impossibility of distinguishing the Predicate pertinently excluding here all possibility of divers respects § 7. The same is demonstrated from the impossibility of distinguishing the Subjects of those Faith-Propositions for those Subjects being Propositions themselves as was shown § 3. and accepted for Truths as is suppos'd they are incapable of Distinction as shall be particularly shown hereafter Evict 3. § 5. Besides those Subjects being Points of Faith and so standing in the Abstract that is not descending to subsuming respects even in that regard too they are freed from all pertinent distinguishableness § 8. The same is demonstrated from the nature of Truth which consists in an Indivisible Whence there is nothing of Truth had how great soever the conceived approaches towards it be till all may-not-bees or Potentiality to be otherwise be utterly excluded by the Actuality of Is or Existence which put or discover'd the Light of Truth breaks forth and the dim twilights of may-not-bees vanish and disappear § 9. The same is demonstrated out of the nature of Connexion found in the aforesaid Propositions For 't is evident their Truth consists in the connexion of those Notions which make the Subject and Predicate Whoever therefore sees not the Connexion between those Notions in the Principle of Faith sees not the truth of any of those Propositions that is those Propositions are not to such a man True Wherefore Connexion excluding formally Inconnexion so that 't is clearly impossible they should be found together in the self-same Subjects and the falshood of such Propositions consisting in the Unconnectedness of their Terms it follows that he who is oblig'd to profess those Faith-Propositions True must see the Connexion between their Terms and consequently that they cannot possibly be inconnected or false Again since all approaches or vicinity to Connexion by how near degrees soever they are made are not Connexion it follows that all Connexion consists in an Indivisible and can admit no Latitude for a Possibility to be otherwise to be grounded on Lastly all Connexion being necessarily Immediate or seen by virtue of Immediateness and to see Immediate Connexion being the Producer of Certain Knowledg or of Assurance the Thing cannot but be so it follows that to see the Truth of such Propositions or which is all one the Immediate Connexion of their Terms is to see they cannot but be so or that they are absolutely void of all Possibility of Falshood § 10. By this time we are brought orderly to look into the nature of Opinion Which word I take not here in a large sense for any kind of Assent however produc 't but for an Assent or Adhesion to a Tenet without sufficient Grounds to evince the Thing is so as the Opiner judges as it is taken in that Proverb Turpe est opinari Now 't is most evident that there would be sufficient Grounds to convince in case the Term or Point were seen to be deduc't by immediate steps or a Train of immediate Connexions to that very Conclusion 'T is manifest then that 't is therefore Opinion and blame-worthy because its Grounds as they are laid in the understanding of the Assenter want or fall short of this immediate Connexion So that Opinion is a judgment upon remote or unimmediate Considerations By which means it comes to pass that the most necessary verity of that Grand Principle The same is the same with it self upon which all Certainty both of first Principles and of Deduction is built and whose perfect Self-Evidence and Interessedness in whatever belongs to right discourse seem to make the very Light of Reason consist originally in It is not engag'd in the Opiners discourse whence wanting Immediateness it becomes unconnected incoherent weak and slack or rather indeed null No wonder then if all Opinion how near soever it approaches seemingly to Immediate Connexion and how strongly soever it be supported by an experienc'd seldomness of such Effects or the conceiv'd unaptness and fewness of Causes fit to produce them yet it admits Possibility of being otherwise in regard it fails in its very Root and Basis by not relying on the main Principle and Foundation of all steadiness in humane Discourse and which is of so necessary a Truth that 't is impossible to falter or give way to uphold and exempt it from a liableness to disconnexion of those Notions which it pretended and ought to Identify that is from a liableness to Errour § 11. From this declaration of the nature of Opinion it is render'd manifest out of what Fountain-head all Rational Assents flow namely from seeing the Immediate Connexion of one Term with another or which is all one that this Principle The same is the same with it self stands engag'd for their verity Also that the Light of Reason consists fundamentally in this and formally in deriving the perfect Visibleness of this to make other Propositions also visible to the Eye of our Understanding Likewise that Assents not springing from this Light of Reason must be as such Irrational and arise necessarily from the Will taken as not following the Light of Understanding but as prompted and put forward by some passion viz. some irrational desire or inclination the thing should be so which prest and precipitated the understanding into Assent before due motives forc't it As likewise that since none can be bound constantly to profess what he cannot steadily see to be true a Christian who is thus bound to profess his Faith True must see that the First Principle now spoken of which gives all Steadiness to our Intellectual Sight is interessed in the patronage of the Proposition he assents to Whence true Faith by reason of its