therefore the consideration of the precept of Christ of the practise of the Church of the necessitie of this doctrine of the dangerous estate of those that are ignorant of it shall mooue to a desire to bee instructed therein this person I would help a little of that former I would bee helped my selfe and therefore dare not offer this my simple Treatise like an vnskilfull Empirick to enforme a Doctor but seeing the contagion of sinne verie extreme and euerie good Physition to haue more then enough to doe to cure the same I haue presumed to minister those approued receites which of great and good Physitions I haue long agoe learned God sends the more excellent sometimes to the lesse excellent as man to the ante the swallow the storke the crane the oxe the asse to learne vnderstanding my hope is then Modus dicendi apertus est omnibus accessibilis licèt paucissimis penetrabilis Aug. ad Volusianum that the best may get some good from hence if it bee but from a sight of the small gifts in mee to consider of the great in themselues and so to bee stirred vp to more thankefulnesse to God and greater care to vse them they shall not lose their labour All true members though not in the same place nor of the same dignitie yet doe labour the preseruation of the whole Euerie man cannot bring gold and siluer to the Temple euerie one hath not the skill of caruing and working curiously if I may bring baser mettals so they bee necessarie or by working plainely may helpe in the building it shall bee my comfort and I shall hartelie praise God for it neither distrust I but that by diligent reading and faithfull prayers to God for a blessing it shall bee effected Quod credimus debemus authoritati quod intelligimus rationi quod ceramus opinioni Aug. de vtil cred And so leauing the errors of the wilful to their opinions which begate them but wishing that thy vnderstanding gentle Reader may leane to reason and thy beliefe to the surest authoritie I commit thee to Gods protection Thine in the Lord RALPH WALKER THE ANALYSIS OR summe of the whole Booke 1. That all things are maintained gouerned PART 1. and effected by Gods Prouidence wherein 1. That this Prouidence extends 1. Generally to all prooued 1. By the word of God 2. Especially to his Church prooued 2. By the consent of the Fathers 3. To the wicked prooued 3. By Heathen writers 4. To the meanest things prooued 4. By meere reason 2. What this Prouidence of God is PART 2. and the order he vseth in gouerning by the same wherein 1. The definition 2. The difference between Prouidence Predestination 3. False opinions 1. Of those which thinke there is no vertue of working in second causes but that God being in them workes all immediatly of himselfe cōfuted 2. Of those vvhich affirme God gouernes all things by a generall influence onely cōfuted 4. Gods order of gouerning 1. Sometimes vvithout meanes 2. Sometimes against meanes 3. Vsually by meanes 5. Questions 1. Why sometimes vvithout meanes answered 2. Why sometimes against meanes answered 3. Why commonly by means answered 4. What these meanes are answered 5. Whether superior creatures worke vpon inferior answered 6. Whether their operation extends vnto men and in vvhat things answered 3. PART 3. Whether Gods Prouidence is immutable or not and if it be whether it imposeth a necessitie vpon all things wherein 1. That all things fall out immutable in respect of God 2. Obiections to the contrarie propounded and answered 3. That this immutabilitie inferres a necessitie vpon all things 4. VVhat is meant by necessarie 4. VVhat is meant by contingent 5. That euery necessitie ariseth frō causes 1. Jnternall 3. Externall or 3. From both ioyntly considered 6. That causes are Definite Their effects Neccessary how both true 6. That causes are Jndefinite Their effects Contingent how both true 7. Reasons confirming a necessitie ouer all things 8. That no necessitie takes away the libertie of the vvill 9. Obiections against the distinctions propounded ansvvered 4. That notwithstanding God effects all PART 4. and that there is an immutabilitie and necessitie in all things yet that he cannot be the author of sinne wherein 1. Diuers opinions touching the Author of sinne 2. That to vvill is taken Properly 2. That to vvill is taken Jmproperly 3. That God vvilleth the euill of the punishment that is the natúrall euill 4. That God vvilleth sinne as a punishment of former sinnes 5. That God willeth sinne as it is an action Inward or Outward 6. That God doth vvill sinne as it is a guilt or bond 7. That he doth not vvill sinne as it is a transgression but onely vvillingly permits it 8. The difference betvvene Gods effectuall vvilling and and his vvilling permission 9. That God can by no meanes be the Author of sinne prooued 1. By his vvord 2. By meere reason Amongst many the last concluding that by no meanes possible neither his 1. Knowledge 1. Contemplatiue 2. Actiue 2. Decree 1. Within himselfe 2. Without himselfe 3. VVill 1. Efficient 2. Commaunding 3. Permissiue 4. Neither because he could hinder sinne and doth not 5. Neither because he might haue made man immutable but vvould not can make him to be Author of sinne 10. That God Common Nature The will are sole causes of our actions wherein is shewed 1. Their vertue and manner of vvorking 2. That they worke that vvhich is good 3. Hovv yet notvvithstanding our actions become euill 11. How sin is attributed in the word of God to 1. God 2. Man 3. Satan 12. A rule to knovv vvhen our actions are Good vvhat causeth either 12. A rule to knovv vvhen our actions are Euill vvhat causeth either 1 Answeres to the obiections made against this maine position PART 5. God gouernes all things therein Shevving further That the righteous 1. Ouercome all afflictions 2. Haue comfort in all troubles 3. Gaine by all aduersities 4. Are indeede rich 5. Haue true honour and blessednesse That the wicked 1. Are svvallovved vp of their miseries 2. Haue true comfort in nothing 3. Lose by all things 4. Are very poore 5. Are base and miserable And therefore no disorder in Gods gouernement 2. Obiections against the manner of Gods gouernement with answers vnto them as 1. To those against Gods vsing of second meanes 2. To the absurdities inferred from a grant of the vse of meanes 3. To the absurdities inferred from his sometimes vsing no meanes 4. To the absurdities inferred from the immutabilitie of his gouernement 3. Answers to obiections falselie inferred vpon this doctrine That God is Author of the euill of the punishment 4. Obiections to proue God the Author of the euill of the sin with answers vnto them 6. The vses of the doctrines deliuered PART 6. amongst which these especially 1. From his effecting of all things 1. To abandon fortune and to acknowledge Gods gouernement 2.
