with and not against his will is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner then that which constrayneth him to sinne against his will as he which by powerfull perswasions draweth a man to stab or hang or poyson himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action then he that by force compelleth him because he maketh him to consent to his own death And so if Gods decree do not onely make men sinne but sinne willingly too not onely cause that they shall malè agere doe evill but malè velle will evill it hath the deeper hand in the sinne Sinne may be considered as sinne Distinct 4. or as a meanes of declaring Gods justice in mens punishments God doth not predestinate men to sinne as it is sinne but as a means of their punishment He is not therefore say they the Author of Sinne. Answ 1 1 A good end cannot moralize a bad action it remayneth evill though the end be never so good bonum oritur ex integris end manner yea and matter too must be good or else the action is naught He that shall steale that hee may give an almes or commit adultery that he may beget children for the Church or oppresse the poore to teach them patience or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example or do any forbidden thing though his end be never so good he sinneth notwithstanding And the reason is because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne for as much as it is laesio divinae majestatis a wronging of Gods majesty and so divino bono opposita directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God as much as
inviolable justice of God cannot absolute Reprobation of such especially as are commanded to beleeve and are called to salvation be reconciled My Reasons are these 1 Because it maketh God to punish the Righteous with the wicked The Sublapsarians say directly in plaine termes that God decreed to destruction men considered without sin and therefore yet righteous And the Sublapsarians say as much in effect for they say two things 1 That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being borne in Originall sinne as I have noted before 2 That he hath determined for that sinne to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever and so they make God to doe that by two acts the one accompanying the other which the other say he did by one Calv. Instit 3. cap. 23. §. 23. This is so cleare a case that Calvin with some others have not stickt to say that God may with as much justice determine men to Hell the first way as the latter See Jnstit l. 3. c. 23. § 7. Where against those who deny that Adam fell by Gods decree he reasoneth thus All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone Adam therefore sinned by this onely decree (z) Quid eos prohibâ—t fateri de uno homine quod inviti de toto humano genere concedunt Quid enim tergiversando luderent operam What lets them to grant that of one man which they must grant of all men And a little after he sayth (a) Bonos istos justitiae Dei patronos perplexos haerere in festâ—â altas verò trabes superare nimis absurdum est It is too absurd that these kind Patrons of Gods Iustice should thus stumble at a straw and leape over a blocke God may with as much justice decree Adams sinne and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure as out of that will and pleasure the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne and their damnation for it that is the substance of his reasoning To the same purpose speaketh Maccovius From hence we may see sayth he what to judge of that opinion of out adversaries viz. That God cannot justly ordaine men to destruction without the consideration of sinne (b) Maccov disp 18. p. 16. Nam dicant quaeso nobis quid majus sit imputate alicui culpam alterius propter ipsam illum morte aeternâ plectere an verò ordinare ad interitum At hoc potest sine ullâ laesione justitiae suae ergo multò magis potest illud posterius Let them tell me which is greater to impute to one man the sinne of another and punish him for it with eternall death or to ordaine simply without looking at sinne to destruction surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater But this God may doe without any wrong to Justice much more therefore may he do the other To these consenteth Dr. Twisse and sayth (c) Dr. Twiss Vind. gra l. 2. digr 1. pag. 15. Quod potest Deus intercedente liberâ suà constitutione illud etiam absolutè poterit vel sine aliqua constitutione interâ—dente If God may ordaine men to Hell for Adams sin which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution he may as well doe it absolutely without any such constitution And it is most true it is all one in substance simply to decree the misery of an innocent man and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to misery Neyther of these decrees I take it are just 2 The second reason why it is against Gods justice is because it maketh him to require faith in CHRIST of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denyed both a power to beleeve and a CHRIST to beleeve in That God bindeth Reprobates to beleeve as well as others it is the constant doctrine of Divines among whom Zanchius delivereth it for a Thesis (d) Zanch. l. 5. de natur Dei cap. 2. q. 1. de praed Sanctorii Quisque mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem aeternam in Christo fuisse electum maximè autem is qui fidem in Christum profitetur Cum dicemus unumquemque teneri hoc credere neminem ne Reprobos quidem qui neque unquam ciedent nec credere in Christum possunt excipimus nisi credant gravissimè omnium peccant Every man especially he that professeth CHRIST is bound to beleeve that hee is chosen in CHRIST to salvation every man without exception even the Reprobate himselfe and if he beleeve it not he committeth a most grievous sinne above all others This he proveth by that speech of CHRIST Ioh. 16.9 The Spirit shall convince the world of sinne because they beleeve not in me Reprobates therefore are bound to beleeve Mr. Perkins also sayth something to the same purpose (e) Perk lib. de Praed pag. 89. Obj. 3. Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei cicde Evangelio tenetur credere se redemptum esse per Christum etiam improbus perinde ac Electus sed aliâ tamen aliâ ratione Electus tenetur credere ut credendo particeps siat electionis reprobus ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis etiam ex intentione Dei Every one in the Church by vertue of this commandement beleeve the Gospell is bound to beleeve that he is redeemed by CHRIST as well the Reprobate as the Elect though for a different reason the Elect that by beleeving he may be saved the Reprobate that by not beleeving he may be without excuse and this out of the very purpose of God But now they cannot in justice be bound to beleeve if they be absolute Reprobates for three causes 1 Because they have no power to beleeve they want it and must want it for ever God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia no man can be justly tyed to impossible performances Because no man can flye like a bird or reach heaven with the top of his finger therefore God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of Faith if it be not possible to them 2 Because it is not Gods unfeyned will they shall beleeve No man will say that it is Gods serious will that such a man shall live when it is his will that he shall never have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation Nor can we say that God doth in good earnest will that those men should beleeve whom he will not furnish with necessary power to beleeve It may rather be sayd it is Gods unfeyned will they shall not beleeve because it is his will they shall want power to beleeve For it is a Maxime in Logique Qui vult aliquid in causâ vult effectum ex istâ causa profluentem He who willeth a thing in the cause willeth the effect that necessarily floweth from that
