Creatures and their various species of being is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as Active or Passive in their several Capacities And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold Passives viz. INTELLECTUAL SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter upon AIR WATER and EARTH § 12. GOD is so Active as not to be at all PASSIVE All the Active Creatures are first Passive as receiving the Influx of the first Cause and Inferiours from the Superiour second Causes But they are Naturally Active in that dependence and supposing that Influx § 13. The works of Providence about the Existent Creatures are MOTION causing Motion GUBERNATION causing ORDER and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination satisfying their Appetites and giving them their Ends. * * * Cyprianus sie explicat Act. 17. In ipso sumus movemur vivimus In Patre sumus in Filio vivimus in Spiritu Sancto movemur Pater est sons omnis essentiae Filius est Vita Spiritus Sanctus est agitator seu motor unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah quod significat endelechiam continuam perennem agitationem Vid. Strigel in Melanct. Loc. com pag. 294. § 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image in Vital-Active-Power Intellect and Free-will a Threefold Virtue in One as the formal Essence of his soul is peculiarly fitted for such acts of Providence as he must be under § 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. Movers 2. Governours of the Inferiour so also are they 3. Their Immediate or nearest End having a Goodness in them fitted to attract terminate and satisfie the Appetites of the Inferiour God is not the only end of Appetites § 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-existent are 1. Action or Motion 2. Special Government 3. Love From whence God is Related to Man the fundamental Relation of CREATOR supposed †††I hold with Bradwardine li. 1. c. 2. cor 3. Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cansa creata Et c. 3. cor 3. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente Et c. 4. cor 3. â—adem de Deo Motore â—aking immediation for proximity and facere movere for the action as such and not for the meer moral specification and comparability 1. As ACTOR vel MOTOR 2. As RECTOR 3. As AMICUS vel FINIS Lover Benefactor and End 1. ACTION as such is from God in the first relation 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the second 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection is in him in the third § 17. Creation inferreth Propriety and making us Good and inter bâ—na and ad bonum inferreth that God is our Benefactor So that ab origine he standing in these three Relations to us from what is past he is to dispose of us by Providence accordingly § 18. Gods Omnipotence is most conspicuous in Creation propriety and Motion His Wisdom in Governing and Order and his Good will in our Benefits efficiently and our Perfection finally in mutual Love § 19. MOTION is caused by Moving â—â—â—ce impressed ORDER moral by LAW or signification of Gods Will de debito And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END § 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called From the second Moral RECTITUDE In the third is FELICITY as to single persons § 21. From the first viz. God as Actor upon Many or the Universe ariseth CO-OPERATION or Concurse All things work together as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second Divine ORDERING ariseth HARMONY and from the third UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and Melody of the whole Creation and to man perfect Love § 22. Motion is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion or passive impedition and its effect as such not free but Necessary Government by Law is resistible and obedience free Final Goodness or Love do perfect and felicitate necessarily and freely not effecting for so they are not now considered but satisfying so far as they are enjoyed § 23. The Creation being past and Beings existent except what Generation and Composition make unfearchably and Gods fundamental RELATIONS setled we shall confound and be confounded if we distin-guish not Gods after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them and their foresaid differences in themselves SECT II. The Order of Divine Operations § 1. GOD is the Immediate Cause of all things and actions caused * * * Bradwardine ib. p. 172. seemeth to favour Averrois saying that God is Forma omnis formae forma maxime essentialis principalis cujuscunque formati and so acteth all things And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature we mean that he is More and not Less And that we have not a fitter Analogical conception of God than that he is eminently more than the soul of the world And c. 14. p. 210. he calleth Necessarium the most proper name of God But when he saith c. 17. that Gods Essence Omnipotence Intellect Naturally precede Gods Knowledge and cause it and so putteth Causes and Effects in God he is too bold by him as to the Proximity of God to the effect For he is every where present in Essence and as near to every Being and Action as it is to it self We must not conceive of Gods using means as we do of mans where the Pen the Saw the Knife c. is between the hand and the effect God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth as if he used no second cause § 2. They that say God is thus Causa Immediata Immediatione Suppositi seu Essentiae Virtutis speak true but not aptly because it ill insinuateth as if Gods Virtus were not his Essence when as in God they are all one only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish suppositum à virtute but not otherwise And it is not as quid creatum that we speak of Virtus § 3. Since the Creation in the Motions of Providence God who at first made the Universe to be One by conjunction and co-operation of parts as truly as a Clock or Man is one hath setled a course of second Causes that one thing may act upon and move another and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superiour created Causes which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course and some of them Voluntary and Free and operate more mutably and contingently § 4. The course of Necessitating Causes is commonly called NATURE and the Influence of Angels and other Voluntary Causes distinguished from Natural But they all operate as second Causes under the Influx and Government of God upon us that are here on earth § 5.
by it self anon Before we come to that these things I here conclude of 1. That the Diversity of Nature or Receptive Dispositions being presupposed God hath an established order of means and a congruous established universal Concurse which quantum in se as far as belongeth to it to do worketh equally on all 2. That this established measure of aid or concurse recipitur ad modum recipientis and operateth variously as to the effects according to the various disposition of the Recipients from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetcht and not from it 3. That this established measure of Concurse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient be both resisted and overcome or frustrate 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace so do all wicked Hi praecedanâ—i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti rebellis voluntatis vitio suffocari penitus extingui pâ—ssuâ—t in multis solent adeâ— ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impressâ— fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae c. mutentur plane in contrarium c. And even Alvarez Disp 18. n. â—0 saith Si non operatur actione qui est in praeceptâ— imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod suâ— culpa se impedivit ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat ut actualiter operaretur sicut si Deus imponeret homini prâ—ceptum volandi quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas adjutorium necessarium uâ— volaret ipse autem responderet Dâ—mine nec vâ—lâ— alas accipere nec volâ—re meritâ— reputaretur reus etiamsâ— non possit absque alis volare qâ—ia sua culpaâ—se impedirit ne illi dâ—narentâ—r a Deâ— men in some cases now And so do all godly men in most of the sins if not all which they commit 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us and when he leaveth his ordinary way but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes even in his wonders So it is very probable that in the Works of Grace Recovery and Salvation he ordinarily keepeth to his established order his Ordinances and fixed degree of Concurse 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works and a free Agent and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concurse than he tieth himself by his Wisdom and Free-will so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace and can when he please forsake that order and work Miracles by Grace as well as on natural things above nature He can strike down Saul and convert him by a voice from Heaven and in a word can do what he will 7. And as in most wonders its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order and work contrary to it or without such second causes as are unknown to us though we can tell when he acteth unusually So is it in this case about his works of Grace A Comet or Blazing Star is an unusual thing whose necessary antecedent cause we know not And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes operating in their established course so are ecclipses better known and unusual Tempests and terrible Lightnings c. So great and sudden unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners and yet all in Gods established course of working and by those second causes which are to us unknown C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent and Grace is hiâ— immediate work or off-spring B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation Preservation and in all the works and changes of nature and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course 2. It s unknown to us what means he useth out of our reach in his operations upon souls as well as in nature 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature yeâ— as morality is but the modality of things natural so we may conceive that God may possibly work it by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions and the recipients 4. Immutability and constancy is one of Gods perfections and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits that is not as they are mutable and the acts contingent but as they have a higher object But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified Angels and Saints are far better than ours And why should we think unsetled mutability of efficiency to be the best discovery of Gods Immutability 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature B. What will you say if I name you such a second universal cause though if I could not it followeth not that therefore there is none such I think I can name you one that all Christians should know and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered JESUS CHRIST as MAN and MEDIATOR is Gods Administrator General of the humane world and is compared to the Rising Sun which illuminateth all the world with a light suitable to it and them So Christ is the light of the world the Sun of Righteousness that ariseth with healing Grace and enlightneth every man that cometh into the world or as Crotius and Hammond render it which coming into the world enlightneth every man supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender and not the Accusative Masculine In him was Life and the Life was the light of men not only to the sanctified who received but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently the light shined in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not The world that was made by him knew him not He came to his own and his own received him not yet he came to them But as many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God John 1. 3 10 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ Matth. 28. 19 20. that all things are delivered into his hands John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church Ephes 1. 22 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour 1. Objectively 2. And as to his Doctrine Covenant and Example But what 's that to internal efficient Grace which is immediately from God
Gods will hath a final cause meaneth but a final object as he confesseth A Tree is a passive recipient cause of the Termination of the Suns calefacient act and of the â—ffect as received but not of the act ex parte solâ—â— 283. Even the Acts of Gods free-will or Decrees have no Cause even in God himself no more than those called Necessary For we must not say that any thing in God is an effect 284. Yet as Gods Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object which in man is a constitutive Cause of the Act loco materiae so extrinsick objects may be called The Causes but rather the Objects of God Will Love or Knowledge not as his Essence but only as so denominated by that Connotation of the object 285. These distributions of Gods Volitions in Number and by specifying objects and individuating objects which are called material constitutive causes of the act are all according to humane weakness in us who know God but enigmatically and in a glass But yet if any man use such words in a broader manner than we think fit before we censure and condemn him we must hear his sence explained For all that ever we can say of God is improper analogical yea metaphorical And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about Gods attributes and actions differ For as is oft said no man hath formal proper conceptions of any thing in God If God should not speak to us in this improper language of our own he must not speak intelligibly to us unless he create another understanding in us And he himself in Scripture using such language of himself alloweth us to use it while we profess to disclaim ascribing to God any of the imperfection which it seemeth to import 286. On these terms not only Various Volitions are ascribed to God in Scripture and exteriour causes of them as John 16. 27. the Father Loveth you because ye have loved me and believed c. * * * So Gen. 22. 16. 26. 5. Prov. 1. 24. Luke 11. 8. 19. 17. Gal. 4. 6. Eph. 5. 6. 1 Sam. 28. 18. 1 King 9. 9. 11. 34. 20. 42. 2 King 10. 30. 2 Chron. 34. 27. Psal 91. 14. But also Fear Affliction Grief Hatred Repenting Rejoycing c. Deut. 32. 27. Isa 63. 9. Gen. 6. 6. Psal 5. 5. Gen. 6. 7. 1 Sam. 15. 11. Joel 2. 13. Jer. 15. 6. Hos 11. 8. Zeph. 3. 17. Jer. 32. 41 c. and exteriour causes of them 287. That which is to be understood by all these is 1. That man is so far the Cause of the Effects of Divine Volitions as the Dispositio receptiva may be called a Cause And I before shewed in the instance of the effects of the Suns Influx how great a hand the various Dispositiones materiae receptivae have in the diversifications of effects 2. And that Gods Volitions themselves are hence relatively denominated 288. Therefore we must say that Gods electing Peter and his rejecting Judas his Love to Peter and his hatred of Judas are not in specie the same act of his will nor his Loving Peter and his Loving Paul the same Numerically As his knowing of Peter to be a Saint and his knowing Judas to be a Saint is not the same numerical act of knowledge Though as they are Gods Essence all are but one And we must say that he Loveth one because he is good and hateth another because he is evil and he justifieth men because they believe and condemneth men because they believe not that he forgiveth a sinner because he repenteth c. Though Gods Will have no efficient Cause 289. Those Volitions of God which are but Immanent as to Efficiency but Transient Objectively are some of them to be denominated as before the thing willed and some as after The Will of effecting is before the thing willed The Will ut finis or Complacency and Displicency as also Intuitive Knowledge of the thing as Existent estimation approbation reprobation of it the Will of Continuing modifying altering perfecting destroying suppose the existence of the thing willed in esse objectivo And so many Volitions may be denominated as beginning in time as connoting the objects †††Pennottus li. 4. c. 24. p. 235. confidently argueth that because God can Love him that he hated or Loved not he can therefore Predestinate him whom he reprobated or change his decrees without any change in himself I answer 1. I grant that God can Love a Saint whom he hated as a sinner before and cease hating him without any change save relative and by extrinsecal denomination 2. But his inference seemeth to me false and dangerous unless he had meant it of executive Election and Reprobation which he doth not For 1. Proper Love and Hatred connote an Object as existent and by such connotation are named And his fourth supposition is false that Love is nothing but Gods Will to give a man life Eternal For the formal Act of Love is Complacency And the Velle Bonum is another thing as I think an effect of Love or at the most another act of Love And we deny that any absolute Velle bonum alicui is ever changed though displicence be changed Because it is the same with Decree 2. And the reason why the said Decree or Volition if absolute and proper may not be denominated changed is because it maketh its own object and so supposeth it not pre-existent and dependeth not on it denominatively And therefore it would inferr God to be mutable to change it But it is not so in the other which as to the Relation and Name followeth the Mutable creature as doth Gods Knowledge of present existents and preteritions as to denomination and connotation And it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability so to name them than to his simplicity to name them many and divers 290. And in this sense it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability to speak of Him as being before in Potentia only as to such Relative denominations As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it and yet is not therefore mutable Or as you are yet but in potentia to the termination of his Relations who will pass about you before and behind on the right hand and on the left So God was but Potentially the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity Though as to any real passion God hath no passive power 291. In this sense of relation to the objects and effects it is that we conceive of Gods acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature as one being before and one after another Though not as they are Gods Essence 292. Yet because the use and truth of words or names is their signification of Things as indeed they are and we should put no name on any creature but what is adapted to notifie it aright
it and the natural then it is no proper expression to say that such a mans falling away was impossible antecedently but only that 1. It is non futurum 2. And logically impossible in order of arguing that it should be so And it is ordinary with high Antiarminians to say That Gods Decree and his Grace too are such as only determine mans power and that neither of them ordinarily make our Fall impossibile but only non-futurum But when God worketh by a greater force of Omnipotency taking away the moral power ad contrarium and how oft what man dare say that he can tell the difference being in the effect and not in God 274. Therefore though the dispute of the event as future or not future have its place yet the dispute de possibilitate is usually but vain and darkening especially as managed by those Confounders who only say It is impossible that Gods decree or fore-knowledge be frustrate and necessary that it be fulfilled not distinguishing the necessity of a consequence in a syllogism from the premises and the necessity of an effect as from its necessitating cause God can cause without necessitating the second cause much more decree and fore-know 275. He that hath saving Grace in the least degree cannot lose that degree without losing all the species or all saving Grace But it 's otherwise with him that hath a higher degree 276. There have many of our acquaintance gone so far in a life of mortification and diligence of suffering like Christians of the highest rank who yet have fallen to the death to the denial of the very essentials of the Christian Faith that from the very Doctrine of certain perseverance hath become a cause of doubting and trouble to some who have said If a man could fall away from true Grace I should not doubt but such and such a man did so and I should hope that yet my heart may at the present be sincere But seeing no man ever had true Grace who apostatizeth these men had none who in all proboble judgment of reason were once far better than I now am And I can never be sure that I have true Grace till I go further than ever they did which I almost dispair of ever doing having intimately known them to be no dissemblers Thus both ways of this controverted Doctrine have their troubling difficulties 277. If none censured the deniers of certainty herein but only those who themselves ever attain to a certainty of their sincerity perseverance and salvation they would not be enough to make any great division or breach about it And could we but be impartial and bear with the dissent of Brethren herein as well as we do of the ancient Doctors and Churches our peace and concord would be less disturbed by this Controversie than it is I have else-where cited some Tertullian is too harsh in conceding a mutability in God Contr. Marc. li. 2. cap. 23 24. Si vero etiam circa personas levem vultis intelligi quum reprobat aliquando probatos aut improvidum quum probat quandoque reprobandos quasi judicia sna aut damnet praeterita aut ignoret futura Atqui nihil tam bono judici convenit quam pro praesentibus meritis rejicere adlegere c. Yet this may have a good interpretation Eusebius Praeparat Evangel li. 6. pag. 289 290. Yea these would fight or be a contradiction that the same man should both become honest or good and certainly fore-know that he shall be honest But I am not of his mind But among those before Augustine such passages are not so strange as these are in himself De corrept Grat. cap. 13. pag. 539. Quis enim ex multitudine fidelium quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur in numero praedestinatorum se esse praesumat Quia id occultari opus est in hoc loco ubi sic cavenda est elatio ut etiam per Satanae Angelum ne extolleretur tantus colophizaretur Apostolus Nam propter hujus utilitatem secreti ne forte quis extollatur sed omnes etiam qui bene currunt timeant dum occultum est qui perveniant Propter hujus ergo utilitatem secreti credendum est quosdam de filiis perditionis non accepto dono perseverantiae usque in finem in fide quae per dilectionem operatur incipere vivere ac aliquandiu fideliter ac juste vivere postea cadere neque de hac vita priusquam hoc eis contingat auferri Quorum si nemini contigisset tamdiu haberent omnes istum saluberrimum timorem quo vitium elationis opprimitur donec ad Christi gratiam qua piè vivitur pervenirent deinceps jam securi nunquam se ab illo esse casuros Quae praesumptio in isto tentationum loco non expedit ubi tanta est infirmitas ut superbiam possit generare securitas Et Epist 101. ad Vitalem Utile est quippe omnibus vel pene omnibus propter humilitatem saluberrimam ut quales futuri sint scire non possint Et lib. 11. de Civit. Dei cap. 12. pag. 67. Quis enim primos illoâ— homines in Paradiso negare audeat beatos fuisse ante peccatum quamâ—â—s de sua beatitudine quam diuturna vel utrum aeterna esset incertos esseâ— anteâ— aeterna nisi peccassent Cum hodie non impudenter beatos vocemus quos videmus juste ac pie cum spe immortalitatis hanc vitam ducere sine crimine vastante conscientiam facile impetrantes peccatis hujus infirmitatis divinum misericordiam Qui licet de suae perseverantia praemio certi sint de ipsâ— tamen perseverantia sua reperiantur incerti Quis enim hominum se in actione profectuque justitiae perseveraturum usque in finem sciat nisi aliqua revelatione ab illo stat certus qui de hac re justo latentique judicio non omnes instruit sed neminem fallit So Prosper Resp ad Gallor cap. sent ad secundam Qui dicâ—â— quod ab his qui non sunt praedestinati ad vitam non auserat percepta baptismi gratia Originale peccatum non est catholicus Sacramentâ—â— enim baptismi quo omnia prorsus peccata delentur etiam in eis verum est qui non sunt in veritate mansuri ab hoc ad vitam aeternam non sunt praedestinati Et sent ad septimum Qui dicit quod Deus quibusdam filiis suis quos regeneravit in Christo quibus fidem spem dilectionem dedit ob hoc perseverantiam non dederit quia a massa perditionis praescientia Dei praedestinatione non sint disereti c. Vid. caetera sent sup 12. Et Resp ad object Vincent 12. Praedestinatio Dei si apud nos dum in praesentis vitae periculis versamur incerta est apud illum tameâ— qui fecit quae futura sunt immutabilis permanet I need not tell the learned that Fulgentius is of the same
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
causeth no antecedent necessity but concomitant existentiae 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression And surely God ever operateth as God which is ut Causa prima But how far he determineth is the doubt i a capable object of knowledge And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not is a vain question 3. Gods acts ex parte sui being but his Essence and all one can no otherwise be distinguished nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority than as the objects are distinct and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connâ—tation so to denominate the acts 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous though from the order of humane operations we say that things are first Intelligible before they are Amiable And so we may say of God after the manner of men but not otherwise 5. God doth not will the form or the act of sin as circumstantiated and as the form necessarily resulteth from it neither for it self nor propter aliud the essence or existence 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it 7. God fore-knoweth or knoweth the formale peccati as well as the materiale yet almost all confess that he willeth not the formale Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it 8. There is no effect in God for all that is in God is God who is not effected Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it noâ— his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good at once 9. Gods inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies and yet moral and to us unsearchable They cause the will to determine it self to Good when it doth so but how we know not But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means and according to their aptitude 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances because he foreknoweth they will prevail That is Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause 11. But the word because is in Scripture applyed sometimes to Gods Love or hatred and sometimes to his outward acts as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you because ye have loved me and believed And in the first case that which is meant is that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God not as it is Himself but as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo And in the second case It meaneth that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo have their proper uses and we our commanded ends in using them And so God is said to send Ministers e. g. because he would save the hearers that is the Ministry is a cause of mens â—â—lvation 12. From all this it appeareth that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation and that they run pari passa For all Good is both willed and known and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin And the non-impedition of sin being no act needeth no positive act of will or decree * * * Yet none of the stress of their differences lyeth on this And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo without proof which I leave to â—uens various opinions But Reprobation which is the decree of damning ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before §. IV. II. Of Durandus 's way II. AS to the way of Aureolus Durandus Ludov. à Dola c. I conceive it is commonly rejected because not understood or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully But it is a great matter that all confess how easily it would end all these controversies were it true And by Lud. à Dola's Explication and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus I conceive that they are commonly mistaken Durandus thinketh that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency and as Near to the effect as if he used no second cause But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude second causes as media And while he useth them he operateth on us according to their kind of operations even as if they were between him and the effect And this is the sense of Durandus and à Doâ—a and easily reconcileth all Amyraldus de lib. Arbit c. 4. concurreth with Durandus It is consâ—derable that all confess that if Durandus's way did hold it easâ—ly ended all the controversie As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes 3. de Concurs Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate c. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination it self influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures concauses and objects and the media of action 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action Now say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest God doth moreover concurr as the first cause to the Act it self by an Immediate efficient Influx besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they that is that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer esse but in its Nature which is its Mobility and its principium motus And this Nature is not only a Power to Action but also an Inclined Power So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion with all necessary concurrents without impediments is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the first Cause while his Influx is not only as to Being but as to the Motive force and inclination And no more than this doth seem to me
I pray you tell me A. It is an idle question For that is but necessitas existentiae He that is ungodly is necessarily ungodly while he is so B. II. VVe hold moreover that the same man will certainly all that time omit the prevalent love of God and all acts proper to the godly A. That 's but the same else he were a godly man B. III. VVe hold also that yet this man may forbear many acts of sin and do many things commanded and so is not under a vicious necessity of committing all Sin or omitting all Duty IV. VVe hold also that his vicious necessity of disposition is curable and not remediless and desperate V. VVe hold also that it is not curable without Gods saving sanctifying Grace proportioned to his disease or pravity VI. VVe hold also that God hath appointed every man certain Duties and Means to be used in order to his cure VII VVe hold that he giveth much outward help and some inward commoner Grace antecedent usually to sanctifying Grace by which much of these Duties and Means may be used VIII And we hold that God appointeth no means in vain nor commandeth any unprofitable Duty or which man hath not sufficient encouragement to use with hope of success and is not unexcuseable if he neglect Do you differ from us in any of this Or is there any thing more that we must have to be capable of your love and concord A. Though I granted you a necessitas existentiae that a wicked mans life while such be wicked in the main for that is but to say that a wicked man is a wicked man yet I grant you not a necessitas effecti as if his pravity made his wicked life unavoidable or necessary as a necessitating cause B. His wicked life is considerable 1. As to his inward actings or to his outward 2. As to the immediate or next Acts and as to the remote 3. And the necessity is voluntary or involuntary And so I say 1. He is under no natural or involuntary necessity but under a * Etsi Amor ille non excedat vires physicaâ— voluntatis humanae per se spectatae eas tamen superat si spectentur difficultates quae occurant Unde fit ut sine speciali auxilio non possit ad actum reduci naturalis inclinatio Dâ—um super omnia diligendi Non potest homo credere mysteria â—fidei â—t oportet ad salutem sine gratiae auxilio etiam quum sufficienter sunt proposita probatum a Deo esse revelatum Non potest homo servare quoad substantiam ullum praeceptum affirmativum supernaturale de interno actu sine auxilio gratiae etiam de singulis Pet. a S. Joseph Thes general de aux p. 81. 82 83. vicious inclination or habit which will produce some effects certainly and others uncertainly 2. The certain effects of the habitual privation of the love of God and enmity to him and to holiness is that his Soul will not in statu praesenti immediately nor till it be cured or over-swayed by a superior cause â— love God above all nor love holiness nor live a holy life Because the Soul will not go contrary to its habitual inclination without somewhat to over-power that habit An effect will not be contrary to the fixed inclination of its cause 3. And another certain effect of a Soul predominantly habituated to sensâ—ality is that it will live a sensual life constantly as to the bent of inward Volitions and ordinarily as occasion serveth in outward actions 4. But being not so necessitated to every Sin nor against every Duty and means of Cure this Soul is not under a necessity of so continuing uncured Now if it be the present voluntary ascertaining Disposition which you deny then 1. You must hold that an Enemy of God can immediately love him above all and live a holy life 2. And that there is some cause in a man most habitually sensual by which he can forbear both the inward desires and outward acts of sensuality which are contradictions to him that knoweth what a prevalent fixed habit is 3. And that all wicked Enemies of God have in them a cause that can immediately cure all their own enmity and pravity without Gods Spirit of Grace or else have his Spirit and Grace immediately at an instant at command And if all a mans Original Sin and contracted habits be so easily laid by at any minute the cure seemeth much easier than the depravation which perhaps hath been a long time growing to that strength which is contrary to all the Worlds experience As it is easier to kindle a fire in the City than to quench it and to catch the Plague or any Disease than to cure it or to wound the Body than to heal it or to pull down a House than to build it to drown a Ship than to make it c. So all Ministers Tutors Parents Christians yea persons find how wofully hard it proveth to cure one Sin To cure the Ignorant the Unbelieving the Hard-hearted the Proud the Lustful the Covetous the Passionate much more the malignant Enemies of God and holiness What need of the sanctification of the Holy Ghost or the medicinal Grace of Christ if the very depraved Will can do all in a moment of it self and depose its enmity A. You speak to me as if I were a Pelagian I am not for any of this But will rather yield to what you say B. II. And as for your second Charge * Vid. quae haâ—â—t Ruiz de praedefin tr 2. d. 8. per tot de necessitate vaga consistentâ— cum libertate secundum quid Et a. 9. p. 137. That all good actions are fore decreed of God proved and multitudes cited that defend it that they assert unresistible necessitating Grace I pray you leave it to the Fourth Article which is its proper place to avoid repetition But here let me remember you by the way 1. That not to love God not to believe not to repent not to live holily are no Acts and therefore no Effects of power but a privation 2. That therefore Gods causing a man to love him to Believe to Repent to be Holy is not to deprive him of any power but to give him act and power 3. Therefore it is not a depriving him of any true Liberty For true Liberty is the Liberty of some faculty or power 4. But if you will call a voluntary Impotency and Viciousness by the name of a free-power then God taketh away such Power by giving us Power and such Liberty by making us free But proceed to the next Crimination The second Crimination A. * The Arminians say that God giveth a supernatural power even to the Will it self and that by immediate operation Synod art 3. 4. p. 15 c. And they add Mente illuminata voluntati concessa supernaturali potentia partim per illuminationem partim per virium immediatam insusionem
finem Now either there is such a middle Impulse or not If not then besides Gods essence there is no effect on us antecedent to our consent but the said cogitation and passion And 1. These are commonly said not to necessitate the will 2. And if they do it must be but Morally which is commonly held to be no way of necessitating though it may be of ascertaining the event And so consent or our Volition it self would be but of co-operating Grace And if there be such a middle Impulse as Gregory holdeth it is confessed by him and the Dominican praedeterminants to determine the will only to act freely and therefore not to necessitate it to consent but only to ascertain it and so the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace though the Impulse would be necessary which tendeth to it of a special Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the rest I doubt B. And then 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls 1. Because you granted that the same degree of help may be effectual to a disposed Soul 2. And so the Help though universal will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the desired effect and is nevertheless Grace or powerful to such for being universal or uneffectual to others 3. And it seems that such a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on Adam before his fall and uneffectual in his fall 4. And it seemeth congruous to Gods other works that he give Grace suitable to his Law and Promise which shall not be always uneffectual So that it is most probable that to prepared Souls that ordinary established degree of the Spirits Influx from Christ which is universal but uneffectual to the unprepared is not only sometimes but ordinarily effectual I think none can prove the contrary And the same Grace you confess to be effectual to preparation But to unprepared Souls whom God will suddenly convert out of the ordinary way a special extraordinary operation seemeth necessary But wherein the extraordinariness of it consisteth antecedent to faith the second effect besides the extraordinary means I think it past mans reach to know C. Well now tell us Unde Gratia fit Efficax B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you that the effect is from all the causes and not from any one alone It is effectual in that it produceth the effect To which each cause doth its proper part and one is not all The effect in question now is Faith Faith is caused as is said 1. By Gods will as the Original 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit and meriting Grace first 3. By the Spirit as the Operator 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument 6. But all this effecteth ordinarily in materia disposita and no other Having before wrought that preparation 7. But extraordinarily in materia indisposita working disposition and all at once Now here 1. Gods Will doth its part without any cause Velle ex parte Dei sicuâ— agere is his essence and the termination of it in rem Volitatam hath no efficient but only an Objective Cause 2. This prime Cause is the prime reason of all the efficacy of Inferior Causes Not qua voluntas simply moving them but qua voluntas cum potentia executiva moving them and qua volitio inferreth the necessitatem consequentiae of the effect So that plainly I think that no Good cometh to pass in the world but what God forewilled and nothing which he absolutely willeth cometh not to pass what he fore-knoweth is necessary necessitate Infallibilitatis and what he absolutely willeth necessitate Imutabilitatis and what he worketh from such a will is necessary necessitate invincibilitatis 3. Though all the other Causes are the reason of the effect and not only the first yet none of them operate on the first Cause and put any force into it for the act So that its force is from it self but theirs from it And having said this much preparatorily I thus resolve your great question Here are three things before us whose cause may be enquired of 1. The necessitas Logica consequentiae ex quo in ordine probandi necessario sequitur eventum futurum esse And this is the Decree or Will of God yea and his fore knowledge This is presupposed 2. The prime effect of Gods Will and Active power operating And this prime effect is not our Faith or Act but the Impression or Received Influx of God on the Soul For the Soul receiveth its like some Impression by the Divine Influx by which it believeth or acteth it self It doth not Receive its own Act as if that act had been first pre-existent in the Donor but it performeth that Act because it is premoved to it Now if the question be of this first effect Unde operatio Gratiosa sit efficax I answer 1. The whole efficient reason is in the operator and operation it self It is effectual ad impressionem ex natura rei because it is an Act If it did nothing it were no Act transient 2. And the specification and individuation is from the terminating object It is denominatively and Relatively one Act which is on a Stone and another on a Soul de specie And it is numerically one which is on Peter and another on John If the Sun did shine in vacuo there being no other creature to be objective or passive it would still agere but it would nihil efficere quia nihil afficere So God is one Infinite act and ex parte sui never begineth to act nor ever ceaseth nor is divided But transiently he doth nihil afficere vel efficere but first by making objects and then acting on them So that were there no mobile Gods act would not movere This first effect then of Impress hath an Effective and an Objective Cause The Effective Cause is Gods Essence that is his Active Power Intellect and Will and nothing else Supposing now that it be not Gods operation on the Instrument or medium that we speak of but immediately on the Soul it self But Man's Soul is the Objective Recipient Cause of this first effect which is the Impress or Influx received 3. The Secondary effect is Mans Act Faith and Repentance it self If the question Unde Gratia sit efficax mean this as with most it doth then it is all one as to ask Unde hic Effectus For that Gods Influx on the Soul immediately is the sole Cause is false Therefore the answer is that this effect is from all the Causes conjunct From Gods Will or Law and Power and Wisdom from Christs mission of the Spirit before merited from the Spirits Impress or Influx from the Gospel from the Ministry usually and from the Agent Believer all these as the efficient Causes And it is from or on the prepared Soul ordinarily as the Materia disposita vel Causa Receptiva Objectiva of the Divine operation And from or on God Christ the promise
the believing sinner may stand before this righteous and holy God is to affirm the eternal damnation of all the World VII The Covenant mentioned justifieth not but declareth our Justification which is the immediate proper effect of Christ's righteousness VIII Never any man in his wits affirmed that the righteousness of Christ is the formal cause of our Justification Give us but leave to call it the material cause or the meritorious cause immediately and properly of Justification c. Some will think that they are great and heinous errors which either these words or some of mine that seem contrary import But I must crave leave here to follow my usual method in separating the Controversies de re de nomine and then I think that even these strange words prove not him and me at so great a distance as they seem to intimate For I grant him as followeth de re 1. That God hath such a decree of Election or eternal purpose as he describeth and calleth the Constitution of the Covenant 2. That God doth wisely and graciously execute this Decree 3. That all Grace and Mercy is given by Christ And therefore so far as Mercy is common Christ is the common cause of it 4. That Christ himself is a blessing or gift decreed and also freely given by God even from his love to the World Joh. 3. 16. 5. That God's electing Act or Decree as in him hath no condition nor his purpose to give Christ as a Saviour to mankind 6. On our part no condition is required either that God may elect us or that the first promise of a Saviour be made or that Christ come into the World or that he fulfill all righteousness or that he obey or die or rise or be glorified or come to judgment or raise the dead or that he enact it as his Law of Grace that he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned 7. Nor is any condition on our part necessary absolutely necessitate medii that the Gospel or the first Grace yea the first special Grace be given us 8. That Christ by his suffering and merits hath procured to his elect not only pardon and life if they believe and obey him but Grace to cause them effectually and infallibly to believe repent obey and persevere 9. That no man can or will believe and repent but by his Grace 10. That to give men a promise of pardon and life if they will believe repent and obey the Gospel is not the whole of Christ's Grace to any but where-ever he giveth this he giveth also much means and gracious help by which men may do better than they do and so be more prepared for his further Grace 11. That if God only gave men a promise of pardon if they believe and gave them no Grace to enable or help them to believe it would be no saving Covenant 12. God did not repeal his Law of Innocency or as he had rather call it of Perfection nor did properly dispense with or relax the preceptive part of it Nor is it absolutely ceased as to a capable subject And therefore Christ was bound to perfection 13. God would not have his Law to be without the honour of the perfect performance of mans Mediator though it be violated by us all 14. No man is saved or justified but by the proper merit of Christ's perfect obedience yea and his habitual holiness and satisfactory sufferings advanced in dignity by his divine perfection 15. This merit as related to us supposeth that Christ as a Sponsor was the second Adam the Root of the justified the reconciling Mediator who obeyed perfectly with that intent that by his obedience we might be justified and who suffered for our sins in our room and stead and so was in tantum our Vicarius poenae as some phrase it or substitute and was made a curse for us that we might be healed by his stripes as he was obedient that his righteousness might be the reason as a meritorious cause of our Justification which supposeth the relation of an undertaking Redeemer in our nature doing this and in our stead so far forth as that therefore perfect obedience should not be necessary to be performed by our selves And righteousness therefore is imputed to us that is we are truly reputed righteous because we as believing members of Christ have right to impunity and life as merited by his righteousness and freely given to all penitent believers And Christ's own righteousness may be said so far to be imputed to us as to be reckoned or reputed the meritorious cause of our right or justification as aforesaid Thus far we are agreed de re And then de nomine I willingly leave men to their way of speech 1. If he will call God's Decree his Covenant in Constitution 2. If he will call the execution of his Decree his Covenant in execution 3. If he will call nothing else the Covenant of Grace or at least nothing of narrower extent but what comprehendeth God's eternal Decrees and the promise and gift of a Redeemer and so of the rest I cannot help it his language is his own But I shall tell you further my thoughts de re de nomine 1. De re 1. God's eternal decrees purposes or election give no one right to Christ Pardon or Life and so justifie no man 2. The execution of God's Decrees yea of Election hath many Acts besides Justification 3. It must therefore be some transient Act done in time ad extra by which God justifieth men 4. There are divers such acts concurring in several sorts of causality or respect 5. Christ's meritorious righteousness and satisfaction are the sole proper immediate causemeritorious of all the Grace or Mercy procured and given by him there being no other meritorious cause of the same kind either more immediate or at all co-ordinate and copartner with him 6. As Christ giveth us Holiness qualitative and active by the real operation of his Spirit though he merited it immediately himself so doth he give us right to impunity to the further Grace of the Spirit and to Glory by the instrumentality of his Covenant as by a Testament Deed of Gift or Law of Grace Which by signifying God's donative will doth not first declare us justified or to have the foresaid right to Christ and Life but doth first give us instrumentally that right and so immediately justify us And God's will giveth us not right as secret or of it self but by such instrumental signification 7. God hath signified his will to us partly by absolute gifts and promises and partly by conditional that such there are he that denieth must deny much of the Scripture Christ was absolutely given to fallen mankind for a Redeemer and so was the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace and many other mercies But he hath made and recorded a conditional Gift of Christ as in special Union to be our
Eligible to be produced in their fittest season 47. They that say God can do no more than he doth must mean only in the second and third instants or sense or speak very presumptuously if not blasphemously 48. That God doth not all that he Can do is no note of imperfection in his Wisdom or Will but is from the perfection of both 49. Nor doth it hence follow that he hath either a Vain or an Unactive Power For his Power is his perfection and therefore not Vain And it is ever essentially Active in himself as he is the Living God And was neither Vain nor Unactive when there was yet no Creature 50. Gods Power doth not therefore Create or operate ad extra meerly as Power For then it should do so ad ultimum posse and from Eternity But as it Voluntarily puts forth the effect 51. Gods Knowledge meerly as Knowledge or as the Knowledge of Congruities Future things yea or things Existent is not Efficient nor yet as it concurreth with his Will ut finis or his Will of Complacency But only as it concurreth with his Efficient Will 52. Gods Knowledge and Will effect nothing ad extra but by and with his Active Power as efficient 53. Therefore Bradwardine and many other Schoolmen do not congruously say that Gods meer Volition without any Effective Power is all his Causing Influx Unless they thrust two Conceptions into one word and mean a powerful active Volition For 1. By the same reason that we must ascribe to God Intellection and Volition we must also ascribe Active Power These being three principles in his Image 2. And in Man Meer Willing effects not 3. And they that say God willeth ut eveniat peccatum ipso non efficiente sed permittente suppose that he willeth something which he effecteth not But against them in this Suarez and others have said enough 54. Though Gods Nature have no Real Accidents but simple essential perfection yet Relations or Relative Accidents are not to be denyed of him For indeed as Ockam hath copiously proved * * * That Relations have no entity extra intellectum praeâ—er absolutum Ockam in many disputes in his Quod lib. sheweth Relations have no real Entity or are nothing besides the Absoluta and the Act of Reason about them †††Relation is but comparabilitas Relation is but rerum Comparabilitas which Reason useth by actual comparing conceptions of them 55. Though the Thomists say that man only is Related to God * * * An Relationes reales sint in Deo ad Creaturas e. g. Creator Dominus c. Affirmatur ab Ockam Gabr. 1. d. 30. q. 5. Durand q. 3. Marsil 1. q. 32. a. 1. Greg. Ar. 1. d. 28. q. 3. a. 1. Pet. Hurtad Negatur à Thomistis sed est Lis de nomine ut notat Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 13. a. 7. Nullum quippe fundamentum de novo est ex parte Dei sed creaturae Ideo Thomistae â—ocant RelationeÌ„ rationis relatione rationis and not God to man yet Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza and others strongly assert that God himself hath not only Relationes rationis and Transcendental but predicamental Relations also as Creator Dominus Rector c. which the Scriptures constantly ascribe to him And which indeed are no way notes of Imperfection For if it be no Imperfection in God to Create Redeem Sanctifie Rule c. it can be none to be related to us as a Creator Redeemer Sanctifier Ruler c. For it is nothing more 56. As Gods Immanent Acts are his Essence but not simply as Essence but as Essence in the distinct Acts of self-living self-knowing self-loving related to Himself so his Actions ad extra are his Essence as Related to the Creature but not simply as Essence but as Essence-Acting 57. Gods Will as meerly Ordinant or Dirigent effecteth only Order and Direction but not the Substances ordered 58. His Will quà Finis is not Efficient †††Bonavent in 1. d. 45. q. 2. Resol Deus non dicitur Omni-volens sicut Omnipotens Omnisciens cum Voluntas abstrahat à ratione actualitatis à ratione causae See his plain explication of it Vide Alliac in princip 1. At è contrà Bradward l. 1. c. 10. cor pag. 197. But not accurately enough though it seems but lis de nomine 59. His Will quà Finis is his Will as Pleased by being Fulfilled 60. All that is Good is Pleasing to God and so is the final fulfilling of his Will 61. God willeth efficiently all that is Good which cometh to pass For all Good that is ever done is done by him though not by him only 62. But he willeth the various production of things as they are variously produced some solely by Himself and some by Creatures and means some necessarily by necessitated agents and some freely by free agents 63. As Gods Efficient Will causeth the thing willed whether substance accidents rule order c. so his Final Will or Complacence supposeth the Pleasing thing in Being That is If it be the Thing it self that he is Pleased in it is supposed Existent If the thing as Past it is supposed Past or that it was existent If the thing as future or fore-known or fore-willed it is not the thing it self that is in that instant properly said to Please him but his own Knowledge and Will concerning it Though we use to call this The Thing in esse Cognito aut Volito SECT V. Of Futurity and its pretended Causes 64. THe Possibility and Futurity of things are not accidental notions or relations of the things themselves but are termini diminuentes Of Futurity see Bonaventures distinction of futur quoad successionem temporis quoad ordinem temporalis ad aeternum secundum consecutionem with the application in 1. dist 38. dub 2. Vid. Blank de Concord lib. decret 1. n. 54. that futurity is nothing but respectus rationis and needs no cause but that of the thing future as to the Things and are spoken of Nothing To say that a Thing May be or Will be which now is not is to say that now it is nothing 65. Nothing is no Effect and therefore hath no Cause Therefore things Possible and Future as such have no Cause 66. Therefore Possibility and Futurity as they are taken for any attribute or accident or mode of Creatures as objects are mistaken Though they may be Conceptions in the mind of Creatures concerning that which is not 67. Therefore also God is no Cause of any Eternal Possibility or futurity 68. Therefore the Possibility and futurity of things conceived as an effect hath no Eternal Cause For there is nothing Eternal but God 69. Though man Imagine Things which are not and then think that they Can be and Will be because that Is which Can or Will Cause them and thence frame notions and names of Nothing and call it
Possible and Future we must be very fearful and not unreverent and rash in ascribing such a dance or lusus of notions to God unless as used with great impropriety after the manner of weak man 70. God knoweth his own Power Knowledge and Will And so knoweth what he can do what he knoweth to be eligible and what he will do And if any will call this knowledge of God by the name of the Possibility or Futurity of the thing known or will denominate Nothing as an Imaginary something as Possible and Future relatively from Gods Power Will or Knowledge Let them remember 1. That Nothing hath no relation 2. That properly they should but give the denomination to that which is that is to Gods Power Will and Knowledge and say God Can e. g. make a World or Will do it and not to that which is not And when they say that e. g. the world is eternally possible or future they can justly mean no more but that God can and will make it 3. And that this is but lis de nomine and not a real difference whether futurition be thus from Eternity 71. And especially let them remember that nothing in God is Caused There are no effects in God Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God and therefore possibility and futurition must needs be names of God himself or some Divine perfection or conception which is himself if they be said to be eternal so such Possibility and futurity can have no eternal cause For God hath no Cause nor any thing in God 72. If the Futurity of sin must have an eternal Cause then God causeth Pennot l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Fathers saying that things are not future because fore-known but fore-known because future And Augustine Greg. M. Boetius Ansâ—lm Lomb. Aquin. saying the contrary And he citeth the four wayes of the Schoolmens reconciling them and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being the first is true and in regard of free acts the second I think that in regard of sin neither is true Unless Because signifie only rationem denominationis objectivam And even if so it is dubious whether they be not simultaneous as Relations are the futurity of all sin But that is not so For none is the Cause that sin will be but he that mediately or immediately causeth the being of it when it is 73. Imagine per possibile vel impossibile that a thousand years hence a free created agent that can do otherwise will cause such an act It may be denominated Future without the taking in of any antecedent cause into the notion It is called Future because it will be and not because there is at present existent any cause from whence it will be mediately or immediately 74. Though Futurity be Nothing yet this Proposition is something This or that Will be And to know the futurity of a thing is most properly to know the truth of that proposition It will be 75. God knoweth not by Propositions for that is the imperfect mode of man But he knoweth Propositions when they are existent as humane instruments or conceptions And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propositions of futurity 76. What man knoweth by Propositions God knoweth otherwise by a more transcendent perfect but incomprehensible way Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be which will be 77. There were â—o Propositions from Eternity For man that useth them was not And God useth them not though he know them as used by man Therefore this proposition Hoc futurum est was not from Eternity Because non entis non sunt affectiones 78. But if there had been such Propositions from Eternity as The world will be made Christ will be incarnate c. they would have been true And so the eternal Futurity of things as commonly disputed of can be nothing but the Eternal Verity of a Proposition de futuritione which was no proposition because then there was none only in time mans brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there might have been Creatures who might have used propositions de futuritione rerum which if they had they would have been true 79. All Verity is either 1. Rei 2. Conceptus 3. Expressionis And 1. Ubi non est Res ibi non est Veritas Rei The thing which was not from Eternity was not a True Thing from Eternity 2. The Divine knowledge that such and such things will be was True from Eternity by an incomprehensible way above propositions 3. If there had been any Propositions Mental or Verbal de rerum futuritione they would have been true And this is all that can truly be said of the Eternity of futurition 80. Only this being added that so far as Gods will was the first Cause determining of any thing that will be so far he was eternally the Cause of the truth of this proposition Hoc erit when such a proposition shall be 81. But where Gods Will is not the first cause of the Thing which will be there it is not his causing the truth of the proposition that is the cause that it will be Though his Knowledge be a medium from whence it may Logically be inferred that it will be 82. Moreover whatever is from eternity must be Res or modus rei or Relatio But from Eternity there is no Res futura no modus rei futurae no Relatio rei futurae * * * I know that the Judicious Greg. Arim. 1. d. 28. q. 3. pag. 122 c. asserteth these four things 1. That aliquid potest reserri realiter ad non ens 2. Non ens potest realiter referri ad ens 3. Quod Deus aeternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quae non erat 4. Quod Deus realiter reserlur ad creaturam ex tempore And his reasons are very considerable for three of them But as to the second which concerneth our case he faileth For 1. his first reason that relations are ever mutual or convertible I deny his proof as vain as to the reality of the relation 2. And that res non existens is causa I deny Fuit causa non est 2. And remember that he instanceth only in things as caused or foreknown Sin therefore can be called future but as fore-known 3. Remember that his Master Ockam hath oft in Quodl proved that Relations are Nothing besides the quid absolution and Reason Being nothing but Comparabilitas all is but to say that God fore-knew what would be and therefore had there been such a proposition from Eternity as This will be it had been true Vid. Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. a. 1. Bonav ib. a. 1. q. 1. 2. Durand 1. d. 38. q. 1. Scot. ib. q. 1. Cajet Bannes Rip Zumel Nazar Molin Vasqu Arrub. c. 1. p. q. 14. a. 8. Greg. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. q. 14. punc 5. s 3. Alvar. de Auxil disp 16. Snarez de Aâ—xil l. 1. c. 13.
