A LETTER ABOUT Liberty and Necessity Written to the DUKE of NEWCASTLE By THOMAS HOBBES of Malmesbury With OBSERVATIONS upon it By a Learned Prelate of the Church of England lately deceased LONDON Printed by J. Grover for W. Crooke at the Green Dragon without Temple-Bar 1676. Imprimatur Anton. Saunders ex Reverendissimo Archiepisc Cant. Ã Sacris Domesticis Ex Aedibus Lambethanis Jan. 19. 1675 6. Mr. HOBBES his Opinion about Liberty and Necessity sent in a Letter to the DUKE of NEWCASTLE FIrst I conceive that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain Action if he have no time to deliberate the doing of it or abstaining necessarily followeth the present Thought he had of the good or evil Consequence thereof to himself As for Example in sudden Anger the Action should follow the Desire of Revenge in sudden Fear the Thought of Escape Also when a man had time to deliberate but deliberates not because never any thing appeared that should make him doubt of the Consequence the Action follows his opinion of the Goodness or Harm of it these Actions I call Voluntary my Lord if I understand him right calleth them Spontaneous I call them Voluntary because those actions which follow immediately the last Appetite are voluntary and here where is one onely Appetite that one is the last Besides I see it 's reasonable to punish a rash Action which could not be justly done by man to man unless the same were voluntary For no Actions of man can be said to be without Deliberation though never so sudden because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life whether he should do that kind of Action or not And hence it is that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger shall nevertheless be justly put to death because all the time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil shall be held for one continual Deliberation and consequently the Killing shall proceed from Election Secondly I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it that he doth nothing else but consider whether it be better for him to do it or not to do it and to consider an Action is to imagine the Consequences of it both good and evil From whence it is to be inferred That Deliberation is nothing else but alternate Hope and Fear or alternate Appetite to do or quit the Action of which he deliberateth Thirdly I conceive that in all Deliberations that is to say in all alternate succession of contrary Appetites the last is that which we call the Will and is immediately before the doing of the Action or next before the doing of it become impossible All other Appetites to do and to quit that come upon a man during his Deliberations are usually called Intentions and Inclinations but not Will there being but one Will which also in this case may be called the Last Will though the Intention change often Fourthly that those Actions which a man is said to do upon Deliberation are said to be voluntary and done upon Choice and Election so that voluntary Action and Action proceeding from Election is the same thing and that of voluntary Agents 't is all one to say he is free and to say he hath made an end of deliberating Fifthly I conceive Liberty to be rightly defined in this manner Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to Action that are not contained in the natural and intrinsecal quality of the Agent As for Example the Water is to be seen descend freely or to have liberty to ascend up the channel of the River because there is no impediment and though the Water cannot ascend yet men say it never wants the liberty to ascend but the power or faculty because the impediment is in the nature of the Water and intrinsecal So also we say He that is tyed wants liberty to go because that the impediment is not in him but in his Bonds whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame because the impediment is in himself Sixthly I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from it self but from the action of some other immediate Agent without it self and that therefore when first a man hath an Appetite or Will to something to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will the cause of his Will is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing So that whereas it is out of controversy of voluntary Actions the Will is a necessary cause and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things which it disposeth not it followeth that voluntary Actions have all their necessary causes and therefore are necessitated Seventhly I hold That to be a sufficient Cause to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the Effect the same also is a necessary Cause For if it be possible that a sufficient Cause shall not bring forth the Effect then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it and so the Cause was not sufficient but if it be impossible that a sufficient Cause should not produce the effect then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause For it is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it Hence is manifest that whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it else it had not been And therefore also Voluntary Actions are necessitated Lastly I hold that the ordinary definition of a Free Agent namely That a Free Agent is that which when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect can nevertheless not produce it implies a contradiction and is Nonsense being as much as to say the Cause may be sufficient that is necessary and yet the Effect not follow My Reasons For the first 5 points where it is explicated 1. What Spontaneity is 2. What Deliberation is 3. What Will Propension and Appetite is 4. What a Free Agent