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A29193 Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied. Bramhall, John, 1594-1663. 1657 (1657) Wing B4214; ESTC R34272 289,829 584

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CASTIGATIONS OF Mr. HOBBES HIS LAST ANIMADVERSIONS IN The case concerning LIBERTY and Universal NECESSITY Wherein all his Excep●…ions about that Controversie are fully satisfied By Iohn Bramhall D. D. and Bishop of Derry Prov. 12. 19. The lip of truth shall be established for ever but a lying tongue is but for a moment London Printed by E. T. for I. Crook 1657. An Answer to Mr. Hobs his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and first to his Epistle to the Reader CHristian Reader thou hast here the testimony of Mr. Hobs that the questions concerning Necessity Freedom and Chance are clearly discussed between him and me in that little volume which he hath lately published If they be it were strange whilest we agree not much better about the terms of the controversie than the builders of Babel did understand one anothers language A necessity upon supposition which admits a possibility of the contrary is mistaken for an absolute and true necessity A freedom from compulsion is confounded with a freedom from necessitation meer spontaneity usurpeth the place of true liberty no chance is acknowledged but what is made chance by our ignorance or nescience because we know not the right causes of it I desire to retein the proper terms of the Schools Mr. Hobs flies to the common conceptions of the vulgar a way seldom troden but by false Prophets and seditious Oratours He preferreth their terms as more intelligible I esteem them much more obscure and confused In such intricate questions vulgar brains are as uncapable of the things as of the terms But thus it behoved him to prevaricate that he might not seem to swim against an universal stream nor directly to oppose the generall current of the Christian World There was an odde phantastick person in our times one Thomas Leaver who would needs publish a Logick in our mothers tongue You need not doubt but that the publick good was pretended And because the received terms of art seemed to him too abstruce he translated them into English stiling a Subject an Inholder an Accident an Inbeer A Proposition a Shewsay an affirmative Proposition a Yeasav a negative proposition a Naysay the subject of the Proposition the Foreset the predicate the Backset the conversion the turning of the Foreset into the Backset and the Backset into the Foreset Let M. Hobs himself be judge whether the common Logical notions or this new gibrish were lesse intelligible Haec à se non multum abludit imago But Reader dost thou desire to see the question discussed clearly to thy satisfastion observe but Mr. Hobs his practicks and compare them with his principles and there needs no more He teacheth that all causes and all events are absolutely necessary yet if any man crosse him he frets and fumes and talkes his pleasure jussit quod splendida bilis Doth any man in his right wits use to be angry with causes that act necessarily He might as well be angry with the Sun because it doth not rise an hour sooner or with the Moon because it is not alwayes full for his pleasure he commands his servant to do thus to as much purpose if he be necessitated to do otherwise as Canutus commanded the waves of the Sea to flow no higher He punisheth him if he transgresse his commands with as much justice if he have no dominion over his own actions as Xe●…xes commanded so many stripes to be given to the H●…llespont for breaking down his Bridge He exhorts him and reprehends him He might as well exhort the fire to burne or reprehend it for burning of his cloaths He is as timerous in a thunder or a storme as cautelous and deliberative in doubtful cases as if he believed that all things in the World were contingent and nothing necessary Sometimes he chideth himself how ill advised was I to do thus or so O that I had thought better upon it or had done otherwise Yet all this while he believeth that it was absolutely necessary for him to do what he did and impossible for him to have done otherwise Thus his own practise doth sufficiently confute his tenets He will tell us that he is timerous and solicitous because he knows not how the causes will determine To what purpose Whether their determination be known or unknown he cannot alter it with his endeavours He will tell us that deliberation must concur to the production of the effect Let it be so but if it do concur necessarily Why is he so solicitous and so much perplexed Let him sleep or wake take care or take no care the necessary causes must do their work Yet from our collision some light hath proceeded towards the elucidation of this question and much more might have arisen if Mr. Hobbes had been pleased to retain the ancient Schoole terms for want of which his discourse is still ambiguous and confused As here he tells thee That we both maintain that men are free to do as they will and to forbear as they will My charity leads me to take him in the best sense onely of free acts and then with dependence upon the first cause That man who knows not his idiotismes would think the cause was yeilded in these words whereas in truth they signifie nothing His meaning is He is as free to do and forbear as he is free to call back yesterday He may call until his heart ake but it will never come He saith A man is free to do if he will but he is not free to will if he will If he be not free to will then he is not free to do Without the concurrence of all necessary causes it is impossible that the effect should be produced But the concurrence of the will is necessary to the production of all free or voluntary acts And if the will be necessitated to nil as it may be then the act is impossible And then he