Ledesm de Aâ—xil dis 2. Ruiz de scient d. 15 16 33 36 c. For non entis non est Modus vel Relatio If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca I answer it must be then God himself only as denominated Knowing or Willing that This or that shall be which is not properly the futurity of the thing For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future Answ 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men as if it signified some being which is not so 2. God cannot know that a thing will be unless it will be But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true This or that will be unless it be true But 1. there were from eternity no propositions 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind whence it hath its first being 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions their Being is considerable before their Verity and the Verity hath its Cause But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself which is either his Decree of what he will Cause or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition causeth that the Thing will be nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent knoweth also that this agent will freely sin In all which the futurity is Nothing nor is any existent cause of it necessary But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not Answ 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false * * * According to Greg. and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other One as a future Cause and another as a future effect And if there were now no Being but hereafter per impossibile a Being would arise of it self it is future though there be none to know it But this futurity hath no Cause And it is no more but that this Proposition Hoc erit would be True if there were any to conceive it 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this that whether it be thought on or not this is a true proposition Hoc vel illud futurum est Which is true when there are propositions extrinsecal which no man thinketh of But 1. God hath no propositions 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity But if he had any they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge 3. And they have no Cause 4. If they had been uttered by words they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge and the object is a †††To the Question An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus Bonavent answereth in 1. dist 38. q. 1. a. 1. Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae non essendi sed aut Inserendi aut Dicendi Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum licet non omnino sed nullo modo è converso Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae quia mutuo antecedunt consequuntur antecedens est causa consequentis Secundum rationem Dicendi futurum est causa praescientiae non è converso Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius si scitum esset semper praesens esset scientia sed non praescientia Bonavent 1. dist 38. dub 3. saith Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth effectum bonitaâ—em but when it is called simplex Notitia it connoteth only the event but in it self is one Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified both of Knowledge and Will cause of the act God knoweth things to be future because they are future as he knoweth existents because they exist Answ Still I say 1. Futurity is Nothing and Nothing hath no Cause 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things because they will be but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be 86. Gods meer fore-knowledge nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action causeth not the thing future and therefore is not the Cause that It will be But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate they are true Causes of the thing And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be but what will Cause its being 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth that without him there would be no impossibles yea that non posset esse impossibile When it were impossible any thing should be were there no God and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause It 's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from those that are consequent The former sort are such as these God is God is eternal omnipotent c. These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them being before his knowledge of them The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface Non proprie distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio ignarus homuncio excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * * * Hervtus in his Quodlib puts the question Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary and to treat of curiosities But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought presumption and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith Religion and Charity and peace in a game
at words What is this Complexe object Deus est Is it any thing or nothing If nothing it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cause of it If any thing Is it God or a Creature A Creature is not before God nor a cause of his knowledge which is God himself If it be God is it his Essence as such or his Essential properties or the Persons None of these For Gods essence is the prime Incomplexe Being and not a Complexe proposition Dens est His Properties primary are Omnipotent-vital-power Intellect and Will But these also are the same Incomplexe essence and not propositions And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself nor the cause of it All the sense he can make of it is that this proposition Deus est est Aeternus c. if it had had an eternal being would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this Deus scit se esse or before his knowledge it self or that if man had been the Knower it had been first a true proposition that He is before he knoweth that he is But God knoweth not himself by propositions Words in mente vel ore are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by And doth God need such to know himself Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means as we do Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect as man as Propositions are And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect Deus est c. before he knew them yea and his self-knowledge which in Act is his pure eternal necessary Essence caused by these All that you can say is that poor creatures know by Propositions and phantasms and diverse thoughts and that God knoweth man and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours but not that he had the like eternally in himself and knoweth them in himself and that Himself as a proposition is the Cause of himself or self-intellection as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight But Bradwardine saith that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt per solam suam essentiam sicut alia vera incomplexa Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota sed per suam voluntatem vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate c. More presumption still He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe And who knoweth what sense those words have What meaneth he by complexa but Notions that is names and propositions as distinct from the Things And what is it to know propositions complexe but to know them as they are And what is it to know them incomplexe unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is or to know that it is no proposition that is to err If God know a Complexum or a proposition that Proposition is in being And where was it in being before God knew it If in God or no where 1. God then is a proposition 2. And God is before he knoweth himself 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge it is to say that God knoweth that he is before he knoweth that he is and his knowing that he is causeth him to know that he is If it be said that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions words nor propositions but the Verity of Gods Being Eternity c. I answer To know things is said to be to know some Truth because by knowing the thing we can make this proposition This is or This truly is But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours but by pure perfect intuition and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things But if it be the Truth of this proposition Deus est that you mean it supposeth that proposition to exist for quod non est non verum est and so to exist in God which is denyed And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of But if by Truth you mean nothing but Gods Essence that is not a Complex object which he speaketh of And he saith not that God knoweth suam essentiam creata vel futura but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est est Omnipotens Aeternus c. per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est So that it 's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propositions in it self and that antecedently to themselves and the Causes of themselves And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-sense to trouble themselves and the world with on false suppositions that Gods knowledge is such as ours or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it when we should tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain and pry into unrevealed things I have purposely been the larger on this instance to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastick Word-mongers who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis or Thoughts as real Divine entities and would perswade us that every nothing which they make a name for is therefore something yea some of them God himself What I have said of Divine Intellection I say of his Volitions of which cap. 20 21. Bradwardine saith that Voluta priora viz. Deum esse omnipotentem esse bonum cognoscentem c. sunt Causa But 1. It is too bold to say that Gods Will is an Effect 2. If it were so it must be his Essence Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will and not a Complex verity as Deus est omnipotens bonus est c. For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence Goodness c. is his Will in act se Velle which some call the third Person yet here would be no Cause and Effect but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity which hath no real diversity or priority SECT VI. Of Gods Knowledge and the Co-existence of the Creature 88. AUgustine well and truly saith that fore-knowledge in God is the same with the Knowledge of things present Past present and future through his Infiniteness and Eternity being alike to him even all as present 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity in which all the things of time are included and co-exist 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes ac
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
them that which they are deprived of So that this Language is not unfit while we speak of Moral Subjects and of God after our manner But in strict speech it cannot be proved that any Nothing is the proper object of a Volition of God 309. The opinion of Scotus and his followers is known this way And subtile Albertine To. 1. princ 4. qu. 4. p. 297. saith that Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Positivo velle negationes Resp Deum non See after the Additions of Divine Nolitions habere actum positivum non concurrendi sed negationem actus Volendi dare concursum efficacem â—uxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo se habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu positivo sed tantum negative se habet circa concursum efficacem dandi remedia illa per quae efficaciter impediretur peccatum Vid. caet 310. III. The third distinction is between Gods Love and Hatred his Volitions and Nolitions And this must be used But Hatred and Nolition in man have more of imperfection than Love and Volition importing some-what contrary to us and either hurtful troublesome feared or that possibly may be so Therefore we must confess here that we speak of God with greater impropriety and must disclaim the imperfection in the sense 311. But if you would not be abused into many errors swallow not the name Love and Hatred without distinction Lest the fore-cited reason of Pennottus cheat you viz. God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked Ergo he can decree or predestinate a man to salvation whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation And all rose from this falshood that Love is nothing but the Willing of salvation to us and so the same with Decree Whereas Love is also yea most properly a Complacency in Good as Good and Hatred a Displicency in Evil as Evil. Benevolence is sometime Antecedent and sometime an effect of this in man 312. IV. The Immanent and Transient acts I need say no more of 313. V. But Divines use to omit the next distinction of Transient D'Orbellis in 1. d. 4. Quando quaeritur utrum Electio vel Reprobatio rationem Meritoriam habeant hoc non intelligitur quantum ad Voluntatem divinam auâ—â—jus actum qui est Deus sed quantum ad transitum ejus super obâ—ectum seu quantum ad ordinationem ad ipsam Voluntatem acts so much that few of them let you know whether that which is but Objectively Transient be numbred by them with Immanent or with Transient acts Briefly 1. As Gods Will is the first efficient and with his Wisdom and Executive Power doth effect ad extra it is effectively Transient though Essentially Immanent in it self 2. But as Gods Will is as aforesaid the Final Cause or End of all things and willeth things only Complacentially supposing all that is Complacent to be Existent in esse reali vel in esse cognito so is it only Objectively Transient and not effectively and therefore by many is numbred with Immanent acts And as God may be said to know and will the creature in himself and to Love the Idea of it in himself the phrase is not to be blamed But as the Creature in it self considered by fore-knowledge or present knowledge if we may so distinguish is the object it seemeth unfit to call the act Immanent though it do nihil ponere vel efficere in objecto 314. But Gods Will as it effecteth Relations ad extra is even effectively Transient as well as that which altereth qualities e. g. his Pardoning Justifying Adopting acts of Will 315. VI. * * * How far Gods Volitions of creatures are free the subtilest confess to be unsearchable Vasquez ut supra in 1. Thom. q. 19. disp 80. p. 504. Licet assignemus in Deo libertatem comparatione facta cum objectis rebus creatis tamen non assignamus sufficientem rationem ex parte Dei cur nunc actu libero efficaci reseratur ad has potius quam ad illas Siquidem Idem omnino manens in sâ— poterat eas non velle quas vult Quare cum rem exactius enodare contendimus difficultatem praedi â—am eâ—adere nâ—â— possumus See more of him before Gods Natural Volitions are those which ex natura rei could not be otherwise that is All his Volitions of his own being and perfections To which some number natural necessary objects in the creatures As his Volition that Contradictions shall not be true that two and two shall be four or two more than one c. His Free Volitions are those which might have been otherwise as to the nature of the thing and as to the power of the Divine will Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures 316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten and the Holy Ghost freely proceed ariseth from the ambiguity of the word free which I will not trouble you with 317. Yet all agree that Gods Volitions are all eternall and therefore eternally necessary necessitate existentiae 318. And some think it best to say that they are respectively to be called both Necessary and Free Because Gods will chose that which his wisdom saw was Best and he must necessarily choose the Best But we must not be here too bold in our Conclusions 319. VII The distinction of an efficient and permissive Will is no better nor other than that of a Volition and no Volition But to distinguish the Efficient and Permissive Act implyeth a falshood That Permission as such is an Act. 320. Yet Gods Law may be said to have a permissive Act that is He may declare This I permit you to do or leave indifferent as to political permission And as to Physical permission I have shewed before that some positive removal of Impediments are sometimes called non impedire or permission But permission it self as such is no act 321. VIII The distinction of Vol. Beneplaciti signi is old and common But not a distinguishing the Acts of Gods will but rather his Volitions from the signs of them For it is his Voluntas beneplaciti that there shall be such signs 322. The five signs commonly named by the Schoolmen are Praecipit ac prohibet permittit consulit implet And the older Schoolmen say that these are called Gods Will Metaphorically only yea by a remote sort of Metaphor they being not mans will properly but metaphorically Aqu. 1. q. 19. art 11 12. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. A. Voluntas Dei sumitur Proprie tunc signat divinum beneplacitum quod non est aliud quam ipse Deus volens 2. Impropriè metaphorice pro aliquo signo ejus c. only when applyed to man and accordingly called Gods will But some of the latter say that they are proper signs of Gods real will The truth is they that first used this distinction
every Man his Right and Due is included 338. It is not Gods will without the sign as is said nor the sign without his will but the sign as notifying and his will as notified that is a Law and Jus the Effect Gods will is the principal Cause and quasi Anima Legis and the sign is the instrumental Cause and quasi Corpus 339. The Sign reâ—pecteth these things 1. The matter due 2. The dueness or right 3. The will of God concerning or constituting it 4. The mind and will of man to whom this is signified Or 1. Gods will as the Efficient of Right 2. The matter and form of Right as Constituted 3. The mind and will of man as the terminus 340. These signs of Gods will are 1. Natural called the Law of Nature which is the Natura ordo rerum especially ipsius hominis as before described 2. By extraordinary Revelation The latter have the great advantage of plainness significandi rem praeceptam The former hath the fuller evidence of its Author and Original that it is indeed of God Both are his Laws to man 341. Laâ— Judgement and execution the three parts of Government differ in that 1. Law maketh the Debitum or Jus 2. Judgement determineth It is of great use for a Divine who handleth Gods Laws to understand the nature of Laws in genere as Suarez in praes de Legib. sheweth which Book is one of the best on that Subject that is extant among us of it by decâ—sive application 3. Execution distributeth according to it 342. The Jus vel Debitum instituted by the Law is twofold 1. A Subditis What shall be Due from the Subjects the Debitum Officii 2. Subditis what shall be Due to the Subjects viz. 1. Antecedently to their merits which is 1. The act of our Governing Benefactor 2. Or a Divider such was the Law for dividing the Israelites inheritances 2. Consequently which is by the Retributive part of the Law commonly called the Sanction which is 1. By the Premiant part what Reward shall be due 2. By the Penal what Punishment 343. Accordingly Laws have several parts 1. Precept and Prohibition making Duty 2. Retributive 1. Premiant 2. Penal called Gods Promises and Threats 3. And subservient or accidental 1. Narratives Historical Chronological c. 2. Pure Donations 3. Prophesies 4. Doctrinal 5. Exhortatory 6. Reprehensive c. 344. Though Debitum vel Jus facere be the formal operation of a Law which is to be Fundamentum Relationis yet the Act of the chief parts preceptive or penal is commonly called Obligation And so many say that obligare aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is all the action of a Law But Obligare is a Metaphor and therefore in dispute to be laid by or to give place to the proper terms And the Premiant act is not properly called obligation nor the penal act save in a secondary notion as he is â—bligatus ad poenam ferendam if judged who is first Reus poenae or to whom it is made Due by the Law 345. The â—bligation aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is not of equality in the disjunctive As if God were indifferent which we chose But it is primarily ad obedientiam and but subserviently ad poenam as a means against future disobedience and a securing the ends of Government in case of sin 346. But the Preceptive and the Premiant parts are each chief or final in several respects God Commandeth us a Course of Duty or Right action to this end that we may be Happy in his Love And he promiseth us first and giveth us after in foretaste this Happiness to draw us to Duty 347. But here is a wonderful inseparable twist and in the main an Identity God Ruleth us as a Father or Regent Benefactor All his Benefits are Free-gifts as to the Thing and Value But given 1. In an Order 2. And the rest as means to the ultimate In which respects they are a Reward or means to it His very Law is a Gift and a great Benefit Duty is the means to keep his first Gifts and to receive more The very doing of the duty is a receiving of the Reward the object of duty being felicitating As if feasting or accepting offered wealth or honour were our work Holiness is happiness in a great part And in our End or state of perfection all will be one To Love God Rejoice in Him and praise him will be both our duty and felicity means and end as it were in one 348. Whereas some say that if there were no Law sin would deserve punishment it is an errour For it is due only by Law But it 's true Of all the following distinctions note these words of Bonavent in 1. d. 4â— a. 1. q. 1. Voluntâ—â—em Dâ—i Antecedentem sâ—â— Conditionalem possiblâ—e â—â—â—â— non impleri at consequentem absolutam nequâ—â—uam Sâ—â—unâ—um Daâ—â—sc Voluntas benâ—pâ—aciti â—t â—apl Antecedens seu Conditionales consequous qua vult quantum in sâ— est omnium salutem alsoluta sive consequens quâ— determinate vult aliquid qâ—â—d noâ—it certitudin 〈…〉 Intelligendum â—â—â— nâ—llam Dei Voluntatem pâ—sse superari aut cassari Aliquam tamen posse non impâ—eri â—t antecedentem Aliqâ—â—m ut consequentem impossibile â—sse noâ— impleri â—â—â— impediâ—i Non â—tiam possibilâ— est Voluntatem Dei cassari Nam cassam diâ—itur aliquid dum priâ—â—tur eâ—â—ectu pâ—â—â—â—io ad quem est Voluntas autâ—â— nullo privatur esseciu ad quâ—m est pâ—â—pâ—ie Nam quod dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homiâ—â—s salvos fieri quantâ—m in sâ— est haec Voluntas non connotat salutem nec proprie est ad effectum salutâ—s sed connotat ordinatioâ—â—m naturae sive naturâ—m ordinabilâ—n ad salutâ—n â—â—â—â— niâ—il plus est diâ—â—re Deus vult istum salâ—â—â— fieri quantum in se est qâ—â—m Deâ— placuit dare isti â—â—â—â—ram per quam posset pâ—â—â—â—â—ire ad saâ—uâ—em quod Deus paraâ—â—â— esset juâ—â—re ita quod salus non deficit propâ—er deseâ—tum à pâ—nte Dei Therefore it connoteth also all the helps which God affordeth men that it 's due by the meer Law of Nature without any superadded Positive Laws 349. Gods will called Legislative or Governing is ever fulfilled in strict sence that is So much as is Gods part and the Laws part to do is ever done e. g. God saith Perfect obedience c. shall be Adams duty and it is done It is his Duty whether he will or not He saith To steal shall be sin and it is sin He saith He that believeth shall have right to Justification and Glory and he that believeth not shall be Filius mortis that is Death and Hell shall be his Due and so it is Thus strictly all Gods Will is done 350. But in the secondary remote sence every sin violateth the Will of God by breaking his Law For when he saith Obedience shall
a Means 2. Making one little parcel of that means to be the end 3. Inserting two acts or parts only of that which they themselves confess to be but Means For what should the names of Salvation and Damnation do in the description of the end Are they any part of the end Why is not Redemption Justification Sanctification Preservation Resurrection c. as well put in Is he not Glorified in them as well as in final salvation or damnation Yea and in Creation and the frâ—me of nature too Yea why is not the glory of Angels and all the world put in as part of the same means to his end 406. If it be said that it is only Gods Glory of Mercy and Justice in menâ— salvation and damnation which is the end of Redemption Conversion Preaching Ordinances Sanctification Adoption c. 1. I deny it His Power Wisdom and Goodness and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means 407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate ends than one And undoubtedly the means consisting of innumerable parts make up one perfect whole in which Gods Glory shineth so as it doth not in any part alone And he that will cut Gods frame into scraps and shreds and set up the parts as so many wholes will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture or a Watch or Clock or House or the pipes of an Organ or the strings of a Lute and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly Well therefore did Dr. Twisse reduce all the Decrees de mediis to one But they are one in their apt composition for one end And the Glory of Sun and Stars and Angels and the whole Creation is a part and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part 408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is onâ—y fit for our debate Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert And about this our Controversie is next to none at all Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius quid superius quid inferius c. and that to our edification 409. Seeing then that we are agreed as is said with Aquinas that * * * Ruiz de Voâ—â—n Dei disp 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius â—olitionis divinae sed solius denominations extrinseâ—ae resultantâ—s ab eâ—â—â—â—lis creatâ—â— sequitur â—anas esse plurimaâ— Thâ—oâ—ogorum de ordine dependâ—â—tia vel ratione diviâ—â—â—um volitionum post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem dependentiam vâ—l rationâ—m habeant externa objecta inter se The conscquent is true They are vain indeed though he deny it And all his reasons p. 161 162 c. to prove that dantur iâ— creatâ—â—a rationes finales moventes divinam voluntatem are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa having before confessed that there is no Real Cause And are there Causes that are not Real 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will and the object is bâ— some called the material cause of the act in â—â—â—â—â—â—â—â— numero 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx 3. It may therefore â—e causa materialâ—s of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in patiente ex diâ—ersitate dispositions 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volitions 5. And may be second Causes of other effects 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man 7. Where our acts are not causes they may be conditions sine quibus non of many of Gods acts quoad effectus as sin is of punishment at least 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects which therefore are the Ratio nominâ—â— And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause the will of God or any of his acts as in himself must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theologie at least He citeth Durand Major Richardus c. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours ut n. 7. and not â—uxta rei veritatem Richard is full for what I say 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur non est aliud Velle aliud Esse But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut velle it is his Essence but to say Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est Et Voluntas Dei est prima summa Causa omnium cujus Causa non est quaerenda non est diversa Voluntas sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis And Richardus in loc p. 141. saith but this that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva cum realiter idem sit quod Deus Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti Which is no more than I have said And as to Major Ruiz did ill to cite him who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis denominatio extrinseca as to God And his ordo signorum in mente divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to mans Deus non propter hoc vult hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc that which we have to do is but to enquire 1. De re how one thing is a Cause or other means of another 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be 410. And 1. It is agreed that the Creation was Gods first work that we know of or have any thing to do with This had as to the first part no Antecedent Object but produceth its effect which some call its object But the latter dayes works had an antecedent object and also a produced effect And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work From whence by connotation that may be called his first Decree 411. That sin or the Permission of sin or other meer Negatives are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees I am anon in due place to
noxious evils we must not ascribe such Imperfections to God but only such Nolitions as his Actions as Rector per Leges Judicia have made to signifie no imperfection as being not contra nocumenta but only contra injurias as against himself contra nocumenta as against his creatures i. e. contra peccatum And now I may answer the solitary argument of Vasquez mentioned in the Margin that non entia non dare gratiam non impedire peccatum c. may have aliquam rationem boni amabilitatis and so may be Willed Loved or Decreed Answ 1. In meer Naturals Negations are not properly any way good or evil but Privations are Natural Evils and not good 2. To be occasio sinè qua non of good as sickness is of the Physicions honour and sin of Gods is not any true ratio boni vel amabilis The bonum amabile is only the good that on that occasion is done The occasion is neither efficient constitutive or final cause of any good nor any causal proper medium 3. In Morals meer Negations are neither good nor evil nor have any Morality but only Positives and Privations 4. In morals God judicially doth that whence Penal privations follow and he may penally non agere non dare gratiam to execute his Law and demonstrate his truth and Justice on sinners and occasion the perception of his mercy to others And here the non-agere non-dare permittere being loco materiae volitae may after our mode be said to be Volita seu decreta bona But properly it is not the non-entity that is bonum or Volitum but the positive Law and Judgement and the relatio debiti pâ—nae and the ratio poenae in the privation and the demonstration of truth justice holiness c. therein 5. But sinful privations that is sinful Volitions nolitions or non-Vâ—litions of the Creature are not properly per se or per accidens propter se vel propter aliud good or amiable or willed or decreed of God And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of sin because he cannot be Causa deficiens must mean as much or speak impertinently and deceitfully It is not impertinent which Judicious Strangius saith Lib. 3. c. 13. p. 677 678. If Scientia Media be an useless conceit how much more cum extenditur ad ejusmodi infinitas vanissimas connexiones rerum disparatarum quae nunquam futurae sunt He instanceth in many and addeth De hac re Ariaga disp to 1. d. 21. sect 7. dicit non sibi videri in Deo esse scientiam harum quia talis scientia videtur plane impertinens Ad quid enim nosceret Deus quid Chimaera esset factura sub tali conditione impossibili c. Et ipse D. Twissus de Scient Med. p. 472. Si plures Angelos Deus condidisset certe decrevisset ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujusmodi Deo decenter tribui potest c. I know the case is not just the same with that before us but the reason is the same for both But still I profess that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to assign him positive Volitions of every negative I shall concurr with them that do and extend Gods Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow And say of them as Judicious Blank doth of Gods knowledge De Concord lib. cum decret 1. n. 64. Saltem ille minus periculose errat qui putat Deum scire ea quae forte scibilia non sunt quam qui negat Deum scire quae revera scit quae intra Divinae omniscientiae objectum continentur So here so be it that God be not feigned to will sin I contend the less against them that say He positively willeth Infinite numerical Nothings and his own non-acting ††††††Bradward l. 1. c. 13. Cor. 10 11. brings in too profoundly like one of Thom. Anglus his Ergo's that God is the Causa prima of every nothing non esse because he is so of negations As if Nothing could be an effect and have a Cause or as if a negative conception or proposition were not something viz. a Thought or a Word as well as an affirmative Such workmen make the world with words 509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I pass by other School-controversies here and only propound to each mans Conscience whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God 2. And that about his secret unsearchable Volitions 3. And of such acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cause of sin be not on the far unsafer side than he that only saith Quae supra nos nihil ad nos If these be not certainly false they are certainly unproved and therefore not to be here received 510. And I say here as Buridane saith about the forementioned nature of Liberty Ethic. li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. Simpliciter firmiter credere volo quod Voluntas caeteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibuâ— potest in actus oppositos Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles specialiter in his quae fidem tangere possunt aut mores Qui enim credit se omnia scire in nulla opinionum suarum decipi fatuus est De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter praesentata formabuntur centum rationes vel quaestiones de quibus contraris sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus erit alter ipforum vel ambo Ideo non miror si in hac altissima materia non possum per rationes solutiones satisfacere mihi ipst 511. To proceed in the application * * * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. Sunt non-nulli Thomistae qui tam severe hanc sequuntur opinionem ut affirment â—undem ordinem servasse Deum in reprobatione quem in praedestinatione tenuit scil ut ante praevisa peccata sola sua Voluntate decreverit quosdam à regno Coelorum excludere licet non ad poenam sensus destinaverit Deinde quos voluit excludere permiserit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno sicut decreverat Et c. 2. Parum ab hac sententia dissert Scotus qui qu. 1. d. 41. asserit in Deo duplicem esse Reprobationem alteram vocat Punitivam alteram permissivam Et punitivae dari causam ex praevisis peccatis factam fuisse Permissivae non dari causam quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum nulla ex parte illius datur causa hujus enim solum nititur Scotus causam negare Hinc ordinem hune in mente Divina assignat c. ut alibi Scotum sequuntur Bassolis Corduba c. Objicit Bradward Privationes ut eclipses mors c. habent
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
move another to do it will not stand with proper permission 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting Answ 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin and not to Will-nill-it 2. If you mean more I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and phâ—sical premoving predetermination of the first cause 3. But if all this were so it 's nothing to the present case and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin but only that man is a Cause also caused by the first Cause and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness than to Will it and to predetermine the will of man to it besides commanding it which is a moral act and we speak only of proper efficiency He doth but will that Holiness be and cause all that hath any entity in it And so they say he doth about sin 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self and so he doth not sin Answ The first is denyed by themselves if you speak of Gods end For they confess that God only is his own end for which he loveth all things 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both if he equally will the existence of both Object But he hath a Complacence in Good only Answ 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will he hath a complacency in it The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is as it is the fulfilling of his own Will And to break his Law they make to be such ergo pleasing 2. But if it were not so that 's nothing to our Case of the efficient Will 588. 4. To avoid tediousness in sum This opinion seemeth to me to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei which is Veracitas Divina and leaveth no certainty of any word of God For if he do will and predetermine by premotion ut fiat omne mendacium quod fit then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles 2. It maketh the Scripture false which saith so much of Gods hatred and unwillingness of sin 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness which is made the great reason of our holiness 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness but a common or indifferent thing 5. It maketh sin so little odious as being a Divine off-spring as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sorrow repenting confession and all practice of means against any sin 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world and did and suffered so much to save men from sin and to destroy it 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell and that God will damn men for ever for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination unavoidably 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God and more For Satan can but tempt us to sin but they make God absolutely to will that it be and physically to predetermine us to it And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil the father of lies malice and murder should come to destroy the work of God 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline and purity and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue good and bad in the Common-wealth 589. Now to their arguments 1. Rev. 17. 17. God put it into their hearts to do his will and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast Answ 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome with the effects will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed and not the sin 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts whether pride covetousness cruelty c. but only to do his pleasure and agree or make one decree to give up c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts which with their own sins would have that effect which he willed If a thief have a will to rob God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way 590. But for brevity besides what is said I shall farther direct the â—mpartial Reader how to answer all such objections And withall let the â—onfounding cavillers against distinguishing see what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter for want of one or two distinctions which â—onfused heads regard not 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin from the nature 2. And â—emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary by privation or position of Volitions 3. Distinguish between the Act as it â—s Agentis and as it is in Passo 4. And between the Act and the effect 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes making a compound effect 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the â—ontrary and one forbidden object compared with another 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin or the Act as Acted and as Received Adultery Murder Theft usually signifie the Acts of the Adulterer Murderer Thief as done and as received â—n Passo and as effecting 2. That the former only is the sin viz. first the Volition Nolition or Non-Volition and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will And no more The reception of this act in Passo is not sin as such nor the most immediate effect of this act It is but the effect of sin 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes a Good and bad And so God may be a cause of that effect which mans sin also concurreth to cause And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden though both make the act sinful and yet
but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
of the effects and consequents of them But doth this signifie God willed your malice or your act God did bruise Christ which signifieth that he was a concause of his death but not that he willed or Caused the Jews to will or act his death And so of the rest 629. The rest of his instances are such as I have answered before or as the former answers fully invalidate And therefore I will not weary my self and the Reader with them 630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he asserteth that Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory and that not per accidens but per se Because sin by how much the worse it is in genere mali inhonesti by so much the better and fitter means it is in genere boni utilis conducibilis to Gods glory c. All which I have before confuted and think not his defence of it worth repeating 631. Many assertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the false supposition that Sin is a medium per se of Gods glory and the unproved supposition that God positively willeth the Permission of it which is nothing whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order and much other vanity And still they confound sin in esse reali which is no medium with sin in esse objectivo which may be a part of holiness and no sin at all 632. Cap. 19. he argueth God useth men and devils in the very act of sinning as his instruments viz. to punish to try to humble c. ergo he willeth the event that they sin Resp Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words instruments and useth Properly an Instrument is an efficient cause moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue And so a sinner in and by the Act of sinning is no Instrument of God For God moveth him not to that Act as specified or circumstantiated so as is prohibited And being not at all so moved by him as David to murder Urias and to vitiate his Wife he is not properly thus his Instrument But sometimes the word Instrument signifieth a presupposed Agent whose Action another can improve to his own ends As the wind and water are improperly called the Millers Instruments of turning his Mill and the spring and poise are the Clock-makers Instruments of moving his Clock or Watch and a Mastiff Dog is my Instrument to keep away Thieves and a Greyhound is my Instrument to kill a Hare and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet and a Hawke to catch a Partridge c. And yet we cause not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind or Water but we can hinder the Water nor the nisus of the spring nor the gravitation of the poise but set the recipients so as that the effect shall be done as we would have it nor cause we the fierceness of the Mastiff the inclination or motion of the greyhound ferret hawk c. but only tye them up and let them loose as our ends require But zeal maketh some men deride that God should be said to be no more the cause of sinning and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer or at least a will to use it without willing and causing the thing which he forbiddeth 2. And the word using signifieth sometime using by motion as I do my pen and sometime by ordination and adjoyning some concause or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as aforesaid as we use wind water dogs hawks Thus only sinners by sinning are Gods used instruments supposing his natural concurse and support And they are not his Instruments thus neither in the same sence as these creatures are ours For their fierceness craft inclination action is good and we do and may will it for our ends But sin is not good And therefore God willeth not it at all but only the consequent of it or effect And that Effect is not Good as it is the effect of sin but as God setteth in and causeth the same effect which a sinner causeth as in generation per concubitum illicitum But when God willeth and causeth the effect and foreseeth and permitteth the sinful Volition and act which concurreth to that effect such a sin is improperly called his used instrument or medium but properly is none 633. To Gibieuf and others saying that God acteth not by sin as an instrument and willeth it not but the effects he answereth that It 's absurd because the sin it self is castigatory and hath such like effects and therefore God need not will that effect as after it But all this is from the fore-noted confusion It is not only the distant effect but the very immediate effect which is the Act it self ut recipitur in passo which God sometime is said to Will As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away and that Christ were killed and that Malchus eare be cut off and that Paul be scourged and smitten on the mouth and that the Apostles were oft imprisoned c. And yet God only foreseeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent which he forbiddeth 634. And here note that when the name of the Effect or Passion connoteth the sinfulness of the Act then it is less meet to say that God willeth it As to say that he willeth that we be persecuted murdered slandered belyed c. But if any will so speak they must mean only the Passion as distinct from the action And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi 635. To those that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of sin the effect being more to be ascribed to the Principal Cause than to the instrument he first ill-applyeth some frivolous distinctions and instanceth thus The hangman as the Judges instrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge Ergo the Judge much more in revenge Non sequitur Putting in Revenge which is but a Cause as if it had been the Effect which was in question And thus The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable ergo nor the striker Non sequitur As if the question had been of the Negation of an effect and not of the position of it And thus If two servants role a stone one being commanded and one forbidden one being father to the other The Son forbidden roleth it unlawfully ergo the father commanded much more non sequitur Resp 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the same act because the effect is the same which is notoriously false unless de specie 2. Whose Instrument do you suppose the Son to be If the Fathers it is because the Father commanded him contrary to the Master And if so the argument is good The Sons act was a fault who obeyed ergo the fathers more who commanded him saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument because he can disobey But Gods premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us 636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true
answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
what they are All created Justice and Holiness is such that is Good for Goodness is their essence because Gods efficient will made them so And then Gods final will taketh complacency in them or Loveth them because they are so But if they talk of Goodness or Justice c. as it is in God there is in him no effect and so no cause of himself or any thing in himself 642. But some things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation and Ordination of the World without any other Law And these are called Duties by the Law of Nature because the very Natura rerum is a Law that is a signification of Gods will constituting mans duty It is mans essence to be an Intellectual-free-agent It is impossible that such an agent Created of God should not be Gods Creature and Gods own and dispositively a Moral governable agent and that he should not owe God all that he is and hath and can do and that God should not have the Jus Dominii Imperii over him and Jus ad summum ejus Amorem * * * Deus non posset obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur sibi non obedire Quaero enim an tenetur obedire an non si sic habetur propositum quia tenetur non tenetur quod est impossibile Consequentia patet Quia teneri non obedire est teneri ad aliquid Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T. Yet after he thinketh it possible for God to have made a Reasonable creature not obliged As if his very nature were not obligatory His instance of the Mad is vain for they are not actually Reasonable Ockam presumptuously concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious it being no contradiction His follower Greg. Arim. confuteth him And Cameracensis invalidateth the confutation and leaveth it doubtful But it is a contradiction to be a man and not obliged by Nature to Love God And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him and yet stante natura bound to hate him And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy It is a contradiction to be a Created Man and not Gods Own and his obliged Subject and Beneficiary Therefore it is a contradiction that submission obedience and Love should not be his Moral duty and good and that self-alienation rebellion or disobedience and hatred should be no sins 643. To dispute then as he doth with Camero and his followers Whether it be good ex natura rei or by Gods meer free-will is a strange dispute and of most easie resolution Either they speak of Gods creating will or of some other subsequent Volition Man is made man by Gods free creating will And the foresaid Relations and duties are made such by making him Man And the duties of Love and Justice to others are made such by his Creators placing him in a world where his Neighbours are about him who are due objects as a part of the society This he himself confesseth pag. 329 330. like a Wheel in a Clock The Creators will is before Nature and therefore before natural duty as the Cause before the effect God could have made beasts instead of men who had owed him no more than beasts can do But from the Nature of a Man coexistent with God his said duties to God so necessarily result that it could not be otherwise nor did there need any subsequent act of Gods will to make that duty 644. But those that are not Duties by Nature must have moreover a Vid. Durand 1. d. 38. qi 4. n. 9 10 11. Scot. 3. d. 37. q. 1. Gabr. 3. d. 37. a. 2. Suarez de Legib. l. 2. c. 15. Aquin. 1 2. q. 94. a. 5. q. 100. a. 4. further act of Gods will as signified to make them so As the Mosaical Ceremonies our Sacraments c. 645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable towards one another because the very Nature and Natural Location or Order of the Things from which they did result are mutable And a word of God can make a change when yet before such antecedent mutation the duty must be duty still 646. As to Mr. Rutherfords oft saying that Omnis actus entitativus simplex est moraliter de se indifferens neque bonus neque malus And then that per actum simplicem he meaneth such as include not the object It is ludicrous or vain talk There is no such Act as hath not an object any more than physical form without matter Quicunque movet aliquid movet Quicunque intelligit aut vult aliquid intelligit aut vult vel seipsum vel aliud An Act without its object is but a partial or inadequate Generical conceptus of that Act which hath an object or an abstract partial notion of an act Why then doth he talk of that which is not Had he said that every act is in the first instant rationis or abstract-partial conception an Act in genere before it be intelligible as this or that act about this or that object he had spoken intelligibly as other men do 647. Such another question many called Arminians much use Whether Whether Justice c. be eternally good or have rationem boni aeternam Justice c. be eternally good Or An dentur rationes boni mali aeternae indispensabiles which needs no other solution than this last There is no such thing as an Universal existent per se and not in some Individual And so no such thing as Love Justice c. Bonum Malum which is not alicujus Justitia Bonum c. There was no Creature from Eternity being Just or unjust good or bad But Gods perfect Nature But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue truth justice c. which therefore analogically have the same name our holiness being Gods Image I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reason Because else we have no certainty that Gods word is true For all our certainty is hence that God cannot lye But if Veracity be not in God we cannot prove that And if he have not that which is eminenter Justice mercy c. how can we prove that he hath Veracity might be called Eternally Just in that he must necessarily be Just if he had been a governour And necessarily was Just when he freely became a governour And also this proposition was Eternally true if there were eternally propositions Si Homines existerent Justitia in ipsis debita foret quandocunque Homines fuerint Justitia in ipsis debita fuerit But when all the sense of these questions is no more but what Duties are natural and what superadded called Positive and what natural duties are immutable and what mutable it 's an unhappiness that the world must be troubled with such uncouth forms of speech as make the question unintelligible till unravelled 648. As to
a Liberty and not Gibieufs Amplitude It is not possible for a Creature to have any thing that 's good but of God nor any good from God but by meer free Gift as to the Good or Value though it be by rewarding Justice quoad ordinem conferendi and comparatively why this man hath it rather than that § 24. M. S. There is no stinting or determining unless you stop here at the first act An. I deny it There are three Opinions more that are all more probable The first which supposeth the Reward of life eternal due upon the over coming of the Devils first temptation which would have drawn from the Love of God And so Love and Conquer once was the Condition The second which supposeth that the Condition was the Conquest of this particular Temptation to eat of the forbidden Fruit and the after eating of the Tree of Life The third which supposeth the only Condition of life eternal to the personal perfect perpetual Obedience or perseverance till God of his own pleasure should translate Adam and end his life of trial I take this last to have far most probability for all the Reasons before given I am sure that the tenor of the Law of Nature made it Adam's Duty still to love God and obey him and resist all that was against it And I find no Promise that his Nature or the Law of Nature should be changed for this or that act or for conquering some one temptation I find that Christ's own Covenant-Condition was more than one act And the Condition of our Glory is overcoming and being faithful to the death and continuing in Christ And I will not add to the Covenant of God § 25. M. S. Arg. 4. From the nature of an obediental act which includeth the approving of the whole Law An. 1. Approving the things that are excellent is made consistent with wickedness Rom. 2. But I will suppose you to mean a full consent to the Covenant of Innocency But 2. How prove you that such consent was the whole condition of life and that it might not be fallen from and that Adam never did consent before his Fall and yet not sin 3. All the godly approve of Gods Law and consent to it and love it and yet merit not as keepers of it for they break it Rom. 7. 4. Yea Covenant-keeping to the last as well as Covenant-consent the first moment is now to us the condition of immutable Glory § 26. M. S. Adam would not obey at first but suspend while he looked about the World to see if there were any good sufficient for him below God Therefore he sinned not then An. This is before confuted He could not in that Integrity and after such divine Revelation be unresolved one hour whether he must first love and obey his Maker without sin § 27. God cannot freely give eternal life to a Creature without Reward for doing because the reasonable Creature was made for the Glory of Justice An. 1. You may say that God will not to man but not that he cannot nor that he doth not to any Angel For man was not made only for the Glory of Justice but of Power and Love or Goodness also 2. It 's certain that God as a free Benefactor giveth many good things freely and â—â— as a Reward for doing As 1. He so freely made all things good in the Creation and gave man all his antecedent good He so gave Adâ—â— his primitive Holiness and Helps and Paradise and all the Creatureâ— 2. He so gave Christ to the World without desert and so far pardoned the first sin as that cometh to 3. He so far gave man the Covenant of Grace 4. He so gave all Christ's Miracles Resurrection Doctrine the Scripture c. 5. He so gave Apostles and Ministry to the World 6. He so sendeth the Gospel to some Nations and Persons above others 7. He so giveth to many the first special Grace as he did to Paul 8. He so giveth to many Kingdoms and Persons Wealth and Health and Strength and such other mercies above others 9. He so giveth greater measures of Grace to some than to others 10. And it seemeth that he so in part giveth the same Glory to some that came in but at the last hour of the day It is certain that all in quantum tale is from God only as a free Benefactor or as the Amor primus And the order of distributing it is two-fold Some antecedent to mans merit or acts and independent on it And this is no Reward though sometime it is an antecedent act of Justice such as is the making of a good Law or Promise And some consequent juxta morman legis And these are Rewards And though God hath assured us now that no man shall have Heaven but by rewarding Justice yet that may be because he thought meet to place man first on Earth in a life of trial and undetermined Liberty But that he hath no Angel that was made Immutable or that Christ was not made immutably holy let them say that can prove it for I cannot § 28. M. S. It 's like that the Angels that stood and they that fell had unequal help for unequal Effects are of an unequal Cause But Adam and the Devils had sufficient Grace and God forsook them not till they forsook him An. 1. This last I accept as true and more than some will grant 2. The first is above our reach only we can say both that God giveth more Grace to some than to others freely 3. And yet he himself is simple and immutable in causing of various and mutable Effects § 29. M. S. By Christs passive Obedience imputed we are pardoned and â—ustified and by his active imputed we deserve the Reward and are under Gods approving Will. An. 1. By the merit of his habitual active and passive that is of his performing all his mediatorial Covenant with the Father we are pardoned and justified and adopted to eternal life principally as a Reward to Christ not to us as meriting by him and subordinately according to Gospel-Justice or Order as a Reward to Believers for their Faith and Obedience by him who will Reward every man according to his Works and will be glorified in his Saints and admired in Believers because they believed 2 Thess 1. 6 to 12. We are under Gods approving Will principally as united to Christ reconciled justified adopted and subordinately as sanctified and obedient For the Father loveth us because we have loved Christ and believed Joh. 16. 27. And it is life eternal to know the Father and the Son Joh. 17. 3. And because we do those things that are pleasing in his sight what-ever we ask we receive 1 Joh. 3. 22. § 30. M. S. By Christs imputed suffering we are but where we were For the Law to have nothing against us will not justifie us unless it have something for us An. This great question needeth distincter handling Adam's Law doth not