is 5. What Liberty is There can be no other proof offered but every mans own Experience by reflection on himself and remembring what he useth to have in his mind that is what he himself meaneth when he saith an Action is Spontaneous a man Deliberates such is his Will that Agent or Action is Free Now he that so reflecteth upon himself cannot but be satisfied that Deliberation is the considering of the good and evil Sequels of the Action to come that by Spontaneity is meant Inconsiderate Proceedings or else nothing is meant by it that Will is the last act of our Deliberation that a Free Agent is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will and that Liberty is the Absence of External Impediments But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive but what they hear and are not able or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they
Agent that he can change his Will and make that not to be last which once was last that is he hath power over his last Will I mean over that which for the time was the last and was as serious and resolv'd as the last And for those Actions which he calls only Intentions and Inclinations I see no reason why they should not be called Wills seeing 1. they are acts of the Will for no application of the Soul to any thing upon a reason can proceed from the inferiour Sensitive part and therefore must either be acts of the Will or be nothing at all And 2ly by Mr. Hobbe's own rule and definition of Will every one of those successive Appetites are Wills because 'till another consequent Appetite followed they were the last for the time and therefore in their courses and turns all are Wills Indeed after they are changed and unwilled again I think no man desires they should be still called Wills when they cease to be at all Fourth Point To say he is a free Agent is all one to say He hath made an end of Deliberation Here I shall call Mr. Hobbs again to his own reflection whether a man cannot be said to be free before he hath made an end of Deliberation rather than after As when I desire to have a friend dine with me I meaning to ask him first whether he be ingaged or resolv'd for any other company do use these words Sir are you free and if he answers me that he is free I presently apprehend that he is not resolv'd for any particular but is still capable of a resolution to dine with me Not but that he may be said to be free too that hath made an end of Deliberation but in another sence that is he is free from all doubts that come by Deliberation But the same may be free also before Deliberation is ended but it is from particular determinations and resolutions which is the freedom we defend to do or not to do And this seems to be a greater and more proper Freedom than the other for he that is free from Deliberation acts indeed freely but it is in that one way to which he is resolved But he that is so free as to go any way is more free than he that goes but freely in one way Fifth Point Liberty is the absence of all Impediments to Action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsecal qualities of the Agent If it will content Mr. Hobbs That shall be allow'd to be one sence of the word but if I may have leave to do but what he desires I should do reflect I find another sence and the very same which is denied by him A Liberty from Necessity As when a Father recommends a Wife to his Son the Son hath no doubt liberty to take that Wife in Mr. Hobbs his sence And yet if the same Son should desire his Father to give him his liberty the Father would presently apprehend that he desired somewhat that he had not given him that is leave as well to refuse her if he saw cause as to take her he would not cavil with him and say You have the liberty in that you are ty'd to her but if he means to give him his liberty his meaning also will be to absolve him of the necessity to take her By this we see that no advantage is gotten to Mr. Hobbs by reflection which shews a Liberty from Necessity reflected also Sixth Point is an argument to prove That all Actions are necessitated because they have necessary Causes I deny the Consequence For when he sayes That all Actions have their necessary Causes his meaning is if his meaning agree with the reason he gives of it That it is necessary they have Causes because saith he nothing can have beginning from itâ— self Now can any one imagine that a reflecting man should think this a good consequence Nothing can have beginning from it self and therefore every thing is necessitated that because an Effect must necessarily be produced by some Cause that therefore the Cause did necessarily produce that Effect For good Sir reflect again and bethink your self That as some Effects cannot be produced but by a concurrence of many Causes together every one of these is necessary to the producing of the Effect and yet not any one of these doth necessitate the Effect but rather it is necessary that nothing should be effected if that cause be single and alone Seventh Point is another argument to prove That voluntary actions are necessitated because they have sufficient Causes and all sufficient Causes are necessary That all sufficient Causes are necessary sufficient may have a double meaning either when there is sufficient virtue and aptness in the things to produce the Effect if they were us'd and imployed by the Agent or else when the Agent also actually imployes them to that purpose 'till the work be produc'd Take sufficient in this latter sence and all men will confess that the Effect will follow necessarily But the Power which the Will is said to have over sufficient Causes is understood of such onely as are sufficient in the first sence