saith no more in effect but this A man is free to do if he will that which is impossible for him to do By his doctrine all the powers and faculties of a man are as much necessitated and determinated to one by the natural influence of extrinsecal causes as the will And therefore upon his own grounds a man is as free to will as to do The points wherein he saith we disagree are set down loosely in like manner What our Tenets are the Reader shall know more truely and distinctly by comparing our writings together then by this false dimme light which he holds out unto him He is pleased if not ironically yet certainly more for his own glory than out of any respect to me to name me a learned Schoole-Divine An honour which I vouchsafe not to my self My life hath been too practical to attend so much to those speculative Studies It may be the Schoole-men have started many superfluous questions and some of dangerous conse quence But yet I say the weightier Ecclesiastical controversies will never be understood and
how uningenuously did he charge me in the last Section to have confessed That nothing can move it self And in this Section accuse me of contradiction for saying That when a stone descendeth the beginning of its motion is intrinsecal Now to justifie himself he saith that from this which I did say That finite things cannot be produced by themselves he can conclude that the act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing If he could do as much as he saith yet it was not ingenuously done to feign that I had confessed all that which he thinketh he can prove that I contradicted my self when I contradicted his conclusions But let us see how he goeth about to prove it He that hath the faculty of willing hath the faculty of willing something in particular In good time This looketh not like a demonstration But let that passe And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same How two faculties the one of willing the other of nilling Hola He hath but one faculty and that is a faculty of willing or nilling something in particular not of willing and nilling He proceedeth If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it And so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time which is absurd I deny his consequence It doth not follow that because the Agent hath power to will or nill indifferently therefore he hath power to will and nill contradictorily He may chuse indifferently whether he will write or not but he cannot chuse both to write and not to write at the same time contradictorily It doth not follow that because the Agent hath power to will or nill indifferently before he do actually either will or nill therefore when he doth will actually he hath power to nill at the same time Hath he forgotten that old foolish rule Whatsoever is when it is is necessarily so as it is How often must I tell him that in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity he seeketh to obtrude upon us hypothetical necessity He proceedeth It seems the Bishop had forgotten that matter and power are indifferent to contrary formes and contrary acts No I had not forgotten it but he had fogotten it To say that the matter is indifferent to contrary formes and yet necessitated antecedently to one form or that power is indifferent to contrary acts and yet necessitated antecedently to one act is a ratling contradiction He saith That it is somewhat besides the matter that determineth to a certain form and something besides the power that produceth a certain act I acknowledge it and it is the onely piece of sense that is in this Section I made this objection to my self in my defence and answered it in these words Yet I do not deny that there are other beginnings of humane actions which do concur with the will some outward as the first cause by general influence which is evermore requisite Angels or men by perswading evil spirits by tempting the object or end by its appetibility some inward as the understanding by directing so passions and acquired habits But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one except God alone who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases And where there is no antecedent determination to one there is no absolute necessity but true liberty Where he maketh The beginning of motion in a stone thrown upwards and a stone descending downwards to be both in the stone it is but a poor trifling homonymy as the most part of his Treatise is The beginning of motion in a stone ascending is in the stone subjectively but not effectively because that motion proceedeth not from the form of the stone But in the descent of the stone the beginning of motion is both subjectively and effectively in the stone And what he telleth us of a former motion in the ambient body aire or water to make the stone descend is needlesse and frustraneous Let him but withdraw the pin that holdeth the slate upon the house against its natural inclination and he shall see presently there needeth no motion in the ambient body to make the stone drop down He adviseth me to consider with what grace I can say that necessary causes do not alwayes produce their effects except those effects be also necessarily produced Rather let him consider with what grace he can mis-recite that which I say by leaving out the word necessary I said necessary causes do not alwayes produce necessary effects and I can say that with better grace than he can deny it When necessary Agents and free Agents are conjoynt in the production of the same effect the effect is not antecedently necessary I gave him an instance Protagoras writ a book against the gods De dis utrum sint utrum non sint nihil habeo dicere The Senate ordered his book to be burned for it Although the fire be a necessary Agent yet because the Senators were free Agents the burning of his book was not antecedently necessary Where