they meane that God being the efficient principall cause of all things doth preserue and mooue that naturall force of working which he gaue vnto them at their creation or that God vseth the vertue of the fire to warme and of bread to nourish they thinke well but if they vnderstand that there is no vertue of nourishing in the bread nor of warming in the fire but that God being in the bread and in the fire warmeth and nourisheth immediately by himselfe and by neither of them as some haue fondly thought and some more fondlie written their opinion is in no wise to bee approued For not onely the Philosopher guided by meere rules of reason but especially the word of God a truth that neuer deceaueth teacheth thus much vnto vs that the Creator at the time of his creating of all things gaue together with their life and being a certaine naturall power and vertue of working as the sunne to expell darkenesse the fire to yeeld a heate liuing creatures to bee apt for procreation and so in particular Gen. 1.11 Those confuted who thinke that God worketh in but not by his creatures Let the earth saith the Lord bud forth the bud of the hearb that seedeth seede the fruitfull tree that beareth fruite according to his kind Also the tree which beareth fruit which hath his seede in it selfe according to his kind By the same commander the sun naturally rules the day the moone guides the night the waters bring forth in abundance euery thing that hath life The naturall place for fish is not to flie in the heauens but to swim in the sea for the fowles of the aire not to swim in the sea but to flie in the Heauens for man neither to swim in the sea nor flie in the heauens but to walke vpon the earth Now as God hath allotted to euery creature his proper place of abode according to his nature and kind so hee hath giuen to euery of them at their creation a certaine power to worke and vertue in working according as their place and kind doth require Man walkes naturally fishes swim naturally fowle flie naturally The earth doth yeeld her fruit the waters bring forth in abundance yet so as that God doth not worke in them without their naturall working but they by God he blessing and moouing that naturall power and vertue in working which at their creation he infused into them When the Lord threatned that hee would take from his people the staffe of bread doth he not plainely teach that there is a vertue of nourishing in the bread else why should it be called a staffe and wherefore should the taking away of that bee a punishment rather then our being depriued of other things This the enemies of Christ had learned and therfore chose rather to giue him vineger for his drinke then any other thing Indeed oftentimes for our sinnes the Lord doth take away that naturall force of working in his creatures that should do vs good sometimes the vertue of those that would hurt his children the one is euident in that Physicke ministred doth often lose his working Dan. 3.25 Sadrach and his fellowes not burnt in she furnace the other apparent in that fire doth sometimes loose his strength of burning Yet this onelie shewes his diuine power but abridgeth not his heauenly ordinance So that this appeareth vntrue that God should gouerne all things immediatelie in his creatures but nothing by them Others againe falling into a second extreme haue affirmed that God doth worke all in all immediately by himselfe but yet influxu quodam duntaxat vt vocant generali by a certaine generall influence as they terme it the which hee gaue to euerie creature in their creation and doth now no more but still keepe and preserue the same So that now they wil haue euerie creature by vertue of that influence receiued to worke of their owne proper nature only God hauing no other stroke but only to maintaine that influence which at first in their creation hee gaue vnto them As the sunne to shine the fire to warme the heauens to be carried circular wise liuing creatures to beget to eate to sleepe men to vnderstand to chuse to speake of their owne proper nature only without any worke of God within them To prooue this their opinion they alleage that in the Acts In God wee liue wee mooue and haue our being Also that to the Hebrewes Chap. 1. vpholding all things by the vertue of his word So that since some effects doe arise from necessarie causes some from lesse necessarie some from contingent and that they often fal out praeter scopum operantis beyond the expectation of him that worketh therefore they inferre that with this Prouidence of God doth very well agree mans free will fortune chance and such like But the ground worke being taken away that which they build vpon it Those consuted which affirme that God gouernes all things by a generall influence onely will quickly fal That of the Acts and the other to the Hebrews although they both teach that nothing can continue without Gods vpholding yet neither doth infer that God doth not in a speciall maner gouerne al things vpholden by him yea the one cannot be affirmed of God but the other must bee concluded vnlesse we wil say there is a Godhead without properties belonging to it For it is euident that God hath not onely a generall working in euery thing which Diuines call his generall Prouidence but that he doth bring euery thing in particular to a certaine end very well agreeing with his iustice and glorie sometimes ouerruling sometimes willingly permitting sometimes moderating sometimes inclining sometimes working contrarie to the nature of the things he worketh by and this is called by Diuines his particular Prouidence which our eies doe tell vs hath a speciall worke in all things We know as it hath bin at large confirmed that God dealeth otherwise with the elect then with the reprobate otherwise with one elect then with another Hee willingly permitted Peter to denie Christ yet of his speciall grace mooued Paul to chide Peter lest hee should offend in not reprehending Yea in one and the same elect God doth work diuerslie at diuers times according to the good pleasure of his will sometimes God withholdeth his grace and then hee falles sometimes maketh a speciall supplie of the same and then he riseth againe At sometimes we only see the rod of correction and then wee tremble for the least affliction sometimes God shewes vs the staffe of his spirit that goes with the same and then with courage wee vndergoe the greatest troubles Psalm 23. But let vs come to a speciall instance If an axe fall forth of the hand of him that cutteth wood and shall slay him that passeth by I the Lord saith God speaking of himself haae slaine that man In which effect can we say that God had only a generall motion and not a particular