i.e. such as have aptness in them to produce the Effect when they are used which is a sence both common and reasonable As I have sufficient to pay all my Debts I have sufficient to defray the charges of a years travel and yet neither pay a Penny nor stir a foot Eighth Point charges the Definition of a Free Agent that is given by others with Nonsense and Contradiction viz. That when all things needful to produce the Effect be present can nevertheless not produce it For the Nonsense let it lie between us a while 'till the matter be examined a little and then let them take it that have most right to it If there be any Nonsense in the Definition it must be either in the meaning of them that use it or in the words they use to express their meaning When they speak of all things needful to produce the Effect their meaning is well known to be of all except the Agent 's Will or if it were not known to Mr. Hobbs it might and ought to have been from the very words of the Definition which plainly suppose the Will of the Agent to be yet undetermined All things needful in this sense may well be and yet nothing produc'd because the Agent hath not yet resolv'd to use them But if Mr. Hobbs will make them mean what they do not he may very well make them speak what they should not Now if their meaning imply no Contradiction or Nonsense as certainly it doth not then of necessity the words must or it will not be difficult on whom to bestow the Nonsense And for the words to say there be all things needful when yet the Agent is excepted who is no less needful than any of the rest let the common language of men or as Mr. Hobbs is pleased
to call it let Reflexion be judge As when a man hath a good seat for a House all materials workmen and mony to defray the charges he may and commonly doth use to say He hath all things requisite and needful to build a House and then too when his Will is yet suspended and unresolved whether to use them or not Therefore your Self or if you will Reflexion being judge you have clapt the Nonsense upon your own head But enough of the Points let us see if we can mend our selves with the Reasons of them REASONS Wipe your Eyes I beseech you for never were there such Reasons seen before such Mysteries discovered For the first Point yea for five of the eight Points the Reasons are That they have no Reasons For he sayes they cannot be prov'd but by Reflexion and in that he speaks but truth for 't is sure no reason or proof can be made of the signification and use of Words which is all that the first five Points have blest us with But though he said true in saying no Reasons could be given yet he said not well in promising Reasons when he puts us off with Reflexions Of the five first points himself confesses that no Reasons can be given and of the two next if he will not confess so too he shall be compelled For they are Arguments and contain in effect and substance Syllogisms which are incapable of Reasons for who ever went about to give or could give Reason of a whole Syllogism if the Reasons presented belong to any part of the Syllogism in which case only Reasons can be given Let him but say to which part of his Points his Reason belongs and I will do him so much reason as to acknowledge it In the mean time he stands upon his good Behaviour whether these two points shall be allowed to have any more reason than the five former And for the eighth and last point which is all the hope that is left us to be a point of reason his Reason is That as he said before so now he sayes again and whatsoever Mr. Hobbs is pleased to say twice over you may be assur'd is true This is the summe of his Reasons in the most sober and favourable construction I can make of them yet because under the title of the seventh Reason some new matter is alledg'd that was not spoken of before I shall say something to that too He layes down a Proposition more general than the question That all Events never so casual have necessary Causes If I should grant this yet the voluntary Agent may be free though the work which he produces be necessary This I shall shew in the Instances which are brought to prove this Proposition The first is of the Chance of a Die I confess that though it be very casual to the Caster yet it doth necessarily come to pass upon such postures and motions of the Hand and Die as happen'd to meet together at that time yet I say too that as to the Caster of the Die it was not necessary because he had a double power over that Chance to have hinder'd it if he pleas'd for either he might not have thrown the Dice at all or he might have so ordered the motion and posture of his hand that could have caused another Chance Yea more desiring to avoid controversies as much as Mr. Hobbs doth to make them I grant also that there is a time when and a respect wherein voluntary Agents are in the same condition with natural and do act necessarily For not onely a natural Agent solely and singly doth work his proper natural Effect necessarily as the Fire necessarily heats but also when they are in conjunction together as it were a corporation of Causes whether that be casual as the motions and posture of the hand meeting with suitable postures with the Die and the Table do produce necessarily a certain chance or whether it be artificial as the Medicine compounded of several Drugs do necessarily produce a common Effect beyond the vertue of their particular natures apart which belongs to them onely in that conjunction and society of operation So likewise a voluntary Agent constantly resolv'd and actually cooperating with other sufficient causes doth as necessarily produce the Effect as any natural Agent working either alone or in