willed by him but only on some things Divina volunt as non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit And in the body of that question thus he writes The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the distinction of God's will For when a cause is effectuall and powerfull to worke the effect followeth the cause not only so farre as to be brought to passe but also as touching the manner of its coming to passe Therefore seing the will of God is most effectuall it not only followeth that those things come to passe which God will have come to passe but that they come to passe after the same manner also after which he will have them come to passe Now God will have some things come to passe necessarily and some things contingently that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary which cannot faile by which effects are brought forth necessarily And for the producing of other effects he hath fitted causes contingent such as may faile in working from which effects are brought to passe contingently So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to passe but how Not allwaies necessarily or contingently And that certaine and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schooles but not necessity simply but only upon suspicion which may well consist with absolute contingency But to make the point yet more cleare Let us distinctly consider the things decreed For they that have an evill cause delight in confusion and feare nothing more then the light of distinction Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either deniall of Grace which is joyned with the permission of sinne Or damnation for sinne according to that on Aquinas Reprobation includes the will of permitting sinne inflicting damnation for sinne Now both the permission of sinne and damnation of God's part are his free acts and therefore come to passe freely But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace it is impossible that such a man should have grace Secondly secluding grace there is noe actuall transgression for which a man is damned but may be avoided man having power for that naturally though naturally he have noe power to performe every good act The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernaturall as the acts of the three Theologicall vertues Faith Hope and Charity But noe sinfull act is supernaturall all such are naturall Now it is confest on all hands that notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of originall sinne yet he hath still power and free will to performe any naturall act and accordingly he hath free power to abstaine from it So that Iudas had free will to abstaine from betraying his Master After he had betrayed him he had free power to abstaine from destroying himselfe so that as these sinnes of his for which he was damned were avoidable by him in like manner his damnation for these sinnes was avoidable And allbeit God had determined that Iudas by Divine permission should betray his Master and destroy himselfe according to to that of Austin Iudas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini Iudas was ordained to betray his master And that of the Apostles jointly Of a truth against thy holy Son Iesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israell were gathered to doe what thy hand and thy counsell had before determined to be done Acts 4. 28. Yet herehence it followes only that it was necessary to wit upon this supposition namely of the Divine ordinance that these things should come to passe namely both Iudas his betraying of Christ and Herods mocking of him and Pilates condemning him and the peoples crying out away with him together with their preferring of Barrabas a murtherer before him and the Souldiers crucifying him But how came it to passe Not necessarily but contingently that is in this Authours phrase evitably and avoidably inas much as it was joyned with an absolute possibility to come to passe otherwise Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborne all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God For both Iudas had free will to abstaine from betraying him and Herod with his Herodians could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him and Pilate from condemning him and the Preists and people from conspiring against him and the Souldiers from crucifying him only they had no power to abstaine from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner as no man else hath power to abstaine from any evill in a gracious manner without grace Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God and a love of God to the very contempt of our selves and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evill is acceptable with God unto eternall life unlesse it proceed from this faith and this love That which is here produced out of Marlorate is a strange speech and such as I never read or heard from any before and such as whereof I can give no tolerable construction And is it fit that every extravagant passage that is found in any Writer of ours should be brought forth to charge our doctrine with It were a fitter speech for a Papist who maintaining the absolutenesse of Reprobation doth withall maintaine an apostacy from grace which we do not If Marlorate had any such opiniō he sings therein to himself to his own Muses What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damne any man otherwaies then by way of punishment for sin continued in unto death without repentance Had he spoken of Good works morall only it is true any hypocrite is capable of them and none taste deeper of Damnation then hypocrites But as for the worke of true faith true repentance it is the generall profession of our Divines that as faith and the spirit of repentance once given never faile so they shall infallibly bring a man unto everlasting life and free him from condemnation But any thing serves this Authors turn to vent his stomack And I am perswaded there is not one more of all our Divines that he can shew to concurre with Marlorat in this And if there were is it fit their improvident inconsiderate expressions should be cast in their teeth that avouch them not but rather conceive them to be void of all sobriety Brentius apud Marloratum in illud Ioh. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet c. Caeterum haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis quae solet argutè magis quà m reverenter de praedestinatione disserere pro suo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari etiamsi pessimè vivat Nullum item à Domino
his own hand still and hereby occasions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himselfe in sinfull courses either in the way of profit or satisfying his unclean lusts And Arminius confesseth that the administration of Arguments and occasions which provoke to such an act as cannot be committed by the creature without sinne if not by Gods intention yet at least according to the creatures affection and often according to the events that arise therehence This administration I say Arminius confesseth doth belong to the Divine providence And these arguments he saith are objected ther to the mind of man or to his senses outward or inward and that either by the mediate worke of the creatures comming between or by God's immediate action And that the end of this Divine administration is to make tryall whether the creature will abstaine from sinne even then when it is provoked thereunto As for the triall of David was Bathsheba going â—oâ—th to wash her selfe objected to David whereupon he was inflamed with lusts Ioseph was not though farre more strongly sollicited by the temptations of his wanton Mistris Secondly to necessitate the will or determine the will are noe phrases of our Divines The first is used only by Bradwardine as at present I remember sometimes Arch-Bishop elect of Canterbury The other is that phrase of the Dominicans Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves Why doth not this Authour answer a chapter or two in Bradwardine a chapter or two in Alvarez where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively Surely hereby he should performe a worke more worthy of a Scholasticall Divine then by so hungry a discourse as this Secondly consider neither Bradwardine maintaines that God necessitates nor Alvarez that God determines the will to sinne but to every naturall act in which kind of acts sinne is to be found Why then should this Auhour carry himselfe thus in his crimination We know sin is meerly privative in the formall notion thereof an obliquitie such as concerning which Austine hath long agoe deliverd that it hath noe efficient cause but deficient only And divers waies Divines have shewed how God may be the authour of the act yet not the Authour oâ— the sin and illustrated it by various similitudes As of a man riding upon a lame horse he makes him goe but doth not make him halt The sun shining upon a dung-mixton makes it evaporate but doth not make it stinke The sun makes flowers to evaporate and send forth their favours as well as a dung-mixton but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavory is froÌ„ the nature of things themselves on which the sun beates In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds even frogs and toades snakes as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food yea of vipers flesh good use is made in the way of physicke And God knowes how to make good use even of the sinnes of men and of the rage and malice of Satan If an underw-heele being out of his place the upper wheele in a jacke or clocke will set him going in a wrong way as well as all the rest in a right way his motion is from the upper whele his irregular motion from himselfe A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry worke The writing is from himselfe the blurring from the moistnesse of the paper on this very question whether the act of sinne be from God Aquinas maintaining the affirmative illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame legge the motion saith he is from the soule the 〈◊〉 is froÌ„ the imperfection of the Organ the infirmitie of the legge Yet this Authour carrieth it hand over head as if to be the Authour of the action were to be the sinne not considering that himselfe maintaines that God is the Authour of the action and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall Thirdly when Bradwardine maintaines that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof he withall professeth that he necessitates it ad liberum actum suum that is to worke every act thereof freely Soe when Alvarerz maintaines that God determinates the will to every act thereof he withall maintaines that God determines the will to worke free ye and so Aquinas For when he workes upon contingent causes he moves theÌ„ to bring forth their effects contingently like as when he workes upon necessary causes he moves them to produce their effects necessarily And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contingently is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the contrary Soe to move free causes to produce their effects freely is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary But to proceed whereas he saith that sinne must needs follow the determination it is as true 1. In this Authour's judgment that it must needs follow upon God's coÌ„currence to this act If he say that this concurreÌ„ce is necessary to every act I answer it is necessary to the substance of every act but not at all required to the sinne though this Authour carieth it blindfold after this manner Secondly so say we is determination required to the substance of every act And Gods concourse with the creature is not coordinate like as one man concurres with another in moving a timber logge which is the expression of the Jesuites thereby manifesting the vilenesse of their opinion as we can demonstrate and that more waies then one by evident demonstration as I have allready shewed in my Vindiciae Let this Authour answer those digressions if he can I am confident he will never answer them while his head is hot nor all the Rabble of the Arminians We know God is the first cause and all other are but second causes in comparison to him Yet we willingly confesse that the providence of God is wonderfull and of a mysterious nature in this but such as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant testimonie as scarce to any thing more So jealous he is least his providence should be denied in evill wherein indeed it is most wonderfull and he takes unto himselfe the hardning of men's hearts and blinding of their mindes and prostituting them to abominable courses even to vile affections and thereby to punish sinne with sin as Rom 1. Therein saith the Apostle they received the recompence of their errour This hath Austine also by Scripture suggestion testified at large in his book De gratiâ Libero arbitrio in two large chap likewise in his fifth book against Iulian the Pelagian third chap this also the Adversaries have been driven to confesse in a strange manner as to give instance first in Bellarmine whose words are these God saith he praesidet ipsis voluntatibus easque regit
men devise God and man to move to the producing of the same act as two men in lifting a timber logge most indecently And to free this concurrence from chance they say sometimes that God workes this or that act in us modo velimus that is upon condition that we will But when they consider that God workes the act of willing as well as ought else are demanded to answer upon what condition he workes this what condition will they devise of this will he say modo velimus provided that we will As much as to say God will produce the act of willing provided that it be produced already by us Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man at such a time will produce such an act of willing in case God be pleased to concurre to the producing of it hereupon he resolves to concurre to the producing of it whereby the finall resolution is rather into the will of God then into the will of the creature I say the finall resolution of every sinfull act committed by the creature Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground For whereas the act of willing as for example in Iudas the act of willing to betray his Master is it in ' its own nature merely possible not future how then did it passe into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future this could not be done without a cause And what cause could there be of an eternall effect but an eternall cause which is God alone And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof but his will or decree Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessitie of nature if not of their own nature yet at least by the necessitie of God's nature he producing them all not freely but by necessitie of nature This is that Atheisticall necessitie whereupon our Adversaries are cast while they oppose such a necessitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to passe agreably to their natures necessary things necessarily contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily for the producing of the one and contingent causes working contingently for the producing of the other as Aquinas discourseth 1. pag q. 19 in the Article whose title is this Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat whether the will of God imposeth a necessitie on things that come to passe in the world The reason this Authour brings is a mere Socysme saying the same over and over againe As when he saith For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one principall overruling cause the other but an instrumentall wholly at the devotion of the principall then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall which by the force of ' its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a mere servant in the production of it To which I answer that which he calls overruling I have often shewed how absurdly it is imputed unto us For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to ' its nature but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof As for the cause principall what Scholar of any braines ever denyed God to be the cause principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurres For is he not the first cause and the first Agent Are not all other second causes and second Agents But this Authour hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sinne not to the naturall act under it whereas God as touching the sinfullnesse of it is no Agent at all much lesse a prime Agent no cause at all much lesse a prime cause Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto yet if he works the creature therunto agreably to its nature that is if it be an necessary Agent moues it to worke necessarily if it be a contingent agent moves it to worke contingently if it be a free agent moves it to worke freely then by Arminius his confesion our cause is gained For God shall be found free from blame and the creature void of excuse Now this is clearly our doctrine and in effect the doctrine of all them who say that God determines the will as the Dominicans or that God necessitates the will as Bradwardine For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely in such sort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwise if they would They confesse this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason Cajetan professeth thus much as before alleadged and Alvarez maintaines it in a set disputation And supposing God's concourse as necessarily required to every act of the creature they are able to prove by evident demonstration that no other concourse can be admitted then this whereby God moves every creature and that effectually to every act thereof but agreably to ' its nature and condition And this is farther demonstrated by God's fore knowledge of things future Another Arminian with whom I have had to deale in this argument being pressed with this reason drawen from God's foreknowledge and urged to shew how things possible became future that from everlasting for from everlasting they were known to God as future had no way to helpe selfe but by flying to the actuall existence of all things in eternity And I have good ground for strong presumption that this Authour with whom now I deale had his hand in that Pye which was above foure yeares agoe See the desperate issue of these mens discourses who are drawen to take hold of such a Tenet to helpe themselves withall which their best freinds the Jesuites the Authours of Scientia media doe utterly disclaime And on the other side the Dominicans who embrace the actuall existence of all things in eternity are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of Scientia media So that when the Jesuites are reconciled to the Dominicans in the point of actuall existence of all things in eternity And the Dominicans to the Jesuites in the point of Scientia media then these men with whom I deale are like to prevaile which I doubt will hardly be before Elias comes Thirdly consider if when one cause is principall overruling the other the effect must be imputed rather to the principall then to the other It followes evidently that when the causes doe equally concurre without any such overruling of one the other then the effect is equally imputable unto each consequently the sin For such is this Authour's language in this Argument is equally imputable to both to God as well as man And he is to be accounted the Author of it as well as man I appeale to every man's