Will or Power as if he could do no more But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher sort are agreeable to his Perfection Wisdom and Liberty Higher action being used on higher creatures 3. Yet hath God placed and kept these free Agents not only under his Moral Government but also under his Dominion and disposal so that he will do with them as his own what he lift and none shall frustrate his disposing Will. 4. It pleased him first to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life and the contrary of Death 5. When Man had sufficient Grace to have kept this Law not sufficient to ascertain the event but sufficient Power to have stood that is as much Grace as was necessary to his standing sine qua non esse potuit cum qua esse potuit he broke it and sinned against that sufficient Grace before God either denyed him any thing necessary or withdrew any from him 6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of Man's Will is such as that it is made to use a Power which doth not necessitate or determine it self or is determined necessarily but freely And that it is no Deifying of the Will nor extolling it above its Nature to say that it can act or determine it self without Gods pre-determinating premotion or by that same measure of help which at another time doth not determine it Though its Nature and its Act as such be of God yet so is its Liberty too and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God the Will can act or not act or turn it self to this object or to that without more help than the said natural support and Concurse And this Power and Liberty is its Nature and Gods Image 7. From hence also it is evident that there is such a thing or operation of God as Grace Necessary called sufficient which is not effectual For God took no Grace away from Adam before he sinned nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to resist nor did he sin for want of necessary Grace but by that same degree of help might have overcome 8. God passing Sentence on faln Man for sin would not forgive him the temporal death nor common calamities of this life but cursed the creatures which he was to use as part of his penalty 9. But the Great evil which sin brought on man was the loss of Gods approbation and complacency and of his Spirits saving Communion and help and of Gods Image on man's Soul and of Communion with God herein and also his right to life eternal All which man 's own sin cast away and man was both the Deserver and Executioner without any change in God 10. Yet was all this privation penal in that God made Man such a creature as that his own sin should become his punishment or ruine if he committed it so that all Punishment is not determinatively of God though Gods Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cause As in argument God saith antecedently If thou sin thy own sin shall be thy torment and misery and man saith I will sin Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cause of the Conclusion My own sâ—â— shall be my torment and misery So it is in Causation God antecedently to man's sin doth resolve I will make Man such a Creature with such a Mind Conscience and Will as that his Holiness shall be his Health and Joy and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me and of his title to my spirit and Glory And that if he forsake me and his Holiness in the very Nature of the thing he shall lose all this Life Light and Love Joy and Communion and title to my Grace and shall feel the torments of his own Conscience telling him of his sin and loss This is Gods Antecedent Law Nay this is Gods Antecedent Creation to make man such a Creature Now if man sin his owâ— sin doth ipso facto become his misery and yet is not caused at all by Gods But yet that his Nature was made such as sin should prove a misery to was Gods Work And from that Antecedent Creation or Constitution the Relative form of a Punishment resulteth to the Sinner Even as God saith If thou Murder it shall be thy sin or Thou shalt not Murder And man doth Murder Here the Act that is sin is of man but that the Relation of sin belongeth to that act resulteth partly from the Law which forbiddeth it and yet God is not the Cause of sin though he Antecedently decreed Murder shall be sin if thou commit it So is it also with this sort of Punishment which is either sin it self or the effect or result oâ— sin immediately By which we see that when sin and punishment are found in one thing God is the Cause Antecedently of the formal Relation of a Punishment without being a Cause of the sin yea antecedently is some cause of the formal relation of the sin by his Law without causing any of the sin it self as the author of it As if God make man of such a temper as that surfetting drunkenness lust will make him sick and hazard his life Here God did no otherwise punish him than by making him such a man which he turned to his own destruction by his sin If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden that men may not steal his fruit and those that will shall â—rick themselves it is they that prick and punish themselves If God say He that will leap into the fire shall be burnt or into the water shall be drown'd it is they that do it that cause the evil and yet some formal relation of penalty may result to it from Gods conditional antecedent Law I say not that God executeth no other kind of punishment But these are the most common 11. Man having thus cast away Gods Image and his Innocency could beget a Child no purer holier or better than himself For he could not communicate that which he had lost So that our Nature is vitiated with Original sin and unhappy in the miserable effects Bradwardine hath a shift which serveth them that say man could do no good in Innocency without supernatural Help viz. Making that Help to be Gods Will that it shall be done But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the foundation of Nature working by natural means It 's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing 12. The promisory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceased with man's first sin cessante subditorum capacitate and so the Condition which is its modus So that no man ever since was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life
supposed in Gods Law which is the reason of our participation in his Sin and not any Will or Judgment of God without or beyond our Natural interest For else it should be God most properly who by his arbitrary imputation should either make us Sinners or repute us such when we are none But yet when we become Persons it is by Derivation from Adam and so the effect can be no better than the cause and as soon as we are Persons we are Guilty persons having Guilt with personality from him though we were not persons in him 3. So Christ is though not the Natural yet the Federal Adam or Root of Believers when he satisfied and merited we were not in him either as in Adam seminally as in a natural Generator nor as existent Persons nor did God falsly so repute us to be But he was then the Cause materially or had that Virtus effectiva which would Justifie and Sanctifie and Glorifie us in due time It was the Nature of Sinners though not a sinful Nature which he assumed But that Nature which he undertook was existent in his Individual person and no other Individual person was existent in his existent personal Nature So that when we say it was the common Nature of Man we mean only specifice that Nature which is of the same Species with all other mens but not that which existed individually in any but himself and a Species extra individuum is nothing but an ens rationis or a notion But it was individual Persons in whose stead or place Christ suffered and whom he undertook to Justifie Sanctifie and Save and gather into a holy Society to that end and to that end he undertook and performed his office and merited all this by his perfect righteousness So that hereby he made Himself a Federal Head and Root of a holy Society his Church And whenever any person doth Believe and is united federally to him he then receiveth the effects of that which was before in Christ as a Virtus effectiva The Law made to Adam or to us did not assign Christ to this office nor oblige him to suffer or merit for sinners according to it Therefore by so doing he fulfilled not the Law as it obliged us that is by that obligation nor suffered by that obligation which bound us to suffer But by the obligation of his own Consent and that Law which was peculiar to himself as to the formal obligation though materially he was bound by it to fulfill the Law of Nature and of Moses The Law of Innocency then or Works took not Christ for the Civil or Legal Person of such Sinner or Believer no more than it made him such 4. As Gods Law to the Mediator made him this office so Christ's Law of Grace doth quod jus Relationem give to every true believing Covenanter first Christ himself in union to be their federal Head and with him title to his Grace Spirit and Glory And now they are Personally and actually his federal Subjects Friends and Members and have right to all his conferred gifts 5. But this right floweth not immediately to them from what Christ did or suffered for them but from his Law or Covenant of Grace by which as his Donative and Ruling Instrument he conveyeth that title to them 6. And therefore they have no right before the Time nor any but on the Conditions and Measure specified in that Covenant or Law so that Righteousness is not theirs because it is Christs nor in the manner or measure and to the ends of the donation 7. This much containeth the matter of this Doctrine of the Collation and Imputation of Christ's righteousness still remembring that as no one till he was a Person could be a person-guilty of Adam's sin not when he was a person any sooner than he was also guilty of his own inherent pravity and none that had the use of Reason was guilty of either or both these only without the guilt of his own Actual Sin and all three together 1. Adam's sin justly imputed to us 2. And our innate Pravity 3. And our actual Sin are the parts which constitute our plenary guilt even so no one till he is a Believer is related as a Member of a Perfectly Righteous Saviour and that is done no sooner in time that he hath the Inherent Righteousness of his personal faith and federal consent and that obligeth him to the further active righteousness of a holy life and all these three conjunct though not co-ordinate make up the total Righteousness of a Saint viz. 1. Our Relation to Christ in Union as to a perfectly Righteous Head who fulfilled all righteousness for us to merâ—â— our Justification which is called Christ's Righteousness Imputed to us as being thus far reputed ours 2. And our penitent believing consent to his Covenant which is the condition of the foresaid Relation to Christ 3. And our after Sanctification and obedience to Christ's Law 8. And when we are commonly thus far agreed of the Matter if any will contend for their self-coyned phrases and words and not being content to call Christ our Redeemer Saviour Teacher King Priest Head Lord Teâ—â—ator Sponsor or Surety Ransom Price Sacrifice c. as the Scripture doth will needs plead that he is or was our Person or was holy obedient suffered in our Persons Legal or Civil or was our Substitute Delegate Instrument c. his contention will be both corrupting and dividing And yet I will acknowledge that among Lawyers the word Person hath so many senses that in some of them were they our way of speech here it might be said that Christ did in some things personate each Sinner or each believer limitedly in tantum ad hoc non simpliciter aut ad omnia And all verbal quarrel I would shun even with them that speak ineptly and dangerously and injuriously to â—he truth and Church so they will but by a sound and necessary explication vouchsafe us an Antidote against the hurtful tendency of their â—hrases 9. Obj. If Christ's person be given us then his personal Righteousness is given us with it Ans Yes as his Person is He is not given us as Proprietors and Lords to become our Own at our dispose Nor is his Person made one Person with each or any of us His Person is not turned â—nto ours nor ours into his As the Husband is not the person of the Wife nor the King of each Subject But as one that hath a Great Wise Learned Bountiful Holy King or Husband hath also his Greatness Wisdom Learning Bounty and Holiness as they have him that is As his perfections for their good as far as his Relation binds him but not as â—f his endowments were removed from him to them or falsly reputed to â—e in them or his person to be their persons so here as we have a Christ â—o we have a perfect Righteous Christ given us to be our federal Head when we believe
may be called 1. A Receiving Cause 2. And a mediâ—â— or dispositive Cause of the effect Justification as Received but not as Given As I said Dr. Twisse chooseth to call it But this causa Dispositiva is pâ—â— of the causa Materialis viz. Qua disposita A cause or more properly a condition why I receive Justification and by receiving it am Justified which is their meaning who call it A Passive Instrument that is A â—â—ceiving Instrument 199. The plain easie truth is that Faiths Nature which is to be â—â—lieving Acceptance of Christ and Life offered on that Condition being â—â— very essence is but its Aptitude to the office it hath to our Justification by which the Question is answered why did God promise us Christ and Life â—â— the Condition of faith rather than another Because of the congruity of its Nature to that office But the formal Reason of its office as to our Justification is Its Being the performed Condition of the Covenant And if God had chosen another condition a condition it would have been Now the true notion in Law being a Condition Logicians would call this improperly a Receiving cause and more properly A Receptive Disposition of the matter reducing it to Physical notions But the most proper term is the plainest We are justified by that faith which is the Believing Practical Acceptance of God the Father Son and Holy Ghost as Given us on that condition in the Baptismal Covenant because or as it is made by God the condition of his Gift thereby Understand this plain doctrine and you have the plain truth 200. They that say contrarily that Faith justifieth proximately as it is an Instrument or a Receiving Accepting act and not as a Condition of the Covenant do evidently choose that which they vehemently oppose viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere justifieth For the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere or the â—â—â—â— of Faith is to be an Acceptance of Christ given But if they will to avoid this say that By Faith they mean Christ believed in then they say that by Receiving Christ they mean not the receiving of him but Christ himself And why then do they not say so but trouble the world with such unintelligible phrases But to open the senselessness and coâ—sequents of that Doctrine would but offend All know that Chriâ—â—â—â— the object is connoted as essential to the act of Faith SECT XII How Repentance is joyned with Faith 201. Repentance is a Dispositio materiae recipientis too and a part of the condition of the Covenant And so far a Material or dispositive Receiving Cause But not an Acceptance of the Gift formally in its averting act 202. Faith and Repentance are words used in Scripture in divers significations Saith Malderus Gu. Amesius a parte recedit ab antiquo Calvinismo quiae requirit ad justitiam bonae operâ— tanquam conditionem praerequisitam quod â—tiam extendit ad ipsam â—lectionem See here how little the Papists understand us As Faith is sometimes taken for bare Assent as Jam. 2. and usually for Affiance or Trust and always when it denominateth a Christian or Justified Believer as such it essentially includeth all the three parts Assent Consent and Affiance but yet denominateth the whole by a word which principally signifieth One act which commonly is Affiance as including the other two so Repentance is sometime taken comprehensively for the whole Conversion of a Sinner to God the Father Son and Holy Ghost and so it includeth Faith in the narrower sence and is the same thing as Faith in the larger sence but express'd under another formal notion Sometimes it is taken more narrowly and that 1. As to the Act. 2. As to the Object 1. As to the Act and so the word Repentance signifieth only the Aversion of the Soul from evil by sorrow and change of mind And this is the strict formal notion of the word though usually it be taken more largely as including also the Conversion of the Soul to Good which is the usual Scripture and Theological sense though the word it self do chiefly signifie the Averting act 2. As to the Object 1. Repentance sometime signifieth the Turning of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God And so Repentance towards God is distinguished from Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ 2. And sometimes it signifieth only the turning of the Soul and life from some particular Sin 203. Repentance as it is the turning of the Soul from sin and Idols * The Papists take Repentance it self to be part of the Remission of Sins And let the Reader note for the fuller opening of what I have said of their darkness thereabouts that Jansenius Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. maketh four things to be inseparably conteined in Remission though distinguishable 1. The Conversion of the Soul to God 2. The abstersion of the Macula or filth 3. Reconciliation or the remission of Gods offence 4. The relaxation of the aeternal punishment That all these are then at once given us we are all agreed But whether the name Remission or Pardon of sin â—e meet for them all we disagree Is it not visible then how unhappily we strive about words wheâ— we talk like men of several Languages But all is but removation and remitting the penalty of which Gods offense is the first part And Macula is either the sin it self or the relative consequents to God is the same with Faith in God in the large Covenant-sence and includeth Faith in God in the narrower sence Repentance as it is our Turning from Infidelity to Christianity is the same with Faith in Christ in the large Covenant-saving-sence and includeth Faith in Christ in the narrower sence as it is meer Assent Repentance as it is a Turning from the Flesh to the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifyer is the same thing as our Faith in the Holy Ghost in the large Covenant sence and includeth Faith in the Holy Ghost in the narrower sence But when they are the same thing the ratio nominis or formal notion is not the same As man's mind is not so happy as to conceive of all things that are one by one entire single Conception so we are not so happy in our language as to have words enough to express things entirely by one name but we must have several words to express our inadequate conceptions by And so that is called Repentance as the Souls motion from the Terminus a quo which is called sometimes Faith or Affiance and sometimes Love from the motion of the Soul to the Terminus ad quem though the Motus be the same But when Faith and Repentance are distinguished as several parts of the Condition of the new Covenant the common sence is that Repentance signifieth the Conversion of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God which is or includeth Faith in God And Faith signifieth specially Faith in Christ as the Mediator and way
unus idemque per vitam totam esse non potest Non est satis quod dixi nisi illud etiam adjeceris qualis scopus hic esse debeat M. Antoninus li. 11. sect 21. p. 113. fruit of the Spirit that it is the very heart of the New Creature the sum of Sanctification as love is the sum of the Law So that to give the Spirit of Adoption to cry Abba Father and to sanctifie and to work in us the love of God and holiness are three phrases of the same signification in the Word of God 248. As Christ as Mediator is the summary means and way to the Father to bring man home to his Creator so Faith in Christ is a mediating Grace to work in us the love of God And as else-where I have oft said The bellowes of Faith kindling Love and Love working by holy Obedience Patience Mortification Gratitude and Praise is the substance of all true Religion 249. Love being the final Grace and Faith in Christ but a means to 1 Cor. 12. last 13. 1. 2. 2. Whether the habit of Love in patria be better than that of Faith and Vision in genere moris only or also in genere rei the School-men are utterly disagreed Cacere's sum Theol. 22. q. 5. a. 1. Utrum in sola charitate supernaturali sit amicitia hominis ad Deum Affirm Quia Dâ—us ut aâ—â—hor natura non ea communicat quae sunt propria ejus sed solum esse naturale potentias quae c. The Reason is not so good as the Assertion Vid. Bradward li. 1. c. 1. cor 30. Contra indoctos artis amandi nâ—scientes Deum esse propter seipsum amandum câ—tera propter Deum omnesque actus humanos ad ipsum propter se finaliter ordinandos ipsumque esse super omnia diligendum and his following proof that God is not to be sinned against in the smallest of his Precepts or in the smallest thing to avoid the greatest pain oâ— obtain the greatest good imaginable it the end must needs be more excellent than the means as such And thus Paul giveth the pre-eminence to Love 250. And no wonder if he prefer it also for duration For Love is Heaven or felicity it self yea somewhat higher than felicity as such For as God is our End for and in himself above the ratio foelicitatis so God is our End as he is to be loved And God the Ultimate Object and Love the Ultimate Act and Gods Love communicated perfectly to us and Gods Will pleased in all this are the inadequate Conceptions which make up the Ultimate End supposing the perfection of Nature and of the Intellect in the sight of God as subservient hereunto 251. Man therefore hath a degree of fruition or attainment of his Ultimate End in this life so far as he hath a delightful love of God Though this be but the foretast and First-fruits 252. Therefore it is not by Faith only that we know what Heaven is and are drawn to seek it and hope for it but also by this earnest and foretast of love which worketh by a spiritual gust and sweet inward experience The Intellect first hath Faith and the Will hath Love And a promise and earnest is more a promise alone 253. When Faith hath wrought this holy Love in the Soul it doth as much if not more to keep us from Apostacy than Faith it self Therefore many unlearned Christians by the power of holy Love stand fast when subtile disputing Doctors may cleave to the world and fall away 254. Though it be an ill expression of those School-men that say Love is the form of every Grace that which I suppose they mean is true that love being the final Grace the rest as they are means to it or the effects and expressions of it are what they are partly in that Relation The means is a means only by its Aptitude to the end And is never loved as such for it self but for the end And what the effect hath it hath from its efficient Cause And it is true that no Faith no Fear no Obedience no Praise no Suffering is further accepted of God and a part of true Holiness nor will prove our Salvation than it participateth of predominant love to God But this predominant Love is always an evidence of Life 255. Qu. What if a man should by Faith in Christ be brought to the love of God and after fall away from Faith in Christ and yet retain his love to God would that love save him Ans When you can prove that ever there was such a man I will answer you Till then such false suppositions are no otherwise to be answered than by telling you that if God should permit a man to fall from Christ that man would lose the Spirit of Christ and the sight and sense of all Gods Love and Goodness manifested in Christ and in all the Work of Redemption And therefore he would lose the love of God 256. How far Holiness is the design of Christianity I have opened in a small Tractate on that Question And how far Sanctification is to be preferred before Pardon as such and yet Christ's Glory in pardoning us I have shewed there and in my Confession and therefore will not here repeat it SECT XVIII Of Perseverance and the certainty of it in order to certainty of Salvation and true Comfort 257. No man can be further certain of his final Salvation than he is certain of his perseverance in Faith and Love 258. Therefore it is a small number of Christians comparatively that ever were certain of their Salvation For 1. No one that is uncertain of his sincerity is certain of his Salvation 2. No one that holdeth this Doctrine That the Saints that are justified may fall away and that we cannot be sure of perseverance can be sure of his own Salvation It 's hard to conceive how he can be certain who holdeth that no man can be certain Now those that hold this Doctrine are almost all the Papists the Arminians the Lutherans and as far as I can learn by their Writings all the ancient Writers for a thousand years after Christ And the Semipelagians and Pelagians no man will put in as an exception except Jovinian alone against whom Jerome writing his second Book chargeth him as holding that a man truly baptized by the Spirit could not sin No doubt he meant to damnation or mortally But it 's doubtful what his Opinion was Augustine's report of him is of no great moment who as Erasmus noteth in his Argum. in Hier. adv Jovin neither had seen Jovinians Book or Hieorm's but spake by report And Austin Prosper and Fulgentius thought that all the Elect persevered as Elect being chosen to perseverance but that more were truly sanctified justified and in a state of Salvation had they so died than were elect That all these fell away and perished That no man could be certain whether or no he were
the least degree or first of true saving Grace is sometimes lost finally and such perish But 2. That they who obtain confirming Grace by a greater degree do never lose it For so the Angels and Adam fell from the first degrees for want of Confirmation And many think though it is not proved that had they overcome in the first or some more tryal they should have had confirming Grace for a reward And the good Angels are confirmed whether by reward or meer gift or nature we know not 2. This would save Christians from that uncomfortable thought I must go further thâ—â— ever such and such a one did who fell away and had lived strictly and suffered patiently or else I cannot be saved For if this be true a man may be saved who goeth no further or not so far as some have done that sell away 3. This will keep men from security and presumption in a state of weakness and keep them in a necessary fear of falling away that they may avoid it 4. And yet it provideth a certainty of perseverance and Salvation for strong Christians who are and perhaps they only fit for it and capable of it 5. And it tendeth thereby to make men long for and press towards a strong confirmed state I only say that if this Doctrine be or were true it hath or would have these conveniencies 331. And I will boldly say that as I before said The weakest Christians are not ordinarily capable of present certainty of Salvation so the weakest or worst sort of true Christians are morally unfit for it 1. He that sinneth as much as ever will stand with Grace and as ever he dare for fear of losing all is under so great obligations and necessity to be humbled to fear to be penitent and deeply sensible of his great ingratitude that he is not fit for the joy of Assurance of Salvation and therefore not fit for assurance it self He that is certain to be saved must rationally be full of Joy which is unseasonable to one that must lye in the tears of deep humiliation 2. And such a one that loveth God and Christ and Goodness in the weakest measure consistent with Salvation must have all other Graces and comforts proportioned hereto or else there will be a monstrous inequality But certainty of Salvation is a degree of applicatory Hope quite above that very little Faith and Love and Obedience of such a one 3. And this certainty must be the effect and product of other Graces Faith and Love c. And a feeble Cause will not bring forth an effect so much stronger than it self 4. Gods Wisdom in Government will not encourage even a child in fits of contempt neglects or disobedience by such Assurance How can he more Reward and Encourage the best And if every true Christian should have certainty of Salvation when he sinneth as fouly as frequently as grosly and liveth as slothfully as ever will stand with sincerity it would tempt such to go on in Sin and be no better 5. God hath his castigatory punishments for sinful Children Even to death it self sometimes and much desertion And who should have such corrections but the worst of his Children But the certainty of their their Salvation useth not to suit with such correction and desertion or at least is forfeited in such a case Lastly experience telleth us that it is not Gods will that the worst of his Children no nor any but the better sort should have such Assurance For 1. De facto they have it not 2. And in the nature of the thing it is quite out of their reach SECT XXIII More necessary Concessions 332. But yet all this is not enough to prove that any of the justified do totally or finally fall away The controversie must not be decided by arguments from convenience but by Scripture assertion where the difficulty is very great because no small number of Texts seem to favour both the opinions the reconciling of which is not the work of every ordinary understanding Those that are brought for the certain Perseverance of all the justified may be seen in Zanchy's Disputes with Marbachius the first hot and high agitation of this controversie as a matter of great moment and necessary determination which I remember to have found among us And those on the other side Bertius Thompson and the Arminians commonly have collected My own opinion about it I have so largely shewed in a Book called My present Thoughts of Perseverance before-mentioned that I need not here again deliver it Though between that and this last opinion as wise a man as I may be in doubt when he hath done his best for a satisfactory resolution 333. I take Augustine's opinion so far as it is for Perseverance to be a certain Truth viz. That All the Elect shall certainly persevere and that the Grace of Perseverance is the consequent of Election and not Election the consequent of foreseen Perseverance unless you mean only that part of Election which determineth of Glorifying and exclude that which decreeth to give Perseverance But the difficulty is about the non-elect And it is most probable that where God decreeth Perseverance he decreeth to give Grace suitable thereto As when he decreeth the Immortality of the Soul he giveth it a Nature apt for Immortality And therefore that such have Confirming Grace But the controversie is whether all true Grace do so confirm 334. That an Argument cannot be fetcht for Perseverance from the meer Nature of the Grace received seemeth plain by Adam's fall and probable from the Angels 335. Some * * * Vid. Mr. George Walker of the Sabbath to avoid this deny Adam to have been Holy and suppose him only Innocent and Neutral and capable of Holiness worse than those Papists †††Petavius in Elench Ther. Vincent Lenâ—s c. 23. p. 97. Saith that Adam had 1. Exteriour Grace viz. his outward blessings 2. Interiour And that 1. Permanent which was Bona Voluntas vel Justitia Originalis ex omnium virtutum fidei spei Charitatis tum caeterarum quae in mente aut Voluntate resident concursu concentuque colleâ—ta 2. Transient that is Actual influx or inspirations But whereas he bitterly censureth Vincent for saying that Grace was in some respect natural it is but de nomine that he quarrelleth And it is as if we disputed whether Health and Food were natural to Adam They were not essential to his nature but the rectitude of it concreated with nature and given by the Creator for nature And yet of Grace because sine merito though not as now contra meritum God made all very good In illa â—um secerat qui fecerat rectum August ab ipso citat who feign his Holiness to be a supernatural addition to his natural state thereby preparing men to believe that man was not made Naturally with an Immortal Soul for Immortal happiness But 1. If Adam had an immediate Moral
is less than a good habit 10. That every man hath a moral proper power to do more good than he doth and forbear more evil 11. That every man is commanded to use some means in order to his salvation which he is morally able to use 12. That God useth to bear long with the abusers of their Power before he forsake them 13. That many have many perswasions and helps to use their power that abuse it 14. That it 's just with God to forsake such 1â— And great mercy to the elect not to be so forsaken All â—â—â—â— will be made cleareâ— in their due â—â—â—â— which I shall now here offer you § 2. AS for the five Articles I. The Article of Predestination II. And the Article of Redemption contain no difference between the parties but only as they relate to the Articles of Free-will and effectual Grace as is aforesaid For all must agree that God Decreed and Christ procured all that Grace or Mercy for men which he giveth them Of which the Conditional gift of the Love of the Father the Grace of the Son and the Communion of the Holy Spirit in the Covenant of Grace with a Commission to his Ministers freely to offer it to all Believing Consenters and to seal it and deliver it by Baptism is a great part And many mercies teachings perswasions and motions tending to draw them to Consent is another part God decreed not to deny men that which he giveth them and Christs Death procured them all that he giveth them To which add what elsewhere I have opened that there is no necessity of ascribing to God any Positive Decrees of Negations or nothings Else there must be a Decree against the existence of all the myriads of possible animals atomes names words c. And remember that to Permit is not-to hinder and so is a meer negation or a doing nothing and that not-to-give faith repentance grace the Gospel c. is a negation or a nothing and so need no Decree seeing a not-decreeing to give c. is sufficient so that the whole of the Controversie about these two Articles is clearly devolved to the Controversies of Grace and Free-will III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denyed but that Natural Free-will is part of that excellency or Image of God by which man is differenced from bruits and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances determine his own will to this rather than that without Divine predetermination which is certain in the â—ase of sin yea and of some good For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had have forborn his sin Or else still all is but resolved into Gods meer will And it is agreed on as is said before that all men can do more good than they do and forbear more evil than they forbear and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will for a man to make a good use or an ill of the same measure of grace at several times or for several men to make several uses of the same measure Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question Why did he forbear this sin to day and not yesterday or Why did this man forbear sin and not that supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace to say Because this man at this time used that power which God had given him in stirring up his own will to concurt with grace and the other man or this at another time did not what he could Not that this answer is good in all cases where more grace is necessary to the effect but in this forementioned So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty made by God in the Image of his Liberty and depending on him and not able to Act without him as the first Cause but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse and of his directions and Laws it is able to make choice hic nunc to will or not will to will this rather than that without Divine necessitating predetermination and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary All which shewing the natural power of mans will and its liberty must be readily acknowledged by all sides that will not say that Adams first sin and every sin of all men else are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions and Gods non-causation in case of omissions and into Gods will in both and that man can no more do any thing but what he doth than he can be God or overcome God or live and act without God And as we must thus agree that natural Liberty consisteth in a self-determining power peculiar to Rational free agents so we are all agreed except the Pelagians that mans nature is vitiated by Original sin and therefore that the will which is naturally free from force and necessitation except from God who never necessitateth it to evil is yet in servitude to our own concupiscence and is not free either from the enticements of sense or the erroneous conduct of a blinded mind or from its own vicious habits averseness to God and holy things and proneness to things sensual and seeming good And therefore that this Holy or Moral Liberty of the will must have the Medicinal Grace of Christ to heal it of which next IV. And as to the Article of Effectual Grace it is agreed on and cannot I speak not of Grace as it is Gods favour but the effect â—e gratia data non de gratia dantâ— with sobriety be gainsayed without subverting the main doctrine of the Scriptures that whereas besides the Preparatory or Promeriting Grace of Christs own performance there is yet a three-fold Grace necessary for the application or conveyance of the Benefits purchased by Christ in the measure hereafter mentioned all this is common I. The first sort of Grace lyeth in the enacting of a new Law of Grace called also in several respects The new Testament the new Covenant and the Promise And as to this it is agreed 1. That God made this Law Covenant or promise in the first Edition with Adam and Eve after the fall Gen. 3. 15. the seed of the woman shall break the Serpents head and did by Actual Remission of their sin and not-punishing them as the first Law threatned yet more plainly manifest to them the pardoning Grace of this Covenant And that he made this new Law or Covenant to all mankind in and by them And that he again renewed the same Covenant of Grace with all mankind in Noah after the deluge Those few inconsiderate persons that deny this are not so valuable as to be an exception to our Concord It is an intolerable conceit of any to think that the tenour or sence of the
that his Wisdom and Mercy and repent of their sins and unfeignedly give up themselves to God as their merciful Redeemer Thus far we are agreed about the Grace of the Covenant II. And as to the second sort of Communicative Grace that is The Promulgation of this Law of Grace and offers of the Covenant-Benefits to man we are and must be all agreed 1. That besides what Tradition sacrificing did intimate the first Edition of the Covenant of Grace as is said is universally promulgate by Providence For whereas by the violation of the Law of Innocency all blessings were forfeited and all miseries deserved and no man had any notice by that Law of any hope or means of his recovery on the contrary all the world hath great abundant mercies and are not punished according to the first Law and therefore have sensible forgiveness of sin and all have an inward testimony or conviction that they are obliged to gratitude for these mercies and also to the use of certain means as Repentance Prayer c. in order to their farther pardon and salvation And all this fully demonstrateth that God hath so far promulgated the old Edition of the Covenant of Grace as to make it notorious that the world is not under the meer Law of Innocency And to believe in a Merciful pardoning God as he was Exod. 34. proclaimed to Moses is become even the Law of lapsed Nature 2. And as I said the last Edition of the Covenant is commanded by Christ in his Ministers commission to be proclaimed to all the world Yea Magistrates parents neighbours all men in their several capacities are bound to promote it 3. And the world hath actually heard so much of the Gospel as that Paul in his dayes said That their sound went into all the Earth and their words to the end of the world Rom. 10. 18. when it had gone but a little way in comparison of what it hath since done Thus far we are agreed of the Promulgation III. The third sort of Grace is the Internal operation of the Spirit of God upon mens hearts And here it is that the heart of all our difference seemeth to lie SECT I. The presupposed Principles § 1. THe way of Gods operation on souls yea or bodies or any creature is so unsearchable that I had rather silence than pretend to decide abundance of the Controversies long agitated about it And had not mens audacious decisions and furious contentions not yet allowing the Churches peace made it accidentally necessary to repress their presumption and their error I should reverently have passed by much that I must now meddle with But the cure must be suited to the disease § 2. So much as is * * * See a notable discourse of Bradwardint of mans little knowledge of God li. 1. c. 1. cor 32. contrae philos which excellently rebuketh audacity in this case intelligible herein is divine and honourable and amiable and the prospect of Gods Providence is delectable to the wise For his works are great and wonderful sought out of them that have pleasure therein § 3. The nature or the order of them cannot be known by the single consideration of particular effects but by beginning at the original and proceeding orderly from the superiour Causes to the inferiour and seeing how every thing worketh in its proper capacity and place which man can do but very defectively and therefore knoweth but little or in part § 4. It is necessary therefore that I briefly look back to the Principles of Providence and Action which were partly mentioned before where UNITY in TRINITY shineth to us in God and in his works § 5. * GOD is ONE INFINITE SPIRIT in THREE ESSENTIAL VIRTUES or PRINCIPLES LIFE or ACTIVE POWER UNDERSTANDING and WILL †††Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor 8. p. 5. Deus est Substantia Potentia rationalis habens intellectum liberam voluntatem cognoscens actualiter â—olens which are wonderfully ONE in ESSENCE yet THREE we know not perfectly how but as the Scotists say formaliter or rather as the Nominals by connotation of their objects and operations ad extra and so by Relation and extrinstck Denomination Not that Life Intellect and Will are formally the same in God as in the Creature or can formally be conceived by us But that while we must know God in a Glass mans soul must be this Glass and the Scriptures must be our Onomasticon and Logick Books and we must use such Notions and Names of God or none § 6. * * * Bradwardines language is Deum esse Omnipotentem active nullipotentem passivâ— li. 1. cap. 1. corol 1. n. 7. p. 5. These Principles as Transcendent in PERFECTION are called GREATNESS †††Communitâ—r antiqui Scholasticâ— agunt de intâ—llâ—ctu Voluntatâ— Potentiae operativae Dâ—â— quasâ— dâ— Potentiis ratione distinct is instâ—tâ—â—ntque de â—llis peculiares tractatus cum Magis Thom. c. Ruiz de Vohâ—â—â— Dei disp 14. â— 4. pag. 158. And he contradicting it saith as much Nihilomiminus intra â—asdem lineaâ— gradus intellectus voluntatis distinguimus Potentiam executivam â—â— partem â—arundem Potentia rum But less aptly or OMNIPOTENCE WISDOM and GOODNESS or LOVE by names borrowed from their effects upon the creatures § 7. This ONE GOD is revealed to us in THREE PERSONS The FATHER the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wisdom Word and Son and the HOLY SPIRIT One in Essence incomprehensibly Three ad intus but discernibly Three in their Operations ad extra and Relations thereto § 8. As we must conceive of GODS ESSENCE by INADAEQUATE Conceptions as aforesaid or not at all so must we of his EXISTENCE as in the Creature we call it Modally viz. His ESSENCE being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 substance VIRTUS PERFECTIO which in the Creature is MATTER or substance FORM and DEGREE and his FORMAL VIRTUS being Potentia-Vitalis Intellect and Will so his Existence is considerable 1. In VIRTUE it self radically which is Potentia Activa Inclinata 2. As in Act IMMANENT objectively as Gods self living self-knowing and self-loving 3. And as in ACTION ad extra either objectively or effectively TRANSIENT And in this third respect Gods Essence is the Operator of all his works § 9. The Three Divine Principles Vital-active Power Intellect and Will and the Three Divine Persons Father Word and Spirit do alwayes inseparably co-operate But so as that there is a Trinity also of their Impressions or Vestigia which are answerably to have a Trine attribution each Principle being eminently apparent in his own impression though with the rest § 10. Gods WORKS are CREATION GOVERNING and PERFECTING And so he is 1. The first EFFICIENT OF ALL BEING Ex QUO by creating and continuing which are as one 2. The DISPOSING or GOVERNING Cause PER QUEM 3. The END AD QUEM IN QUO perficiuntur § 11. God having given a BEING to the
the Threefold Divine Excellencies Communicated and the Threefold humane Receptive faculties viz. LIFE LIGHT and LOVE or spiritual Vivification Activity and Power spiritual Illumination of the Intellect and spiritual Conversion or Sanctification of the Will by holy Love § 21. It is certain that it is not only on believers that Christ operateth by the spirit For he draweth men by it to believe and many wicked men that are not his elect have common even miraculous gifts of the spirit * * * Mat. 7. 21 22 23. Gal. 3. 1 2 3. Heb. 6. 5 6. 1 Cor. 14. which are all communicated by Christ § 22. As Nature it self is in his Political power and is delivered to him so far as it is reparable and belongeth to the reparation of man so all gifts and operations Received by any in the world which are Mercies contrary to commerit are the effects of Christ Even as the Sun shineth in the night by the Moon and in the dawning of the day by it self unseen and after by it self appearing so Christ shineth to the Heathen world in abundance of natural and providential mercies and by the help of many Creatures and experiences and to some by nearer approaches as well as to the Church by the manifestation of himself All which is evident 1. Because the whole lapsed world in Adam and Noe were brought under his own Covenant of Grace according to which he operateth 2. In that so much mercy after sin will not stand with Gods regiment by the meer Law of Innocency violated 3. In that Christ is expresly called the Saviour of the World and the Saviour of all men especially of them that believe who dyed for all in that all were dead that they that live should live to him who tasted death for every man c. And Joh. 1. 9 10 11 12. That was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world or coming into the world lighteth every man He was in the world and the world was made by him and the world knew him not And v. 4 5. In him was life and the Life was the Light of man and the Light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not c. § 23. This threefold Influx of Christs Spirit for LIFE LIGHT and LOVE is not equally effectual on all nor equally effectual on the same person at several times nor each part of the influx equally effectual on the same person at the same time The Reasons anon SECT III. Of the Operations and Principles as compared § 1. THough Power Wisdom and Goodness or Love all co-operate by the spirit of Christ yet in the work of Mans Recovery their Impressions are not equal But as POWER with Wisdom and Love more appeared in the CREATION as is aforesaid so WISDOM with Power conveying Love appeareth more in our Redemption and LOVE with Power and Wisdom is most conspicuous and illustrious in our Renewed state begun indeed by Sanctification but perfect in our GLORIFICATION * * * As to the Question between the Schoolmen define beatitudin undoubtedly the Thomists err in placing it chiefly in the Intellect And Medina and others give silly reasons for it and the Scotists of whom Rada well handleth it are far righter And Agid. Romanus briefly and clearly tells us the truth Quodlib 3. q. 18. p. 187. Btatitudo est in aliquo finaliter in aâ—â—quo formaliter Naâ— si ipsum objectum principaâ—â— Voluntatis prout habit rationem finis sit beatitudo oportet quod beatitudo principaliter sit in hoc objecto coâ—sequenter formaliter in actu Voluntatis Nam Voluntas in suum objectum tendit finaliter sed per suum actum teadit in objectum formaliter Ex quo apparet quod be â—titudo sit magis in ipso objecto Voluntatis quam in actu quia ratio finis est magis in objecto quam in actu This is clear truth if you put but finis alone for beatitudo For Beatitudo qua talis is not the principal end of man but God as God in his perfect Goodness and the fulfilling of his will next and then our own beatitude with that of the blesâ—ed And he maketh Vision and not Love to be the secondary final object of all The Omnipotent Father as is said Createth Nature with the Son and Holy Spirit The Son the Wisdom of the Father is the Physicion of souls and healeth them by SKILL with Power and Love The Holy Ghost called by the Schoolmen The LOVE of God dwelling and working peculiarly in us to and in perfection with power and Wisdom is the PERFECTION of the soul And so Natura Medela Sanitas are the various effects of the Divine operation § 2. Therefore the SONS operation in procuring and communicating the SPIRIT of Love and Holiness is eminently sapiâ—â—tial § 3. The Impressions of all the Divine Virtues are excellent in their several kinds And it 's hard for us to say that this is simply more excellent than that But we can say which is more suitable to the nature of man to be esteemed and Loved by him And so we esteem the Impressions of Wisdom and Love as most suitable to us § 4. A Horse or Oxe excelleth Man in strength and a Bird or Hare or Dog in swiftness and a Mountain and an Oak in Greatness And yet we account the Wisdom and Moral Goodness of man to be a greater excellency and to make him the more noble Creature § 5. And God seemeth to tell it us 1. By calling these his Image 2. And by making man the Lord of these stronger Creatures § 6. And among men we take him not for the most excellent who is the strongest but who is the Wisest and the Best And therefore the Wisest and Best are by Aristotle said to be born by Nature to Rule the rest and by all sober men are thought to be the Fittest to Guide and Rule others how seldom soever it cometh to pass while the Robuster sort are Labourers and Mechanicks § 7. Yet I deny not but the effect is answerable to the Cause And as Active-Power causeth Action and Wisdom and Government causeth the Order and Rectitude of action and Love and Goodness the Perfection of it and the agent so Gods Vital-Power Wisdom and Goodness are equal which are the Principles of all As the Father Son and Spirit are coequal And God is indeed glorious in the Motion of Sun and Stars c. as well as in the Wisdom and Holiness of man But besides the foresaid suitableness this difference must be considered that as Life Intellect and Will Power By special Grace some mean two distinct things viz. 1. Our Love to God and other holy Habits and acts or an Inclination to them 2. Gods favour to us and acceptation of us and that as relating to the Glory which he will give us so that the first they call the Habit of Grace quâ— ens qualitas
Creature doth preach him to us and all things must be sanctified and used to this holy end § 33. He setteth Death continually before our eyes assuring us of the shortness of our lives and shewing us how we must leave this world that we may read Vanity upon all and not be deceived by it § 34. By all this we see that this Kingdom of Christ is a sapiential frame of Moral Causes designed for the Government of man in right ordering his internal and external acts and glorifying eminently the wisdom of our Ruler § 35. And he that will think rightly of this excellent frame must have all these things in his consideration 1. That Christ himself is not only a Justifier and Actor of us but a Prophet Priest and King and that the Government is laid upon his shoulders Isa 9. 6. 2. That we are not only Patients and pardoned sinners but also Subjects and engaged Covenanters 3. That Christs Church is not like a Statuaries shop but a Kingdom and a School where all must learn and obey 4. That Christ hath not only Motive power but Laws Promises Threatnings c. to work by 5. That his great blessings of Glory are his Rewards and Hell at last after those here are his punishments foretold to work on souls 6. That he hath a day in which as Rector he will judge the world in righteousness according to what we have done in the body 7. That faith is wrought by Preaching and Love and Hope and obedience are the ends and uses of faith 8. That the felicity of individuals and in them of the Heavenly Society in one Glorified body with Christ is the end of all where Gods Remunerating Justice is to be glorified and his governing Wisdom and Love for ever § 36. From all this I conclude That they that slight all this work of God by the contemptuous name of Moral Suasion and take it to be a diminutive term as to the honour of it to call it Moral and by Means and talk of Gods work of Grace on the soul as if there were no more in it very honourable than a physical Motion and God Converted souls but as Boyes whip their Tops or Women turn their Wheels or the Spring moveth the Watch are Cartesian blind Theologues and overlook the very nature of that Theologie which they profess which is the Doctrine of the Kingdom of God over man And while they see little but Matter and Motion they are fitter mechanically to treat of or deal with Stones or Bricks or Timber than men â— being unfit to treat of humane Government much more of Divine SECT IV. How far God useth Means § 1. CHrist who is the chief means is used in all the Conveyances of Grace to any one in the world § 2. God hath a double work in Illuminating and Converting souls One by activity of exteriour appulsive causes The other within us on the Agid. Column Rom. Quodl 1. qu. 2. p. 5. citeth Dioâ—ys de div nom l. 3. as holding that every order of second causes is like a beam of light streaming down from God as so many cords let down to men to draw them up to God And if a man should take hold of one of them and ascend to Heaven he might imagine that Heaven did bow down to him when indeed it moveth not but he would draw himself up to it so when upon Prayer or other second Causes God doth us good he seemeth to incline and bend to us but it is not so but he is unchangeable and it 's we that are drawn and moved to him and by the use of means by us we are conjoyned to Gods purpose that the things may be done for us which he hath decreed Vid. reliq where he confuteth the contrary errours faculties of the soul without those causes I cannot better illustrate it than by the causing of sight hearing c. The Light without us is not only a terminating object as some dream but an Active thing or Action which operateth by appulse upon the eye And the Sun and Aire are the causes of it The eye is not only a passive Receiver as some dream but an Organ where the visive spirits and soul are Active And God worketh internally on this visive faculty by his influx to sustain it in its activity And by a congress of these two fires or Active causes the sensitive soul doth see Now we all know that God giveth the external light only per media by the Sun c. But how he sustaineth and actuateth the Visive faculty is more difficult His own influx or Causation is undoubted And that the same Sun ut causa universalis cherisheth and moveth the visive spirits But whether God move the sensitive faculty or soul it self by any superiour spirit or mediate cause in its motion or action towards and on the exteriour light is past our knowledge Though the order observed in other cases maketh it not improbable Even so in the Illumination of the mind and conversion of the will we are sure that beside the terminative object there is an external motion which by the foresaid means is made at least on the senses and imagination whatever it do further on the Intellect But in the superiour Influx on the soul it self what use God may make of Angels or other superiour spirits or causes we cannot tell We are sure as is said that if there be a second cause yet as to proximity it is never the less neerly from God And souls being Intellectual and for ought we know of the highest nature of Creatures though not the highest Degree neither is improbable that God moveth us by a second cause or that he doth it without § 3. But as Christs fore-described mediate Causality is still supposed so it is certain that God doth not only work as some think concomitantly with the word but by it as his Instrument Though his wayes of co-operation are past the reach of man yet this much is sure 1. That he adapâ—eth the means to do their work both word Minister c. 2. And that his concurse maketh the due Impression on the sense and imagination 3. And though no Philosopher certainly know whether the Images in the phantasie be meerly passive as to the Intellect or what use is made of them and the passions to Intellection and Volition yet such use as is naturally to be made of them for these ends God maketh and manageth them accordingly by skill and power § 4. But here MOTION the effect of Active force and ORDER of motion as the effect of GOVERNMENT must be well distinguished For it is not so much the second Causes of the souls Action as such that we are now enquiring after But of the ORDER and Rectitude of its Actions which is done by Government § 5. That God doth work Grace on man by means ordinarily as ordinarily he causeth natural effects by means and Miracles are rare may be proved by all
these following evidences § 6. 1. In that he hath made so large provision of means and that in an admirable frame which is as it were a Moral world Which he would never do in vain nor if he ordinarily workt without them that work which he hath appointed them to do It is the reason of the Brittish Divines in their suffrages at Dort Had not God decreed to work Grace by means he could have done it with a fiat § 7. 2. The Glory of this Kingdom or Sapiential Rule which is so constantly and largely given him in the Scripture Psal 103. 10. and 145. and 119. throughout and Matth. 25. As the Ship master or Pilot is praised who by a Helm can turn about the Ship as he will Jam. 3. 4. § 8. 3. God worketh on all things according to their nature And this is suitable to the nature of man And the Causation is answerable to the effect And ORDER is a moral effect which needeth not a Creation but a moral ordering Causation § 9. 4. Experience telleth us that those prosper best in grace that most faithfully and diligently use the means And we never knew of any man 1 Tim. 4. 15. Prov. â— 20 21. 3. 5. 8. 13. 4. in the world that came to Actual knowledge faith or Love without means but all by the causality of them § 10. 5. We find that the greatest neglecters and despisers of means are every where most graceless and the worst of men § 11. 6. We have Ministers and people frequent and strict commands to use means most diligently constantly and carefully § 12. 7. We have abundance of promises of Gods blessing upon the Licet omnis causa secundâ— proprie dicta causet effectum ex natura rei tamen quod ipsa sit causa non est ex natura rei quia solum ex voluntate Dei Alliac in 4. q. 1. F. use of means Act. 26. 17. I send thee to open their eyes and turn them Rom. 10. How shall they hear without a Preacher c. Isa 55. 2 3. Hear and your souls shall live Matth. 28. 20. I am with you alwayes c. Luke 10. 16. He that heareth you heareth me Psal 19. 7 c. The Law of the Lord is pure Converting the soul 1 Pet. 1. It is the incorruptible Seed that regenerateth us Heb. 4. The word is powerful and a searcher of the heart c. § 13. 8. When God will save a people he sends them the Gospel and Amos 8. 11. Prov. 29. 1â— when he will forsake them he taketh it away § 14. 9. The Devil sheweth his malice to souls and grace by opposing the means depriving men of them or keeping them from them or from the faithful using of them § 15. But it is none of my meaning that the bare means of it self doth change the soul or that it is the principal cause But only that God operateth Moral effects by Moral means as he doth Natural by Natural means being still the prime Cause of all himself § 16. If we thus conjoyn all Causes and separate not what God hath conjoyned it will help us the better to escape errour in this matter But if men will dream that all the honour or action that is ascribed to second causes is a derogation from God and a dishonouring of him they forsake the truth and injure him § 17. For if this were true that to honour the means or acknowledge Though God be proxiâ—uâ—â— not as in loco in all his operations yet seeing he operateth by second causes he doth it according to them as all experience tells us Therefore to end these Controversies we should consider more how those causes operate second Causes and their aptitude and efficacy is to dishonour God then God should be the greatest dishonourer of himself by making and using such causes and means And so many Creatures as there be in the world so many dishonours are cast on God and the excellentest Creatures would dishonour him most which sottish conceit must needs be joyned with Manichaeism that an ill God was the Maker of the World God is Glorious in all his works and shineth to us in them all SECT V. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means § 1. * * * Gerhard Tom. 2. de lib. aâ—b cap. 6. §. 1. supposeth that no cause of the efficacy of Grace is found in the will of man as being dead and vicious but yet that Grace doth not physically determine the will but so work as leaveth it a power to resist and that resistance is it that maketh the difference between man and man by making Grace uneffectual And Georg. Calixtus was of the same mind as you may see in his words de Minist Verbi p. 241. in Judic de Controvers num 33. See â—e Blank Thes de distinct Gratiâ— ALl that is Good in the Difference between man and man is Willed by God and Caused by him But nothing that is Morally Evil. § 2. As in Nature God seemeth to Cause Motion in genere by an equal universal Influx of the Sun which maketh no difference per se but per accidens But the wonderful variety of motions and effects is otherwise caused So it seemeth that Christ the Sun of Righteousness affordeth by his Means of Nature which he Politically manageth an indifferent influx or help for Action as Action to the souls of men which as Dr. Twisse frequently saith well is to be called Nature rather than Grace except as the repriving of Nature is Grace so far as it is meer Power to Act because it is equally indifferent to a good act as a bad and to do or not do § 3. The Power of Action as such being given by an equal Natural Universal Influx it is the ORDER of Actions where we must enquire of the difference and its Cause § 4. Action it self is not a proper substantial being but a Modus Rei But yet it is such a Mode as by the Cartesians leave requireth more Causation to it than a meer non agere doth But ORDO Actionum is but a modus modi § 5. ORDO is the beauty of the World and soul the genus of all Relation in fundamento and of all morality and worthy to have had a notable place in the predicaments And yet we know not what to call it whether any thing or nothing The ORDO Rerum is not Res And it is Rerum status which we better know in se than we know with what Logical Notion to cloth it § 6. This excellent Nothing is the summ of Morality in its form and the business of frail man on earth and much of the glory of the Church triumphant in Heaven It is Gods work and not ours to make new substances It is ours to keep ORDER in our selves as Gods work yea in the Actions which God by Nature enableth us to So vain a thing is man that