conjunction and society So as in this case if Mr. Hobbs seeks for an Adversary I assure my self he will find none and if he thinks he hath found a Truth 't is but such as was never lost But when we affirm voluntary Agents to be free from necessity in acting we look upon them in another state and condition for they act not like natural Agents whose work immediately follows and flows from their Being but have a progressive operation that is before any thing beside their Being they deliberate resolve and fall to execution and there is a time for all these allow'd And though when they are come to that perfect state and progress that they have pass'd the irrevocable resolv'd Will they act as necessarily as natural Agents do yet in their imperfect state that is from their first Deliberation to their last constant Resolution they are absolutely free to do or not to do In which case alone we assert the liberty of voluntary Agents against which nothing either is or can be prov'd by the instance of the chance of a Die 2. And for the other instance of the Weather That whatsoever comes to pass rain or not rain it comes so to pass necessarily I answer first that this is impertinent to the question concerning the liberty of voluntary Agents who have no operation or concurrence to the event of Weather And secondly the reason that is us'd to prove that necessary is insufficient in many respects as because it is necessary that one of the two must happen either rain or no rain therefore that which doth happen comes to pass necessarily My first reason is because the truth of a Disjunctive Proposition as this is it must rain or not rain consists in disjunctione partium and not in disjunctis partibus for when you resolve this Proposition into two Categoricks it shall rain for one and it shall not rain for another which resolution the event will make as the nature so the truth of the Proposition is changed For when the Event hath turned the Disjunctive Proposition into a Categorick as that it rains it cannot partake of that Necessity which consisted onely in the Disjunctive And to make this plain I shall quit your Instance with another Suppose I am confin'd to live within the walls of London so as it is now necessary for me either to live in Cheap-side or in some other part of the City yet am I not ty'd by that confinement to London to any one place if I were ty'd and necessitated to any one place it must be either to that place I chuse to live in or to that I do not
live in The latter I hope no man will imagine can be necessary to live where I do not and if the former were necessary that is to live where I do viz. for Example in Cheap-side then by vertue of that confinement to London I might be punish'd if I had not liv'd in Cheap-side in which case a Jury out of Bethlem would not condemn me for that were to make it all one to be necessitated to live in London and to be necessitated to live in Cheap-side And the reason why from the necessity of the Disjunction cannot be inferr'd a necessity to the parts of it separately is clear by the Instance I have given The necessity that is laid upon me is to the whole latitude and compass of London which leaves me free to any part within that latitude So the necessity that it shall rain or not rain is onely to the compass and latitude that these two make raining or not raining but within that latitude as to the one alone or to the other there is no necessity If you say it is necessary for me to live in Cheap-side because I live in no other part of the City so that it is necessary it should rain because it doth not hold up I answer that this is a necessity of Consequence which infers no necessity upon the Consequent which is the Necessity in question that is that my living in Cheap-side or the raining to morrow which are the Consequents did come to pass by necessary Causes And because I am afraid of Mr. Hobbs his bitter Sarcasm upon Distinctions that to say It is necessary necessitate consequentiae but not consequentis is all one to say It is necessary Tityre but not necessary tu patulae I will prevent it by shewing the difference in an instance If Mr. Hobbs would not have the Goose go bare-foot it is necessary he should shoo it this no doubt but is a necessary consequence and yet I suppose he will not think that the consequent is necessary as that it is necessary he should shoo the Goose and to say truth there is no more necessity it should rain to morrow than there is to shoo a Goose. 3. In this instance of the Weather there is another impertinency about Necessity for whereas the question is Whether all things come to pass necessarily that is out of such necessary Causes that it was not possible they should not come to pass the proof of this is taken from such a necessity as belongs onely to Propositions not to Productions Which necessity of Propositions consists onely in a necessary coherence of the parts together so as the Enunciation is never false as when the Genus is predicated of the Species or the proper Accident of the Subject as Homo est Animal Homo est visibilis are Propositions necessarily true because they are alwayes true and nothing can happen that should make them false So it is necessary that it should rain or not rain to morrow that is it is a Proposition necessarily true and cannot but be true but no intimation of the Necessity in question which is the necessary production of these Events from necessary Causes For if this Necessity were implyed in that Disjunction then every necessary Proposition should consist of a necessary Effect predicated of sufficient and necessary Causes which every mean Logician knows to be false And therefore to use Mr. Hobbs his