Simile The husbandmans workes saith he are diuers At one time he soweth at another time moweth at another he ploweth his ground at another carieth forth his compasse is therefore his Art changed or his mind altered surelie no. Therfore to reason from the change of the effect to the change of the cause is no argument to make a man doubt of the immutabilitie of Gods Prouidence Quest. Hence it may be demanded in the second place whether Gods Prouidence being immutable doth impose a necessitie vpon all things or not that is whether it graunts a liberty of being or not being of falling out or not falling out according to the wil of him which worketh and the nature of the thing hee worketh by If the one be graunted then shall the Stoicks destinie seeme to be established If the other admitted then shall wee seeme to imagine such a decree in God as is oppositely contrary to his word For that there should be heresies that there should bee offences that Christ should be betraied by Iudas condemned by Herod crucified by the Scribes and Pharisies together with all other things which befell him in his course of finishing our redemption although to mē they were cōtingēt such as might fall out or not fal out yet with God they were simplie necessarie such as could not but so come to passe Therfore the question is thus answered Ans The Prouidence of God being the first immutable cause of all things doth impose such a necessity vpon all second causes that their effects cannot be hindred their manner of working altred nor their time of comming to passe any whit deferred yet because Gods Prouidence doth not take away the nature of second causes of the which some are ordained to worke certaine effects Gods Prouidence doth impose a necessitie vpon al things others appointed to no such certaine ends but doth continually preserue them hence it is euident that in respect of the first cause namelie God beholding all things clearely and gouerning certainely all things fall out by an immutable necessitie not possible to bee preuented But in respect of the nature of second causes working not by compulsion but according to their owne nature some things may be said to fall out necessarily One and the same thing may be said to fal out necessarily and contingently others contingently hauing a libertie of falling out or not falling out yet so as that the Lord doth continually guide and dispose them from their first beginning to their last end as best may be for the manifestation of his glorie for which they were ordained For the vnderstanding of this aright What is meant by necessarie we must know what is meant by necessarie and what by contingent That is said to bee necessarie which can consist no otherwise then it doth consist and which can worke no otherwise then it doth worke As a man to be endued with reason the Sunne to shine and such like From whence this conclusion followes Euerie thing that is as long as it is hath his being necessarily because it cannot but be as long as it hath a being Now because all things to come are present with God all one with him as if they were already effected therefore with God all things fall out necessarily so as that they can neither be hindred nor altered whence it is that a cause cannot but worke that which it doth worke and therefore that it worketh necessarily as it cannot be but the Sunne as long as it is the Sunne must needes shine and therefore that his shining is a necessarie worke which must needes be performed Now Necessarie and Contingent being directly contrarie since we perceiue what is the one we may easily conceiue what is the other We call that thing contingent VVhat is meant by contingent which before it had any being may be said to be hereafter done or not to be done to haue his being or not to haue his being I say before it was done because being done it is now no more contingent but necessarie according to that old saying Omne quod est dum est necessariò est Euery thing that is as long as it is hath his being necessarily For it is impossible that that which is alreadie done should not be done or that now hauing a being it should haue no being But before it was done it might haue bin said to be contingent An effect may may be said to be contingent in two respects So that the effect of a cause may be said to bee contingent when it is in the power of the cause to worke that effect or not to worke it Secondly when the natures of the causes simply considered their effects may be said to fall out or not to fall out Quest. But it may be demanded whence it doth arise that effects are necessarie and whence that they are contingent Ans Touching the first The necessitie of things proceedeth either from internall causes VVhence the necessitie of things ariseth that is frō the natures of things or else from an externall cause impossible to be eschewed or else from both of these ioyntly together A necessitie ariseth from internall causes after this manner 1. A rebus interuis The Sunne is said to shine necessarily because it is of such a nature that it cannot but shine for it is ordained by God to shine naturally The fire burneth necessarily because God hath giuen it such a nature that it must needes burne Euery creature must needes bee dissolued because their natures consist of corruptible contraries and therefore they cannot alwaies liue Now this necessitie ariseth from inward causes whether it be from the forme as in the Sunne and the fire or from that whereof they consist as in euery liuing creature So a man not regenerate doth necessarily sinne but this necessitie doth not arise so much from any externall cause as from his inward naturall corruption moouing thereunto Secondly 2. A rebus externis a necessitie ariseth sometimes from externall causes So the elect are said to bee saued necessarily but this proceeds not from any inward cause arising from themselues but from an externall cause namely God of the exceeding riches of his grace mercie freely electing them vpon which all other blessings and graces bestowed doe wholly depend So likewise it was necessarie that Christ should die at the age whereat hee did die neither could he liue any longer Whence ariseth this necessitie Not from any inward cause in Christs nature for in that respect hee was likely to liue long but hence it was as Peter teacheth because God of his determinate counsel and foreknowledge had deliuered him Act. 2.23 and therefore appointed the time of his death and speciall maner of the same Of his time Christ saith on this wise My houre is not yet come teaching vs that there was a certaine terme which could not bee exceeded Of the manner he also saith Behold we
go to Ierusalem and the Sonne of man shall be crucified Thus the necessitie of things doth arise sometimes from causes externall Thirdly 3. A causis internis externis coniunctim consideratis this necessitie doth arise partly from internall causes and partly from externall ioyntly considered As in the Sunne and the fire with infinite other though the shining of the one and heate of the other are from internal causes namely their natures yet both these effects come to passe by Gods decree and actuall power of continuall working which are externall And so in all other things in particular But for the vnderstanding of these things aright Causes are either definit or indefinite wee must know that causes are either definite or indefinite and what is meant by either of them Definite causes Causes definite are causes ordained by God to worke certaine effects necessarily In this sense the Sunne is ordained to giue light not so much by nature as Philosophers say but by the will of God as Diuines say Causes indefinite Causes indefinit are such as are not ordained to worke certaine effects but haue it naturally in their power either to worke or not to worke As for example It agreeth with the nature of man to write yet that hee should not write doth not disagree from his nature So that after that skill gotten he may be said to write or not to write naturally Whence it is that the Sunne and the Moone with such like are called necessarie causes of their effects but liuing creatures with others seruing to their vse are not necessarie but contingent But yet wee must vnderstand that causes are thus distinguished in regard of their natures and vertue of working giuen them by God in their creation for if wee respect Gods euerlasting decree and his diuine gouernment of euerie thing in particular then all causes are ordained to their certaine effects and euery thing appointed to his certaine end Iudas