Parentemque caeterorum the Caeteri belike were such spirits as wee call Angells And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles and this was called Necessity and such a Necessity cui ne Deos quidem that is inferior spirits resistere posse Quae verò ab Astris geruntur talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ industriâ labore queant in quo sua est Fortuna Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things we read the one the cause of Good the other of Evill and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both and that man in his nature was compounded of both and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience We read But of their opinion that all things were determined by them both good and evill I no where read but in this Authors Legend Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up The 19 th is this Voluntatem malè agendi quod vocant liberum arbitrium nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam non rebellione nostrâ accersitam vel ex inobedientiâ natam Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians I find no mention at all of this He should have shewed from whom he takes this that understanding their Opinion aright we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes 2 To the consideration of which comparison of his I now addresse my selfe He proposeth two things one whereof he saith must needs be maintained The First whereof is this That all actions naturall and Morall good and evill and all events likewise are absolutely necessary Concerning which I say First I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright the very notions of absolute necessity and necessity not absolute There is no greater necessity then necessity of nature And this necessity is twofold either in Essendo in being or in Operando in working God alone is necessary in being and his being is absolutely necessary it being impossible he should not be as not only we believe but Schoole Divines demonstrate and that with great variety of evident and curious conclusions As for the other necessity which is in respect of operation First this is no way incident unto God speaking of operation ad extrà and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature and that only in such creatures as by necessity of nature are determined one way as fire to burne heavy things to move downwards and light things upwards the Sunne Moone and starres to give light and the heavens to turne round all naturall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined to wit to work that whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature but yet so that being finite they are subject to superiour powers and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them even to powers create all of them to power increate Whence it comes passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary especially in respect of God who can either set an end to all when he will or restraine their operations at his pleasure We know the Three Noble Children when they came forth of the fiery oven had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily doe indeed come to passe meerely contingently in respect of the will of God Neverthelesse we willingly professe that upon supposition of the will of God that this or that shall come to passe it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come to passe like as upon supposition that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come to passe but how not necessarily but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents working necessarily after the manner aforesaid or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe by rationall agents working contingently and freely And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency Aquinas and Scotus concurre in resolving it into the Will of God but with this difference Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God as an efficacious agent For the will of God is so efficacious that he can effectually procure both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily and things contingent contingently and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof to wit both agents naturall for the produceing of necessary things necessarily and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things contingently and freely Thus God preordained that Josias should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jewes to returne into their Country yet what sober Divine hath made doubt whether Josias and Cyrus did not herein that which they did freely And as in doing so in abstaining from doing For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken as also that when the Jewes all the Males came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem None of their neighbours should desire their land Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones as from ought else and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine from invading the land of Israel And how often is this phrase used in Scripture Necesse est of some things coming to passe which yet came to passe as contingently and freely as ought else And unlesse this be granted that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God or that they are works produced freely and so every action pleasing in the sight of God For the Scripture expressely professeth that God it is who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight And whatsoever God workes in us or bestows upon us in time the same he determined to work in us and to bestow upon us from everlasting For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting it being the same with God
nature then all things must be acknowledged to come to passe by necessity of their owne nature which is to deny God But if things be of their owne nature meerly possible and indifferent to become either future or non-future then there must be acknowledged some cause whereby they are brought out of the condition of things meerly possible into the condition of things future And this cause must exist from everlasting otherwise it should not be so ancient as the effect thereof for it is well knowne that all things future have been future from everlasting otherwise God could not have foreknown them from everlasting but all confesse that God from everlasting foreknew every future thing Therefore the cause making them to passe out of the condition of things meerely possible such as they were of their owne nature into the condition of things future was also from everlasting Now consider where was this cause to be found Not without God for nothing without God either was or is everlasting without beginning therefore is it to be found within God or no where Consider in the next place what is that within God which is fit to be the cause hereof We say 't is his decree but this Author cannot away with that Therefore Si quid novisti rectius isto candidus imperti Certainly the knowledge of God cannot be the cause for as Aquinas saith that causeth nothing but as joyned with Gods will and therefore it is commonly conceived that foreknowledge doth rather presuppose things future than make them so nothing then remaines to be the cause hereof but the essence of God Now the essence of God may be considered two waies either as working necessarily or as working freely if it be the cause of things future as working necessarily then it followeth that God shall produce them by necessity of nature which utterly overthrowes Divine providence What remaines then but that we must be driven to confesse that Divine essence makes them future as working freely which is as much as to professe that Gods will and decree is that alone which maketh things to passe out of the condition of things meerly possible in to the condition of things future And I challenge the whole Nation of Arminians and Jesuites to answer this argument Yet this decree we willingly acknowledge is a permissive decree but look that we understand that aright also thus God decreeth this or that evill to come to passe by his permission like as good things he decreeth shall come to passe by his effection and that upon Gods permission it is necessary that that which he permits shal come to passe is acknowledged not only by our Divines but by Vorstius by Arminians by Navarettus the Dominican as I have quoted thē in my Vinditiae gratiae Dei which yet they deliver without clear expressing how which I perform thus look what God decrees to permit it is necessary that it should come to passe but how Not necessarily but contingently freely And the Scripture is expresse as before expressed that the most barbarous actions cōmited against Christ by Herod Pontius Pilate together with the Gentiles and people of Israell in their contumelious usages of him were all predetermined by the hand and counsell of God Marke the issue of this Authors most frivolous discourses for this will whereof he speakes whereby God is pretended gratiously to will mans Salvation conditionall as much as to say 't is Gods will that a man shall be Saved in case he believe in Christ now what Christian was ever known to deny this Secondly consider whether this deserves to be called a will to save more than a will to damne for like as 't is certaine a man shall be saved if he believe in Christ so it is most certaine a man shall be damned if he believe not and withall consider to which of these the nature of man is most prone whether to faith or to infidelity DISCOURSE SECT VII BUt by this opinion the gifts of nature and grace have another end either God doth not meane them unto those that perish albeit they doe enjoy them because they are mingled in the world with the elect to whom only they are directed or if he doe he meaneth they shall have them and by them be lifted up above the common rank of men ut lapsu graviore ruant that their fall may be the greater for how can God intend that those men should receive them or any good by any of them whom he hath by an absolute decree cut off and rejected utterly from grace and glory More particularly by this doctrine 1. Christ came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish because they were inevitably preordained to perish 2. The word is not sent to them or if it be it is that they might slight it or contemne it and increase their damnation by the contempt of it and so these inconveniences will arise 1. That God is a meere deceiver of miserable men whom he calls to Salvation in the name of his Sonne by the preaching of his word because he fully intends to most men the contrary to that which he fairly pretends 2. That Ministers are but false witnesses because in their Ministry they offer Salvation conditionally to many who are determined to damnation absolutely 3. The Ministry of the Word canot leave men inexcusable for Reprobates may have this just plea Lord dost thou punish for not believing in thy Sonne when thou didest call us to believe by the preaching of thy Word thou didest decree to leave us woefull men in Adams sinne to leave us neither power to believe nor a Christ to believe in how canst thou justly charge us with sinne or encrease our punishment for not believing in him whom thou didest resolve before the world was that we should never believe in That Ministry gives men a faire excuse which is given to no other end than to leave them without excuse 4. The Sacraments by this opinion signify nothing seale up conferre nothing to such as are not Saved but are meere blankes and empty ordinances unto them not through the fault of men but by the primary and absolute will of God 5. Lastly other gifts bestowed upon men of what nature soever they be are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention 1. Unprofitable such as shall never doe them good in reference to their finall condition 2. Dangerous and hurtfull given them not of love but extreame hatred not that they might use them well and be Blessed in so doeing but that they might use them ill and by ill using of them procure unto themselves the greater damnation God lifts them up as the Divell did Christ to the pinacle of the Temple that they might fall and loades them with knowledge and other goodly indowments that with the weight of them he might sink them into Hell and so by good consequence Gods chiefest gifts are intended and laid as snares
That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne as that which forceth it because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed which otherwise might be avoided and therefore if the Divine decree necessitate man's will to sinne it is as truly the cause of sinne as if it did inforce it 3. That which necessitates the will to sinne is more truly the cause of the sinne then the will is because it overruleth the will and beareth all the stroke taketh from it ' its true liberty by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disporser of ' its own acts and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power which is under the insuperable check and controule of no Lord but it selfe It overruleth I say maketh it become but a servile instrument irresistably subject to superiour command and determination And therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sins as proceed from the will so determined then the will is For when two Causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one a principle overruling cause the other but instrumentall and wholly at the Devotion of the principall then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall which by the force of ' its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a mere servant in the production of it We shall find it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent It is not ye that speak saith Christ but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you I laboured more abundantly then they all yet not I but the grace of God which was in me And I live yet not I but Christ liveth in me saith St. Paul Gal 2. 20. In these and many other places the effect or work spoken of is taken from the instrument and given to the principall agent Which being so though man's will worke with God's decree in the commission of sinne and willeth the sin which it doth yet seing what the will doth it doth by the commanding power of God's Allmighty decree and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause 4. That which makes a man sinne by way of necessitie that is with and not against his will is the cause of sin in a worse manner then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will As he which by powerfull perswasions drawes a man to stab to hang to poison himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action then he that by force compells him because he maketh him to consent to his own death And so if Gods decree doe not only make men sin but sin willingly too not only cause that they shall malè agere doe evill but malè velle will evill it hath the deeper hand in the sinne God determines the will to sinne by necessitie though not by compulsion this he obtrudes upon our Devines as their opinion but quotes none is it likely that he who quotes Beza to shew that in his opinion God doth not only permit sinne but will sinne And Calvin to shew that a man's mind is blinded volente jubente Deo would not quote some or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them If his common place booke could afford him any such quotation out of any one of them to shew who they be and where they say that God determines the will to sinne by necessity though not by compulsion Was there ever the like crimination made against any without naming them that say so and the place where and their own words Or hath this man or any of his spirit deserved any credit to be trusted this way The very phrase of determining in Latine is no word of course with our Divines in this argument It is the phrase of the Dominicans But doe they say that God determines the will to sinne I doe not thinke he can produce one of them that expresseth himselfe so unscholastically so absurdly Alvarez saith that God by his effectuall decree predetermineth second causes to worke He saith that God doth predetermine the will to the act of sinne as it is an act That the first root of contingency is the will of God Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production Namely to produce it voluntarily and freely Nothing lesse though this Authour counts it his wisdome to conceale this God by his omnipotency doth cause that man whose heart he moves to will and will freely Againe God's generall concourse is a divine immediate influence into second causes whereby they are foremoved applyed and determined to worke every one according to the condition of its nature The naturall cause naturally the free cause freely as I have professedly delivered Disput 18. 23. And that in such sort freely as they can choose to doe otherwise if they will and that in the very instant wherin they doe what they doe But come we to consider his answer 1. Touching that which he saith of the Ancients he gives us his bare word for it as touching the confounding of necessitie and compulsion yet Bernard I confesse willingly in talking of liberty from necessity understands by necessity coaction He saith farther that those Ancients did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne least they should grant thereby that God is the Authour of sinne But I doe not thinke he can shew this phrase of necessitating the will any way to be found among the Ancients what he hath touched before I have considered what he shall intimate hereafter I hope I shall not let it passe unsaluted And the truth is to necessitate hath such an Emphasis with it as to perswade that whatsoever a man is necessitated to do that he doth by constraint against his will And it is a rule commonly received that Voluntas non potest cogi The will cannot be forced which is most true as touching Actus eliciti the acts of the will inward and immediate and not so of actus imperati acts outward and commanded But Bradwardine who alone useth this phrase among'st School-Divines takes it in no such sense but only for an effectuall operation of God upon the will moving it to worke this or that not necessarily but freely which this Authour most judiciously dissembleth all along for desparing to prevaile by true and substantiall information of the understanding perturbundis affectibus suffuratur by a corrupt proposition of his Adversaries tenet hopes to worke distast upon the Readers affections Bradwardines position is this God can after a sort necessitate every created will to ' its free act and to a free cessation vacation from act and