own words because he is like to be best pleased with them this is all one as to say It is necessary Tityritè Ergo it is necessary tupatulicé After he hath given his Proofs as he thinks in full weight like a free Chapman he casts in one Argument over and above taken from God's Decrees and Prescience Because Mr. Hobbs himself doth not warrant this to be good Logick I cannot in civility charge him for it but if his design be in that caution if I thought it good Logick to make us believe that he made a conscience of keeping these Rules I am sorry for his ill-luck that he chose to do it here for if he had but dipped his finger blindfold upon any other part of his Discourse he might with more colour have accused himself than in this For I pray against what Rule of Logick doth he trespass that useth what arguments he pleaseth But so apt is he to mistake in reprehending others that hâ— cannot blame himself without an errour yet for all this though there be no want of Logick in using this argument yet there is not much in the argument he uses First in general both for the Decree and Prescience together they be Divine Actions that proceed from God's Attributes and the using of such for arguments of truth in other things Mr. Hobbs himself in his Postscript confesseth to be the cause of those many Errours that men fall into yet had he not the grace to forbear but falls himself into the same condemnation he decreed to others as if he would prove his Errour by his Fault For what but a Fatal Necessity could make him to do that which with the same breath almost he condemns But to particulars First of the Decree that it is frustrated by Liberty 1. I answer that to prove Necessity from God's Decrees is to prove obscurum per obscurius for of all the points of Divinity it is confessed by all that write of it That nothing is more obscure than the nature and efficacy of Divine Decrees That is one Elenche and Fallacy in Logick 2. Another is That Decree is an equivocal word and admits of diverse sences and constructions As for instance God decrees to destroy some City that it may be either Conditional as if it repent not or Absolute whether it repent or no. 2. That Absolute may be either as to the destruction of the City onely and not to the means by which it is to be destroyed or to both For though God should decree absolutely to destroy the City yet it is yet free that it be done either by the mutual dissensions of the Citizens or the invasion of an Enemy either of which are a sufficient neither a necessary meanes Dissension is not necessary because it may be by Invasion and Invasion is not because it may be by Dissension 3. It may be Absolute both to the thing and to the means As for the purpose that it may be by Dissension among the Citizens yet that means may come to effectâ— it two wayes either upon foresight that they would dissent of themselves or by another Decree of God that they should dissent 4. God may also decree that two wayes either by working upon the Will by a power irresistible peâ—motionem Physicam as they call it or per Moralem that is such inducements and inclinations as will ducere not trahere by either of which wayes God's Decree may be accomplished This variety partly in the Decrees partly in the constructions that are made of them which do all imply a
allow Mr. Hobbs to say That those things which are future to us though not to God are yet foreseen by him provided that use be not made of it to argue from his foresight as an act that is past upon which as a Cause must depend an Effect that must follow after it for God's vision doth not prevent the thing seen but accompany it for that 's the nature of every act that it supposes the object in some kind of being and so is meerly accidental to the nature of it and can lay no necessity upon it And though it be hard to comprehend how God should now be said to be present with those things which are yet to come and yet on the other side it is as hard to apprehend how it can be otherwise that God should be eternal and yet not present with any part of time as well future as past When Mr. Hobbs shall teach us how God can see that which is not to be seen for that which is future is not and therefore is not to be seen and to say they are to be seen in their Causes is liable to the same difficulties because the particular Causes of the thing are as well future as the thing it self that is if he can shew a better way than this That those things are present to God which are future to us I will let go my hold In the mean time it shall serve for my first answer to the argument from God's Prescience That because all vision supposes the thing seen to be it is accidentall to it and cannot necessitate it 2. Admitting foresight in God as an act past and the thing to follow it must follow in the same condition it was foreseen granting me that which I shall presently prove That Cod can foresee contingent things That which in the nature of it was contingent cannot become necessary by being foreseen for then he should not see as they are But you will say If God foresees them it is necessary they should come to pass I say so too but how in that quality that God foresaw them that is contingently for it 's as necessary that those things that are produced of contingent Causes should come to pass as those that are produced of necessary upon supposition of God's foresight and it is no bull in that sense to say That contingent things are necessary For there is a double Necessity one of Illation and Discourse an other of Production and Operation To affirm the latter of contingent things implies a contradiction but not so the former that is God's Prescience is a necessary