was not of his owne nature ordained to betray Christ for as he was naturally mā it lay in his power to doe it or not to doe it But if you respect Gods eternall will and counsell then is hee truly said to be a cause ordained for that purpose And therefore that which Iudas did vnto Christ was foretold long before by the Prophets of the Almightie as Peter in the Acts plainly teacheth Cyrus in his owne nature considered was not a definite cause of deliuering the Iewes yet if you respect Gods eternall decree hee was ordained as Isaiah saith for that excellent end Therefore in regard of Gods decree Cyrus deliuered the Iewes necessarily and Iudas betraied his master necessarily yet neither by compulsion but willingly and freely For it is as hard for the will to bee forced as it is impossible that it should will contraries at one and the same time One and the same effect may be said to be both cōtingent and necessarie Hence it is cuident that one and the same effect may bee both contingent and necessarie Contingent in respect of the nature and inward causes VVhy effects are called necessarie necessarie in regrad of Gods immutable decree and Diuine Prouidence Which necessitie is in two respects first because the creature of it selfe being so ordained by God cannot but naturally yeeld such an effect Secondly because the chiefe efficient in al things hath determined in his heauenly counsell that so it shall worke An act not to be reclaimed As for example the Sun doth shine of a twofold necessitie the one because the nature of it is such that it cannot but shine vnlesse Gods ouer-ruling power doth hinder it the other because it is Gods wil that in his ordinary course it should giue light vnto vs. There was a twofold necessitie that Christ should rise from the dead and ascend into heauen the one the will of God the other because he was without sin and therefore could not be swallowed vp of the graue nor detained by death In which respects as Peter saith it was impossible hee should be ouercome Adams sinne was committed freely and by consequence was contingent for his nature was of that sort that he could either sin or not sinne either will a thing or not will it according as seemed good vnto him If therefore you shall meerely respect Adams nature then his sinne was contingent but if Gods eternal counsell and immutable will then was his sinne necessarie for God had decreed that by his fall as thorow a pinching narrow doore we should passe to receiue a certaine assurance in O foolix culpa quae talem tantum habere meruit Redēptorem through Christ Iesus of a farre more excellent estate of glorie Christ died freely Isai 53. He was offered because it was his will to be offered Ioh. 10.11 I haue power to lay downe my life yet if you respect Gods decree Christ died necessarily both cōcerning the time and manner of the same It must needs be that Hierusalem should be destroyed by the Romanes yet not simplie in regard of the citie or matter whereof it did consist nor yet frō any necessitie in the persons of the Romans for they freely besieged it and willingly subuerted it and therefore it may be said the it lay in their power to spare it But if you respect Gods eternal decree thē they were necessary meanes of the subuersion thereof because God for their sinnes had so ordained it as himselfe had long before declared Wherefore we conclude that although Gods Prouidence doth impose a necessitie vpon all things yet that it doth not take away their naturall working And therefore in respect of God all things are done necessarily but in respect of second Causes some necessarily and some contingently Yet wee must obserue that whereas some causes are definite some indefinite some effects necessarie some contingent that this wholly proceeds frō Gods Prouidence for he ordained them such natures prescribed them such an order appointed their manner and ends of working Therefore this necessitie doth not impugne this doctrine of Gods Prouidence but rather confirmes the same This may suffice to proue this necessity yet for confirming thereof I will adde some reasons Those things which God hath foreknowne Reasons to proue that Gods Prouidence imposeth a necessitie vpon all things Reas 1. by his certaine and infallible knowledge those things fall out necessarily But all things are thus foreknowne Therefore all things fall out necessarilie That it must needes bee Si praescierat Deus quod non est praescientia iam non est Aug. de Praedest lib. 1.15 that those things fall out necessarily which God hath certainly foreknowne it is euident because otherwise his knowledge should bee deceiued which is impossible And that there is nothing which he hath not certainly foreknowne it is likewise apparent because he is an Al-seeing God to whom all times are present and therefore the conclusion is good Reas 2
is cast into the lap but the euent proceedes from the Lord. Ionas by casting of lots was found out to be the partie for whose sake God sent the storme vpon the Seas which could not be done by chance nor yet vndone because being thereby cast into the Sea swallowed of a Whale and remained in his bellie three daies three nights but afterward cast vpon the land again he was therein a figure of Christs lying in the earth and of the time it should containe him In the election of a new Apostle the Lot fell vnto Matthias but not as hauing a libertie of falling vpon the other for it was to shew that hee which knew al things as the text saith had chosen him Act. 1.24 Therefore if these things seeming meere contingent fall out necessarilie in respect of GOD though vnto vs to whom future euents are vnknowne farre otherwise how can wee denie the same necessitie in all other things to which the like libertie is not granted Further it is to be obserued that although causes in their own natures not definite may encline vnto either part as the will to chuse or refuse yet these by Gods decree encline to one part only According to that of Salomon Man 's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the riuers of waters and whither he pleaseth hee turneth the same yet so as that which we doe that wee thinke for that instant best to bee done But you must vnderstand me of things propounded to our choice whereof there is in vs a libertie of chusing or refusing either In which case euery of vs may say by experience that we are moued to incline rather to the one then to the other Otherwise wee cannot be said to make a choice of any Now this inclining of the will comes from God Psalm 105. Prou. 16.1 20.24 hee worketh in vs both the will and the deede according to his good pleasure Philipp 2.13 The Lord August de Gratia Arbitrio Tom. 7. cap. 21. saith Augustine doth incline the willes of men whither it pleaseth him but yet so as that he doth not disturbe their natures neither violently worke vpon them but doth it by a pleasing inclining and gentle mouing them forward According as Boaethius in his Topicks Vid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vpon the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 taken by him for destinie or Prouidence indifferently very well noteth Thus wee see that men will freely yet necessarily freely because they are only inclined and moued neuer forced nor compelled necessarily because GOD doth moue them to one part only according to his act of decreeing which cannot be altered Obiect If such things as are of their own natures appointed to no certaine ends but may fall out this way or that way in regard of themselues are so gouerned by God as that they can fall out no otherwise and therefore are necessarie then we cannot call