Immoveable Grounds can bear an asserting the absolute Impossibility of its being False whereas who ever affirms Faith may possibly be false makes it built upon remote mediums that is such as are either not immediate or which is all one not seen to be immediate to the two Terms of the Proposition assented to and so they become destitute of the Invincible strength of that first Principle which establishes all deduc't Truths and legitimates all Assents to them Whence follows inevitably that he turns all Faith into Opinion makes Faith absurd preternatural and irrational importing that 't is a thing which men must assent to or say interiorly 't is so and yet see no solid Grounds why it must be so profess stoutly 't is true and that they are sure of it and yet if they will speak truly profess with all that it may be false and that the whole world may be mistaken in it and lastly he leaves all Christs Doctrine Indefensible and utterly unmaintainable to have absolutely speaking either any solidity or steadiness in its Grounds or one true word in it self Second Eviction § 1. FRom this not-seeing the Connexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion by a Medium immediately connected to them both but by distant Glances onely which have not
the power to make one see Intellectually the Thing is or Assent joyn'd with this that notwithstanding 't is not seen those Terms are Opposit or Inconnectible the Soul becomes hereupon as it were invironed with a kind of Intellectual Darkness and sees not which way to step forwards without danger of harming hor Cognoscitive or Truth-affecting Nature by Errour Whence she remains in a kind of Neutral Condition which we call Suspence But 't is to be well noted that this Suspensive Condition of the Soul not being a state of Actuality or Determination much less of utmost Actuality as is the seeing by virtue of that main Principle before-nam'd that a thing is but of Indetermination Potentiality and Confusedness its Nature admits consequently infinite degrees according as the Appearances which incline her towards Assent or Dissent are greater or less Moreover as in the passing from Indetermination to Determination for example in a motion to a Terminus of Rest there are diverse approaches of that Motions Quantity so very near the Terminus or End that their distance is undiscernable to a vulgar eye and needs exact skill to distinguish them So it happens here that there must necessarily be found divers Inclinations or Approaches towards Assent which have so small a degree of Suspence in them that they are hard to be distinguisht from absolute Assents but by a learned Reflecter and the way he takes to distinguish them must be to observe whether the Understanding acting reflectingly that is looking into the Nature of its own Act finds there that it absolutely yields it self over to judg the thing is existent or true or whether it onely judges it very probable or Truthlikely For any Assent to the greatest Likelihood of a thing is as far from being an Assent to the things Existence as the Notion of Existent or True is from the Notion of very likely to be true And if the Assent to the former be not actually an Assent to the later yet tend towards it as it does then 't is Potential in respect of it and so includes some degree of Suspence which defect only can in our present case hinder the other from being actually it according to our former Discourse Assent then to the meer Likelihood of a thing is or at least implies Suspence of its Existence § 2. Another thing which inclines men to confound the Assent to the Likelihood of a thing with the Assent to its Existence or Truth is Habituation or Custom For men being us'd to proceed naturally to outward Action upon a very high Probability without more adoe or examination they are hence apt to apprehend that a Conceit which had so little and so undiscernable a proportion of Suspence in it was a perfect Assent and that because the Soul quite yielded to the Motive as to Exterior Action therefore it yielded likewise as to Interior Assent Whereas by reflecting on the Nature of this Act in the Soul and by retriving its Grounds we come to discover that however the Soul runs promptly and rationally to Outward Action upon such a Motive when she is concern'd to act even after deliberation yet not so to Interiour Assent if she acts rationally but upon reflexion finding in her self nothing to fix in her the Existence of the thing or elevate it beyond the possibility of not-being or being False she hangs back from assenting the thing is and is constrain'd to say interiorly or acknowledg in her own breast she may possibly be mistaken and the thing possibly be not-Existent for ought she sees which restrains her from truly assenting that the thing is § 3. An Instance will render our Discourse clearer 'T is propos'd then for example to our Judging Power whether America be or no And we 'l suppose to avoid a disputed case the Evidence of Authority has convinc'd the Understanding it once was by the Impossibility the several Attesters should either be deceiv'd in a plain Object of Eye-sight or have a common Motive able to make them conspire to bely their Eyes But the Question is whether it be now or no. And the uncouthness and unlikelihood that so vaste a place should be destroy'd joyn'd with the Customariness of acting upon a very great probability makes him who is to act in order to it for example send a ship thither proceed to his intended outward action fearlesly and esteem him mad who desists upon a conceit of so unlikely a failure For since all Action is in particulars and Particulars are the very