argument to prove because he cannot be mistaken but not a necessary Cause to produce the Effect of which onely necessity the question is moved This argument therefore hath a term too many there is one Necessity in the Premises another in the Conclusion Praescientia Dei necessariò probat non necessariò producit 3. If Mr. H. shall deny that which I promised to prove That God can foresee contingent Events because they have no necessary Causes then he cannot also foresee what shall come to pass or not come to pass upon the performance or not performance of a condition But that God can foresee such things I hope he will not deny yet because he is a liberal and fierce denyer I shall put in him mind of one Instance God told David that the men of Keilah would deliver him into Saul's hand but with this tacite condition If he stay'd among them And for the consequence I prove it thus In this prediction and prevision of what the men of Keilah would do there was no necessary Cause as is plain for that it did not bring to pass the Effect for the men of Keilah did not though God foresaw it deliver David into Saul's hand And if God can foresee what would have been but what was not why may he not rather foresee any thing that shall be though it may not have been that is any future contingent For if the reason why future contingents cannot be seen or foreseen be that they have no necessary Causes then conditional previsions and predictions of such things as for failance of the condition come not to pass could not be foreseen also for that they have no necessary Causes as appears by the event These be all Mr. Hobbs his Arguments yet because he hath found another invention a kind of Lieutenant-Argument to which we are ever and anon remitted when arguments be out of the way which he calls Reflection and he may take it ill if it goes away unlooked on it will be necessary to exchange a word or two about it also OF REFLECTION LET us see how well it deserves to stand in the Muster-roll of his Militia and hath done such Facts for the subduing of those Monstrous Errors of our Ignorant Forefathers as is pretended and for which he dresses a particular Discourse This you will easily perceive both by the Nature of it and the Effects and Atchievments of it 1. The Nature of it is as far as I can guess to consider what I my self think of that which another says and proves not that is I demand of him and would know whether that be true which he affirms he bids me Go look Now is that a way to teach me Knowledge to send me to my self that is to one that is ignorant to inform me And this is that Columbus of our New World of Philosophy Reflection This is that which by a Digression on purpose is celebrated to Posterity as an excellent new Engine that will fetch Truth out of the very bottom of Democritus his Pit And yet perhaps there 's more in it than we are at the first sight able to apprehend especially being blinded with our Old and Hereditary Errors 2. Therefore he shews to the World two Noble Experiments of the vertue of it which he hath found in himself two such Rarities as could never be found in all the Books and Philosophers that ever you met with One is that thinking a thing to be good and loving it is all one The other that Eternity is not Nunc stans These be the two rare Experiments which like a prudent Mountebank he hangs out for the better reputation and vending his Reflection I must needs grant that these be two admirable strange Effects of it For in the first Reflection makes him see that which is not and in the second it makes him not see that which is For First that thinking a thing to be good and loving it is all one who ever saw such a sight before times who can believe that any thing should make Thinking and Loving all one For my part I am still in as much doubt as ever I was for no Reflection can prevail with me before these Reasons 1. Because they proceed from several Faculties of the Soul one from the Intellectual the other from the Effective part It is not in the power of Reflection to
hear such words no argument can be sufficient because Experience and Matter of Fact is not verified by other mens Arguments but by every mans own Sense and Memory For example how can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is all one to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words Or how can it be proved that Eternity is not Nunc stans to a man that says these words by custom and never considers how he can conceive it himself in his mind Also the 6th point that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a Cause can no other way be made known but by crying how he can imagine it but if he try he shall find as much reason if there be no Cause of the thing to conceive it should begin at one time as an other that is he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times which is impossible and therefore he must think there was some special Cause why it began then rather than sooner or later or else that it began never but was Eternal For the 7th point that all Events have necessary Causes it is there proved in that they have sufficient Causes Further let us also in this place suppose any Event never so casual as the throwing for example Ambs-ace upon a Pair of Dice and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown for seeing it was thrown it had a beginning and consequently a sufficient Cause to produce it consisting partly in the Dice partly in outward things as the posture of the parts of the Hand the measure of Force applied by the Caster the posture of the parts of the Table and the like In summe there was nothing wanting which was necesarily requisite to the producing of that