this cause definite that indefinite this effect necessarie that contingent but must needs agree with the Stoicks that there is no libertie of working granted vnto them Euery thing doth take his name from his owne nature Solution the matter whereof it consists and the manner of subsisting and not from the externall cause of the same Adam was not called God from the externall cause of his being from whom hee receiued the breath of life but hee was called Adam of the earth being the matter whereof hee was framed Wee doe not call such things as we doe against Gods law good works from the externall cause farthest remoued from their working but wee call them transgressions of Gods law sins and such like from a defect within our selues and from our own corrupted natures Euen so when wee consider the natures of causes within themselues we call some definite some indefinite some effects necessarie some contingent Yea in this sense we say that our willes haue some freedome But if wee looke vnto Gods certaine foreknowledge his immutable will and act of gouerning then hath his infallible knowledge taken away chance his heauenly will limited our willes and his act of gouerning imposed a necessitie that cannot be eschewed And thus much touching the immutability of Gods Prouidence and the necessitie it imposeth on all things THE FOVRTH PART wherein is especially contained That although God doth gouern all things and that so as his gouernment can neither be altered nor hindered yet that he cannot be the author of sin although he is the principall cause of euery action with the which the sinne concurreth SVndry are the opinions cōcerning this point Diuers opinions thouching the author of sinne The Libertines affirme that God so willeth sinne as that he is the cause thereof The opinion of the Libertines And therefore that sinnes should not be reprooued because they are the workes of God For say they it is not mā which sinneth but the Lord by man If you contradict them their answere is You are not regenerate by Gods Spirit and therefore cannot iudge aright of his workes But this opinion tendeth wholly to the libertie of the flesh and therefore is diuellish and damnable The Manichees haue thought The opinion of the Manichees that God cannot so suffer sinne as that he should any way wil it and therefore concluded that there are two onely Authors of all things the one the chiefest Good the principall Efficient of all goodnes the other the chiefest Euill the sole Effecter of all wickednes as well the sinne as the punishment for the same And so they will haue sinnes to be committed whether the Author of all goodnes will or not Others there are which neither consenting to these nor agreeing with the former would haue God to will sin and that he is the cause thereof yet that no fault can be imputed vnto him but vnto men who commit it Their reason is Gods will is a rule of equitie and therefore whatsoeuer hee willeth the same is iust and right Thus you see the diuersitie of iudgements whence ariseth the necessitie of handling this doctrine In the entreating whereof it is necessarie to touch these three points How farre foorth God doth will sinne That he can in no respect be Author of any thing as it is simplie sinne That the diuell is the setter and wee the effecters of it For the vnderdanding How God doth will sinne how far forth God doth will sinne we must obserue that there is a double euill The one the euil of the offēce 1. Malum culpae which is the sinne the other the euill of the punishment which is the reward of sin 2. Malum poenae called euill in respect it is hurtfull to him which suffers it The Euill of the offence Sinne is to be considered three waies which is the sinne is to be considered three waies The first as it is simplie contrarie to Gods law in which respect onely it is
their eyes blindfolded and iudgements corrupted neither see perfectly nor iudge directly For if the actions of men Prou. 15.9 with their goings foorth and commings in yea the hoppings of sparrowes are gouerned by God Exod. 3.21 then without question he directs their races If God be the Captain of his people Deut. 33.29 the helmet and sword of Israel that none can preuaile against them then he must needes be the God of Armies If the eyes of all creatures that looke vp receiue a blessing a blessing extended to the sillie rauens of the field will God detaine it from the wise If those that seare the Lord want nothing doth he not giue sufficient riches to men of vnderstanding Lastly hee which suffers griefe wrongfully for cōscience sake towards God is counted thankes worthie in his sight 1. Pet. 2.19 and therefore he will shew fauour to such as haue the true knowledge of his name If things fall out by chance in regard of vs Replie not of God whose Prouidence extending to all things imposeth a necessitie vpon their seuerall euents then you seeme to approue Stoicall destinie which the godly condemne Ans Destinie is obserued to be fourefold Naturall Mathematicall Stoicall Destinie fourefold and Christian Naturall when naturall and definite causes do worke their proper and certaine effects as the fire doth heate the Sunne yeelds light the water doth moisten and so in particulars 1. Naturall This naturall or physicall destinie is no other thing but nature it selfe as it is noted by Alexander Aphrod an Interpreter of Aristotle in his book of Destinie to Seuerus and Antonius By Tullie when he saith Multa impendere videbantur praeter naturam praeterque fatum Manie things hung ouer my head besides nature and destinie By Aristotle himselfe when he saith Generationes quae fiunt secundum naturam sunt fatales Such generations as are according to nature are fatall So that it seemes fatall is à fando because it speakes in that order that is is so ordained by God to work his certaine effects Destinie or fate thus taken is not to be blamed Mathematical destinie 2. Mathematicall whereby certain mathematitians do attribute particular effects to the operatiō of the heauens as the Sun the Moone the Starres and such like affirming no man to bee borne to die to be rich to be poore to be happie to be vnhappie but by the sole operation of the heauens and influence of the Starres Touching this destinie we say with Augustine Hoc fatum verè fatuum est August de Ciuitat Dei This is fooles destinie and so I leaue it Stoicall destinie is noted by Tullie to bee an ordinarie succession of causes 3. Stoicall wherein by a neere coniunction one cause is the cause of another cause and that cause the cause of that which followeth The error of Manes teaching fatall destinie condemned Eus lib. 7. Socrat. lib. 5. and so by a perpetuall succession one cause to be an absolute cause of another cause by vertue of their next and neerest coniunction But herein all honor is giuen to the creature none to the Creator and therefore this destinie is most damnable and wholly condemned by the former doctrine wherein all effects are attributed to God and their necessity of falling out to his diuine immutabilitie Christian destinie 4. Christian. so called because it agreeth with the profession of Christians is a necessarie course and goodly order of all things depending vpon Gods diuine Prouidence This differs much from the former The difference betweene Stoicall and Christian destinie That separates Gods power from the operatiō of causes this includes it and makes his will efficient of all things That teacheth that the course and order of things is naturall only but this teacheth that God in wisdome framed all by his power created all and by his Prouidence gouernes all That teacheth that the naturall