can do no more than this nor this but by the Power given him of God § 7. Vainly therefore do the Dominicans pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various ORDER of mans Actions by meer moral helps without Gods predetermining premotion to that order For this is to cause no Real being And he that is moved to the Act in genere needeth no more premotion from God to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act. § 8. And they that will call the production of faith a Creation in the strict and proper sense do not understand that Creatio est Rerum non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum vel existentium An Act is of it self improperly said to be created in a pre-existent Agent That is not called created which is educed è potentia materiae nor that which is produced by the Potentia Activa prae-existentis forma Faith is an Act of the same Natural Power or faculty which we had before And Grace or rather Nature usually suscitateth that faculty to the Act as an Act in genere And Grace doth cause us to ORDER that act aright as to the due object and other circumstances But if any will call it a Creation I contend not about the name § 9. But the whole state of the Man Habitual Relative and Practical set together is called in Scripture a New Creature and the New Man tropically but not unfitly Partly because we are really new though not by another Humanity or Species of Natural Essence yet by many Accidents And partly because those Accidents are so great and make so great a change of our state as that they emulate a natural Essence and we use to say in common things that when an unlearned man is made learned and a poor man a Prince and a dying man healthful he is another man § 10. Though God be one and the same and Christ the same and the Law and Word and many Antecedent means the same to many on whom they have different effects This difference may be caused many wayes The Causes of difference As 1. By the diversity of other inferiour or concomitant second causes 2. By the diverse Disposition of the Receivers a common cause of varieties in the World 3. By the diversity of Impediments and temptations And many other wayes § 11. * * * I know that Bradwardine li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. saith that Deum non dare scientiam eratiam aut perseverantiam seu quodlibet munus suum creaturâ— capaci est causa quare ipsa non accipit non habet non è contra Et p. 614. Quicquid obex dicatur potest illa respâ—nsio corripi cum nullus possit hunc obicem tollere nisi Deus vel per Deum prius praetollentem si ipse cum voluerit tollere irresistibiliter tollitur Auferam cor lapideum c. The great question is How far the diversity of Receptive Dispositions is from God Answ 1. God made all equal at first in Adam 2. All were equal in sin by his fall 3. Cain and Abel differed from several causes and not one alone Abel differed from Cain in faith and obedience by Gods grace as the chief cause and his own will and agency as the second cause Cain differed from Abel by unbelief and sin by his own will and Satans temptations 4. The sins of later parents as of Cain Cham Esau Achan Gehezi c. make a further difference by depriving their posterity of some means helps or grace which else they had been equally capable of with others 5. It is certain that man hath much to do about his own heart by which he is to be the second cause of his own Receptive disposition and if he fail is the only cause of his indisposition § 12. Difference is but Dissimilitude And an alteration of one of the subjects which soever will make it dissimile or to differ from the other When the good Angels stood and the evil fell if you ask Who made the difference It was the Devils by forsaking their first estate Though Constitutively both their sin and the Angels obedience made the dissimilitude If you suppose Cain and Abel equally under grace at first and ask Who made the difference I answer Constitutively Cains sin and Abels righteousness maketh or is the difference But as to Reputative efficiency Cain made the difference by rejecting grace So if you should suppose two equally qualified with common grace and one of them to lose it the efficience of the difference is Imputable to him But if you suppose two equally lost in sin and one converted and not the other the Constitutive Causes of the difference are ones sin and the others repentance But the Imputable efficiency is Gods grace and mans repentance or will that is recovered § 13. But when Paul doth ask Who made thee to differ he meaneth Who gave thee that good by which thou differest and expoundeth it by What hast thou which thou hast not received And no doubt but all good is received from God And this would have held true if God had by equal operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indisposition or rejection § 14. Nature and Scripture perswade us that the same measure of help or influx is not enough to make one repent or believe which is enough to make another For the difference of souls and temptations and impediments plainly prove it The same strength will not move a Mountain which will move a Feather nor the same Teaching make an ignorant Sot to understand which serveth a prepared person § 15. Bodily aptitude or ineptitude do much to vary receptivities which are usually Gods punishments or rewards for Parents actions And oft-times for mens own Some by fornication gluttony drunkenness sports and idleness make themselves even next to Brutes § 16. But we have great Reason from Scripture to believe that though Gods Laws be equal and his Judgements where men do not make an inequality yet as a free Lord and Benefactor he dealeth not equally with all that are of equal merit Though he do no man wrong nor deny any what he promised in his Word but keep perfect Justice as a Governour yet he may do with his own as he list and he will be specially good to some though others see it with an evil eye § 17. Whether all that are elect have at first a greater measure of the Divine help and impress than any that are not converted no man can say of which more anon But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by Gods will to that certain conversion which others were not so decreed to SECT VI. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul § 1. THat which sticks in the minds of many is that God being Omnipotent all his operations must be equally unresistible and efficacious because none can conquer God But they must
consider that though he be Almighty yet he doth not all that he can do nor do his works equally manifest his Omnipotency And there are these causes for Limiting his operations in the effects § 2. 1. * * * Gemina operatio Providentiae reperitur partim naturalis partim voluntaria Naturalis per occultam Dei administrationem quae etiam lignis herbis dat incrementum Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera hominum Vid. catera August de Genesi ad lit l. 8. cap. 9. plura li. 9. cap. 15. The chief cause is his Wisdom and Free-will It is his Will to do what he doth and to do no more which hath no cause § 3. 2. Another cause is that God operateth by Jesus Christ whose Humanity is finite being a Creature and God worketh according to the Instrument or medium As he shineth by the Sun Moon or Stars according to their several natures and not according to his meer omnipotency so doth he communicate Grace by Jesus Christ § 4. †††Mark 6. 5. He Christ could there do no mighty work because of their unbelief and 7. 24. He could not be hid and 1. 45. Jesus could no more openly enter into the City with many such places all speak of an Ordinate power working not ad ultimum posse And Christ by Office being King and Prophet will operate upon certain terms which in his Sapiential Government he sets down And God will not violate those terms § 5. 3. Also under Christ there are many subordinate Causes There are his Word Preachers and all the forementioned means and helps and Christ will work according to these means Though he tye not himself from doing more or otherwise I have proved that this is his usual way And the effect will be limited according to these second causes § 6. As the Sun shineth on us first in and through the air which abateth somewhat of its force and then through the exhalations and then through the glass window and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us so is it in this case § 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver Every eye hath a tunicle which the Suns light must penetrate But he that hath a suffusion or he that winketh hath a greater impediment to limit the effect so is it with the various degrees of Indisposition or moral incapacity which yet be nothing if God did work ad ultimum posse and did not as aforesaid work according to his free will and second causes SECT VII Of the Resistibility of Grace § 1. TO Resist Grace signifieth 1. Either Not-to Receive it Passively * * * Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 1◠§. 6. p. 187. distinguisheth of Gods will 1. As to its ratio totalis including not only the viâ— aut causalitas effectiva but also the formal reason of Volitio effiâ—ax which includeth the prescience of future contingents And so he saith It is never resisted 2. Secundum partialem inadaequatam rationem praecise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum prout offert motiva confert causas secundas suum concursum abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis quae quidditativè supponit formalissimam rationem praescientiae c. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo ut praecisus ab actu secundo potest non sortiri effectum as a stone receiveth not the rain ad intus or as oyl resisteth water or hard things receive not impressions as the soft 2. Or Not-to-Receive-Actually which is Receptio Moralis as a man receiveth not a gift who consenteth not or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes The bare Not-Consenting with the Will or not using the senses or organs not opening the hand c. is such a Resisting 3. Or an Active opposition which is more As a man resisteth an Enemy with heart or hand or a man by Nolition and not only Non-volition resisteth a suiter § 2. Mans sinful soul resisteth Gods gracious operations all these wayes 1. It is Passively become undisposed to Reception And thus he is said to have a hard heart of stone and a seared conscience and to be dead and past feeling Eph. 4. 18 19. 2. 1 2. 2. It doth not do what it can do morally to receive grace that is it doth not Conari or suscitate it self to be willing of it 3. Yea it doth Positively resist by Action and is unwilling of Gods gracious operations And this is twofold 1. By willing the contrary and prosecuting carnal interest over-loving the pleasures of the flesh and so turning away from the motions of grace 2. And therefore by an enmity to that grace and work which would †††Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is universaliter efficax nec impedibilis frustrabilis aut defectibilis which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not meerly final and complacite But yet the Schoolmen that say he is not Omnivolens give reason for it convert him and take him off his chosen Idols § 3. No creature by resisting God doth abate or retund his essential Power or Activity nor make any thing properly difficult to him § 4. All the Elect resist Grace before it overcome and convert them And all our lives after we resist it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty and draweth us from sin § 5. He that repenteth not of his Resisting of Gods Spirit and Grace doth not understand and well repent of his sin § 6. All Resisting is not Overcoming All Resist grace but all overcome it not that is do not frustrate it as to the due effect § 7. There are several Degrees of yielding to Gods motions and operations and so several degrees of overcoming He is fully overcome by it who yieldeth to it wholly He overcometh it in some part who yieldeth to it but in part And because Gods grace moveth us to more than we ordinarily yield to therefore we do ordinarily overcome it in too great measure even when we are happily overcome by it § 8. God worketh not alike on all sometime as on Paul he so suddenly changeth the mind and will as that at once he both produceth the Act of mans consent and also taketh away even the moral though not the natural power to the contrary in the antecedent instant So that no man ever denyeth consent who is so moved And sometimes he procureth Actual Consent by such an operation as in the antecedent instant might have been resisted and overcome there being a Moral Power to the contrary So that there is Actually-Converting Grace which was superable in the antecedent instant as to Moral power and there is such a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome § 9. Gods grace when it prevaileth doth not take away but determine
the Natural power in it self but by so doing formaliter relativè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary in that instant Of which more anon § 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event is never overcome For Gods decree is not frustrate § 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of as an Act For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts For God doth not militate against himself § 12. The case lyeth thus God antecedently to his Laws framed Nature that is the Being and Natural Order of all the World and so he became the Head or Root of Nature the first Cause who by his wise decree was to concurr to the end with that Natural frame and to continue to things their proper forms and motions And man is one of his creatures having a Nature of his own to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concurr By this natural concurse of God the fomiâ— cator the murderer the thief c. are naturally able to do those acts But being free agents that can do otherwise God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them And when they break this Law they resist that gracious concurse which suitable to the organical cause God conjoyneth with the means But they do this by their Natural power and activity not used as God requireth them but turned against his own Law So that if God would withdraw his sustentation and destroy mâ—ns Nature they could not resist his grace But that he will not do being his antecedent work and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act disordered and turned against his grace § 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will de debito 2. And his will of purpose to give man so much help and no more by which he can and ought to believe and Repent is said to be resisted or frustrate so far when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done § 14. Gods Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * * * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora and work by means not for want of them but from the abundance of his Goodness so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. 3. m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace § 15. But it is not the barâ— Word or Means alone but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted For though no moâ—tal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means yet we may know that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily and that he worketh with and by them not according to his Omnipotency in it self considered but according to the means or organs And as in Nature he operateth nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes so in Grace he operateth non quantum potest but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace § 16. When the preaching of the Word Education Company and other visible Means seem equal God hath innumerable means supernal internal external invisible and unknown to us by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls without any second cause or means at all though we cannot prove the contrary neither And therefore he that resisteth all means for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul § 17. * * * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aâ—x l. 7. disp 59. p. 264. Eadâ—m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam in genere cause materialis antecedit illam In genere tamen causae formalis efficientis est effeclus ejusdem gratiae propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae est tamen meritoria vitae aeternâ— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis est meritoria vitae aeternae ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nisâ— procedat à gratiâ— habituali ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from Unless he mean eadem specie and not numerically which yet is false For it is not eadem or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh Whether Gods condional will and so his operation be Volo te velle modo velis or credere modo credas to give us faith if we believe and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself This semi-subtilty though it beget voluminous confidence must cry peccavi if a little more subtilty do but detect the defectiveness of it We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi but of the Rationes non habendi nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions But whether he deny or give-not grace for actual faith effectual or sufficient to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform even preparatory Volitons Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi not de causis Actus donandi Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith in that soul which doth not wilfully resist and omit such preparatory acts as it could do even Volitions And so I answer 1. It is not I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing But it is 1. If by resisting common preparing grace thou so harden â—hy heart or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self as that the same degree of grace means help impress will not change thee which otherwise would
make this motion to be somewhat received before we act and yet nothing but our act which is absurd IV. Other Thomists hold that It is somewhat really distinct from our operations and that is Quoddam complementum virtutis activae quo actualiter agat And he that knoweth what predicament this complementum belongeth to and what it is let him take this opinion for more than a meer complement And here they tell you that they speak not of Gods simultaneous concurse for that Alvarez confesseth is nothing besides Gods essence and mans act But of his previous motion which he saith is somewhat more So Amesius Antisynod de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis esset apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle sine ulla Impressione intercedente certe posse efficere ut Voluntas consentiat ipsius Vocationi I now meddle not with the truth of this and Twisses argument is easily answered But I intreat the Reader to note into what all our controversies are by these excellent men reduced who yet most aggravate them What now is the Gratia efficax ad credendum Nothing besides Gods esse but ipsa fides Is faith effective of it self No. Is Gods essential will effective of it Who ever denyed it What place is there for Controversies of sufficiency and efficacy when it is but Gods essence and the known effect of which they speak and hold not as Alvarez doth any motion or Impress made by God upon mind or will at all Gods will then is effectual quia vult effectum and it is virtually sufficient for whatever he willeth not but could will But then no man can possibly do any more good or less evil than he doth because no more or less is willed of God which volition is the first necessary Cause of all things And is not all their Volumes de Auxiliis Gratiae and the several sorts previous simultaneous operating co-operating c. meerly vain when there is no such thing as any Grace besides Gods meer will and the Act of man And yet Dr. Twisse elsewhere saith that Gods Decrees do nihil ponere in objecto As if they differed in the nature of motion And he saith that this is true both of supernatural acts which are from Infused habits as faith hope Love and of Imperfect supernaturals as fear of hell and attrition by which man is remotely prepared for Justification ◠which proceed not from supernatural habits but from the spirits special impulse not yet inhabiting but moving And Alvarez thus concludeth I. That which God doth in second causes by which these act is Aliquid habens esse quoddam incompletum per modum quò colores sunt in aere virtus artis in instrumento artificis It is Aliquid incompletum transiens cum ipsa operatione Are you ever the wiser for all this II. Hoc ens incompletum praevium actioni causae secundae producitur in illa effective à solo Deo nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influx◠ipsius causae secundae And therefore herein the will is passive though not in its own Act as he falsly affirmeth Luther to assert for what can act and not be active III. When second causes natural or supernatural have by their inherent form sufficient Active virtue per modum actus primi proportioned with the effect then Gods premotion is not a Quality but proprio vocabulo dicitur Motio Virtuosa by which the universal cause maketh the second actually operate according to its proper mode Therefore it is not a Habit or disposition or natural power IV. Yea in Imperfect supernatural acts as fear of hell which go before habits and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts it is not a Quality but Motio Dei virtuosa by which they are done and is of the same sort with that which causeth acts from habits V. This previous Motion is Really distinct from the operation of the second cause and is not our act it self but is immediately from God Which he useth many arguments to prove And can all this give any man a formal conception what it is which he calleth aliquid incompletum and Motio Virtuosa We know not what the Vis projectis impressa is in corporeals And can we tell how spirits and how the God of spirits maketh his Impressions or what the word Impression or Motion here signifieth We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not And why is it called Motio Virtuosa Virtus he maketh a quality It is no quality and yet Virtuosa Omnis motio est Actio Is it Actio Increata Then it is God himself which he denyeth and speaketh of somewhat between God and mans Act. Is it Actio creata Then it is a Modus Agentis for so is every Action as such as distinct from its effect in patiente And if so it cannot be modus Dei for then it is Ipse Deus And if it be modus hominis it is either homini◠agentis vel patientis If the first then it is mans Action If the second it is formally no action For modus patientis is passio though many would confound action and passion with saying after their Masters that Actio est in patiente which is equivocation So that the plain truth is that mans understanding can reach no further than to conceive 1. That our souls are the termini of Gods Volition and Active power 2. That though God act not on us by corporeal contact yet we must call our selves Patients and think of the Attingency of his Active essence with its effects by some Analogie of Corporeal attingency contact and impressed moving force But truly to know how God toucheth moveth operateth on any Creature and by what Impressions or what there is indeed between Gods essence and mans Act we know not at all And if Christ had never said Joh. 3. so is every one that is born of the spirit our own experience might have told us that we know it not Boldly then tell our Church-distracting wranglers that contend about the nature sufficiency efficacy resistibility of this Act of Grace that they know not the very subject of their disputes And shall we still fire the Church by striving about words that profit not but subvert the hearers and tend to the increase of ungodliness Yea and shall bold blind zeal use the Reverend names of God and his precious Truth to colour and countenance these pernicious contentions I grant that the nature of Grace and the concord of it with Free-will may be soberly treated of But when men have followed the controversie beyond the ken of humane understanding and there will proceed to build great Fabricks upon unknown suppositions and perversly contend for them against Love and peace they do but serve Satan against God under the colour of his sacred truth and name And I think it not amiss here to tell you what Alvarez saith to this Question de Aux l. 12. disp 118. p.
voluntatis à Deo elevatis suo speciali influxu consistere aiunt gratiam praevenientem excitantem Liberum autem arbitrium his duobus motibus gratiae praevenientis adjutum excitatum liberam habet potestatem imperandi aut non imperandi assensum fidei Quod si voluntas fidem amplecti velit actumque credendi imperet intellectui influente simul nutu gratiae praevenientis quam habet elicit in seipsa actum supernaturalem quâ— fidem amplecti vult quóque assensum imperat intellectui simúlque Intellectus motus imperio illo supernaturali voluntatis illustrationéque divinâ adjutus elicit actum supernaturalem assentiendi revelatis Gratia excitans seu praeveniens novo influxu quo unà cum libero arbitrio influit in supernaturalem actum fidei sortitur rationem gratiae adjuvantis cooperantis efficacis Si autem voluntas pro sua innata libertate fidem nolit amplecti gratia excitans praeveniens manet intra limites gratiae sufficientis nec est efficax quia voluntas non voluit fidem amplecti cum potuisset II. The second is Durandus's way Nullum esse necessarium Divinae voluntatis concursum ad actiones secundarum causarum sed saâ—is esse quod Deus eas produxerit in esse ipsas naturas earúmque virtutes postmodum conservet But this is a partial recitation for this sustentation of their Active Virtues is the same with an Universal Influx or Concurse to action as action which Bellarmine is for Read of this Ludov. à Dola III. * * * So Malderus in 1. 2 q. 111. a. 3. dub 1. Hic Dei concursus quod attinâ—t ad identitatem realem ex parte termini nam ex parte principii est ipse Deus aut Dei voluntas est ipsa actio Causae secundae quatenus est à Deo Nihil ponit in ipsa Voluntate sed est influxus Dâ—i in actionem seu effectum So many others The third he saith is attributed to Greg. Arim. Scotus and Gabriel great Wits if any Cooperationem Divinam se tenere ex parte effectus non Causae h. e. Conâ—ursum Dei non determinare Voluntatem nostram nec aliquid in illam imprimere aut operari sed immediate influere in effectum eumque producere illo ipso momento quo à voluntate nostra producitur Ergo Deus non determinat Voluntarem nec Voluntas Deum Nam uterque concursum libere adhibet si alter noâ—â—â— concurrere opus non fiet sicut cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem Et licet simul operentur tamen Deus operatur quia Voluntas operatur non contra But this is partially recited and it is true only of the effect And his confutation is that then Graetia est pedissequa Voluntatu And why saith he not God is pedissequus hominis because he judgeeth men according to their works I have otherwise opened the matter than is expressed here of any of these But can the sober Reader think that the IV th way which is that of the Dominicans predetermining premotion of all acts good and bad is so much surer than these three as that he dare venture on that supposition to cry down his Brethren as enemies to the Grace of God and to his Providence who would gladly ascribe all to both which belongeth to perfection and are only afraid to deny Gods holiness and the Christian Religion by resolving all sin and damnation into the meer Will and Love and Irresistible Omnipotent efficiency of God SECT IX Whether Gods Operations be equal on all § 1. IF the question be ex parte Dei it is absurd to make a question of it For God is the same whatever the diversity be in his * * * Of Preparation for Grace Medina noteth three degrees of it one which Grace ever followeth which is it that our Divines mean by effectual Vocation and this he saith is never had but by Gods special help the other two are distant and common But that the Schoolmen of the other parties think otherwise he confesseth and saith In hac quaestione Durand Scot. propemodum omnes Nominales quos sequitur Adrian Quodlib 7. q. 4. tenent partem affirmativam scilicet quod homo per sâ—as vires sine speciali auxilio Gratiae potest se ad Gratiam praeparare sic ut consequatur gratiam infallibiliter ex merito de congruo D. Tho. tenet contrarium Medin ib. p. 593. But then by sufficiens praeparatio ad Gratiam he meaneth Conversion it self dimovere animum ab iniquitate st in Deum convertere sicut convertere faciem ad solem ut quiâ— illuminetur works And Gods acts as in himself are God And there is no Virtue or Efflux from God but what is a creature or effect of God § 2. If the question be of second causes and of Gods operation in and by them I answer 1. Some things God Giveth and Doth as Rector of the World by a Law or according to a Law And herein God doth equally till man make a difference as is aforesaid viz. in his Legislation though not in the promulgation and in his Judgement 2. Some things God Giveth and Doth besides as Owner and free-Benefactor and here he primarily maketh a difference So that there is a certain sort and measure of grace given equally till men make a difference And there is a sort and measure given unequally by the meer will of God as he diversifieth Natural things § 3. But if the question be of the effects on the soul those effects are 1. Mans predisposition 2. The divine Impress 3. The Acts 4. The Habits as is said And as to the first God equally disposed man at first But two Causes have filled the World with very unequal dispositions One is mans sin corrupting themselves and their posterity more than as they are the seed of Adam and this God is no Cause of The other is Gods free differencing mercy to some of equal ill desert giving them both Greater outward helps and Common Grace and fewer impediments and so more preparing them for special Grace But no man by Indisposition is deprived of special Grace but he that hath contracted more than he had from Adam only And God doth not equally repair and dispose all that have viciously undisposed themselves Though while they are here he giveth such mercy to all as tendeth to their recovery § 4. If the question be of the equality of Gods Impulse or Influx on the soul 1. There may be a diversity of further effects where the Impress is the same in kind and measure because of mens various Dispositions to receive it and their various concurse That may convert one that doth not another But yet God doth not make equal Impressions on mens souls For 1. His own free-will as a Liberal benefactor doth more for some as Paul than for others 2. Mens ill deserts may so forseit grace and quench the Spirit as
to make a difference 3. The means much differ which several men have And God usually operateth according to the means upon the soul § 5. If the question be either of the Act or Habit it is no question For that were but to ask Whether all men have equal faith love and other graces which common experience denyeth § 6. Whereas some will stick at my mentioning a Divine Impress on the soul in nature antecedent to Act and Habit I would have them remember that either there is such a thing or not If there be I rightly mention it If not we are instantly at an end of all this sort of Controversies and Calvinists and Arminians cannot differ if they would For then the question must be only about that which is past question viz. 1. Either about Gods Act as in Himself which is his simple Essence 2. Or about the Act and Habit of Faith Love c. in Man which all the World knoweth is not equal For all men have not faith For as for pre-disposition the question will be revolved to the same point It is certain that all are not equally disposed and it is certain that Gods Acts as in him are his Essence SECT X. Whether the said Operation be Physical or Moral § 1. THis paltry question is worthy but a few words though â— make too much stir Of the sense of the words Physical and Moral having spoken before I will not repeat it here 1. If the question be de operatione ut est actus agentis before the effect it were but to ask Whether Gods Essence be Physical or Moral which is unworthy an answer § 2. 2. If the question be of the Action of second Causes as the Preacher c. if truly Acts they are both Physical as they are really actus naturalis and moral as they are the acts of free intellectual agentâ— But the Acts of Laws and other objects meerly as objects on man are called Moral Acts because they are but nominal but indeed are no Acts and therefore neither Physical nor Moral For they are but signa and significare is not agere but is only an objective aptitude by which an Intellectual agent can â—difie it self All the Books in my Library teach me without any Action by being signa objectively to my active Intellect § 3. 3. If the question be of the Divine Impress on the soul it is quid reale and therefore physicum And it is moral as it is the principium actus moralis The same is to be said of our own Acts and Habits They are physical and moral accidents And they cannot be moral unless they be physical § 4. But it must be known that to be quid naturale and quid morale formally differ as Actus qua talis and ordo qua ordo do differ ab ordine seâ— Relatione ad Legem ad finem morum and Moralitas est actus Physici vel privationis Relatio viz. ad Regulam finem morum § 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act but the Morality of the Cause viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally I answer plainly that There is no true Cause which is not Physical A moral Cause not physical is but Causa reputata vel â—â—minalis Objects are usually said to Cause morally But if they be meerly objects they cause not efficiently at all but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie But some things vulgarly called objects as Light Heat c. are Active and so effect And he that doth proponere objectum doth indeed effect by speaking or doing But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind as it is a meer object But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation And many mercies afflictions and other means forementioned have their several wayes of active operation But it is readily confessed that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul but only Active Spirits like it self Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do largely as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical And I plainly say de nomine that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent and Physical as they are Physical effects on man and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects And that they are called Moral in two usual senses 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them 2. And in that objects being much of the Means the operation or efficiency of objects as objects is properly none at all They do but materially as it were constitute the Act and terminate it and occasion it as sine quibus non which many call a Moral Reputative Metaphorical Causation And yet diversification is much by objects § 6. If this stumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other side and occasion them to think that it is little efficient operation which we own in the collation of faith and conversion I desire them to consider well 1. That it is no new substance at all that is to be produced but a pre existent substance and faculty to be actuated 2. That it is not an Act as such in genere that is to be caused by Grace but the due ordering of acts as to right objects c. 3. That the soul as such is an Active Spirit not indifferent between Action and cessation but as naturally prone to Act as the earth to rest and as a stone in the air to descend and as the Sun to move and shine so that it is never one minute out of Action even in this earthen tabernacle from its first being to the last breath day or night Though in different manner 4. That God as the God of Nature doth uphold the soul in this Active Nature affording it that Concurse or Influx necessary thereto which in Nature he made due to it As he doth to the Sun in its action and to the souls of Brutes So that Activity as such distinct from the due order of it is given by God in Nature 5. And God hath placed the soul in the Universe as a wheel in a Watch where it must needs have some effects of the co-operation of Concauses or superiour agents 6. And Angels and Devils who have very much to do with our souls do work as Voluntary Agents in Political Order though not without the regulation of Gods Law or Will 7. And God can do what he will on souls without any second cause though whether he do so or what we know not 8. All this being supposed for Efficiency objects duly qualified may do much for the Order of Acts though properly they do nothing so that though they be but ut Materia ad formam occasions sine quibus non yet the reasons
permissor sed effector â—jus mali Prorsus invalida consequentia Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis N. B. Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non sit alicui conducibile Neque necessâ— est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati Nam certissimum est extra omnem controversiae alâ—am positum peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi etiam in genere conducibilis potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversie An â—â—li existentia bonum sit viz. the bonum honestum utile jucundum I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctors confusion and to be so much more accurate than he as to remember that this distinction is but de Bono Creaturae whose pleasure profit and honesty are distinguishable But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good and that things are first Good as related to him the Prime and Ultimate Good And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the â—creature is none of those three but the conformity of things to the Will of God the absolute Rule of Goodness And therefore when we ask An bonum sit ut sit malum we mean not an sit bonum hominis secundum quid but an sit bonum simpliciter viz. conforme Voluntati Divinae And if they can prove that Deus velit â—â—â—â— fieri we will confess it to be Good But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile seeing it doth the sinner no good For Bonum jucundum in genere is not sin God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth and not less But it is hoc minus jucundum sensibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum spirituale which is sin Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure So that sin is neither utile nor jucundum And the Doctor is quite out in calling â—ccasio a medium conducibile and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to Gods Glory but as occasio Whereas occasio as such is no medium at all no more than possibilitas est ens unless you take Medium very largely Their chief argument is that the moral specification of an Action is an Entity and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without Gods first causing it is to deifie that creature making it a first cause Answ 1. The comparative Order of Actions as the terminating them on this object rather than that and at this time rather than that c. is but the modus modi entis and so is no proper entity 2. Or if the Name be the quarrell it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cause without his predetermining Causality 3. This power is the excellency of the creature and the honour of its Creator § 5. As for their argument that there is no effect without a cause nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect I answer 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself And he is the Free cause of all things necessary in the World 2. The soul is Gods Image 3. The Will when undetermined hath a self-determining power Therefore this is but petere principium 4. But there are many sub causes that are a reason of the determination As objects opportunity knowledge the removing of competitors c. § 6. Therefore Gibieufs Guil. Camerarius c. way of predetermination by the Causa finalis is nothing to our question that being no efficient but a Material objective or Moral Causation § 7. When they say that else God dependeth on the creature and is determined by it as to his Concurse I answer 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent be his dependence on it when it expresly speaketh its dependence on him without whom it cannot be nor act 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts nor his transient as to the meer Impress and first effect and so not Gods Act at all unless Terminating be Determining It is only its own Act which the creature determineth which is a secondary effect of Gods act as proceeding from the second cause Gods Influx maketh all that Impress on the soul which God intendeth absolutely But whether by that Impress the sinner will consent the will determineth and is the chief determiner in Evil. § 8. Saith Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digres 9. The second cause non agit in primam c. Hoc faceret vel volendo vel aliâ—d agendo c. Answ It 's granted God is not passive nor doth any second cause act on him as passive Who is his Adversary in this § 9. He addeth Neither on the Influx of God do we act for an Act is not the subject of an act Answ 1. If by Gods Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the soul it is a false supposition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Essence But if the said effect be meant I have shewed you that both Indisposition in the Recipient and a contrary Act may resist it § 10. Against our Passive determination of the effect he saith that God is denyed to act by physical action on mans will which if he did he would rather determine it than be determined by it because it cannot resist him c. Ans 1. The will doth not resist by reaction on and against God but by Indisposition and by its own not acting when it can c. 2. Who dare deny all Physical Action of God on mans will when it is quaedam natura 3. The will doth not Determine Gods will nor reject his Impress but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum posse the will would never disobey or fail of the due effect § 11. He saith ib. Doth God move only to the Act in genere or also to this species of action The first cannot be said For Suarez Hurtado say that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act And the creature hath as much need of help to the species of motion which is perfecter than the genus as to the genus And Gods Influx is singular and not determined to Generical nature c. Answ Gods universal motion as the Suns doth necessarily make its Impress on the creature and giveth him sufficient help ex parte sui to Act yea necessarily continueth the soul in some Action And that Action is singular and not a non existent universal But it is only the General Nature of a singular Act which Gods Natural Influx necessarily causeth And the Moral species what need soever we
have of help to it is caused otherwise not by this common Influx of God as the root of Nature but by a special Gracious Influx with and by special supernatural means And this it doth only to Good and not to Evil and not alwayes with a causally necessitating influx as to our act § 12. He addeth If the will need not Gods motion to its Act in specie it is either in genere entis or in genere moris The first cannot be said For the special Nature includeth the General and more And the species in genere moris are no species of acts but only accidents of humane acts and that only by extrinsick denomination as to the Law c. Answ 1. The vanity of arbitrary Logical notions is a wood for you to hide the matter in You are not able certainly to define what physically specifieth an Action and what not To say that one is the species of an Act and the other is but an accident and no species is but to say that you will say what you list We use to say that Acts are specified by their objects And so when objects differ specie physica vel morali the acts do so But when the question is with Judas shall I betray my Master or not with another shall I be perjured or not with another shall I commit this Adultery or not with another shall I pray in season or out of season to another shall I love God or the creatures more shall I will or not will this shall I will it or nill it c. Here you are so much at liberty that you may please your self with saying that to betray and not betray to forswear and not to forswear to love more or less in degree c. are physical species of entity and so make physical species of Action But I will not say that non agere non ens is a species of Entity physical Nor do I believe that we need Gods Influx ad non agendum as such And as for your Accidents of Actions if you mean Relations it is their fundamentum that we are questioning The extrinsick denomination is founded in Relation or else it 's Causeless In a word Man by Common Influx can determine his own will to go this way rather than that and also not to go and this without a further physical predetermining premotion of God § 13. But here let the Reader note that when he maketh Moral Good and Evil no species of Actions but an extrinsick denomination which is true abstracting the relation from the fundamental difference of the Acts and maketh God the Naturally necessitating Cause of all that is physical in the acts he maketh God equally the necessitating prime Cause of Good and Evil which are but relations resulting from the specified acts § 14. He addeth If God move the will it is to that same act which it doth or to another If to another why should it be said that God moved it to that which is not done rather than that which is done when we speak not of moral but necessary physical motion Answ The Particle To doth cheat you by ambiguity 1. As to noteth the effect of God alone it is to the Impress which he maketh on the soul which effect he still obtaineth which urgeth it towards its own act 2. The same I say if to signifie an absolutely intended end 3. But if to signifie the natural tendency of Gods Impulse as to an effect possible and desirable yea and due by command from the subordinate cause mans will then it was to our act of repentance faith duty that God moved us That is he gave us that Power and necessary influx by which it might and ought to have been done by us § 15. It is but to make toil for the Reader to answer all these fallacies and quibbles founded in some false supposition or ambiguous word else I would answer the rest of that Digression and his Digres 5. li. 1. p. 2. contra Alvar. Only here I must take notice that in this Digr 9. he himself rejecteth Greg. Arim. and Hurtado's assertion of Gods Determining us to this or that Numerical Act as distinct from another ejusdem speciei ut merum figmentum ad curiositati hominum nimium infoelici satisfaciendum duntaxat introductum Whereas were it not for wearying the Reader I might shew that the same Reasons will hold for or against this numerical as are for or against his specifical predetermination And the species having no existence but in the individuals and himself saying that Gods motion is ad actus singulares if he say that it is not to that singular act that is done rather than that which is not done he giveth up his whole cause § 16. But to this he hath an answer that it is a fiction and unsound to say that Possibilia quae nondum existunt do differre numero cum differre numero est tantum existentium Answ 1. He may as well say that esse possibile is a fiction when possibile is terminus diminuens ad esse And is not possibile as much a fiction de specie as de numero That which is not neither is in specie nor in numero But there is a Possibilitas numeri as well as speciei Yet with this answer he oft insulteth over the Schoolmen when at another time he would have said that Possibile hath an esse cognitum in both respects § 17. And I think the good man forgat that by this he quite overthroweth his Book de Scientia Media and much of all his other Books which are animated with the supposition of Gods Will causing faturition from eternity For if only existentia differunt numero futura non sunt existentia And if the futurition of differentia numero be not decreed nor eternal as of this Sun this Earth Paul Peter and their singular acts c. then nothing is future from eternity And so we are brought to the Arminians election of species only and not of individuals in primo instanti which is rejected Sure God electeth Individuals or none And if so it is future individuals Individuation existeth not but in existentibus But if foreknowledge and Decree may be of futures and non-existents it may be of individuals that are such as well as of species § 18. Yea he proceedeth to say pag. 412. Deum scire plura esse possibilia quam sunt non est scire multitudinem rerum possibilium sed tantum scire se praestare posse ut detur major multitudo rerum existentium quam actu sit Quare multitudo rerum individuarum Deo notum est tantum existentium sive ea sit multitudo actualis sive potentialis c. And yet the soul of his Book de Scientia Media is Causa transitionis rerum è numero Possibilium in numerum futurorum And my foresaid opposition to his Eternal Causation of futurity is hereby confirmed 2. It 's
an Infinite effect But the world is not Infinite § 4. As to the second question it is either de nomine or de re If the former let every man speak as he list for me rather than I will contend with him whether Creation of faith be a fit name As to the matter 1. It is agreed on that faith is not a substance 2. Nor an Accident con-created with a substance 3. Nor a composition of substances into one done by secondary Creation Generation or Art 4. But that it is the right ordered Act of a substance whose natural power which performeth it was pre-existent though without that act and the moral disposition Therefore it being a Modus entis or modus modi that we talk of the common name is Alteration and suscitation actuating and ordering But if men sober sometime call it a New Creation as indeed the whole frame of holiness together is called the New Creature in the Scriptures and sometimes the Divine nature sometimes Regeneration sometimes a Divine Artifice Alteration Conversion Sanctification c. it is the same thing that is meant by all their several names § 5. As to the third Question Whether it be a Miracle * * * Justificationem non esse proprie Miraculum Vid. Malder ib. p. 578. Et Brâ—anson in 4. q. 8. Cor. 2. fol. 144. confessing it above the power of a Creature to justifie us but not properly a miracle p 1. As a Miracle signifieth a wonder a thing is wonderful either for the Rarity or for the Great appearance of Gods power in it In the first respect faith is not so Rare as to be a miracle In the second the Sun and Heavens are a greater wonder than faith 2. But as a Miracle signifieth that which is done by second Causes but unknown to us and out of Gods ordinary way of working so it is no miracle 3. And as some men call that a Miracle which exceedeth the power of the second causes so all things would be Miracles that God doth For they are effects of his power as exceeding the power of second causes 4. As a Miracle is that which is done by God without any second causes †††Many good people would never be so much against the acknowledgement of second Causes if they understood the matter But they ignorantly think it derogateth from God the first cause so some think that the propagation of souls is a miracle But of souls and faith it is much unknown to us how far God useth second causes But that Generation as to one and Preaching and all other means to the other are some sort of second causes * * * We have no reason to think that God useth no second cause in working faith It is much to be noted which Pet. de Alllaco saith in 4. q. 1. E. Plus facit Deut faciendo aliquem effectum mediante causa secunda quam si faceret euâ—dem effectum se solo Quia in prima factione sunt plures termini divina actionis quam in secunda For as he said before Quandocunque Deus facit aliquem effectum mediante causa sceunda ipse non solum facit illum effectum sed etlam facit causam secundam esse causam illius effecti Marâ— this well is sure 5. And lastly if by a Miracle be meant that effect which God produceth both above the power of second causes and by a more glorious exertion of his own power than in his Course of Nature and Government he useth by and with second causes so it is not a Miracle because in the way of his ordinate co-operation with his Gospel he ordinarily produceth it § 6. So that as all Christians must confess that we had never believed if God had not wrought it in us by that spirit of Wisdom and Love which is Omnipotent so to contend any further whether it be a Miracle and a proper Creation or an effect of Omnipotency as such c. are such questions as presumptuous Schoolmen heretofore and hot-headed Sectaries in our times have used to afflict the Church of Christ with and to tempt their ignorant zealous followers into such employments as most effectually destroy their charity and injure others and scandalize the world SECT XV. Of the sufficiency and efficacy of Grace § 1. I Have said so much of this before as that lest I be tedious by repetition I must be but brief * * * Malderus against the Synod of Dort and 1. 2. q. 111. art 3. dub 8. bestirs himself with special industry to tell what Gratia efficax is And he concludeth that it is afflatus gratiae praevenientis sub genere gratiae excitantis quae non respuitur cum respui possit rather praeparans voluntatem quam adjuvans rejecting Valentia who placeth it in the Habit of Grace caused by excitation and à Lorca who takes it to be adjuvant and those that make it co-operant and those that place it in praedetermination physical of which he confuteth four opinions p. 502. and saith Probabilior sententia est quae negat omnimodam gratiae infallibilitatem adeóque efficaciam sumi posse ex sola reali aliqua differentia considerata ex parte gratiae praevenientis And that Just and unjust have effectual grace and therefore it differeth not from sufficient really And he resolveth all per scientiam mediam that Grace is effectual because ex proposito convertendi Deus it a hominem trabit sicut aptum novit ut sequatur certissime secuâ—urum and so that Grace iâ— effectual er natura sua and not so called only ex eventu I. By sufficient Grace is meant that which is necessary to the effect and without which it Cannot be but with it it may be though it sometimes be not § 2. That there is such a sufficient Grace not alwayes effectual to mans act is before proved by Adams Case And that no man hath such now for any means or duty in order to his recovery as Adam had to stand when he fell is not to be asserted or received And that no prepared soul hath such sufficient Grace to believe that yet believeth not is a thing that is past our reach to know § 3. This sufficient Grace consisteth in a Power to the act when the Indisposition of the natural power is so far altered or repressed as that by the means and helps vouchsafed by God the act is Morally possible to be done For he that truly can do it all things considered is well said to have such necessary grace § 4. But God of his bounty usually giveth men more than such a meer moral possibility by many additional helps and urgencies to the act which I mentioned before § 5. But by sufficient is not meant As much as is useful yea or needful to the Ascertaining of the Event much less to the meliority of the act § 6. II. The EFFICACY of Grace relateth to the effect And
by the effect it must be described Efficacy is Aptitudinal which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause Or Actual which is Efficienty it self § 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God 2. In the means And 1. In Gods Absolute Power 2. In his Ordinate Power § 8. 1. Gods Absolute Power is Omnipotency or Infinite and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made § 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects which he hath decreed to produce according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means or the disposition of the recipient or at least as limited in the effects by his meer free will § 10. In these respects though still Gods power in it self be Omnipotency yet in the limited way of operation it is various 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various 2. And as the means are various 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various To one the same operation ex parte Dei mediorum though not from the same Decree is abundantly efficacious and to another not § 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it even by a former help and not absolutely § 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt § 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God falleth in with his ordinate power herein and is not the thing in question § 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are 1. The Giving of the Means themselves 2. The first Impress on the soul 3. The altering of the souls Disposition 4. The production of the act 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies perhaps will appear to be nothing § 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you enquire of â— Is it Gratia operans or operata The efficient cause or the effect If it be Gods Gratia operans it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes If it be the Prime Cause it is Gods essence only Even his Essential Power Vasquez in 1 Tho. â—â—â—â— 19. disp 8c p. 5â—â—â—â—â— Voluntas libera Deâ— â—â—â—â— essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis affectus eliciti cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras quae liberâ— Deo convenit sient etiam res libere futurae sunt Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries â—â—â—â— ex rebus ipsis objâ—â—â—â— futuriâ— ipsa etiam habitudâ—â—â—â—â—re Deo convenit non intrinsicè sed extrinsecâ— solum denominationâ— quam Deo convenire non conveâ—ire â—on est absurdum Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam sed cum tali respectâ— â—ti-â—â—sâ— libera Volunt as possâ—â— Dâ—o adesse abesse niâ—il sequitur absurdi quod divina simplicitati immutabilitati repugâ—et This little is all that they can tell us what Gods free Volition of extrinsick effects is And can you tell us any more Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides meer Volition though he call him oâ—â—nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition doth make Grace â—x parts Dâ—â— to be nothing but his Will that we shall do the act and be such and â—â—ch Intellect and will And is that the Question Wherein consisteth the efficacy of Gods essence Why it consisteth in it self if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy It is Gods essential Virtue If you mean Actual efficiency that speaketh the effect of which more anon So that about Gods essential efficacy there is no Controversie § 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named Gods essential Power is never limited but Infinite and to be Ordinate is but to have ordinate effects So that still either the Controversie must be of Gods essence which is past Controversie or of some second cause or some meer effect § 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes 1. You will deny your selves that means and second causes have any power but from God 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect because they cause mostly morallyâ— And it is one of the accuâ—ations against the Aâ—minians right or wrong that they lay all on moral suasion or causality 3. And second causes are so numerous and unknown to us that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy 4. But it is I think agreed between you that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuites which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect yet they deny it to cause necessarily at least alwayes when the effect followeth And what if we add that objects effect not as such And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum must extend to some second effective Agents and not only to objects as such nor to those that preach present and offer objects as such And what that Agent Cause must be under God by that time you are agreed you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect it self on the soul it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes or we must question whether God be God For I can find nothing else to question § 18. It remaineth then that the question Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth must be meant of Gratia operata even of the effect it self And then either you mean that this effect is efficacious to it self or to something else The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined that you should think that an effect is its own cause and ask How doth faith e. g. cause it self Therefore there is nothing left but only to question How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second § 19. And here 1.