I say that the will is not a necessary cause of what it willeth in particular action●… He inferreth That there are no universal actions and if it be not a necessary cause of particular actions it is the necessary cause of no actions And again he would be glad to have me set down what voluntary actions not particular those are which are necessitated It is scarcely possible for a man to expresse himself more clearly than I did but clearly or unclearly all is one to him who is disposed to cavil I did not oppose particular acts to universal acts but to a collection of all voluntary acts in general qua tales as they are voluntary It is necessary That all acts generally which proceed from the will should be voluntary and so the will is a necessary cause of voluntary acts that is of the voluntarinesse of them But the will is not a necessary cause of the particular acts themselves As upon supposition that a man be willing to write it is necessary that his writing be voluntary because he willeth it But put the case without any supposition and it is not necessary that he should write or that he should will to write because it was in his own power whether he would write or not So the voluntarinesse of all acts in general proceeding from the will is necessary but the acts themselves were not necessary before the free Agent had determined himself and then but upon supposition His excepting against these common expressions The will willeth or the will may either will or suspend its acts is but seeking of a knot in a bullrush It is all one whether one say the will willeth or the man willeth or the will may will or suspend its
can So though a necessary connexion of all natural causes were supposed yet it inferreth not a necessary connexion of all voluntary causes Secondly I deny his assumption that there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning for proof whereof he produceth nothing nor is able to produce any thing All he saith he alledgeth out of me That it deserveth further examination And from thence according to his wild roving imaginations he draweth consequences from the staff to the corner that have not the least grain of salt or weight in them As these Hitherto he knows not whether it be true or no. And consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect nor hath he shewed any thing to prove that elective actions are not necessitated Thus his pen runneth over without time or reason He that would learn to build Castles in the air had best be his Apprentise The truth is I was not willing to go out of mine own profession and therefore desired to hold my self to the question of liberty without medling with contingency But yet with the same reservation that the Romans had in their Military Discipline nec sequi nec fugere not to seek other questions nor yet to thu●… them if they were put upon me And now we are come to his two famous instances of casting ambs ace and raining or not raining to morrow I said that I had already answered what he produceth to prove all sufficient causes to be necessary causes Now saith he It seemeth that distrusting his former answer he answereth again O memory he did not urge them in that place neither did I answer them at all in that place But though he had urged them and I answered them there yet he repeating them or enforcing them here would he not have me to answer him It is true that in another Section upon the by he hath been gravelled about his ambs ace and therefore he treadeth tenderly still upon that foot He saith I bring no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown but this that the caster did not deliberate By his leave it is not truly said I shewed undeniably that the necessity upon which he buildeth is onely hypothetical I enumerated all the causes which were or could be recited to make the necessity As the dice the positure of the casters hand the measure of the force the positure of the table c. And shewed clearly that there was not the least grain of antecedent necessity in any of them which he is not able to answer and therefore he doth well to be silent But if I had urged nothing else This alone had been sufficient to prove the caster a free Agent from his own principles A free Agent saith he is he that hath not done deliberating He who never began to deliberate hath not done deliberating There can be no necessity imaginable why the caster should throw these dice rather than those other or cast into this table rather than that or use so much force and no more but the casters will or meer chance The caster never deliberated nor so much as thought of any one of these things And therefore it is undeniably apparent that there was no necessity of casting ambs ace but onely upon supposition which is far enough from antecedent necessity But he pleadeth further That from our ignorance of the particular causes that concurring make the necessity I infer that there was no such necessity at all which is that indeed which hath deceived me and all other men in this question Whose fault was it then first to make this an instance and then to plead ignorance Before he was bold to reckon up all the causes of the antecedent necessity of this cast and now when he is convinced that it is but a necessity upon suppositon he is fain to plead ignorance He who will not suffer the Loadstone to enjoy its attractive virtue without finding a reason for it in a fiddle-string as Scoggin sought for the Hare under the leades as well where she was not as where she was is glad to plead ignorance about the necessary causes of ambs ace Whereas my reasons did evince not onely that the causes are unknown but that there are no such causes antecedently necessitating that cast Thus If any causes did necessitate ambs ace antecedently it was either the caster but he thought not of it or the dice but they are square no more inclinable to