Synod of Palestine 1200. yeares agoe to this day The difference of opinions here feigned by him about the point of Reprobation amongst our Divines is like the feigning of a knot in a bulrush For what is a peremptory denying of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall other then a denyall of that grace and glory which is prepared in the decree of election to the sonnes of God though indeed neither of them make it a denyall which is done in time but rather Gods decree to deny it For do not the latter Divines maintaine it to be peremptory as well as the former For what difference doth he devise between a flat denyall and a peremptory denyall and as for the latter decree belonging to reprobation here mentioned namely a preordination of the man thus left to the torments of hell do not the latter Divines acknowledge this decree to belong to Reprobation also Only they professe that God preordaines none to eternall torments in hell but for their sinnes actuall as well as originall of as many as live to ripenesse of age Now I would faine know what Divine of ours maintaines the contrary 1. Our Divines in saying Reprobation is Decretum quo statuit non misereri do manifest that not denying grace but the decree of denying it is Reprobation Walaeus speaketh of no common endowments though that be a truth which here is attributed unto them else how should they be called common endowments 2. If he decrees to leave Reprobates without grace and consequently under that necessity of sinning into which all are cast by the sinne of Adam it is nothing strange I thinke that God should accordingly leave them therein though in a different manner the Lord prostituting some to their own lost's and to the power of Satan more then others and making some even by the ministery of the Gospell proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur as Austin some where speaketh If Gods decree cannot be frustrated as here is avouched I wonder he should charge us with teaching that God decreeth this or that immutably For if he should change any of his decrees they should undoubtedly be frustrated Indeed we do not say that God decrees Hypothetically to give grace to wit upon condition that men will make themselves fit for it and for failing herein to deny them grace And I am very glad to observe so good correspondence in the suffrages of Protestant Divines in the Synod of Dort and our English also with them Sect 3. 3. God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves of his alone absolute will and pleasure This is the third branch 1 That they say so witnesse the suffrage of our English Divines We affirme that this non election is founded in the most free pleasure of God And that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God is numbred by the same Divines among the heterodox positions To this purpose also speake The Palatinate Ministers The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospell the cause is the same free pleasure of God Thus the Divines of Hessen God decreed to leave some in the fall of his own good pleasure The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen and doth not bestow upon them meanes necessary to beleive c. and this out of his most free pleasure This they joyntly affirme and prove it by this reason especially All men were lookt on as sinners If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate he should have reprobated or rejected all But he did not Reprobate all therefore for sinne he reprobated none but for his owne pleasure in which we must rest wthout seeking any other cause 1. Now from these two things layd together viz. 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning 2. That he hath left the Reprobates under this necessity it will follow that he is the Authour of the reprobates sinnes 1. Because Causae causae est causa causati the Cause of a cause is the cause of its effect if there be a necessary subordination betweene the causes and the effect whether it be a cause by acts negative or positive But God is the cheife or sole cause by their doctrine of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of reprobates namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace therefore he is by the same doctrine the true and proper cause of their sinnes 2. Because Removens prohibens that which withdraweth and withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event is the cause of that event As for example he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs is the cause of the falling of that stone And he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to uphold a house is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house But God by their opinion withholdeth from reprobates that power which being granted them might keep thē from falling into sinne therefore he becometh a true morall cause of their sinnes In whose power it is that a thing be not done to him it is imputed when it is done sayth Tertullian In cuius manu est quid ne fiat ei deputatur cum iam fit It will not suffice to say that God by withholding grace from reprobates becometh only an accidentall not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes For a cause is then only accidentall in relation to the effect when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause For example Digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold when that event is neither expected not intended by the husbandman in digging But when the event is lookt for and aymed at then the cause though it be the cause only by withholding the impediment is not accidentall As a Pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storme foreseeing that by his neglect the ship will be drowned is not to be reputed an accidentall but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship This being so it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne from reprobates not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow but knowing infallibly what mischeife will follow and determining precisely that which doth follow viz their impenitency and damnation becomes the proper and direct cause of their sinnes That God of his meere pleasure sheweth mercy on some and hardeneth others is the expresse word of God Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardneth Now to shew mercy is to give the grace of faith and obedience as appeares
by the opposition of it to obduration which is such as whereupon followeth disobedience as appeares by the objection following hereupon Thou wilt say then why doth yet cōplaine For who hath resisted his will Now God complaineth of nothing but disobedience Againe to give faith is to shew mercy For to have faith is to obtaine mercy Heretofore ye have not believed but now have obtained mercy through their unbeliefe Where to believe to obtaine mercy are made equipollent of the same signification And in reason if God did deny faith because of some unpreparednesse in the creature then God did expect that the creature should first prepare himselfe and make himselfe fit for faith that so God might bestow it upon him so grace should be conferr'd according to workes which is contradictious to expresse testimony of holy scripture testifying that God hath saved us called us with an holy calling not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace all along hath beene condened in the Church of God for Pelagianisme Thus we have beene entertained with a discourse containing nothing but the opinion of our Divines which none of us deny Yet in the proposing hereof he hath wasted a whole leafe and more Now he comes to his argument drawen from these two layd together 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning 2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity Hence he concludes that God is the Author of the reprobates sins But this we utterly deny Therefore this he undertakes to prove by two reasons 1. Because the cause of the cause is the cause of its effect if there be a necessary subordination betweene the causes and the effect But God is the cheife or sole cause by their doctrine of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace For answer whereunto I say first begining with the minor 1. That the want of supernaturall grace is not the immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates nor the cheife cause much lesse the sole cause And I prove it evidently Let instance be given in any sinne committed by a Reprobate let it be the sinne of murther or of fornication or of theft or of lying For if it were then every reprobate should be guilty of murther of fornication of lying of stealing For positâ causâ principali immediatâ ponitur effectus Where a principall and immediate cause doth exist there the effect must needs exist But it is apparent that albeit every reprobate doth want supernaturall grace yet every reprobate is not guilty of murther of fornication lying and stealing Secondly If the want of supernaturall grace were the immediate and principall cause of all the sinnes of reprobates then not only every Reprobate should be guilty of committing all the sinnes formerly mentioned but at all times every one of these sinnes should be committed by them Because at all times they want supernaturall grace And the truth is every one of these sinnes may be abstained from without supernaturall grace and for carnall respects Only without supernaturall grace they cannot be abstained from in a gracious manner as namely out of faith in God and love to God He that hath neither faith nor love cannot abstaine from these vile courses out of faith and love In like sort heathen men in their generations have beene exceeding vertuous according to the worlds account of vertue in moderating their passions and ordering their conversation aright one towards another and all this hath beene performed by them without supernaturall grace Thirdly The immediate cause of all their sinnes rather of the two is their naturall corruption whereby they are habitually turned away from God and converted unto the creature in an inordinate manner Like as the immediate cause actionis laesae of a naturall function of the body imperfect is the disease or infirmity that hath seised upon some part of the body And the Physitian who is able to cure it and will not is the cause why it continueth uncured But no wise man will say he is the cause why this or that member in a sicke mans body doth not performe its operation as it should In like manner as touching the vicious actions of the soule the want of supernaturall grace is the cause why those vicious actions continue uncured because God alone by his grace can cure them but no sober man that is well in his wits should say that is the cause of vicious actions but acknowledge rather the corruption thereof to be the cause of these vicious actions And indeed all morall philosophy referres the cause of every vicious action unto the vicious habit depraving the will and inclining it to vicious courses Fourthly Yet farther to represent the wildnesse of this Authours discourse The vicious habit it selfe is not the sole cause no nor the principall and immediate cause of a vicious action in particular For if it were then that particular vicious action should alwayes be committed by it So that an impure person should alwayes commit fornication a Lyar should alwayes lye a Theife should alwayes steale a Murtheret should alwayes commit murther For it is a rule generally received that the immediate and principall cause being existent the effect must needs exist also And indeed albeit habits whether good or evill do worke after the manner of nature inclining and swaying the will to the accomplishment of them Yet the will of man being a free and not necessary Agent proceeds not to worke but according unto judgement and occasions and opportunityes from without And albeit a purser that maintaine himselfe by robbery hath a faire opportunity offered him to advantage himselfe to take a purse yet if upon consideration he finds himselfe too weake to goe through with it or that he cannot do it safely he will forbeare For albeit a vicious habit doth naturally and necessarily incline him to a naughty end yet in the choice of the meanes conducing to this end he is free How much more plainely doth it appeare that the want of supernaturall grace is farre off from being either the sole cause or the immediate or the principall cause of any sinne committed by a Reprobate Rather of the two the intestine corruption of the Reprobate is the cause of his sinnes and the want of grace is the cause why this corruption is not cured Now albeit a Physitian may sinne in not curing a sicke person when it lyes in his power to cure him For we are in charity bound to do to others as we would have others do unto us yet God is bound to none I will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion 2. Observe how sluttishly he carryeth himselfe in the next reason taken from removens prohibens His rule proceeds both of withdrawing and withholding a thing which being
privatio cui non possit etiam competere habitus And therefore we call not any thing deafe blind or dumbe but what is capable of hearing sight and speech In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man but what he may be hindered and restrayned from but now a man cannot be hindered or restrayned from the performance of an outward action unto which he hath no propension or inclination of which he hath no purpose or desire no more than he can be constrayned unto that from which he is not averse therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him if we take permission properly as Bannes saith as it is not nuda negatio sed privatio By this time the Reader I suppose is satisfied that God doth not permit every man to murther or destroy the life of every one that cometh in his way and therefore consequently he hath not decreed or intended any such permission As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your assertion it nothing mends the matter for I have prooved the assertion to be false in it selfe by arguments that feare not the light of your tryall or examination and false assertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatsoever so much I learned when I was a Boy from Keckerm System Log. lib. 2. cap. 4. Quicquid subjecto limitativè tribuitur id verè tribuitur But suppose this assertion were justifiable by some limitation or other yet not by this which you bring because this naturall power to doe the execution as you speake is insufficient to denominate the permission of murther because 't is consistent with the opposite of such a permission restraint from murther c. First because 't is insufficient to denominate the permission of murther A naturall power to performe an action is essentially requisite unto the permission thereof but it is not only the essentiall requisite thereunto and therefore an insufficient ground for the affirmation of it If it be lawfull to affirme a predicate of a subject in respect of the presence of one essentiall requisite unto the said predicate when there are wanting any other things essentially required thereunto also as absurd propositions as are imagineable will be hence justified As that beasts and plants are men and Men beasts for of beasts and plants there are affirmed diverse things which doe agree unto man essentially and so on the other side diverse things are predicated of men essentially which are also essentiall unto beasts and plants Secondly a naturall power to destroy the life of another is consistent with the opposite of such a permission to wit restraint from the murther of him a power to produce an act may be hindered majoris aut aequalis saltem potentiae oppositione saith your Arminius by opposall of a greater or at least an equall power though a man have not only a power but a will a desire and purpose to take away the life of another yet he may be restrained not only by feare of punishment dictates of a naturall conscience within but also by opposition of a greater or equall power without Now permission and restraint are privatively opposed and therefore we cannot say that an action is permitted in regard of that which is common unto both permission and restraint and may be found as well when an action is restrained as when it is permitted If I should say that a blind man sees in respect of the first naturall power of seeing that a deafe man hears in respect of the first naturall power of hearing you would say that my limitation were absurd and ridiculous because this naturall first power of seeing is found both in the blind and the seeing and we may say the same of the first power of hearing Yet this limitation is as justifiable as yours for the naturall power you speake of to doe the execution is found as well in the restraint as in the permission of murther MR GOODWIN GOD permitted Adam to eate of every tree in the Garden of Eden the tree of knowledge of Good and evill only excepted Gen. 2. 16 17. and therefore certainly had decreed or intended this permission yet was not Adam any waies necessitated by any vertue or influence of this decree upon him to eate of every one of these trees nor is it in the least degree credible that ever he did eate of every of them nor yet of any one of them but only that which was prohibited unto him his ejection out of this Garden following so suddainly after this patent or permission granted unto him IEANES THE permission spoken of Gen. 2. 16. was Morall or Legall in genere officii not naturall or Physicall in genere facti and therefore nothing at all to the purpose Mr GOODWIN NEither doth any such decree in God suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary for the bringing of things so decreed to passe which will actually bring them to passe though God hath decreed that a sparke or coale of fire falling i. e. in case it shall fall into a barrell of Gunpowder shall fire it yet it doth not follow from hence that he hath decreed that any such sparke or coale shall fall into it without which notwithstanding the effect decreed viz. the firing of this Powder will not come to passe IEANES FIrst Arminius tells you that the absence of one necessary cause is sufficient to denominate a restraint Ad productionem effecti requiritur causa integra sufficiente ad ejus impedimentum unius causae necessariae absentiâ And if this be true then permission doth imply a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary for the bringing of things so permitted to passe which will actually bring them to passe if they be not hindered and consequently a permissive decree doth though not suppose that 's not our language yet inferre the futurity of such a presence of all requisite and necessary causes Besides Secondly Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44. out of Zabarell acquaints us how restraint is sometimes taken privatively pro privatione actionis inferendae and absence not only of one requisite and necessary cause but also of one necessary condition is sufficient to denominate such a restraint Sic distantia loci saith he impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus non quasi distantia illa habeat efficientiam vel influxum aliquem sed solum distantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne passionis in calefactibili In regard of this acception of restraint fire cannot be said to be permitted to burne combustible matter unlesse there be an approximation of the fire unto the said combustible matter for distance of place hinders the fire from burning distance of place between fire and a barrell of Gunpowder doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrell of Gunpowder if you take hinderance or restraint in such a sence as Scheibler speakes of