Some of you will grant that as motion causeth motion by contact of bodies so the first effect on the soul can cause the second And others of you will deny it and say that Gods Actions being diversified only by the diversity of effects and objects that which causeth the second effect is to be denominated a second Action and not the same numerically which caused the first no nor specifically if the effects specifically differ And so as scholastick wits here exercise their curiosity without respect to Arminianism or Calvinism you will here fall into notional Controversies in the way § 20. 2. But granting that the first effect is that efficacious Grace which must cause the second how shall we know what the first effect is and what the second Gods Grace like the Sun is still shining though we are not still receiving it When it worketh but the commoner sort of effects these tend to more and more The first Gracious effect may be forty years before Conversion But this is not your meaning But I suppose you will say that it is the first special effect or gratia operata that is proper to the saved which you mean But to pass by that Augustine Prosper Fulgentius much more their predecessors held that sincere faith Love holiness Justification present right to Life if they so dyed are not proper to the saved but that some lose all these If you say but proper to the Justified or Sanctified or Converted or it be the first effect which is proprium Justificandis which you mean Are we agreed what that is § 21. Either the first effect on the soul or the first Gratia operata is the Act of faith it self or somewhat antecedent If the Act as many subtilly maintain then it were a foolish question to ask Whether the Act of faith be Effectual to cause it self and How Therefore it must be somewhat antecedent or we can find no matter for our Controversie de efficacia Gratiae ad credendum § 22. If somewhat antecedent to the Act it is either a Disposition or Infused Habit or an Impression Impulse or Influx which is neither Disposition nor Habit. * * * Dico 1. Non certo constare ex divinis literis esse hujusmodi Habitus supernaturales 2. At baptizatis infunditur Gratia â—o sensu quod efficiuntur Dâ—o grati consortes divinae naturae renati 3. Conceditur Dei adjutorium ut credamus velimuâ— diligamus per inspirationem infusionem spiritus sancti 4. Dei adjutorium desuper infusum est omnino necessarium ut credamus diligamus c. non tantum ut facilius credamus Medina in 12. q. 51. p. 282. See many definitions of a Habit confuted in Medina 1. 2. p. 271. and that which he resteth in is Aristotles Qualitas quâ rectè vel malè afficimur § 23. 1. A proper Habit of faith it is not Though Mr. Pemble singularly seem so to think yet he meaneth but a seminal disposition And it 's commonly held that the Habit is given by sanctification after the Act given in Vocation 2. But if it were otherwise the Habit is not alwayes sufficient to ascertain the Act. For holy men oft sin against a Habit and believers do not alwayes exercise it Habits Incline per modum naturae but do not certainly determine to the act 3. And of a Disposition it must be so said much more § 24. 2. And if it be an Impulse or Influxus Receptus as I think we must affirm this is but a general notion of which our understanding is very crude or small A meer Motus it is not For as was said in the beginning the Divine Influx is threefold viz. From Vital-Activity or Power Wisdom and Love to Life Light and Love in man Now as I said if there be no such Impulse besides the Life Light and Love produced our Controversie is at an end For these are not efficacious or efficient of themselves But if such a different Impulse there be it 's hard to know what it is in man I conceive it best expressed by all these inadequate notions conjunct 1. An inward urgency to this threefold act which is called in the Schools both auxilium concurse and Influx 2. By which Urgency the soul is more Disposed to the Act in hoc ordine than it was before 3. Which Disposition containeth in it a Moral Power to that Act so ordered and somewhat more even some Inclination to perform it If any man can tell me better what that Divine Impulse is which is antecedent to mans Act I am willing to learn § 25. Now if this be the question Whether this Divine Impulse which is the first effect of Gods spirit be of its own nature efficacious to produce According to Jansenius the first Grace is Necessary Delectation or Love in act before that which is free and full And if so then there is no grace causing this grace and so none to be the subject of this question Whether it be more or less sufficient or effectual operating or co-operating grace which maketh one man love God initially rather than another For it is no Grace bâ— Gods essential will this Love be the first Grace and no received Impulse antecedent to it our Faith Love c. as the second effect I answer 1. Sometimes Gods Impulse is so Great as propriâ vi doth change mind and will and overcome resistance and procure our act 2. Sometimes it is so strong as that it prevaileth against the contrary ill-disposition so far as to give man a Moral Power to the Act with some Inclination which yet contrary habits and temptations do overcome and the Act doth not follow which yet was not for want of Power to have done it And this is called sufficient Grace 3. We have great reason to believe that as in some Instances Gods greater Impress is the chief differencing Cause so in other Instances an equal Impulse of God on unequally disposed subjects doth produce the Act of faith c. in one of them which it produceth not in the other through the incapacity of the recipient 4. Therefore there is a double degree of efficacy or Vis One which only so far moveth and helpeth the will as that it can do the act and sometime doth it without more Another which is so strong as that the second effect alwayes followeth it 5. But whenever the Act of faith is produced by force or Impulse more or less God is the first and principal cause of it and man but the second and the praise of it is accordingly due And I think this decision accommodateth both sides of our contenders § 26. The foresaid Impulse or first effect is only the work of God and the means and not ours But the Act of Faith Love c. is Gods work and ours and ours as Free-agents Therefore that Impulse of God which is Aptitudinally efficacious on supposition of mans due reception and self-excitation
is oft not Actually effectual for want of that Voluntary Reception and self-excitation § 27. As to the various effects of Grace fore-mentioned 1. As to the preparation of Means and Gracious medicine Christ the Covenant c. Grace is efficient of it self and doth it 2. As to the first Impulse or Impress on the soul God certainly effecteth it in some degree wherever his spirit worketh on the soul 3. Some Urgency and some degree of disposition to the act is constantly contained in this Impulse And usually it giveth a moral power to the Immediate Act-required 4. The Act of faith sometimes followeth this Impulse through its invincible force And sometime it followeth it through its sufficient force and the due Reception * * * Omne agens requirit de necessitate aliquam dispositionem in suo passo Maximè si illud pà ssum habeat dispositiones actionâ— illius agentis contrarias ut patet de igne c. Ergo cum Gratia non sit minus inmo magis quam naturalis forma Certum est quod Gratia requirit majorem dispositionem in passo Et voco illam dispositionem Libertatem arbitrii sui Deo submittere se ad alteram partem declinare scilicet ad volendum Gratiam recipere dolere de culpa commissa voluntarie libere per attritionem Brianson in 4. q. 8. cor 3. fol. 152. This is just the doctrine of our Protestant Preachers supposing that Common Grace must make this preparation which the Papists grant of the subject And sometimes it followeth it not at all through the Recipients indisposition 5. The Habit of faith ever followeth a special Act through the powerful operation of the Holy Ghost But usually it goeth not before the Act Man hath not a fixed Habit to promptitude and facility of believing before he believeth but after 6. The Habit ordinarily procureth following acts by the way of Inclination but not necessarily nor alwayes For by strong temptations Habits are oft born down § 28. If the question then be Whence Gods Grace is Aptitudinally and Potentially efficacious able and fit to effect It is because God is God that he is Able and his Impulse is such because he maketh it such And if the question be Whence Grace is Actually efficient of its first effect the Impulse It is because God will so do and his will hath no Cause being the first Cause And if the question be Whence Grace is Actually efficient of mans faith It is by its Impelling man to believe But if you ask Whence faith it self is or of what cause is it an effect I answer of God as the first cause and the Means as his Instrument and of the Believer as a free second Cause And if the question be Why sufficient Grace which is Effectual ad Posse is not effectual ad agere It is because being but sufficient mans Indisposition and wilful neglect or opposition maketh him an unfit Receiver § 29. There being nothing then but Gods essence and the means antecedent to the first effect on the soul and that effect ever following where God worketh and the second effect being the effect both of God by the first and of man as a free agent the questions unde efficatia Gratiae and unde effectus are thus healingly answered § 30. Obj. But the will of God is the first differencing and effectual Cause And that not as it is his essence but as it is terminated on the Creature and decreeth such an effect Answ 1. It is no will but his essence which is so terminated or decretive 2. That termination maketh no difference at all that 's real in the will of God but only in the effect or object 3. What is the difference then between Gods will simply in it self and as willing from eternity a thing not yet existent None really at all And that which is not yet being Nothing what Relative Connotative and Denominative difference such Nothings can make on the will of God besides the variety of imperfect notions in mans frail Intellect let the wise consider § 31. From whence it is that School-divines after Augustine say that with God there is no futurum velpraeteritum no fore-knowledge or fore-decrees properly because no difference of time but only knowledge and will of things as present § 32. Yet Gods Vital Activity Knowledge and Will as he himself is the object of them have a Greater distinction because to be self-living self-knowing and self-loving are his Essential Acts on himself the eternal object which made many Ancients account them the Trinity of persons And also to Will an existent Creature is an extrinsick denomination from existence But to will that which is not that man shall be that he shall believe hereafter c. as it is nothing really different from Gods essence so it is but an extrinsick denomination of his essence from nothing SECT XVI Of Infused Habits and the Holy Ghost Given us The Schoolmen that speak most for the necessity of Infused Habits cannot agree what use they are for Aureolus supposeth chiefly for the right circumstantiating of Acts rather than for promptitude to them and pleasure in them And when all is said they give men but small comfort from them saying as Aureolus Brianson c. that no man can be sure that he hath them seeing acquired Habits may do the same things that Infused do Utrum Beatitudo supernaturalis hujus vitae sit magis in Habitibus quam in operationibus vid. Suarez Metaph. disp 44. sect 8. n. 18. Molina 1. p. q. 12. ar 5. disp 2. ar 2. pro habitibus Sed contra inquit Aegid de Sancta Praesentatione Li. 4. de beatit q. 5. a. 3. pâ— 471. His non obstantibus oppositum affirmant omnes Theologi qui bac de re scripserunt nec videtur posse de hoc dubitari And yet Alens 2. p. q. 104. m. 3. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. a. 2. ad 3. q. 63. a. 2. ad 3. Valentiâ—â— To. disp 4. q. 3. punct 2. c. are for preferring Habits Idem Aegid de Praesentat li. 4. p. 443 444. tells us that by Grace God is Present in the soul as his Temple otherwise than by Immensity and sustentation But his praesentia Amicitia can mean nothing but the special effects of Gods Love Nostrâ tempestate non solum est temerarium periculosum sed ferè hareticum habitus insusos negare Nam Concil Vienens c. universi Theologi uno consensu affirmant dari habitus insusos Medina in 1. 2. q. 51. a. 4. 282. But Soto li. 2. de nat grat c. 17 18. saith that the Concil Trid. purposely forbore to define the case of infused habits Let the Reader note that Jansenius proveth that Pelagius himself asserted infused Habits given in baptism and that without merit Jans Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. § 1. EVery operation of the Holy Ghost is not the Giving
to Angels nor to Brutes For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible and another sort necessarily though freely determined to things spiritual so it pleased him to make a middle sort endued with Reason and free-will undetermined as to their choice and able freely to determine their own Volitions without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life by Laws and other moral means § 4. God as Creator maketh substances with their necessary Accidents and as the Natural Orderer of them placeth them in their natural order and as Motor or Actor he causeth Action as such But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order of Actions as far as belongeth to a Rector the rest being presupposed in Nature and leaveth it to man to cause the rest § 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man of a middle defectible undetermined Will left to his free choice with necessary helps it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature and is his first cause of Action § 6. God could prevent all future sin if he absolutely willed so to do either by destroying the World or disabling the sinner or by withholding his Moving Influx or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible But he that made man in this Middle state will so continue him and not make a change in the frame of Nature to fulfil our wills § 7. No Act as an Act no Vital Act as Vital no Intellection no Volition as such is Virtue or Sin And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil § 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner Ruler and our chief good efficiently as our Benefactor and finally as our End so to consent to these Relations and to the Duties of our correlations and to Practise them is the summ of all Moral Good even Dispositively and Actually to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner to obey and please him as our Ruler and to be Thankful to Him and totally Love Him as our Benefactor and our ultimate End All Moral Goodness lyeth in this § 9. By which it appeareth that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions as they are a Moral Agent 's related to God himself in these three Relations and to his Actions therein viz. his Disposals his Laws and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits § 10. In these the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them is Morality secundum quid § 11. And among them all our Action submission resignation patience to God meerly as our Owner is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense And our Actions as related to him as our Rector are Moral in the fuller formal sense And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality as being a relation to a Law But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor Lover and End are Moral in the highest most perfective notion § 12. It is not only sub rationâ— obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law that Love to God is Morally good but also in that superiour sense formally as it is the Love of God And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws and the fulfilling of the Law not only as commanded by a Law but as being the End of the Law and the state of perfection above it as Christ is to the Law of Moses and also as being a Law eminenter something greater though not formaliter § 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing All Love is Obedience and all Obedience is submission to our Owner But all Obedience is not Love nor all Submission or Resignation formal obedience to a Rector Though they must all concurr and not be divided when they are formally distinguished § 14. I have thought it necessary though I be guilty of some repetition to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality Virtue and Vice because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin till we know what sin is which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is which we cannot do till we know what Morality is And also because the Schoolmens most subtile elaborate enquiries into this point especially de naturâ— peccati are generally too little subtile or accurate as comparing it with this little you may perceive § 15. From all this it is plain 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature doth not cause us to Obey or Love him And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation § 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature viz. as it is Intellection Volition Action But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded is otherwise caused For though the Generical nature of Action Intellection and Volition as such be seldom found but in some Moral species and that be never found but in singular acts yet can one causality procure the Generical nature and another the Specifical and another the singularity in the same action As the Sun is the Generical Cause and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying and the Individuatio seminis the Individâ—â—aâ—ing of Plants Animals c. § 17. As God is the God of Nature so he hath setled Nature in such a constant course of motion as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations And therefore as the Sun aforesaid he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all Specifying and Individuating Causes according to their several natures or receptivities § 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action must of natural necessity ad esse by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free to its object compared with other possible objects and that in all its modes and circumstances do confound Nature and Morality and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused allowing the difference of the second effects â— yea but what he doth in causing every sin For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination § 19. Jesus Christ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means and the Spirit to co-operate are the proper second causes by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily
saith is not willed by the sinner himself § 33. So far as God Causeth not sin he willeth it not and they that say that he Loveth and Willeth the existence of it as a means to his glory abuse Gods Moliness and are confuted before Par. 1. § 34. How God overruleth sinners and the effects of sin and procureth his own ends not by the Means or Causality but Occasion of it I have so largely there opened that I must refer the Reader thither SECT XX. How far God and how far Man himself is the Cause of Hell and other punishments THough somewhat be said of this in the Conclusion of the second Jo. Major in 4. sent d. 50. fol. 289. q. 1. inquit concl 3. Sive actus damnatorum dicantur mali culpâ— vel peccata non patientur aliquam poenam inflictam ratione illorum actuum Quia non sunt in statu merendi demerendi sed addit Signanter de poena inflicta loquor quae à culpa distinguitur ejus est reordinativa per cruciatum De poena enim acta non est possibile dare culpam quin suam poenam habeat annexam eo modo quo idem potest habere se Ipsa scilicet peccandi continuatio est poenae miseriae continuatio Nec mihi probabile videtur quod Demerendi ratio cessat apud inferos Praemium quidem mereri non possunt At quare non Poenam commereri sunt putandi Nonne adhuc sunt subditi etiam ipsi daemones sub quadam Lege ideâ—que peccandi adhuc capaces nonne omne peccatum suâ naturâ meretur poenam Ipsius scilicet Joh. Majoris ibid. Conclus 1. Est Damnati habent multos malos actus in inferno libere An opâ—abilius sit damnà tum esse an non esse vide quae ibidem sequuntur ubi concludit Itaque tenco si daretur viro optio vel non esse vel esse in perpetua flamma quod licitè posset vel alterutrum eligendum est non esse Nam minus malum habet rationem boni See Aureolus in 2. d. 31. a. 2. pag. 301. shewing ten wayes how one sin causeth another and so multiplyeth and continueth it self in the wicked Part I think meet to say more here because I find that the not understanding it doth tempt many to unbelief and others to hard repining disaffected atheistical thoughts of God § 1. Again here consider that God made man such as he is in Nature before either Laws or sins or punishments had any being so that if you can but forgive God for making you men that is Rational Free-Agents you can have no fair pretence of quarrel with him As will appear by these considerations following § 2. Mans Body and sensitive soul are of such a nature as that things inconvenient will be his pain He that will take poison shall be griped and tormented by it and he that will eat unwholsome meat or will surfeit shall be sick and he that will cherish diseases by sloth or excesses or abuses of nature will have the pain of them And he that will wound himself or break his bones will be his own afflicter And he that cuts his throat or hangeth himself must dye And all this without any doing of God besides the making him a man and continuing such a nature under his Government in and with the world § 3. Not only positive hurting but omissions will bring mens bodies unto pain and death As not eating not exercising not keeping warm c. And consequently such a life of prodigality or sloth as tendeth to such wants § 4. The inward senses Imagination and Passions are so constituted as that their inconveniences will be a pain and torment as well as the inconveniences of the outward senses 1. Cares and Melancholy thoughts are distracting 2. Desires breed such care and are themselves like a thirst or hunger to the soul 3. Fears are tormenting 4. Sorrows if deep and long are as a living death 5. Anger is a vexatious feaver of the mind And revengeful malice and envy do prolong it 6. Despair anticipateth eternity of misery c. 7. And Love it self how pleasing soever at first is the strength of them all § 5. The superiour faculties as they are more noble are capable of greater misery and their corruption and disorder is the worst To have an ignorant erring mind that taketh evil for good and good for evil To have a carnal malignant wicked obstinate froward Will and sinful Affections and by these to have mens actions misguided and so the sensitive soul it self brought into the foresaid misery through bad government is a misery to man in the Nature and immediate effects of the thing § 6. Man liveth among multitudes of fellow Creatures in the world which will all be tormentors of him if he will make them such As a post will hurt him if he knock his head to it The fire will burn him if he touch his flesh with it The water will drown him if he will leap into it over-head The Sun will scorch him the frost will pain him if he expose himself to them A Lyon or Mastiff will tear him if he avoid them not His neighbours will hurt him likely if he hurt them and cross their interest Men in power will hurt him if he offend them And all things will be to him as he behaveth himself to them § 7. All this being Natural let us now consider what sin doth to the sinner here and you will find that almost all his calamity consisteth in his very sin it self and the natural effects of it But yet it is sin as mans and it is punishment as from God when yet God is no Cause of the sin § 8. This is plain if you consider that Gods Act by which he maketh sin a Punishment was Before the sin though the Relation of a Punishment come after the relation of sin Here are two Agents 1. God making Nature and a Law therein 2. Man disordering his actions by transgressing 3. Hence Immediately followeth Guilt or the form of sin 4. And with it even in the change or after it the natural pain of loss or hurt 5. And this is Related to man as a punishment for the sin in the last place For instance God made man and God made meat wine and poyson God telleth Man in Nature I have made thee such a Creature as that excess of Meat will make thee sick excess of Wine will make thee mad and Poyson will torment and kill thee I have given thee self-love and command thee that thou avoid all these and I will not deny thee necessary help But if thou wilt not it will be thy pain which I will that thou suffer for and by thy sin I need not further apply it here the application is obvious § 9. All this I speak only of natural punishments which by the Law of nature follow sin what is supernatural is after to be considered §
the difference seemeth to be founded 1. See what the Brittish Divines say in the Synod of Dort de art 3. 4. suffrag p. 124. Th. 1. There are certain outward works ordinarily required of men before they are brought to the state of Regeneration Rom. 10. 14. Mat. 6. â—â— Act. 13. 46. Psa 58. 5. or Conversion which use to be sometime freely done by them and sometime freely omitted as to go to Church to hear the Preaching of the Word and such like Th. 2. There are certain inward effects which are excited in the hearts of those that are not yet justified previous to Conversion and Regeneration Act. 2. 37. by the virtue of the word and spirit such as are the knowledge of Gods will the sense of sin the fear of punishment the thoughts of deliverance some hope of pardon To the state of Justification Gods grace useth not to bring men by sudden Enthusiasm but prepared and fitted or disposed by many previous actings by the Ministry of the word As in natural Generation there are many previous dispositions 1 Cor. 4. 15. before the reception of the form so in the spiritual we come to the spiritual birth by many foregoing actings of Grace If God would immediately Regenerate and Justifie a wicked man not prepared by any knowledge any sorrow any desire any hope of pardon there were no need of the Ministry of man and the Word Preached to do it Th. 3. Those that God thus affecteth by his spirit by means of the Word them he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth to faith and conversion We must judge of the helps of Grace by the nature of the offered benefit and by Gods plain word and not by the abuse and event Seâ—ing the Gospel of its own nature calleth men to Repentance and Salvation seeing the excitements of grace tend to it we must not think that 2 Cor. 5. 20. 2 Cor. 6. â—â— Gal. 1. 6. Rev. 3. 2. God here doth any thing dissemblingly Nor can it be imagined that that calling by the word and spirit can make men unexcuseable which is given only to that end to make them unexcuseable Th. 4. Those whom he thus affecteth God forsaketh not nor ceaseth to promote them in the true way to conversion before he is forsaken by them by voluntary neglect or the repulse of this initial grace The talent of grace once given men of God is not taken away from any man till he bury it by his own fault Therefore we are oft warned in Mat. 2â— 2â— Scripture not to resist or quench the spirit nor to receive the grace Heb. 3. 7. Prov. 1. 24. 2 Chron. 24. 20. of God in vain nor to fall from God Yea it is plainly given as the reason of Gods forsaking men that they first forsake him Th. 5. Many lose these beginnings Mat. 13. 19. Heb. 6. 4. 2 Pet. 2. 21. Th. 6. The Elect do not so behave themselves under these preparatory workings but that for their negligence and resistance they might justly be forsaken of God But such is Gods special mercy to them that though Joh. 6. 37. â—er 14. 7. 32. 39. Phil. 1. 6. for a time they may repel or suffocate this exciting and illuminating grace yet God doth urge them again and again and ceaseth not to promove them till he fully subjugate them to his grace and place them in the state of regenerate sons Th. 7. All men resist Gods grace and God might justly forsake all Rom. 9. 18. 11. 35. Act. 28. 27. but doth not By all this it is evident that they took not man to be forsaken of God in the state of meer original sin or the corrupt mass but as a wilful resister and refuser of offered Grace and oft after the receiving of much preparing grace and that God forsaketh none till they forsake his grace 2. To the same sence our English Divines commonly tell us how ordinarily God prepareth men for conversion before he convert them and how far persons unconverted may go in common grace He that readeth Mr. Hooker of New England Mr. John Rogers his doctrine of faith Mr. Boltons instructions for comfort Mr. Meads Almost a Christian and abundance such will see that they were of the same mind 3. Hence it is plain that those persons that resisted this further work of grace and forsook God first had true Power to have done otherwise and could have gone further than they did without any other grace than they had Though quoad necessitatem sequentem vel consequentiae it might be inferred even from Gods prescience that it could not be 4. They here describe Gods effectual grace by moral titles of Gods urging them till they yield though as after they open it Gods renewing active influx maketh new creatures and is not a meer moral indetermining suasion leaving the will indifferent 5. The truth is as is aforesaid no mortal man can tell of any difference on Gods part between his common and special agency on souls but only on the part of the work done Nay it is against the doctrine of all â—orts of Divines both Papists and Protestants as to the generality that there is any difference at all For they all say that all Gods actions ad extra are noâ—hing but his essence viz. his essential knowledge will and power which is undividedly one as terminated effecting related and denominated variously E. g. by one Volition he willeth divers products but not by divers volitions See the Conclusion of the first Chapter ex parte sui either considered specifically or numerically but the specification and individuation is only in the effects and in Gods will as relatively denominated And if this be all mens doctrine what an unhappy case is the Church faln into that the very same men that say this should yet intolerably quarrel Whether this one Divine attingency or operation shall be called Creation infusion urgency excitation perswasion physical hyperphysical moral or what else when all are agreed that all are one and the same ex parte Dei And as to the effects I do my self think that a certain Impulse received on the soul is the first effect and the Act of man as faith is but a second and that of both Causes But we cannot tell well what that Impulse is And therefore must dispute in the dark about the differences of it And this is nothing to them that own nothing but Gods essence as the cause of our act as the first effect If their opinion hold true that as in Creation there was no mediate Impulse between the Creator and the Creature for there was no recipient so here there is no effect on the soul before the Act and habit of faith it self then what is that Grace whose Ratio efficaciae we can make a Controversie of Ad hominem at least I may say that it is common acts and habits overtopt by fleshly interest and concupiscence which
are wrought by common grace and that it is special acts and habits overcoming the flesh and world which are wrought by special grace So that those firemen that are resolved that yet differ they will and implacably differ and their adversaries shall be enemies of Gods Grace whether they will or not are yet defective in that acuteness and pregnancy of wit which is necessary to pretend a real disagreement and are forced to say that they disagree when they have not wit enough to seem to prove it to any but those that take their cholerick zeal and reproach for proof For in this there is no difference among us 6. Obj. At least we can prove that we differ in this about the effects that one side make Gods gracious habits given to believers to be such as may be lost and dye and the other do not Answ That is no difference You still want wit to make differences though you want not will For both sides are agreed that perseverance ariseth not from the meer nature of the Habit of grace but from Gods superadded sustentation For Adam and the faln Angels had as is commonly held such kind of habitual grace as we though objectively differing 7. Seeing there is no difference on Gods part as they all conclude Resistible grace and irresistible sufficient and effectual can have no difference but in the very effect or event and the connotation of mans Power or impotency to the contrary I know as I have said that not only the Dominicans and Calvinists but Suarez and other Jesuits say that Effectual Grace is such ex parte principii as is forcibler for faith as the effect But they contradict themselves who confidently say that besides that effect it is nothing but Gods essence which hath no degrees or real differences And mans power of Resistance and frustration is none as to Gods will and essence but only as to the effect When he could have done otherwise 8. The same Vanity they declare in the question Whether the same degree of Divine Grace help or operation would Convert one man as doth another or would Convert as doth not Convert When they are agreed that the effect is not the same and that the cause hath no degrees of difference 9. And though it 's past mans understanding to comprehend how all the various effects in the world should be produced without the least diversity in the Cause Will or Action ex parte agentis and that Velle salvare Petrum velle damnare Judam should be perfectly the same Volition ex parte Volentis yet it is the liker to be true because man cannot comprehend it as long as he hath no evidence to prove that it is not true For God is incomprehensible 10. Seeing then that we must concent 1. That God Decreed to do all that he doth and properly and absolutely no more 2. And that Christs death is the cause of all that it effecteth and properly of no more Of which the conditional gift of pardon and life is part And so that all the Controversie 1. Of Decree 2. Of Redemption is resolved into that of the effects 3. And seeing all the effects are such whose difference we little differ about if at all and ex parte Dei agentis they agree that there is no difference where then is the Difference among all the contenders §. II. Alvarez his Epitome in Twenty Propositions considered BUt that all this may more plainly appear I will recite the Twenty Conclusions which Alvarez in his Epilogus giveth us as the summ of all his Book one hundred twenty one Disputations And I shall tell you how far they are all to be consented to * Thus Bradwardine concludeth his Book with thirty six errors and as many verities which he would have the Church especially that of Rome determine But leaving out the most unsavoury parts or expressions of his own judgement Whether God be the chief necessitating Cause of all sin is none of them I. Free-will in lapsed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work which by co-operation of the supernatural End shall be truly good and a work of Virtue so as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved simply above all as to the ultimate natural End Answ It is granted and more that though all natural men have one sort of Grace given them yet I think this cannot be done without special saving grace II. Man by the sole strength of nature cannot assent to all supernatural mysteries propounded and explained to him as revealed of God or because revealed of God so as the formal reason of his belief is Divine revelation Answ It 's true He must have commoner grace to believe them dogmatically and uneffectually and special saving grace to believe them practically and savingly III. Not only faith it self but also the first beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace and not from the strength of Nature only Answ Very true IV. The free-will of man in lapsed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all simply even as he is the author of Nature Answ It 's true V. Man in lapsed Nature without the help of Grace cannot fulfill all the precepts even of the Law of Nature nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation even for any little time which it is necessary to overcome for the keeping of that Law Answ True Therefore they have some Grace that do it VI. There is no Law nor ever was made by God of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace to them that do all that is in them by the sole faculty of nature nor hath Christ merited or would have any such Law Answ True For he giveth some common grace to all men antecedently without any condition on their part And though he give to those that use their common grace to the utmost or near it sufficient encouragement to go on and hope that such endeavour shall not be in vain as to the obtaining of peculiar grace yet de nomine vel definitione Whether this encouragement shall be called a Law or a Promise or neither we contend not VII God by his helping grace floweth into free-will by premoving it that it may co-operate and also truly-efficiently together with the same free-will causeth its pious operation Answ It 's true But all adjuvant grace produceth not the second effect which floweth from both Causes of which before and after VIII When God by his exciting Grace striketh and toucheth the hearts of men he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty begin its motion by Consenting But God by adjuvant grace effecteth that it freely and infallibly Consent Answ It 's true of all that do consent But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace which are Necessary and give the posse Velle which cause not the act through mans defect And though God expect not that effect as one that is deceived
yet he commandeth it and requireth it of us But exciting and adjuvant Grace are all one on Gods part And if you will difference the same things as connoting divers effects you must denominate it more fitly from the effects by words that notifie the difference IX Adjuvant Grace and Free-will are not Partial Causes of supernatural Consent as two drawing a Boat so as neither is premoved by the other or maketh it co-operate with it Answ True For God premoveth the will of man though through mans fault it be not ever effectual And though Gods will and mans be two Causes of the same effect the term Partial is scarce fit while man hath his whole power and activity from God X. Scientia media is not to be ascribed to God But all prescience of the future co operation of the will even from the foresaid Hypothesis presupposeth in signo rationis the free decree of Gods will by which absolutely or granting that Hypothests he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good and permit it if Evil. Answ Here come in your presumptions of things unknown or false 1. That God knoweth future contingents and conditionals is certain But I think this scientia media unfitly named and an unnecessary distribution and insufficient to the Jesuits ends 2. And your fiction of signa rationis and the necessary antecedence of a decree of Gods to his knowledge of every Volition of man is a more ungrounded and perillous figment which you have not proved It seemeth a denyal of Gods Omniscience or perfection that he cannot know an act future as future but only as decreed to be so 3. You deceitfully talk of permitting evil while you plead for the irresistible predetermining premotion of the will by God to every evil act with all its circumstances Is that but Permitting 4. To permit is Nothing no act of God but a non-agency not to hinder And how prove you that God must of necessity have a Positive Decree for every Nothing or non-agency Is not the not-willing or not-decreeing to hinder a lye e. g. supposing natural concurse or to make more worlds enough to the production of that lye by an ill inclined nature or to the not-being of more Worlds We are in the dark and God is infinitely above us and these tremendous mysteries are not to be so presumptuously handled by unproved assertions XI There is on our part no Cause Reason or Condition assignable for which Gods supernatural providence in comparison of this or that hath the formal reason of predestination or retaineth the common reason of providence but predestination is to be reduced into the sole free-will of God Answ Most of this is about meer words The word Predestination connoteth various effects and objects and so is called various Acts. There is no efficient Cause in the Creature of any act of God But there are objects without which Gods Acts have not their special denominations and these objects are the termini and called Material Constitutive Causes of those various acts as denominated various specially or numerically And so Gods Decree or Will to Justifie and Glorifie man hath something in the object as a necessary condition of it * * * That is of that object which is not â—â— the object of his decree of giving faith And that hath something in its object which is not in the object of the decree of giving a Redeemer to the World or making the World c. if you will at all distinguish Gods decrees by their objects or effects But if not there will be no matter for any Controversie And Predestination is an ambiguous word If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing or all about man or all of Good to us then our Being is the first effect of it in us and the making of the World a preparatory effect c. And so no doubt the first effect supposed us no men before and therefore no condition in us But if you take Predestination for Gods decree of Giving us Grace and Glory only then it is presupposed that we are lapsed sinners And the decree of damning men is exercised only on them as foreknown damnable sinners And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to sinners for sin supposeth them such punishable sinners But the bare Negation of a Decree to give faith to one to whom the absence is no privation is unfitly called Reprobation though men may talk at their own rates And we grant that some such no-decrees have no condition in the objects for they have no objects e. g. If you will feign that God decreed from eternity to give me no faith before the Creation or before I was born or to give Innocent Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him this were no reprobating act But when God hath given men a Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept here if he deny them necessary grace to believe it is a penal act And note that Christ and Common grace as absolutely given to mankind and offered to individuals ever goeth before mens accepting or refusing him And no man to whom he is offered refuseth him for want of necessary help till by sin against that grace he forfeit it XII God by an absolute and efficacious decree of his Will antecedently to the prescience of the future good use of free-will predetermined all good acts which are done in time specially those by which the predestinate come to eternal life Answ The substance of this seemeth true only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree efficacious from eternity which effecteth nothing till the Time I leave to them that dispute of words 2. You presumptuously determine Gods Decrees to be antecedent to his prescience herein when they are neither before nor after one another 3. If by predetermining you mean more than predecreeing or prevolition as if mans will was predetermined when it was not determined or determined before it had a being you speak contradictions But Gods own will was eternally determined if we may so say of that which was never undetermined to give all the grace that he giveth in time and to cause all the good acts that he causeth as he causeth them XIII The Co-operation of free-will with the gifts of grace is in the predestinate an effect of predestination and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to co-operate and consequently dependeth not on the sole and innate liberty of the will Answ I think so too XIV We must necessarily distinguish of a twofold help of Grace one sufficient by which man may be converted to God or work piously The other effectual by which God effecteth that he be actually converted and act piously Answ Hold to that and contradict not the terms in your description and all 's well XV. The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth mans free-will to act not only by perswading alluring inviting or other
sinners find a good will to goodness and like it and many years perhaps are wishing and purposing to leave their sins for it and turn to God till at last Love prevaileth And this though imperfect is true sincere Love not from a perfect habit but from the excitation of the Holy Ghost It hath the same object as perfect Love that is Justice for Justice or God for God not loved on consideration of any other reward which proveth it sincere Love Such wish to live chastely temperately justly but cannot come to it Out of this imperfect love springs faith faith may be habitually many years before Justification Justification is the grace of perfect Love to God above all Hope and Perfect Love also come from this initial Love c. 7 8 9. XVIII As Hope so Reward and respect to it may stand with this grace of Love For the Reward is not desired ex amore concupiscentia for our selves only cum enim charitatis proprium sit unica voluptas diligere Deum non quia hoc sibi suave vel utile vel gloriosum est vel alia quacunque consideratione redundat in se sed quia ita est ordo creaturâ— sub creatore qui propter seipsum super omnia ex superexcellenti bonitate diligendus est ita unicum praemium est veritatem bonitatem Dei facie ad faciem contemplando ardentius amare lauaare Deum non quia utile est beatificum diligenti sed quid aeâ—â—rnae veritati congruum dilecto debitum c. Amoris hic inchoati Amor futurus consummatus unica merces Praemium Dei ipse Deus est Quisquis delabitur ab illa charitatis puritate ut amore concupiscentiae incipiat velle concupiscere sibi Deum totum dilectionis ordinem quem natura docet Lex aeterna praecipit diligendi perversitate perturbat Nam Deum ad se refert seipso fruitur quorum utrumque aeterna indispensabili lege proscriptum est c. 10. XIX The fear of punishment and attrition is good being fâ—gâ— mali an Antecedent of wisdom It is from a certain general grace but not that properly called the grace of Christ The Spirit of the Old Testament even of fear is Gods Spirit not that which Christ dyed to give men which is contrary delectation but another much inferiour grace which after the firm belief of Gods judgement and eternal punishment fortassis Gratiam peculiaris cujusdam providentiae operationis non excedit They that have but the Righteousness of fear by knowing the Law have not Gods righteousness but their own Indeed they have faith and that radicated but not Christs proper grace but that which may come ex proprii arbitrii viribus excited by providence or if you will inspired fear no sin can be avoided by it but by other sin c. 22 23 c. It is but of self-love It is Legal righteousness and our own c. 31 32. XX. Liberty of will is either meer Voluntariness whose contrary necessity is involuntarii coactio or that free state which is the Love of God consistent with simple necessity lib. 7. XXI Gratia Christi est Praedeterminatio voluntatis sed non Dominicanorum praedeterminatio 1. Praedeterminatio physica est motio nescio quae virtuosa habens esse incompletum ut colores in aâ—re impetus in impulso Gratia Christi est verissimus motus voluntatis ineffabilis viz. delectatio c. 2. Praed physica non est eis actus Vitalis animi sed aliquid cui voluntas tantum passive subjacet Gratia contra c. 3. Praedet physica in quibuscunque circumstantiis voluntas collocetur omnem superat resistentiam semper facit effectum contra delectatia victrix si alter ardâ—ntior est in solis inefficacibus desideriis haerebit animus 4. Praed physica est instar concursus cujusdam generalis Dei in ordine supernaturali Adjutorium Christi non ita 5. Praed physica necessaria statuitur omnibus agentibus ex vi causae secundae c. Christi adjutorium laesa tantum voluntati propter vulnus necessarium est 6. Praed physica propter naturalem indifferentiam voluntatis exigitur Gratia non ita 7. Praed physica statui innocentiae necessaria dicitur Gratia Christi non ita ergo hi Dominicani magis Aristotelici quam Augustiniani sunt Gratia tamen est Praed physica And grace and free-will are reconcilable as Predetermination and free-will are l. 8. c. 2 3 4. Summa est quod Gratia Amantem Volentem facit non tantum posse velle dat In conclusion he belyeth Calvin 1. As denying in man boni mali electionem and so in many â—ther points cap. 21. XXII His doctrine of Predestination as congruous to this I pass by â—nly adding that he denyeth Angels to be elected of grace or to perseveâ—ance which was but foreseen and they were made to differ not by â—race but by merits Man is elected to merits and glory but to glory â—efore the foresight of merits The Reprobation of Angels was after the â—urpose of giving them sufficient grace and the foresight of sin Permisâ—â—on of sin was no effect of it But the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute will of men in original sin and the effect of it excaecation and obduration but not the permission of the first sin lib. 10. This is the Epitome of Jansenius as far as concerneth our present business The Animadversions § 2. I. IT seems Augustine and Pelagius were both pious men that differed in the methodizing and wording those fundamental conceptions in which they agreed by which Pelagius ran into errors And I doubt he was not so innocent as Jansenius intimateth when he maketh Augustine to be the first true Teacher of grace and Pelagius his Opinion to have been so antient And if it were not too bold to say so against one that read over all Augustine ten times and all his writings against the Pelagians thirty times I would say that I think that Austin owned more universal grace and free-will than Jansenius supposeth him to have owned Of Prosper and Fulgentiuâ— it cannot modestly be denyed who I think were of Augustines mind II. He confesseth that self-determining free-will and sufficient Grace were the condition of the Angels and innocent man and so that it is not alien to Gods government or prerogatives for subjects to be so Ruled and Judged III. He seemeth to me to ascribe far too much to innocent man and Angels in using sufficient grace when he maketh their wills the chief laudable cause of the effect I rather think that no Angel ever did any good the chief praise of which was not due to God as the principal first cause God giveth them all the power liberty help means motives by which they do it Besides that they did nothing but what he fore-decreed and willed they should eventually do Therefore there is no good but of him as the first cause though not