one cast than another or the positure of the table but the caster might have thrown into the other table or the positure of the hand but that was by chance or the measure of the force but that might have been either more or lesse or all of these together But to an effect antecedently necessary all the causes must be antecedently determined where not so much as one of them is antecedently determined there is no pretence of antecedent necessity Or it is some other cause that he can name but he pleadeth ignorance Yet I confesse the deceit lieth here but it is on the other side in the ignorant mistaking of an hypothetical necessity for absolute antecedent necessity And here according to the advice of the Poet Nec deus inter sit nisi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit He calleth in the fore knowledge of God to his aid as he doth alwayes when he findeth himself at a losse but to no purpose He himself hath told us That it cannot be truly said that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing seeing foreknowledge is knowledge and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the thing known God seeth not future contingents in an antecedent certainty which they have in their causes but in the events themselves to which Gods infinite knowledge doth extend it self In order of time one thing is before another one thing is after another and accordingly God knoweth them in themselves to be one before another But his knowledge is no beginning no expiring act Nothing is past nothing is to come but all things present to his knowledge even those things which are future with the manner of their futurition His casting ambs ace hath been unfortunate to him he will speed no better with his shower of rain In the enterance to my answer and as it were the stating of the cause I shewed that rain was more contingent in our Climate than in many other parts of the World where it is almost as necessary as the seasons of the year I do not find so much weight in his discourse as to occasionme to alter one word for which I could have produced authours enough if I had thought it needful but I alledged onely the Scriptures mentioning the former and the later rain And even this is objected to me as a defect or piece of ignorance I thought saith he he had known it by experience of some Travellers but I see he onely
act or the man may will or suspend his acts Scaliger saith that volo velle is a proper speech I will will and received by the common consent of all nations If he had any thing of moment to insert into his Animadversions he would not make use of such Leptologies Canting is not chargable upon him who useth common and known terms of art but upon him who deviseth new terms as Canters do which die with their inventers He asketh How can he that willeth at the same time suspend his will Rather why doth he insert into his demand at the same time It is enough to liberty if he that willeth could have suspended his will All this answer of mine to his second argument was illustrated by the instance of the election of a Pope to which he opposeth nothing but It may be and it doth not follow and I would be glad to know by what arguments he can prove that the election was not necessitated I have done it sufficiently all over in this Treatise I am now answering to what he produceth not proving If he have any thing to demand let him go to the Cardinals and inquire of them whether they be such fools to keep such a deal of needlesse stir if they were atecedently necessitated to chuse one certain man Pope and no other Castigations of the Animadversion Num. 31. and Num. 32. I Joyne these two Sections together because they concern one and the same thing namely Whether every sufficient cause do necessarily effect whatsoever it is sufficient for Or which is the same in effect Whether a free Agent when all things are present which are needful to produce an effect can neverthelesse not produce it Which question may be understood two wayes either inclusively or exclusively either including and comprehending the will of the Agent under the notion of sufficiency and among things requisite to the producing of the effect so as the cause is not reputed to be sufficient except it have both ability and will to produce the effect and so as both requisite power and requisite will do concur and then there is no question but the effect will infallibly follow Posita causa ponitur effectus or else it may be understood exclusively not comprehending the will under the notion of sufficiency or not reckoning it among the necessary requisites to the production of the effect so as the Agent is supposed to have power and ability to produce the effect but no will And then it is as infallibly true on the other side that the effect cannot be produced Thus far this question is a meer Logomachy or contention about words without any reall difference And T. H. doth but abuse his Readers to keep a jangling and a stir about nothing But in truth the water stopeth not here If he should speak to the purpose he should leave these shallows If the will of the free Agent be included under the notion of sufficiency and comprehended among those things which are requisite to the production of the effect so as both sufficient ability and sufficient wil are required to the making a sufficient cause Then it cometh to be considered in the second place whether the will in things external be under God in the power and disposition of the free Agent himself which is the common opinion of all men who understand themselves And then the production of the effect is onely necessary hypothetically or upon supposition that the free Agent is willing Or else Whether the will of the free Agent be not in his own power and disposition but determined antecedently by extrinsecal causes which is the paradoxical opinion of T. H. and then the production