order and succession of causes is euerlasting but this that they had a beginning are vpholden still by God and shall haue an end at his will and pleasure That teacheth that naturall causes do by their owne vertue worke necessarie effects but this that some causes are ordained necessarie and some contingent and that both of these are thus appointed by God Lastly Stoicall destinie for such are the opinions of sundrie of that sect teacheth that this their naturall order and succession of causes doth enforce the willes of men but Christian destinie teacheth that God only moueth the will that not forceably but mildlie enclining it and gently mouing it Object Whatsoeuer derogates from Gods honor that he will not do but to gouerne base things derogates from his honour because they are not beseeming his regard Therfore he doth not gouerne them The moe things any one is able to gouerne Solution the more is his power magnified and the moe he will gouerne the more is his goodnes manifested So that for God to gouerne all both great and small therein is his glorie exceedingly exalted Secondly none of Gods creatures are base in regard of themselues but as they are compared with others The Angels though base in regard of God yet in respect of other creatures are most excellent A horse compared with a man is base but considered with a flie is of great estimation and so in particular yea which of Gods creatures can we behold but vpon due consideration we shall finde matter of admiration in the same euen in the gnat and little flie as Augustine noteth But I proceed to the rest Obiections against the doctrine of the manner of Gods gouernment with the answers vnto them Obiect GOd hath appointed no one ouer the earth besides himselfe hee alone works all in all 1. Against the meanes As by him al things were created so by him alone all things are maintained and preserued Iob 34. Ephes 1. Col. 1. c. Therefore he vseth no second meanes in gouerning the world In these and such like places Solution God doth not exclude his creatures which he hath ordained to vse for the setting forth of his glorie but onely sheweth that there is no other God in heauen or earth besides himselfe and that he onlie workes all in all by his mightie power in such a manner as that although his creatures doe worke yet it is by a strength and vertue receiued from him Wee say Iulius Caesar conquered manie nations yet wee doe not exclude his Souldiers whereby he preuailed Here is the only difference Iulius vsed them because hee could not subdue others without them but God being Almightie vseth his creatures because it is his good pleasure Obiection If God worketh by all meanes Absurdities inferred 1. From the meanes Solution and disposeth of all ends then wee are not tied to any men for kindnesses shewed or benefits bestowed We are not bound vnto any men or any other thing as authors of our good but as
knoweth euil as it is euil doth no way conceiue of it to be good that mā doth not at any time will that euill for the wil is naturallie caried to that which is good and when it wils the contrarie it is from the corruption of the naturall instinct of willing and because man is deceiued through his corrupted nature and by the false shew set thereon by Satan to take that for good which indeede is euill Yea to those whose consciences tell them they refuse the good and chuse the euil euen to them doth the good for that instant seeme lesse beneficiall and the euill more cōmodious pleasing But God being an absolute pure goodnesse can will nothing corruptlie he knoweth euill in al respects it cannot deceiue him he is not deluded with a false shew to whom all things are apparent the outward painting hides not the inward corruption from him to whom all things are naked the nature of his owne effects cannot deceiue him to whom the verie secrets of all mens hearts are euident Satan may leade the blind awrie but hee cannot seduce the Al-seeing though his first assault ouercame Adam and Eue yet many attempts could not preuaile against Christ Therefore if good be the proper obiect of the will in the corrupted creature how much more doth the pure Creator the Al-seeing God will only that which is good Reas 6 Sixtlie those things which God willeth those he both liketh and loueth for it is the propertie of the will to bee caried with a certaine affection vnto that which it doth will But God doth no way affect sinne but both hateth and condemneth it Psal 44. Thou Lord hast hated iniquitie and loued righteousnesse And Zacharie after he had perswaded the people to eschue sin addes the reason wherfore they should obey namely For these are the things which the Lord of Armies hath hated And therefore the will being carried with a certen affectiō to the thing willed how can God hating sinne and iniquitie meerely will the same Reas 7 Seuenthly if God was the effecter of sinne in his owne person or did worke it by others then hee would not vse meanes for the preuenting thereof for therein he should crosse his own works But hitherto tend all his works of creation the whole Law and the Gospell namely vnto obedience vnto God and auoiding of sinne and for this purpose as Iohn saith that he might take away the sinnes of the world and destroy the workes of the diuell Ioh. 1.30 1. Ioh. 3.6 he gaue the greatest price euen his only begotten Son that which was most neere and deare vnto him Now what wisdome can we hold it to labour continually to preuent that which wee purpose continually to effect and why should wee doe that for which wee would giue the greatest price to haue it abolished Since wee hold this to bee follie in our selues how dare wee impute it to God being wisedome it selfe Reas 8 Eighty euery sinne is committed either by leauing that vndone which ought to bee done or by doing that which ought not to be done Sinnes are either of omnissiō or commission But God is tied to neither of these and therfore can faile in neither If hee should bee bound to any thing how should hee be ruler of all things for to be bound to a thing and yet to haue authoritie ouer that thing agrees not with reason Now since all of vs acknowledge God to bee Almightie which is to rule al and haue authoritie ouer all we must needs confesse he is not tied to any law and therfore cannot offend against the law Reas 9 Ninthly euery sinne is properly a sin from the next cause of the same and not from another cause further remoued A tree blowne down by the winde is called a windfall as attributing the cause of the fall vnto the winds and not vnto the heauens which drew vp the vapors whereby the winds were caused When a man is scald with hot water it is called a scalding as attributing the cause to the water and not a burning as hauing relation to the fire by whose vertue the water was heated As these effects are properlie imputed to their next causes so is sinne vnto vs and not vnto God being the cause farthest remooued in our actions whereunto our sinnes are ioyned Though the diuell was the setter deciuer and instigator in the sinne of eating the forbidden fruit yet the transgression was properlie Adams else how could Gods iustice haue taken hold vpon him and his whole posteritie for the same Reas 10 Tenthly what God punisheth in all that he cannot in iustice effect in any Either in the person of Christ or on these which commit it But God punisheth sinne in all And therefore being Iustice cannot effect it in any Reas 11 The eleuenth reason If God bee the author of sinne it must needs be as hee doth either foreknow it decree it or will it But God cannot be the author of sin any of these waies And therefore not at