Sphear of Contingency it follows that we must not act at all if we expected Demonstrations of the several Objects and Adjuncts of our outward Action Whence he deserves justly to be accounted frantick who should desist from Action where there is so high a Probability for this extravagant cautiousness were in effect to take away the Motives to any Exteriour Action in the world and consequently all such Action it self But now let two Speculaters or Scholars meet together who consider not the Practicableness but meerly the Truth of things and aim not to better their Purse by Merchandizing or outward Endeavours but their Understandings by rightly-made Judgments or Assents that is by Knowledges and we shall see their working on the Point turns upon other hinges In the other there was Necessity of acting without which the world could not subsist but here 's no necessity of Assenting which we suppose onely aim'd at at present nor can there be any unless that Principle or Cause of all Assent The same is the same with it self comes to exercise its over-powering Virtue upon the Soul There it was enough that prudential considerations discover'd a betterness to act exteriourly all things weigh'd to which needed not a severity of Principles forcing the Truth of the thing but here those Principles which are the Maxims of Metaphysicks or Supreme Wisdom are the only things to be consulted and the prudential weighing of Particulars avails little or nothing towards the secure establishment of the Truth aim'd at There some harm was likely to ensue if they acted not exteriourly and went not about their work but here no harm at all could come by not acting interiourly I mean by not-Assenting but Suspending till the beams of Truth by the Fountain-light of that First Principle clear'd their Understandings rather on the contrary a great harm was certain to ensue upon assenting in that case that is an Injury to Reason their true Nature by concluding without seeing a middle Term connecting the two Extreams on which every act of right Reason is built These Scholars then or Pursuers of Truth consult with Speculative not Practical Principles to guide their Assents by They are certain that such an Effect as is the destruction of America cannot be without a Cause and Experience tells them such Causes seldom or never happen Yet knowing that all material things have Contingency annext to their Natures and not discovering any evident Principle in Nature hindering the
upon him with this pressing demand I but are you certain of it may not you be mistaken Which clearly intimates that that Disposition call'd Certainty is beyond all Inclinations Motions or indeterminate Tendencies of the Understanding making it verily think 't is true which speaks the next remove as it were from a certain Assent and consequently that 't is an absolute determination and fixure of the Soul that 't is true As also that Certainty elevates the Soul beyond hazard of mistake Again many times when one is smartly questioned if he be Certain of a thing not daring upon better reflexion pretend to Certainty he replies warily in a moderate word which diminishes and falls short of the other that he is Morally certain of it which evidences that the Notion of Certainty is in point of fixing or determining the Understanding beyond that counterfeit Certainty call'd Moral Certainty Wherefore since all Moral Certainty as they call it how great soever though it be penetrated perfectly according as 't is in its own Nature is seen to consist with a Possibility to be otherwise True Certainty which exceeds it must needs include an Impossibility to be otherwise Faith then is not in true speech Certain unless it be Impossible to be False § 10. Again let an Overweener after his mistake becomes Visible be challeng'd with it we find that in common speech we use these or the like words You said or thought You were Certain of it but You see You are mistaken Is it not Evident that the word Certain excludes a possibility of being otherwise since his being Certain of it formerly is deny'd purely upon this score because he was mistaken which shews that the true notion of Certain is inconsistent with mistake that is that Certainty implyes Unmistakableness or which is all one Inerrability hîc nunc in the present affair Whereas had the notion of Certainty admitted a Possibility not to be as he judg'd he had not been so mistaken in judging that Certain which by actually happening not to be was shewn afterwards Possible not to be To think to evade by alledging that it was not meant his mistake consisted in judging that Certain or Impossible not to be which was Possible not to be but in judging that would be which afterwards hap'd not to be is meerly Childishness and Folly amongst Men who hold that things are carry'd on by the course of Cause and Effect and that things therefore happen because a Cause puts them or not happen because no Cause puts them To judg then a thing would not be is the same amongst Intelligent Men as to judg there would be no Cause to make it be and if there would be none such 't is most evident it could not be or was Impossible to be in this order of the world Such answers are fit for men who are led more by Sounds than Sense and who think a different word will gain them an Escape though that word signifies the same thing as the former 11. The same will appear from the Absurdity which palpably discovers it self in any Expression that modifies the true Notion of Certain with a Contingency as if one should say 't is Certain per adventure or 't is fallibly Certain The Nonsence of which shews that the true Notion of