of the the effect is absolutely and antecedently necessary So still the question is where it was and all his bustling about sufficiency and efficiency and deficiency is but labour in vain If he would have spoken any thing at all to the purpose he should have attempted to prove that every sufficient cause excluding the will that is every cause which hath sufficient power and ability doth necessaryly produce whatsoever it is able to produce though the Agent be unwilling to produce it or that the will of the Agent is not in his own power and disposition We expect proofs not words But this he could not do for he himself in this very Treatise hath several times distinguished between liberty and power telling us that a sick man hath liberty to go but wanteth power And that a man who is bound hath power to go but wanteth liberty If he that is bound hath power to go then he hath sufficient power to go for unsufficient power cannot produce the effect And so by his own confession an Agent may have sufficient power and yet cannot necessarily nor yet possibly produce the effect I urged That God is sufficient to produce many Worlds but he doth not produce them therefore a sufficient cause dorh not necessarily produce all those effects which it is sufficient to produce He answereth That the meaning is that God is sufficient to produce them if he will Doth he not see that it followeth inevitably from hence That there may be a sufficient cause without will Doth he not see likewise from hence plainly that for those things which are within the power of man he is sufficient also to produce them if he will So still he would obtrude a necessity of supposition If a man will for an absolute necessity That which is but necessary conditionally If a man will is not necessary absolutely And he confesseth that without this supposition If he will a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action I added other instances as this That the passion of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind and so is acknowledged by all Christians yet all mankind shall not be saved by virtue of his passion therefore there may be a sufficient cause without production of the effect This is the language of holy Scripture Which of you intending to build a Tower sitteth not down first and counteth the cost whether he have sufficient to finish it That is as our Saviour expoundeth himself in the next verse whether he be able to finish it So St. Paul saith Who is sufficient for these things that is Who is able for these things When God saith What could I have done more for my vineyard that I have not done God had given them sufficient means and could have given them more if they had been more capable but because they were wanting to themselves these sufficient means were not efficacious I looked for grapes saith God How could God look for grapes if he had not given them sufficient means to bring forth grapes yet these sufficient means were not efficacious These things being premised do answer whatsoever he saith as this The Bishop thinks two Horses may be sufficient to draw a Coach though they will not draw c. I say they
may be sufficient in point of power and ability though they will not draw Many men have sufficient power to do what they will not do And if the production of the effect do depend upon their wills or upon their contingent and uncertain endeavours or if their sufficiency be but conditional as he maketh it if they be not lame or resty then the production of the effect is free or contingent and cannot be antecedently necessary For otherwise all these conditions and suppositions are vain Where he chargeth me to say That the cause of a Monster is unsufficient to produce a Monster he doth me wrong and himself more I never said any such thing I hope I may have leave to speak to him in his own words I must take it for an untruth untill he cite the place where I have said so I have said and I do say That the cause of a Monster was unsufficient to produce a man which nature and the free Agent intended but it was sufficient to produce a Monster otherwise a Monster had not been produced When an Agent doth not produce what he and nature intend but produceth a Monster instead of a Man it is proof enough of his insufficiency to produce what he should and would have produced if he could Where he addeth That that which is sufficient to produce a Monster is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Man no more than that which is sufficient to produce a man is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Monster is even as good sense as if a man should say He who hath skill sufficient to hit the white is insufficient to misse the white He pretendeth that sensus divisus and compositus is nonsense though they be Logical terms of art And what I say of the power of the will to forbear willing or the dominion of the will over its own acts or the power of the will in Actu primo he saith are as wild words as ever were spoken within the walls of Bedlam though they be as sad truths as the founders of Bedlam themselves could have uttered And the Authours who used them the greatest wits of the World and so many that ten Bedlams could not hold them But it may be he would have the Scene changed and have the wisest sort of men thrust into Bedlam that he might vent his Paradoxes more freely So Festus accused Saint Paul of madnesse Paul Paul much learning hath made thee mad In the definition of a free Agent Which when all things needful to the production of the effect are present can neverthelesse not produce it They understood all things needful in point of ability not will He telleth us gravely That Act and Power differ in nothing but in this That the former signifieth the time present the later the time to come As if he should tell us That the cause and the effect differ nothing but that the