all The former part of the Argument is euident It remaines to proceed to the proofe of the latter part Touching the first namely that Gods foreknowledge cannot be the cause of sinne God is said either to know things or to foreknow them we must note that God is said either to know things or to foreknow them betweene his knowledge foreknowledge there is this difference The difference betweene Gods knowledge and foreknowledge Knowledge is general of all things both done and to be done but his foreknowledge is restrained to things that are to be done hereafter Secondly Gods knowledge extends to that within himselfe as well as to that without himselfe but his foreknowledge is onely of outward things and cannot be said to be of any thing within himselfe because whatsoeuer is in God is his essence which being from euerlasting in reason he cannot be said to foreknow the same We must further obserue Knowledge is either contemplatiue or actiue that this his knowledge is to be considered two waies The one absolutely and simplie as it is only in himselfe the other secundùm quid respectiuely as whē an Artificer maketh that whose maner forme he doth foreknow The former is a contemplatiue knowledge that is a knowledge without practise or effecting the thing foreknowne The latter is an actiue knowledge that is a knowledge ioyned with practise or a working the thing foreknowne Contemplatiue knovvledge no cause of sinne Out of which diuision this Argument ariseth If Gods knowledge is the cause of sinne it is either as it is contemplatiue or actiue But it is not a cause of sinne either of these waies And therefore not at all That Gods bare foreknowing a thing will come to passe Gods foreknowledge cannot be a cause of sin cannot be the cause of the thing foreknowne it appeares first by the naturall signification of Theorica contemplatiue which is a meere conceiuing and
vnderstanding of a thing without any working vpon that thing for then it should cease to bee contemplatiue and should become actiue Secondly the vnderstanding as it is in it selfe considered cannot properly be said to work any thing for it is proper to the vnderstanding to cōcciue of those things which are without and it is peculiar to the will to bee moued from the vnderstanding to the working of those things which the vnderstanding conceiueth Now knowledge doth belong to the vnderstanding and not to the will therefore of it selfe cannot worke any thing outwardlie and if it worke nothing it cannot be the cause of any thing Causa enim est cuius vires est For that is the cause of a thing by whose force or vertue that thing is effected The Physition knowes his patient will die shortly Simile The Carpenter knowes his neighbours house will fall quicklie the Mariner knowes a leake not stopt in a passengers ship will drowne him presentlie Is therfore the Physitiō the cause of his patients death the Carpenter the cause of the fall of his Neighbours house or the Marriner the cause of the sinking of the Passengers ship Surely no Therefore wee conclude that Gods foreknowing of sins cannot be a cause of them Secondly Gods actiue knovvledge cannot be a cause of sinne actiue knowledge cannot be a cause of sinne for it is not simple but is ioyned with the will neither doth knowledge work vpon outward things but the will onlie Simile A Shipwright from his knowledge prescribes the forme of a ship and directs the way of making it but his will going with his knowledge is actiue and only worketh in the same because it is from his will that he worketh himselfe and from thence also that hee commandeth others for a man doth not make a ship because hee knowes the way of framing it but because he desires and willes a ship therefore he labours to haue it Indeed with God there is neither time past nor to come yet by that order which we see he hath set downe in the course of things which is vsually called a naturall order we may say that knowledge goeth before the wil and the wil before the effecting of the worke for we worke nothing but that which we first will neither will wee any thing properlie but that which our vnderstanding doth first conceiue and our iudgement approoue Now I hold it lawfull by the consideration of this naturall course infused into the creatures Though not strictly in all yet in this vve now entreats of to ascend vnto the knowledge of the diuine order of working in the Creator and so in humilitie to reason from things naturall to supernaturall And this seemes Paul to warrant when hee saith Rom. 1.20 The inuisible things of God that is his eternall power and his Godhead are seene by the creation of the world the heauens declaring the glorie of God and the earth shewing his handiworke Therfore it is certaine that Gods knowledge is not a cause of any thing but that his knowledge and wil conioyned effect all things Wherefore wee conclude this truth with Augustine Lib. 7. de Anima Deus nos peccatores pranoscit non facit God foreknowes we will sinne but makes vs not sinne according to that of Hierome Non ideò peccauit Adamus quia Deus hoc futurum nouerat sedpraesciuit Deus Dial. 3. aduersus Pelag. quasi deus quidille erat propria voluntate facturus Adam did not therefore sin because Godknew hee would sinne but God as he was God did know what Adam of his owne will and accord was about to do And thus much for the proouing that Gods knowledge cannot properly bee the cause of any thing I come to the second Before I enter the prouing that Gods decree cannot be the cause of sinne Gods decree is not a cause of sinne we must obserue that it is to be considered two waies Gods decree considered two waies First as it is in himselfe before all beginnings not manifested vnto any secondly as it is put in execution and so made apparent to others The former is called an Act of decreeing within himselfe the latter the execution of this decree effected without himselfe Ephes 1.4 The first is that whereby God hath necessarilie yet freelie from all eternitie decreed all things the second is an Action of God by which al things in their appointed time are so accomplished as in his heauenly wisdome they were foreknowne and in his eternall counsell decreed Now Gods decree considered either of these waies cānot be an absolute cause of any actiō but only so far forth as God hath willed that action True it is that God willeth not any thing but that which in great wisdome he had decreed yet he cannot so properlie be said to be the cause of any thing in that he decreed it as in that respect that he willed it because his will effecteth what his decree appointeth whence this argument ariseth If Gods will is not a cause of any sinne then much lesse his decree But Gods will is not at any time a cause of sinne And therefore not his decree Of the proposition there is no question Gods vvill is not a cause of sinne It resteth to prooue the assumption being the third and last part of the disiunction The will of God Rom. 8.19 Ephes 1. Gods vvill is either efficiēt commanding or permissiue being that whereby he most freely and powerfully willeth all things and that with one and the same Act of willing is distinguished into efficient commanding and permissiue 1. Efficient His efficient will is that whereby hee either worketh absolutelie of himselfe without the meanes of any other or if by others yet so as that they doe not properlie worke but God in and by them 2. Commāding His commanding will is that whereby he worketh by commanding and setting of others to worke 3. Permissiue His permissiue will is that whereby he doth willinglie suffer sin to bee committed for the manifestation of his iustice and glorie The two former waies doe so comprehend Gods working as that the thing being effected according to the manner and end prescribed he is made the principall cause and author thereof But his latter way of willing namely his voluntarie suffering can by no meanes make him the cause of the euill he doth so permit But all is reduced after this manner If Gods will is the cause of any sinne then it is either as he doth effect it himselfe command others to commit it or because he doth willinglie suffer it But Gods will is not a cause of sinne any of these waies And therefore not at all Touching the former two because from a cause simplie good cannot proceede any euill neither can he which is Iustice it selfe punish that in another which hee commandeth that partie to commit by reason of these and many moe alreadie alleaged there is