Certainty implies an Oppositness to all Contingency or an Impossibility to be otherwise You 'l ask what then must be said of the Phrase Moral Certainty where Certainty seems to admit an allay of Contingency I answer 't is evident even hence and from all my former Discourse that the word Certainty is there us'd Catachrestically or abusively for some great Likelihood and its Epithet means such a degree of it as is found generally in humane exteriour actions which depend on Free-will and are contingent as being Particulars and speaks not proper Certainty as 't is meant to signifie that perfect Intellectual Determination whose Principles and Causes being high Truths are unalterable Whence Moral Certainty how high soever it be exalted and triumph in an empty name is in reality Uncertainty and the highest degree of Moral Certainty is the lowest degree of Uncertainty truly so call'd that is of that which expresses an Intellectual Indetermination § 12. Thus much from the use of the word which when it falls naturally and unaffectedly from the tongue of the Speakers is a proper Effect of the Notion or meaning in their Souls that is of the Signification of that word whence 't is an apt Medium to demonstrate that Notion its proper Cause à posteriori § 13. From this Discourse follows first that since speaking of the present and the same in proportion holds of other differences of time 't is the same to say The thing is certain as to say the thing is and to say the thing is speaks Indivisibility the Notion of Certainty too consists in an Indivisible By which is not meant that one Certainty may not be greater than another both from a greater Perfection in the Subject and a greater certifying Power in the Object but that Certainty in the way of being generated in the Soul is either there all at once or not at all in the same sort as there is no middle between is and is not or half-beings of them which are the formal Expressers of Certainty Whence again appears that what we abusively call Moral Certainty is indeed none at all because it reaches not that Indivisible or Determinative Point in which True Certainty consists § 14. Secondly since true Certainty is caus'd in us by seeing the thing is and this cannot be seen but by virtue of Principles especially that chief one A thing is the same with it self which Principles being Truths cannot possibly be False it follows both that what is Certain cannot possibly be False and that what can possibly be False subsists upon no Principles Whence all Moral Certainty as they call it as also all high Probabilities which confessedly may possibly be false are convinc'd to subsist upon no Principles and they who acknowledg they have but Moral Certainty and high Probabilities for their Faith or Opinion confess they have no Principles which in true Language deserve that name to ground them but at best certain likely Topical Mediums that oft prove true or hold for the most part which may serve for a talking kind of Discourse or Exteriour Action but are flat things and useless when Truth is to be concluded § 15. Thirdly it follows that true Certainty of any thing is the self-same with Infallibility or Inerrability as to the same thing For Certainty is not had till it be seen that that First Principle A thing is the same with it self is engag'd for the identification of the two Notions which make up the Proposition we are Certain of that is for the Truth of that Proposition Wherefore since we can have Infallible Assurance of the Truth of that First Principle as also of this that nothing
to the other immediately foregoing induces all the Absurdities mentioned in my former Discourse and pins them upon the Deity as on their first Cause So horrible and Diabolical a Tenet is this of the Possible Falshood of Faith that it calumniates Heaven it self nor can any thing but an Invincible Ignorance in the Maintainers of it excuse them from highest Blasphemy from making the unenvious Fountain of all Goodness like our own narrow and crooked Selves Fifth Eviction § 1. LEt us hear next what the Science of Divinity both Speculative and Moral will award concerning the Point in Question § 2. The Wisdom of the Eternal Father having been pleas'd to take our Nature upon him and amongst his other Offices he perform'd towards Mankind that of a Master being manifestly one we cannot doubt but that he both would and could that is did accomplish what belong'd to that Office Again true Dâ—vinity assigning one main if not the chiefest Reason why the Second Person was made Man to be this that it being requisite God should come and converse with us visibly to cause in us Knowledg of his heavenly Doctrine or be our Master and Knowledg or Wisdom being appropriated to the Second Person it was therefore most fit that Person should be Incarnate it follows that the Office of a Master in our Saviour Christ springs peculiarly out of the nature of his Divine Personality and not of his Humanity precisely as does his Suffering and Dying for us c. Wherefore the Proper Agent of Instructing and Teaching Mankind being as such Infinitely Perfect 't is evidently consequent Christ perform'd the Office of a Master or wrought the effects proper to a Teacher as such with all imaginable Perfection § 3. It being then the proper Office or Effect of a Master or Teacher to make his Schollers know his Doctrin is True we cannot think but that this Divine or Infinitely-perfect Master made them absolutely or perfectly know the Truth of his Doctrine § 4. And because the end of this Teaching was not terminated in those few himself convers'd with nor in the Christians of the First Age but was