effect signifieth the time present and the cause the time to come Lastly he saith That except I shew him the place where he shuffled out effects producible and thrust into their place effects produced he will take it for an untruth To content him I shall do it readily without searching far for it My words were these The question is whether effects producible be free from necessity He shuffles out effects producible and thrusts in their places effects produced Now that he doth this I prove out of his own words in the Section preceding Hence it is manifest That whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily For whatsoever is preduced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it or else it had non been Let the Reader judge if he have not here shuffled effects producible out of the question and thrust into their places effects produced The question is whether effects producible be necessarily produced He concludeth in the place of the contradictory That effects actually produced are necessary Castigations of the Animadversions Num. 33. HE saith That to define what Spontaneity Deliberation Will Propension Appetite a free Agent and Liberty is and to prove that they are well defined there can be no other proof offered but every mans own experience and memory what he meaneth by such words I do readily believe all this to be true in order to his own opinions That there neither is nor can be any proof of them but imagination But his reason was shot at random For definitions being the beginning of all demonstration cannot themselves be domonstrated that is proved to another man Doth he take all his particular imaginations to be so many definitions or demonstrations He hath one conception of Spontaneity of Deliberation of a free Agent of Liberty I have another My conception doth not prove my opinion to be true nor his conception prove his opinion to be true but our conceptions being contrary it proveth either his or mine or both to be false Truth is a conformity or congruity of the conceptions of the mind with the things themselves which are without the mind and of the exteriour speech as the signe with the things and conceptions as the things signified So there is a threefold truth The first is objective in the things themselves The second is conformative in the conceptions of the mind The third is signative or significative in speech or writing It is a good proceeding to prove the truth of the inward conceptions of the mind from their conformity with the things themselves but it is vain and ridiculous to prove the truth of things from their agreement with the conceptions of my mind or his mind The Clocks may differ but the course of the Sun is certain A mans words may not agree with his thoughts nor his thoughts agree with the things themselves But I commend his prudence in this and in this onely That he hath chosen out a way of proof that cannot be confuted without his own consent because no man knoweth another mans inward conceptions but himself And the better to secure himself he maketh his English Reader judge of Latine words and his ignorant Readers judge of words of art These are the fittest Judges for his purpose But what if the terms be obscure He answereth If the words be unusaal the way must be to make the definition of their signification by mutual consent What mutual consent The signification of these words was setled by universall consent and custome And must they be unsetled again to satisfie the homour of every odd Paradoxical person who could find no way to get himself reputation but by blondring all things He telleth us that the School-men use not to argue by rule but as Fencers use to handle weapons by quicknesse of the hand and eye The poor School-men cannot rest quietly in their graves for him but he is still persecuting their ashes because they durst presume to soare a pitch above his capacity The Scool-men were the most exact observers of rules in
given him a reasonable soul may as well seek for a necessary cause of the Egyptian Pyramides among the Crocodiles of Nilus This distinction of a mans time is an act of dominion done on purpose to maintain his domion over his actions against the encroachments of sensual delights He saith here upon the by That he knoweth no action that proceedeth from the liberty of mans will And again A mans will is something but the liberty of his will is nothing Yet he hath often told us That a man is free to do if he will and not to do if he will If no action proceed from the liberty of the will then how is a man free to do if he will Before he told us He is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it and may forbear it if be have the will to forbear it If the liberty of the will be nothing then this supposition If he have the will is nothing but an impossibility And here to all that I have said formerly against that frivolous distinction I shall adde an undoubted rule both in law and Logick A conditional proposition having an impossible condition annexed to it is equipollent to a simple negative He who is free to write if he will if it be impossible for him to will is not free to write at all no more than he is free to will But this Castle in the aire hath been beaten down often enough about his ears Where I say that contingent actions do proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes my intention was not to exclude contingent determination but necessary determination according to an antecdent necessity which he hath been so far from proving unanswerably that he hath as good as yeilded the cause in his case of Ames ace by making the necessity to be onely upon supposition Concerning mixt actions partly free and partly necessary he saith That for proof of them I instance in a tile falling from an house which breaketh a mans head How often must I tell him that I am not now proving but