for me includes many things as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ may be conceived to be many But let these benefits be distinguished and we shall readily answer to the question made and that perhaps differently as namely affirmatively to some negatively to others as thus Doe you speak of Christs dying for me that is for the pardon of my sins and for the salvation of my soule I answer affirmatively and say I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner as God hath ordained to wit not absolutely but conditionally to wit in case I doe believe and repent For God hath not otherwise ordained that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation by vertue of Christs Death and Passion unlesse I believe in him and repent But if question be made whether I am bound to believe that Christ died for me to procure faith and repentance unto me I doe not say that I am bound or that every one who hears the Gospel is bound to believe this Nay the Remonstrants now a daies deny in expresse tearmes that Christ merited this for any at all I am not of their opinion in this but I see clearly a reason manifesting that Christ merited not this for all no not for all and every one that hears the Gospel For if he had then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or conditionally Not absolutely for then all and every one of them should believe de facto which is untrue for the Apostle saith Fides non est Omnium Nor conditionally for what condition I pray can be devised upon the performance whereof God for Christs sake should give us faith and repentance In like sort if I am demanded whether God did decree of the meer pleasure of his will to refuse to give grace and glory unto some and to inflict upon them damnation To this I cannot answer at once there being a Fallacy in the demand But distinguish them I answer and say that as touching the poynt of denying grace God doth that of his meer pleasure but as touching the denyall of glory and the inflicting of damnation he doth not decree to doe these of meer pleasure but rather meerly for sin to wit for their infidelity and impenitency and all the bitter fruits that shall proceed from them So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly stated is the decree of God partly to deny unto some and that of his meer pleasure the grace of Faith and Repentance for the curing of that infidelity and hardnes of heart which is naturall unto all and partly to deprive them of glory and to inflict damnation upon them not of his meer pleasure but meerly for their finall continuance in sin to wit in infidelity and impenitency and all the fruits that proceed therehence 2. Now as for the cause of this decree as likewise of all the decrees of God when any of our Divines say that it is the meer pleasure of God as in some places it is expressed of some decrees let them be understood aright not as if they distinguished between the decree of God and the good pleasure of his will for we know full well that the decree of God is the good pleasure of his Will what decree soever it be but hereby we only exclude all causes from without moving God to make any such decree like as when it is said Deuteron 7. 7. The Lord did not set his love upon you nor chuse you because ye were more in number then any people but because the Lord loved you as much as to say The Lord loved you because he loved you Where we cannot soberly devise any distinction between love and love as between the cause and the effect only hereby is excluded all cause from without Now we are ready with open face to professe that of the Will and decree of God there neither is nor can be any cause from without all things from without being temporall and the Will of God being eternall and the Will of God quoad actum Volentis being the very Essence of God For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One whereby he is said to Bee whatsoever he is as wee doe conceive variety of perfections in God yet all these are but one indivisible Act in God and by this one indivisible Act he both knowes all that he knowes and willeth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth Man when he willeth any thing as likewise an Angel when he willeth ought they produce an act of willing passing upon this or that object but it is not so with God in whom there is no accident And therefore Aquinas was bold to professe that never any man was so mad as to professe that merits were the cause of Predestination as touching the act of God predestinating and why so why surely upon this ground because predestination is the will of God and like as nothing can be the cause of the will of God as touching the act of willing so nothing can be the cause of divine predestination as touching the act of God predestinating His words are these in the same place Sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis dictum est autem suprà quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi But because like as the love of God is sometime taken for the good thing which God bestowes like as Jansenius interprets that place Iohn 14. 21. He that loveth me shall be beloved of my Father to wit of the effect of the Fathers love and we commonly say that Passions are attributed unto God not quoad Affectum but quoad Effectum in like sort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed as 1 Thes 4. 3. This is the will of God even your sanctification that is this is willed by him Therefore Aquinas distinguisheth a double consideration in the will of God one quoad actum volentis and so it hath no cause from without another quoad res volitas and so it may have a cause So likewise in predestination as considering it either quoad actum Praedestinantis and so it hath no cause or quoad effectum Praedestinationis and so it may have a cause as there he professeth both touching the will of God in generall and touching Predestination in speciall Of the will of God in generall thus Non est assignare causam voluntatis divinae ex parte actus volendi sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum in quantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud And of predestination in speciall thus Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam hoc est quaerere utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui propter aliqua merita Now thus
rather a fiction of the remnants of the Pelagians wherewithall to reproach the doctrine of S. Austin in the poynt of Predestination Thus have I examined this Authors pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent I come to the consideration of that which followes DISCOURSE The Second Motive IT S unwillingnesse to abide the Tryall I find that the Authors and Abettors of it have been very backward to bring it to the Standard not only when they have been called upon by their Adversaries to have been weighed but also when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magistrates who might have commanded them A shrewd argument mee thinks that it is too light In the Disputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between Beza and Jacobus Andreas with some Seconds on both sides Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the person of Christ the Lords Supper c. When they came to this Point did decline the sifting of it and gave this reason among others that it could not then possibly be disputed of sine gravi eorum offendiculo qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt without the great scandall and hurt of the ignorant and unacquainted with these high mysteries The Contra-Remonstrants also in their Conference with their Adversaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Westfrizland that they might not be urged to it resolving rather to break off the Conference then to meddle with it In the Synod likewise of Dort in the year 1618 and 1619. the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod ut de Electione potius quà m de odiosâ Reprobations materiâ agerent that they should rather dispute of the point of Election then the odious point of Reprobation Can this Doctrine be a truth and yet blush at the light which makes all thing manifest especially considering these things 1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of Practicall divinity by the ill or well stating of which the glory of God and good of Religion is much promoted or hindered 2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation both being parts of predestination that the one cannot well be handled without the other 3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time 4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falshood and therefore bound in justice to purge it selfe of the crimination 5. That it may easily be defended if as some say it be such an apparent truth for Nihil est ad defendendum puritate tutius nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius saith S. Hierom. The striving to lye close and hide it selfe though perhaps it be not so infallible yet it is a very probable argument of a bad cause Truth covets no corners but is willing to abide the tryall whether in men or in doctrines David knowing his heart to be without guile offers himselfe ready to the Lords tryall Search me o God and know my heart try me and know my thoughts and see if there be any wicked way in me And our Saviour tells us that Every one that doth evill hates the light and comes not to the light least his deeds should be reproved but he that doth truth comes to the light that his deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God As S. Paul saith of an Heretick he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 selfe condemned and so may we say of Heresy and untruth it condemnes it selfe and by nothing more then by refusing the Touch-stone He is to be thought an empty Scholler who is loath to be opposed and his gold to be light and counterfeit that will not have it touched and weighed and these Opinions to be but errours which would so willingly walk in a mist and dwell in silence when it concernes the peace of the Church so much to have them examined TWISSE Consideration VVHo are these Authors of this Doctrine who here are said to have been backward to bring it to the standard Is Beza those Authors whereof was he the Author Was it the doctrine of predestination as proceeding of the meer pleasure of God and not upon foresight of mans faith and works Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Austin 1200 years agoe and that in opposition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians Or was it the doctrine of reprobation as not proceeding upon the foresight of sinne but of the meer pleasure of God Is this Author so ignorant as not to know what are the conclusions of Alvarez in the question Whether there be any cause of reprobation on mans part Lib. 10. de Auxil disc 110. pag. 866. 1. His first Conclusion is this Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto some everlasting life and to permit their sinne is not conditionate but absolute neither doth it presuppose in God foresight of the deserts of reprobates or of their perseverance in sinne unto the last period of their life 2. His next Conclusion is In the Angells that fell there is no cause of their reprobation on their part as touching the whole effect thereof but before any foresight of their future sinne God pro sua Voluntate of his meer will did reprobate some of them and suffered them to fall into sinne 3. The third Infants departing in Originall sinne alone there is no cause on their part of reprobation if they be considered in comparison with others which are not reprobated and the like is to be said proportionably of men of ripe years 4. The fourth Not only comparatively but absolutely there is no cause of reprobation Therefore neither sinne actuall nor originall nor both of them foreseen by God was indeed the meritorious and motive cause of the reprobation of any as touching all the effects thereof and the proofe hereof he prosecutes at large 5. Reprobation as touching the last effect thereof presupposeth in signo rationis the foresight of sinne originall or actuall for which a reprobate is damned Marke it well He does not say as the cause for which God decrees his damnation but as the cause for which a reprobate is damned And Aquinas whose followers the Dominicans are expresseth this doctrine in this manner and that more Scholastically and accurately then Alvarez Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata c. in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine that is Prescience of sinnes may be some reason of reprobation on the part of punishment to wit in as much as God purposeth to punish wicked men for their sinnes Where sinne is evidently made the cause of damnation and that by vertue of Gods purpose but by no means the cause of the
same nature with the naturall faculties of man As for the graces of Gods spirit what are these but the three Theologicall vertues all other are but Morall vertues sanctified by these Now shew me what Faith there is in God of the same nature with our Faith differing only in degree What hope there is in God of the same nature with our hope differing only in degree what charity there is in God of the same nature with our Charity differing only in degree These indeed being of all other the most peculiar fruits of regeneration whereby we are renewed after the image of God as touching the adventitious qualification of our natures should have Attributes divine answerable unto them if any of the same nature with them differing only in degree Yet herein as I conceive consists not so much our participation of the Divine Nature as in that the Spirit of God the Father and God the Sonne is communicated unto us given unto us to be the immediate fountain of all actions and motions spirituall in us 3. And albeit these Attributes which in common doe denominate God and man are one thing in God and in man another yet this nothing derogates from our imitation of God and striving to be perfect and holy in our kind as creatures like as God is perfect and holy in his kind as Creator And that I may represent some authority for my discourse whereas this Author represents none for his it is a poynt generally received in the Schooles that in this weaknesse of our understanding we come to know what God is by negation rather then by affirmation Capreolus upon the first of the Sentences Dist 2. Quest 1. rehearseth diverse passages out of Aquinas to this purpose as out of 1. Contra Gentes cap. 14. In consideratione Divinae substantiae praecipue utendum est via remotionis Nam Divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit suâ excedit immensitate Et sic ipsam apprehendere non pessumus cognoscendo quid est sed aliqualiter ejus notitiam habemus cognoscendo quid non est tantóque ejus notitiae magis appropinquamus quanto plura per intellectum nostrum poterimus ab eo removere Tanto enim unumquodque perfectiùs cognoscitur quanto differentias ejus ab alio pleniùs intuemur Quià in consideratione Divinae substantiae non possumus accipere quid quasi genus nec distinctionem ab aliis rebus per differentias affirmativas accipere possumus eam oportet accipere per differentias Negativas Id. 3. Contra gentes cap. 47. Per effectus Dei pertingere possumus ut cognoscamus de Deo quia est quod causa aliorum est aliis supereminens ab omnibus remotus hoc est ultimum perfectissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vitâ ut Dionysius dixit lib. de Mysticâ Theologiâ Cum Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur quod quidem contingit cùm de Deo quid non sit cognoscimus quid vero sit penitùs manet ignotum unde ad hujusmodi sublimissimae cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam dicitur de Mose Exod 20. quod accessit ad caliginem in qua Deus er at In the consideration of the Divine Essence we must chiefly use the way of negation for the Divine Essence through its immensity doth exceed every forme that our understanding can conceive So that we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is but after a sort we have the knowledge thereof by knowing what it is not And so much nearer doe we approach to the knowledge thereof the more we are able to remove from the nature of God For every thing is known so much the more perfectly by how much the more at full we doe behold how it differeth from other things Now in the consideration of the Divine essence we cannot take any thing as the Genus thereof neither can we apprehend its distinction from other things by differences affirmative and therefore we must apprehend it by differences negative The same Thomas in his Third Book Contra Gent. cap. 47. By the effects of God saith he we may attain to know that God is and that he is the cause of other things eminent above them and removed from them all and this is the last and most perfect degree of our knowledge in this life as saith Dionysius in his Book of Mysticall Divinity We are conjoyned with God as unknown which verily comes to passe when we know of God what he is not but what he is it remains utterly unknown unto us and therefore to demonstrate our ignorance of this most sublime knowledge it is said of Moses Exod. 20. that he came unto the darknesse where God was The same Capreolus proceeds to shew out of Aquinas in 1 Sent. Dist 8. q. 1. art 1. ad 4. How we must make progresse in our knowledge of God by way of remotion or negation Quando inquit in divinis procedimus per viam remotionis primò negamus corporalia Secundò intellectualia secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis ut bonitas sapientia tunc remanet in intellectu Quod est nihil amplius unde est sicut in quadam confusione When saith he we proceed by way of remotion or negation in searching out the Divine nature first we deny of him all corporall things and secondly we deny of him all intellectuall things after such a sort as they are found in the creatures as godnesse and wisdome mark this well for these and such like are the vertues which this Author saith are of the same nature in God and man differing only in degree and then there remains in the understanding id quod est as much as to say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens and nothing more and hence the understanding remains as in a certain confusion And indeed the notion of entity is most generall most abstract and if any notion signifies one and the same nature such as may be affirmed of God and the creature surely this is it Now observe Aquinas his judgement concerning this out of the same Capreolus in these words Ad ultimum autem Essentiam ipsam secundum quod est in creatur is ab ipso removemus tunc remanet intellectus noster in quadam tenegrâ ignorantiae secundum quam ignorantiam quantum ad statum viae pertinet optime Deo conjungimur ut Dionysius dicit haec est caligo in qua Deus habitare dicitur To the last I answer the very entity or existence in the creatures we remove from God and then our understanding remains in the darknesse of ignorance according to which ignorance so farre forth as it pertains to our condition as Viatores and in the way we are conjoyned with God in the best manner as Denis saith and this is the darknes wherein God is said to dwell By this let any man judge whether this Authors discourse be not as opposite to the discourse of
God that is not yet regenerated but yet neverthelesse they may be in good time Yet here also there is some defect for want of cleare explication of this truth For will you conclude hence that non-regeneration is the cause of infidelity as some doe in effect Why but this is either notoriously false or if true it is true in such a sense as whereby God is no more the cause thereof then a Physitian is the cause of a disease because he will not cure it For infidelity is a naturall fruit of mans hereditary corruption and God alone can cure it but if he will not God is not to be said to be the cause of any disobedience issuing therefrom otherwise then per modum non removentis by way of not removing the cause of it or per modum non dantis quod prohiberet by way of not curing the cause that is by not giving faith Now what harshnesse there is in this to as many as doe not concurre with the Pelagians so as in plain termes to professe that Grace is given according to mens works And the objection framed against Austin and grounded upon that doctrine which he acknowledged ranne thus Caeteri qui in peccatorum delectatione remoramini ideo nondum surrexistis quia nec dum vos adjutorium gratiae miserantis erexit Therefore you are not risen out of that delight you took in sinne because the succour of Gods grace hath not raised you not as Calvin expresseth it Therefore you believe not because ye are ordained to destruction And this very doctrine as formerly I said our Saviour spares not to apply to some particular persons and Preach it to their faces like as Moses Preacheth the very same doctrine to the Children of Israel Deut. 29. 