have it not want it because they refused Preparatory grace which they were able to have better used oâ— submitted to So that the Reward is only such as a free gift which quoad ordinem conferendi rationes adjudicandi is given by God as a Father who at once useth Power Love and paternal Justice according to the tenour of his own Law of Grace which is founded in Christs perfect merits and is Christs own Law VIII and IX 1. That quoad eventum the good Angels grace was effectual and Adjutorium quo as well as sine quo non he granteth And Adams till he fell Let us find out the difference then To say that yet They could have sinned is a doubtful speech If could signifie Pâ—tâ—â—â—iam naturalem it is noâ— for want of Natural Power that Christ himself sinned not but because perfection caused the right use of that Power To be able to sin or not to believe or not to love God if it signifie any more than the Natural power which men abuse is an improper speech for sin is from moral impotency or indetermination and not an vaâ—t of other power But a Logical Possibility of any event but what â—ame to pass Gods very fore-knowledge will exclude and so his Decree And if the question be Whether Adam could not have stood when he fell it is agreed that he could It seemeth then that our Controversie lyeth plainly â—â— these two things 1. Whether any man now Holy or unholy have any help from God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more â—â—â—â— other than he doth or to forbear any more evil 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation â—e such as of it self alone will inferr the â—â—â—tainty of mans Volition as the Effect We gâ—ant that Divine prescieâ—â—â— doth inferr it eâ—â—â—oessitate infallibilitâ—â—â—â— Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed and that God hath no other operation but Volition as Bradwardine and others Others deny this 〈…〉 that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition aâ—â—â—tellection is and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be because he held that the free-will of Adam before his fall and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation And yet â—ethinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God willed or decreed However the former is but a wordy strife For if God operate only Volendo yet his will as Immanent and a meer will as mans must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation So then the thing in question is Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum viz. fidem charitatem humanam secuturum And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus it followeth Deus praescâ—t hoc futurum ergo futurum est so ex perfectione Voluntatis summo Imperio foelicitate Divina it followeth Deus vult hoc futurum esse ergo futurum est and that ex necessitate existentiae no doubt it is a good consequence Deus hoc fecit ergo factum est But Whether from his meer adjutorium or prime efficiency limited by his own will it be a good consequence God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition ergo man will consent or will is the doubt He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed but he thinks that now it will We grant that God giveth not only the posse velle but the ipsum velle to those that have it His giving it being but a causing their faculties to Act And we grant that wherever God absolutely willeth that his Help shall be successful it is so And also that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power and Gods grace conjunct God is the cause of both And is ever the total cause quoad effectum that is totius effecti And we grant that Gods causing Impress on the will is such on some and perhaps on all in the act of special sanctification as ex vi causae will inferr the effect and is unresistible and doth not only determine the will but so determineth it as overcometh all moral power or disposition to the contrary But yet that there is a Grace or adjutorium of Christ which giveth a power either not necessitating the act or when the act followeth not such as he calleth sine quo non I think for these reasons 1. Because else no man can do any more good or less evil than he doth which I believe not 2. Because else All men that perish are damned only for original sin and its consequents which they had never power to avoid which is quite contrary to the tenour of the Scripture 3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency whereas he will judge them by Christ and by his Remedying Law for rejecting the remedying grace 4. And then the Conscience of the damned would have nothing to torment them with or accuse them for but original sin and its unavoidable consequents And it would give them this excuse and ease God never made it Possible for me to do otherwise 5. Because it teacheth men great ingratitude to say I never had any help of Christ 6. And so it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their sin if they do but find themselves wicked and to say I never sinned against any Grace of Christ 7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival and mercy which the reprobate have from some other Cause and not by Christ And so to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace 8. Because God is Immutable and too gross mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government Therefore it seemeth to me an injurious fiction to say as Jansenius that God had such Laws as supposed mans self-determining will and governed so as to use sufficient Grace or adjutorium sine quo non to man and Angels at the first and thaâ— now he hath no such at all but only a moving efficiency I should sooner yield to the Dominicans and Hobbes that no other than necessitated Volitions are possible or ever were than to hold as he that there were other before the fall and none ever since For as to his great argument vitiated nature I answer it 1. Man is man still And therefore God ruleth him as man And that in via And if then man and Angels were supposed to have a self-determining free-will that could do this or not do it we have reason to think it is so still Why is not grace meerly sufficient as consistent with Lapsed as Innocent nature supposing that it is not the
strange But I must say 1. That I see no cogent proof of this super-angelical nature 2. That seeming congruities and conveniences must not embolden us to take up a doctrine which is new and strange to the Church of Christ in so great a matter as the Natures and person of Christ are 3. And were it never so true if it be not sufficiently revealed to us in Gods Word it cannot be necessary to our salvation 4. Yea presuming too boldly to conclude of unrevealed things so high seemeth to me dangerous temerity curiosity and prophaneness like the Bethshemites or Uzzah's meddling with the Ark and the Sons of Aâ—râ—n offering false fire Let them therefore here thus proceed that dare For I dare not § 18. But this much I easily concede 1. That as all Being is originally from God so there is a continued divine causation of them without which they would all cease or be annihilated which some call a continued Creation and some an Emanation and some a continued Action or operation ad rerum esse And it is an intolerable errour to hold that God hath made the World or any part of it self-sufficient or Independent as to himself as to Being Action or Perfection We grant therefore that all the world is so far United to God as to depend on his continued causality And that the Beams do not more depend on the Sun or Light heat and motion on the Sun and other fire nor the branches fruit and leaves more depend on the Tree than the Creature on God § 19. 2. I grant that thus far the world may be said to be one as all things are united in one first cause from which they flow and by which they are § 20. 3. But yet all these are no parts of God as the fruit and leaves are of the Tree and as the beams are of the Sun 's But they are Creatures because Gods emanation or causation is creative causing the whole Being of the effect And it seemeth likest to the Sun or fire's causation of Motion Light and Heat as they are in the Recipient distinct ab essentia actione Agentis quà tuli § 21. 4. I grant that though as to proximity of essence God is no further from one Creature than from another being intimate to all immediatione essentiae yet he useth one Creature as a second Cause to operate on another and that the Higher and Nobler operate on the lower and more ignoble And in that sense we may conceive that some Creatures are first from God or nearest to him that is of the highest nature and use And so we deny not but that it is like that in the Creation God made one nature existent e. g. the highest Intellectual as more excellent powerful pregnant active and perfect than any of the rest that there was in the wonderful diversity some one that was Best and above the rest § 22. 5. I grant that it soundeth probably that the first and noblest Nature in specie should be found but in one Individual But of this there is not the least certainty to us mortals viz. Whether from one God first flow one perfect Created Intelligence of Spirit or ab uno plures two three or millions in the first order flow from one God Though in nature we see that from the trunk of the Tree few great members first arise and multiplicity is in the extremities And we grant that the greatest multiplicity appeareth where things dwindle to littleness or baseness One sound Sheep iâ— better than a rotten one that hath a thousand Worms in his Veins and Intestines And a man that hath a thousand Lice on his Head is not the Nobler And when the one soul hath left a Garkass it may turn to thousands of contemptible Vermine And a Looking-glass broken into an hundred pieces is not the better because it will make an hundred images of the face But yet we are strangers to Gods unseen works further than he revealeth them and therefore must confess our ignorance § 23. 6. We grant that all Gods works have some Union Concord and Harmony among themselves which yet consisteth with numerical diversity And though Men and other Animals walk about with Bodies that touch not one another and therefore the ignorant conceive of them as totally incoherent and think that though Pears Apples and other Fruit on the Tree and Trees in the Earth be both Many and Divert and yet parts of one Tree and of one Earth yet it is not so with animals because the union of spiritual beings in invisible yet indeed it is not probable that the souls of Animals have no dependant coherence with noblet supriour Spirits Though because we know of no nature above the Intellectual it is utterly uncertain to us Whether Humane souls depend on any proper superiour Cause of their Being but God alone immediately For God causeth the highest Natures without any mediate second Cause Though as to ORDER and helps of action and well being they may depend on others as the several Wheels or parts of the same Watch or Clock or as the Sheep upon the Shepherd § 24. Augustine de Anima is put to it whether he will hold 1. That souls are Many and not One 2. Or One and not Many 3. On both One and Many The two first he rejecteth The last he confesseth hard to defend but seemeth most inclined to But what Union he meant is hard to conjecture Whether that they were all the spiritual Parts of one Universal or one Greater soul if souls may be Parts or Whether distinct products of one such soul either Universitatis or hujus systematis or Whether One Relatively and Politically by making up one society or Whether one because emaning from one spring or Causa prima The two last are certain The two first are far otherwise § 25. 7. If he could prove that there is one First Best Universal created Intelligence or super-Angelical Spirit which God made the chief of all second causes by which he created and governeth all the rest and that this is Christ in his second Nature we would not deny but that Christ as the Mediator of Nature as Mr. Sterry calleth him is in all other Creatures as the Cause is in the being of the effect But it would not follow that the Essence of Christ or this Universal Intelligence is any Constitutive Cause or part of each creature For as God causeth them by Creative Emanation and not as a Constitutive part of them so we should rather hold that under God by a Power of producing Entities received from him this Universal Spirit did the same in a subordinate second place § 26. But his Opinions which I am now most concerned to renounce are those about Gods Moral Government his Laws Justice our free-will sin guilt and Gods Redemption Judgement and Punishment of man all which I think he much subverteth § 27. And I. I take the root of his error to be
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
us in all this * Vid. Episcop Instit Theo. li. 4. sect 5. cap. 7. pag 415. col 1. 4. But as to presumption hereupon I answer you 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuse even Christ and the hopes of Heaven it self 2. As long as wickedness is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from he that is wicked may be sure that he hath not the benefit nor mark of Election and cannot have the least assurance that he is elect 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to persevere in godliness this is no rational inducement to him to forsake godliness any more than to renounce Heaven but rather to conclude I am decreed to persevere in holiness therefore I must so do 4. And to pass by the Controversie of perseverance till we come to it it is as all confess so few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election that this Objection can extend but to a few 5. Lastly None are certain of their Election but such as have strong clear active Grace and evidence that believe firmly and love God much and obey him carefully And such as these are fit to improve assurance and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude Did you ever know what love and thankfulness and delight in God and holiness are and yet can you think that they are the way to sin You know nothing in Religion if you know not that they are the life and soul of true Religion and the most powerful principles of Obedience and Perseverance Nor do you understand the Gospel-design if you know not that the greatest manifestation of the love of God is the greatest means of love and thankfulness and desire and delight in God and goodness unto man The ninth Crimination A. At least thus * Suetonius saith Tiberius was a neglecter of Religion because he thought that all things were ruled by fate Fate is set up in the World and all things are under necessity and unavoidable B. You had this Objection about necessity before and to the answer of it I refer you further 1. Immutable Election doth set up but a consolatory quietting certainty in the World without which mans mind must still be in troublesome unquiet if not tormenting terrours Is it a wrong to you if you can be sure to be saved Had you rather live and die under these apprehensions I know not whether I shall be in Heaven Kipping Philonatur l. 9. c. 11. p 431. voluntas ista absoluta hominem cum effectis suis ineluctabiliter necessitat hoc est ad unum oppositorum necessario constringit determinat omnia ejus acta eventa ut non aliter evenire queant quam eveniant where he confuteth Piscators Arguments for such necessitating Decrees p. 432 c. or Hell for ever If you have not certainty or a hope that is somewhat near it I think this conclusion if you be awake and in your wits must needs make your life a constant bondage and the fear of death your constant misery and must blast all the pleasures of your fulest Prosperity Thank God that his Foundation standeth sure and the Lord knoweth who are his and see that you keep his mark upon you professing Christ and departing from iniquity And do not cry out as if you were fatally carried to Heaven against your wills 2. As for the word Fate it is ambiguous Some by fate mean but the certainty that God's Predictions shall be fulfilled Quod fatur eveniet Some mean only the certain connexion of Causes and Effects under Gods sapiential Government of the World As Campanella maketh Necessity Fate and Harmony to be the result of Power Wisdom and Love but not accurately enough And some say but how truly I know not That the Stoicks took Fate for some primary necessitating Cause which did necessitate all Acts of the Gods and Men. It is a word that we have no need of they that will play them with it may 3. But as to Necessity again I say 1. Election maketh no mans sin or misery necessary nor tendeth to it 2. It maketh no mans Salvation Thus Fewrbornius in Fascicul Disser de termino vitae useth 17 Arguments contra sententiam Calvinianam de fatali simpliciter necessario termino vitae quasi Deus ex absoluto simplici decreto absque ullo ad causas secundas physicas voluntarias respectu câ—ique hominum genus horam mortis praesixerat And all upon the encouragement of some ill and unsound words of Piscator who is most extream in this whereas this is none of the Calvinists sense commonly who hold that sin is only fore-seen and not decreed but all true means are decreed with the end in one Decree therefore respected as decreed necessary against his will in sensu composito 3. The more it maketh our Salvation necessary that is certain and insuperable the greater is Gods mercy the greater our happiness and cause of gratitude and Joy The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their persevering blessedness If you shall Object That it necessitateth the perishing of all others because none can be saved who are not Elect. Remember that this was your third Crimination and is answered before I say again 1. Necessity and Impossibility are either Logical in ordine probandi or Physical in ordine causandi The first sort followeth upon your own Doctrine He that God fore-knoweth shall sin and perish it necessarily followeth Necessitate consequentiae and it is impossible but it should follow that he will sin and perish but not by Gods fore-knowledge Causal necessitating either taketh away the true power of escaping or depriveth of such power by prevention But so doth not the Election or Decree of God 2. Though we hold such absolute Election as hath been opened to you and that God decreeth to cause men to believe before he fore-seeth that they will believe in order of Nature according to humane Conception yet we hold as you do that Reprobation doth not so proceed but that God decreeth men to Hell only on fore-sight of final wickedness which he never caused or willed And if in this we agree with you you must accuse your selves as much as us 3. God doth both Decree to give and actually give men power to do more than they do And his decreeing that another man shall well use that power which he hath doth sure take away no power from you 4. Yea Gods not decreeing to cause you to use your own power well doth take none of it from you But includeth that such power you have much less his Decree to do more for others 5. All the World acknowledgeth that a Benefactor as such is free to give his own benefits as he pleases unequally And giving more to one taketh nothing from another Suppose that
less a cause in man least of all in man when he is no man 5. The word Condition either respecteth 1. The thing or event willed 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event 3. Or that Will radically consider'd in it self I opened this before but think of it again for the reason of the distinction is very plain And 1. God damneth no man but for sin nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace but for sin Therefore the event no doubt is before-hand conditional that is dependeth on a condition God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently and not else 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly may be called A conditional Act or Will But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition * Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas that is in respect of the punishment willed thereby this hindreth not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And unless we understand the Fathers thus we must charge them with an Opinion which Aquinas is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm c. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 49. But 1. The actus reprobantis as really distinct from the effect is nothing but Gods Essence And who saith that sin causeth Gods Essence 2. And the effect of Reprobation as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate Gods Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement Ruiz de praedef d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis praedâ—finitus suit reproborum numerus Dr. Twisse denieth none of this 6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally all the Christian world almost confess And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing that should tempt good people to father it on God or attribute the being of it to his Will or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise 7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general but with all its modes and circumstances he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin or the immediate necessary cause of it which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear C. God willeth not the Form that is sin as sin and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form and yet not will it as sin To will it as sin is to take the form of sin as such to be good and so to be the ratio volendi which few if any Sinners ever do But to will both matter and form in one not as the formal reason of Volition but making total sin the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end this is possible for a very wicked man to do But I think the ordinary case of Sinners is not at all to will the form of sin but cast that by and to will the matter of it for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness that they will not malum sub ratione mali or sin because it is sin but for another end And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do C. God willeth it to a good end and they to an evil end B. As evil must not be done that good may come by it so neither must it be willed to that end Man may need such a * Sure Arminius granteth enough and that which â—theâ—us and many School-men deny and for my parâ— I cannot grant when he saith At per accidens bonum est ut malum siat propter Det saptentiam bonitatem potentiam secundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae suaeillustrandae sumit Est ergo peccatum isto respectâ— non medium per se illustrandae Gloriae Divinae sed occasio tantum non data in hunc finem neque natura sua ad illum accommodata sed a Deo arrepta horsum mira arte landabili abusu usurpata Armin. exam Perkins pag. 508. An occasion it is indeed but I will not grant that ex peccato God setcheth matter for his Glory nor that by accident it is good ut fiat Caeterum peccata etiam secundum rationem malitiae moralis objecta sunt seu materia circa quam divina praedestinatio versatur â—o modo quo versatur poenitentia Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. dâ—sp 93. c. 2. means to his ends but so cannot God Yea men have oft good ends for evil Acts Many lye to glorifie God and sin for his Cause and Church and for their own and other mens Salvation Much of the Blood and Cruelties and Superstitions in the World have had good ends which yet excused not the things from sinfulness C. God is under no Law and therefore cannot sin But man is B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man 2. Gods natural essential Perfection is his Law and more than a Law to him And from that Perfection all Laws in the world that are just and good have their Original that is Gods own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature and Mans Laws are authorized by and subservient to and derived from the Laws of God in Nature and Scripture So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God he saith That the Law is not made for the Righteous 3. If Gods Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law forbidding sin on pain of Hell the same Wisdom and Holiness with his Justice and Mercy will not will the sin so forbidden nor cause it nor consist with so doing C. It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth but the existence and futurity or event not sin but that sin be B. I many a year studied thinking to prove that true But I doubt it is but a game at words and groundless distinguishing for a false conclusion For 1. Sin is a Relation formally even a disconformity of an Act or disposition and so of the person to Gods Law It can no otherwise be caused but by making the Law and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform God maketh the Law and God maketh man and his faculties and God causeth the Object and God permitteth the tempter If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin And so of his Volitions or Decrees As for the essence of sin in notion without the existence more
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially
is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world judge by their confuted words in the former Book 1. They deny not nor can do that Love and Volitiâ—â— in God are all one Gods Love is not a Passion but his Will 2. They say that God willeth that sin exist 3. And that as summè unicè conducible to his Glory 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being so is he in the greatness and power and efficacy of his Volitions 7. And that man loveth not nor willeth not evil as evil or sin as sin but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory for which he willeth its existence And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is C. Yet it sticks with me that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World and all Sin which is the common work of the World should be without or against his Will Providence is wronged by this B. You mistake the matter 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will under moral Government was not from impotency as if he could have made man no better or more necessary an Agent But of his Wisdom and Freedom by which he made the Bruits without Reason and Stones without Sense 2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God which determineth only of Duty and not directly of Event But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees 3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first â—ook that Gods Providence doth about mans sin and then you will â—ot say that he is Idle or neglecteth his Government unless he cause Sin I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image and the Lord of his own Acts as a Creature morally governable by Laws And so all his free power is of God who still upholdeth it II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin And I do not believe that Aureolâ—â— Duraâ—d or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise though they differ in expressing the mode of concurse III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse IV. God himself concurreth with Sinners in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions as in generation c. even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect And that by all the ways fore-named and many more V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor maketh mens sins the occasions of much good and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events so as not to miss of any of his ends But will attain all his ends while the Sinner seeketh his own VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do And all that Sinners do he fore-knew And neither his Wisdom Goodness or Power is ever over-come by sin or defective in any thing about it And is not all this enough for you but yet God must be the chief willer of sin C. I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much B. Take in but one thought more which I afterward suggest Ockam laboriously endeavoureth to prove that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in it self distinct from that of the Will I have told you my Opinion of his tenet But this is granted him that no outward Act hath any sinfulness but secondary and participative as animated by the Will and that sin is primarily in the Will alone Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of but seemingly of the Act indeed of the Effect Now God cannot be the cause of any mans sin unless he cause the sinful Volition But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed And therefore when we come thither you must excuse me from repeating it or pardon what you put me to do The sixth Crimination C. My next offence against them is that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional and so make God dependent upon man B. This is opened in the Second Book * Vasquez in 1. Tho. disp 91. c. 1. Cum quaeritur an divinae praedestinationis detur causa qu. non est de actu divinae voluntatis quatenus est ipsa essentia divina res increata sic notant scholastici omnes clarum enim est divinae praedestinationis hoc modo non esse causam sed est de effectibus Et perinde est quaerere causam praedestinationis ex parte nostra atque causam aliquam totiuâ— effectus praedestinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non sit annumeranda Nam si quidpiam ponitur effectus praedestinationis nequit illud ulla ratione esse causa totius effectus In Deo 1. Ipsa essentia Dei 2. Respectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas Hic nascitur ex objectis Ejus igitur possunt esse causae Indeed they differ not from the Synodists or Dr. Twisse himself I think in this That is 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations Promises and Threatnings in his Word 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word and all that is in it with its conditional mode 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse and all say Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc sed non hoc vult esse propter hoc Gods Will doth not depend on the Condition but Gods Will is that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition When the Condition is performed it is not a medium of Gods Volition but of the Effect 4. But yet this all must confess that as to the bare extrinsick denomination from the Object as Gods Will is variously denominated from things past present and future so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises which you will not deny but God hath made 5. And in case of sin and damnation sin fore-seen is an objective condition disposition or qualification sine qua non of such as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on as they confess at the Synod at Dort and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large C. But this decreeing upon fore-sight of somewhat in man maketh God to follow the Creature and depend upon it B. It maketh him no way dependant at all For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do It is
Some of these are Decrees of common Grace and not called Election by any that I know of except as some say God chose Man and not Devils to have a Saviour But all that I speak of are agreed with you that Gods decreeing Will is his Essence and that it is but one God or Will in the notion of Essence or Principle or Act as it is meerly Agentis But they say that if we distinguish not Gods Decrees by connotation of the various Effects or Objects our Controversies are at an end And I ask of you Do not you distinguish them when you dispute of their Order Priority and Posteriority C. Yes There is no Order without distinction B. Will you not distinguish Election from Reprobation C. Yes Though both be Gods Decree B. Will you not distinguish the Election of Peter both from the Reprobation of Judas and from the Election of Paul C. Yes as connoting various Objects and Effects B. Is there not then the same reason for distinguishing Gods Voâ—â—tioâ—â— about one and the same person as to various effects As Gods Will that Paul be born that he be redeemed that he be endured in his sin that he be converted that he suffer persevere be glorified C. Yes But though these be various Decrees yet not Elections B. These names and words are our unhappy Difference 1. Remember then that you agree to call them divers Volitions or Decrees and I think no sober man will fall out with you for the name Election 2. But what reason is there in the nature of the thing why you may not as lawfully and decently say that to choose David to be a Saint a King and a Prophet to choose Paul to be a Christian a Preacher and a Martyâ— â—â—e various Elections as well as various Decrees 3. But my own Opinion is that the denomination should follow the Object And therefore where the Objects elected or the Termini of the Relation are various we may call them various Elections But when they are diversified but as parts we should call them various acts and parts of one Election And no doubt but our election to have the Gospel to Conversion to Justification to Perseverance to Glory to the Ministry to Martyrdom c. may in several respects be named many and parts of one Election C. I confeâ—â— I am convinced that it is a shame to make a quarrel of this because it is about â— word and really there is no difference But why make they various Objects in one man of these Decrees B. What is it but diversity of Objects that doth diversifie them In the execution the case is plain Paul uncreated and creandus was nothing or no man 2. Paul before he heard the Gospel was a Pharisee that had not heard it 3. Paul before Conversion and convertendus was a persecuting Infidel 4. Paul jam justificandus was a Believer 5. Paul jam vocandus ad facrum Ministerium was a Christian 6. Paul persevering and ready to overcome finally was a faithful holy Christian and Apostle 7. Paul janâ— justificandus per judicem finaliter glorificandus was a persevering over-coming Christian Saint and Apostle The ninth Crimination C. * Bannes in 1. q. 23. a. 2. pag. 264. Jaciendum nobis est fundamentum necessarium viz. quod in divinis omnia sunt simul nihil prius aut posterius in aliquo genere causae nihilque realiter ab alio distinctum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio At quia non simplici conceptu sed multis imperfecte nos cognoscimus necesse est distinguere you may see a multitude of Authors and Reasons to prove that Gods Will to all Objects is but one most simple Volition in Ruiz de Volunt Dei disp 5. sect 6. p. 34. But that 's my next offence that they order Gods Decrees according to the order of Execution and not according to the order of Intention when as Quod prius est intentione posterius est executione B. Dr. Twisse hath that word I think many score if not hundred times But it is no fit matter for contention Do you believe that in God himself there is Priority and Posteriority of Decrees C. Not in time but in order of Nature or Intention B. How can there be difference of Order where there is no diversity C. Though in God there be no diversity yet you confess there is the Relative connotation and denomination from the Objects B. True Therefore the Order also must not be denominated from any feigned diversity in God but from the Order of the divers Objects as one is first or last in time or nature or use That which is first God decreed should be first That which is propter aliud God decreed should be propter aliud And that which is the end of another thing God decreed should be its end C. But even in God himself we must as men conceive that his velle â—â—em and velle media are not all one but must distinguish them B. As men we must not judge falsly of God when we know that it is false If velle finem media be certainly one without any diversity in God saying what is in the connoted Objects and the relation or denomination how can we without sin destinguish where there is no difference But I pray you tell me what mean you by Gods intendere â—â—â—em C. I mean that as every wise man doth first will an end and then do all for it so doth God B. We call nothing to man an end but something which he wanteth â—â— at least is without But God wanteth nothing nor is ever without his â—â—d or the accomplishment of his Will But of this I crave leave to refer you to the first Book where I have fully shewed that God willeth an â—â—â—â— improperly and not as man doth But tell me what take you to be strictly Gods end C. His Glory B. What mean you by his Glory C. Our Knowledge Admiration and Praise of his Perfection B. * Constat totius effectus praedestinationis non esse causam per modum finis aliquid ex parte praedestinati cum Gloria quae posset esse sinis inter effectus annumeretur Vasqu in 1. Thom. disp 91. c. 4. These are Acts of men and can mans Acts be Gods chief â—od C. I know some say It is the objective Luster or Demonstration of Gods Perfections Take that if it please you better B. That Luster or Demonstration objective is a Creature And can a Creature be Gods Ultimate End C. No God who is the Beginning is the End alone B. God is no efficient Beginning of himself or any thing in himself For in God there is no Cause or Effects how then can he be his own End or final Cause * If any man will say that to be generated and to proceed in the second and third persons are effects I account it presumption to enter into a dispu â— of it But it 's
Decree to predetermine the Agent For sin is so e. g. hating God blasphemy And that Dr. Twisse ill maketh Gods Decree the sole cause of futurity As to the presumptuous question how God knoweth future things besides that there is no time to measure Gods Acts by there need no other answer than that Gods infinite Understanding knoweth all that is intelligible But futures as such are intelligible Quid divinus intellectus infinitae â—â—â—tutis est quicquid intelligibile est necessarie debâ—t amplecti intelligere At futura contingentia intelligibilia sunt â—o quod sunt determinatae veritatis Vasq 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. cap. 4. But whereas he himself also defendeth that futures are known in decretis divinis he is forced to say that sin is known in Gods Decree of the materiale peccati where yet in his Doctrine of Simultaneous Concurse he maketh Gods concurse to be but part of the determining cause which would not without mans free co operation do it Therefore the Decree of a half causation is not enough to infer the effect futurition while they make sin that is eternally future yet not to be eternally willed or decreed by God to be future How can things pass without a cause enumero possibilium in numerum futurorum B. Alas what men and what Engines must the poor Church suffer and be tortured by sure Paul fore-saw these things when he feâ—red lest as the Serpent beguiled Eve with a promise of being as God in Knowledge so he should draw us from the simplicity that is in Christ. And when he warned us to beware lest any beguile us with vain Philosophy according to the rudiments of the world And when he telleth us of a Wisdom which is foolishness with God and of some who professing themselves wise became Fools Your Doctrine soundeth so unlike to Christ's and his Apostles that I must crave your Interpretation of it that we may understand before we wrangle I pray you what is it that you call Futurition C. The name tells you what it is You know what we mean by it B. I know that it is Grammatically a Noun Substantive but doth it signifie something or nothing C. It signifieth that something will be hereafter B. Now you turn it to a Verb But is futurity anything or nothing C. Suppose I say It is something B. If it was eternally something it is God For nothing else was eternal C. Suppose I say It is nothing B. If it be nothing it is no effect and therefore hath no cause and therefore no eternal cause C. Suppose I say that it is neither something nor nothing You know there are five sorts that Burgersdicius placeth between Res and Nihil and futurity may be one of them B. Five sorts of what You cannot tell If you take Ens or Res limitedly for less universal than Aliquid or a Species of it you may say that Datur medium inter Rem Nihil But sure esse and non esse are contradictories And taking Aliquid Ens or Res in the most universal notion it is a contradiction and a denial of the first principle of Knowledge to feign a medium Burgersdieius'es five Non-entia quae non sunt nihil are Privatio Denominatio externa ens Rationis Relatio modus entis And all this cometh from the pittiful narrowness of mans mind that can know nothing at all by one simple Conception but by parts And then it frameth several names according to all its inadequate Conceptions as if they all signified several somethings 1. Privatio is it self a compound notion including 1. The absence of the form 2. The debitum inesse 3. The matters capacity of it The first is Nothing the second is a Relation of which after the third is the nature or mode of the matter which is an inadequate Conception of Ens. 2. Denominatio externa signifieth 1. The Denominabilitas 2. Or the actual denomination The first is considerable 1. Qua talis 2. Or in causa velratione Denominability in se is nothing else but an inadequate Conception of ens rationis For I can call nothing by a Name But the Ratio denominandi may be something and as now intended is Relation 2. And the actual denomination is Res that is Verbum vel mentis veloris 3. Entia Rationis taken effectivè subjectivè are confessed to be real Entities but objectivè it is denied All Objects are so called 1. As aptitudinal 2. Or actually apprehended 1. As aptitudinal they are not entia rationis but something antecedent 2. As actual they are quid reale For they are conceptus humanus inadaequatè expressus sub ratione materiae A thought or conception is an Act which is quid reale And every Act consisteth of the modus agentis and the Object which as such is quasi materia and is essential to the Act so that even Genus and Species as in mans thoughts are quid reale And out of mans thoughts they are Relation or nothing 4. Relation is a something or nothing which keepeth an exceeding room in all our Sciences But when anatomized it is considerable 1. As in extrinsick Objects 2. As in the mind of man considering them 1. In the Object there is 1. Quid absolutum that is the subject the terminus the fundamentum cum ratione fundandi 2 The formal Relation The first is quid reale as is confessed The second is nothing besides the first It is nothing but rerum comparabilitas And that comparability is nothing besides the quid absolutum or thing it self When an Egg is new laid at the Antipodes an Egg here is newly related to it ut simile But nothing is added to this Egg But only now the mind of man can compare it with that at the Antipodes and consider that in quantity figure colour c. they are like which likeness as in ovo is nothing besides the same quantity figure colour c. themselves But by those Realities it is capable of being compared and the mind can raise an universal notion of both as compared 2. But this comparing Act of the Understanding is quid reale So that Ockam in his Quodlibets hath well proved in many questions that Relation is nothing besides the quid absolutum in re in mente humana And though his Gregor Armin. at large dispute that non-entia may be related yet it is on this supposition that non-entia may be imagined and be the matter of a thought or conceptus and as such they are entia rationis realia that is that conceptus is quid reale But besides that the Relatio non-entis is nothing but non-ens and a meer nihil Yet I confess that Rerum ordo is the sum of Relations and of morality and that this Ordo is existent whether we think of it or not But this Ordâ— is nothing distinct ab absolutis rebus ordinatis cum omnibus suis modis circumstantiis realibus Things are wonderfully diverse by
yet hereby confesseth that he willeth or decreeth that permission You say then that he decreeth to permit mens unbelief and this is all that the Synod saith of non-Election or leaving men out of the number of the Elect. 2. If you yourselves believe all this with what face can you oppose the same in others If you do not either you believe that none are Infidels and damned or you believe that God doth not permit it to be so but it is done by conquering his Omnipotency or else you know not what you believe choose which you will 3. Do you really differ as Episcopius pretendeth about the cause of Reprobation As to the cause of Damnation all are agreed that sin is the true meritorious cause The question is only of Gods Will or Decree of it And it is not of his sententia prolata or Decree pronounced by Christ in Judgment for of that also it is agreed that sin is the meritorious cause Your oft recurring to your Objections when they have been fully answered puts me on the rediousness of repeating the same Answers Gods * The cause of Gods Will in reprobating Will is considered either ex parte volentis essentially or as extrinsically denominated from the connotation of the Object In the first sense you have not yet declared your selves to deny the common Doctrine of the Christian World that Gods Will is his undivided most simple Essence and that God hath no cause and so his Will in it self hath no cause that in God there is nothing but God Dare you say that a Creature made God yea that so base a thing as Sin made him How then doth it cause his Will which is himself Is Gods Will such a mutuable thing as mans And is it not the first cause of all things And shall men pretending to Learning reproach others for not assigning a cause of the first cause and that Sin which is baser than a Creature causeth the Creator But if you speak of Gods Will as denominated by connotation of the Object mark what we grant you viz. that as thus only Gods Will or Volitions are denominated diverse so are they denominated to be of this or that sort and numerically also distinguished And so they may be said to have a cause but not an efficient cause but only an * Arminius and Arnoldus Corvinus frequently affirm that Faith is not the cause of Gods Election to Glory but only a condition in the object objective cause And what Cause is an Object To let pass the Error of many Logicians it is only as an Object a material constitutive cause at least here And so sin is the objective material cause of that extrinsical denomination and relation of Gods Will called Reprobation to damnation It is that dispositio objecti which is essential to the Object And so as Gods Will may any way be said to have a cause we will say freely after the manner of men that sin is the objective cause of the Decree of damnation And speak now with shame can you say more or less Do you or any of us that are sober and understand our selves differ at all in this 4. And you cheat your selves and others more in saying Not from any ill desert of theirs more than others When if you would speak congruously you should only say that when all deserved to be utterly forsaken God effectually prevaileth with the Wills of his Elect not for any good desert of theirs above others You would infinuate that God must punish no man unless he deserve worse than every man whom he forgiveth which is false Do you not your selves believe that all have sinned and come short of the Glory of God and that God might justly have let them perish Do you not hold your selves that all men are guilty of resisting or sinning against Grace it self as well as against Nature and that God may justly with-hold his Grace from the Rejecters of it and if he did so by all he did not wrong them If God then leave not all as he might do but resolve to prevail with some infallibly do you represent this mercy as if it were cruelty to others What if it be apparent that you your selves charge God with as much of that which you call cruelty to all the World as the Synod doth to the Reprobate alone or as many of us do For they do but say that God leaveth the Reprobate to their own free Wills And you say that he doth so by all the World You say that God giveth all men that hear the Gospel so much Grace as that they may have Christ and Salvation if they will And they say so too as confidently as you do Tell me if you can then what Mercy or Grace you plead for as common more than they you cannot tell me And will you wrangle as if you differed when you do not Only they say and think that they give more to Gods Grace as to the Elect than you do which is to be examined anon And then you will quarrel about the Cause of the first Cause the Will of God and dream of it as if it were like the Will of Man which is an effect and that of many Causes Is it not enough for you that sin is the cause of all punishment but it must also be the efficient cause of Gods Will which is God Yet again I tell you that all sobeâ— men will agree with you that Gods Volitions of extrinfick Objects viz. Reprobations denominate not Gods Essence as such for we use not to say God is Reprobation or Election but only his Essence as terminated ad extra And to gratifie you to the utmost we distinguish an operating efficient Cause from a recipient Cause And we maintain that a Sinner is the recipient Cause of Gods damning Volition or Reprobation As shutting the Windows is the cause that my Room is dark and opening them is the cause that they are light not by causing the Sun to shine but by receiving or not receiving it so man is a receiving Cause of the Effects of Gods Will and Operation and of the Will and Operation it self as extrinsically denominated and diversified by the Effects But this recipient Cause is nothing but cause materialis objectiva which hath two parts the ipsa materia and the materiae dispositio Take not on you still to differ where you do not The third Crimination A. * Of that Deus vult omnes salves fieri saith Alliaco 1. q. 14. F. 1. Potest exponi de voluntate signi vult id est praecipit vel obligat c. 2. Si exponitur de voluntate beneplaciti potest intelligi de Vol. antecedente 3. Si de Vol. beneplaciti proprie dicta debet intelligi ut dicit Magister i. e. nulli salvantur nisi quos Deus vult salvari 4. Vel de generibus singulorum sed at singulis generum By denying Universal Redemption they deny that
But that which I ask you is whether this new power given by sufficient Grace be of the same Species with our natural powers or of some other A. What if I say It is of the same sort B. Then as I have hinted you must make the Soul to have either two orders of natural powers of the same Species one founded or subjected in the other which is it that Dr. Twisse derideth or else indeed to have two Souls For I have else-where at large proved with the Scotists that the faculties are essential to the Soul or else you must make the specifick powers of the Soul to have degrees and Souls to be augmented and so that they have more Soul that have Grace than they that have none and so Grace is a kind of generation or augmentation of Souls A. What if I say that it is of another Species B. Then we must consider what it is Is it of a superior Species or subordinate or co-ordinate If you say with some Fryers and Fanaticks that it is the Spirit of God in Essence or God himself it would be Omnipotency If it be not any created Spirit or Substance which would alter our Species or make each one two it must be an Accident as all confess it is and therefore not ejusdem speciei with the faculties that are essential And if so tell us what this power is A. The Soul of man is it self so little known to it self that we cannot easily tell what its natural powers be as the difference between Thomas and the Scotists sheweth much less can we tell how to conceive aright of the quiddity of the Accidents of a Soul who know so little of the Accidents of Bodies or of Bodies themselves Let me hear what your own conceptions are of the matter if they tend to elucidate or reconcile B. He that will take up with the bare words Can or Cannot and confess that he knoweth not what they signifie should not with the blind confidence of too many Contenders trouble the peoples ears in Pulpits and set them on fire against one another and by raving distract the Churches of Christ with such Can's and Cannot's Able and Unable And yet this one poor word is the Granade or Fire-Ball If I pretend to understand it no more than you yet I will be ashamed to vex and ensnare mens Souls with what I understand not but will use the easiest intelligible words But to answer your desires distinctly 1. The Soul is as you say so little known to it self that no man living I think hath a true formal conception of that first accident or effect which it receiveth from Gods Spirit nor yet of the true nature of a habit or disposition following it He that readeth but what our Metaphysicks and School-men have said of Habits will find this to be true and that their quiddity is past his understanding To say that they are qualities by which we are prompt to act is but to name a general notion no better understood than the quaesitum Quality and to name the effect promptitude and not the form or thing it self II. The nature of fire seemeth to be a kind of likeness to Spirits And in this sensible thing we cannot tell what it is that is added by excitation and incension And they that talk of generation of fire know not what generation signifieth whether the production of a new simple substance that before was nothing or the introduction of a new form into a pre-existent substance by mixture or how or only a new motion or if they say It is a generation of new Qualities they know not what the word Quality signifieth But this much is apparent that whether it be done by Collision or however to kindle a spark or latent fire into a flame or incendium is to excite a pre-existent active nature And this excitation is by motion And as we have some very defective conception what motion received is in Bodies and how by contact when it cometh from force motus motum causat vis per motum vint quandam imprimit so by some Analogy we may conceive how Spirits move Spirits and such as is the unexpressible action of one Spirit on another such is the thing thereby imprinted and received A kind of spiritual motus And as in bodily motion the first thing received is the very thing moved by contact qua talis as it self in motion or act so Spirits sno modo seem qua agentes attingentes transcendently to be the first received by the moved Spirits And the second thing the vis impressa and thence followeth the ipse motus But if it to this day most certainly surpass the wits of the greatest Philosophers formally to conceive what it is that adhereth to the res mota to contiue its motion and what that is that is called Vis impressa and in what subject it moveth the projectum c. For the Cartesian fancy that motus inceptus nunquam cessabit nisi impeditus either tells us nothing of the continued cause or supposeth moveri to be no effect and to need no more cause than negatio motus which is unworthy a confutation what wonder then if it surpass the conception of all mortal men to know what that spiritual Vis impressa on a Soul is But what-ever it is this much is the best notion that we can have of that which the Divine Action first communicateth that it is influxus Dei Receptus vel excitatio facultatum exeâ—â—ata as distinct from excitatio Dei excitans It is passive excitation or a spiritual Vis impressa whence Action followeth III. But it hath also a similitude to the Agent in more than simple motion Even as the Sun or Fire doth kindle fire on combustible matter which had also a latent fire before or else it 's not combustible which is not as the Cartesians feign by motion alone but by the operation of a three-fold virtue in the Sun viz. the motive lucid and calefactive producing the same in the Receiver so the Spirit of God doth in this excitation at once communicate to the three faculties of the Soul an impressed force for Vital-activity Intellection and Volition so that the three natural faculties by this received impress and excitation are suscitated to holy Activity Knowledge and Love the habit of which is holy Life and Light and Love abiding For it is certain that it is not one only but all the faculties of the Soul that are vitiated by Sin and therefore all that must be repaired by sanctifying Grace The Vital-active-power as it is a faculty of the rational Soul is as it were sleepy dead and impotent and must be quickened with spiritual life and strength The Intellect is dark and must be illuminated The Will is carnal and unholy and must be turned from the Flesh to God by mortification and by holy love And all this the Holy Ghost doth by Action but not meer Action in