answering that which he produceth He may find proofes enough to content him or rather to discontent him in twelve Sections together from the fifth to the eighteenth And upon the by thoroughout the whole book He who proveth that election is alwayes inter plura and cannot consist with antecedent determination to one proveth that that man who did elect or chuse to walk in that street at that very time when the stone fell though he knew not of it was not antecedently necessitated to walke there And if any one of all those causes which concur to the production of an effect be not antecedently necessary then the effect is not antecedently necessary for no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause He saith I should have proved that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes though a little before I granted they are First he doth me wrong I never granted it either before or after It is a foule fault in him to mistake himself or his adversary so often Secondly it is altogether improper and impertinent to our present controversie Let him remember what he himself said If they the instances of casting ambs ace and raining to morrow be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of mans will he doth impertinently to meddle with them Not so neither by his leave Though I refuse to prove them formally or write Volumes about them yet I do not refuse to answer any thing which he doth or can produce Such is his argument which followeth immediately Whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence though contingent concurrence He addeth That though I perceive it not concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one It may be in his Dialect which differs from the received Dialect of all Schollars but not in the Dialect of wiser and learneder men To his argument pardoning his confounding of natural and voluntary causes I answer That if he speak of the immediate adaequate cause as it is a cause in act without doubt he saith truth Causa proxima in actu posita impossible est non s●…qui effectum But he told us of a necessary connexion of all causes from eternity and if he make not this good he saith nothing If he intend it in this sense I deny his assertion That whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes was antecedently determined from eternity As for instance that the generation of a monster which nature or the Agent never intended was necessary from eternity or necessary before the contingence was determined Concerning the individual actions of brute beasts that they should be necessitated to every act they do from eternity As the bee for example how often she shall hum in a day and how often she shall flie abroad to gather thyme and whither and how many flowers precisely she must suck and no more and such like acts I had reason to say I see no ground for it Yet the least of all these acts is known to God and subject to his disposition He telleth us That he hath pointed out the ground in the former discourse If he have it is as the blind Senator of whom I told him formerly pointed the wrong way All his intimations have received their answers But whereas I made an objection to my self Are not two sparrows sould for a farthing and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your father He doth not deale clearly to urge mine own objection and conceale my answer He doth not say which your father casteth not down or which your father doth not necessitate to fall but without your father That is without your fathers knowledge without his protection without the influence of his power or which is exemted from your fathers disposition The last sort of actions are the natural actions of inanimate creatures which have not the least pretence to liberty or so much as spontaneity and therefore were declined by me as impertinent to this question Out of my words concerning these he argueth thus If there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning then there is no doubt but that all things happen necessarily But there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning First I deny his consequence and by it he who is so busie to take other mens heights in Logick wherein he never medled yet but he was baffelled may have his own height taken by them that are so disposed There is scarce a freshman in the University but could have taught him the difference between causa efficiens physica and voluntaria the one acting by necessity of nature the other freely according to deliberation The former cannot defer nor moderate its act nor act opposite actions indifferently but the later
c. 1. Rational will Eth. l. 3. c. 6 7 8. Passive obedience Act. 4. 19. Compulsion what it is Fear of hurt doth not abrogate a law Cap. 2. d. 18. C. 6. d. 13. Natural Agents act determinately Not voluntary Seal exerc 307. d. 3. T. H. maketh God the cause of sin Amos c. 3. 6. 2 Sam. 16. 10. 1 King 22. 23. 1 King 12. 15. Fount of Argu. Six witnesses for universal necessity answeted Cal. Instit. l. 2. c. 2. d. 4. Visit. Saxon. Cal. Instir. l. 2. c. 4. d. 7. Iudic. Theol. Lorit de lib. A rb Thes. 4. Mentall terms Metaphorical drawing Jam. 4. 8. Joh. 6. 44. Joh. 12. 32. Pro. 20. 5. Paradoxes what they are Whether a feather make a Diamant yeild Or a falling drop move the whole World Power of objects concerneth the moral Philosopher Eth. l. 3 c. 2. Still he seeketh to obtru de hypothetical necessity for absolute Num. 1. Num. 3. Hearing speaking all one with T. H. Eth. l. 3. c. 2. There are other motions than local Spirits moved as well as bodies Both bodies and spirits move themselves Quality infused by God Joel 2. Acts 2. 33. Rom. 5. 5. Tit. 3. 6. 1 Cor. 12. Num. 9. The understanding and will two powers of the reasonablesoul Mans willing is not like a falling stone Absolute necessity admitteth no contrary supposition A man may will contrary to the dictate