2 3 4. Yet Austin to prevent harshnesse doth not like this manner of proposing it so well seeing it may be and it is fit it should be delivered coveniently thus Si qui autem ad huc in peccatorum damnabilium delectatione remoramini apprehenditis saluberrimam disciplinam Quod tamen cum feceritis nolite extolli quasi de operibus vestris aut gloriari quasi non acceperitis If any of you doe yet continue in the delightfull course of damnable sinnes take hold of wholesome discipline which when you have done be not proud thereof as of your own work or Glory as if you had not received this grace of God Now what advantagious service this first witnesse hath done him I am well content the indifferent may judge I come to his second witnesse that is of the Land-grave of Turing reported by Hesterbachius as I remember it is about the Twelfth Century of yeares since our Saviours incarnation This man being admonished by his friends of his dangerous and vitious courses made this answer Si praedestinatus sum nulla peccata poterunt mihi Regnum Caelorum auferre Si praescitus nulla bona mihi illud valebunt conferre It is not the first time I have met with this story not in Vossius only but in an Arminian Manuscript it seems they make some account of it yet I see no cause they should make any such account thereof It is the common voyce of prophane persons corrupting the doctrine of Predestination to serve their own turnes My selfe remember an instance of it in my minority when I was little more then a child and I remember both the Person whom and the place where it was delivered and it was accounted as a signe of a prophane heart yet this Vossius makes use of as an instance forsooth of a Predestination Heretique And I wonder why they doe not devise as well a Praescientiarian Heresy and that by as good an instance as this of one of Austins Monkes who being reproved by his brethren made the like answer as touching Gods praescience but yet with more sobriety saying Whatsoever I am now I shall be such as God foreseeth I will be Yet herein as Austin professeth he spake nothing but truth but the saying of the Landgrave implyes a notorious untruth namely that if he were predestinated he should be Saved though he continued in his sinfull courses Now this I say is a grosse untruth For predestination is the preparation of Grace as Austin desineth it and consequently such as are predestinated shall be taken off from their sinfull courses in good time and by Grace be brought unto Salvation In like sort he supposeth a Reprobate may be truly righteous whereas Austin professeth of such as are not predestinate that God brings none of them to wholsome and spirituall repentance whereby man is reconciled unto God in Christ what patience soever he affords them Contr. Jul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. Nay this kind of Argumentation drawn from destiny Stoicall wherewith our adversaries doe usually reproach our doctrine of Predestination like as the Pelagians did in the same manner reproach Saint Austins doctrine concerning Predestination I say this argument was in course and profligated in the daies of Cicero and censured as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an idle argumentation as before I mentioned and it is to be seen in Cicero his book De Fato and thereupon they distinguished of some things which they called Fatalia as victory and some things which they called Confatalia as all necessary meanes requisite to the getting of the victory And Origen though he be accounted a favourer of our adversaries Doctrine in his writings yet he shewes the vanitie of this Argument applyed to fate wherby undoubtedly he meanes providence divine For he proposeth such a kind of objection as if a sicke man should dispute himself from taking Physick after this maner Either by destiny is it appointed I shall recover or no If my destiny be to recover I shall recover though I use no Physicke if my destiny be not to recover all the Physitians in the world shal doe me no good And the vanity of this is represented by the like argument in another manner thus If it be thy desteny to beget children whether thou usest the company of Woemen or no thou shalt beget children And concludes thus Ut enim hic si fieri non potest ut quis procreat nisi cum muliere concubuerit sic si valetudinis recuperatio medicinae via efficitur necessariò adhibetur medicus The Greeke of Origen is set downe at large by Turnebus in his disputation upon Cicero his book De Fato against Ramus Now judge you I pray what colour of detriment to Religion hath he produced from our doctrine of absolute Reprobation and whether his discourse herein is any better then the imagination of a vaine thing DISCOURSE SECT IV. BUt there are two things chiefly which are said for the vindicating of this opinion from this crimination 1. First that many of them which believe and defend this opinion are Godly and holy men and therefore it doth not of it selfe open a way to liberty but through the wickednesse of men who pervert the
be such a God A Morall efficient is twofold being only of a moveing nature to move others to doe somewhat as namely either by perswading or by meriting or deserving He that perswades moves an other to doe some what he that meriteth thereby moves another either to reward him or punish him Now to walke in the light of this distinction and not to please our selves by walking in darknesse though God be the prime principall and invincible cause of man's damnation in the kind of a cause efficient physicall which should not seeme strange to an ordinary Christian who knowes full well that vengeance is God's peculiar worke as the Iudge of all the world and that he delights in the execution thereof yet this hinders not but that man may be the cause of his own damnation in the way of a meritorious cause justly deserving it Omnis poena Deum habet Authorem All punishment hath God for the Authour of it This is a principle acknowledged both by the Arminians and Vasquez the Jesuite but never is punishment inflicted on any by the hands of God save on those who formerly have deserved it Consider we farther as touching the severall kinds of causes formerly mentioned if the question be which is the principall Aristotle answereth that this is not confined to any one kind of them somtimes the materiall cause somtimes the formall cause somtimes the efficient somtimes the finall cause is the demonstrative cause the cause propter quam the cause by vertue where of the effect hath its existence but this peculiar and speciall cause is described thus It is that whereby satisfactory answer is made to the question demanding why such a thing is Now in execution of punishment or condigne vengeance this satisfactory answer is made by representing the meritorious cause never by representing the efficient cause as for example if it be demanded why such a malefactor is executed upon the gallowes no sober man will answer because the Sheriffe cōmanded it to be so or because the Judge would have it so but because he robd upon the high way or committed some criminall fact or other which is capitall by the lawes of our land and to be punished with hanging upon the gallowes In like sort if question be made why devills or wicked men are damned is it our doctrine to referre the cause hereof to the mere pleasure of God Doe not all confesse that God inflicts damnation upon thē merely for their sinnes and transgressions wherein they have continued unto death without repentance Yet we acknowledge that God could have taken them off from their sinnes while they lived if he would by giving them repentance as he hath dealt with us and that merely of his free grace For we willingly confes that our sinnes are our owne but our faith is not our repentance is not When I say our owne I meane in respect that they are of our selves otherwise we acknowledge both faith and repentance to be our owne accipiendo in asmuch as we receive them but they are God's gifts and so they are his dando in asmuch as he gives them as Remigius speaketh Now what is become of this Authours pompous discourse Is it not the like the cracking of thornes in the fire making a great noise but the light of distinction like fire sets an end unto it and makes it appeare in its owne likenesse and proves nothing but a squib For albeit God in his decree makes the damnation of reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable yet seeing he makes it not to fall on any but for their sinnes what colour of dishonour unto God in ordaining that Iudas shall necessarily and unavoidably be damned for betraying the Sonne of God and afterwards most desperatly murthering himselfe If hereupon he could no more avoid his damnation then Astionax could the breaking of his neck when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the tower of Troy will any man that is not bereaved of common sense make strange of this It is true God did appoint both Iudas and all other wicked persons that never break off their sinnes by repentance unto destructiō of his own voluntary disposition For God workes all things according to the counsaile of his will and if it pleased him he could annihilate them upon the fresh foot of any sin or after they have suffered the vengeance of hell fire as many yeares in hell as they lived here in sinne yea and the devills in hell as Origen was of opinion and the Jewes at this day are of the same by Sir Edwin Sandes his relation whether this Author be of the same or not I know not And lastly we willingly confesse that the decree of God was antecedent to the deserts of men for reprobation is as antient as election and election was made before the foundation of the world if we believe Saint Paul rather then any other who either by word or deed doth manifest himselfe to be of a contrary opinion Still damnation is inflicted by God only for sinne and in degree answerable unto their sinnes and only because of their sinnes as a meritorious cause thereof though God makes use of it to his owne ends and the manifestation of his owne glory as Solomon professeth namely that God made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill And Saint Paul tells that as the Lord suffereth with long patience the vessells of wrath prepared to destruction that he might shew his wrath and make his power known So likewise another reason hereof he specifies to be this That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessells of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory For when we shall behold the unspeakable misery brought upon others by reason of their sinnes how rich will God's glory appeare unto us when we consider that had it not been for his free grace delivering us from sinne we had been swallowed up of the same sorrowes And thus Alvarez writeth disput III. The glory of God's mercy in his elect and in like manner the manifestation of divine justice on Reprobates is truely and properly the finall cause why God did permit sinnes both in Reprobates and Angells And he proves it out of this passage of Saint Paul So Aquin 1 p. pag. 23. art 5. This is the reason saith he why God hath chosen some and Reprobated others that representation might be made of Gods goodnesse towards the Elect in the way of mercy pardoning them and on the Reprobates in the way of justice punishing them And Alphonsus Mendoza a Scotist concurres with them in this and we see they make Saint Pauls doctrine their foundation And indeed albeit at the day of judgment there will be found a vast difference between the Elect and Reprobates the one having departed this life in the state of faith repentance the other in infidelitie and impenitency in such sort as God will bestow on his elect
foresee their wicked courses and what will become of them for it namely to be condemned to everlasting fire with the Divell and his Angells what shall we therefore conclude that God did not foresee the wicked waies and ungodly courses of all Reprobates that they would continue in them and die in their sinnes without all faith in Christ and true repentance towards God And if he did foresee what would be the ends of them in case he did create them and bring them forth into the world yet seeing he would neverthelesse create them and bring them forth into the world one after another in their severall times and ages shall we brand the holy name of God and reproach him for unnaturallnesse and barbarous crueltie Rather I will say what meanes this Auhour so unconscionably to corrupt the state of the question by mentioning only the shortnesse of their life and utterly concealing the wickednesse of their life the only meritorious cause of their torments which they suffer and accordingly to shape the ends intended by God to be only the demonstration of his power and Soveraingtie over them without all mention of his justice whereas we say that in the inflicting of damnation the cheife glory which God manifests is only the glory of his justice proceeding herein according to a law which himselfe hath made as most fit it is the Creatour should give lawes to his creature and the law is this whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved whosoever dyeth in sinne without repentance shall be damned Not one of our Divines that I know maintaines that inflicting damnation the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleasure of his will in the communicating of faith and repentance we willingly confesse the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleasure of his will and it is expresse Pelagianisme to affirme that grace is given according unto workes And herein this Authour is very well content to walke in the darke and conceale his most corrupt opinion most opposite to the grace of God But that damnation should be inflicted without respect to sinne as the meritorious cause thereof what one of our Divines can he produce that affirmeth Yet thus he is pleased to disguise our opinion when he findes the poverty of his strength to wage faire warre and so expose it to the hatred of me as if God ordained to damne men not for their sinnes but of his owne mere pleasure Thus of old the enemies of the Gospell dealt with Christians for first they would cloath them with beare skinnes and then set doggs upon them All that he hath to say to excuse his shamelesse crimination though so much he doth not expresse here is only this that our Divines maintaine the decree of damnation to preceed the foresight of sinne Yet this is untrue of the most part of them who premit both the foresight of sinne originall before reprobation from grace and of sinne actuall before the decree of damnation I willingly confesse for my part that I concurre with neither and if I should I should withall make the decree of permitting of sinne to preceed the decree of damnation for which I see no reason but yet I doe not make the decree of permitting sinne to follow the decree of damnation I hold these decrees to besimultaneous thus that God at once decrees both to create men and suffer them all to fall in Adam and to bring them forth in their severall generations into the world and to bestowe the grace of faith and repentance upon the one and so to save them and to deny the same grace unto others finally permitting them in their sinfull courses and so to damne them for sinne and all to manifest the glory of his mercy to the one and the glory of his justice on the other yea and his soveraingty too but wherein not in rewarding the one with Salvation and inflicting damnation on the other but only in giving grace to the one and not to the other And all the difference between our Divines is merely in apice Logico a point of Logick To wit as touching the right ordering of decrees concerning ends and meanes tending to the ends all concurring in this that God hath mercy on whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon them and whom he will he hardeneth in denying the same graces unto others Now when this Authour shall fairly prove that according to our opinion God destroyeth the righteous with the wicked then and not till then shall he prove that our faith differeth from the faith of Abraham What Divine of ours was ever knowne to affirme that God damneth any one that dyeth in repentance Yet it cannot be denied but that temporall judgments befall the righteous as well as the wicked When the Lord swept away 70 thousand with a three dayes pestilence in the land of Israel was it not possible thinks this Authour that any of God's deare children should perish by that pestilence To be caried away into captivity by an heathenish nation I should thinke is a greater calamity then to dye of the pestilence yet those who were carried away into Babylon with King Iechoniah the Lord represents by the basket of good figgs and those the Lord professeth that he had sent them away into Babylon for their good Were all damned will this Authour say that perished in the flood Saint Peter seemes to be of an other opinion where he saith To this purpose was the Gospell preached also to the end that they might be condemned also to men in the flesh but might live according to God in the spirit Truly I doe not say so much of them that perished in the conspiracy of Corah when the earth opened her mouth and swallowed up the conspirators nor them only but their wives and children also especially considering that inter pontem fontem mercy may be sought and mercy may be found Sect. 2. Containing the first Objection with the answer thereunto devised and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto But God say some is soveraigne Lord of all creatures they are truly and properly his owne Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and doe with his own what he will The question is not what an almighty soveraigne power can doe to poore vassalls but what a power that is just and good may doe By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole masse of mankind for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or soveraingty but by the power of a Judge to wit that actuall power of his which is alwaies cloathed with goodnesse and justice he cannot For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall mind It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendring to every one his due and that is
Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwise Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of these actions For if they are good and so farre as they are goood they come to passe by Gods working of them but if they are evill and so farre as they are evill they come to passe onely by Gods permitting according to that of Austin Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotēs fieri velit vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo Not any thing comes to passe but God willing it either by suffering it to wit in case it be evill or himselfe working it to wit in case it be good And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Bishop and Bishops and the rest of the Clergy in Ireland which is this God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever should come to passe in time yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather Farther consider it is confessed by all that God concurres in producing the act of sinne as an efficient cause thereof not morall but naturall And Aquinas himselfe though he denyes that Voluntas Dei est malorum Because indeed as Hugo de Sancto Victore observes by the will of God is commonly understood in this case Voluntas approbans his will approving it and loving it And so it is justly denyed that God doth will evill things speaking of the evill of sinne Yet Aquinas professeth and disputes and proves that Actus peccati est a Deo the Act of sinne is from God Like as the Act of walking is from the soule though the lamenes in walking ariseth from some disease in the legge Now the Devill concurres not in this manner to any act of sin neither is the efficient cause thereof in the Kinde of a Naturall efficient but onely Morall by tempting and perswading What therefore shall we conclude as this Authour doth without feare or witt or honesty that by the confession of all men God is hereby made worse then the Devill To what abominable courses do the wilde witts and profane hearts of these men expose them The greatest works of Satan in moving men to sin are comprehended under blinding and hardening of them Now these operations are also attributed to God And like enough he doth usually performe them not by the ministry of his holy Angells but by the Ministry of Satan and his Angells of Darkenesse as we read 1. Kings 22. v. 21. 22. 23. Ioh 13. 27. Acts 5. 3. What then shall the Devill so farre possesse our hearts as to break forth into such intolerable blasphemyes as to conclude hereupon that God is bad or worse then the Devill The providence of God I willingly confesse is wonderfull and mysterious in this like unto the Nature of God to be adored rather then pryed into So this providence to be dreaded rather then for satisfaction to every wanton and wild witt to be searched into Yet all confesse that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleased him and rebuke Satan and restraine the power and stop the course of sin and prevent occasions leading thereunto but he will not and why But because he knowes it becomes his allmighty power and wisdome infinite rather exmalis bene facere quà m malum esse non sinere To worke good out of evill then not at all to suffer evill Lastly what meanes this Authour to carry himselfe so as to betray so strange ignorance in mitigating Satans operation in tempting unto sin as if this were not sufficient to make him the Authour of sin Especially considering the reason that moves him hereunto which is meerely the delight that he takes in dishonouring God and being a desperate spirit himselfe to make as many as he can partakers of the same desperate condition For cupiunt perditi perdere sayth Cyprian cum sint ipsi paenales quaerunt sibi ad poenam comites being damned themselves they desire to damne as many as they can And being bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day they desire to have as many companions as they can in drinking of that cup of trembling and sucking the very dreggs of that cup of trembling and wringing them out For as the Historian observes Maligna est calamitas cum suo supplicio crucietur acquiescit alieno Calamity makes a man of a spightfull nature and when himselfe is tormented he takes content in this that others suffer with him And as the Oratour observes Nullum adversarium magis metuas quà m qui non potest vivere potest occidere No adversary more to be feared then he who cannot live himselfe yet can kill another This makes a coward resolute when he must needs dye he will fight like a mad man and kill all he can I say what meanes this Authour to carry the matter hand over head as if it were without question That he is not the Authour of sinne who onely is a Morall cause thereof but rather he that is the naturall efficient whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary As namely Dominicus Soto in his first booke of nature and grace chap 18. Although sayth he there are many that thinke it hard to explicate how in the hatred of God which hath an inward and indivisible malignity God can be the cause of the entity but not of the fault Yet this is not so hard to be understood Then he proceeds to shew how this may be First laying for his ground what it is to be the cause of sinne thus In morall actions he is altogether and is judged to be the cause who by a law or help or counsell or favour or perswasion moves any one either to good or evill Observe I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Authour supposeth without all proofe For in the judgement of Dominicus Soto he onely is to be accounted the cause of another mans sinne who is the morall cause thereof as by tempting counselling perswading thereunto And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Authour of it after this manner But as for God he by all these wayes moves his creatures to that which is good and honest and none at all to evill Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamancha as Molina confesseth in his disputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jesuite were of another opinion Yet Vasquius the Jesuite professeth that he was ever of the same minde with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamancha in this In his 129 disputation upon the first part of his Summes As for Prosper he hath no such argument But first observe the Objection whereunto he answereth was made against the Doctrine of Austin as the Authour acknowledgeth Whence it followeth that looke
ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari etiamsi optimè vivat se itaque velle pro suâ libidine vivere Ut ut enim sollicite lahoret non tamen posse decretum Dei infringere Respondet hic Christus Omnem palmitem c. qnod dicitur Quid ad te de occultâ Dei praedestinatione Hoc tu videris ut tu in me maneas fructum feras reliquae dispensationi prudentiae Dei committenda sunt Nam etiamsi videar is ad aeternam salutem praedestinatus non tamen fructum feras abjicieris in ignem tanquam infructuosus palmes He instances in Saul then whom there was not a better man in Israel That which is here cited out of Marlorat his Expositio Ecclesiastica it is set down as in Calvin's Commentary but no such thing is found in Calvin And it may be that is the fault of the Printers mistaking And Marlorat's own exposition succeeds in a few words thus Quae ideò dicuntur non ut fideles inde ansam arripiant de suâ salute dubitandi sed ut carnalis securitas ignavia ab hominibus tollatur And the next sentence whence this question is taken seems to cohere with this though a great C. as if it were Calvin's comes in between and it begins thus Certum est enim dècretum Dei à nemine infirmari posse quia Deus non est ut homo qui poenitentiam agat retractet sententiam semel decretam Then followes the passage here alleadged and at the heels of it these words Time igitur in solam Domini eligentis manum respice ut salutem per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum assequaris Undoubtedly Marlorat approves of Brentius his exposition otherwise he would not have placed it in his Expositio Ecclesiastica Now Brentius brings in the very saying for which Maldonat is criminated as the objection of some carnall person Therefore when Marlorat seems to justifie such a saying it must be in another sense and that either of good workes in shew of which Brentius also observed that such might have been found in Saul Or of workes in distinction from faith And accordingly he concludes with exhortation feare that is not to be secure how good soever his workes are but to have an eye to God and trust only to him that so he may obtain salvation through Jesus Christ Calvin in Ioh. 15. 6. Arescere dicuntur instar emortua sarmenta quae à Christo resecta sūt quia sicuti initiū vigoris ab ipso est ita continuus tenor Non quòd ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari sed quia multae hypocritae in speciem ad tempus florent virent qui postea in reddendo fructu spem domini frustrantur They are said to to wither like a branch cut off such as are cut off from Christ because like as the beginning of their vigour is from him so also their continuance Not that at any time it falleth out that any of Gods Elect is cut off but because many Hypocrites carry a faire shew for a time as if they were green and flourishing who afterwards in rendring fruit make void the Lords Expectation 2. The decree of Reprobation as touching one part of it cannot be executed without sin For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for sin so that there is no place for damnation where sinne and that as a meritorious cause preceeds not I had thought this Authour needed not to runne out to Piscator and Maccovius for proofe of this neither Arminius nor the Authour is of any other opinion I am confident then that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned But there is another part of Reprobation For as Aquinas speakes it includes the will of permitting sin Now the execution of this decree which consists in the permitting of sin doth not require the precedency of sinne For when God first permitted the Angels to fall this permission of his did not require any precedency of sinne in them nor the permission of Adam to fall it cannot be said without manifest contradiction that it did For before the first sinne there was no sinne Piscator saith that God created men for this very purpose that they might fall he saith hoc consilio which is as much as to say with this purpose not for this purpose to wit to permit them to fall And God purposing this purposed that they should fall by his permission For Arminius confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that Necesse est ut nullo argumentorū genere persuadeatur ad nolendum It must needs be that no argument shall perswade him to will that which God permits him to will And that it is good that evill should come to passe by God's permission both Austine hath affirmed Bellarmine subscribed And shall it not be lawfull for God to will that which is good Undoubtedly neither justice punishing nor mercy pardoning can be manifested without sin either to be punished or pardoned or both neither is it credible to me that this Authour thinks otherwise And is not the manifestatiō of God's mercy on some and his justice on others the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind and consequently by the most received rules of Schooles first intended even before the permisson of sinne For if the permission of sinne were first intended then by the same rule of Schooles it should be in the last place executed that is God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some and punishing others and afterwards suffer them to sinne such is the learning and judgments of these Divines And as for the foresight of sin it is apparent that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it and more then that it presupposeth the fruition of it Now it is well knowne that sinne in its own nature is meerly possible How comes it to passe that from the condition of a thing meerly possible it hath passed into the condition of a thing future This cannot be done without a cause and that cause must be eternall for the effect was eternall For from everlasting sinne was future for from everlasting God knew it to be future Now there is nothing everlasting but God himselfe therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing meerly possible in its own nature became future And therefore either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof or by his will and decree Not by his knowledge for that rather supposeth thē to be future then makes them such It remaines therefore that the will of God and that alone makes every future thing to passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting Let this Authour satisfie this argument and I will ease him of all further paines and lay down the bucklers before
rather then to an other If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases it is no other then they find in use among School-divines It is true indeed Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this This Authour sides with the Jesuites but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer to overthrow their grounds which are no other then the very word of God and cleare reason doth justifie And the ground of the Jesuites in opposing is meerely an invention of their own concerning a certaine knowledge of God called a middle knowledge a vile invention and a palpable untruth and controulable of manifest contradiction For they suppose a thing knowable by God as future before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future being in it's own nature meerly possible and consequently cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause Now noe cause can be devised hereof with any colour of reason but the will of God For first the cause hereof must be eternall seeing the thing it selfe of the cause whereof we dispute is eternall to wit the fruition of any thing This I say was eternall for it is known with God from all eternity Now there is noe eternall cause to be found but in God alone therefore the cause why things meerly possible in their own nature became future and that from everlasting must be found in God alone Therefore it must either be the will of God or the knowledge of God that did make it future and seing the knowledge of God rather supposeth them to be future then makes them so what remaines but that the will of God must necessarily be the cause hereof Nay consider whether the Jesuites themselves doe not manifest more ingenuity by farre then this boisterous Theologue that thinks to carry all with the blast of his words the resolution of whose arguments generally neither having the word of God for their ground nor any confest principle of reason Whereas not the greatest Angell of God will take upon him such an authoritative manner of discourse For did we grant that God by his Allmighty will did impose any necessity upon our wills Yet Suarez confesseth that so to worke doth neither involve any contradiction nor exceed the Allmighty power of God Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved that their doctrine of God's concourse without subordination of the second causes to the first implies flat contradiction We say the wills determination of it selfe is the worke of God otherwise faith and love and every gracious act shall not be the worke of God Againe the wills determination of it selfe is no other then the wills operation and this Authour that opposeth us dares not deny the wills opperation to be the worke of God But what School divine can he produce that delivers himselfe in so absurd a manner as to say that God first determines the will and that afterwards the will determines it selfe especially speaking of such actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature The wills determination of it selfe we say is the worke of God moving the creature agreably to the nature thereof that is to be carried necessarily to that which is it's end and appeares to be good in genere convenientis and freely to the meanes which appeare to be good in genere conducentis as fit to pronounce the end intended All confessing Durand excepted that God works the act the question whether he works the act absolutely the will a second agent subordinate unto God as to it's Creatour Or conditionally modo vellimus provided that we will it God the first agent subordinate to the will of the creature This Authour will have it to be wrought by God that is conditionally in dependence upon and expectation of the operation of the creature which we say is most absurd First because thus the first agent is made subordinate to the second agent which is most unaturall Secondly observe a manifest contradiction For the question is about actus volendi the act of willing in man Now if God produce this act upon supposition that man produceth this act then the same act is produced by God upon supposition that it is produced by man If it be produced by man what need is there of God's producing it by way of supplement Thirdly by this meanes the thing is made the condition of it selfe For hereby it is said this act is made upon condition that it doth exist so the selfe same thing shall be before after it selfe 4. Thus man's production of the act shall be noe worke of God which holds off faith and repentance as well as of any naturall act in this Authours opinion Fiftly It is not possible the will can produce the act unlesse God produceth it If then God doth not produce it unlesse the will doth produce it in this case there shall be noe act produced For if I goe not to London unlesse you goe with me nor you goe to London unlesse I goe with you here is no going at all till one saith I say I goe and his resolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon 6 Whereas to helpe at a dead lift the Jesuiticall doctrine of Scientia media middle knowledge is called in after this manner God foreseing that at such an instant the will of man will produce such an act if God be pleased to concurre and upon this foreknowledâ—e God resolves to concurre This doctrine I have already confounded by shewing the apparent falsity of this supposition For seeing the wills producing such an act at such an instant is a thing merly possible in it's own nature no more future then not future It is impossible that this should passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the conditioÌ„ of a thing future without a cause And noe cause hereof can be but the will of God as I have often proved It followes that the wills producing such an act depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced then on the contrary that Gods producing such an act dependes upon the creatur's will to produce it As for that which followes of the absolute dominion that the will of the creature should have over it's action I presume he meanes independent it sounds more like the voice of the Devill then of a sober Christian Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himselfe challengeth any such absolute Dominion over his actions unto himselfe If he doth I know noe greater sinne that hee or the creature can be guilty of unlesse in case grosse ignorance doth excuse it To deny God to be the first Agent is to deny his God-head and if hee be primum agens hee must be primum liberum too the first free agent And to make our selves to be prima libera the first free agents what is other
for hereby many times men are drawen full sore against their wills to doe that which they would not It is true God's power cannot be resisted but neither hath any man any will to resist that motion of God whereby he workes agreable to their natures then indeed there were place for resisting If the Lord carrieth on a covetous person such as Achan to covet a wedge of gold and a Babylonish garment and coveting it move him accordingly to take it and convey it away secretly and hide it in his tent what resistance doth he make in all this Or what is done in all this lesse agreably to his covetous disposition then to the disposition of Toades and Addars when he moves them according to their nature to sting and poyson So he moved the Babylonians compared to Serpents and Cockatrices to sting a wicked people Doe not the Scriptures plainly professe that God did send them Is not Assur in this respect called the Rod of God's wrath and the staffe in his hand Was it not called the Lords indignation Is he not compared to an axe and a sawe shall the axe boast it selfe against him that heweth therewith Or shall the saw extoll it selfe against him that moveth it Still he confounds the act with the sinfulnesse thereof speaking of God's producing sinnes whereas sinne is never produced it being only an obliquity consequent unto the act of such a worker as is subject to a law And our Adversaries confesse that God is the cause of the act as well as we Yet will they not hereby be driven to professe that in producing the act he produceth the sin As for that which he speaks of Inforcing we may well pitty him that when he wants strength of reason he supplies that by phrases We deny that God inforceth any man's will Nay it is the generall rule of Schooles that voluntas non potest cogi the will cannot be forced We maintaine that every act of the will especially in naturall things such as a sinfull act must needs be for only gracious acts are supernaturall is not only voluntary which is sufficient to preserve it from being forced but free also by as much libertie as the creature is capable of only we deny that the will of man is primum liberum a first free agent that is the prerogative of God alone the first mover of all and the supreme Agent thus I have dispatched my answer to his first reason consisting of three parts I come unto the second Sect 4. If we could find out a King that should so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any Subjects as by this opinion God doth in the affecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates we would all charge him with the ruine and sinnes of those his Subjects Who would not abhorre saith Moulin a King speaking thus I will have this man hangâ—d and that I may hang him justly I will have him murder or steale This King saith he should not only make an innocent man miserable sed sceleratum but wicked too and should punish him for that offence cujus ipse causa esset of which himselfe was the cause It is a cleare case Tiberius as Suetonius reports having a purpose to put some Virgins to death because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins caused them all to be deflouered by the hang-man that so they might be strangled Who will not say that Tiberius was the principall Authour of the deflouring of those Maides In like manner say the Supralapsarians God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame he hath decreed that the Devill shall defloure them that afterwards he may damne them It followeth therefore that God is the maine cause of those their sinnes If a King should carry himselfe as God did in hardning Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe and when he had let Israel goe to harden his heart that he should follow after them we would acknowledge such a one not to be man but God And then surely whatsoever our Arminians would thinke of such a one we would thinke noe otherwise then Solomon did of him of whom he professed that he made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill If God doth but permit a man to will this or that necesse est saith Arminius it must needs be ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum that noe kind of argument shall perswade such one to abstaine from willing it And I hope Arminius hath as great auhority with this Authour as Mr. Moulin deserves to have with us Noe King hath power to dispense any such providence as this St. Paul tells us plainly that God hath ordained some unto wrath and as he hath made of the same lumpe some vessells unto honour so hath he made other vessells unto dishonour The Lord professeth that he kept Abimelech from sinning against him Thus the Lord could deale with all if it pleased him Why doth he not is it not for the manifestation of his own glory For to this purpose he hath made all things And that he suffers with long patience vessells of wrath prepared to destruction And what to doe doth he suffer them But to continue and persevere in their sinfull courses without repentance the Apostle plainly tells us that it is to declare his wrath and make his power known This is not the voice of any Doctor of ours now a dayes but of St. Paul And shall Mr. Moulin be brought in to affront St. Paul For recompence let the Jesuits be heard to whom the nation of the Arminians are beholden for their principall grounds Wherefore doth God give effectuall grace unto one and not unto another but because he hath elected the one and rejected the other And I appeale to every sober Christian whether the absolutenesse of reprobation doth not as invincibly follow herehence as the absolutenesse of Election But touching Mr. Moulin I have heard that Doctor Ames somtimes wished that he had never medled in this argument I am not of Doctor Ames his mind in this though it were I thinke most fit every one should exercise himselfe in those questions wherein by the course of his studies he hath been most conversant so should the Church of God enjoy plus dapis rixae multo minus invidiaeque I doe admire Mr. Moulin in his conference with Cayer as also upon the Eucharist and on Purgatory he hath my heart when I read his consolalations to his Breathren of the Church of France as also intreating of the love of God I would willingly learne French to understand him only and have along time desired still to get any thing that he hath written I highly esteem him in his Anatomie though I doe not