but meer power For morality consisteth formally and primarily in the Will or Voluntary And to be able to do Good or Evil as such is not formally any moral Good or Evil but natural But Disposition is 4. Power is called Moral Analogically and Reputatively as causa finalis is said to cause when it is called a moral cause and the operation metaphorical or as he is called a moral cause who perswadeth to the End or Object And so we take the word Moral Power in our question And so the received Impress or Influx of Divine Agency as also the habits of Grace in the Soul are an Analogical Power because they are necessary to the natural powers performance of the Act And so the suscitation as received of a dormant active power may be called Analogically a Power And the right disposition of a power may be called a power And the deep fore described Action of the Soul may be called a power to other sensible Acts. XXVII Next to this moral power is potentia logica which is but the name of Power given extrinsically from some other thing without which the effect will never be though it be possible and the Causes have power sufficient And the name of Impossibility de effectu is oftner and more tollerably here used than of impotency as in the cause So we say that whatsoever God willeth or decreeth is possible and what he nilleth absolutely is impossible And thence some say That God can do it because be will and he cannot do what he will not And so we say that in sensâ— composito an undisposed or averse Will cannot love or will aright when perhaps no more than a Logical impotency is meant viz. That these two Propositions cannot possibly be both true Judas is undisposed to Love and Justice and Judas at the same time doth exercise Love and Justice speaking of a predominant disposition And this is but a denomination of the same sense as necessitas consequentiae vel logica is as distinct from necessitas consequentis vel effecti And so we say that he that is fore-decreed yea or fore-known to be good cannot be bad The meaning is not that he wanteth true power to be bad But that in ordine dicendi these two cannot possibly be true Peter is decreed by God or fore-known to be a Saint and Peter will not be a Saint And this logical impossibility is meant oft in Scripture as Joh. 12. 39. Therefore they could not believe because that Isaiah saith c. not that this hindered them but logically de consequentia both these could not be true that Esaia's Prophecy should be true and yet that the Person prophesied of should be Obedient And so the words the Scripture must be fulfilled and that the Scriptures might be fulfilled are oft used as to the inference XXVIII Thus by extrinsick denomination and connotation impotency is oft imputed to the Agent from the incapacity of the Recipient As it is said Mark 6. 5. That Christ could do no mighty work there because of their unbelief When as this was not from a disability in Christ to have done it if he would But here it is first supposed that God hath ordinately fore-decreed to do no such Works but where the persons were so qualified as to be capable of them And then that the persons there were unqualified And so the Effect was logically impossible in sensu composito Thus we say That God cannot save Unbelievers he cannot hear the prayers of the Wicked he cannot forsake the Faithful that is His Ordination and Decree supposed logically such a thing cannot consist with it in verity XXIX When something else and not impotency doth ascertain an event by omission or something besides Power ascertaineth the contrary efficiently yet the effect is oft denominated possible or impossible and ascribed to Power or Impotency by a conjunction of this moral and logical denomination So we say That God 's pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity that God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity as such Not for want of Power but by reason of his perfect Will and Nature So God cannot lye Tit. 1. 2. And it is impossible for God to lye God cannot deny himself 2 Tim. 2. 13. God cannot be tempted with evil Jam. 1. 13. So Joh. 10. 35. The Scripture cannot be broken Isa 1. 13. Your Assemblies I cannot away with No wonder also if this be said of men As 1. Joh. 3. 9. He cannot sin because he is born of God Not for want of power but partly he will not and partly logically these cannot consist So of the wicked Joh. 7. 7. The World cannot hate you XXX Oft times the word Cannot is taken politically I cannot that is I must not or I cannot lawfully Quod turpe impossibile Gen. 19. 22. I cannot do any thing till thou be come out Act. 10. 47. Can any man forbid water c. that is lawfully 2 Cor. 13. 8. We can do nothing against the Truth that is by Authority from God XXXI Oft times in Scripture the word Cannot is meant only of that which a man cannot do without suffering or loss or difficutly So Act. 4. 16. We cannot deny it that is without the shame of falshood Luk. 14. 20. I cannot come that is without such inconvenience as I am unwilling to bear Jer. 29. 17. They cannot be eaten that is without loathing 1 Sam. 25. 17. He is such a Son of Belial that a man cannot speak to him that is without inconvenience by it 2 Sam. 23. 6. They cannot be taken with hands that is without hurt Gen. 34. 14. We cannot do this thing that is without God XXXII Oft times this inconvenience procuring unwillingness this unwillingness is named like impotency and it is said Men cannot because they will not And so it is in divers of the last cited instances Joh. 3. 9. They cannot sin that is They will not Luk. 14. 20. I have married a wife and therefore I cannot come that is I will not because I cannot without this inconvenience Neh. 6. 3. I cannot come down that is I will not Gen. 44. 26. We cannot go down Josh 24. 19. Ye cannot serve the Lord for he is a holy God that is you are not disposed to do it holily and then he will destroy you Joh. 6. 60. This is a hard saying who can hear it that is willingly Isa 49. 15. Can a woman forget her sucking-Child that is will she forget it Jer. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornaments Mar. 2. 19. Can the Children of the Bridegroom fast c. Mar. 9. 39. Can ye drink of the Cup that I drink of and be baptized c. 39. They said unto him we can that is Have you Wills disposed for such sufferings and will you go through them And this unwillingness when it is habitual and prevalent is it that is commonly called mans moral impotency as to believe love obey c. XXXIII This impotency which is
pulsare quin home pulsetur And that exciting Grace is always sufficient Grace to the Act to which it exciteth see his Reasons ibid. pag. 462. And 1. It is plainly the first that the most Contenders mean upon a false supposition They think that God puts forth one degree of strength to one effect and another degree to another effect and so that ex parte Dei operantis there is a different Operation in kind or degree to the producing of different effects which is blasphemy in the Judgment of the Philosophical Divines For though we are fain to use the name of Act and Influx yet it is nothing but Gods own Essence in Power Wisdom and Will by which he produceth all effects And to say that Gods Essence is divers in kind or degrees is contrary to his Simplicity and Immutability And if all Gods Operation from the creation of the World to the moving of a Feather and from the converting of Saul to the least gracious action of a Saint be done by the same kind and degree of power and there be no difference at all in God or his Agency but only as in passo in the effect then the very supposition of your dispute and the Subject being nothing you may see how wisely you have long troubled the World C. But it is unconceiveable that there should be variety in the Effects when the Cause hath no difference at all in its agency ex parte sui B. * Aureolus in his Quodlib 2. art 2. pag. 13. who hath many singularities confidently maintaineth that there is some causal Action of God e. g. in creation between his essence and the effect because posita causa ponitur effectus but God did not create from c. and saith This Action is not God and yet no part of the Universe But 1. It is utterly unintelligible what that should be For Action is virtutis alicujus actio and that virtus is substantiae virtus Vis or Actio creata subsist not of themselves Therefore an Action that is neither God nor yet a Creatures Action is unintelligible 2. And the difficulty will recur upon his own way For either that middle Action is one or many eternal or in time If one and eternal his own Arguments assault it why then is the Effect temporary and multifaricus If it be many Actions and temporary it is all one for one eternal God to cause many temporary Creatures as to cause many temporary Actions Therefore when all is done we must say that Omnia sunt ab uno Though how we cannot comprehend 3. And Gods Essence is an infinite power in Act intimately present with every effect no other intermediate action need to be imagined How now Did the Calvinists so much stir up King James against Vorstius and condemn him in the Synod of Dort and now must we plead against you as Vorstians Did not one God without any diversity in himself make all the variety of Creatures in the World Can he not unica volitione velle plurima And so unica actione plurima efficere All multitude proceedeth from perfect Unity C. But Gods Influx or Action seemeth to be somewhat else than his Essence B. You must mean ex parte Dei or you say nothing And if so it must be some Creature For besides the Creator and the Creature there is nothing C. Action is not Res but modus agentis And so it may be in God B. Some indeed make the three Persons to be three Modes in God which yet others deny But otherwise it is commonly taken for blasphemy to say that God who is most simple and immutable hath any true mode distinct from his simple Essence much more that his Essence hath diversity of modes And if you will deny this we must make a whole new method of Divinity and such as will most accommodate the Arminians C. But to say that God doth Influere vel agere and to say that he is God are not words of the same signification B. True For they are different Conceptions that narrow-minded man must have about God in whom there is no difference We have our general conception of Essence and Perfections and Relation which we express by the Name GOD And we have one more particular yea our modal conceptions and expressions And to express the one is not to express the other But that proveth no diversity in God C. If Actio be in Passo then it is not God but a Creature B. That old saying is but de nomine actionis Doubtless there is of created Agents a certain modus by which in Action they differ from themselves not-agent and agere signifieth somewhat distinct from the effect which is it that is in Passo and is called Passion And if it be only quid creatum or the effect that you mean we will after speak of that But now the question is of the efficient Causality C. By this rule we must say that ex parte Dei to will Peter's Salvation and Judas his Damnation are all one B. So all Philosophical Divines affirm save only that the same Will unvaried in it self is variously related and denominated ab extra from the diversity of Objects and Effects C. At least then we may here denominate Gods Operations on several Souls as various from the variety of Effects B. You may and must do so But then remember that the question is but de nomine and that you confess that there is no real diversity in all Gods Operations on mens Souls on his part no not in degrees II. And then as to the means though for my part I think that a great diversity is caused by their diversity yet you your selves will not consent that the question about sufficiency and efficacy be there laid 1. Because it is a moral operation and you think that some other physical operation causeth the difference 2. Because many that live under the most excellent means are not converted when some are that had far less 3. Because you suppose no means sufficient of it self and no means insufficient when God will work by it But if this must be the question it must be remembred that you grant 1. That means are but sufficient for their own part and not ad omnia and therefore suppose somewhat in the person disposition or use to make them effectual 2. And that God is the Author of means and that in themselves they are the same oft to good and bad But 3. That the diversity of mens dispositions maketh the same less suitable to one which is now suitable and consequently more effectual to another So that here is the same Grace oft times as in the means made various by variety of Reception And so that which you are to say of God herein is this that when some wicked Parents have more vitiated their Posterity than others and when some wicked men by their practices have more vitiated themselves yet God doth not always give them a greater
thank himself too for all the good he does that Being as much of him as the other c. Answ It follows not For 1. Of all the good that man doth God is still the moral Cause egging on to it by all c. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind renewing the Will healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it and in a word making it every way more it self God must be more an Owner than man And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will because it flowed from Divine Goodness That which is good in man by way of Off-spring being so in God by way of Well-spring Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress or influx or force which causeth one man to believe or act is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed Nay it is most probable that they are not Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference than their countenances have of particles making the wonderful diversity which we see Nor is the same man long equally disposed 5. Men equally disposed if such there were may have unequal impediments without and in their bodies and temptations which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power causeth not the Act also For that is a contradiction to cause the Act and not to cause it 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one when a greater degree causeth it not in another 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in â—ll other diversities in the World by the diverse receptive dispositions of the Patient Which made Johan Sarisberiensis in Nugis Curial and many School-men to liken God with some acknowledged difference in his Operations to the Sun which by one invaried efflux of motive illuminative and calefactive power causeth innumerable varieties of effects as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions 9. But all good disposition or preparation is of God But by such ways of operation as we are searching after But all ill disposition is from our selves 10. To conclude God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act when they do not as they have when they do But usually not an equal predisposition some having more indisposed themselves which is to be changed by contrary acts But whether de facto men equally enabled predisposed helped and hindered do yet without any cause but their own free-will it self act or will variously is a question that these Controversies need not come to That such were there such in the World could do it I take for granted what-ever they do The Controversie is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World who saith That to be free and to be willing is all one and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion as the motions of any Engine are And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark not that there is any such thing indeed but when we know not the train of Causes we use those names which signifie but our ignorance And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow And the Dominicans predetermination and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think But I think God hath made a very good use by his over-ruling ordination of the Doctrine of Hobbes learnedly and timerously or cautelously seconded by Gassendus and improved by Benedictus Spinosa an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez Twisse Camero in all other points moderate and admirably judicious hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded is now detested by almost all good men For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion and consequently of all true Religion I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion nor yet am And that indeed all pretended middle ways between Hobbes his Necessitation Physical and true Free-will are but fancies as far as I can perceive And if I leave true Free-will I must turn to their necessitation I confess their arguing is very plausible that there is no Effect without a Cause and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing and refuseth another there is some antecedent Cause in the power disposition or external things and that the same Cause in the same state and mode having no difference in it self doth always produce the same effect Otherwise the diversity should have no cause And that the Will being in the same disposition and having all the same objects helps impediments and other circumstances will have the same acts All this is plausible But 1. If I receive it I must let go almost all Religion as well as Christianity of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate unicus plurima immo omnia causat Therefore their Principle is false 3. And finding man made after the Image of God not only as holy but as man Gen. 6. I have great reason to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum so may Free-will be And that as a God is causa prima entium so Free-will may be a kind of causa prima not actionis qua talis but of the comparative moral species of its own acts as choosing this thing rather than that which is no addition to real entity but a wonderful mode of it which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause Free-will may be the cause of various Effects without a various predisposition C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act B. That it acteth not always according to Habits which are more than dispositions is certain by experience For objects oft prevail against habits and habits do not necessitate C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits As either
commonest observation 3. All other Habits follow the Acts and therefore we have little reason to say it is otherwise here C. Doth the Soul believe before it is inclined or disposed to it B. Inclination is a hard word and belongeth both to Natural Inclination such as we have to Felicity and to Habits and to meer Dispositions And a pre-disposition we grant As when you spur your Horse you make him first the patient of your act and by suscitating his natural faculty you dispose him to a speedy motion though the similitude doth not quadrare per omnia because Gods influx is on the whole Soul it self But this Disposition to the present act is far less than a proper Habit or it 's another thing C. When I spur my Horse or whip my Dog I do but stir up a former faculty or slothful power But God giveth a new life and power to them that were dead in sin B. Yet I cannot take words for matter 1. It 's nothing but the natural faculty or power which you suscitate in the beast And hath not an unbeliever the Natural faculties or power Is he not a man Why do you not bury him if he be not alive 2. Death in sin is relative or real The Relative is Reatus mortis which denominateth men filios mortis and is done away by pardon The real is the Privation of a holy disposition to the act of Faith and Repentance c. or of the Act it self or of the Habit. You can name no other Now 1. the death which consisteth in the privation of the first disposition to act supposing all natural dispositions is taken away by the first influx or suscitation of the Holy Ghost 2. And by the same in secunda instanti is caused the Act and the death gone that lay in its privation 3. And in the third instant or afterward by degrees is taken away the death which lieth in the privation of the Habit. And this giving the Habit is called in Scripture and by Divines Sanctification as following Vocation and it is wrought in us by degrees and not all at once and that by the Spirits power with and by our exercised Acts. In my youth I was so prematurely confident of the contrary that the first Controversie that ever I wrote on was a Confutation of Bishop Downam Amesius Medall de Vocat Mr. Tho. Hooker c. in Defence of Pemble herein but riper thoughts made me burn that Script C. But the spur or rod putteth no new power at all into your Horse but Gods Spirit putteth a new Power into us B. I have talkt long enough to you about Power before and therefore would not turn back needlesly to say it over again Gods Spirit putteth no such thing into us as we call a faculty or natural power For that is the form or essence of the Soul and our Species is not chang'd by Grace But he giveth us that which is called a Moral Power which consisteth conjunctly in the concurrence of means and objects and the disposition of our faculties to the act Hear Dr. Twisse against Hord pag. 12. lib. 2. He secretly maintaineth that every man hath such a power by Grace by which he may repent if he will Concerning which Tenet of his we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power but we say it is nature rather Page 18. Truly I see no cause to deny this that even the wicked could do good if they would We may safely say with Austin Omnes possunt Deo credere ab amore rerum temporalium ad Divina praecepta servanda se convertere si velint Here is posse se convertere id est velte si velit But saith Twisse pag. 170. l. 1. But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency moral with impotence natural as if there were no difference which he oft sheweth is but the want of actual and dispositive willingness Now the rod or spur may cause both a present disposition and an act of will C. But is this all the new Life and Spirit and Divine Nature that is given us Sure it is much more B. No doubt but it is much more But that Spirit Life and Nature is promised and given to Believers and is promised on condition of our accepting Christ in whom is our life And therefore it is that habitual Grace which followeth the first act of Faith and is a nobler disposition to the following acts C. Will one act of ours cause a Habit B. Not as ours only But when the Spirit will work by it it will But even that Habit I told you is weak at first and increased by degrees But proceed and tell me Quest 7. Are you sure that in the Acquisition of Habits there is no immediate operation of God on the Soul that causeth them C. We all hold an immediate Influx necessary to the Being and Action of every Creature natural and free but not an immediate Infusion B. What 's the difference between Influx and Infusion C. The first is an universal operation the other a particular B. Do you mean that the difference of the acts or operations is at all ex parte agentis sen act us ut est agentis antecedent to the effect or only in the effect it self C. I dare not say that there is any difference in God for it is against his simplicity and his very will and act as in himself is his Essence though varioâ—sly related and denominated by cannotation Therefore I must needs confess that the diversity is only in the effect B. Do you not see then what a delusory and troublesome stir men make for and about meer words What 's the Crimination come to then about Acquired and Infused Habits when the difference is only in the effects You confess that all proper Habits Infused are by our cogitation and use of means and so are also acquired And you confes that all Acquired Aabits are wrought besides our cogitation and use of means by an immediate influx of God so that as to the Causes you can name no difference And yet the words Acquired and Infused signifie a difference in the Causes and their operation and not in the Effect by their notation Is not this deceit then C. Tell me what you take to be the difference your self B. 1. I suppose that ab uno omnia God without diversity causeth all diversity which is only in the Creatures and not in him 2. I suppose that God hath appointed natural means and second causes for common natural effects and his Will is that they shall operate according to their aptitude And that he hath appointed extraordinary means even Christ and supernatural Revelation for the production of saving Faith And it is his will that they shall work usually according to their aptitude 3. It is his command that we use these several means natural and supernatural accordingly 4. As these means are special extraordinary and for a special end
other and giveth real Grace to both But because the intellect is in the natural order the first in acting and the will but second and because the act is commonly and reasonably supposed to go before the Habit though not before all Divine Influx ad actum therefore men are uncertain whether God who first acteth the Intellect do not by its act first operate on the will But this dependeth much on the Physical Controversie whether the Intellect determine the will ad speciem actus or at least really and efficiently move it or rather only present the object to it and so work but in subserviency to the material cause which is constitutive indeed of the act in specie but not efficient and the perception of it goeth to the conditio objectiva without which it is no object to the will This I incline to with Scotus and suppose that the Intellect moveth not the will per modum naturae by necessitation But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own souls how shall we know the unsearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghost The seventh Crimination C. They make Gods Grace a resistible thing which man can frustrate and so God worketh at uncertainties * Mans ignorance of the way of Gods operation on second causes told us by Christ himself Job 3. should end such quarrels and teach us all with judicious Davenant to prosess uncertainty and with judicious Jos Placeus de lib. arb p. 174. speaking of the dependance of the second cause on the first and the Papists digladiations about concurse and predetermination to say Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majestatem ducimur non audemus definire quanta sit dependentia causae secundae a prima Nobis sufficit modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum nostrorum vel minimam labem aspergat non posse nimiam statâ—i To which also the very judicious Lt Blank subscribeth Thes 51. de concursu c. The Remonstrants Syn. ar 3 4. p. 15. c. do profess that Gods operation of the Intellect Affection and Will do thus differ that the converting work on the will is more resistible than the other And to the question An conversâ—o contingens sit et in certa an vero necessitate causae aut eventus insallibiliter sequatur in â—o qui convertitur Respondent conversionem esse contingentem quia Libera est nec tameâ— Dâ—o incertam quia praecognita est nec sequi necessitate causae sive consequentis quia resistere poterat homo sed necessitate consequentiae c. Et pag. 17. Declarat Quare dicimus hominis voluntatem ad volendum bonum non necessitari sed hominem posse resistere hoc est non-velle et saepe actu non-velle et resistere gratiâ— sufficientis operationibus B. I have said so much of this before that I need not tire you with much more Quest 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of success if Grace be resistible C. I will not say so I know what you have said to this before B. Why then do you speak that which is not valid in your own judgment Quest. 2. Dare you undertake to justifie all the world against the accusation of having resisted the Grace of God C. No I dispute not on such hard terms B. Quest. 3. Did you never repent your self for resisting Grace C. Yes in some sense but not as I now mean it B. How is that C. To resist the Gospel and Ministry is a resisting of Grace and the Holy Ghost Acts 7. and so I have done But I speak of immediate resisting God B. 1. Remember that here you confess that the Gospel is Grace even to them that resist it 2. God himself cannot be resisted immediately where he worketh not immediately 3. But where he doth so he is said to be resisted 1. Not by any repelling of his strength 2. Much less by opposing a greater strength 3. Nor by acting by any strength but what he giveth 4. Not by causing any difficulty to him 5. Not by frustrating any absolute will of his But 1. Passively by being ill disposed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth and that operation which else might effect it 2. And actively by doing that which rendereth us yet more ill-disposed both naturally and morally by commerit 3. As also in that we do that which is contrary to Gods actions in their tendency to the effect When he moveth us to hear read meditate pray love trust c. and we do the contrary this may be called a resistance C. If God intend the effect it will be done but if he intend it not how is he resisted in that which he never intended to do B. You know the Scripture speaketh not at these rates but when men will set their silly wits against Gods Word thus they will seem subtiler than he But it 's but a dream 1. God may be resisted when he intendeth not the effect in that his Law is resisted and with it that necessary measure of Grace by which the effect might have been wrought Though his Decree be not resisted yet his Law and his Grace and help which had a tendency to the effect and a sufficiency on its part may be resisted 2. And he is ordinarily resisted in that which he doth both intend and do For he seldom doth us any good without resistance though he overcome But he that overcometh resistance is resisted C. But I mean by Resisting Overcoming B. Why then did you not speak as you meant None dreameth that Omnipotence is overcome by a greater strength much less by the derived power of us worms But the Case is weighty which you and others perilously overlook C. Let me hear your explication of it B. God doth not work like necessary agents to the utmost that he is able His Wisdome hath diversified Creatures and his Wisdome hath appointed even in the works of Grace a stablished order of second causes and means which he will use for the effect And his Wisdome and Free will hath fixed a certain degree or proportion of his concourse suitable 1. To the nature of man 2. And to the nature and use of all those means 3. And to the effect as it is to be ordinarily accomplished Even as in nature he concurreth with all causes agreeably to their stablished nature and use Now though Omnipotency cannot be overcome yet the same creature that hath a certain stated proportion of natural activity and Gods suitable concourse e. g. to a healthful body which hath strong appetites and also a congruous proportion of Gracious means and concurse and helps of Grace by which he can rule the foresaid appetite may yet by neglect of that help and by wilful indulging of that appetite make the appetite stronger than his ordinary degree of help and so overcome the Grace of God though he overcome not Gods Omnipotence or Decrees
But there is yet another thing of great moment commonly overlooked C. What is that B. The great importance of that common saying Recipitur ad modum recipientis on which had I time I would write a Book of Instances Causa Receptiva is not well understood Aristotle maketh Privatio to be one of his three Principles in Physicks By Privation must be meant not Absentia formae sed Dispositio materiae And whether you will call it a third Principle or only the due qualification of the first Matter to make it immediately Receptive of the form the matter being de nomine â—umero is small But it is most certain that the wonderful diversity of alterations or effects of motion in the world is very much to be ascribed to the diversity of Receptive Dispositions And accordingly as in Physicks the three Active Natures Intellective Sensitive and Vegâ—tative which its like is Ignis are to be defined per virtutes suas Activas so the Passive Elements Earth Water and Air are to be defined by their several contextures or constitutions which make up Dispositionem Receptivam Influxus Activorum unicuique propriam which is their very form In Physical cases God doth first as Creator make all things in wonderful variety of natures quantities figures and contextures And secondly he causeth an Universal Cause to Influence them generally such as is the Sun for one what other we know not well whose â—râ—ple influx Motion Light and Heat affecteth all things according to their several Natures and Receptivities The special Active principle in every living thing is both cherished and suscitated by this universal solar influx But the diversity of effects is not from the Sun but from the diversity of Recipients The Sun by its influx is the cause that all things live and move But that one thing hath a life and motion Intellective and another Nonsttive and another Vegetative that by the Suns influx an Aâ—orn bringâ— forth an Oak and every Seed it s own kind of Plant that a Horse â—â—â—â— as a Horse a Dog as a Dog a Sheep as a Sheep c. that the â—osa hath one smell colour shape the Carnaâ—ion another the Tulip another â— that the Dungâ—â—l sâ—â—keth that the Clay is hardened the Waâ— softened c. the innumerable different effects in the inferior creatures are all caused by the Sun as to their general nature the received Influx of a Motive Illuminative and Calefactive Virtue but they are none of them in specie vel gradu unde differentia qua talis oritur caused by the Sun alone but also by the variety of the suscitated vital forms in animals And in things inanimate though not the Recipient but the solar Influx be the efficient cause of the variety of alterations and effects yet the Ratio diversitatis is more in the Disposition of the Recipient The Suns Influx is the same in it self without any difference on the clay and wax on the dunghill and the rose Let the question then be what causeth the different effects Answ 1. The Suns influx causeth all the Motion Light and Heat which they all receive as the Efficient cause 2. The Material Recipients I have marvelled oft why Elisha called for a Ministrel when the spirit of Prophecy was to come upon him And so Musick help'd Saul I am sure that Satan worketh on the minds of Melancholy Cholerick c. persons by and according to the temper of the spirits and humors and cannot do the same things without them And perhaps the spirit of God who can work as he list will do it ad modum recipientis and so Elisha's spirits must be brought up into an harmonious elevated preparation that the mind may be made fit to receive the spirits extraordinary work are the several things named as Material 3. The said Recipients being of divers Natures and Shapes c. have their variety of Receptive Dispositions 4. The forma Recepta a sole is nothing but its triplex influxus Motus Lux Calor 5. These are variously Received according to the various Dispositions of the Recipients 6. Hence follow the Variety of the second effects By the motive Influx some things are moved when stones and houses stir not By the Lucide Influx the eye seeth when the hand doth not the flowers appear in various colours according to their various Receptivities and some things give little reflective appearance of their Reception of it The Calid Influx cherisheth the living and burneth by a burning-glass when the dead stir not by it and some unapt recipients are little altered by it I call these the second effects which are thus various For the first effects are still the same viz. the Motive Illuminative and Calefactive efflux of the Sun is still sent forth and some how or other reacheth every capable recipient in general But the Alterations which are thereby made are diversified according to the diversity of Receptivities But yet these Receptive Dispositions are no efficient Causes of this difference or of any of the alterations But they are the Receptive Material Causes without which the efficient doth not make them and according to which he doth make them So that the Sun though but Causa Universalis yet is also the Universal Cause and sole efficient of all these Particular motions and alterations And yet the Ratio differendi is not to be given from it but from the different Receptivities according to which it still produceth them So the Rain falleth equally on the stones on the earth on vessels of various shapes and sizes The stone retaineth none The vessels variously retain it As they are round square long great or small so are they variously filled The efficient cause of the difference is the descent of the rain The material constitutive cause is the different quantities and shapes of the water But yet the Ratio differendi is to be assigned from the diversity of Receptive dispositions in the vessels And that you may see that these Receptivities are no efficients and yet contain the chief Rationem differendi note that the Reason to be given from them is ex alter a differentium parte still Negative or Privative as on the other it is Positive E. g. Why doth the Sun make the Rose smell sweet and not the stone or dunghill Because the stone or dunghill have not those odoriferous particles to be suscitated by it as the Rose had Why doth the Sun move the Flies and not the Stones Because the Stones had not that vital principle to be suscitated as the Flies had Why did not the rain fill the Stones as it did the Cisterns and this Vessel as that Because they had not the same Receptive and Retentive shapes C. Well! but what is all this physical Discourse to our present Controversie B. 1. The constancy of God in operating according to an established Order in the world doth shew us that the God of Order delighteth so to do 2. Therefore we
have reason to conceive that he doth some such thing in the methods of Grace as he doth in nature viz. That he hath instituted a frame of means which are the established way in and with which he will convey his Grace And that he hath decreed to concur with a certain congruous universal influx which shall afford to all such a degree of suscitating illuminating and converting attractive force as his wisdom seeth meet to be the established measure for the redeemed World And this universal Influx is the sole efficient of all the good that is found in the redeemed But 1. It is but a certain convenient proportion and therefore will not do all that God can do nor do the same on one man as on another nor at one time as at another on the same man 2. And recipitur ad modum recipientis The diversity of second effects may oft be most assigned to the diversity of receptive Dispositions It is a wonder to see how the same causes variously work on mens minds that are dispositively diversified but by some preconceived opinion You Remonstr Declar. p. 17. Huic sua conversionâ— homo ex insita sibi pravitate in res mundanas affectu obicem impedimentum liberum opponere potest ponit sape five voluntas praedicationem Evangelii externam neglegat susque dequeâ—abeat tum quum ejus audiendi copiae fit homini aut auditum verbum perfunctorie traâ—â—â—t magis rebus mundanis intentus aut aliâ— modo impediat quo minue ipsi doctrina Evangelicâ— veritas necessitas utilit as a spiritu sâ—persuadeatur sivt verbo assentiatur sed voluntatem c. laxatis carni babenis spiritum extinguat spiritui resistat bona desideria cogitationesque sâ—pius calituâ— infusas oblatas volent elidat extermenet may see two men learned sober pious in doubt whether the Arminians or Calvinists the Conformists or Non-conformists yea perhaps the Papists or Protestants be in the right One is before hand more inclined one way and the other the other way yea perhaps not inclined in will but have received in judgment a great apprehension that some one Principle is right which more induceth to one side than the other They both pray and meditate and resolve to read and search the Scripture and Controversal Writings with all possible diligence and impartiality They set upon it and one seeth all along as he goeth the fullest evidence as he thinketh for the one side and the other seeth all go on the other side through the difference of Receptive disposition I have had sufficient notice of two Non-Conformist Ministers that had favoured in mind the late cause of the Parliament in the Civil War and by the face of the dreadfulness and heynousness of the guilt if it should prove that their cause was bad were brought to resolve to do all that possibly they could to be resolved They both set themselves to Fast and Pray they searched the whole Scripture read over the Statute-Book and all the Common Law-Books and Cases that they could get and all the History of our ancient Government and of our late Transactions they read what was said on both sides and one saw all as clear as the light go for the King against the Parliament wondering that any should make a doubt of it and the other though still not fully certain was more confirmed in his old apprehensions the other way yet both learned able judicious godly and truly desirous to know the truth and many and many years begged it of God and unweariedly followed on the search and no carnal interest I am fully perswaded made the difference And what then shall we ascribe it all to immediate operations of God without any more ado No as far as I could perceive the difference arose from hence One of them was first deeply possessed with the sense of Gods late Judgments Spiritual and Corporal on the Religious party which adhered to the Parliament and thought these Judgments indicated their sin Their Scandal Divisions Confusions Matual Censures and Errors were still before his eyes and the Laws of Order and Government and Obedience and Patience lay in greatest power on his heart The other lookt all abroad the world to Infidel Heathen Mahometan and Popish Kingdoms and thought that tyranny was the grand sin on the earth which kept out the Gospel and consequently Godliness and Salvation from the generality of mankind that kept up Popery and kept out Reformation that silenced powerful Preachers Suffrag Theol. Britt in Synod Dord art 3. 4. Sunt quaedam effecta interna ad conversionem praevia quae virtute verbi spiritusque in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitantur qualia sunt notitia vâ—luntatis divinae sensus peccati timor poenae cogitatio de liberatione spes aliqua veniae Quos Deus mediante verbâ— per spiritum sâ—um hunc in modum afficit eos ad fidem conversionemque vere serio vocat invitat Quos ita afficit Deus non deserit nec desistit in vera ad conversionem via praemovere priusquam ab illis per neglectionem voluntariam art hujus gratiae initialis repulsam deseratur and kept up Ignorance that most served Satan and fed the jaws of Hell He thought of all the inhumane consequents of unrestrained Tyranny He read Politicks more than the other and read more of the Greek and Roman History and regarded more the Judgment of the several Parties and Religions among mankind and he fell upon Bilson and Hooker the chief Prelatists and he thought that Gods Judgments consequential to those Wars had been incomparably less than the mercies and benefits and that there were now proportionably multitudes more of Godly Ministers and People than there were before the Wars And these different pre-conceptions and pre-possessions made them have quite different Interpretations of all the Scriptures the Statutes the Law Books c. which they read And as the Proverb is As the Fool thinketh so the Bell tinketh So it is wonderful to see in all things how much the divers disposition of the Recipients doth occasion diversity of effects from the same cause C. But I hope you would not make us believe that all diversification is from man Though the Sun be but an universal cause yet God is also a particular cause and a specifying and who is it else that caused that diversity in the Creatures which turneth the Suns universal Influx into various effects As God created the variety of Recipients so he doth by Grace diversifie mans Receptive dispositions B. These are weighty matters and deeply to be considered with many thoughts and cautelous sobriety We have two questions fallen before us 1. How far Gods Grace is resistible 2. How God or man do cause diversities Though I have been drawn on to speak much to the last it is here but in order to the resolving of the first The last is to be spoke to
Whether God Actually in his mind thus Compare men and prefer one before another and say I will cause this man to believe rather than that I answer 1. There is no Act in God but his Essence which is invariable and indivisible 2. But because his operations as terminated and productive ad extra are various and have objective material causes of their diversity in the recipients therefore we usually thence denominate Gods volitions as various And so when we see that one man hath Grace given him to believe when another hath not we hence say that God mentally and by Decree preferreth one before the other when the difference is not at all in God not his Act ex parte agentis but only of and by God in the Recipients C. But come yet nearer the heart of the case and tell me plainly 1. Whether the difference of Effects be more from the will and action of God or from mens different Receptive dispositions And 2. Whether all these different Receptivities be not of God B. Order bids me begin with the latter 1. The different Dispositions are of two sorts Good and Bad. God is not the cause of the Indisposition or illdisposition of any And as to the good disposition or Preparation of Souls no doubt but he is the principal Cause of it all but not the sole Cause nor always at least the necessitating Cause but oft giveth men that necessary help by which they might have been prepared for more when yet they are not through their wilful resistance or neglect For few men will deny that men have sufficient uneffectual Grace for some preparatory acts though not for faith Ad. Q. 2. I told you that the difference in the effects resulteth from the Causes in both Subjects and not in one only That which maketh one a believer and the other an unbeliever maketh them differ And I have told you what these Causes are But further I suppose as aforesaid a certain established order and degree of universal help external and internal by Christ to the Soul as the Sun affordeth to inferior Bodies This stablished order of Grace universally affordeth such a degree of Divine Influx and help as will cause faith in a prepared Soul and will not cause it in some much unprepared Souls For if as little help would serve the unprepared as the prepared to what use is preparation quomodo recipitur ad modum recipientis In this case now the efficient of Grace is God and not Man but * That even Jesuits confess in their way of scientia media that the Ratio discriminis why one person rather than another hath Grace is from God initially and principally and not from any beginning in man See Ruiz proving it at large in all his Tract 3. Disp 18. 19. De Praedest exordio So that this is no difference between us Yea more he maintaineth that ante fidem niâ—il est dispositionis meriti aut impetrationis Sect. 3. Disp 19. 24. And one would think that this should satisfie even the Antinomians But he meaneth only that this disposition is not always necessary He that will in brief see what the Schoolmen say of preparative Grace may find abundance of them cited by Ruiz ibid. d. 21. per totam and what nature can do in preparation Greg. Armin in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 1. speaketh most like the Reformed Aug. de bono persever c. 8. Sed cur Gratia Dei non secundum merita hominum datur Resp Quia deus miserecors est Cur ergo non omnibus Et hic respondeo Quoniam Deuâ— justus Judex est the Ratio proxima of the difference in the event and effects is the Diverse disposition of the Recipients But here mark well that it is not the good disposition or preparation of one party that is the only and I think not the chief reason of the difference but the Privative and Positive indisposition of the other party is as much if not the chiefest reason If one man shut his eyes against the light when another doth not the Ratio discriminis why one man differeth from another in seeing and not seeing is on both parts but principally on his part that shutteth his eyes because the other doth but what he was made to do and all living creatures should do But the other absurdly crosseth nature So that under an universal Influx and help the said Influx is the efficient of the action or effect but the disposition of the Recipients are the Occasions and Reasons to be assigned of the various effects but especially the incapacity of the defective party As the reason why the Sun doth make a Tree bear fruit and not a dead stock is because the Tree is an apt recipient of its influx but the stock or stone is not 2. But Note that in case that God operate not by such an universal Influx only but also by superadded special or extraordinary degrees of particular Grace which by a difference from the universal Influx or degree is peculiarly apt to procure the effects here the ratio discriminis is principally to be ascribed to that special Grace and not to the preparations on the Soul C. Tell me then what you think whether God works by such an universal Grace or by such a special Grace 1. How far doth he work by universal Grace 2. Is that universal Grace ever effectual of it self on prepared Souls 3. How far doth he also use the special particular Grace which you mentioned B. I. To your first Qu. I answer 1. God in the beginning made mankind upright in Adam and Eve and made no difference as to the present case 2. Eve having first sinned did make a difference between her self and Adam which God made not nor altered first his universal Grace 3. Adam next without Gods alteration by Sin did difference himself from himself as he was before 4. God then set up a new universal Grace even Christ with the new Covenant and Recovering means to give out universal help suited to his Covenant and means to be the Giver of the Spirit and the Light of the world we cannot have time now to open the difference between Christ's administrations before and after his Incarnation There was at first an universal sufficiency in this Recovering help of Grace 5. Cain that could have done otherwise wilfully sinned against this universal Grace and Covenant and so made a difference between him and the rest of mankind when God made none 6. Whether Abel did offer his acceptable Sacrifice by this same universal Help alone or by any special extraordinary Grace ex parte mediorum vel Influxus primi recepti is a thing unknown to us because unrevealed 7. The Posterity of Cain as of Adam at first because Seminally in him and personally from his very guilty essence were justly deprived of some of that Grace both Subjective and Objective which Cain had deprived himself of Their natures were more vitiated and so
Glory as the materia objectiva actus humani where I conclude the Causa finalis as the chief object Thus I have shewed you truly and plainly unde fit fides as that is all one as unde hic effectus and that is all one as unde Gratia fit efficax as to this secondary effect C. But I conceive that the sense of the question rather iâ— which of all these is the chief cause or reason of the existence of the effect B. Pardon my impatience of Confusion The chief cause and the chief reason are not always the same There is no question but God is the only and total Causa prima from whom all the rest have all their power and force But by the Reason of the existence is often meant that which in discourse must be assigned proportionately in answer to the question Why is one converted rather than another supposing Gods Influx on them both And this is oft the Receptive disposition as is said for Reciptur ad modum recipientes C. Well But the question recurreth what is the chief Cause and Reason that one not another hath that preparatory Receptivity B. The chief Cause is God why one hath it The chief Cause why another hath it not is himself that is the Moral deficient cause The Ratio differendi I opened to you before The most notable if we suppose Gods Influx to be of it self universal and equal is the Indisposition of the Sinner whence he doth difference himself from those that God causeth to receive even preparing Grace But the true Ratio effectus is from all the Causes conjunct C. But you must come at last to some prime difference And if you will say that the reason of our Preparatory effect or degree of Grace is because I used a former well or did not refuse it or was prepared for it what will you say of the first degree B. I say that the first preparatory Grace or help was given to Adam and all in him as the first natural goodness was C. But where came in the first difference B. By Cain's wilful Sin against God and his Grace C. But though you do with Augustine hold a communicated guilt of the sins of other Parents than our first and so a difference between persons yea and Kingdoms thence arising yet some Children as Esau and Jacob born of the same Parents must have in them some other cause of difference even as to preparatory Grace B. Suppose Gods fixed equal Influx universal there are two Causes of difference herein 1. One is the meer sinful wilfulness of one party that doth not do what that Grace enabled him to do by which a difference is made C. You mean that Jacob better used his help than Esau B. Not so but that Esau more abused it than Jacob. Suppose Jacob had slept out his youth or done no good and Esau had rebelled against God also and done much mischief Esau had hereby made a difference which is assignable without commending Jacob. C. Well what is the other Cause B. 2. Gods own free differencing Will and Grace who is a free Benefactor and may do with his own as he list and therefore freely loveth Jacob with the electing special love and decree which he hath not to Esau For though I have all this while discoursed with you of the Ratio Efficaciae of an Universal Grace I say not that there is no other C. O Now you come to the matter indeed B. II. The Question Unde fit Gratia efficax * Blank de Dist Grat. Thes 79. Naturam Gratiae efficacis Thomistae ponunt in motione quadam virtuosa quae est in voluntate per modum quo impetus in re quae impellitur Jansenius in â—ffectibus Amoris desiderii boni coelestis spiritualis quibus suaviter sursum rapitur animus humanus Discipâ—li Cameronis in potâ—nâ—â—ssima mentis illuminatione persuasione quae voluntatem â—ffectus secum rapit Alii in omnipotenti efficacissima Dei operatione qua novum principium spiritualis vitae Cordi hominis vocati inditur homo simâ—l excitatur ad actus eliciendos quae hic plerique vâ—i docti proferunt componenda potius quam opponenda videntur Even they that are for Physical praedetermination are not agreed what it is some make it a transient quality passing with the act Some say it is only mans Act it self as from God the first cause Some with Alvarez say It is Aliquid quod habet esse incompletum as colours in the air that is They know not what and yet venture on hot contentions about it And Jansenius who maketh it to be Delectatio or Complacentia saith it is Actus vitalis indeliberatus animo quidem amoris desiderii praecedentis consensum ac delectationem illam quae quies animi gaudium dicitur De Grat. Christi l. 4. c. 11. Much like to Vasquez save that Vasq calls it but an indeliberate prime motion of the affection and Jansenius calls it Indeliberate Delectation or Complacency which certainly is an Act of man and the Scotists say that all the Wills Acts are free though not all its inclinations But thus we strive about that which none of us understand viz. How God moveth his Creatures and our Wills in special being put of Gods special Grace by which he arbitrarily maketh a difference and is more than his Universal Grace must be thus resolved That though other Causes concur to the effect the Great over-ruling differencing and ascertaining Cause is the very quality and aptitude of Gods operation it self as proceeding from an absolute volition of the effect and in the Means and Influx fitted to ascertain the effect C. Wherein consisteth this differencing special Grace B. Deceive not your self No mortal man can know in what it ordinarily constantly or chiefly consisteth We know 1. That though God as Rector per Leges keeps one even and constant course yet as Proprietor and Benefactor he may vary as he please And that a Benefactor may give unequally to men of equal merits And that God really doth so de facto And that his Will hath no Cause 2. We know that God hath innumerable ways to fulfil his Will and make a difference between man and man which are beyond the search of Mortals 3. And though we can name divers which he can take we know not de facto which he doth take hic nunc C. What differencing free acts of Grace do you observe B. None which violate Gods established order or diminish his universal Grace But such as are superadded specially to some As 1. To Children of the same Parents he giveth to divers a temperament of Body as in one much more conduceth to thoughtfulness tenderness meekness sobriety chastity zeal honesty c. than in the other He is a stranger to man that knoweth not this 2. He sometime giveth them various Education One is piously educated Another is snatch'd away and