principally intended for the Body of Mankind which was future in respect of them it follows that this Enlightning and Instructing now spoken of was to be equally extended to the following World of Christians they being all Sectators or Followers of his Doctrin that is his Scholars and He their Master Unless then he had taken order that succeeding Ages also should have perfect Assurance or know his Doctrine was absolutely True he would have set up a School and laid no means to preserve the far greater part and in a manner the whole Body of his Scholars or Christians from Ignorance and Errour § 5. All Christians then both the Primitive and their Successors had and will have means to Know absolutely Christian Doctrine is True This means we call the Rule of Faith Both the Rule of Faith then must be known to be veracious and Faith which is built on it to be absolutely Tâ—ue and by consequence to be absolutely Impossible to be False § 6. Besides Man being an Intellectual Creature 't is evident the true Perfection of his Nature consists in Knowing and this whether we consider him as a Speculater or as an Acter For if the thing may Possibly be False for any thing he knows then he is most evidently Ignorant whether it be False or no that is whether it be True or no which speaks Imperfection in his Nature as 't is a Capacity of Knowledg And if he be to Act about it 't is evidently a less Perfection and worse for mankind to go to work unassuredly than assuredly Faith then being Gods Ordinance and God doing what is best for Mankind it follows Faith is perfectly secure to him that is he must know it to be such and consequently 't is not subject to the Contingency of being False § 7. But leaving Man the Subject of Faith and reflecting upon Faith it self in us the first thing that offers it self to our Consideration is that it's Habit is a Virtue and consequently Rational Also that it's Act is an Assent upon Authority since then 't is demonstrated formerly that there can be in reason no Assent without Certain Grounds and that what is Certain is Impossible to be False it follows that the Grounds of Faith and consequently Faith it self is not possible to be False § 8. Next Faith is an Intellectual Virtue that is apt to perfect mans understanding as such that is 't is to him a Knowledg and so informs his mind with Truths The Nature of Faith then forces that Points of Faith must be Truths and so as is manifoldly demonstrated Faith it self is not possible to be False § 9. Again this Intellectual Virtue call'd Faith is also a Supernatural one and therefore as such proceeds from an Agent infinitely more perfect than any can be found in Nature therefore the immediate effect aim'd at by Faith that is the informing the Understanding would be perform'd with infinite advantage as far as concerns that Supernatural Agent 's or God's part and if it be not so exquisitely perform'd it must spring from some Incapacity in the Subject There being then in this Effect of informing the Understanding two Considerations viz. Evidence which is had either by Experience of our Senses of which Spiritual Natures the chief Objects of Faith are incapable or by intrinsecal Mediums that is Demonstration of those Spiritual things of which taking the Generality of mankind the Subject of Faith very few are capable And that other of Certainty attainable both by those Intrinsecal and also Extrinsecal Mediums or Authority which Authority by means of the Practicableness of it's Nature all are to a great degree able to understand it follows that here being no violence or unsuitableness to Humane Nature consider'd in it's Generality the â—upernatural Agent or Cause of Faith will effect here a greater Certainty than meer natural Impressions could produce that is all Extrinsecal Arguments being finally resolv'd into Intrinsecal ones the Best and Chief Nature in the world will be made use of and most strongly supported to make up the greatest Authority that is possible and so to establish this Certainty of Faith and it's Principles beyond that of any Humane Sciences But divers pieces of Humane Science nay the least particle of true Science is acknowledg'd impossible to be False Faith therefore à fortiori must be such also § 10. This Supernaturality of Faith by which word we mean Divine Faith convinces that it ought to exceed all other Faith 's according to the Notion of Faith in common that is it ought to partake whatever Perfection truly belongs to Faith or Belief as such in an especial manner and far above what is found in Humane Faiths in a word it ought to have as much in it as can elevate it under the Notion of Faith without
stand to it and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it For example tell him he believes there was a K. Iames because those who pretended to live then have told us so but what if they were mistaken His answer would in likelihood be to this purpose what a God's name were they blind in those dayes that they could not see who was King then Which expresses naturally his conceit of their Inerrableness in such a point in case they had eyes which nature taught him men generally have Insist farther Perhaps they were not mistaken but had a mind to cozen all England that came after them Nature will lead him to this or some such kind of Reply To what purpose should they all make fools of every body Which words though rudely exprest yet couch in themselves the full reason given in Sure Footing as far as 't is built on Nature For first it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose end or reason Next his Interrogatory way is in his rude style equivalent to a Negative and