is in his power or when he hath authority to forbid 't is as if he should command the committing of that sin Now this is only in such a case where the necessitie respects the person who is the deficient cause as namely in case he be bound in duty to afford help and succour to him that cannot keepe himselfe from sinning without the succour of an other not otherwise And therefore it reacheth not to God who is not bound to preserve any man or creature from sinning Least of all is he bound to regenerate a man that is borne in sinne Adam was created in all sufficiency that the reasonable creature was capable of without any pronenes unto evill but rather in a morall propension to that which was good And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all mankind even a necessitie of sinning as Arminius and Corvinus confesse He wanted no power to doe that which was good or to abstaine from sin but ever since his fall impotency to that which is good pronenesse unto that which is evill hath been the naturall inheritance of all mankind And as for the permission of Adam's fall his sin was in a thing naturally indifferent the holines of his nature not inclining him more to abstain from that fruit any more then to partake of it Neither doe we say that God did withhold from Adam any grace that these our adversaries maintaine to be necessary for the avoiding of that sinne which was committed by him How Adam himselfe was brought by Eve to eate of that fruit is not expressed As for Eve the temptation which Satan used with her which did prevaile is expressed He allured her with the representation of the powerfull nature of that to make them as Gods knowing good and evill he made this seem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree the Tree of knowledge of good and evill It seemes not likely that she knew who it was that spake unto her in the Serpent nor that she was acquainted with the fall of Angells Then againe the desire of knowledge is no evill thing it selfe or stands in any contradiction to the integrity of a reasonable creature Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the best it brings such a perfection with it Only the errour was in affecting it this way God did not keep the Devill off nor reveale unto her who it was that spake unto her much lesse his apostaticall condition least of all his project to supplant them Neither did he quicken that holy feare which he had inspired into her to resist it at the first to goe to her husband to acquaint him with it She might thinke that the knowledge of good and evill might make her more fit for the service of God then unfit All which considered her will being moved to seek this perfection by tasting of such a fruit there was no cause or reason to hinder her from tasting it save only the consideration of God's prohibition For the will of every reasonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good and though that good may prove evill in some circumstance yet if that circumstance be not considered the will proceeds to affect it How long the Devill was exercised in this temptation we know not Inconsideration is conceived by Durandus to be the originall of that sinne of theirs and God was not bound to maintaine this consideration quick in her and of the danger of such a transgression In fine she came to a will resolution to tast of it to the producing of this act as a naturall thing the Lord concurred as all confesse namely to the substance of the act The question is whether he concurred to the effecting of it absolutely or conditionally It was as true of Adam and Eve that in him they lived and moved and had their being as it is of us We say God as a first cause moves every second cause but agreeably to their natures Necessary agents to worke every thing they worke necessarily Free agents to doe every thing they doe freely But to say that God made them velle modo vellent to will in case they would will is so absurd as nothing more The act of willing being hereby made the condition of it selfe and consequently both before and after it selfe See what I have delivered concerning this in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digr 3. and Digr 6. of the nature of permission more at large where unto this Authour is content to answer just nothing Sect 7. There are two things say they in every ill act First the materiall part which is the substance of the action Secondly the formall part which is the evill or obliquitie of it God is the Authour of the action it selfe but not of the obliquitie and evill that cleaveth to it as he that causeth a lame horse to goe is the cause of his going but not of his lame going And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Authour of sinne First all sinnes receive not this distinction because of many sins the acts themselves are sinfull as of the eating of the forbidden fruit and Saul's sparing of Agag and the fat beasts of the Amalekites Secondly It is not true that they make the decree of God only of actions not of their aberrations For they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull and not as bare actions For actions deserve damnation not as actions but as trangressions of Gods law 3. To this simile I say that the Rider or Master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knock him on the head and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him is undoubtedly the cause of his halting And so God if he determine to cast men into hell and then to bring them into a state of sinne that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the Authour as well of their sins as of those actions to which they doe inseperably adhere and that out of Gods intention to destroy them This distinction of that which is materiall and that which is formall in sinne is commonly used by Aquinas 1. secun q 71. art 6 in corp Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo Unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actûs humani quod est quasi materiale in peccato cum dicit dictum vel factum vel concupitum Aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali quod est quasi formale in peccato cum dixit contra legem aeternam So then the substance of the act is the materiall part in sinne And the opposition of this act to the law of God is the formall part of it both according to Aquinas and according to Austin also And q 75. art 1. corp He defineth sinne to be Actus inordinatus
hath a Corollary to this effect That some kind of necesity and liberty are not repugnant but may consist together Againe God doth after a sortnecessitate every created will unto every free act therefore and to every free cessation and vacation from act that by necessity antecedent naturally And he addes a Corollary that some kind of antecedent necessity and liberty are not repugnant and may consist together This distinction of liberty from necessitie liberty from sinne liberty from misery I find in Bernard and Vossius alleadgeth it only out of him and the School-men might take it up after him Bernard hath many obscure passages in the prosecuting of it especially in reference to the two first members Neither doth Vossius take any paines to cleare them from a manifest contradiction in shew And no marvaile if Doctor Potter doth not in stating the opinion of the Church of England in the point of free will which he undertakes very magnificently in his answer to charity mistaken he was content to be led by his blind guid now the seeming contradiction is this If there be in a naturallman no liberty from sinne then is he necessarily carried into sinne and how then is there any liberty in him from necessitie unlesse necessitie be taken as all one with constraint And Bernard sometimes in that very treatise doth clearly expresse himselfe to understand thereby coaction And so M. Fulkes in his answer to the Rhemish testament denying unto man liberty from sinne yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction And indeed sinne to the profane person is like a sweet morsell which he rolleth under his tongue as the booke of Iob speaks he comes not constrained thereunto but naturally takes delight therein I doubt too many there be who though they are driven to confesse that a naturall man hath no liberty from sinne yet they please themselves with a certaine expression of Lindan's that a man hath free will unto sinne hoping therehence to conclude when time serves that a man as he hath freedome to commit it so he hath freedome to abstaine from it and so by a backe doore to draw in a Tenet quite contrary to the first namely that even a naturall man hath liberty from sinne I am not sure that Lindan did well understand his own expression so as to know how to make it good much lesse that they are able who licke their lips at it But of this and the clearing of Bernard and of the difference between liberty naturall and liberty morall I have else where discoursed at large And Calvin observing this contradiction might well blame them that confound necessity with coaction whereby a way is opened to conclude that because a man is free from constraint of sinning therefore he is free from necessity of sinning whereas originall sin doth necessarily incline him to sinfull actions courses in generall though to this kind of sin in speciall or to this particular in what kindsoever it doth not yet by the way it is to be considered that Calvin in some particulars as namely in gracious courses did attribute so much to the efficacy of God's operation upon a man's will as that the actions performed thereby though voluntary yet in his opinion were not to be accounted free indeed they are wrought in opposition as it were in spight of a certain principall of corruption that in part remaines in the very best of God's children But we see no reason to the contrary but that when once God hath planted in us a principle of new life of the life of grace by the spirit of regeneration though all the powers thereof doe incline only to that which is good like as the powers of naturall corruption incline only unto evill yet the particular use and exercise of those is alwaies free Like as the particular use and exercise of the powers of our corruption is allwaies free to the committing of this or that sinne according unto emergent occasions standing in congruity to every man's particular dispositioÌ„ 2. The Authour keepes himselfe to the language of his own Court but he should not so imperiously put it upon his opposites to concurre with him in the language of Ashdod We know nothing that necessitates the will to sinne but that originall corruption wherein every man is conceived and which we brought with us into the world For that makes us impatient of a yoake like unruly Heyfers And nothing is more burthensome unto us in our corrupt nature then the holy lawes of God The statutes of Omri are not so nor all the manner of the house of Ahab these are punctually observed when God's holy ordinances are proudly despised God moves every creature to worke agreeably to ' its nature Necessary Agents necessarily contingent Agents contingently Free Agents freely He doth not move to any such act as is sinfull save only where the feare of God is not at all found or not quickned but the motions and suggestions of Satan entertained nor then neither alwaies and that not only in his own children but even in the hearts of the wicked to restraine from sinfull courses in spight of Satans temptations by injecting into their minds the consideration either of danger or of shame ensuâ—ng so in a naturall way to restraine from the committing of such an act as is sinfull especially when he seeth it prejudiciall to the peace of his Church in generall or any member thereof in particular otherwise if he gives them over to Satan and moves them agreably to his suggestions entertained by them as being naturally well pleased with them why should this seem strange to any So that not any sin is inevitably committed by the most wicked creature that lives upon the face of the earth but he hath power enough I doe not say to avoid it an absurd phrase as if sinne were a thing to be forced upon a man whether he would or no but to abstaine from it though not in a gracious manner that being in the power of them only who have the spirit of regeneration dwelling in them 3. In the same language he prosecutes his vile cause giving manifest evidence to the world that it cannot be supported without lyes nor embraced by any but those whom God in his secret judgments hath given over to strong illusions to believe lyes It is not incredible to me that ever any Papist or Protestant hath affirmed that God necessitates the will to sinne They generally acknowledge that evill hath no cause efficient but deficient only The terme of God's operation is no other then the substance of the act which as an entity and as an act must necessarily proceed from God as Aquinas hath delivered And albeit they maintaine that God's concurrence to the producing of the act doth worke upon the will of the creature which from the first time that Divines came resolutely unto the acknowledgment of this Divine concourse to the act of sin hath also been received
of the creatures future cooperation what the free will will doe in particular This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace not only morally but efficiently and physically doth cause us to worke that which is good it is proved saith he by all those reasons whereby it hath been formery shewed that God by his decree effectuall motion doth predetermine all second causes even such as are free to worke preserving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created but in the power and dominion of God especially in respect of acts supernaturall Our meaning is that all dominion actuall use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth proceedeth from God as from the cheifest first cause efficient ought to be resolved into him as into the first Authour first absolute Lord thereof And the truth is the question of free will is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distincion For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall and the resolution thereof is according to the resolution in the point of originall sinne But free will unto actions in generall under an appearance of good this is naturall liberty and the resolution thereof depends upon a right understanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world and working with all creatures in their severall kinds such operations as are agreable to their severall conditiōs The first liberty consists in disposing man aright towards his end like as morall vertues tend to this But the second liberty consist's only in the right use of the meanes unto what end soever is projected by us The appearance of good moving herein is only in genere boni conducentis in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded whether that end can be good or evill right or wrong But the appearence of good moving in the former is only summiboni of our cheifest good the enjoying whereof will make us happy But to returne this Authour with whom I deale in present stands for the will of man's absolute dominion over her acts as before he did expresse whereas Alvarez professeth utterly against this Neither doe I blame him for contradicting Alvarez in this but for carrying himselfe like a positive Theologue nor so only but like a peremptory Theologue contenting himselfe to dictate rules to others without all proofe save this that otherwise we make God the Authour of sinne Yet this is not any expresse Argument of his neither but he obtrudes premise upon us which I thinke was never affirmed by any Divines of these dayes unlesse it be by some Libertines against whom none that I know have disputed more effectually then some of those very Divines which here are traduced by him But observe the vile and abominable issue of this Authours doctrine in this particular making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act yea and to have the absolute dominion thereof as formerly he did expesse Sect 3. For seing the act of faith of repentance and the like are free acts if liberty cannot be maintained unlesse a man hath the absolute dominion of his own act hence it manifestly followeth that God doth not determine the will to believe to repent or to any good work yet the Scripture professeth that God is he who makes us perfect unto every good worke working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ That it is God who worketh in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure So that if a man should live Methusalch his age and spend that whole time in a gracious conversation yet that God doth worke in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more it is merely of his good pleasure so little cause have we to presume of perseverance in that which is good by out own strength And againe all this God workes in us for Christ his sake Christ hath deserved even this at the hands of God his father What then is the meaning of this that God should cooperate with us to the will and the deed provided that we will Consider the absurdity of this upon the supposall of the possibility of such a cooperation which yet by evident reason may be demonstrated to be utterly impossible Did Christ merit any thing for the Angells yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours Nay is it possible that any act should exist without God's operation And is it reasonable to subject such a course of Divine providence to the merits of Christ Thus we see whereunto this Authour tends in this discourse of his namely so to maintaine God to be no Authour of sinne as withall to maintaine that he is no Authour of that which is good no not of faith repentance or any gracious act that is freely performed by any creature man or Angell we on the other side desire endeavour so to carry our selves that while we vindicate God from being the Authour of evill we may not therewithall deny him to be the Authour of any thing that is good and gracious which is this Authours course as appeares manifestly in the issue And observe his crafty cariage foxe like Had he dealt upon predestination and the efficacy of grace and therein professed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts every man's will hath an absolute dominion over them and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto For that were to make God the Authour of faith and repentance how many thousands would have been ready to have flowen in his face and abhorre such abominable doctrine Therefore he baulks that and deales only upon reprobation and here he layeth to our charge that we make God the Authour of sinne by necessitating and determining the will to sinne though his premises herein I have shewen to be most false therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will so much as to the act whereunto the sinfulnesse accrewes both because man's will is free and because so he should be the Authour of sinne And if once he can make his Reader to swallow this he doubts not but to take him in the point of predestination and grace also and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or necessitates the will of man to any good act whether it be of faith or of repentance and that for feare of denying man to have the absolute dominion over his will to worke himselfe to faith and repentance at his pleasure and secondly for feare of makeing God the Authour of faith and repentance and every good act Like as by saying that God doth determine or necessitate the will to sinne we make him the Authour of sinne