made a Janizary A third the Parents dying leave to such as educate them vitiously And some the Parents apostatizing educate in Heresie or unpiety themselves 3. He oft casteth their lot under different means for their Edification One is set Apprentice to a Godly Master and another to an ungodly one One is cast under a Holy able Minister and another under an ignorant Seducer One is cast among Godly Companions and another among lewd Seducers idle wanton voluptuous unclean malignant scornful or other such tempting persons as that a great deal more grace or help is necessary to their preservation 4. One for ought we see of equal commerit is impelled or occasioned to go to Church just when an apt Sermon is prepared for him and another occasioned to be absent A Minister or Friend is sent as Philip to the Eunuch though by ordinary means to meet with one and speak suitably to his case and not to the other 5. One falleth under some great affliction which taketh him down and awakeneth him to seriousness and another swimmeth down the violent and dangerous stream of prosperity and constant health 6. One seeth some notable Judgments on others or some convincing Providences or hath some strange deliverance himself which another never hath 7. One Nation or Kingdom of equal ill desert hath the Gospel and powerful Preachers sent to them while others are left as the most of the world without it yea as the poor Islanders Laplanders Brasilians Soldanians and Canibals A thousand ways God hath to fulfil his Will which we know not of But besides all these in point of Means we see that under the same Means or Sermon or Family helps there is not the same success Not only because the unbelievers make the difference by sinning against sufficient universal Grace but because God doth especially touch the hearts of some by such Grace as he giveth not to others Thus did he open the heart of Lidia Act. 16. C. Methinks you should lay all on this Internal changing Grace and not on the difference of means B. Certain Experience telleth us that most usually God giveth extraordinary differing means where his Grace shall work different effects Christ himself who was to bestow extraordinary Grace after his Incarnation was himself to be an extraordinary means He must work Miracles raise the Dead rise from the Dead c. as the Means The Apostles that were to do extraordinary things in calling the unbelieving world to Christ were to do it by miracles and extraordinary means The 3000 Act. 2. must have the Apostles miraculous gift of tongues to be the means of their Conversion Cornelius must have both an Angel and Peter Paul must be strucken down and blind and hear Christ speak from Heaven and after have Ananias's Ministry The Eunuch must have Philip. The Jaylor Act. 16. must have an Earthquake and so of others And to this day we see how little God doth where there is no Ministry or Means And how much the success of able holy skilful Ministers doth differ from that of wicked or Ignorant sots And how usually in all the world the success goeth according to the means and that the instances of contrary are unusual rarities Therefore separate not what the wisdom of God hath conjoyned C. But do you think that God ever ascertaineth the Effect meerly by such Moral Differencing helps or means annexed to his universal Gracious Efflux or aid without a special degree of that Immediate Efflux it self on the Soul B. 1. We little know when God worketh Immediately and how far His Efflux or Action ex parte agentis I oft tell you hath no degrees being himself The degrees are in the Received Impress on the Soul And it 's like this special differencing Grace consisteth in a special degree of Impress But when that Impress is made by the Spirit without the Instrumentality of Means we know not God can make our own Imagination and spirit and inward temperament a means undiscernably to us 2. If I have proved to you that even the universal Grace it self with common means may attain the effect and doth in many who dare question whether All yea One extraordinary or special Means added by God to that Common Influx with a will of success may ascertain the effect It were Blasphemy to say that God hath not Wisdom enough thus to attain his ends by a series of adapted means in conjunction with that Grace C. But methinks you spin too fine a thred when you talk of an Impress of the Spirit on the Soul as the first Effect of God alone or God and the Means antecedent to faith or the Act of man as the second effect of God and Man together I find not that our Curiousest School Wits do talk much of such an Impress B. 1. You will find the same sence in the Thomists and many of the Schoolmen And methinks it is clear in it self The Act of Faith is done by us Our Souls have need of some Grace to be the Cause or it The Cause goeth before the Effect This Cause must not be out of us but within us Grace therefore must be first within us as a Cause before it is within us as the effect of it Yea Action being nothing but Modus Agentis is not a fit recipient it self immediately of a vis impressa It is the Soul or faculty that must Act and to say that Gods Influx is not on the Soul or faculty as the recipient but on the Act of that faculty aloue seemeth to be unintelligible if not absurd It is our Act or our Soul that needeth help or Grace If not the Soul but the Act then we have need of none at all For the Act is yet future that is is no act and nothing and so hath no need 2. But if really you will hold to the opinion that our Act it self is the first Effect of Gods Influx or Will then take notice that all our controversie here between you and the Arminians what Grace is sufficient and what effectual is at an end And it is on your part and for the truth that I spin that thred which you account too fine C. How do you manifest that B. Most plainly For if we have nothing to enquire after between Gods agency ex parte sui and the Act of Faith it is a ridiculous question to ask what Grace is sufficient and what effectual and what difference between the one and the other and what is that which maketh efficiently the difference For either your Question is of the Cause or the Effect If of the Cause it is besides the second Causes nothing but Gods Essence even his essential Activity Wisdom and Will And do you think that Gods essence is diversifyed as little and great more or less sufficient and effectual Do you enquire for Diversity in simple unity That which worketh all effects in the world is one Cause that hath in it self no real difference of parts kinds
or degrees II. But if your question be of the Effect it is ridiculous or past question Do you ask what Grace in us it is that maketh the Difference between a Believer and an Infidel Why your question answereth it self It is Faith and that maketh the difference in one as Infidelity doth in the other Do you ask what is sufficient To what If to Salvation it is perseverance in Faith and Holiness If to Justification it is Faith if to Faith and Conversion nothing pre-existent in us Do you ask what maketh Grace effectual what Grace mean you If Faith it 's none of the doubt or Controversie It is improperly effectual to Justification being no efficient of it but a Condition which is a Receptive dispoâ—ition ex ordinatione divina virtute foederis You must recur then and ask what maketh Gods Essence or Spirit effectual As if Gods essence had a Cause or suffered from the Creature But if you mean no more but what are the Causes of Faith that 's another question oft answered Choose now whether you will lay all our Controversies on that fine thred of Gods various Impress on the faculties in order of Nature antecedent to Faith in act or true habit or else confess that we have no difference nor shew of any but have many ages abhominably abused the world C. But seeing you maintain that God as a free Lord and Benefactor doth vary his gifts of Grace as he doth of Nature though we know not when he doth it Morally and by means and when by Immediate differing Impress yet methinks you should hold that by one of the two he always doth it And that equal Grace hath never unequal effects by the unequal free reception rejection or other difference made by man B. To conclude this whole dispute 1. * By Grace here I mean not with Bradwardine Gods Will as denominated from various objects Gods Will in it self is but One and the Effects are many and the Will is variously denominated virtually ex connotatione terminorum vel effectuum If he could prove more diversity in Gods Will or that no man can do any thing but what he doth I should be of his mind That equal universal Grace can end in different effects in the same Man and in divers men by man's own free various concourse or neglect I have fully proved to you 2. And when we have proved that such a Grace there is and so it can do we have great reason to think that sometimes it doth so And no man can prove that it never doth so 3. And de facto I have proved that sometimes it doth so in Adam's case and in Cain's making a difference before God denyed him sufficient Grace And in all bad men and good men in the world who sometimes sinfully omit to do that which by the same Grace they could have done and did another time 4. But de facto How oft and when and in how many God converteth men by the one way or the other no Mortal man can tell And therefore forget not that when I call universal Grace ordinary and the special different Grace extraordinary I intend not to tell you which God most usually doth the work by as distinct from the other But I call one Ordinary because it is common to all or more in it self and also concurreth always with the other in its work and so is never left out And I call the other Extraordinary because it is above the universal degree and way and proper to some as superadded C. You did well to remember that For I was offended that you called that Different Grace Extraordinary B. I say again to conclude I will earnestly intreat you to take heed of these few errors in your foundation here that they mislead not your understanding in all the controversie I. Do not think that God must needs act ad ultimum posse in all his operations It 's certain that as to many possible effects he doth omnino non agere as to make more Suns more Men more Worlds And if he can therein totally not act he can act limitedly or in tantum only as he freely will II. Do not think these degrees of Operation as various ex parte Dei for they are but his most simple essence Nor do not Imagine that there is a certain Vis media called Grace which is somewhat Causal between the Creator and the Creature I doubt such a wrong conceit lyeth at the bottom of all these disputes and men think that besides Gods essence and the effects on the Soul there is some middle force or cause called Grace which is neither God nor a Creature whose kind and degree they enquire after * As Aureoluâ— maintaineth III. Do not overlook the Glory that God designeth to himself in his SAPIENTIAL Kingdom Government and operations I doubt some think so much of Strength and Power alone as if they thought God were Glorified by nothing else or more in an Oxe or Horse than in a Man And whatever is ascribed to Gods Sapiential operation they contemptuously call A Moral Causing and not a Physical As if God must move men as he doth the air the water or a stone Remember that though Gods Omnipotent Activity his Wisdom and his Will do still inseparably co-operate yet they have each its eminent Impress Effect and Glory And so the frame of Nature is the Glorious Impress of Omnipotency with Wisdom and Love The Kingdom of God on earth especially of Grace is the Glorious work of the Wisdom of God directly governing Man as a Moral agent by Moral means And the Kingdom of Glory as foretasted on Earth and perfect in Heaven is the glorious work of Divine Love Separate not these nor undervalue or dishonour any one of them But study the Glory of Gods Sapiential Kingdom and works And remember that Moral Means and Moral Operations of God are not unsuitable to the Government of Moral Agents in Moral works IV. Forget not the great difference between the way of operation suitable to such a Moral Rector as such and to a meer Proprietor or Actor and Benefactor And then you will see that standing Laws are the Rectors Instruments and Judgments and Executions equal according to those Laws And that Life Eternal and Gods Glory and pleasure being the ends of Government it cannot be doubted but Gods Laws to all the world have some aptitude and suitableness on their part to that end And therefore that the frame of Moral means and annexed help hath a certain universal equality antecedent to man's sinful will which by forfeiture and rejection maketh an inequality And therefore it is one of the noblest parts of your study here to find out what Acts God doth as Legislator for those are first and equal and as Judge which man maketh unequal and what he doth as Owner and free-Benefactor For so he may make what difference he pleases And the wonderful varieties through all the
true a translation as Worthy and Worthiness when it is the very same thing that is meant Nay when Merit of Condignity is the highest kind which the Papists themselves mention and are reproved for do you not hereby imply that Condignity is a bigger word than bare Merit Quest 2. And I ask you Whether all the antient Teachers of the Churches since the Apostles whose Writings are come down to us do not familiarly apply these names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Meritum to believers And if you perswade men that all these Teachers and Churches were Papists you will perswade most that believe you to be Papists too But such is the success of over-doing Quest 3. And I would know Whether in common speech Reward and Merit or Desert be not Relatives as Master and Servant Husband and Wife are Is there any Reward which is not Meriti Praemium the Reward of Merit What mean you your self else by the word Reward Lib. I mean Gods free Gift without respect to merit or desert P. Doth not the usage of the World distinguish between a meer Gift and a Reward What if you give money to the next man you meet without respect to any thing in him will you call it a Reward Review all the Scripture Texts that speak of a Reward and see whether they have no relation to any foregoing act in man God gave Christ himself to the lapsed world Was this Gift of Christ a Reward God gave some Prophets some Apostles c. and giveth the Gospel to Infidel Nations Is this Gift a Reward or ever so called Your humane nature is Gods Gift but is it a Reward Nay will you say that the first Grace is a Reward which is said to be Pelagianism Lib. Well but Rewards are Gods second Gifts as they follow the former without respect to Worthiness or Merit P. That cannot be neither If God first Give the world a Saviour and then give them the Covenant of Grace and Pardon through him is this a Reward If Christ first heal the sick man and then cause him to walk or if Peter and John first heal the lame man and then cause him joyfully to leap c. is the second a Reward If an Infidels Life be first preserved and then the Gospel given him is this a Reward Lib. No but a Reward supposeth only our Fitness to receive a free gift which is called our worthiness and not our Merit P. Do you mean our Natural fitness or our Moral A man is Naturally fit for his food when he is hungry Will you say therefore that his food is his Reward for being hungry Lib. Well Let it be then his Moral or rather his Spiritual fitness P. Your explications are but darkning Spiritual is either Natural or Moral as well as corporal The soul as a Spirit is in its nature fit to understand common things here in the body Is this understanding its Reward for being a Spirit But Heaven is a Reward Lib. Well Call it a Moral fitness if you will but what is that to Merit P. It is so much to it as to tell the world that such as you do revile others for holding the same which you are forced to profess your self and wrangle about meer words and know it not For by Merit is meant nothing else but A moral aptitude for Reward or that Rewardableness which consisteth in Moral Good or Evil as freely done and had and so acceptable to God as our Governour But tell me next what word will you choose to serve instead of Merit that we may agree in it Lib. I know not what words to use that please you when we are not agreed about the thing signified I hold not any Reward in proper sense but only free gift and therefore how can I tell you what word to use instead of merit I think the word Reward is used but figuratively P. Christ saith Matth. 6. 4 6. Your Father which seeth in secret shall Reward you openly Col. 3. 24. Ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance Heb. 10. 35. Cast not away your confidence which hath great recompence of reward Heb. 11. 26. He had respect to the recompence of reward v. 6. He that cometh to God must believe that God is and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him Mat. 16. 27. He shall reward every man according to his works I ask you again What is meant here by Rewarding Lib. I tell you again the meaning is that as men shew their liking of a thing that pleaseth them by a proper Reward so God sheweth his liking of our duty by a free gift of some greater good which therefore after the manner of men he calleth a Reward P. If it be a Metaphor I ask you but the Meaning and Reason of the name If it be because it followeth our duty then every gift that followeth our duty is a reward without any further respect to that duty but the order of time but that you denyed before Else Christs Incarnation and the Apostles and the Gospel and all that ever followeth our duty should be a Reward But if you mean that it is called a Reward as it is a sign of Gods approbation of our duty only then if God should tell men that he Approveth of their duty it would be a reward though he immediately annihilate them or should never do them any good which I think you will not say If you say that all three must concurr viz. that it be 1. A Benefit or Gift 2. Following duty 3. Signifying an Approbation of it you come almost up to all that is asserted by them that you quarrell with If God should by some benefit to one man signifie that he approved the duty of another or of a thousand more and should annihilate them all this were no reward to them Therefore when you have talkt all that you can devise to say you must say that there is some Fitness in the duty for that approbation and benefit and that the Relation of the Gift to that Fitness is it that denominateth it a Reward And that though there be no Cause in man of any Acts of God ex parte agentis yet are there Causes in man of our Reception and of the effects ex parte recipientis And so that mans Rewardable duties are his Moral aptitude cause or condition why he rather than one that doth otherwise receiveth that Gift which is called the Reward But we are gone from our question de nomine and have already dispatched also that de re Have you any more to say of any Matter besides words in which you confess we speak as the Scripture doth in which we differ Lib. Seeing you like not my explications tell me fully what you hold your selves and then I shall better know whether we differ in sense or words only P. It 's great pity for the Churches sake but you would have understood that first before you reviled us as Legal
and not have spoken evil of what you understand not But it 's better now than not at all Our judgement is as followeth I. That God hath three Essential Attributes which he expresseth and glorifieth in his works His Vital Power or Activity his Wisdom and his Will or Love That all these are and operate conunctly but yet each appeareth in eminency in its special effects That Gods Power eminently appeareth in the Being and Motion of things and his Wisdom eminently in the ORDER of things and his LOVE in the Goodness and Perfection of things That accordingly he is 1. The first Efficient 2. The chief Dirigent 3. The ultimate Final Cause of all II. That as to man he is Related to us 1. As our Creator the Cause of our Being Nature and natural Motion as the Fountain of Nature where Power is most Eminent 2. As our Governour and the God of ORDER and the Dirigent Cause where all Attributes concurr but Wisdom is most Eminent 3. As our most Bounteous Benefactor and most Amiable Good and End where Goodness or Love is most eminent III. That accordingly God is the Author of Nature Grace and Glory and since the fall of Natura Medela Sanitas of our Nature our ORDER and Gracious Government and of our Holiness and Happiness and so is our Creator Redeemer and Sanctifier IV. That neither Man Angel or any Creature can possibly have any good but by Gods gift any more than they can make themselves or a World And this Gift must needs be free seeing the Creature hath nothing that is good but what it hath of God and nothing to give him that can add to him or but what is absolutely his own V. God is to us 1. Our OWNER 2. Our RULER 3. Our BENEFACTOR antecedently And no man can Merit of God as he is an Owner or a meer Benefactor for so he freely disposeth as he pleaseth of his own But only of God as a Ruler as is after opened VI. Therefore it is blasphemy to hold that man or Angel can Merit of God in point of proper Commutative Justice which giveth in exchange one thing for another to the benefit of the receiver For as is said God cannot Receive any addition to his perfection nor have we any thing but his own to give him Luke 17. 10. we are thus unprofitable servants as to a Proprietor in point of Commutation though the unprofitable servant be daâ—â—ned Matâ—h 25. 30. in another sense that is who improveth not his Masters stock to the benefit of himself and others and the pleasing of his Ruler VII Mans Duty therefore meriteth only in point of Governing distributive Justice And not every way neither in respect of that For Governing Justice is distinguished according to the Law that governeth us which is either 1. The Law of Innocency or 2. The Law of Grace And no man since the fall can Merit of God according to the Justice of the Law of Innocency which exacteth personal perfection VIII The Law of Grace is in its first notion a free gift of Christ Pardon and Right to Life Eternal by Adoption to all that will Accept it believingly as it is offered that is according to the nature of the Gift And this Gift or Conditional promise and pardon no man can merit For Christs perfect Righteousness and Sacrifice hath already merited it for us and so hath left us no such work to do Nor is there the least place for any humane Merit or Rewardableness from God but on supposition of 1. Christs Merits and Meritorious Righteousness 2. And of this free gift or Act of Oblivion and Life already made to us without our desert IX But yet this is not a meer Gift but also a true Law God is still our God and Governour and Christ is Lord of all Rom. 14. 9. He that is a King and Ruler hath his Laws and Judgement That which is a Gift in the first respect hath 1. It s condition 2. Many commanded duties and so is a Law of Grace in other respects And it is only in respect to this Law of Grace that man is Rewardable or can Merit X. The Gift is from God as Benefactor considered as Good and in it self But it is from God as Sapiential Rector quoad ordinâ—m conferendi as to the Order and Reason why one man rather than another receiveth it So that we Merit not of God as Benefactor nor as Rector by the Law of Innocency or Works nor yet as to the Value or Goodness of the Benefit which is a free Gift But only of God as Rector by the Law of Grace which regulateth the Reception of his free gifts merited by the perfect Righteousness of Christ and so only as to the Order and Reason why one more than another receiveth that free gift As if a Father hath many Sons One living obediently Others playing the prodigals and upon his freely-offered pardon and grace one receiveth it thankfully and the other refuseth it scornfully Here both the obedient and the penitent son have all upon free gift as to Commutative Justice but on various terms And yet both merit in point of paternal Governing Justice but very differently One meriteth of strict Fatherly Justice The other only of a forgiving Father quite on other terms And it is a Comparative Merit by which he is fitter for pardon than the Sons that despise it and spit in the Fathers face XI God as a Benefactor and a Governour giveth some benefits Antecedently to any duty of man And these are never a Reward to us but of Christ perhaps in some instances As Legislation so the benefits of it and that attend it are before Reward and Judgement But other benefits are given by God both as Benefactor and Legislator upon condition of some duty of ours in the Antecedent gift and so in the Judicial sentence and execution that duty is rendered as the reason of our actual Right to them And these are a Reward XII Our first Grace is no Reward nor merited because it antecedeth all conditional duty of ours XIII Our first Reception of Right to Christ Pardon and Life being given on the condition of penitent Acceptance in faith may be called a Reward because they are consequent gifts on condition But because the condition is so slender a thing as the thankful Acceptance of a free gift Divines agree not of the fitness of the name Reward and Merit while they wholly agree about the thing But our after-mercies and final Glory being promised on the condition of such a faith as worketh by Love obedience and improvement of Gods mercies in good works and patience perseverance and conquest of the Flesh the World and the Devil therefore they have more unanimously agreed not only de re but that the names of Reward and Rewardableness or Merit and Worthiness are here fit but used only in the fore explained sense XIV And though the Scripture oftest use the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
not Cause it as it is exercised on either of those objects compared with such as are not forbidden 592. And you will here plainly see that God hath many wayes to Cause the effect without willing or Causing the sin As for instance 1. He can do it by adding as I said before a good act to the sinners bad one As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Christ God can put into Caiaphas's De hoc vid. Ockam ubi supra thoughts the jealousie of the Romans over the Jews and the visible danger they are in if they should be thought to have another King which thoughts in themselves are true and good So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loss of the Israelites service which was not sinful of it self The wise Reader that can impartially receive truth without respect of persons may find much in Episcopii Institut Theol. li. 4. sect 4. de provident in his answering all these Texts of Scripture as mis-expounded by some And his moderate opinion expressed in Conclus 2. in the end of that Section how far doctrines are or are not damning which subvert the foundation is laudable and his reason very good and clear viz. so far as they actually prevail with the will and practice Even as our faith is saving as effectual and practical and not as a dead opinion so is error damning I think as he doth 593. And 2. God can set that object before a sinner which he is most inclined to abuse Which is not to Will his sin But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect As if Absalom be by Pride and Lust enclined to Adultery his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way And God may will to punish David by their passive pollution without willing his act of sin at all interior or exterior 594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way so that this object shall be solitary or most obvious to the sinner As if a drunken man were resolved to kill the next he met God can keep Peter John c. out of his way and so Judas shall be the next 595. 4. Yea God can suspend his own intrinsick concurse as to some one sinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object Many other such wayes God hath which are unknown to us 596. And if you suppose a man so inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exercise it on the next most provoking object if God now did Cause the Act as exercised on a forbidden object compared with another it were to Cause the sin But if he only be the moral Cause that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter this is not to Cause sin For to choose Judas rather than Peter for the object is no sin For as I said God câ—â— do it only by removing Peter and Willing that he shall be preserved 597. Suppose a King that hath made Laws against Murder foreknoâ— that a Robber is waiting in such a Road for a prey and that a Traytor broke out of Prison will go that way and so will be rob'd and kill'd He may will or desire the Death of the Traytor as a punishment He may restraâ—â— some that would travail that way before him and may restrain some that would lay hold on the Robber or drive him away that so this Traytor may be killed And yet only Permit and not Will at all the Robbers Will or Acâ— as it is Agentis but punish him for it and hate it and Will only the effect 598. The next Text cited is 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto also they were appointed viz. to stumble on the rock of offence Resp 1. This hath respect to Luke 2. 34. he is set for the fall of many c. and of Christs own words that he that falleth on this stone shall be broken in pieces And no more can hence be gathered but that God hath decreed that as a Punishing Judge 1. He will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on iâ— their own sinful way 2. And that their opposition to him shall be theâ—â— ruine So that 1. He doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ that deserved it 2. He speaketh not at all as willing their sin but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace 3. But the thing that he is said to Ordain them to is not sin but Ruine the consequent of their sin The word stumbling and falling signifying their destraction 599. The next Text is 2 Thes 2. God shall send them strong delusions or the acting of deceit that they should believe a lye Answ Here is nothing signified but 1. That God shall permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits 2. And permit wicked men to believe them which is mentioned as a permitted consequent and not as an end intended by God And the word sending is used because the permission was Penal for their sin And his punishing-providence might morally cause the deceivers rather to go towards these men than towards others 600. The next is Rom. 1. 24 26 28. God gave them up to uncleâ—â—ness to vile affections to a reprobate mind c. Resp Here is nothing at all said but a Penal desertion and permission and no Will or Cause of sin in God 601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done Answ Here is nothing said of sin at all but of the effect of it All that was done on Christ even all the effect in passo God fore-determined should be done But the Act ut volentis agentis he neither willed nor caused as on this forbidden object And though elsewhere the Doctor deride this answer that God decreed Christ should dye or be sacrificed and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one else should do it It is a great and necessary truth He that willed the effect and did much himself to cause it willed not the murderers sinful act And permitting and foreseeing it was enough 602. The next is Isa 10. 6. and so Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King 11. 31. 12. 24. God sends the Assyrian as his rod. Thy Wife shall commit Adultery and thy Children fall by the sword They that are hated of God shall fall therein David was foretold his Wives should be vitiated The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam It was of God that he took not good counsel Pharaohs heart was hardened by God Answ The first is only a Prophesie and a penal effect of sin and nothing of Gods Willing or Causing sin And so is the second Though God can send afflicters by the wayes before mentioned without willing their sin The third speaketh only of a penal permission of sin And the rest all speak only of Gods penal permission of the sin and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it and his occasioning the sinner to take one sinful object not as such
it 's clear 1. That in the first case the Motion will be if it be not hindered But that it is not caused by not-hindering it but by its proper moving causes In the second case the consequence of futurity is false And where the inclinations to good and evil that is to superiour and inferiour prohibited good are equal yea though antecedently somewhat unequal Yet bare permission ascertaineth not futurity 3. Much less in the third case where the soul must have positive help or provocation Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly Love God if God did but Permit them But Gods Permitting or not hindering sin may respect divers acts 1. Iâ— God continue not his natural support man will be no man but be aâ—â—â—â—lated and so will neither do good nor evil 2. If God uphold mans nâ—ture in its Integrity as it was in Adam and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace and his natural concurse Adams sin would have necessarily followed 3. If God give Adam both such support and means to stand and do no more Gods permission would not have inferred the certainty of Adams sin when he fell any more than before For God withdrew no grace from him which was necessary to his standing 4. Iâ— God give a lapsed sinful man Nature and common grace it followeth not necessarily because God doth no more that he will commit every sin that he is not further hindered from but it 's certain that he will not do the works to which special grace is necessary 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit and continue his influx necessary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions with necessary means and do no more this man will do some good and some evil and though he may be equally said to be Permitted to do this sin as another yet he may do one and not another 6. God totally permitteth no man to sin but hindereth them many wayes though he hinder not all alike 7. It 's possible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to sin or the same man at several times and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the sin and the other to commit the sin and omit the duty As many Schoolmen have copiously proved Yet in this case Permission would be the same thing to both But if you use the word Permission as connoting the Event then indeed you may say that the event from another cause will follow And Gods non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinsecally denominated Permission in the one case and not in the other But this is but from your arbitrary use of the word 615. Next the Doctor assaulteth Durandus who thus argueth Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge But he knoweth not sin approvingly being of purer eyes c. He answereth 1. God approveth that sin be though he approve not sin 2. God willeth the manifestation of his mercy and justice Ergo he willeth the existence of sin as that which is necessarily required to it To which I reply 1. The first answer is unproved and false God approveth not that sin be If he did few wicked men do more as Estiâ—s saith For it is not sin as sin or evil that they will but that it be for other ends which seem good 2. He phraseth it with his ad quâ—d necessario c. as if God first willed this manifestation of his Justice c. as the end and then sins existence as the means yea the necessary means But this is false as I have fully shewed 1. And his own opinion should confute it that maketh one Decree only de mediis And this particular Manifestation being some Acts of God and not God himself â—or the Complacency of his Will must needs be part of the media ad finem â—â—timum 2. And indeed sins existence is not a necessary means willed for â—ods glory but it is a presupposed mischief our Deliverance from which â—â— punishment for it is willed for his glory It is indeed necessary but â—â—ly necessitate existentiae in esse praecognito as a foreseen evil and so preâ—pposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory Therefore his assertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in â—nere Conducibilis etsi non honesti is detestable 616. Ibid. p. 196. He again saith that Though it be dishonest in the â—eature to sin because forbidden it is not dishonest in God to will that he â—â— it by his permission it being unice conducibile to his glory â—nsw 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too 2. Fie upon this oft â—peated permittente non efficiente It is utterly lusory or immodest â—or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning but â—hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to even as to all â—e entity in act and circumstances imaginable and that in all omissions â— was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this â—edetermining premotion And for the man that in the next saith that â—alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis but ipsa effectio rei I â—y for this man yet to say that the creature effecteth sin and God effecteth â— not is too too gross The common evasion is that sin is not any â—â—ing and therefore not effectible But why then do they say that the â—eature effecteth it when they have said and defended that the creaâ—re doth nothing but what God doth and what he unavoidably maketh â—â—m do 617. Durandus argueth that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a â—â—ght understanding Ergo not by God The Doctor answereth That â—es own sin cannot be judged convenient but anothers may He inâ—anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury â— When a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by Maâ—â—met 3. When God willed that Absalom should defile his Fathers Concuâ—nes And he addeth that for us to sin is contrary to our right reaâ—â—n because it is forbidden and hurtful to us But for God to will that â—e sin is not contrary to his right reason as not forbidden or hurtful â— him Repl. 1. No man should will unlawful usury He that willeth to Borâ—â—w though he cannot have it without usury doth not will the usury â—ut the money non-obstante usura As he that chooseth to travell with Blasphemer rather than to go alone in danger he doth not will his â—lasphemy but his company non obstante blasphemia 2. The same is to â—e said of swearing by Mahomet It is only the Oath as an Oath that is â—â— be willed and not as by Mahomet that is not willed but unwillingly â—â—dured 3. Absaloms instance is answered before God willed only â—avids punishment and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin â—n a foresight of Absaloms active Volition and sin and not as
willing â—is at all And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law and much more against sin than mans is And that God willeth not and causeth not the sin of man And is it now come to â—his that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason but not to Gods because â—e is no subject You may next say that Holiness is meet for man but not â—or God 618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it Bonum esse ut sint mala Quia bonum est ut Deus finem sibi praefixum assequatur At hoc sine interventâ— mali peccati nullo modo potest Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium though not sine peccatâ— 2. Interventus therefore implyeth a falshood For in esse cognito sin is antecedent or presupposed to the way of glorifying Justice and Mercy upon sinners sinners are the object And consequently you must take it as before proved for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous 619. He urgeth Oportet haereses esse ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant Answ That neither meaneth that men ought to be Hereticks nor yet that God loveth willeth or approveth that there be heresies But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest 2. And he foreseeth that there will be heresies 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he foreseeth and hateth The same is the case of all tryal by persecutions And God willeth not the sin of active perâ—ecution but only the effect or passive part So that the oportet by your own confession of it signifieth no more than a Logical necessitas consequentiae which â—ore-knowledge without Volition will inferr 620. He addeth Obj. It sufficeth that God permit sin and not will it Resp But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Permission of it or not If not Gods Intention may be frustrate If yea What matter is it whether God will that sin shall be he permitting or sâ— permit it as that infallibly it will be so we obtain either of these it 's all one to our cause of predestination Repl. 1. If it be all one take up with that agreement and make â—â— further difference with them that grant you enough 2. In case of veâ—â—ment Inclination to a sin it would follow upon Gods total permission but God never totally permitteth sin But in other cases it will not follow that is It is not a good consequence that This or that sin will be done because God doth no more to hinder it than that which sometime hindereth it not And yet Gods Intention is not frustrate For â—â— will infallibly come to pass from its proper cause which God foreknoweth And the consequence is good from his fore-knowledge And is not that all one as to the certainty of Gods intentions 3. You phrase it as if sin followed Gods permission as a deficient cause or as that which cannot be otherwise unless God do more to hinder it and so weâ—â— necessary thence necessitate consequentis or as others call it necessitate â—â—tecedente which is false and oft denyed by your self 4. The very truth is Permission is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity as relating to so many sorts of Impedition that it is but delusory withâ—â— much distinguishing to say sin will or will not follow it If you restraâ— it to a non efficaciter impedire as is usual it taketh not away the ambâ—guity much For still the question is What must make it effectual unless you call any impedition effectual meerly ab eventu whatsoever it be â—â— it self 621. He saith that the Universe would not be perfect if there werâ— perfect holiness and no sin and so no pardon or punishment But â—â— giveth us no proof but confident assertion at all I need not say thâ— It would be more perfect if there were no sin It sufficeth me to say thaâ— It would be as perfect And so that it is not Necessary to the World perfection that there be sin or Hell God could have freely willed the contrary And Gods Goodness could have been as fully manifested if iâ— had so pleased him and his Holiness too without sin or Hell It 's unpleasing to me that this good man pleadeth so hard against a necessity of Christs satisfaction for sin in another digression and yet pleadeth as hard for a necessity of sin As if it were more necessary to Gods Glory than Christ 622. It is very observable in all this controversie that he asserteth pag. 198. That it 's past all controversie that neither God nor the most sinful creature do will any thing but as Good And that no man can be instigated to malice or evil but only to the Act which is evil because he that is instigated is instigated to do something But to the evil of an act no efficiency is necessary but deficience only How far this is true or false I have opened before I here only note that he confesseth that he that causeth the Act of sin which he saith God doth more than man causeth all that is causable 623. Yet p. 199. he saith Sin is of man only as the cause when he professeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cause it yea as the first total cause and that as to Deficiency man can do no more than he doth without predetermination which if God withhold man can no more help it than make a World So that all the mysterie of his language is this that because man is under a Law and God is not therefore man doing the same act as moved by God must be called the only cause of sin because it is no sin in God But if we spake as plain men ought to do should it not rather be thus exprest by you God is the chief cause of sin in man but not in himself 624. Pag. 200 201. he hath the same over and over again that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus Quod ex se habet quod conducibile est ad â—onum tanquam Materia scilicet non tantum idonea sed necessaria exercendae divinae justitiae misericordiae and that this manifestation conjunct with sin is Deo multò appetibilius than that Good which sin depriveth us of that is Holiness Because this Holiness is only the Creatures Good and the other is the Creators Good Answ But as the assertion is all false so the reason is vain For if he distinguish the Creator and Creature as subjects he is quite mistaken For both is the Creatures good and neither the Creators For to manifest Justice and Mercy is not Gods Essence as in it self but his Work of Punishment and Mercy And the glory of this is but the resplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God And all this is in the Creatures
certain that nothing in God is effected by a a Creature nor his Essence by himself C. He is neither Beginning nor End efficient nor final Cause of himself but of his Works or Creatures only B. Therefore not of his Volitions or Decrees which are himself not of any of his Actions meerly as Agentis because they are himself but as they are in the effects But how can God be the Creatures end The Creature is no means either that God be God or that he be perfect or that he be glorious in himself or that he be just or merciful It is the highest blasphemy to say it C. You know all our Divines say That Gods end in decreeing is the Glory of his Mercy in the Salvation of the Elect and of his Justice in the damnation of the Reprobate †Bannes's order is thus 1. q. 23. a. 2. pag. 266. Actus qâ—os nos possumus imaginari esse in mente divina tam communes quam proprioâ— circa praedestiâ—atos hi sunt Cognovit Deus omnes homines possibiles ex quibus quosdam dilexit quantum ad esse naturae hos voluit creare ex quibus adhuc quosdam dilexit ad finem supernaturalem quae divina electio dicitur quatenus ex aliis quos creare volebat isâ—os seperavit sibi denique hos electos praedestinavit hoc est providet ordinavit ut per quaedam media supernaturaliter efficaciter pervenirent in finem supernaturalem That nothing but God himself can be the objectum formale of Gods Volition see Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 15. sect 6. p. 165. Ruiz de Vâ—l. Dei disp 22 23 24. pretendeth to more accurateness than others in ordering Gods Decrees and other Acts. Denying with others all real distinction but asserting a distinction secundum rationem ratiocinatam and would perswade us that he knoweth what that is what the fundamentum in re is he refuteth many others Opinions de ratio ordinis Molina's Vasquez Zumel Driedâ—s c. especially Aureolus and concludeth sect 5. that inter divinas operationes ordo prioris posterioris ex eo est quod â—nus actus sit requisitus ad alium vel sit alterius ratio vel conditio He confessetâ— all these to be fictious and that there is no real diversity and disp 11. sect 1. on the qu An in Deo sit proprie libera Volitio effiâ—ax dicit Nullius animus tranquilla paâ—e quiâ—scit solutionibuâ— hac usque inventis nec aliis se satisfacisse put at quâ— nec sibi satisfecerit Yet against Ockam he would have these fictions thought to be of very grâ—â—â— use when as all his prophane tremendous presumptions are but enquiring after a cause of the first cause under the name of Ratio vel conditio while he denieth that indeed there is any cause Their question is why Gods Will is terminated on this Object rather than on that And is not this to ask a cause of it of the first cause say but that Deus volitione â—nica vuiâ— diversa diver si mâ—de ordinata and you have said enough Had they meant only the Ratio receptiva increatis ratio constituâ—ivâ— alliâ—â—â—m diviâ—arum ut in effectis vel pâ—sso â—â— extrinâ—eâ—uâ— denominatâ—rum it had been sense But in God himself there is diversitas rationum volendi B. Here are a multitude of Errors or Ineptitudes together 1. That the name of the means Salvation and Damnation is put into the end 2. That one little parcel of the means only is put as if it were the whole If we must speak so low as to ascribe an End to God we must say that Ultimately he hath but one And that one must needs be more than the glory of his Mercy and Justice towards man Is all the rest of the world Angels and Men Heaven and Earth and Christ himself no means in which he will be glorified 3. That quid creatum is made Gods Ultimate End For this Glory of his Mercy and Justice is no other but a created demonstration or apprehension of it 4. And why are Mercy and Justice only named as though the glory of his Power Wisdom and Goodness it self were here no part C. If you like none of this tell me your own sense of it B. 1. I suppose that Intendere finem is spoken of God only in a transcendent sense and not at all as it is of man And 2. I suppose that Gods Being hath no Beginning or End nor any thing in him 3. I suppose that Gods Free-will by communication of Essence and of Perfections is the Original free Cause of all things He necessarily is what he is but he freely made what he made 4. Therefore I suppose that the same Will which is the Beginning of all is the End of all So that Gods Will as efficient is the Beginning and Gods Will as fulfilled and pleased is the end of all his Works 5. This may be called finis Dei improperly after the manner of men but tollerably and with the least impropriety and such as we must use 6. This is more properly the commanded and appointed end of the Intellectual Creature and analogically the end that all things tend to 7. God is never without his end For his Will is ever fulfilled and pleased For pro hic nunc he willeth nothing but what is 8. But there are degrees of Perfection in Gods Works and the narrow Creature hath lower ends besides the Ultimate inseparable from it And so man must intend his own felicity and above that the perfection of the Universe and above that the complacency of Gods Will. 9. And because all the parts are to contribute to the perfection of the whole and so all the parts of the means do make up one perfect Universe in the state of Glory and there and then the whole world shall bear the liveliest impress of the Divine Perfections this Impress or objective Splendor and Image of God together with the active Vision Love and Praise of the glorified which is part of the said Image or Impress is called Gods Glory which shineth in part in every part and perfectly in the whole perfected world 10. So that in a word the perfection of the Universe being the medium compleated is called Gods End in the lower material notion And the fulfilling and pleasing of his Will in the perfected world is called his End in the formal and higher notion And we can say no more of Gods Velle finem C. I confess your explication of Gods End and Intention seemeth to be most agreeable to the Principles of Theology B. And do you think that it is wise and Christian-like dealing to fill the Church with Contentions and make others odious to the people about the Order of Gods Decrees secundum intentionem while men know not whether God do Intendere finem or not or what his End is or what his Intention is or while they mistake all Will you make