particular Cast and consequently that Cast was necessarily thrown for if it had not been thrown there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it and so the Cause had not been sufficient In the like manner it may be proved that every other Accident how contingent soever it be is produced necessarily which is that that my L. Bishop disputes against The same also may be proved in this manner Let the case be put for example of the Weather 't is necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain if therefore it be not necessary it shall rain it is necessary it shall not rain otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition It shall rain or not rain should be true I know there be some that say it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass but not singly that it shall rain which is as much as to say one of them is necessary yet neither of them is necessary and to seem to avoid that absurdity they make a distinction that neither of them is true determinatè but indeterminatè which distinction either signifies no more but this One of them is true but we know not which and so the Necessity remains though we know it not or if the meaning of the distinction be not that it hath no meaning and they might as well have said One of them is true Tytiricè but neither of them Tupatulicé The last thing in which also consisteth the whole controversie namely that there is no such thing as an Agent which when all things necessary to Action are present can nevertheless forbear to produce it or which is all one that there is no such thing as Freedom from Necessity is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged for if it be an Agent it can work and if it work there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the Action and consequently the Cause of the Action is sufficient and if sufficient then also necessary as hath been proved before And thus you see how the inconveniences which his Lordship Bishop Bramhal objecteth must follow upon the holding of Necessity are avoided and the Necessity it self demonstratively proved To which I could adde if I thought it good Logick the inconvenience of denying Necessity as that it destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by Man as an Instrument or foreseeth shall come to pass a man if he have Liberty such as his Lordship affirmeth from Necessitation might frustrate and make not to come to pass and God should either not foreknow it and not decree it or he should foreknow such things should be as shall never be and decree that which shall never come to pass This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it and I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it onely to my Lord Bishop and so praying God to prosper Your Lordship in all Your Designs I take leave and am my most Noble and most Obliging Lord Rouen Aug. 20. 1645. Your most Humble Servant THO HOBBS The POSTSCRIPT ARguments seldom work on men of Wit and Learning when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion if any thing do it it is the shewing them the Cause of their Errour which is this Pious men attribute to God Almighty for Honours sake whatsoever they see is Honourable in the world as Seeing Hearing Willing Knowing Justice Wisdom c. but deny him such poor things as Eyes Ears Brains and other Organs without which we Worms neither have nor can conceive such Faculties to be and so far they do well But when they dispute of Gods Actions Philosophically then they consider them again as if he had such Faculties and in that manner as we have them this is not well and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties We ought not to dispute of God's Nature he is no fit subject for our Philosophy True Religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants and in giving God such Honour both in Attributes and Actions as they in their several Lieutenancies shall ordain OBSERVATIONS Upon A LETTER Of Mr. T. Hobbs to the Duke of NEWCASTLE Which he calls His Opinion about Liberty and Necessity THE Design of the Letter or as he himself speaks in one part of it that in which the whole Controversie consists is That Voluntary Agents do always act necessarily or which is all one act without liberty that is from necessity And this Opinion of his is first set down in 8 Points and then as the Title of the next Part imports so many Reasons to those Points The first Point is That by Spontaneity is meant Inconsiderate Proceeding c. without Deliberation I call this the first Point not because I find Spontaneity described here but because at the entrance of his Reasons he declares that to be his design It 's true that he saith somewhat of the Bishops Opinion concerning it but very doubtfully as he had cause for he shall not find among any that maintain the difference between Spontaneous and