Behold Reader the issue of this man's Divinity and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death by working thee with him to oppose the free grace of God both in predestination and in regeneration and the power and efficacy therereof in working thee to faith to repentance and to every thing that is pleasing and acceptable unto him that through Jesus Christ Yet we have shewed a manifest difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good and moving the creature unto such acts as are evill For in evill be moves only to the substance of the act whereof our Adversaries themselves acknowledge God to be the Authour that is the efficient cause and this he performes by influence generall But as touching every good act the Lord moveth not only to the substance of the act by influence generall but also to the goodnes thereof by influence speciall He proceeds to tell us what Philosophers teach concerning the condition of the will And because it is very absurd for a Christian to goe to schoole to Philosophers to learne the condition of Divine providence he tels us of Fathers too that maintaine the same as he saith but he quotes neither the one nor the other Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it and ex nolentibus volentes facere of unwilling to make men willing to worke men to faith to repentance to all kind of pious obedience And as for God's secret providence in evill how plentifull is the Scripture concerning this God is said to have sent Ioseph into Egypt though this was brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren To tell David that the sword should not depart from his house though this could not be taken up or used but by the free will of men To send Senacherib against a dissembling nation and to professe that this proud King in all his bloudy executions upon the people of God was but as the axe or the sawe in the hand of God The like is testified concerning Nabuchodonosor after him Nay the Prophet demands Whether there be any evill in the Citty and the Lord hath not done it speaking of the evill of punishment though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land though this was done by the hands of his own children And as in violent courses so in impure courses the Scripture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fift book against Iulian the Pelag c 3 and in his book de gratia libero arbitrio professing occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cordis that the perversity of the heart or will comes to passe by the secret judgment of God And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evill that is his phrase as I have formerly shewed abundantly representing the places where he delivers this He proceeds not so much in Scholasticall discourse as in rhetoricall amplification more like a Shrew vexing him selfe and fretting that he cannot have his will then like a disputer That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument irresistably subject to superiour command and determination this action of command comes in most unseasonably it denoting a morall action commanding not only things agreable but sometimes contrary to the will of the person commanded No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man did he move it unto sinne which yet is most false for he moves it only to the substance of the act But why should it seeme strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator and his instrument and a servile instrument Yet the notion of servility is very aliene from the matter in hand that having place only in proper speech as touching morall obedience that which we treat of is rather of motions naturall and of the subordination of the second cause to the first the second Agent to the first And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Authour doth Doth this Authour himselfe thinke it possible that the Creature can move it selfe or performe any operation without God's concourse I doe not think he doth Doe we not live in God have we not our being in God And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God in the kind of a cause efficient And doth not the same Apostle and in the same place testifie and that in the words of an heathen man to shew that all such did not so maintaine the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 condition of the will as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine professe that in God we move also And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concourse divine whereabouts this Authour spends not a word as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deale on that point which alone is controverted The irresistable subjection he speaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty which is most untrue For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon Alvarez that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining And upon Bradwardine who alone that I know maintaines the same divine motion under the notion of necessitating Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined then the will is Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts but we have nothing but his bare word for it And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free Whereas both Bradwardin maintaines that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his And Alvarez that God determines the creature to worke freely Now is it a sober course hence to inferre that the act is not free As much as to say it cannot but be free therfore it is not free And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sinne and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sinne God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concourse Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourse We say God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only but the first Agent not a cause only but the first cause and man as a second Agent and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies like as he lives in God and hath his being in God But these
sober conscience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equall but that God's concurrence is conditionall to wit in case the creature will and so man is to be accounted the Authour of sinne and not God hence it followeth that seeing God's concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance is of the same nature in the opinion of these men God is not the Authour of faith and repentance any more then he is the Authour of sinne in the language of these disputers Or if they fly not to this as I have found this Authour as I guesse to deny God's concourse to stand in subordination to man's then my former argument is not avoided But a third reason ariseth herehence against his former discourse of God's concourse namely that if God and man doe equally concurre unto the act of sinne then as I have already shewed that they are equally guilty of sin So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Authour of his own fatih and repentance as God is in direct contradiction to the Apostle who saith that Faithis the guift of God not of our selves We willingly grant that God is the principall agent in producing every act whether it be naturall or supernaturall For in him we move as well as in him we live have our being But we deny sin as sin to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God as the Apostle defines it to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principall agent the texts produced by him that we may not be carried away as he is with a superficiary apprehension of things And first consider we might plead as well for such acts as this Authour calls sins as he doth for acts gracious by his superficiary discourse For doth not Ioseph comforting his brethren say unto them in like manner Now then you sent me not hither but God But consider farther in that passage alleadged by him out of Mat 10. 20. It is not ye that speak but the spirit of my Father which speaketh in you Was not this speech of the Apostles a free action The labour of Paul more abundantly then of all the rest of the Apostles was it not a free action in Paul â—f God determined theÌ„ unto these actions then freedome of will humane stands not in opposition to determination divine and consequently though the act be evill that is done by man yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act without any impeachment of the creatures liberty If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a simultaneous concourse to their actions why is he called the cause principall since it is confessed God doth afford the like concourse to every sinfull act as touching the substance thereof Againe he repeates the same when in case of divine determination he saith the sinne cannot be so rightly ascribed to man's will the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause To which I answer againe being drawen thereunto by his Tautologies by the same reason it may be inferred that when the fire burnes any combustible thing the burning is rather to be ascribed to God the more principall cause then to the fire the lesse principall the first cause being more principall then the second and if it please God so to order it the fire shall not burne as it appeares in the three noble children cast into the furnace of Babylon when they came forth there was not so much as the smell of fire upon them Secondly I answer as before by the same reason when the concourse unto the sinfull act is equall on man's part on God's each shall equally be accounted the Authour of that sinne and not man more then God Now such a concourse is maintained by this Authour Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance since by these mens opinions God affords only his concourse he shall be no more the Authour of man's faith and repentance then man himselfe is Lastly be it granted that God is a more principall cause then maÌ„ in producing the act yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the causality of the sin who hath no Agency therein by doing what he ought not to doe or not in that manner he should doe this is found only in the creature who being a free Agent otherwise then as originall sinne hath impaired liberty which I hope this Authour will not deny is justly answerable for his own transgression As for example God determined that Cyrus should give the Jewes liberty to returne into their own land yet this action of Cyrus was as free an action as any that was performed by him throughout his life God determined that Josiah should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar at Bethel yet Iosiah did this as freely as ought else God determined that Christ's bones should not be broken yet the souldiours abstained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had used in case they had broken them This divine providence we willingly confesse is very mysterious and as Cajetan saith the distinctions used to accommodate it to our capacitie doe not quiet the understanding therefore he thought it his duty to captivate his into the obedience of faith And Alvarez in a solemne disputation proves that it is incomprehensible by the wit of man 4. His last is delivered most perplexedly I can make no sense of it as the words lie but I see his meaning He supposeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to sin willingly that he saith is worse then to constraine a man to sinne against his will Where observe how this man's spirit is intoxicated when he delivered this For first he calls that worse which is merely impossible and that by his own rules For he holds that sinne cannot be except it be voluntary speaking of sinne committed by any particular person Secondly he supposeth that by our opinion God makes a man to sinne which is most untrue For when he acknowledgeth that no sin can be committed by man without God's concourse will he say that God by his concourse helps a man to sinne He helps him to the producing of the act not to the committing of the sinne And indeed be the act never so vertuous if it proceed not out of the love and feare of God it is no better then such as the Heathens performed of which Austin hath professed that they were no better then splendida peccata glorious sins So that if God doth not give a man these graces of his holy Spirit in every act that is performed by him he shall sinne and not only in acts vitious and God is not bound to bestow these graces on any Section 9. Sinne may be considered as sinne or as a meanes of
Answerably unto which fire cannot be said to be permitted to fire or blow up such a barrell of Gunpowder between which and it there is such a distance M r GOODWIN OR if it be said that God hath decreed that such a sparke or coale shall fall into the said barrell of Gunpowder now is not the decree barely permissive but operative and assertive and such which ingageth the decreer to interpose effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to passe But such decrees as this in matters of that nature we deny to be in God IEANES IF By matters of that nature you meane in such contingent things as the falling of a Sparke or Coale into a Barrell of Gunpowder why Doctor Twisse hath an argument which he takes to be unanswerable clearly evincing that whatsoever thing comes to passe that is good with a transcendentall goodnesse or Metaphysicall God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree You have it in his examination of M. Cottons Treatise c. p. 68 69. As also in his Consideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of Tilenus viz. the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practise p. 18 19. Nay I say more saith he that every thing which cometh to passe in the revolution of times was decreed by God which I proove by such an argument for answer whereunto I challeng the whole nations of both Arminans and Iesuites It cannot be denied but God foresaw from everlasting whatsoever in time should come to passe therefore every thing was future from everlasting otherwise God could not foresee it as future Now let us soberly enquire how these things which we call future came to be future being in their own nature meerely possible and indifferent as well not at all to be future as to be future Of this transmigration of things out of the condition of things meerely possible such as they were of themselves into the condition of things future there must needs be some outward cause Now I demand what was the cause of this transmigration And seeing nothing without the nature of God could be the cause hereof for this transmigration was from everlasting but nothing without God was everlasting therefore something within the nature of God must be found fit to be the cause hereof And what may that be Not the knowledge of God for that rather presupposeth things future and so knowable in the kind of things future then makes them future therefore it remaines that the meere decree and will of God is that which makes them future If to shift off this it be said that the essence of God is the cause hereof I farther demand whether the essence of God be the cause hereof as working necessarily or as working freely If as working necessarily then the most contingent things became future by necessity of the Divine nature and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessity of nature which is Atheisticall therefore it remaines that the Essence of God hath made them future by working freely and consequently the meere will and decree of God is the cause of the futurition of all things He speakes indeed of Gods will and decree indefinitely but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree is undeniable But the force of this reason you may think easily to evade by your deniall of Gods fore-knowledge your reasons for which denyall I shall in the next place proceed to examine Mr GOODWIN pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2. THat Prescience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in God is the constant assertion both of ancient and moderne Divinity The learned Assertours of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their Adversaries the Schoolemen and Papists in this Nor is it any wonder at all that there should be peace and a concurrence of Judgement about such a poynt as this even between those who have many Irons of contention otherwise in the fire considering how obvious and neere at hand the truth herein is For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God then might Predestination Election Reprobation and many other things be properly and formally in him also in as much as these are in the letter and propriety of them as competible unto him as foreknowledge Nor can there be any reason given for a difference But unpossible it is that there should be any Plurality of things whatsoever in their distinct and proper natures and formalities in God the infinite simplicity of his nature and being with open mouth gainsaying it 2 ly If foreknowledge were properly or formally in God there should be somewhat in him corruptible or changeable For that which is supposed to be such a fore-knowledge in him to day by the morrow suppose the thing or event fore-known should in the interim actually come to passe must needs cease and be changed in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge in the Propriety of it being res futura somewhat that is to come Thirdly and lastly there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God The reason is because then there must either be somewhat finite in God or somewhat infinite in the Creature both which are unpossible But if Praescience or fore-knowledge being properly and formally in the Creature should be properly and formally also in God there should be somewhat in the Creature univocally and formally the same with somewhat which is in God Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge properly so called in God IEANES DIverse Heathen Philosophers I have found censured for denying of Gods Prescience or foreknowledge as Cicero by Austin lib. 5. De Civ Dei cap. 9. Seneca by Aureolus 1. distin 38. Aristotle by Vasquez and others But that Christian Divines either ancient or moderne unlesse you will appropriate that name unto Socinians are so unanimous in impugning of Gods foreknowledge is great newes unto me and not only unto me but unto all others I believe that have read any thing in either ancient or Moderne Divinity Hierome in his third book Adversus Pelagianos teacheth as Franciscus Amicus informes me that he who takes away Prescience from God takes away the Godhead Eum qui a Deo praescientiam tollit divinitatem tollere As for Austin whom you quote in the Margent against this Prescience of God let any one read that place but now quoted Lib. 5. De Civ Dei cap. 9. and he must needs confesse that he is a zealous Assertor of Gods foreknowledge against Cicero who opposeth it in favour of the liberty of mans will And so saith Austin Dum vult facere homines liberos facit sacrilegos multò sunt autem tolerabiliores saith he qui vel sydera fata constituunt quam iste qui tollit praescientiam futurorum Nam consiteri esse Deum negare praescium futurorum apertissima insania est