no doubt to be made of them The question is about the third namely Gods voluntary suffering of sin which although I haue prooued that it cannot be a cause of the thing so suffered yet because the aduersaries of this truth doe draw most of their arguments from hence Satan cunningly raising many doubts of his goodnes who indeed is an infinit goodnesse in and of himselfe and is also infinitelie good and gratious vnto others I will by way of confirming the latter part of this Argument stand somewhat more vpon opening this truth vnto vs. What Gods permissiue will is I haue shewed immediatelie before The fountaine from which it proceeds is his foreknowledge as that from which all his actions quoad extra as Diuines call them which are effected without him haue their beginning and is thus distinguished either it is absolute and simple Permission is either simple or respectiue as the suffering of Adam to eate the forbidden fruit or it is respectiue and hath regard and consideration to the parties suffered God determining thereby to keepe his law of iustice vnspotted and yet to giue a generall rule to all Magistrates how to vse a wise moderation As when God permitted the Israelites to sell their children into bondage and Moses for the hardnesse of the peoples hearts granted a bill of diuorcement Matth. 19.8 though from the beginning it was not so Touching this permission thus considered Jn God permitting of sin foure things to be obserued these things are to be obserued First that Gods suffering of sinne is voluntarie for being almightie he cannot be constrained to any thing Secondly that this suffering is for a set purpose and end agreeing with his iustice and glorie as that the exceeding riches of his grace and mercie might more appeare in sauing the elect and his iustice and power be more euidēt in condemning the wicked Thirdly that this permission is not idle proceeding either of negligence inabilitie or ignorance common causes of mans permitting but is from the determinate counsell of God knowing and decreeing a voluntarie suffering Lastly that this permission is with a limitation of the natures of sins of their number with the times places and persons committing them So that men are often restrained in their wicked purposes neither can the diuell preuaile alwaies in what he most desireth no not with the most wicked much lesse with the vnregenerate in the secret counsell of God elected to eternall glorie though not as yet called home to Christ Iesus the Shepheard of the flocke and Bishop of our soules For if Gods diuine power and rich grace should not concurre in this then alas men should neuer cease sinning yea then their least transgressions should be peccata clamantia crying sinnes sinnes of presumption blasphemies sins against the holy Ghost that so the committers might perish finally Whereto then should serue the gratious promises of God in Christ Iesus vpon true repentance by a liuely faith apprehended Alas to no end Ephes 2.2.3 for without the barres of Gods grace and mightie power wee inclining the world alluring and Satan continually tempting how should we eschew that great seareful sinne for which the grace of repentance is neuer granted If this was not true euen in the wicked most lamentable miserie should befall all true hearted Christians We haue experience of the truth of this doctrine in the most grieuous persecutions of the Church of Christ and especially in that most fearfull conspiracie and infernall treason deuised plotted and prosecuted by that Antichristian sect and diuell incarriate Papists against the Church of Christ his chiese Anointed and all other the most religious wise and honourable Peeres of this Common-wealth whom had not the hand of the Lord of his especiall grace to the Nursefathers of his Church miraculously deliuered they cursed be the soules that shall once intend it as innocent lambes had been deliuered to the bloodie slaughter-house of diuellish Tyrants the walles of our Hierusalem had been broken downe the honour of our Sion laid in the dust yea the many Pillars and sole Maintainers of our welfare being taken away farre be it from vs O Lord for this is most fearefull to thinke of how fearfull then O Lord to endure it we thewhole bodies of his Highnes dominions had come to a most lamentable subuersion and ouerthrow A comfortable instance of Gods reslrayuing the sinnes of the wicked But to the euerlasting praise of our most gratious God bee it spoken they haue digged a pit and haue fallen into the middest of it themselues the Lord of the riches of his mercie hath broken their nets our soules are deliuered from the bloodie hands of these infernall insatiate fowlers O that men would therefore praise the Lord for his goodnesse Psalm 107. and declare the wonders hee hath wrought for the children of men Surely the policie of man preuented it not they stood affected to vs and holding the grounds of their profession will alwaies so stand euen as Satan vnto Iob Iob 1. desiring if the Lord would permit to plague both soules and bodies yet as the Lord said he would not suffer Abimelech to sinne against him Genes 10.6 by comming neere vertuous Sarah so let vs al with one hart voice confesse that our mercifull God would not suffer these diuellish Papists to proceed to the height of their hortible sinnes by comming neerer his Anointed and honorable chosen ones to extinguish the blessed light of Christs Gospel and that admired happines which by their most religious iust wise and careful gouernment we haue enioyed amongst vs. Further In euery permission two Agents it is to bee obserued that in euery permission there are two Agents the person permitting and the person permitted The former hath power to hinder whē he pleaseth doth vse the same The latter hath an abilitie of working and when hee is permitted doth put the same in execution In both of these there is a voluntarie action as wel in the suffered as in the suffer but herein is the difference the action of his will which suffereth is only inward and worketh nothing in him whom it suffereth the partie suffered worketh of his owne proper will his end of working being not preuented nor his meanes of accomplishing hindred by the other so that although in both of these there is a voluntarie action yet one of them onely is author of the fact And by consequence God onely suffering and we wholly executing hee is most pure and holy and we only guiltie of our sinnes committed For although as Augustine saith Nothing is done in the world which the Lord would not to be done Enchir. cap. 95. Vel ipse faciendo vel voluntariè sinendo either by doing it himselfe or by a willing suffering of it to be done yet he is altogether free from the guilt of the transgression though for the manifestation of his iuflice and glorie he