Voluntary Actions that Spontaneity consists in Inconsiderateness or Indeliberation as he would have it when he says it must mean that or nothing Whereas indeed his Adversaries would be as well content it should mean nothing as that For Inconsideration is the privation and want of considering where it should and ought to have been i. e. in Agents of Reason and Will for we do not say that Natural Agents that have no Reason and Will do act inconsiderately For when the Water doth sponte fluere and the Fire calefacere we cannot say they do it inconsiderately or for want of that Deliberation of which they are not capable for you might as well say they act so for want of Reason and if want of Reason and Deliberation makes an Action spontaneous then all violent Actions would be spontaneous for they also want Reason in all natural Agents as that the Water ascends for want of Reason and Deliberation And therefore the next time Mr. Hobbs means to play the Philosopher about Necessity and Liberty I shall advise him to take better notice of the nature and difference between Spontaneous and Voluntary Actions Men call those Voluntary Actions as the word it self imports that proceed from the Will i.e. voluntary Agents and those spontaneous that proceed from the fixt unchangeable nature of i.e. from natural Agents If Mr. Hobbs knew not this difference let him learn't against another time if he did know it it had been the part of a good Philosopher to have took notice of it and when he would prove that Spontaneous and Voluntary are all one to make instance in such Actions as are in that more appropriate and special sence called Spontaneous such as I nam'd before the Water 's flowing and the Fire 's heating and make it appear that they are also Voluntary that is do follow the last Will of the Water and Fire for so Voluntary is defined Now if no man in his right wits will either say that these are Voluntary or gainsay their being Spontaneous i.e. that they do sponte agere it must of necessity follow first That there is a manifest difference between those sorts of Actions and secondly That it is necessary that those things which differ for more distinct knowledge should have given them also different Appellations and thirdly That none are of themselves more apt though they may sometimes be used promiscuously than those of Voluntary and Spontaneous But for so much as I have already taken notice of in the first Point whether he be mistaken in the Bishop or I in him it makes not much either for or against the principal question of Liberty for I find no mention of Spontaneity afterwards that there need any enquiry of the nature and definition of it But for voluntary Actions because we have often use of them in the following Discourse it will be better worth the labour to examine what they are defined to be Those Actions that follow immediately the last Appetite are Voluntary I should acknowledge this Definition if the word last did not corrupt it which makes it either false or frivolous For if he supposes it to be the last Will before it be followed it is false for it becomes rather the Last by being followed or if that Will be supposed to be followed because it is last it is also false for the Action follows the Will because it is the Will not because it is the last Will for the Will is last because it is followed not followed because it is last It 's not First or Last that makes a thing willed but because it is good or seems so Or if there be a sence in which it is not false it is yet frivolous As if a man should say out of a deep contemplation and observation of Nature No man dyed ever of any Disease but the last he was sick of No man ever drank a whole Glass of Wine but the last when he drank it If the word last carries no force in it either to make the Disease more malignant or the Wine more pleasant such Speculations though they have a truth in them will go for no better than ridiculous so last which adds nothing to the Will might have been left out in the Definition And yet I am content it should stand there still untill you see more cause to remove it as perhaps you may when we come to the third point for there we are promised to hear more of the same matter a point set apart of purpose to shew the nature of the Will and Inclinations Second Point is the Definition of Deliberation Deliberation is nothing but Alternate Hope and Fear or Alternate Appetite to do or quit the Action It 's a strange impropriety of Speech 1. to say that Deliberation which is an act of the Understanding should be either Fear or Hope which be affections such a confus'd tumbling together of the Faculties of the Soul becomes onely him that either understands not or desires not to be understood But perhaps his meaning may be that the Understanding in Deliberation represents one-while matter of Fear otherwhile of Hope This I confess is true and that this Hope or Fear doth not always produce such a resolution and act of the Will upon which the Action follows but yet produces a true and perfect resolution or act of the Will For it is not possible for a man to have true cause and matter of Hope represented to him but he must will it at least in a degree and so long as that Hope is not impeach'd by a new Deliberation So it is alike in Fear that whosoever actually fears any evil effectually wills the avoiding of it till something intervenes that diverts the Fear But of this more in the next Point Third Point The Will is defined to be the last Appetite and is immediately before the doing of the Action Other Appetites that come upon men in time of Deliberation are but intentions and inclinations The truth of these and the like Points saith Mr. Hobbs is to be tried by reflection upon our selves what we conceive when such Speeches are us'd and then the Will is nothing else but the last Appetite Methinks Mr. Hobbs should have heard of Voluntas ambulatoria a Will liable to change and therefore every Will is not the last For if you reflect you shall find a man seriously to will and resolve that to day which the next day he wills not When a man makes his Testament which is also call'd his last Will and is indeed of all others the most resolv'd act of his Will yet he may change that Will and often men do it But then you say it ceaseth to be his last Will. 'T is true And therefore something was a Will for the time which was not the last Appetite But it cannot now be call'd his Will True because he has chang'd it not because it is not last for herein say we consists the liberty of a voluntary