cause Now if it be the certaine will of God that Reprobates shall in no wise beleeve hee cannot with reason and equity tye them to beleeve For then he tyeth them to an act contrary to his determinate will 3 Because they have no object of Faith no Christ to beleeve in Credere jubet fidei nullum obiectum ponit He commandeth to beleeve and affordeth no object to beleeve in this soundeth not well The Divels have no part in Christ or the new Covenant We will not therefore say that God can justly bind them to beleeve or punish them as transgressors of the Covenant because they beleeve not How then can we say that God can justly require faith of Reprobates or destroy them for not beleeving if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the Covenant then the Divels have If a man should command his servant to eate and punish him for not eating and in the meane time fully resolve that hee shall have no meat to eat would any reasonable man say that such a man were just in the command or punishment Change but the name and the case is the same Againe that Christ dyed for Reprobates by the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation is a lye and can God justly bind men to beleeve a lye This is the second reason 3 The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice is because it will have him to punish men for omission of an act which is made impossible to them by his owne decree not by that decree alone by which he determined to give them no power to beleeve having lost it but by that decree also by which he purposed that we should partake with Adam in his sinne and be stripped of all that supernaturall power which we had by Gods free grant bestowed upon us in Adam before he fell These are the reasons which move me to thinke that this absolute decree is repugnant to Gods Iustice Three things are usually answered 1 That Gods wayes may be very just and yet seem unjust to mans erring understanding and so is this decree though flesh and bloud will not yeeld it to be so This answer I take to be false and the contradictory to it to be true namely that nothing is truely just which humane understanding purged from prejudice corrupt affections and customes hath in all ages places and persons judged to be unjust The reason is because God hath by the light of nature and those generall impressions of good and evill honest and dishonest just and unjust made in the hearts of men sufficiently instructed and enabled them to judge what is just and what is not When a thing is done reason so quallified is able to say This is just or this is unjust whether it be done by God or man For vertues in men being but the image of those perfections that dwell in God Iustice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing though infinitly differing in degree as the greater and lesser light That this power is ingraffed in men God himself who best knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature hath sufficiently signified in those Scriptures where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his wayes Iudge J pray you between me and my vineyard Esay 5. Judge O ye house of Israel are not my wayes equall and your wayes unequall Ezek. 18.25 God would never put them upon the tryall of reason if he had not made it able to examine them The incarnation of the sonne of God his birth of a Virgin his dying the resurrection of the body and such mysteries as are peculiar to the Gospell and the proper objects of the Christian faith God hath not offered to the tryall of our understandings buâ— rather derideth those that presume to judge of them by reason 1 Cor. 1.20 Where is the Scribe where is the wise when is the disputer of this world and the reason is because these things being supernaturall and therefore not discernable by naturall power man is no competent judge of them by his naturall understanding nor may adventure upon the tryal and iudgement of them with lesse danger then Vzzah look into the Ark for Scrutator majestatis opprimetur à gloriâ 〈◊〉 that pryeth into Gods majestie will be overwhelmed of his glory But of the justice of his decrees and wayes he maketh him a judge because the common notions of just and unjust being imprinted in nature he is able by naturall reason to apprehend what is just in divine acts as well as in his owne 2 It is answered that these decrees are set downe is Scripture to be the will of God and therfore they must needs be just For Gods will is the rule of all righteousnesse To this answer I have these things to reply 1 This rule in Divinity is much abused by the mainteyners of absolute Reprobation and may not be admitted in their sence and meaning For Gods will is not a rule of justice to himself as if things were therefore just because he willeth them and worketh them but his justice rather is a rule of his will and works which are the expressions of his will He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them because they are agreeable to that justice which dwels in the divine nature as he maketh nothing which hath not potentiam objectivam a power of being created without implying contradiction to himself or any thing in him so he willeth and doeth nothing but that which may be willed or done salvâ justitiâ without wrong to his justice Hierom Proâ—m in Hosea St. Hierom speaking of the Prophet Hoseas taking a wife of fornications Hosea 1.2 saith it was done in typo typically not really quia si fiaâ— turpissimum est because if had beene indeed done it had beene a most foule thing But thou wilt answer sayth he Deo jubente nihil turpe est God commanding it nothing is dishonest Thus much we say sayth the Father that God commandeth nothing but what is honest but he doth not by commanding dishonest things make those things honest which are abominable plainely giving us to see what he thought viz. that God doth not will a thing and so make it good but willeth it because it is in it selfe good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it And thus much doth Zanchy though a rigid mainteyner of absolute reprobation not obscurely confesse in his Treatise de nativ Dei where he letteth fall such speeches as make Gods justice antecedent to his will and therefore the rule of it rather then a thing regulated by it (f) Zanch. l. 3. de nat Dei c. 4 q. 9. thes 2. Neque aliquid velle potest quod justuÌ„ non sit Neither can God will anything sayth he which is not just And againe (g) Quod placet principi legis habet vigorem The Princes pleasure hath the strength of a Law is a rule