so it signifies there could be no reason for it and lastly his standing to his former Tenet implies virtually a Conclusion from the reason given that the thing could not be done which involves necessarily a knowledg of that First Principle on which all force of consequence is grounded and also of that Principle no Effect can be without a due Cause both perfectly suppos'd and held by him though not exprest in his rude Enthymeme From this discourse is collected what this Practical Self-evidence is and that 't is distinguish'd from Experience in this that Experience is onely found of what uses to make the Minor in this virtual discourse but Practical Self-evidence is of Conclusions deduc't as it were from a common maxim naturally known as the Major and a Minor for the most part experientially or else Practically known which joyn'd with the Self-evident Principle in which the force of Consequence consists make up that virtual discourse Again it differs from Science in that a man of Science reflectingly sees a Medium identifying the two Extreames and is aware of the virtue of those Causes which beget Evidence whereas the other is rather Passive from Natural Impressions than Active by any Self-industry in these Knowledges and rather feels the force of those Causes in his own Adhesion than sees it Secondly 'T is collected that this Practical Self-evidence is notwithstanding True Knowledge though perhaps it be the sleightest kind of it in which 't is differenc't from Opinion built on probabilities For seeing such Assenters have both by Experience or by Common Conversation true Knowledg of the natures of diverse things in common which make the Minor as also by Nature of all the Principles of our Understanding which countervail the major and force the Consequence it comes to pass that this Practical Self-evidence is intirely and adequately grounded on true Knowledges both as to Premises and Consequence and cossequently 't is it self a True Knowledg likewise Which consideration will help to explain my later Postulatum and shew by what means 't is possible all Christians may know their Faith to be True or the same the Apostles taught by the Churches Testimonie because they know the Inerrableness and Veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of Fact which are practiceable daily And lastly 't is collected that what is Practically Self-evident to the Unlearned is Demonstrable to the Learned in regard These are capable of seeing by what virtue the causes of this Self-evidence bred that Knowledg which the other 's incultivated Reason would give no account of Objection V. That first Principle Every thing while it is is necessarily what it is seems to be often times misapply'd particularly Evict 2. § 11. 13. to Truth at present whence the Arguer would conclude that 't is Impossible that a thing should be also at present False Which is true if it be meant of Objective Truth but then it seems to miss the Question But the consequence holds not in case the Discourse be of Formal Truth that is of Truth in us or of Truth to us that is of Certainty for none pretends that his Judgment can at the same time be Conformable and Disconformable to the thing which speaks those inrintsecall Dispositions call'd Truth and Falshood in us or that himself can be Cetrain or Uncertain of it at once which expresses Truth and Falshood to us this being put those Motives which only he had at present in his Understanding able to prove the Point true and false both or at once whereas what is pretended by the Objecter is only this that though upon present Motives he now judges it True and Certain yet afterwards upon other Motives he may come to see it False Answer I mean in those places Truth to us or Certainty But the Objection proceeds as if there were but one man in the world or as if True False Certain and Uncertain could be relative to one person only First then my Position is that whoever puts a thing True to himself yet possible to be False to another puts no less a capacity of the thing 's being at once thus True and False though in several Subjects than as if it were in one Subject onely Next he supposes each of those different Judgers to have possibly just Grounds for so judging since he puts in one Motives sufficient to evince the Truth of the thing in the other possible ones to conclude it's Falsehood For our Question is not to what degree weak Souls can miscarry in assenting but what degree of strength is found in the Motives to Faith which the Objecter as a Christian that is as a Holder that Points of Faith are Truths must affirm to be sufficient to conclude it True and yet as himself contends leaves it still Possible to be False that is proveable by other Grounds to be so for else the word False cannot mean False to us or in the Subject as is pretended that is he must make it possible to be justly or in right reason held by one True by the other False Now 't is the Impossibility of such opposite Grounds I constantly maintain or that the Grounds of Faith are Impossible to be False Thirdly hence I go farther and urge that if those different Motives can oblige justly one man to hold Faith True the other to hold it False then putting them in the same man it ought to oblige him to hold both sides of the Contradiction and this enforces my proofs of this nature in my Third Eviction I know it will be readily answe'rd that this will not follow because the Motives being disparate the more probable one would when in the same subject over-power the other and so hinder the opposite Assent But I desire it may be consider'd that Intellectual Motives or Reasons have their power to